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History of Europe from the
commencement of the French
Revolution in 1789, to the restoration



HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN 1789,

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN 1815.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.,

ADVOCATE.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

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"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit; et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt"—LIV., lib. 21.

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THE cannon of Nelson, which destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, re-echoed from one end of Europe to the other, and everywhere revived the spirit of resistance to their ambition. That great event not only destroyed the charm of Republican invincibility, but relieved the allies of the dread arising from the military talents of Napoleon and his terrible Italian army, whom it seemed to sever forever from the soil of Europe. The subjugation of Switzerland and the conquest of Italy were no longer looked upon with mere secret apprehension; they were the subject of loud and impassioned complaint over all Europe, and the allied sovereigns, upon this auspicious event, no longer hesitated to engage in open preparations for the resumption of hostilities.*

Austria felt that the moment was approaching when she might regain her lost provinces, restore her fallen influence, and oppose a barrier to the revolutionary torrent which was overwhelming Italy. She had accordingly been indefatigable in her exertions to recruit and remodel her armies since the treaty of Leoben; and they were now, both in point of discipline, numbers, and equipment, on the most formidable footing. She had two hundred and forty thousand men, supported by an immense artillery, ready to take the field, all admirably equipped and in the finest order, and to these were to be added sixty thousand Russians, who were advancing under the renowned Suwarrow, flushed with the

* Th., x., 144, 145. Ann. Reg., 1799, 236. Jom., xi., 10, 11.

storming of Ismael and Warsaw, and anxious to measure their strength with the conquerors of Southern Europe. The Emperor of Russia, though he had been somewhat tardy in following out the designs of his illustrious predecessor, had at length engaged warmly in the common cause; the outrage committed on the Order of Malta, which had chosen him for their protector, filled him with indignation, and he seemed desirous not only to send his armies to the support of the Germanic states, but to guarantee the integrity of their confederation. Turkey had forgotten its ancient enmity to Russia in animosity against France for the unprovoked attack upon Egypt, and its fleets and armies threatened to enclose the conqueror of the Pyramids in the kingdom he had won. Thus, while the ambition of the Directory in Switzerland and Italy roused against them the hostility of the centre of Europe, their impolitic and perilous expedition to the shores of Africa arrayed against France the fury of Mussulman zeal and the weight of Russian power.*

On the 18th of December, 1798, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between Great Britain and Russia, for the purpose of putting a stop to the farther encroachments of France. By this treaty, Russia engaged to furnish an auxiliary force of forty-five thousand men, to act in conjunction with the British forces in the north of Germany; and England, besides an immediate advance of £225,000, was to pay a monthly subsidy of £75,000. The Emperor Paul immediately entered, with all the vehemence of his character, into the prosecution of the war; he gave an asylum to Louis XVIII. in the capital of Courland; behaved with munificence to the French emigrants who sought refuge in his dominions; accepted the office of grand master of the Knights of St. John of Malta, and excited by every means in his power the spirit of resistance to the advances of Republican ambition. All his efforts, however, failed in inducing the Prussian cabinet to swerve from the cautious policy it had adopted ever since the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick, and the neutrality it had observed since the treaty of Bale.† That power stood by in apparent indifference, and saw a desperate strife between the hostile powers, in which her own independence was at stake, when her army, now 220,000 strong, might have interfered with decisive effect in the struggle; and she was rewarded for her forbearance by the battle of Jena.

Great Britain made considerable exertions to improve the brilliant prospects thus unexpectedly opened to her view. Parliament met on the 20th of November, 1798, and shortly after entered on the arduous duty of finance. To meet the increased expenses which the treaty with Russia, and the vigorous prosecution of the war in other countries, were likely to occasion, Mr. Pitt proposed a new tax, hitherto unknown in Great Britain, that on property. No income under £60 a year was to pay any duty at

all, those under £105 only a fortieth part, and above £200 a tenth. The total income of the nation was estimated at £102,000,000, including £20,000,000 as the rent of lands; and the estimated produce of the tax on this graduated scale was £7,500,000. This tax proceeded on the principle of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies of the year by taxation within its limits, and compelling all persons to contribute, according to their ability, to the exigencies of the state: an admirable principle if it could have been fully carried into effect, and which, if practicable and uniformly acted upon, would have prevented all the financial embarrassments consequent on the war. But this was very far indeed from being the case. The expenses incurred so far exceeded the income, even in that very year, that a supplementary budget was brought forward on June 6th, 1799, which very much augmented the annual charges.*†

The principle of making the supplies of the year as nearly as possible keep pace with its expenditure, is the true system of public as well as private finance; which has suffered in every country from nothing so much as the convenient but ruinous plan of borrowing for immediate exigencies, and laying the undying burden of interest upon the shoulders of posterity. But a greater error in finance never was committed than the introduction of the income-tax. In appearance the most equal, it is, in reality, the most unequal of burdens, because it assesses at the same rate many different classes whose resources are widely different. The landed proprietor, whose estate is worth thirty years' purchase of the rental at which he is rated; the fundholder, whose stock is worth twenty or twenty-five of the same annual payment; the merchant, whose profits one year may be swallowed up by losses the next season; the professional man, whose present income is not worth five years' purchase; the young annuitant, whose chance of life is as twenty, and the aged spinster, in whom it is not two, are all rated at the same annual sum. The tax, in consequence, falls with excessive and undue severity upon one class, and with unreasonable lightness upon others; it extinguishes the infant accumulations of capital, and puts an end to the savings of laborious industry, while it is comparatively unfelt by the great capitalist and the opulent landed proprietor. Unlike the indirect taxes, which are paid without being felt, or forgotten in the enjoyment of the objects on which they are laid, it brings the bitterness of taxation, in undisguised nakedness, to every individual, and produces, in consequence, a degree of discontent and exasperation which nothing but the excitement of continual warfare, or a sense of uncontrollable necessity, can induce a nation to bear.

A considerable addition was made to the army this year. The land forces were raised to 138,000 men; the sea to 120,000, including 20,000 marines; and 104 ships of the line were put in commis-

Observations on the expedi-
ence of this
tax.

Land and
sea forces
voted by
Parliament

* Arch. Ch., i., 40, 41, 47. Jom., xi., 96. Th., x., 146.

Ann. Reg., 1799, 238.

† Hard., vii., 6, 7. Ann. Reg., 1799, 76, 78. Jom., xi., 9, 10.

* Ann. Reg., 1799, 176, 191. Parl. Hist., xxxi., 174.

† Between the two budgets, loans were contracted to the amount of £15,000,000, and the total expenditure, including £13,653,000 for the army, £8,400,000 for the navy, and a subsidy of £825,000 to Russia, amounted, exclusive of the charges of the debt, to no less than £31,000,000.

sion. Besides this, 80,000 men were imbedded in the militia of Great Britain alone, besides 40,000 in Ireland; an admirable force, which soon attained a very high degree of discipline and efficiency, proved, through the whole remainder of the war, the best nursery for the troops of the line, and was inferior only in the quality and composition of its officers to the regular army.*

The forces with which France was to resist this formidable confederacy were by no means commensurate either to the ambition of the Directory, or the vast extent of territory that they had to defend. Both externally and internally, the utmost discontent and dissatisfaction existed. The Republican armies, which, in the outset, divided so many states by the delusive promises of liberty and equality, had excited universal hatred by the exactions which they had made, and the stern tyranny to which they had everywhere subjected their new allies. Their most devoted adherents no longer attempted to palliate their conduct; from the frontier of the Jura to the extremity of Calabria, one universal cry had arisen against the selfish cupidity of the Directory, and the insatiable rapacity of its civil and military officers. The Swiss Democrats, who had called in the French to revolutionize their country, made the loudest lamentations at the unrelenting severity with which the great contributions, to which they were so little accustomed, were exacted from the hard-earned fruits of their industry. The Cisalpine Republic was a prey to the most vehement divisions; furious Jacobinism reigned in its legislative assemblies; the authorities imposed on them by the French bayonets were in the highest degree unpopular; while in Holland, the whole respectable class of citizens felt the utmost dissatisfaction at the violent changes made, both in their government and representative body, by their imperious allies. From the affiliated republics, therefore, no efficient support could be expected, while the French government, nevertheless, was charged with the burden of their defence. From the Texel to Calabria, their forces were expanded over an immense surface, in great, but still insufficient numbers; while the recent occupation of Switzerland had opened up a new theatre of warfare hitherto untrod by the Republican soldiers.†

During the two years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities, the military forces of France had signally declined. Sickiness and desertion had greatly diminished the ranks of the army; twelve thousand discharges had been granted to the soldiers, but more than ten times that number had deserted from their colours, and lived without disguise at their homes, in such numbers as rendered it neither prudent nor practicable to attempt the enforcing their return. Five-and-thirty thousand of the best troops were exiled, under Napoleon, on a distant shore; and though the addition of two hundred thousand conscripts had been ordered, the levy proceeded but slowly, and some months must yet elapse

before they could be in a condition to take the field. The result of the whole was, that for the actual shock of war, from the Adige to the Maine, the Directory could only count on one hundred and seventy thousand men; the remainder of their great forces were buried in the Italian peninsula, or too far removed from the theatre of hostilities to be able to take an active part in the approaching contest. The administration of the armies was on the most corrupted footing; the officers had become rapacious and insolent in the command of the conquered countries; and the civil agents either lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, or plundered, without control, the public money and stores which passed through their hands. Revolutionary energy had exhausted itself; regular and steady government was unknown, and the evils of a disordered rule and an abandoned administration were beginning to recoil on those who had produced them.*

The disposition of the Republican armies was as follows: Of one hundred and ten thousand men, who were stationed in Italy, thirty thousand, under MacDonald, were lost in the Neapolitan dominions, and the remainder so dispersed over the extensive provinces of Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Roman States, that only fifty thousand could be collected to bear the weight of the contest on the Adige. Forty-two thousand, under General Jourdan, were destined to carry the war from the Upper Rhine, across the Black Forest, into the valley of the Danube. Massena, at the head of forty-five thousand, was stationed in Switzerland, and intended to dislodge the Imperialists from the Tyrol and the upper valley of the Adige. Thirty thousand, under Bernadotte, were designed to form a corps of observation on the Lower Rhine, from Dusseldorf to Mannheim; while Brune, at the head of fifteen thousand French and twenty thousand Dutch troops, was intrusted with the defence of the Batavian Republic. The design of the Directory was to turn the position of the Imperialists on the Adige by getting possession of the mountains which enclosed the upper part of the stream, and then drive the enemy before them, with the united armies of Switzerland and Italy, across the mountains of Carinthia, while that of the Upper Rhine, descending the course of the Danube, was to unite with them under the walls of Vienna.†

The forces of the Austrians were both superior in point of number, better equipped, and stationed in more advantageous situations. Their armies were collected behind the Lech, in the Tyrol, and on the Adige. The first, under the command of the Archduke Charles, consisted of fifty-four thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand cavalry; in the Grisons and Tyrol, forty-four thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse were assembled under the banners of Bellegarde and Laudohn; twenty-four thousand foot soldiers and one thousand four hundred horse, under the command of Hotze, occupied the Vorarlberg; while the army on the Adige, seventy-two thousand strong, in-

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxi., 231, 242. *James' Naval Hist.*, App., vol. iii. *Ann. Reg.*, 1799, 193. App. to Chron.
† *Jom.*, xi., 88, 89. *Th.*, ii., 161, 173, 174, 207, 208. *Bot.*, iii., 94, 97.

* *Th.*, x., 182, 208, 209. *Jom.*, xi., 89, 94. *Dum.*, i., 33. *Arch. Ch.*, Campagne de 1799, i., 48, 51.

† *Dum.*, i., 32, 33. *Jom.*, xi., 90, 91. *Arch. Ch.*, i., 50, 51.

cluding eleven thousand cavalry, obeyed the orders of Kray; and twenty-four thousand on the Maine, or in garrison at Wurtzburg, observed the French forces on the Lower Rhine. Thus two hundred and forty-six thousand men were concentrated between the Maine and the Po, and their centre rested on the mountains of Tyrol; a vast fortress, which had often afforded a sure refuge in case of disaster to the Imperial troops, and whose inhabitants were warmly attached to the house of Austria. Above fifty thousand Russians were expected;* but they could not arrive in time to enter into operations either on the Danube or the Adige at the commencement of the campaign.

These dispositions on both sides were made on the principle that the possession of the mountains ensures that of the plains, and that the key to the Austrian monarchy was to be found in the Tyrol Alps: a great error, and which has been since abundantly refuted by the campaigns of Napoleon, and the reasoning of the Archduke Charles.† The true avenue to Vienna is the valley of the Danube; it is there that a serious blow struck is at once decisive, and that the gates of the monarchy are laid open by a single great defeat on the frontier. It was not in the valley of the Inn, nor in the mountains of the Grisons, but on the heights of Ulm and the plains of Bavaria, that Napoleon prostrated the strength of Austria in 1805 and 1809; and of all the numerous defeats which that power had experienced, none was felt to be irretrievable but that of Hohenlinden, on the banks of the Iser, in 1800. There is no analogy between the descent of streams from the higher to the lower grounds, and the invasion of civilized armies from mountains to the adjacent plains. A ridge of glaciers is an admirable fountain for the perennial supply of rivers, but the worst possible base for military operations.‡

By the invasion of Switzerland, the French government had greatly weakened, instead of having strengthened, their military position. Nothing was so advantageous to them as the neutrality of that republic, because it covered the only defenceless frontier of the state, and gave them the advantage of carrying on the campaigns in Germany and Italy, for which the fortresses on the Rhine and Piedmont afforded an advantageous base, without the fear of being turned by a reverse in the mountains. But all these advantages were lost when the contest was conducted in the higher Alps; and the line of the Rhine or the Adige was liable to be turned by a single reverse on the Aar or the St. Gothard. The surface over which military operations were carried was, by this conquest, immensely extended, without any proportionate addition either to the means of offensive or defensive warfare. The Tyrol was a great central fortress, in which the Imperialists had often found shelter in moments of disaster; but no such advantage could be hoped for by the Republicans from their possession of the hostile or discontented cantons of Switzerland, while no avenue to the heart of

Austria was so difficult as that which lay through the midst of the brave and indomitable inhabitants of that almost inaccessible province.*

Nor had the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan States, and the banishment of Napoleon to the sands of Egypt, contributed less to weaken the formidable powers with which, two years before, he had shattered the Austrian monarchy. Now was seen the sagacity with which he had chosen the line of the Adige for tenacious defence, and the wisdom of the declaration that, if he had listened to the suggestions of the Directory, and advanced to Rome, he would have endangered the Republic. Though the forces in the Peninsula were above one hundred and ten thousand, and were soon increased, by the arrival of conscripts, to one hundred and thirty thousand men, the Republicans were never able to meet the Imperialists in equal force on the Adige; and Italy was lost, and the retreat of the army from Naples all but cut off, while yet an overwhelming force, if it could only have been assembled at the decisive point, existed in the Peninsula.†

Notwithstanding the deficient state of their military preparations, and the urgent representations of all their generals, that the actual force under their command was greatly inferior to the amount which the Directory had led them to expect, the French government, led away by ill-founded audacity, resolved to commence hostilities. The Austrian cabinet having returned no answer to the peremptory note in which the Directory required the sending back of the Russian troops, Jourdan received orders to cross the Rhine, which was immediately done at Kehl and Huningen, and the Republicans advanced in four columns towards the Black Forest. A few days after, Bernadotte, with ten thousand men, took possession of Mannheim, and advanced against Philippsburg, which refused to capitulate, notwithstanding an angry summons from the Republican general. Upon receiving this intelligence, the archduke passed the Lech, and advanced in three columns towards Biberach, Waldsee, and Ravensberg, at the head of thirty-seven thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry; while Starry, with thirteen thousand men, was moved upon Neumarkt, and six thousand men were thrown into the fortifications of Ulm.‡

While the hostile armies were thus approaching each other, in the space between the Rhine and the Danube, the contest had commenced, on the most extended scale, in the mountains of the Grisons. During the night of the 5th of March, Massena marched upon Sargantz, and, having summoned the Austrian general, Auffenberg, to evacuate the district, his troops advanced at all points to cross the Rhine. The left wing, under Oudinot, afterward Duke of Reggio, "a general," said Napoleon, "tried in a hundred battles," was destined to make a false attack on the post of Feldkirch, so as to hinder Hotze, who commanded at that important point, from sending any succour to the centre at Coire, and the right at Reichenau; the right wing, under

* Arch. Ch., i., 40, 41. Dum., i., 33. Jom., xi., 95, 96. Th., x., 226.

† Archduke Charles, i., 117, 162, Camp. de 1796.

‡ Jom., x., 286 and xi., 96. Archduke Ch., i., 53, Guerre de 1799.

* Th., x., 217. Arch. Ch., i., 56.

† Jom., xi., 95, 96. Th., x., 218, 219, 226.

‡ Jom., xi., 95, 96. Th., x., 227, 229. Arch. Ch., i., 140.

Ruinous effects of the invasion of Switzerland and Italy to the French military power.

Dumont, was destined to cross at that place, and turn the position of Coire by the upper part of the stream, while Massena himself, in the centre, was to force the passage opposite to Luciensteg, and carry the intrenchments of that fort. Subordinate to these principal attacks, Loison, with a brigade, was directed to descend from the valley of Urseren upon Disentis, and support the attack of Dumont; while Lecourbe, who lay at Bellinzona, received orders to penetrate by Tüsis, over the snowy summit of the Bernhardin, and down the stupendous defile of the Via-mala, into the Engadine, and open up a communication with the Italian army on the Adige.*

These attacks were almost all successful. The Rhine, yet charged with melting snows, was crossed under a murderous fire; after an obstinate resistance, the fort of Luciensteg was carried by the intrepidity of the French chasseurs, who scaled an almost inaccessible height which commanded it, and eight hundred men, with five pieces of cannon, were made prisoners. Meanwhile Dumont, having forced the pass of Kunkel, and made himself master of the central point and important bridge of Reichenau, situated at the junction of the two branches of the Rhine, not only succeeded in maintaining himself there, but made prisoners an Austrian detachment which had resisted Loison at Disentis. The result of this movement was, that Auffenberg, who fell back slowly, contesting every inch of ground, towards Coire, found his retreat cut off up the Rhine; and, being surrounded there by superior forces, he had no alternative but to lay down his arms, with two thousand men and ten pieces of cannon, while a battalion he had stationed at Embs underwent the same fate.†

While these successes were gained on the centre and right, Oudinot advanced against March 7. Feldkirch. Hotze instantly collected his troops, and advanced to meet him, in order to preserve his communication with Auffenberg; but after maintaining his ground for a whole day, he was at length driven back to the intrenchment of Feldkirch,

The Austrians are driven back with great loss into the Tyrol. with the loss of a thousand men and several pieces of cannon. At the same time, Lecourbe, having broken up from Bellinzona, crossed the Bernhardin, yet encumbered with snow, and arrived at Tüsis by the terrible defile of the Via-mala, where he divided his forces into two columns, one of which moved over the Julian Alps towards the sources of the Inn, while the other, under Lecourbe in person, began to ascend the wild and rocky valley of Albula. The intention of the Republicans was to have supported this irruption by Dessoles, who received orders to debouche from the Valteline into the valley of the Upper Adige; but the march of the latter column across the mountains having been retarded by unavoidable accidents, General Bellegarde, who commanded the Austrian forces in that quarter, made preparations, by occupying all the passes in the neighbourhood, to envelop the invaders.‡

Martinsbruck, in consequence, was assailed

by Lecourbe without success; but although Laudohn, in his turn, made an attack with his own troops, combined with his garrison, in all fourteen thousand men, upon the French forces, he was unable to gain any decisive advantage; and the Republicans, awaiting their re-enforcements, suspended their operations for ten days. At length Dessoles, having come up, and other re-enforcements arrived, Lecourbe commenced a general attack on Laudohn's forces, leading his division against Martinsbruck, while Dessoles and Loison were directed to cross the mountains into the Munsterthal and cut off their retreat. To arrive at that valley, it was necessary for the division of the former to cross the highest ridges in Europe, amid ice and snow, which might have deterred the most intrepid chasseurs. With undaunted courage, his soldiers ascended the glaciers of the Wurmser Joch, which separates the sources of the Adige from one of those of the Adige. After having turned the fortifications on the summit, which the Imperialists occupied in perfect security, he descended the wild and rocky bed of the torrent of Rambach, amid frightful precipices, where a handful of men might have arrested an army, surprised the post of Taufers, which Laudohn had fortified with care, and totally routed its garrison, after a desperate resistance, with the loss of four thousand prisoners and all its artillery. The situation of the Austrian general was now altogether desperate; for while Dessoles was achieving this decisive success, Loison had seized upon Nauders, and Lecourbe forced the post and passage of Martinsbruck, so that all the avenues by which his retreat could be effected were cut off, and he had no resource but to throw himself, with three hundred men, into the glaciers of Gebatch, from whence, after undergoing incredible hardships, he at length reached the valley of Venosta, and joined General Bellegarde, who was marching to his relief. After this glorious victory, achieved with forces hardly half the number of the vanquished, and which cannot be appreciated but by those who have traversed the rugged and inhospitable ridges among which it was effected, Dessoles advanced to Glurns;* and the French found themselves masters of the upper extremity of the two great valleys of the Tyrol, the Inn and the Adige; but here their advance was arrested by General Bellegarde, who had collected nearly forty thousand men to oppose their progress, and the intelligence of events in other quarters, which restored victory to the imperial standards.

The intelligence of the first success in the Grisons reached Jourdan on the 11th, and induced him to move forward. On the 12th he passed the Danube, and advanced in four marches to Pfullendorf and Mengen, between that river and the Lake of Constance. Judging, however, that he was not in sufficient strength to attempt anything until the post of Feldkirch was carried, he urged Massena to renew his attacks in that quarter. That important town, situated March 11, 12, and 14.

But Massena is defeated in repeated attacks on Feldkirch.

* Arch. Ch., i., 141, 142. Dum., i., 36, 37. Jom., xi., 100, 101. Th., x., 230, 231.

† Jom., xi., 101, 102. Dum., i., 38, 39. Arch. Ch., i., 58, 62.

‡ Arch. Ch., i., 95. Jom., xi., 114.

* Dum., i., 54, 56. Jom., x., 114, 116. Arch. Ch., i., 98, 136.

uated on a rocky eminence in the middle of the valley, and supported by intrenchments extending from the river Ill, which bathed its feet, to inaccessible cliffs on either side, was repeatedly attacked by Oudinot, at the head of the French grenadiers, with the utmost impetuosity; but all his efforts recoiled before the steady courage of the Imperialists. Massena, conceiving this post to be of the utmost importance, from its commanding the principal passage from the Vorarlberg into the Tyrol, united the whole division of Menard to the troops of Oudinot, and advanced in person to the attack. But the

great strength of the works, and the invincible tenacity of the Austrians, defeated all his efforts. In vain the French sought to establish themselves on the right of the position; the Tyrolese sharpshooters ascended the adjacent eminences, and assailed the Republicans with such a close and destructive fire, as rendered it impossible for them to maintain their ground;* and Massena, after beholding the flower of his army perish at the foot of the intrenchments, was obliged to draw off his forces, with the loss of three thousand men, to Luciensteg and Coire, while Oudinot recrossed the Rhine, and established himself at Reineck.

Jourdan, to compensate the inferiority of his force, had taken up a strong position between the Lake of Constance and the Danube. Two torrents, the Ostrach and the Aach, flowing in opposite directions, the one into the Danube, the other into the lake, from a marsh in his centre, ran along the front of his position. St. Cyr, with the left, was stationed at Mengen; Souham, with the centre, at Pfüllendorf; Ferino, with the right, at Barnsdorf, while Lefebvre, with the advanced guard, occupied the heights behind the village of Ostrach. That point was the most accessible of the line: placed at the source of the two torrents, it was to be reached by a chaussée, which crossed the marshy ground from which they descended. It was against this part of the line that the principal efforts of the Imperialists were directed, while subordinate attacks were simultaneously commenced on the right and left against St. Cyr and Ferino. The force brought

to bear against Ostrach, under the archduke in person, was long resisted, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers in the attacking columns, by the Republicans, under Jourdan; but at length the

left, under St. Cyr, having been outflanked at Mengen, and the centre being on the point of sinking under the increasing masses of the assailants, a general retreat was ordered, and such was the danger of the left wing, that it was continued, without intermission, on the day following, till they reached the position of Stockach.†

This affair did not cost above two thousand Importance of men to the vanquished party, and this success. the loss of the victors was nearly as great; but it had the most important effect

upon the fate of the campaign. It broke the charm of Republican invincibility, compelled the French standards openly to retreat before the imperial, and gave to the Austrians all the advantage of a first success. Now appeared the good use which they had made of their time during the short interval of peace. Their cannon, well served and formidable, were much more numerous in proportion to the troops engaged than they had been in the former war, and the light artillery in particular, formed on the French model, had attained a degree of perfection which entirely deprived the Republicans of their advantage in that important weapon of modern warfare.*

Jourdan clearly saw the importance of the village of Stockach, where all the Position of roads to Swabia, Switzerland, and the French the valley of the Neckar unite, and at Stockach. beyond which he could not continue his retreat without abandoning his communications with Massena and the Grisons. Perceiving that the archduke was preparing an attack, he resolved to anticipate him, and obtain the advantage of the initiative, always an object of importance in the commencement of a campaign. The Austrians were by this time in great force on the Stockach, a small stream which flows in a winding channel before the village of the same name, and terminates its devious course in the Lake of Constance; their centre occupied the plateau of Nellenberg in front of the river, their right extended along the same plateau towards Liptingen, their left from Zolbruck to Wahlweis. On the side of the Republicans, Souham commanded the centre, Ferino the right, and St. Cyr, whose vanguard was led by Soult, the left wing. This last body was destined to attack Liptingen, where Meerfeld was stationed; and it was in that quarter that the principal effort was to be made, with a view to turn the Austrians, and force them to retreat by the single chaussée of Stockach in their rear, where they of necessity must, in case of disaster, have lost all their artillery.†

At five in the morning all the columns were in motion, and the advanced guard of Soult soon came in sight of the videttes of Meerfeld. He was soon attacked so vigorously by that general and St. Cyr that he was driven from Liptingen, and thrown back in confusion into the woods which lay along the road to Stockach. Speedily were they expelled from that stronghold; the infantry, in great disorder, retreated to Stockach, and the cavalry on the road towards Meskirch. Meanwhile the two armies were engaged along the whole line. Souham, in the centre, repulsed the light troops of the enemy as far as Wahlweis and Orsingen on the Stockach, and menaced the plateau of Nellenberg, while Ferino was actively engaged on the right. A violent cannonade was heard along the whole front of the army; a decisive success had been gained on one point, the Austrian right was turned, the victory seemed already decided.‡

No sooner, however, did the archduke per-

* Jom., xi., 110, 113. Dum., i., 47, 48. Arch. Ch., i., 112, 118.

† Arch. Ch., i., 147, 151. Th., x., 233. Dum., i., 43, 45. Jom., xi., 120, 124. St. Cyr., i., 130, 132.

* Dum., i., 42, 43. Arch. Ch., i., 156, 165.

† Jom., xi., 128. Dum., i., 49. St. Cyr., i., 133, 135. Arch. Ch., i., 171, 175.

‡ Jom., xi., 130. Dum., i., 49, 50. St. Cyr., i., 136, 139. Arch. Ch., i., 175, 190.

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Stockach.

ceive the impression which the French had made on his right wing, than he set off at the gallop for that quarter of the field, followed by twelve squadrons of cuirassiers, after whom succeeded six battalions of grenadiers; while a powerful body of cavalry were stationed in the plateau of Nellenberg to protect the retreat of the army, in case of its becoming necessary to have recourse to that extremity. These dispositions, rapidly adopted at the decisive moment, changed the fortunes of the day, and their effect was increased by a faulty step of Jourdan, who, instead of supporting the menaced point with all his disposable force, sent orders to St. Cyr to advance to Mœskirch, in the idea of cutting off the retreat of the Imperialists. A violent struggle now ensued in the woods of Liptingen, which Soult had gained in the first moment of success. The archduke attacked them with fresh troops, the Republicans defended them with heroic valour, and one of the most furious combats that occurred in the whole war took place, without intermission, for several hours. Three times the French advanced out of the wood to meet their enemies, and three times, notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts, they were repulsed by the obstinate perseverance of the Germans. At length the Imperialists became the assailants; the archduke charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers. Prince Fürstemburg and Prince Anhalt-Bernburg were killed while leading on their respective regiments, and the flower of the army on both sides perished under the terrible fire which overspread the field of battle. St. Cyr, who felt that he had gained what, if properly supported, might have become a decisive success, long and obstinately maintained his ground; but at length, finding that the principal effort of the Austrians was directed against his wing, and that their reserves were coming into action, he ordered Soult to evacuate the wood, and retire into the plain of Liptingen. This perilous movement was performed by that able officer in presence of a victorious enemy, and when his rearguard was almost enveloped by their cuirassiers, with admirable steadiness; but, when they reached the open country, they were charged by Kollowrath, at the head of the six battalions of grenadiers and twelve squadrons of cuirassiers which the archduke had brought up from the reserve. This effort proved decisive. In vain Jourdan charged the Austrian cavalry with the French horse; they were broken and driven back in disorder by the superior weight and energy of the cuirassiers, and the general-in-chief narrowly escaped being made prisoner in the flight. This overthrow constrained the infantry to a disastrous retreat, during which two regiments were enveloped and made prisoners; and St. Cyr, who was now entirely cut off from the centre of his army, alone escaped total destruction by throwing himself across the Danube, the sole bridge over which he was fortunate enough to find unoccupied by the enemy.*

This great success, and the consequent separation of St. Cyr from the remainder of the army, was decisive of the victory. Souham and Ferino, with the centre

and right, had maintained their position, notwithstanding the superiority of force on the part of their opponents; but they had gained no advantage, and they were totally unequal, now that the left wing of the army was separated, and unable to render any assistance, to maintain their ground against the victorious troops of the archduke. Although, therefore, the French had bravely withstood the superior forces of the enemy, and the loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about five thousand men to each party, yet, by the separation of their left wing, they had sustained all the consequences of a serious defeat; and it became necessary, renouncing all idea of co-operating with the Republicans in Helvetia, which could not be approached without the sacrifice of St. Cyr and his wing,* to endeavour to reunite the scattered divisions of the army by a retreat to the passes of the Black Forest.

Jourdan was so much disconcerted with the result of this action, that, after reaching the defiles of that forest, he surrendered the command of the army to Ernouf, the chief of the staff, and set out for Paris, to lay in person his complaints as to the state of the troops before the Directory.†

With superior forces, and twenty thousand cavalry, in admirable order, the Austrians had now an opportunity of Retreating the French army in the course of its retreat to the Rhine, across the Rhine. such as never again occurred to them till the battle of Leipsic. The archduke clearly perceived that there was the important point of the campaign: and had he been the unfettered master of his actions, he would, in all probability, have constrained the French army to a retreat as disastrous as that from Wurtzburg in 1796; but the Aulic Council, influenced by the erroneous idea that the key to ultimate success was to be found in the Alps, forbade him to advance towards the Rhine till Switzerland was cleared of the enemy. He was compelled, in consequence, to put his army into cantonments between Engen and Wahlweis, while the Republicans leisurely effected their retreat through the Black Forest, by the Valley of Kintzig and that of Hell, to the Rhine, which stream they crossed at Old Brissach and Kehl a few days after, leaving only posts of observation on the right bank. This retreat compelled Bernadotte, who, with his little army of eight thousand men, had already commenced the siege of Philipsburg, to abandon his works with precipitation, and regain the left bank;‡ so that, in a month after the campaign had been commenced with so much presumption and so little consideration by the Directory, their armies on the German frontier were everywhere reduced to the defence of their own territory.

The bad success of their armies at the opening of this campaign, to which the French had been so little accustomed since the brilliant era of Napoleon's victories, might have proved fatal to the government of the Directory, had it

* Arch. Ch., i., 198, 202. Jom., xi., 136, 137. Th., x., 241. St. Cyr, i., 150, 156. Dum., i., 51.

† Th., x., 241, 242. Jom., xi., 136, 139. St. Cyr., i., 160, 167.

‡ Arch. Ch., i., 211, 218. Jom., xi., 139, 140. Th., x., 242.

* St. Cyr, i., 139, 150. Th., x., 238, 240. Jom., x., 131, 134. Dum., i., 50, 52. Arch. Ch., i., 190, 198.

not been for an unexpected event which occurred at this time, and restored to the people much of the enthusiasm and vigour of 1793.* This was the massacre of the French plenipotentiaries at the congress of Rastadt.

Though at war with Austria, France was yet at peace with the German Empire, and the congress at Rastadt was still continuing, under the safeguard of neutrality, its interminable labours. When the victory of Stockach had placed that city in the power of the Imperialists, the cabinet of Vienna ordered the Count Lehrbach, their minister plenipotentiary, to endeavour to obtain intelligence of the extent to which the princes of the Empire had made secret advances to the Directory. The count conceived the most effectual way would be to seize the papers of the French embassy at the moment of their leaving the city, and for this purpose he solicited and obtained from his court authority to require an armed force from the Archduke Charles. That gallant officer refused, in the first instance, to comply with the request, alleging that his soldiers had nothing to do with the concerns of diplomacy; but fresh orders from Vienna obliged him to submit, and a detachment of the hussars of Szeckler was in consequence placed at the disposal of the imperial plenipotentiary.†

Towards the end of April, the communications of the ministers at Rastadt having been interrupted by the Austrian patrols, the Republicans addressed an energetic note on the subject to the Austrian authorities, and the remonstrance having been disregarded, the congress declared itself dissolved. The departure of the diplomatic body was fixed for the 28th of April, but the Austrian colonel gave them orders to set out on the 19th, as the town was to be occupied on the following day by the imperial troops, and refused to grant the escort which they demanded, upon the plea that it was wholly unnecessary. The French plenipotentiaries, in consequence, Jean

Debry, Bonnier, and Roberjot, set out on the same evening for Strasburg, but they had scarcely left the gates of Rastadt when they were attacked by some drunken hussars of the regiment of Szeckler, who seized them, dragged them out of their carriages, slew Bonnier and Roberjot, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the wife of the latter to save her husband, and struck down Jean Debry by sabre blows into a ditch, where he escaped destruction only by having the presence of mind to feign that he was already dead. The assassins seized and carried off the papers of the legation, but committed no other spoliation; and, leaving two of their victims lifeless, and one desperately wounded on the ground, disappeared in the obscurity of the night. Jean Debry, whose wounds were not mortal, contrived to make his way, after their departure, into Rastadt, and presented himself, bleeding and exhausted, at the hotel of M. Gœrtz, the Prussian envoy.‡

This atrocious violation of the law of nations excited the utmost indignation and horror throughout Europe. The honour of the Germans felt itself seriously wounded by the calamitous event, and the members of the deputation who remained at the congress unanimously signed a declaration expressive of detestation at its authors. It is, perhaps, the strongest proof of the high character and unstained honour of the Emperor Francis and the Archduke Charles, that, although the crime was committed by persons in the Austrian uniform, and the hussars of Szeckler had been detached from the army of the archduke to the environs of Rastadt, no suspicion fell upon either of these exalted persons as having been accessory to the nefarious proceeding. That it was committed for political purposes, and not by common robbers, is evident from their having taken nothing but state papers; and although the Directory has not escaped the suspicion of having been the secret authors of the crime,* in order to inflame the national spirit of the French, there seems no ground for imputing to them so atrocious a proceeding, or ascribing it to any other cause than an unauthorized excess by drunken or brutal soldiers of a duty committed to them by their government, requiring more than ordinary discretion and forbearance. But, though Austria has escaped the imputation of having been accessory to the guilt of murder, she cannot escape from the disgrace of having been remotely the cause of its perpetration; of having authorized an attack upon the sacred persons of ambassadors, which, though not intended to have been followed by assassination, was at best a violation of the law of nations, and a breach of the slender links which unite humanity together during the rude conflict of war, and of having taken guilt to herself by adopting no judicial steps for the discovery of the perpetrators of the offence.† As such, it is deserving of the severest reprobation, and, like all other unjustifiable actions, its consequences speedily recoiled upon the head of its authors. The military spirit of the French, languid since the commencement of hostilities, was immediately roused to the highest pitch by this outrage upon their ambassadors. No difficulty was any longer experienced in completing the levies of the conscription; and to this burst of national feeling is in a great measure to be ascribed the rapid augmentation of Massena's army, and the subsequent disasters which overwhelmed the Imperialists at the conclusion of the campaign.‡

While an implacable war was thus breaking out to the north of the Alps, reverses of a most serious character attended the first commencement of hostilities in the Italian plains. The approach of the Russians, under Suwarrow, who, it was expected, would reach the Adige by the middle of April, rendered it an object of the last im-

General horror which it excites in France, and throughout Europe.

Jom., xi., 141.

† Jom., xi., 142. Lac., xiv., 318. Th., x., 255.

‡ Hard., vi., 236, 238. Jom., xi., 142, 143. Lac., xiv.,

318, 320. Th., x., 256, 275. Procès Verbal des Ministères

Plénipotent. à Rastadt. Lac., xiv., 435. Arch. Ch., i., 224.

* Nap. in Month., vi., 40.

† The Queen of Naples was the real instigator of this atrocious act, though the catastrophe in which it terminated was as little intended by her as the single-hearted general who detached from his army the hussars by whom it was committed.—D'ABRANTES, ii., 304.

‡ Th., x., 257, 258. Jom., xi., 143, 144. Lac., xiv., 324. Hard., vi., 244, 245.

portance for the Republicans to force their opponents from the important line formed by that stream before the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement; but, by the senseless dispersion of their vast armies through the whole peninsula, they were unable to collect a sufficient force in the plains of the Mincio, in the commencement of the campaign, to effect that object.

Imprudent dispersion of the French forces there.

The total force commanded by Scherer on the Adige was now raised, by the arrival of conscripts, to fifty-seven thousand men; Macdonald was at the head of thirty-four thousand, at Rome and Naples; ten thousand were in the Cisalpine Republic, the like number in Piedmont, five thousand in Liguria; but these latter forces were too far removed to be able to render any assistance at the decisive point; while, on the other hand, the imperial forces consisted of fifty-eight thousand combatants, including six thousand cavalry, cantoned between the Tagliamento and the Adige, besides a reserve of twenty thousand infantry and five thousand horse in Carinthia and Croatia. Their field artillery amounted to 180 pieces; the park of the army to 170 more; and a heavy train of eighty battering guns, admirably provided with horses and ammunition, was ready at Palma Nuova for the siege of any of the fortresses that might be attacked. This summary is sufficient to demonstrate the erroneous principles on which the Directory proceeded in their plan of the campaign, and their total oblivion of the lessons taught by Napoleon as to the importance of the line of the Adige to the fate of the Peninsula; while the Imperialists were collecting all their forces for a decisive blow in that quarter, half the French troops lay inactive and scattered along the whole extent of its surface, from Piedmont to Calabria.*

The Austrians had, with great foresight, strengthened their position on the Adige during the cessation of hostilities. Legnago, commanding a bridge over that river, had become a formidable fortress; the castles of Verona were amply supplied with the means of defence; a bridge of boats at Polo enabled them to communicate with the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, on the eastern slope of the Montebaldo; Venice, placed beyond the reach of attack, contained their great magazines and reserves of artillery stores; all the avenues by which it could be approached were carefully fortified; a flotilla of forty boats, carrying three hundred pieces of cannon,† was prepared, either to defend the lagunæ of that capital, or carry the supplies of the army up the Po; while bridges, established over the Piave and the Tagliamento, secured the communication of the army in the field with the reserves by which it was to be supported.

Scherer had obtained the command of the French army; an officer who had served with distinction in the Pyrenees and the Alps during the campaign of 1795, but, being unknown to the Italian army, he possessed the confidence neither of the officers nor soldiers; while Moreau, the glorious commander of the retreat through the Black Forest in 1796, occupied the unworthy situation of inspector of infantry. On

the side of the Austrians, Melas had obtained, upon the death of the Prince of Orange, the supreme command; an officer of considerable experience and ability, but whose age, above seventy years, rendered him little competent to cope with the enterprising generals of the Republic. Until his arrival, however, the troops were under the orders of General Kray, a Hungarian by birth, and one of the most distinguished officers of the Empire. Active, intrepid, and indefatigable; gifted with a cool head and an admirable *coup d'œil* in danger, he was one of the most illustrious generals of the imperial army, and, after the Archduke Charles, has left the most brilliant reputation in its military archives of the last century.*

The plan of the Directory was for Scherer to pass the Adige near Verona, drive the Austrians over the Piave and the Brenta, while the right wing of Massena's army, commanded by Lecourbe, was to form a conjunction with a corps detached from the Italian army into the Valteline, and fall, by Brixen and Botzen, on the right flank of the imperial army. But at the very time that they meditated these extensive operations, they detached General Gauthier, with five thousand men, to occupy Tuscany; a conquest which was, indeed, easily effected, but was as unjustifiable as it was inexpedient, both by weakening the effective force on the Adige, and affording an additional example of that insatiable desire for conquest which the allied powers so loudly complained of in the Republican government. Meanwhile Scherer, having collected his forces, established himself on the right bank of the Adige, opposite to the Austrian army, the right at Sanguinetto, the left at Peschiera, and immediately made preparations for crossing the river. At the same time, Kray threw eight thousand men into the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, under Generals Gottesheim and Elnitz, while the divisions of Kaim and Hohenzollern, twenty thousand strong, were established around Verona, with detachments at Arcola; Frélich and Mercantin, with an equal force, were encamped near Bevilacqua; and Klenau, with four thousand, was stationed near Acqua; and the reserves, under Ott and Zoph, received orders to draw near to the Brenta.†

The French general having been led to imagine that the bulk of the Austrian forces were encamped at Pastrengo, between Verona and the Lake of Garda, resolved to make his principal effort in that quarter. With this view, the three divisions of the left wing, commanded by Serurier, Delmas, and Grenier, were moved in that direction; while Moreau, with the divisions of Hatry and Victor, received orders to make a false attack near Verona, and, on the extreme right, Mont-Richard was to advance against Legnago. Kray, on his part, being led to believe that their principal force was directed against Verona, repaired in haste to Bevilacqua, where he concerted with Klenau an attack on the right flank of the Republicans. Thus both parties, mutually deceived as to each other's designs, manœuvred as if

* Jom., xi., 147, 148. Dum., i., 58. Th., x., 243, 244. St. Cyr., i., 172, 173. Arch. Ch., i., 225.

† Jom., xi., 149. St. Cyr., i., 173, 175.

* Jom., xi., 149, 153.

† Jom., xi., 155, 156. Dum., i., 58. Th., x., 245 Bot., iii., 216, 217. Arch. Ch., i., 226.

their object had been reciprocally to avoid each other; the bulk of the Austrian forces being directed against the French right, and the principal part of the Republicans against the imperial left.*

At three in the morning of the 26th of March, the whole French left wing was in motion, while the flotilla on the Lake of Garda set sail during the night to second their operations. In this quarter they met with brilliant success; the redoubts and intrenchments of Pastrengo were carried, Rivoli fell into their hands, and the garrison of the intrenched camp, crossing in haste the bridge of Polo, left fifteen hundred prisoners and twelve pieces of cannon in the hands of the Republicans. The action

did not begin in the centre till near ten o'clock, but it soon became there also extremely warm. The villages in front of Verona were obstinately contested, but, after a desperate resistance, the Republicans pressed forward, and nearly reached the walls of Verona. At this sight, Kaim, who was apprehensive of being attacked in the town, made a general attack on the front and flanks of the assailants with fresh forces; but, although the village of San Massimo, taken and retaken seven times during the day, finally remained in the possession of the Austrians till night separated the combatants, they sensibly lost ground, upon the whole, in that quarter; and the post of St. Lucie, also the theatre of obstinate contest, was carried by the Republicans. But, while fortune favoured their arms on the left, and divided her favours in the centre, the right was overwhelmed by a superior force, conducted by Kray in person. General Montrieux advanced in that quarter to Legnago, and had already commenced a cannonade on the place, when Frelich debouched in three columns, and commenced a furious attack along the dikes which led to the French column, while the division of Mercantin advanced as a reserve. The Republicans were speedily routed: attacked at once in front and both flanks, they lost all their artillery, and were driven with great loss behind Torre, on the road to Mantua.†

The loss of the French in this battle amounted to four thousand men, while that of the Imperialists was nearly seven thousand; but, nevertheless, as the success on the left and centre was in some degree balanced by the disaster on the right, they were unable to derive any decisive advantage from this large difference in their favour. The capture of the camp at Pastrengo and of the bridge at Polo was of little importance, as the Austrians held Verona, and the only road from thence to the plain passed through that town. Kray, abandoning the pursuit of Montrieux, hastened to Verona with the divisions of Mercantin and Frelich, leaving a few battalions only to guard the line of the Lower Adige, while the Republicans recrossed the upper part of that river above Verona, and retired towards Peschiera. Thus the bulk of the forces on both sides were assembled near Verona, which was felt to be the key to the

Adige equally by the Imperialists and the Republicans. Already the courage of the Austrians was elevated by the balanced success which they had obtained;* and, from the hesitation of the enemy in following up his advantage at Pastrengo, they perceived with pleasure that the genius of Napoleon had not been inherited by his successor.†

After much irresolution, and assembling a council of war, Scherer resolved to descend the Adige with the bulk of his forces, to attempt a passage between Verona and Legnago at Ronca or Albaredo, while Serrurier, with one division, was thrown across the upper stream at Polo to distract the attention of the enemy. Preparatory to this design, the army was countermarched from left-right, a complicated operation, which fatigued and embarrassed the soldiers without any adequate advantage. At length, on the 30th of March, while the main body of the army was descending the river, Serrurier crossed with seven thousand men at Polo, and boldly advanced, on the high road leading to Trent, towards Verona; Kray, debouching from the central point at Verona, assailed the advancing columns with fifteen thousand men of the divisions of Frelich and Elnitz, and, attacking the Republicans with great vigour, drove them back in disorder to the bridge, and, pressing forward, approached so near that it would have fallen into his hands if the French had not sunk the boats of which it consisted. The situation of Serrurier was now altogether desperate; part of his men dispersed and saved themselves in the mountains, a few escaped over the river at Rivoli, but above fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and the total loss of his division was nearly three thousand men.‡

Notwithstanding this severe check, Scherer persisted in his design of passing the Adige below Verona. After countermarching his troops, without any visible reason, he concentrated them below Villa Franca, between the Adige and the Tartaro; his right encamped near Porto Legnago, the remainder in the position of Magnano. Kray, perceiving the defects of their situation, wisely resolved to bring the weight of his forces to bear on the Republican left, so as to threaten their communications with Lombardy. For this purpose, he directed Hohenzollern and St. Julien to the Montebaldo and the road to Trent; while Wukassowich, who formed part of Bellegarde's corps in the Tyrol, was to move on La Chiesa by the western side of the Lake of Garda, and he himself debouched from Verona, at the head of the divisions of Kaim, Zoph, and Mercantin, right against the Republican centre at Magnano. The peril of the left wing of the French was now extreme, and it became indispensable to move the right and centre towards it, in order to avoid its total destruction. Had Kray, whose army was now raised, by the arrival of his reserves, to forty-five thousand, attacked on the 4th of April, he would have surprised the French in the midst of their lat-

Scherer experiences a check in endeavouring to cross the Adige.

March 30.

Counter-marches of both parties.

* Th., x., 246. Jom., xi., 162. Dum., i. 58.
† Jom., xi., 166, 170. Th., x., 247. Dum., i., 59, 60.
St. Cyr, i., 177, 179. Arch. Ch., i., 226.

* Dum., i., 60, 61. Jom., xi., 172, 173. St. Cyr, i., 179, 181.

† Saguntinis quia præter spem resisterent, crevisset animi. Pœnus quia non vicisset pro victo esset.—Liv., xxi., 9.

‡ Jom., xi., 177. Dum., i., 62, 63. Th., x., 248, 249. St. Cyr, i., 182, 183.

eral movements, and destroyed two of their divisions; but, by delaying the action till the day following, the perilous change of position was completed, and the opportunity lost.*

It was just when the lateral movement was on the point of being accomplished that the hostile armies encountered each other on the plains of MAGNANO.

The French force amounted to thirty-four thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry; the Austrians were superior, having nearly forty-five thousand in the field, of whom five thousand were horse. Mercantin was intrusted with the attack of the French right, Kaim the centre, and Zoph the left, while Frelich, at the head of a powerful reserve, was to follow the steps of Kaim, and Hohenzollern was moved forward against Villa Franca, on the road to Mantua. The marshy plain to the south of Magnano is intersected by a multitude of streams, which fall into the Tartaro and the Menago, and render the deploying of infantry difficult, that of cavalry impossible.†

The right wing of the French, commanded by Victor and Grenier, overwhelmed the division of Mercantin to which it was opposed; but, while this success attended the Republicans in that quarter, the Austrian centre, under Kaim, penetrated, without opposition, between the rear of Montrichard and the front of Delmas, who were in the act of completing their lateral movement from right to left, and occupied a salient angle in the centre of the French position. Had the Imperialists been in a situation to have supported this advantage by fresh troops, it would have been decisive of the fate of the day; but Kray, alarmed at the progress of the Republican right, was at the moment hastening to support Mercantin with the reserve of Frelich; and thus time was given to Moreau and Delmas, not only to restore affairs in that quarter, by causing their rear and vanguards to form in line to resist the farther progress of the enemy, but even to attack and carry the village of Buttapreda, notwithstanding the most vigorous resistance from Kaim's division. On the left, Moreau, having arrived at the open plain favourable to the operations of cavalry, executed several brilliant charges, and drove the Austrians from all the villages which they occupied almost into the walls of Verona. Victory on every side seemed to incline to the Republican standard, though decisive success was no longer to be expected from the insulated situation of all the divisions, and the unconnected operations which they were severally carrying on. But Kray changed the fortune of the day by a decisive operation against the French right. Putting himself at the head of the reserve of Frelich, supported by two batteries of heavy artillery, he fell unawares upon the division of Grenier, and put it to the rout; Victor, trying to restore the combat, was charged in flank by the imperial horse, and driven back in disorder, while the overthrow of that wing was completed by the attack of Mercantin's division, which had now rallied in its rear. Meanwhile Moreau continued to maintain his ground in the centre, and Serurier made himself master on the left of Villa

Franca, and advanced near to Verona. But the rout of the right wing, which was now driven a mile and a half from the field of battle, so as to leave the centre entirely uncovered, was decisive of the victory. Before night, Scherer drew off his shattered forces behind the Tartaro, carrying with them two thousand prisoners and several pieces of cannon, a poor compensation for the loss of four thousand killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners, seven standards, eight pieces of cannon, and forty caissons, which had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists.*

This victory, one of the most glorious in the annals of Austrian monarchy, was decisive of the fate of Italy. Thence- Its decisive results. forth the French fell from one disaster into another, till they were driven over the Maritime Alps, and expelled from the whole peninsula: a striking example of the importance of early victory to the whole fate of a campaign, and of the facility with which the confidence and vigour resulting from long-continued triumphs may, by a single well-timed success, be exchanged for the depression and irresolution which are the sure forerunners of defeat. The advantages gained by the Imperialists were mainly owing to the possession of the fortified posts of Verona and Legnago, and the interior line of operations which they afforded them on the Adige: another circumstance, among the many which this war exhibited, of the inestimable importance of a central position in the hands of one who can avail himself of it, and the degree to which it may sometimes, in the hands of a skillful general, counterbalance the most decided superiority in other respects.†

The Republicans, thrown into the deepest dejection by this defeat, retired on the Disorderly following day behind the Mincio; and retreat of the French. there, even with the fortress of Mantua on one flank and that of Peschiera on the other, Scherer continued his retreat behind the Oglio, and then the Adda. This retrograde movement April 12. was performed in such confusion, that it entirely lost that general the little consideration which remained to him with his troops, and they loudly demanded the removal of a leader who had torn from their brows the laurels of Rivoli and Arcola. The Austrians, as- April 14. tonished at their own success, and fearful of endangering it by a precipitate advance, moved slowly after the beaten army. Eight days after the battle elapsed before they crossed the Mincio and established themselves at Castillaro, after detaching Elnitz, with ten thousand men, to observe Mantua, and three battalions to form the investment of Peschiera.‡

While the Republican fortunes were thus sinking in Italy, another disaster awaited them in the capture of Corfu. Corfu surrenders to the Russian and Turkish fleets. which capitulated to the combined forces of Russia and Turkey shortly after the commencement of hostilities; and thus deprived them of their last footing in the Ionian isles. Thus on every side the star of the Republic seem- March 3.

* Jom., xi., 179, 181. Dum., i., 65. Th., x., 250. St. Cyr., i., 184. † Dum., i., 65. Jom., xi., 186, 187.

* Th., x., 251, 252. Jom., xi., 190, 194. Dum., i., 64, 65. St. Cyr., i., 185, 190. † Jom., xi., 195.

‡ Th., x., 252, 253. Jom., xi., 198, 199. Dum., i., 66. St. Cyr., i., 191, 195.

ed to be on the wane, while that of Austria was rising in the ascendant.*

While these important events were in progress to the south of the Alps, the Austrians evinced an unpardonable tardiness in following up their success at Stockach. In vain the archduke urged them not to lose the precious moments; the Aulic Council, desirous not to endanger the advantage which they had already gained, enjoined him to confine his operations in clearing the right bank of the Danube by detached parties.

After several engagements, the French were finally expelled from the German side; but in their retreat they, with needless barbarity, burned the celebrated wooden bridge at Schaffhausen, the most perfect specimen of that species of architecture that existed in the world.†

Massena, to whom the command of the army on the Rhine, as well as in the Alps, was now intrusted, found himself under the necessity of changing entirely the disposition of his army. Turned on the one flank by the Imperialists on the Lake of Constance, and on the other by the advance of Kray beyond the Adige, he was necessitated to retire into the central parts of Switzerland, and the Directory now found how grievous an error they had committed by attacking that country, and rendering its rugged frontiers the centre of military operations. Deprived of the shelter which they had hitherto found for their flanks in the neutral ridges of the Alps, the Republicans were now compelled to maintain one uninterrupted line of defence from the Texel to the Gulf of Genoa, and any considerable disaster in one part of that long extent weakened their operations in every other. Massena was well aware that a mountainous country, in appearance the most easy, is frequently, in reality, the most difficult of defence; because the communication from one part of the line to another is often so much obstructed, and it is so easy for a skilful adversary to bring an overwhelming force to bear against an unsupported part. Impressed with those ideas, he drew back his advanced posts at Taufers, Glurentz on the Adige, and Fintermuntz on the Inn, and arranged his forces in the following manner: The right wing was composed of Lecourbe in the Engadine, Menard in the Grisons, and Lorges in the valley of the Rhine, as far down as the Lake of Constance; the centre, consisting of four divisions, supported by an auxiliary Swiss corps, occupied the line of that river as far as Huningen. Headquarters were established at Bâle, which was put in a respectable posture of defence. The left wing, scattered over Huningen, Old Brisach, Kehl, and Mannheim, was destined to protect the line of the Rhine below that place. The whole of these forces amounted to one hundred thousand men, of whom about two thirds were stationed in Switzerland and the Grisons.‡

Three impetuous streams, each flowing within the other, descend from the snowy ridges of the Alps towards the north, and form, by their junction, the great

river of the Rhine. The first of these is the Rhine itself, which, rising in the glaciers near the St. Gothard, and flowing through the Grisons to the north, loses itself in the great Lake of Constance; issues from it at Stein, and flows to the westward as far as Bâle, where it commences its majestic and perpendicular course towards the sea. This river covers the whole of Switzerland, and contains within its ample circuit all its tributary streams. The second is formed by the course of the Linth, which, rising in the Alps of Glarus and the Wallenstatter Sea, forms in its course the charming Lake of Zurich, and issuing from its northern extremity at the town of the same name, under the appellation of the Limmat, falls into the Aar not far from the junction of that river with the Rhine. That line only covers a part of Switzerland, and is of much smaller extent than the former; but it is more concentrated, and offers a far more advantageous position for defence. Lastly, there is the Reuss, which, descending from the St. Gothard through the precipitous valley of Schollenen, swells into the romantic Lake of the Four Cantons at Aldorf, and leaving its wood-clad cliffs at Lucerne, falls into the Aar, near its junction with the Rhine. All these lines, shut in on the right by enormous mountains, terminating on the left in deep rivers, and intersected by vast lakes and ridges of rock, present the greatest advantages for defence. Massena soon found that the exterior circle, that of the Rhine, could not be maintained, with the troops at his disposal, against the increasing forces of the Austrians, and he retired to the inner line, that of the Limmat and Linth, and established his headquarters at Zurich, in a position of the most formidable strength.*

Meanwhile Hotze and Bellegarde were combining a general attack upon the whole line of the Republicans in the Grisons. Towards the latter end of April, their forces were all in motion along the immense extent of mountains from the valley of Coire to the Engadine. After a vigorous attack, Bellegarde was repulsed by Lecourbe from the fortified post of Ramis, in the Lower Engadine, while a detachment sent by the Col de Tcherfs to Zemetz was cut to pieces, with the loss of six hundred prisoners, among whom was the young Prince de Ligne. But as the Imperialists were advancing through the valleys on his April 30. flanks, Lecourbe retreated in the night, and next day was attacked by Bellegarde at Suss, whence, after an obstinate resistance, he was driven with great loss to the sources of the Albula. At the same time, a general attack was made, in the valley of the Rhine, on the French posts; but, though the Imperialists were at first so far successful as to drive back the Republicans to Luciensteg and the heights of Mayenfeld, yet at the close of the day they were obliged to fall back to their former position.†

This general attack upon the French line in the Grisons was combined with an insurrection of the peasants in their rear and in the small

General attack upon Massena's line in the Grisons.

* Ann. Reg., 1799, 80. Jom., xi., 199.

† Jom., xi., 205. Dum., i., 72. Arch. Ch., i., 215, 221.

‡ Dum., i., 71. Jom., xi., 211, 213, 215. Th., x., 277, 278. Archduke Ch., i., 233, 241.

* Th., x., 278, 279. Jom., xi., 213.

† Jom., xi., 215, 219. Dum., i., 114, 117. Archduke Ch., i., 253, 256.

cantons, where the desire for revenge, on account of the cruelties of the French during the preceding year, had become extremely strong. This feeling had been worked up to a perfect fury by an attempt of the Directory to complete the auxiliary forces of eighteen thousand men, which Switzerland was bound to furnish, by levies from the militia of the different cantons. Determined to combat rather against than for the destroyers of their liberties, ten thousand men took up arms in the small cantons and adjoining districts of the Grisons, and fell with such rapidity upon the French posts in the rear, that they not only made themselves masters of Disentis and Ilantz, but surprised the important bridge of Reichenau, which they strongly barricaded, thus cutting off all communication between the divisions of Lecourbe at the sources of the Albula and the remainder of the army. Had the attack of Hotze and Bellegarde succeeded at the same time that this formidable insurrection broke out in their rear, it is highly probable that Massena's right wing would have been totally destroyed; but the defeat of Hotze at Luciensteg gave the Republicans time to crush it before it had acquired any formidable consistency. Massena, aware of the vital importance of early success in subduing an insurrection, acted with the greatest vigour against the insurgents; Menard moved towards Reichenau, which was abandoned at his approach, and pursued the peasants to Ilantz and Disentis. At this latter place they stood

May 5. firm, in number about six thousand, and, though destitute of artillery, made a desperate resistance. At length, however, they were broken, and pursued with great slaughter into the mountains, leaving above one thousand men slain on the spot. At the same time, Soult proceeded with his division to Schwytz, where he overthrew a body of peasants; and, embarking on the Lake of Lucerne, landed, in spite of the utmost resistance, at Altdorf, and cut to pieces a body of three thousand men, supported by four pieces of cannon, who had taken post in the defiles of the Reuss above that place. The broken remains of this division fled by Wasen to the valley of Schollenen, but there they were met and entirely dispersed by Lecourbe, who, after subduing the insurrection in the Val-levantine, had crossed the St. Gothard, and fallen upon the fugitives in rear. In this affair above two thousand peasants were killed and wounded; and such was the consternation excited by the military execution which followed, that the people of that part of Switzerland made no farther attempt, during the progress of the campaign, to take a part in hostilities. They saw that their efforts were of little avail amid the immense masses of disciplined men by whom their country was traversed; and suffering almost as much, in the conflicts which followed, from their friends as their enemies, they resigned themselves, in indignant silence, to be the spectators of a contest from which they had nothing to hope, and no power to prevent.*

These movements, however, rendered it indispensable for the French to evacuate the En-

gadin, as great part of the troops who formed the line of defence had been drawn into the rear to quell the insurrection. Loison retired from Tirrano, and joined Lecourbe at St. Giacomo; and as the Imperialists, who were now far advanced in Lombardy, were collecting forces at Lagano, evidently with the design of seizing upon the St. Gothard, and so turning the flank of Massena's position, that active general instantly crossed the Bernhardine, and descending the Misocco, advanced to Bellinzona, in order to protect the extreme right of his interior line, which rested on the St. Gothard, the Lake of Zurich, and the Limmat.*

The archduke, convinced that it was by turning the right of Massena in the mountains that he would be most easily forced from this strong line of defence, strengthened Hotze by fresh troops, and combined a general attack upon Lecourbe for the

14th of May. The forces they brought into action on that day were very considerable, amounting to not less than thirty thousand men, while those of Menard, since the greater part of Lecourbe's division had retreated to Bellinzona, did not exceed fourteen thousand men. Luciensteg, since it fell into the hands of the Republicans, had been greatly strengthened; a narrow defile, bounded by the precipices of the Alps on one side, and a rocky eminence, bathed by the Rhine, on the other, was crossed by strong intrenchments, mounted with a formidable artillery; but the intelligence which the archduke received of the approach of thirty thousand Russians to support his army, who had already arrived in Gallicia, determined him without delay to commence offensive operations. Accordingly, on the 12th of May, the columns were everywhere put in motion in the mountains, and two days afterward this important post was

May 14. attacked. The assailants were divided into four columns: one was destined to engage the attention of the enemy by a false attack in front; the second, to make a circuit by the Alps of Mayenfeld, and descend on the intrenchments in rear; a third, to cross the Suvisir Alps; and the fourth, to which the cavalry and artillery were attached, to assail the pass called the Slapiner Joch. Hotze commanded in person the attack in front, while Jellachich directed the other columns. After twelve hours of fatiguing march, the latter succeeded in bringing his troops in rear to attack the intrenchments. When the animating sound of their hurra was heard, Hotze pressed forward to assail the works in front, and, after a stout resistance, the barriers were burst open, and the fort carried, with the loss to the Republicans of fifteen hundred prisoners.†

This important success occasioned the immediate retreat of the French army from the Grisons. Their left fell back by Sargans to Wallenstadt; the centre by the gorge of Vettis; the right by Reichenau, Ilantz, and Disentis, into the valley of Urseren. The centre of the army was forced; and, had Bellegarde been at hand to follow up the successes of Hotze, it

* Dum., i., 120, 121. Jom., xi., 222, 223. Arch. Ch., i., 263, 267.

† Dum., i., 123, 124. Jom., xi., 224, 225. Arch. Ch., i., 271, 278.

* Jom., xi., 219, 221. Dum., i., 117, 119. Arch. Ch., i., 267, 268.

Massena draws back his right wing in the Italian Alps.

General attack by the Austrians on the French in the Grisons. Luciensteg is carried.

would have been all over with the Republicans in Helvetia. As it was, they did not effect their retreat from the Grisons without sustaining a loss of three thousand men in prisoners alone, while the total loss of the Imperialists was only seventy-one men; an extraordinary, but well-authenticated proof of the immense advantage of offensive operations in mountain warfare, and the great disasters to which even the best troops are subjected, by being exposed, when acting on the defensive, to the loss of their communications, by their adversary turning their position.*

This catastrophe obliged Massena to alter entirely his line of defence. The right wing in the Alps being driven back, it was no longer possible to maintain the line of the Lake of Constance and the Rhine from Stein to Eglisau. In consequence, he fell back from the Rhine behind the Thur; Lecourbe received orders to evacuate the St. Gothard, and concentrate his forces below the Devil's Bridge, in the valley of the Reuss, while the bulk of his army was assembled round the headquarters at Zurich, all the approaches to which were fortified with the utmost care.†

Notwithstanding the strength of this position, Lecourbe would have been unable to have maintained his ground with the right wing against the impetuous attacks of Hotze, had that enterprising general been supported by Bellegarde; but the Aulic Council, conceiving that Italy was to be the theatre of decisive operations, directed him to descend into Lombardy, and re-enforce the army there, now commanded by Suwarrow, leaving only ten thousand men to guard the Valteline and gain possession of the St. Gothard. In pursuance of these orders, he crossed the Splügen, and proceeded by the Lake of Como to Milan, while Hotze vigorously pursued the retreating enemy in the valley of the Rhine, and everywhere drove him back to the Swiss frontiers.‡

Encouraged by these successes, and the near approach of the Russian auxiliaries, to push the war with vigour, the archduke published a proclamation to the Swiss, in which he announced that he was about to enter their territory, to deliver them from their chains, and exhorted them to take up arms against their oppressors.

At the same time, the Rhine was passed at all points; a large column crossed at Stein, under Nauendorf; another at Eglisau; while Hotze crossed the upper part of the stream in the Grisons, and penetrated, by the source of the Thur, into the Toggenberg. To prevent the junction of the archduke and Hotze,

Massena left his intrenchments on the Limmat, and commenced an attack on the advanced guard of Nauendorf. A desultory action ensued, which was maintained with great vivacity on both sides; fresh troops continually came up to re-enforce those who were exhausted with fatigue, and though undecided upon the whole, Oudinot gained a considerable advantage over an Austrian division, commanded by Pe-

trach, which was defeated, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners. Notwithstanding that check, however, the object was gained; the archduke marched on the following day, towards Winterthur, while Hotze descended with all his forces to support him. The important post called the Steigpass was attacked at noon, and carried by that intrepid general,* while the archduke effected his junction with the left wing of his army at Winterthur and Nestenbach. Massena, upon this, fell back to Zurich, and the Republicans confined themselves to their defensive position on the Limmat.

While the French centre was thus forced back to their interior line of defence, the right wing, under Lecourbe, was still more severely pressed by the Imperialists. No sooner had Bellegarde arrived in Lombardy, than Suwarrow detached General Haddick, with ten thousand men, to drive them from the St. Gothard. Loison's division, defeated at the Monte Cenere by Hohenzollern, retired up the valley of the Ticino to Airolo, where it was re-enforced by several additional battalions, in order to maintain the passage of the St. Gothard, and give time for the baggage and artillery to defile to Altdorf. Overwhelmed by numbers, Loison was at length driven over the snowy summit of that rugged mountain, through the smiling valley of Urseren, and down the deep descent of the Devil's Bridge to Wasen, with the loss of six hundred prisoners. An Austrian brigade even chased him from Wasen down to Amsteg, within three miles of Altdorf; but Lecourbe, justly alarmed at so near an approach, sallied forth from that place at the head of a considerable body of troops, and attacked them with such vigour, that they were obliged to retrace their steps in confusion up the whole valley of Schollenen, and could only prevent the irruption of the enemy into the valley of Urseren by cutting an arch of the Devil's Bridge. At the same time, General Xaintrailles, at the head of a strong French division, which Massena had despatched to the support of the army of Italy, attacked and routed a body of six thousand peasants, which had taken post at Leuk,† in the upper Valais, and made himself master of Brieg, the well-known village at the foot of the Simplon.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the Austrian forces were concentrated in the environs of Zurich, where Massena still maintained, with characteristic obstinacy, his defensive position. The French lines extended from the intrenched heights of Zurich through those of Regensburgh, and thence to the Rhine, in a direction nearly parallel to the course of the Aar. The camp around Zurich was strengthened by the most formidable redoubts, at which the army had laboured for above a month, while the whole country by which it could be approached, situated between the Glatt, the Limmat, and the Aar, filled with wooded heights, and intersected by precipitous ravines, presented the greatest obstacles to an

May 25. The French centre is forced by the archduke.

Their right wing is driven from the St. Gothard.

May 29.

Massena's position at Zurich.

* Jom., xi., 226, 227. Dum., i., 124, 125. Arch. Ch., i., 271, 281.

† Jom., xi., 228. Dum., i., 127.

‡ Dum., i., 124, 126. Jom., xi., 228, 230. Arch. Ch., i., 268, 284.

* Dum., i., 164, 167. Jom., xi., 235, 237. Arch. Ch., i., 292, 306.

† Jom., xi., 240, 244. Dum., i., 158. Arch. Ch., 286, 290.

June 5. He is there unsuccessfully attacked by the archduke.

attacking army. On the 5th of June, the archduke, having assembled all his forces, assailed him along the whole line. The chief weight of his attack was directed against Massena's centre and right. At the latter point, Hotze gained, at first, what seemed an important success: his advanced posts even penetrated into the suburbs of Zurich, and carried the whole intrenchments which covered the right of the army; but, before the close of the day, Soult, coming up with the reserve, regained the lost ground, and forced back the Imperialists, after a desperate struggle, to the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the action. The combat, at the same time, raged in the centre with uncertain success, and at length the archduke, seeing the repulse of Hotze, and deeming the heights of the Zurichberg the decisive point, detached General Wallis, with a portion of the reserve, to renew the attack, while the Prince of Lorraine made a simultaneous effort on the side of the Attisberg. Wallis, at first, made a great impression, carried the farm of Zurichberg, and, after a vehement struggle, arrived at the palisades of the intrenchments; but Massena, seeing the danger, flew to the spot, at the head of a column of grenadiers, and assailed the Imperialists in flank, while a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from the summit of the works tore down the foremost of their ranks. Notwithstanding all their efforts, the Imperialists were unable to force the intrenchments; Hotze himself was severely wounded, and, after a bloody conflict, they retired over the Glatt, leaving three thousand killed and wounded on the field of battle.*

Nowise discouraged by this check, the archduke, after a day's repose, made arrangements for a renewal of the attack; and, taught by experience, adopted such dispositions as must have ensured success. Before day-break on the morning of the 6th, two columns, of eight thousand men each, were destined to assault the heights of Zurich and Wipchegen, while all the left, the reserve, and part of the centre, were to support their attack. But Massena, apprehensive of the result, retreated during the night, defiled over the bridges of Zurich and Wetingen, and took post, between Lucerne and Zurich, on Mount Albis, a rocky ridge stretching from the Lake of Zurich to the Aar, in a position even stronger than the one he had left. The retreat was effected without loss under cover of night; but the great arsenal of Zurich, containing one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon and immense warlike stores, fell, on the day following, into the hands of the Imperialists.†

The evacuation of the intrenched camp at Zurich drew after it the dissolution of the forces of the Swiss Confederacy in the interest of France. The battalions of Berne and Soleure, already much weakened by desertion, were entirely dissolved by that event;

while those of Zurich and Turgovia, menaced with military execution on their dwellings if they continued longer with the enemy, made haste to abandon a cause of which they were already ashamed in their hearts. In a week the battalions of the Pays de Vaud, and a few hundreds of the most ardent of the Zurich Democrats, alone remained of the eighteen thousand auxiliaries first assembled under the tricolour standard. At the same time, the provisional government of Helvetia, no longer in safety at Lucerne, set off for Berne; the long file of its carriages excited the ironical contempt of the peasantry, still ardently attached to the institutions of their fathers, in the rural districts through which they passed.*

The details which have now been given of the campaign in the Alps, though hardly intelligible to those who have not traversed the country, or studied the positions with care in an excellent map, offer the most remarkable spectacle in a military point of view which the Revolutionary war had yet exhibited.† From the 14th of May, when the attack on the fort of Luciensteg commenced, to the 6th of June, when the intrenched camp at Zurich was abandoned, was nothing but one continual combat, in a vast field of battle, extending from the snowy summits of the Alps to the confluence of the great streams which flow from their perennial fountains. Posterity will hardly credit that great armies could be maintained in such a situation, and the same unity of operations communicated to a line, extending from Bellinzona to Bâle, across the highest mountains in Europe, as to a small body of men manœuvring on the most favourable ground for military operations. The consumption of human life during these prolonged actions for twenty days; the forced marches by which they were succeeded; the sufferings and privations which the troops on both sides endured; the efforts necessary to find provisions for large bodies in those inhospitable regions, in many of which the traveller or the chamois-hunter can often hardly find a footing, combined to render this warfare both the most memorable and the most animating which had occurred since the fall of the Roman Empire.‡

While success was thus attending the imperial standards on the Rhine and the Alps, events of a still more decisive character occurred on the Italian plains. A few days after the important battle of Magnano, twenty thousand Russians, under Suwarow, joined the imperial army, still encamped on the shores of the Minicio. Thus were the forces of the North, for the first time since the origin of the Revolution, brought into collision with those of the South, and that desperate contest commenced which was destined to inflict such terrible wounds on both empires; to wrap in flames the towers of the Kremlin, and bring the Tartars of the Des-

Reflections on the magnitude of the preceding operations in the Alps.

Dissolution of all the Swiss forces in the service of France.

* Jom., xi., 249, 251. Dum., i., 169, 170. Th., x., 295. Arch. Ch., i., 327, 344.

† Jom., xi., 251, 252. Th., x., 296. Dum., i., 169, 170. Arch. Ch., i., 345, 350.

* Jom., xi., 255, 256. Arch. Ch., i., 350, 357.

† Those who have enjoyed the advantage of having travelled over these mountains will require the aid of no map to remind them of places whose relative position is indelibly imprinted in their memory. Those who have not will find them delineated in the common *Carte Routière de la Suisse*.

‡ Dum., i., 172, 173. Jom., xi., 257, 258.

ert to the shores of the Seine, and ultimately establish a new balance of power in Europe, by arraying all its forces under the banners either of Asiatic despotism or European ambition.

The Emperor Paul, who now entered, with all the characteristic impetuosity of his character, into the alliance against France, had embraced the most extensive and visionary ideas as to the ulterior measures which should be adopted upon the overthrow of the French Revolutionary power. He laboured to effect the formation, not only of a cordial league between all the sovereigns of Europe, to stop the progress of anarchy, but the restoration of all the potentates and interests which had been subverted by the French arms, and the closing of the great schism between the Greek and Catholic churches, which had so long divided the Christian world. He went even so far as to contemplate the union of the Catholics and Protestants, the stilling of all the controversies which distracted the latter body, and the assemblage of the followers of Christ, of whatever denomination, under the banners of one Catholic Church: captivating ideas, which will never cease to attract the enthusiastic and benevolent in every age, but which the experienced observer of human events will dismiss to the regions of imagination, and class with the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, or the probable extinction of death which amused the reveries of Condorcet.*

The troops thus brought against the Republicans, though very different from the soldiers of Eylau and Borodino, were still formidable by their discipline, their enthusiasm, and their stubborn valour. Their cavalry, indeed, was poorly equipped, and their artillery inferior in skill and science to that of the French, but their infantry, strong, hardy, and resolute, yielded to none in Europe in the energy and obstinacy so essential to military success. Field-marshal Suwarrow, who commanded them, and now assumed the general direction of the allied army, though the singularity of his manner and the extravagance of his ideas in some particulars have detracted, in the estimation of foreigners, from his well-earned reputation, was yet unquestionably one of the most remarkable generals of the last age. Impetuous, enthusiastic, and impassioned, brave in conduct, invincible in resolution, endowed with the confidence and ardour which constitute the soul of the conqueror, without the vigilance or foresight which are requisite to the general, he was better calculated to sweep over the world with the fierce tempest of Scythian war, than conduct the long and cautious contests which civilized nations maintain with each other. His favourite weapon was the bayonet, his system of war incessant and vigorous attack, and his great advantage the impression of superiority and invincible power, which a long course of success under that method had taught to his soldiers. The first orders he gave to General Chastelar, chief of the staff to the Imperialists, were singularly characteristic, both of his temper of mind and system of tactics. That general having proposed a reconnoissance, the marshal answered warmly, "Reconnoissance! I am for none of

them; they are of no use but to the timid, and to inform the enemy that you are approaching. It is never difficult to find your opponents when you really wish it. Form column—charge bayonets: plunge into the centre of the enemy—these are my reconnoissances;" words which, amid some exaggeration, unfold more of the real genius of war than is generally supposed.*

Fearless and impetuous in conversation as action, the Russian veteran made no secret of the ultimate designs with which his imperial master had entered into the war. To restore everything to the state in which it was before the French Revolution broke out; to overturn the new republics; re-establish, without exception, the dispossessed princes; restrain universally the spread of revolutionary ideas; punish the authors of fresh disturbances, and substitute for the cool policy of calculating interest a frank, generous, disinterested system, was the only way, he constantly maintained, to put down effectually the Gallic usurpation. The Austrian officers, startled at such novel ideas, carefully reported them to the cabinet of Vienna, where they excited no small disquietude. To expel the French from the whole Italian peninsula, and, if possible, raise up an effectual barrier against any future incursions in that quarter from their ambition, was, indeed, a favourite object of their policy; but it was no part of their designs to sanction a universal restitution of the possessions acquired since the commencement of the war, or exchange the distant and rebellious provinces of Flanders for the rich and submissive Venetian territories adjoining the hereditary states, and affording them at all times a secure entrance into the Italian plains. Hence a secret jealousy and distrust speedily arose between the coalesced powers, and experienced observers already began to predict, from the very rapidity of the success with which their arms were at first attended, the evolution of such causes of discord as would ultimately lead to the dissolution of the confederacy.†

The plan of operations concerted between the archduke and Suwarrow was to separate entirely the French armies of Switzerland and Italy, and to combine the movements of the two allied armies by the conquest of the Italian Alps, Lombardy, and Piedmont, in order to penetrate into France on its most defenceless side by the Vosges Mountains and the defiles of the Jura, the same quarter on which the great invasion of 1814 was afterward effected. It was on this principle that they maintained so vigorous a contest under Bellegarde and Hotze, in the Val-levantine and Grisons, and by their successes the right wing of Massena was forced to retire; the Imperialists were interposed in a salient angle between the Republican armies, and the one thrown back on the line of the Po, the other on that of the Aar.‡

Moreau succeeded Scherer in the command of the army of Italy at this momentous crisis. He found it reduced, by sickness and the sword, to twenty-eight thousand combatants; and, after a vain attempt to maintain the line of the Oglio, the troops re-

Moreau succeeds to the command of the Italian army. Its wretched condition.

* Jom., xi., 261, 262. Dum., i., 173. Hard., vii., 218, 219.

† Hard., vii., 220.

‡ Dum., i., 174. Jom., xi., 262. Arch. Ch., ii., 33, 34.

* Hard., vii., 215, 217.

tired towards Milan, leaving the immense military stores and reserve artillery parks at Cremona to the conquerors, while a bridge equipage, which was descending the Mincio from Mantua, with a view to gain the waters of the Po, also fell into the hands of the Imperialists.*

Moreau, finding himself cut off from his connexion with Massena in the Alps, retreats behind and being unable to face the allies the Adda, in the plain of Lombardy, resolved to retire towards the mountains of Genoa, in order to facilitate his junction with Macdonald, who had received orders to evacuate the Parthenopean Republic, and retire upon the Apennines. Mantua was invested, and all the frontier towns of the Cisalpine Republic were abandoned to their own resources. Soon after,

April 20. Peschiera was carried by assault, Ferrara besieged, and Brescia summoned. Kray, to whom the right wing was intrusted, carried the latter town without opposition; and the garrison, eleven hundred strong, which had retired into the castle, soon after surrendered at discretion. The French now retired behind the line of the Adda, a rapid stream, which, descending from the Lake of Lecco, runs in a deep and swift torrent, over a surface of twenty-four leagues, to the Po. The right bank is almost everywhere so lofty as to command the left; and the bridges at Lecco, Cassano, Lodi, and Pizzighitona are defended either by fortified towns or strong *têtes-du-pont*. On the 25th of April the allies approached this formidable line, and a sharp skirmish ensued between the Russians, under Prince BAGRATION, destined to meet a glorious death on the field of Borodino, and the French, before the walls of Lecco, in which the former were repulsed: commencing thus a contest which was never destined to be finally extinguished till the Russian standards waved on the heights of Montmartre.†

Suwarrow now left twenty thousand men, under Kray, to besiege Peschiera and blockade Mantua, and prepared to force the passage of the Adda. To frustrate this intention, Moreau accumulated his troops in masses on that part of the river which seemed chiefly threatened. But, while actively engaged in this design, the Austrian division of General Ott succeeded in throwing a bridge, during the night, at Trezzo, and before morning his whole troops had crossed over to the right, while, at the same time, Wukassowich surprised the passage at Brivio. The French line was thus divided into three parts; and Serrurier's division, eight thousand strong, which formed the extreme left, was not only cut off from all support, but even from receiving any orders from the remainder of the army. The divisions of Ott and Zoph commenced a furious attack on Grenier's division, and, after a brave resistance, drove it back towards Milan, with the loss of two thousand four hundred men, including eleven hundred prisoners; while Serrurier, whose division was entirely isolated by the passage of Wukassowich at Brivio, took post at Verderio, in a strong position, determined to defend himself to the last extremity. Guillet,

with the brigade under his orders, who was returning from the Valteline, escaped destruction by embarking on the Lake of Como, steering for Menagio, and making his way to the Lake of Lugano by the beautiful valley which leads from that place to Porlezza. By remaining in his position at Verderio while the allied army was advancing, Serrurier necessarily was soon enveloped by their columns; evincing thus rather the courage of a soldier who disdains to retreat, than the conduct of an officer who knows how to extricate his men from difficulties. He was soon surrounded on all sides by the Imperialists; and, after an honourable resistance, finding his retreat cut off, and the assailants triple his own force, laid down his arms with seven thousand men. At the same time, Melas carried the *tête-du-pont* at Cassano, and pursued the fugitives with such vigour, that he passed the bridge pell-mell with them, and pushed on before night to Gorgonzelo, on the road to Milan.*

The situation of the French was now in the highest degree critical. In these Suwarrow engagements they had lost above ten thousand men, and could triumph.

now, even with all the re-enforcements which they received, hardly muster in their retreat twenty thousand to meet the great army of the allies, above sixty thousand strong, which was advancing in pursuit. In these disastrous circumstances, Milan was abandoned, and the army withdrawn behind the Ticino. Suwarrow, the same day, made his triumphal entry into that capital, amid the transports of the Catholic and aristocratic party, and the loud applause of the multitude, who greeted him with the same acclamations which they had lavished, on a similar occasion, on Napoleon three years before. The Republican army, having left a garrison of two thousand men in the castle, moved slowly, in two columns, towards Turin, in deep dejection, and heavily burdened with the numerous families compromised by the Revolution, who now pursued their mournful way towards the frontiers of France.†

Nothing now remained to Moreau but to retire to such a position as might enable him to rally to his standards the yet unbroken army which Macdonald was bringing up from the south of the peninsula. For this purpose he divided his forces into two columns, one of which, under his own command, escorting the parks of artillery, the baggage, and military chest, took the road of Turin, while the other, consisting of the divisions of Victor and Laboissiere, moved towards Alexandria, with a view to occupy the defiles of the Bocchetta and the approaches to Genoa. Having effected the evacuation of the town and the arsenal, provided for the defence of the citadel, in which he left a garrison of three thousand men, under General Fiorilla, and secured the communications with the adjacent passes of the Alps, the French general moved the remainder of his army into the plain between the Po and the Tanaro, at the

Surrender of Serrurier with 7000 men. April 25.

April 29.

Moreau retires to Alexandria and Turin.

May 7.

* Jom., xi., 262, 263. Dum., i., 174, 175.

† Jom., xi., 265, 267. Dum., i., 79. St. Cyr., i., 200, 202.

* Th., x., 284. Jom., xi., 276, 278. Dum., i., 112. St. Cyr., i., 194, 199. Arch. Ch., i., 230, 231.

† Arch. Ch., i., 35, 36. Th., x., 286. Jom., xi., 278, 279. St. Cyr., i., 199, 201.

foot of the northern slope and principal débouchés of the Apennines, where they encircle the Bay of Genoa and join the Maritime Alps. This position, extending only over a front of four leagues, supported on the right by Alexandria, and on the left by Valence, affording the means of manœuvring either on the Bormida or the Po, and covering at once the roads from Asti to Turin and Coni,* and those from Acqui to Nizza and Savona, was better adapted than any other that could have been selected to enable the Republicans to maintain their footing in Italy, until they were re-enforced by the army of Macdonald, or received assistance from the interior of France.

Master of all the plain of Lombardy, and at the head of an overwhelming force, Suwarrow did not evince that activity in pursuing the broken remains of his adversary which might have been expected from the general vigour of his character. For above a week he gave himself up to festivities at Milan, while an army hardly a third of his own was in full retreat, by diverging columns, before him. At length, finding his active disposition wearied with triumphal honours, he set out for Alexandria, leaving Latterman to blockade the castle of Milan with four thousand men. At the same time, Orzi, Novi, Peschiera, and Pizzighitona surrendered to the allies, with a hundred pieces of cannon, twenty gunboats, a siege equipage, and immense stores of ammunition and provisions: an advantage which enabled Kray to draw closer the blockade of Mantua, and despatch Hohenzollern to assist at the siege of the castle of Milan. On the 9th the allies reached Tortona, blew open the gates, and drove the French into the citadel, while their advanced posts were pushed to San Julian, Garofalo, and Novi. Meanwhile, though a re-enforcement of six thousand Russians arrived at Tortona, Moreau remained firm in his position behind the Po and the Tanaro. To divert his attention, the Russian general extended his right from Novi to Serravalle and Gavi, threatening thereby his communications with Genoa and France;† but this was a mere feint, intended to mask his real design, which was to cross the Po, turn his left, and force him to a general and decisive action.

The right, or southern bank of the Po, from the junction of the Tanaro to Valence, is more lofty than the northern, which is low, marshy, and approachable only by dikes. Some large islands opposite Mugarone having afforded facilities for the passage, Rosenberg, who commanded one of Suwarrow's divisions directed against Valence, was induced, by his military ardour, to attempt to cross it in that quarter. In the night of the 11th he threw six thousand men across the principal arm into a wooded island, from whence they shortly passed over, some by swimming, others by wading, with the water up to their armpits, and May 11. took possession of the village of Mugarone. Moreau no sooner heard of this descent than he directed an overwhelming force to the

menaced point; the Russians, vigorously attacked in the village, were soon compelled to retire; in vain they formed squares, and, under Prince Rosenberg and the Archduke Constantine, defended themselves with the characteristic bravery of their nation; assailed on every side, and torn to pieces by a murderous fire of grapeshot, they were driven back, first into the island, then across to the northern bank, with the loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, four pieces of cannon, and seven hundred prisoners. No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the first success of Rosenberg's attack, than he pushed forward two divisions to support him, while another was advanced towards Marengo to effect a diversion; but the bad success of the enterprise, which failed because it was not combined with sufficient support at the first,* rendered it necessary that they should be recalled, and the allied army was concentrated anew in the entrenched camp of Garofalo.

At the same instant that this was passing in one quarter, Suwarrow raised his camp at St. Julian, with the design of crossing the Po near Casa Tenia, and marching upon Sesia. This attempt was not attended with decisive success. A warm action ensued between the division of Victor and the Russian advanced guard, nine thousand strong, under the orders of Generals Bagrathion and Lusignan. Victory was long doubtful, and although the French were at length forced to retreat under shelter of the cannon of Alexandria, the demonstration led to no serious impression at the time on the position of the Republican general.†

Tired with the unsatisfactory nature of these manœuvres, Suwarrow resolved to march, with the bulk of his forces, upon Turin, where the vast magazines of artillery and military stores of the French army were assembled, in the hope that, by reducing its citadel, and occupying the plains of Piedmont to the foot of the Alps, the position of Moreau on the Po and the Tanaro might be rendered no longer tenable, from the interruption of its communications with France. By a singular coincidence, not unusual in war, at the very time that the Russian marshal was adopting this resolution, Moreau had resolved, on his part, to retire by Asti upon Turin and Coni, and, abandoning the line of the Apennines, concentrate his forces for the preservation of his communication with the Alps. Inevitable necessity had compelled him to adopt this retrograde movement. Great part of Piedmont was in a state of insurrection; a large body of peasants had recently occupied Ceva, another had made themselves masters of Mondovi, which closed the principal line of retreat for the army, the sole one then practicable for artillery and carriages. The recent success of the Russians towards Alexandria led May 19. him to believe that the weight of their force was to be moved in that direction, and that he would soon be in danger of having his communications with France cut off. Influenced by these considerations, he detached the division of Victor, without artillery or baggage, by the

* *Jom.*, xi., 280, 284. *Th.*, x., 286, 287. *Dum.*, i., 141, 142. *St. Cyr.*, i., 200, 203.

† *Dum.*, i., 142, 145. *Jom.*, xi., 289, 290. *St. Cyr.*, i., 203. *Arch. Ch.*, iii., 37, 39.

* *Jom.*, xi., 292, 294. *Dum.*, i., 146. *St. Cyr.*, i., 204, 205. *Th.*, x., 288.

† *Jom.*, xi., 296, 297. *Dum.*, i., 146. *St. Cyr.*, i., 205.

mountain paths, towards Genoa, in order to maintain the crest of the Apennines, and re-enforce, when necessary, the army of Macdonald, which was approaching from Naples, while he himself, having first thrown three thousand men into Alexandria, retired by Asti towards Turin, with the design of maintaining himself, if possible, at Coni, the last fortified place on the Italian side of the Alps, until he received the promised re-enforcements from the interior of France.*

No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the retreat of Moreau than he occupied Valence and Casala, which had been abandoned by the Republicans, and, after having moved forward a strong body under Schwiekowsky to form the investment of Alexandria, advanced himself with the main body of the army towards Turin. Wukassowich, who commanded the advanced guard, with the aid of some inhabitants of the town who favoured his designs, surprised one of the gates, and, rapidly introducing his troops, compelled the French to take refuge in the citadel. The fruits of this conquest were 261 pieces of cannon, 80 mortars, 60,000 muskets, besides an enormous quantity of ammunition and military stores, which had been accumulating May 24. in that city ever since the first occupation of Italy by the arms of Napoleon. This great stroke, the success of which was owing to the celerity and skill of the Russian generals, deprived Moreau of his resources, and rendered the situation both of his own army and that of Macdonald in the highest degree critical. At the same time, intelligence was received of the fall of the castle of Milan, after four days of open trenches, an advantage which permitted the division of Hohenzollern to re-enforce the besieging army before Mantua, while the artillery was despatched to Tortona, which was now closely invested.†

Unable, from these disasters, to maintain his ground in the basin of Piedmont, Moreau retreats towards Genoa. Moreau now thought only of regaining his position on the ridge of the Apennines, and covering the avenue to the city of Genoa, the only rallying-point where he could still hope to effect a junction with Macdonald, and which covered the principal line of retreat for both armies into France. For this purpose he retired to Savigliano, having first moved forward an advanced guard, under Grouchy, to clear the road he was to follow, by retaking Mondovi and Ceva, into the latter of which the Austrians had succeeded in throwing a small garrison to support the insurgents who had occupied it. That general retook Mondovi, but all his efforts failed before the ramparts of Ceva. The closing of the great road through this town rendered Moreau's situation apparently hopeless. Suwarrow, with a superior force, was close in his rear; the only route practicable for artillery by which he could regain the Apennines was blocked up, and he could not retire by the Col di Tende without abandoning all prospect of rejoining Macdonald, and leaving

his army to certain destruction. From this desperate situation the Republicans were extricated by the skill and vigour of their general, aided by the resources of Guillemot and the engineer corps under his directions. By their exertions, and the indefatigable efforts of one half of the French army, a mountain path, leading across the Apennines from the valley of Garesio to the coast of Genoa was in four days rendered practicable for artillery and chariots; and as soon as this was done, the blockade of Ceva was raised, three thousand men were thrown as a garrison into Coni, which was abandoned to its own resources, and the remainder of the army, after a strong rear-guard had been posted at Murialto to cover the passage, defiled over the narrow and rocky path, and arrived in safety at Loano, on the southern side of the mountains. No sooner were they arrived there than they formed a junction with Victor, who had successfully accomplished his retreat by Acqui, Spigno, and Digo, and occupied all the passes leading towards Genoa over the Apennines; Victor was intrusted with the important post of Pontremoli, while the other divisions placed themselves on the crest of the mountains from Loano to the Bocchetta.*

Suwarrow, on being informed of the retreat of Moreau from the plain of Piedmont, spread his troops over its rich surface, and up the glens which run from thence into the heart of the Alps. The Russian divisions entered into the beautiful valleys of Suza, St. Jean de Maurienne, and Aosta. Froelich pushed his advanced posts to the neighbourhood of Coni; Pignerol capitulated, Suza surrendered at discretion, and the advanced posts of the allies everywhere appearing on the summit of the Alpine passes, spread consternation over the ancient frontiers of France. At the same time, the citadel of Turin was closely invested, the sieges of Tortona and Alexandria were pushed with vigour, while intelligence was received at the same time that a detachment, sent by Kray from before Mantua, had made itself master of Ferrara, that a flotilla from Venice had surprised Ravenna, and an insurrection had broken out in the mountainous parts of Tuscany and the Ecclesiastical States, which threatened Ancona, and had already wrested Arezzo and Lucca from the Republican dominions.†

Thus, in less than three months after the opening of the campaign on the Adige, the French standards were driven back to the summit of the Alps; the whole plain of Lombardy was regained, with the exception of a few of its strongest fortresses; the conquests of Napoleon had been lost in less time than it had taken to make them; and the Republican armies, divided and dispirited, were reduced to a painful and hazardous defence of their own frontiers, instead of carrying the thunder of their victorious arms over the Italian Peninsula.

* Th., x., 291. Dum., i., 148, 149. Jom., xi., 300, 301. St. Cyr., i., 206, 208. Arch. Ch., ii., 44, 45.

† Jom., xi., 302, 305. Dum., i., 152, 158. Th., x., 292. Arch. Ch., ii., 45.

* Jom., xi., 307, 308. Th., x., 292. Arch. Ch., ii., 45. Dum., i., 176, 177.

† Jom., xi., 310, 315. Dum., i., 176, 179. Arch. Ch., ii., 46, 48.

A hundred thousand men were spread over the plain of Lombardy, of whom forty thousand were grouped under Suwarrow round Turin.* History has not a more brilliant or decisive series of triumphs to record, and they demonstrate on how flimsy and insecure a basis the French dominion at that period rested; how much it was dependant on the genius and activity of a single individual; how inadequate the Revolutionary government was to the long-continued and sustained efforts which were requisite to maintain the contest from their own resources; and how easily, by a combined effort of all the powers at that critical period, when Napoleon was absent, and time and wisdom had not consolidated the conquests of Democracy, they might have been wrested from their grasp, and the peace of Europe established on an equitable foundation. But, notwithstanding all their reverses, the European governments were not as yet sufficiently awakened to the dangers of their situation; Prussia still kept aloof in dubious neutrality; Russia was not irrevocably engaged in the cause; and Great Britain, as yet confining her efforts to the subsidizing of other powers, had not descended as a principal into the field, or begun to pour forth, on land at least, those streams of blood which were destined to be shed before the great struggle was brought to a termination.

These successes, great as they were, were yet not such as might have been achieved if the Russian general, neglecting all minor considerations, and, blockading only the greater fortresses, had vigorously followed up with his overwhelming force the retreating army of the Republicans, and driven it over the Maritime Alps. Unable to withstand so formidable an assailant, they must have retired within the French frontier, leaving not only Mantua and Genoa, but the army which occupied the Neapolitan territory, to its fate. This bold and decisive plan of operations was such as suited the ardent character of the Russian general, and which, if left to himself, he would unquestionably have adopted; but his better judgment was overruled by the cautious policy of the Aulic Council, who, above all things, were desirous to secure a fortified frontier for its Venetian acquisitions, and compelled him, much against his will, to halt in the midst of the career of victory, and besiege in form the fortresses of Lombardy. Something was no doubt gained by their reduction,† but not to be compared with what might have been expected if an overwhelming mass had been interposed between the French armies, and the conquerors of Naples had been compelled to lay down their arms between the Apennines and the Po.‡

* Arch. Ch., ii., 47.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 47, 48. Hard., vii., 248, 249.

‡ A Russian officer of Suwarrow's staff at this juncture wrote to Count Rostopchin at St. Petersburg: "Our glorious operations are thwarted by those very persons who are most interested in their success. Far from applauding the brilliant triumphs of our arms, the cursed cabinet of Vienna seeks only to retard their march. It insists that our great Suwarrow should divide his army, and direct it at once to several points, which will save Moreau from total destruction. That cabinet, which fears a too rapid conquest of Italy, from designs which it dares not avow, as it knows well those of our magnanimous emperor, has, by the Aulic Council, forced the Archduke Charles into a state of inactivity, and enjoined our incomparable chief to secure his conquests rather than extend them; that is, to waste its

While these disastrous events were in progress in the north of the Peninsula, Affairs of the the affairs of France were not in a Parthenopei- more favourable train in its south- an Republic at Naples. ern provinces. The Parthenopeian Republic, established at Naples in the first fervour of Revolutionary success, had been involved in those consequences, the invariable attendant on a sudden concession of power to the people, spoliation of the rich, misery among the poor, and inextricable embarrassment in the finances of the state. In truth, the Directory, pressed by extreme pecuniary difficulties, looked to nothing so much in their conquests as indemnifying themselves for the expenses of their expeditions, and invariably made it the first condition, with all the Revolutionary states which they established, that they should pay the expenses of the war, and take upon themselves the sole support of the armies which was to defend them. In conformity with these instructions, the first fruits of Democratic ascendancy in Naples were bitter in the extreme; the successive contributions of twelve and fifteen millions of francs on the capital and provinces, of which mention has already been made, excited the utmost dissatisfaction, which was greatly increased soon after by the experienced insolence and rapacity of the civil agents of the Directory. A provisional government was established, which introduced innovations that excited general alarm; the Jacobin clubs speedily began to diffuse the arrests and terror of Revolutionary times; the National Guard totally failed in producing any efficient force, while the confiscation of the Church property, and the abolition of its festivals, spread dismay and horror through that large portion of the population who were still attached to the Catholic faith. These circumstances speedily produced partial insurrections; Cardinal Ruffo, in Calabria, succeeded in exciting a revolt, and led to the field an army, fifteen thousand strong, composed of the descendants of the Brutians and Lucanians, while another insurrection, hardly less formidable, broke out in the province of Apulia. But these tumultuary bodies, imperfectly armed and totally undisciplined, were unable to withstand the veteran troops of France. Trani, where the principal force of the insurgents of the latter province had established themselves, was carried by assault, with great slaughter; but, on the other hand, Ruffo, in Calabria, defeated an attack on Castelluccia by the Democratic bands of the new republic, and, encouraged by this success, marched into Apulia, where his forces were soon greatly augmented, and he was re-enforced by some regular troops despatched from Sicily.*

Revolt excited by the oppression of the French.

Affairs were in this dangerous state in the Neapolitan dominions, when orders reached Macdonald to evacuate, without loss of time, the south of Italy, in order to bring his army to support

May 7. Macdonald commences his retreat.

time and strength in the siege of fortresses which would fall of themselves if the French army was destroyed. What terrifies them even more than the rapidity of our conquests is the generous project, openly announced, of restoring to every one what he has lost. Deceived by his ministers, the Emperor Francis has, with his own hand, written to our illustrious general to pause in a career of conquest of which the very rapidity fills him with alarm."—HARD., vii., 249, 250.

* Jom., xi., 316, 338. Orloff's Memoirs, ii., 190, 220.

the Republican arms in Lombardy. He immediately assembled all his disposable forces, and after having left garrisons in Fort St. Elmo, Capua, and Gaeta, set off for Rome at the head of twenty thousand men. His retreat, conducted with great rapidity and skill, was exposed to serious dangers. The peasantry, informed by the English cruisers of the disasters experienced by the French in Upper Italy, broke out into insurrection in every quarter. Duhesme left Apulia in open revolt, and had a constant fight to maintain before he reached Capua; a few hundred English landed at Salerno, and, aided by the peasantry, advanced to Vietri and Castello-mare; while the insurgents of the Roman and Tuscan States, becoming daily more audacious, interrupted all the communications with the north of Italy.

Though repeatedly assailed, he retreated in safety to the north of Tuscany.

Notwithstanding these menacing circumstances, Macdonald effected his retreat in the best order, and without sustaining any serious loss. He arrived at Rome on the 16th, where he re-enforced his army by the divisions of Grenier, continued his route by Acquapendente to Florence, where he rallied to his standard the divisions of Gauthier and Montriehard, who were in the environs of Pistoia and Bologna, and established his headquarters at Lucca in the end of May. The left wing, composed of the Polish division Dombrowsky, took post at Carzana and Aula; the centre occupied the great road from Florence to Pistoia, the right the high road to Bologna, and all the passes into the Modena, with an advanced guard in the city of Bologna itself.*

In this situation, Moreau and Macdonald were in open communication; and it was

He enters into communication with Moreau, and concert measures with him.

concerted between them that the chief body of their united forces should be brought to bear upon the Lower Po, with a view to threaten the communications of the allies, disengage Mantua, and compel their retreat from the plain of Lombardy. For this purpose it was agreed that Macdonald should cross the Apennines and advance towards Tortona, his right resting on the mountains, his left on the right bank of the Po, while Moreau, debouching by the Bocchetta, Gavi, and Serravalle, should move into the plain of that river. As the weight of the contest would in this view fall upon the former of these generals, the division of Victor, which formed the eastern part of Moreau's army, was placed under his orders, and a strong division directed to descend the valley of the Trebbia, in order to keep up the communication between the two armies, and support either, as occasion might require.†

The position of the allied armies, when these Position of formidable preparations were made the allies at king to dislodge them from their conjuncture. quests, were as follows: Kray, who commanded the whole forces on the Lower Po, had 24,000 men under his orders, of whom one half were engaged in the siege of Mantua, while 5000, under Hohenzollern, had been despatched to cover Modena, and 6000, under Ott, watched the mouths of the lateral valleys of the Taro and the Trebbia. The main body of the army,

consisting of the divisions Zoph, Kaim, and the Russians, amounting to 28,000 men, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Turin, with its advanced posts pushed into the entrance of the Alpine valleys. Frœlich, with 6000 men, observed Coni; Wukassowich, with 5700, occupied Mondovi, Ceva, and Salicetto; Lusignan, with 3000 combatants, blockaded Fenestrelles; Bagrathion, with a detachment of 1500 men, was posted in Cezanna and the Col di l'Asietta; Schwickousky, with 6000 men, blockaded Tortona and Alexandria; the corps of Count Bellegarde, 15,000 strong, detached from the Tyrol, was advancing from Como to form the siege of these two fortresses; while that of Haddick, amounting to fourteen thousand bayonets, which formed the communication between the rear of the army and the left wing of the Archduke Charles, was preparing to penetrate into the Valais by the Simplon and the pass of Nuffenen.*

Thus, though the allies had above a hundred thousand men in the field, they could hardly assemble thirty thousand men at any one point; so immensely had they extended themselves over the plains of Lombardy, and so obstinately had the Aulic Council adhered to the old system of establishing a cordon of troops all over the territory which they occupied. This vast dispersion of force was attended with little danger as long as the shattered army of Moreau alone was in the field; but the case was widely different when it was supported by thirty-five thousand fresh troops, prepared to penetrate into the centre and most unprotected part of their line. Had Macdonald been able to push on as rapidly from Florence as he had done in arriving at that place, he might have crushed the divisions of Klenau, Hohenzollern, and Ott before they could possibly have been succoured from other quarters; but the time consumed in reorganizing his army in Tuscany, and concerting operations with Moreau, gave Suwarow an opportunity to repair what was faulty in the disposition of his forces, and assemble a sufficient body of men to resist the attack at the menaced point.†

Macdonald, having at length completed his preparations, raised his camp in the neighbourhood of Pistoia on the 7th of June, with an army, including Victor's division, of thirty-seven thousand men, and marched across the Apennines to Bologna: Hohenzollern, who commanded in the Modena, withdrew his posts into the town of Modena, where he was attacked in a few days, and, after a bloody engagement, driven out, with the loss of fifteen hundred men. Had the right wing of the Republicans punctually executed his instructions, and occupied the road to Ferrara during the combat round the town, the whole of the Imperialists would have been made prisoners. Immediately after this success, Macdonald advanced to Parma, driving the imperial cavalry before him, while Ott, who was stationed at the entrance of the Valley of the Taro, seeing that his retreat was in danger

Dangers arising from their great dispersion.

June 12. Macdonald's advance. First combats with the Imperialists.

* Th., x., 297. Jom., xi., 338, 341. Dum., i., 154, 156.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 49. Jom., xi., 341, 342. Th., x., 299

* Arch. Ch., ii., 48, 49. Jom., xi., 343, 344. Dum., i., 160, 182, 185. Th., x., 297, 298.

† Th., x., 298, 299. Dum., i., 154, 159. Jom., xi., 344.

of being cut off, retired to Placentia, leaving the road open to Victor, who upon that debouched entirely from the Apennines, and effected his junction with Macdonald at Borgo San Denino, entirely to the north of the mountains. On the day following, Placentia was occupied by the Republicans, and their whole army established in the neighbourhood of that city.*

No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the appearance of Macdonald's army in Tuscany, than he adopted the same energetic resolution by which Napoleon had repulsed the attack of Wurmser on the Adige three years before. All his advanced posts in Piedmont were recalled; the brigade of Lusignan near Fenestrelles, the divisions Frœlich, Bagrathion, and Schwiekousky, began their march on the same day for the general rendezvous at Asti; and Kray received orders instantly to raise the siege of Mantua, despatch his artillery with all imaginable speed to Peschiera and Verona, and hasten with all his disposable force to join the main army in the neighbourhood of Placentia. The vigour of the Russian general communicated itself to all the officers of his army. These movements were all punctually executed, notwithstanding the excessive rains, which impeded the movements of the troops; the castles of Milan and Pizzighitone were provisioned, a great intrenched camp formed near the *l'île-du-pont* of Valence, and all the stores recently captured, not necessary for the siege of the citadel, removed from Turin. By these means the allied army was rapidly reassembled; and on the 15th of June, although Kray, with the troops from Mantua, had not yet arrived, thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry were encamped at Garofalo, on the ground they had occupied six weeks before.†

The intelligence of Suwarrow's approach induced Macdonald to concentrate his forces; but, nevertheless, he flattered himself with the hope that he would succeed in overwhelming Ott before he could be supported by the succours which were advancing. Three torrents, flowing parallel to each other, from the Apennines to the Po, intersected the plain occupied by the French army, the Nura, the Trebbia, and the Tidone. The bulk of the Republican forces were on the Nura; the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca were in advance on the Trebbia, and received orders to cross it, in order to overwhelm the Austrian division stationed behind the Tidone. For this purpose, early on the morning of the 17th, they passed both the Trebbia and the Tidone, and assailed the Imperialists with such vigour and superiority of force, that they were speedily driven back in great disorder; but Suwarrow, aware, from the loud sound of the cannonade, of what was going forward, despatched Chastellar with the advanced guard of the main army, which speedily re-established affairs. By degrees, as their successive troops came up, the superiority passed to the side of the allies; the Austrians rallied,

and commenced a vigorous attack on the division of Victor, while the Russian infantry, under Bagrathion, supported the left of the Imperialists. Soon after, Dombrowsky, on the left, having brought up his Polish division by a sudden charge, captured eight pieces of cannon, and pushed forward to Caramel; but at this critical moment Suwarrow ordered a charge in flank by Prince Gortschakoff, with two regiments of Cossacks and four battalions, while Ott attacked them in front. This movement proved decisive; the Poles were broken, and fled in disorder over the Tidone. Meanwhile, the right of the Republicans, composed of Victor's division, withstood all the efforts of Bagrathion, and was advancing along the Po to gain possession of the bridge of St. Giovanni, when the rout of Dombrowsky's division obliged them to retire. This retreat was conducted in good order till the retiring columns were charged in flank by the Cossacks, who had overthrown the Poles; in vain the French formed squares, and received the assailants with a rolling fire; they were broken, great part cut to pieces, and the remainder fled in disorder over the Trebbia. The Russians, in the heat of the pursuit,* plunged, like the Carthaginians of old, into that classic stream; but they were received with so destructive a fire of musketry and grapeshot from the batteries of the main body of the French on the other side, that they were forced to retire with great loss; and the hostile armies bivouacked for the night on the same ground which had been occupied nineteen hundred years before by the troops of Hannibal and the Roman legions.†

During the night Suwarrow brought up all his forces, and, encouraged by the success of the preceding day, made his judicious plan of attack. Judging, with great sagacity, that the principal object of Macdonald would be to maintain his ground on the mountains, by which the communication with Moreau was to be preserved, he directed towards his own right, which was to assail that quarter, his best infantry, consisting of the divisions Bagrathion and Schwiekousky, under the orders of Prince Rosenberg. These troops received orders to pass the Trebbia, and advance by Settimo to St. George, on the Nura, in order to interpose between the French left and the mountains. Melas commanded the centre, supported by a powerful reserve under Frœlich, while Ott, with a small corps, formed the left, and was established on the high road to Placentia, rather to preserve the communication with the castle than to take any active part in the engagement. The

* Jom., xi., 354, 357. Dum., i., 195, 197. Th., x., 300, 301. Arch. Ch., ii., 53.

† It is remarkable that the fate of Italy has thrice been decided on the same spot: once in the battle between the Romans and Carthaginians; again, in 1746, in that between the Austrians and French; and in 1799, between the French and Russians. A similar coincidence will frequently occur in the course of this work, particularly at Vittoria, Leipzig, Lutzen, Fleurus, and many others: a striking proof how permanent are the operation of the causes, under every variety of the military art, which conduct hostile nations, at remote periods from each other, to the same fields of battle. —See ARCHDUKE CHARLES, ii., 61. The author visited this field in 1818, along with his valued friend, Captain Basil Hall; the lapse of two thousand years had altered none of the features described by the graphic pen of Livy.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 51, 52. St. Cyr., i., 213, 214. Dum., i., 191, 192. Jom., xi., 346, 349.

† St. Cyr., i., 215, 217. Jom., xi., 349, 353. Dum., i., 193. Arch. Ch., ii., 55.

day was the anniversary of the battle of Kolin; and Suwarrow, to stimulate the ardour of the Austrians, gave for the watchword "Theresa and Kolin," while the general instructions to the army were to combat in large masses, and as much as possible with the bayonet.*

Macdonald, who intended to have delayed the battle till the day following, had only the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, with the brigade of Salm, in position on the Trebbia; those of Olivier and Montrichard could not arrive in line till noon. A furious action commenced at six o'clock, between the troops of Bagrathion and Victor's division, which formed the extreme left of the French, and rested on the mountains. The French general, seeing he was to be attacked, crossed the Trebbia, and advanced against the enemy. A bloody battle ensued on the ground intersected by the Torridella, till at length, towards evening, the steady valour of the Russians prevailed, and the Republicans were driven back with great slaughter over the Trebbia, followed by the allies, who advanced as far as Settimo. On the French right, Salm's division, enveloped by superior forces, retreated with difficulty across the river. In the middle of the day, the divisions Olivier and Montrichard arrived to support the centre; but though they gained at first a slight advantage, nothing decisive occurred, and at the approach of night they retired at all points over the Trebbia, which again formed the line of separation between the hostile armies.†

Worn out with fatigue, the troops on both sides lay down round their watch-fires, on the opposite shores of the Trebbia, which still, as in the days of Hannibal, flows in a gravelly bed, between banks of moderate height, clothed with stunted trees and underwood. The corps of Rosenberg alone had crossed the stream, and reached Settimo, in the rear of the French lines; but, disquieted by its separation from the remainder of the army, and ignorant of the immense advantages of its position, it passed an anxious night, in square, with the cavalry bridled and the men sleeping on their guns, and before daybreak withdrew to the Russian side of the river. Towards midnight, three French battalions, misled by false reports, entered, in disorder, into the bed by the Trebbia, and opened a fire of musketry upon the Russian videttes, upon which the two armies immediately started to their arms; the cavalry on both sides rushed into the river, the artillery played, without distinguishing, on friends and foes, and the extraordinary spectacle was exhibited of a nocturnal combat by moonlight, by hostile bodies up to the middle in water. At length the officers succeeded in putting an end to this useless butchery, and the rival armies, separated only by a stream, sunk into sleep within a few yards of each other, amid the dead and the dying.‡

The sun arose for the third time on this scene of slaughter, but no disposition appeared on either side to terminate the contest. Suwarrow,

re-enforced by five battalions and six squadrons, which had come up from the other side of the Po, again strengthened his right, renewed to Rosenberg the orders to press vigorously on in that quarter, and directed Melas to be ready to support him with the reserve. Hours, even minutes, were of value; for the Russian general was aware that Moreau had left his position on the Apennines, that the force opposed to him was totally inadequate to arrest his progress, and he was in momentary expectation of hearing the distant sound of his cannon in the rear of the army. Everything, therefore, depended on a vigorous prosecution of the advantages gained on the two preceding days, so as to render the co-operation of the Republican armies impossible. On the other hand, Macdonald, having now collected all his forces, and reckoning on the arrival of Moreau on June 19. the following day, resolved to resume the offensive. His plan was to turn at once both flanks of the enemy: a hazardous operation at all times, unless conducted by a greatly superior army, by reason of the dispersion of force which it requires, but doubly so in the present instance, from the risk of one of his wings being driven into the Po. The battle was to be commenced by Dombrowsky moving in the direction of Niviano to outflank the corps of Rosenberg, while Rusca and Victor attacked it in front; Olivier and Montrichard were charged with the task of forcing the passage of the river in the centre, while the extreme right, composed of the brigade of Salm and the reserve of Watrin, were to drive back the Russian left by interposing between it and the river Po.*

Such was the fatigue of the men on both sides, that they could not commence the action before ten o'clock. Suwarrow, at that hour, was beginning to put his troops in motion, when the French appeared in two lines on the opposite shore of the Trebbia, with the intervals between the columns filled with cavalry, and instantly the first line crossed the river, with the water up to the soldiers' armpits, and advanced fiercely to the attack. Dombrowsky pushed on to Rivallo, and soon outflanked the Russian right; and Suwarrow, seeing the danger in that quarter, ordered the division of Bagrathion to throw back its right in order to face the enemy, and, after a warm contest, that general succeeded in driving the Poles across the river. But that manœuvre having uncovered the flank of the division Schwiekousky, it was speedily enveloped by Victor and Rusca, driven back to Casaleggio, and only owed its safety to the invincible firmness of the Russian infantry, who formed square, faced about on all sides, and by an incessant rolling fire maintained their ground till Bagrathion, after defeating the Poles, came up in their rear, and Chastellar brought up four battalions of the division of Forster to attack them in front. The Poles, entirely disconcerted by their repulse, remained inactive; and, after a murderous strife, the French were overwhelmed, and Victor and Rusca driven, with great loss, over the Trebbia.†

Preparations of both parties for battle on the third day.

Desperate conflict on the Trebbia.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 54. Jom., xi., 358, 359. Dum., i., 196, 197. Th., x., 302.

† Th., x., 302, 303. Dum., i., 197, 198. Jom., xi., 360, 361. Arch. Ch., ii., 54.

‡ Jom., xi., 362. Th., x., 304.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 55. Jom., xi., 363. Th., x., 303.

† Jom., xi., 364, 365. Dum., i., 200, 201. Th., x., 304. Hard., vii., 256, 257.

In the centre, Olivier and Montrichard had crossed the river, and attacked the Austrians under Melas with such vigour, that they made themselves masters of some pieces of artillery, and threw the line into disorder. Already Montrichard was advancing against the division Forster, in the middle of the Russian line, when the Prince of Lichtenstein, at the head of the reserve, composed of the flower of the allied army, who at that moment were defiling towards the right to support Schwiekowsky, suddenly fell upon their flank when already somewhat disordered by success, and threw them into confusion, which was soon increased into a defeat by the heavy fire of Forster on the other side. This circumstance decided the fate of the day. Forster was now so far relieved as to be able to succour Suwarrow on the right, while Melas was supported by the reserve, who had been ordered, in the first moment of alarm, in the same direction. Prince Lichtenstein now charged the division of Olivier with such fury that it was forced to retire across the river. At the extreme left of the allies, Watrin advanced, without meeting with any resistance, along the Po; but he was ultimately obliged to retreat, to avoid being cut off and driven into the river by the victorious centre. Master of the whole left bank of the river, Suwarrow made several attempts to pass it; but he was constantly repulsed by the firmness of the French reserves, and night at length closed on this scene of carnage.*

Such was the terrible battle of the Trebbia, the most obstinately contested and bloody which had occurred since the commencement of the war, since, out of thirty-six thousand men in the field, the French, in the three days, had lost above twelve thousand in killed and wounded, and the allies nearly as many. It shows how much more fierce and sanguinary the war was destined to become when the iron bands of Russia were brought into the field, and how little all the advantages of skill and experience avail, when opposed to the indomitable courage and heroic valour of northern states. But, though the losses on both sides were nearly equal, the relative situation of the combatants was very different at the termination of the strife. The allies were victorious, and soon expected great re-enforcements from Hohenzollern and Klenau, who had already occupied Parma and Modena, and would more than compensate their losses in the field; whereas the Republicans had exhausted their last reserves, were dejected by defeat, and had no second army to fall back upon in their misfortunes. These considerations determined Macdonald; he decamped during the night,† and retired over the Nura, directing his march to re-enter the Apennines by the valley of the Taro.

Early on the following morning, a despatch was intercepted from the French general to Moreau, in which he represented the situation of his army as almost desperate, and gave in-

formation as to the line of his retreat. This information filled the allied generals with joy, and made them resolve to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigour. For this purpose, all their divisions were instantly despatched in pursuit; Rosenberg, supported by Forster, moved rapidly towards Nura, while Melas, with the divisions Ott and Frélich, advanced to Placentia. Victor's division, which formed the rear-guard on the Nura, was speedily assailed by superior forces, both in front and flank, and, after a gallant resistance, broken, great part made prisoners, and the remainder dispersed over the mountains. Melas, on his side, quickly made himself master of Placentia, where the French wounded, five thousand in number, were taken prisoners, including the generals Olivier, Rusca, Salm, and Cambray, and had he not imprudently halted the division Frélich at that town, the whole troops of Watrin would have fallen into his hands. Macdonald, on the following day, retired to Parma, from whence he dislodged Hohenzollern, and with infinite difficulty rallied the remains of his army behind the Larda, where they were reorganized in three divisions. The melancholy survey show-
June 21.
ed a chasm in his ranks of above fifteen thousand men since crossing the Apennines. At the same time, Lapoype, defeated at Casteggio by a Russian detachment, was driven from the high road, and with great pain escaped by mountain paths into the neighbourhood of Genoa.* All the French wounded fell into the hands of the allies; they made prisoners in all, during the battle and in the pursuit, four generals, five hundred and six officers, and twelve thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight private soldiers.†

The pursuit of Suwarrow was not continued beyond the Larda, in consequence of intelligence which there reached him of the progress of Moreau. Macdonald retired, therefore, unmolested to Modena and Bologna, where he repulsed General Ott, who made an attack on his army at Sassocolo, and regained the positions which it had occupied before the advance to the Trebbia.‡

In effect, the return of Suwarrow towards Tortona was become indispensable, and the dangerous situation of matters in his rear showed the magnitude of the peril from which he had extricated his army. Moreau, on the 16th, debouched from the Apennines by Gavi, and moved in two columns towards Tortona, at the head of fourteen thousand men. He advanced, however, with such circumspection, that on the 18th he had not passed Novi and Serravalle; and on that day the fate of the Neapolitan army was determined on the banks of the Trebbia. Bellegarde, unable with four brigades to arrest his progress, retired to a defensive position near Alexandria, leaving Tortona uncovered, the blockade of which was speedily raised by the French general. Immediately after, Moreau attacked Bellegarde with forces so immensely superior, that he defeated him, after a sharp action, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and five pieces of can-

Successful operations, during the battle of Moreau against Bellegarde.

* Dom., i., 201, 202. Jom., ii., 367, 368. Th., x., 305, 306. Hard., vii., 257, 258. Arch. Ch., ii. 55.

† Jom., xi., 367, 368. Th., x., 306, 307. Dum., i., 202, 203.

* Dum., i., 205. Th., x., 306. Jom., xi., 371, 373.

† Arch. Ch., ii. 56.

‡ Jom., xi., 374, 375. Dum., i., 205.

non. The Austrians, in disorder, sought refuge behind the Bormida, intending to fall back under the cannon of Valence;* and Moreau was advancing towards Placentia, when he was informed of the victory of Suwarrow and the fall of the citadel of Turin.

The vast military stores found by the allies in the city of Turin enabled them to complete their preparations for the siege of the citadel with great rapidity. A hundred pieces of heavy cannon speedily armed the trenches; forty bombs were shortly after added; the batteries were opened on the night of the 10th of June, and on the 19th the second parallel was completed. Night and day the besiegers from that time thundered on the walls from above two hundred pieces of artillery, and such was the effect of their fire that the garrison capitulated within twenty-four hours after, on condition of being sent back to France. This conquest was of immense importance. Besides disengaging the besieging force of General Kaim, which instantly set out to re-enforce Bellegarde, and rendering the allies masters of one of the strongest fortresses in Piedmont, it put into their hands 618 pieces of cannon, 40,000 muskets, and 50,000 quintals of powder, with the loss of only fifty men.†

No sooner was Suwarrow informed, upon the Larda, of the advance of Moreau and the defeat of Bellegarde, than, without losing an instant, he wheeled about, and marched with the utmost expedition to meet this new adversary. But Moreau fell back as rapidly as he approached, and, after revictualing Tortona, retired by Novi and Gavi to his former defensive position on the Apennines. The allies occupied Novi, and pushed their advanced posts far up the valleys into the mountains, while the blockade of Tortona was resumed, and the besieging force, removed from the lines before Mantua, sat down again before that important fortress. Macdonald commenced a long and painful retreat over the Apennines into Tuscany and the Genoese territory: a perilous lateral operation at all times in presence of an enemy in possession of the plain of the Po, and doubly so after the recent disaster which they had experienced. Fortunately for the French, Suwarrow had received, at this time, positive orders from the Aulic Council, ever attached to methodical proceedings, to attempt no operation beyond the Apennines till the fortresses of Lombardy were reduced,‡ in consequence of which he was compelled to remain in a state of inactivity on the Orba, while his antagonist completed his hazardous movements. Macdonald arrived, leaving only a detachment on the Apennines near the sources of the Trebbia, at Genoa by July 17. Lerici, in the middle of July, in the most deplorable state: his artillery dismounted or broken down, the cavalry and caissons without horses, the soldiers half naked, without shoes or linen of any sort, more like spectres than men. How different from the splendid troops which, three years before, had traversed

the same country, in all the pomp of war, under the standards of Napoleon!*

Mutual exhaustion, and the intervening ridge of the Apennines, now compelled a cessation from hostilities for above a month. Suwarrow collected forty-five thousand men in the plain between Tortona and Alexandria to watch the Republicans on the mountains of Genoa, and cover the sieges of those places and of Mantua, which were now pressed with activity. The French, in deep dejection, commenced the reorganization of their two armies into one; Macdonald was recalled, and yielded the command of the right wing to St. Cyr; Perignon was intrusted with the centre, and Lemoine, who brought up twelve fresh battalions from France, put at the head of the left. Montrichard and Lapoye were disgraced, and Moreau continued in the chief command. Notwithstanding all the re-enforcements he had received, this skilful general was not able, with both armies united, to reckon on more than forty thousand men for operations in the field, the poor remains of above a hundred thousand that might have been assembled for that purpose at the opening of the campaign.†

The remarkable analogy must strike the most inattentive observer between the conduct of Suwarrow previous to the battle of Trebbia, and that of Napoleon on the approach of Wurmsers to succour Mantua. Imitating the vigour and activity of his great predecessor, the Russian general, though at the head of an army considerably inferior to that of his adversaries, was present everywhere at the decisive point. The citadel of Turin, with its immense magazines, was captured by an army of only forty thousand men, in presence of two whose united force exceeded fifty thousand; for, although Suwarrow ordered up great part of the garrison of Mantua to re-enforce his army previous to the battle of the Trebbia, they were prevented from joining by an autograph order of the emperor, who deemed the acquisition of that fortress of greater importance than any other consideration to the Austrian Empire.‡ The Russian general, therefore, had to contend, not only with the armies of Macdonald and Moreau, but the obstacles thrown in his way by the imperial authorities; and, when this is considered, his defeat of the Republicans, by rapidly interposing the bulk of his forces between them, and turning first on the one and then on the other, must be regarded as one of the most splendid feats which the history of the war afforded.

During these critical operations at the foot of the Apennines, the Directory had succeeded in assembling a great naval force in the Mediterranean. Already convinced, by the disasters they had experienced, of the impolicy of the eccentric direction of so considerable a part of their force as had resulted from the expedition to Egypt, they exerted all their efforts to obtain the means of their return, or,

Reorganization of both French armies under Moreau.

Reflections on Suwarrow's admirable conduct in the preceding movement.

Naval efforts of the Directory to get back the army from Egypt.

* Jom., xi., 379, 380. Dum., i., 204. Th., x., 307. Arch. Ch., ii., 57.

† St. Cyr, i., 220. Jom., xi., 380, 381. Dum., i., 206.

‡ Arch. Ch., ii., 63.

* Jom., xi., 381, 387, 388. St. Cyr, i., 218, 219. Arch. Ch., ii., 65, 67.

† Jom., xi., 388, 390. Dum., i., 220, 223. St. Cyr, i., 220.

‡ Jom., xi., 386. Hard., vii., 250, 251.

at least, open a communication with that famed, now isolated army. No sooner was intelligence received of the defeat of Jourdan at Stockach, than Bruix, minister of marine, repaired to Brest, where he urged, with the utmost diligence, the preparations for the sailing of the fleet. Such was the effect of his exertions, that in the end of April he was enabled to put to sea with twenty-five ships of the line, at the time when Lord Bridport was blown off the coast with the Channel fleet. As soon as intelligence was received that they had sailed, the English admiral steered for the southern coast of Ireland, while Bruix, directing his course straight to Cadiz, raised the blockade of that harbour, which Admiral Keith maintained with fifteen ships of the line, and passed the Straits of Gibraltar. The entrance of the combined fleet into the Mediterranean seemed to announce decisive events, but nevertheless it came to nothing. The immense armament, amounting to fifty ships of the line, steered for the Bay of Genoa, where it entered into communication with Moreau, and for a time powerfully supported the spirits

Which come to nothing.

of his army. But, after remaining some weeks on the Italian coast, Bruix sailed for Cadiz, from whence he returned to Brest, which he reached in the middle of August 13. August, without either having fallen in with any of the English fleets, or achieved anything whatever, with one of the most powerful squadrons that ever left a European harbour.*

The retreat of Macdonald was immediately followed by the recovery of his dominions by the King of Naples. The army of Cardinal Ruffo, which was from Naples, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, advanced against Naples, and, having speedily dispersed the feeble bands of the Revolutionists who opposed his progress, took possession of that capital; and a combined force of English, Russians, and Neapolitans having a few days after entered the port, the fort St. Elmo was so vigorously besieged, that it was July 29. obliged to capitulate, the garrison returning to France on condition of not again serving till exchanged. Capua was next July 31. attacked, and surrendered, by capitulation, to Commodore Trowbridge, which was followed, two days after, by the reduction of the important fortress of Gaeta, on the same terms, which completed the deliverance of the Neapolitan dominions.†

The French, who surrendered in these two last fortresses, gave up unconditionally to their indignant enemies the revolted Neapolitans who had taken a part in the late revolution. A special commission was immediately appointed, which, without much formality, and still less humanity, condemned to death the greater part of those who had been engaged in the insurrection; and a dreadful series of executions, or rather massacres, took place, which too clearly evinced the relentless spirit of Italian revenge. But the executions at Naples were of more moment, and peculiarly call for the attention of the British historians, because they

have affixed the only stain to the character of the greatest naval hero of his country. The garrisons of the Castello Nuovo and the Castella del Uovo had capitulated to Cardinal Ruffo on the express condition that they themselves, and their families, should be protected, and that they should have liberty either to retire to Toulon or remain in Naples, as they should feel inclined; but in this latter case they were to experience no molestation in their persons or property. This capitulation was subscribed by Cardinal Ruffo as viceroy of the kingdom, by Kerandy on the part of the Emperor of Russia, and by Captain Foote on the part of the King of Great Britain; and the cardinal, in the name of the king, shortly after published a proclamation, in which he granted an entire amnesty to the Republicans, guaranteeing to them perfect security if they remained at Naples, and a free navigation to Marseilles if they preferred following the fortunes of the tricolour standard. In terms of this treaty, two vessels, containing the refugees from Castellomare, had already arrived safe at Marseilles.*

But these wise and humane measures were instantly interrupted by the arrival of the king and queen, with the court, on board of Nelson's fleet. They were animated with the strongest feelings of revenge against the Republican party; and, unfortunately, the English admiral, who had fallen under the fascinating influence of Lady Hamilton, who shared in all the feelings of the court, was too much inclined to adopt the same principles. He instantly declared the capitulation null, as not having obtained the king's authority, and entering the harbour at the head of his fleet, made all those who had issued from the castles in virtue of the capitulation prisoners, and had them chained two and two on board his own fleet. The king, whose humanity could not endure the sight of the punishments which were preparing, returned to Sicily, and left the administration of justice in the hands of the queen and Lady Hamilton. Numbers were immediately condemned and executed; and the vengeance of the populace supplied what was wanting in the celerity of the criminal tribunals; neither age, nor sex, nor rank were spared; women as well as men, youths of sixteen, and gray-headed men of seventy, were alike led out to the scaffold, and infants of twelve years of age sent into exile. The Republicans behaved, in almost every instance, in their last moments with heroic courage, and made men forget, in pity for their misfortunes, the ingratitude or treason of which they had previously been guilty.†

The fate of the Neapolitan admiral, Prince Francis Carraccioli, was particularly deplorable. He had been one of the principal leaders of the Revolution, and, after the capitulation of the castles, had retired to the mountains, where he was betrayed by a domestic, and brought bound on board the British admiral's flag-ship. A naval court-martial was there immediately summoned, composed of Neapolitan officers, by whom he was condemned to—

Violation of capitulations by the Neapolitan court.

Nelson concurs in these iniquitous proceedings.

Deplorable fate of Prince Carraccioli on board Nelson's own ship.

* Jom., xi., 394, 396. Ann. Reg., 1799, 291.

† Ann. Reg., 1799, 292. Bott., iii., 395, 410.

* Bot., iii., 401, 402. Ann. Reg., 1799, 292.

† Bot., iii., 406, 407. Southey's Nelson, ii., 47, 49.

death. In vain the old man entreated that he might be shot, and not die the death of a malefactor: his prayers were disregarded, and, after being strangled by the executioner, he was thrown from the vessel into the sea. Before night his body was seen erect in the waves from the middle upward, as if he had risen from the deep to reproach the English hero with his unworthily fate.*

For these acts of cruelty no sort of apology can be offered to be offered. Whether the capitulation should or should not have been granted, is a different and irrelevant question. Suffice it to say, that it had taken place, and that, in virtue of its provisions, the allied powers had gained possession of the castles of Naples. To assert in such a case that the king had not ratified the capitulation, and that, without such a sanction, it was null, is a quibble which, though frequently resorted to by the French, is unworthy of a generous mind, and destitute of any support in the law of nations. The capitulation of the vanquished should ever be held sacred in civilized warfare, for this reason, if no other existed, that, by acceding to it, they have deprived themselves of all chance of resistance, and put the means of violating it with impunity in the hands of their adversaries: it then becomes a debt of honour which must be paid. The sovereign power which takes benefit from one side of a capitulation by gaining possession of the fortress which the capitulants held, is unquestionably bound to perform the other part of the bilateral engagement, by whomever entered into, which, so far from repudiating, it has, by that very act, homologated and acquiesced in. If the Neapolitan authorities were resolutely determined to commit such a breach of public faith, the English admiral, if he had not sufficient influence to prevent it, should at least have taken no part in the iniquities which followed, and not stained the standard of England by judicial murders committed under its own shadow. In every point of view, therefore, the conduct of Nelson in this tragic affair was inexcusable; his biographer may perhaps, with justice, ascribe it to the fatal ascendancy of female fascination;† but the historian, who has the interests of humanity and the cause of justice to support, can admit of no such alleviation, and will best discharge his duty by imitating the conduct of his eloquent annalist, and with shame acknowledging the disgraceful deeds.‡

The events of this campaign demonstrate, in the most striking manner, the vast importance of assuming the offensive in mountain warfare; and how frequently a smaller force, skillfully led, may triumph over a greater in such a situation, by the simple expedient of turning its position by the lateral valleys, and appearing unexpectedly in its rear. The nature of the ground is singularly favourable to such an operation, by the concealment which lofty intervening

ridges afford to the turning column, and the impossibility of escape to the one turned, shut in on both sides by difficult, perhaps impassable ridges, and suddenly assailed in rear when fully occupied in front. The brilliant successes of Lecourbe at Glarus and Martinsbruck, and of Hotze at Luciensteg, were both achieved, in opposition to superior forces, by the skillful application of this principle. Against such a danger, the intrenchments usually thrown up in the gorge or at the summit of mountain passes afford but little protection; for open behind,* they are easily taken by the column which has penetrated into the rear by a circuitous route, and, destitute of casemates, they afford no sort of protection against a plunging fire from the heights on either side.

Nor did this memorable struggle evince in a less convincing manner the erroneous foundation on which the opinion then generally received rested, that the possession of the mountains ensured that of the plains at their feet; and that the true key to the south of Germany and north of Italy was to be found in the Alps which were interposed between them. Of what avail was the successful irruption of Massena into the Grisons, after the disaster of Stockach brought back the Republican standards to the Rhine, or the splendid stroke of Lecourbe in the Engadine, when the disaster of Magnano caused them to lose the line of the Adige? In tactics, or the lesser operations of strategy, the possession of mountain ridges is often of decisive importance, but in the great designs of extensive warfare seldom of any lasting value. He that has gained a height which commands a field of battle is often secure of the day; but the master of a ridge of lofty mountains is by no means equally safe against the efforts of an adversary, who, by having acquired possession of the entrance of all the valleys leading from thence into the plain, is enabled to cut him off both from his communications and his resources. Water descends from the higher ground to the lower; but the strength and sinews of war, in general, follow the opposite course, and ascend from the riches and fortresses of the plain to the sterility and desolation of the mountains. It is in the valley of the Danube and the plain of Lombardy that the struggle between France and Austria ever has and ever will be determined;‡ the lofty ridges of Switzerland and Tyrol, important as an accessory to secure the flanks of either army, are far from being the decisive point.

Although the campaign had lasted so short a time, it was already apparent how much the views of the Austrian cabinet were hampered by the possession of Venice, and how completely the spoliation of that republic had thrown the apple of discord between the allied powers. The principle laid down by the Emperor Paul, of restoring to every one what he had lost, though the true foundation for the anti-revolutionary alliance, which had been eloquently supported by Mr. Burke, and afterward became the basis of the great confederacy which brought the war to a successful issue, gave the utmost uneasiness to the cabinet of Vienna. They were terrified at the very rapidity of the Russian

* Southey, ii., 47, 53. Bot., iii., 414, 415.

† Southey, ii., 47, 53. Bot., iii., 415, 416. Hard., vii., 332, 333.

‡ It deserves to be recorded, to the honour of Napoleon, that he endeavoured to palliate Nelson's share in these dark transactions, ascribing it to misinformation, and the fascinating ascendancy of Lady Hamilton.—O'MEARA, i., 306.

* Arch. Ch., i., 95, 96.

† Arch. Ch., i., 53, 54.

conqueror's success, and endeavoured, by every means in their power, to moderate his disinterested fervour, and render his surprising success the means only of securing their great acquisitions in the north of Italy. Hence the jealousies, heartburnings, and divisions which destroyed the cordial co-operation of the allied troops, which led to the fatal separation of the Russian from the Austrian forces both in Italy and Switzerland, and ultimately brought about all the disasters of the campaign. Had the hands of Austria been clean, she might have invaded France by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, and brought the contest to a glorious issue in 1799, while Napoleon was as yet an exile on the banks of the Nile. Twice did the European powers lose the opportunity of crushing the forces of the Revolution, and on both occasions

from their governments having imitated its guilt; first by the withdrawal of Prussia, in 1794, to secure her share in the partition of Poland, and next from the anxiety of Austria, in 1799, to retain her iniquitous acquisitions in Italy. England alone remained throughout unsullied by crime, unfettered by the consciousness of robbery, and she alone continued to the end unsubdued in arms. It is not by imitating the guilt of a hostile power, but steadfastly shunning it, that ultimate success is to be obtained; the gains of iniquity to nations, not less than individuals, are generally more than compensated by their pains; and the only true foundation for durable prosperity is to be found in that strenuous but upright course, which resists equally the seduction and the violence of wickedness.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1799—PART II.

FROM THE BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

ARGUMENT.

Dangerous Position of the Republic at this Juncture.—

Enormous Consumption of Human Life since the Commencement of the Campaign.—Clear Proof thus afforded of the Error of the Directory in attacking Switzerland and Italy.—Military Preparations of the Allies and Republicans.—Objects of the contending Generals.—Great Levy of Troops by the Directory.—Their Measures to re-enforce the Armies.—The Aulic Council injudiciously restrain Suwarow from active Operations.—This leads to an Agreement for a disastrous Separation of the Austrian and Russian Forces.—Resumption of Hostilities by the Republicans around Genoa.—Progress of the Siege of Mantua.—Description of that Fortress.—Commencement of the Siege by Kray.—Its Surrender.—Fall of Alexandria.—Commencement of the Siege of Tortona.—Position of the Republicans in front of Genoa.—Magnanimous Conduct of Moreau on Joubert's assuming the Command.—Advance of the French to raise the Siege.—Positions of the Allies and of the French.—Joubert had resolved to retreat on learning the Fall of Mantua.—He is attacked before doing so by Suwarow.—Death of Joubert.—Battle of Novi.—The Allies are at first repulsed.—Combined Attack of all their Forces.—The Advance of Melas at length decides the Victory.—Great Loss on both Sides.—Moreau still maintains himself on the Crest of the Apennines.—Separation of the victorious Force.—Operations of Championet in the Alps at this Time.—Fall of Tortona.—Situation of Massena and the Archduke at Zurich.—Insane Dislocation of the Allied Forces at this Period by the Aulic Council.—Description of the Theatre of War.—Plan of the Allies, and of Massena.—Commencement of the Attack by Lecourbe on the St. Gothard.—The Imperialists are forced back at all Points.—They are driven from the Grimsel and the Furca, and the St. Gothard.—Successes of the French near Schwytz, who drive the Austrians into Glarus.—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Archduke to cross the Limmat below Zurich.—Being foiled, he marches to the Upper Rhine.—Austrian left is defeated in Glarus.—Successful Expedition of the Archduke against Mannheim.—Plan of the Allies for a combined Attack by Suwarow and Korsakow on Massena.—Relative Situation of the French and Russian Centres at Zurich.—Unfounded Confidence of the latter.—Massena's able Plan of Attack.—The Passage of the Limmat is surprised below Zurich.—Feigned Attacks on Zurich and the Lower Limmat.—Dreadful Confusion in the Town of Zurich.—Brave Resolution of Korsakow to cut his Way through the Enemy.—He does so, but loses all his Artillery and Baggage.—Success of Soult against Hotze above the Lake.—Death of the latter Officer.—Operations of Suwarow on the Ticino.—Bloody Conflict above Airolo.—The St. Gothard is at length forced by the Russians.—Dreadful Struggle at the Devil's Bridge.—Arrived at Aldort, Suwarow is forced to ascend the Schachenthal.—Difficult Passage of that Ridge to Muttén.—He finds none of the expected Re-enforcements there, and is surrounded on all Sides, and reluctantly compelled

to retreat.—He crosses the Mountains into Glarus.—Desperate Struggle at Nefels.—Dreadful Passage of the Alps of Glarus to Ilanz on the Rhine.—Bloody Conflicts with Korsakow near Constance.—The Archduke hastens to his Aid, and checks the farther Pursuit.—Treaty between Russia and England for an Expedition to Holland.—Vigorous Preparations for the Expedition in England.—The Expedition Sails, and lands on the Dutch Coast.—Action at the Heider.—Defeat of the Enemy.—Capture of the Dutch Fleet at the Texel.—The British are attacked by the Republicans, but repulse them with great Loss.—The English, joined by the Russians, at length Advance.—Plan of the Attack.—Disaster of the Russians on the Right.—Victory of the British in the Centre and Left.—But the continued retreat of the Russians arrests the British in the midst of their Success.—Removal of the Dutch Fleet to England.—The Duke of York renews the Attack, and is Successful.—His critical Situation notwithstanding.—Indecisive Action, which leads to the Retreat of the British, who first Retire, and at length Capitulate.—Reflections on this Disaster in the Nation.—Affairs of Italy after the Battle of Novi.—The Imperialists draw round Coni.—Championet is constrained to attempt its Relief.—Measures to effect that Object.—Preparations for a decisive Battle.—Battle of Genoa, in which the French are defeated.—Success of St. Cyr near Novi.—Siege and Fall of Coni.—Gallant Conduct of St. Cyr in the Bocchetta Pass.—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Imperialists upon Genoa, who go into Winter-quarters.—Fall of Ancona.—Position of the respective Parties at the Conclusion of the Campaign.—Contrast between the Comforts of the Imperialists and the Privations of the French.—Death of Championet.—Jealousies between the Russians and Austrians.—Suwarow retires into Bavaria, which leads to a Rupture between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg.—Positions assumed by the Austrians when so abandoned.—Operations on the Lower Rhine.—Reflections on the vast Successes gained by the Allies in the Campaign.—Deploable internal Situation of the Republic.—Causes of the Rupture of the Alliance.—Comparison of the Passage of the St. Gothard by Suwarow and the St. Bernard by Napoleon.—Deploable Insignificance of the Part which England took in the Continental Struggle.—Causes of the rapid Fall of the French Power in 1799.

SINCE the period when the white flag waved at Saumur and the tricolour was displaced at Lyons and Toulon, the Republic had never been in such danger as after the first pause in the campaign of 1799. It was, in truth, within a hairbreadth of destruction. If the allied forces in 1793 were nearer her frontier, and the interior was torn by more vehement dissensions, on the other hand, the attacking powers in 1799

were incomparably more formidable, and the armies they brought into the field greatly superior both in military prowess and moral vigour. The war no longer languished in affairs of posts or indecisive actions, leading to retreat on the first reverse; a hundred thousand men no longer fought with the loss of three or four thousand to the victors and the vanquished; the passions had been roused on both sides, and battles were not lost or won without a desperate effusion of human blood. The military ardour of the Austrians, slow of growth, but tenacious of purpose, was now thoroughly awakened, from the reverses the monarchy had undergone, and the imminent perils to which it had been exposed; the fanatical ardour of Suwarrow had roused to the highest pitch the steady valour of the Russians; and Great Britain, taught by past misfortunes, was preparing to abandon the vacillating system of her former warfare, and put forth her strength in a manner worthy of her present greatness and ancient renown. From the Bay of Genoa to the mouth of the Rhine, nearly three hundred thousand veteran troops were advancing against the Republic, flushed by victory, and conducted by consummate military talent; while the Revolution had worn out the capacity which directed, as well as the energy which sustained its fortunes. The master-spirit of Carnot had ceased to guide the movements of the French armies; the genius of Napoleon languished on the sands of Egypt; the boundless enthusiasm of 1793 had worn itself out; the resources of the assignats were at an end; the terrible Committee of Public Safety no longer was at the helm, to wrench out of public suffering the means of victory; an exhausted nation and a dispirited army had to withstand the weight of Austria and the vigour of Russia, guided by the science of the Archduke Charles and the energy of Suwarrow.

Though the war had lasted for so short a time since its recommencement, the consumption of human life had already been prodigious; the contending parties fought with unprecedented exasperation, and the results gained had outstripped the calculations of the most enthusiastic speculators. In little more than four months, the French and allied armies had lost nearly half of their effective force: those cut off or irrecoverably mutilated by the sword were above 116,000;* while the means of supplying these vast chasms were much more ample on the part of the allied monarchs than the French Directory. Never, in ancient or modern times, had such immense armies contended on so extensive a field. The right of the allies rested on the Maine; their centre was posted in Switzerland; while their left stretched over the plain of Lombardy to the foot of the Apennines; and a shock was felt all along this vast line, from the rocks of Genoa to the marshes of Holland. The results hitherto had been, to an unprecedented degree, disastrous to the French. From being universally victorious, they had everywhere become unfortunate; at the point of the bayonet they had been driven back, both in Germany and Italy, to the frontiers of the Republic; the conquests of Napoleon had been

lost as rapidly as they had been won; and the power which recently threatened Vienna now trembled lest the imperial standards should appear on the summits of the Jura or the banks of the Rhone.

It was now apparent what a capital error the Directory had committed in overrunning Switzerland, in extending their forces through the Italian peninsula, instead of concentrating them to bear the weight of Austria on the Adige; and exiling their best army and greatest general in Africa at the very time when the allies were summoning to their aid the forces of a new monarchy and the genius of a hitherto invincible conqueror. But these errors had been committed; their consequences had fallen like a thunderbolt on France; the return of Napoleon and his army seemed impossible; Italy was lost; and nothing but the invincible tenacity and singular talents of Massena enabled him to maintain himself in the last defensive line to the north of the Alps, and avert invasion from France in the quarter where its frontier is most vulnerable. To complete its misfortunes, internal dissension had paralyzed the Republic at the very time when foreign dangers were most pressing, and a new government added to its declining fortunes the weakness incident to every infant administration.

The preparations of the allies to follow up this extraordinary flow of prosperous affairs were of the most formidable kind. The forces in Italy amounted to one hundred and fifteen thousand men; and after deducting the troops required in the siege of Mantua, Alexandria, and other fortresses in the rear, Suwarrow could still collect above fifty thousand men to press on the dispirited army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, which could not muster twenty thousand soldiers around its banners. This army was destined to clear the Maritime Alps and Savoy of the enemy, and turn the position of Massena, who still maintained himself with invincible obstinacy on the banks of the Limmat. The archduke had not under his immediate orders at that period above forty-three thousand men, twenty-two thousand having been left in the Black Forest, to mask the garrisons in the *têtes-du-pont* which the French possessed on the Upper Rhine, and sixteen thousand in the Grisons and the central Alps, to keep possession of the important ridge of the St. Gothard. But a fresh Russian army of twenty-six thousand men was approaching under Korsakow, and was expected in the environs of Zurich by the middle of August; and something was hoped from the insurrection of the Swiss who had been liberated from the French armies.*

To meet these formidable forces, the French, who had directed all the new levies to the north of Switzerland, as the chiefly-menaced point, had seventy-five thousand men, under Massena, on the Limmat, and the utmost efforts were made in the interior to augment to the greatest degree this important army. The English and Russians also had combined a plan for the de-

Clear proof thus afforded of the error of attacking Switzerland and Italy.

* Dum., i., 434.

* Archduke Ch., ii., 2, 92. Dum., i., 223, 225. Jom., xii., 60, 72.

scent of forty thousand men on the coast of Holland, for which purpose seventeen thousand men were to be furnished by his imperial majesty, and twenty-five thousand by Great Britain; and this force, it was hoped, would not only liberate Holland, but paralyze all the north of France, as General Brune had only fifteen thousand French troops in the United Provinces, and the native soldiers did not exceed twenty thousand.* Thus, while the centre of the French was threatened with an attack from overwhelming forces in the Alps, and an inroad preparing, by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, into the heart of their territory, their left was menaced by a more formidable invasion from the northern powers than they had yet experienced, and their right with difficulty maintained itself with inferior forces on the inhospitable summits of the Maritime Alps.

But, although the plan of the allies was so extensive, the decisive point lay in the centre of the line, and it was by the archduke that the vital blow was to be struck, which would at once have opened to them an entrance into the heart of France. This able commander impatiently awaited the arrival of the Russians under Korsakow, which would have conferred a superiority of thirty thousand men over his opponent, and enabled him to resume the offensive with an overwhelming advantage. The object of Massena, of course, was to strike a blow before this great re-enforcement arrived; as, though his army was rapidly augmenting by conscripts from the interior, he had no such sudden increase to expect as awaited the imperial forces. It was equally indispensable for the Republicans to resume the offensive without any delay in Italy, as the important fortresses of Mantua and Alexandria were now hard pressed by the allies, and, if not speedily relieved, must not only, by their fall, give them the entire command of the plain of Lombardy, but enable them to render the position of Massena untenable to the north of the Alps.†

To meet these accumulating dangers, the French government exhibited an energy commensurate to the crisis in which they were placed. The imminence of the peril induced them to exhibit it without disguise to both branches of the legislature. General Jourdan proposed to call out at once all classes of the conscripts, which, it was expected, would produce an increase of two hundred thousand men to the armies, and to levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 francs, or £4,800,000, on the opulent classes, secured on the national domains. Both motions were at once agreed to by the councils. To render them as soon as possible available, the conscriptions were ordered to be formed into regiments, and drilled in their several departments, and marched off the moment they were disposable, to the nearest army on the frontier, while the service of Lisle, Strasburg, and the other fortresses was in great part intrusted to the National Guards of the vicinity. Thus, with the recurrence of a crisis in the affairs of the Republic, the Revolutionary measures which had

already been found so efficacious were again put in activity. Bernadotte, who at this crisis was appointed minister at war, rapidly infused into all the departments of the military service his own energy and resolution; and we have the best of all authorities, that of his political antagonist, Napoleon himself, for the assertion, that it was to the admirable measures which he set on foot, and the conscripts whom he assembled round the imperial standards, that not only the victory of Zurich at the close of the campaign, but the subsequent triumph of Marengo, were in a great degree owing.*

In order to counteract, as far as possible, the designs of the allies, it was resolved to augment to thirty thousand men the forces placed on the summit of the Alps, from the St. Bernard to the Mediterranean; while the army of Italy, debouching from the Apennines, should resume the offensive, in order to prevent the siege of Coni, and raise those of Mantua and Alexandria; and Massena should execute a powerful diversion on the Limmat ere the arrival of the Russians under Korsakow. For this purpose, all the conscripts on the eastern and southern departments were rapidly marched off to the armies at Zurich and on the Alps, and the fortresses of Grenoble, Briançon, and Fenestrelles, commanding the principal entrances from Piedmont into France, armed and provisioned. At the same time, the direction of the troops on the frontier was changed. Championet, liberated from prison, was intrusted with the command of the army of the Alps, while that of the army of Italy was taken from Moreau, under whom, notwithstanding his great abilities, it had experienced nothing but disaster, and given to Joubert; a youthful hero, who joined heroic valour to great natural abilities, and though as yet untried in the separate command of large armies, had evinced such talents in subordinate situations as gave the promise of great future renown, if it had not been cut short in the very outset of his career on the field of Novi.†

Suwarrow, who was well aware of the inestimable importance of time in war, was devoured with anxiety to commence operations against the army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, now not more than twenty thousand strong, before it had recovered from its consternation, or was strengthened by the arrival of Macdonald's forces, which were making a painful circuit by Florence and Pisa in its rear. But the Aulic Council, who looked more to the immediate concerns of Austria than the general interest of the common cause, insisted upon Mantua being put into their hands before anything was attempted either against Switzerland, Genoa, or the Maritime Alps; and the emperor again wrote to Suwarrow, positively forbidding any enterprise until that important fortress had surrendered. The impetuous marshal, unable to conceal his vexation, and fully aware of the disastrous effects this resolution would have upon the general fate of the campaign, exclaimed, "Thus it is that armies are ruined!" but, nevertheless, obeying the orders, he de-

* Jom., xii., 60, 178, 182. Ann. Reg., 1799, 301. Arch. Ch., ii., 2, 92.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 79, 86. Dum., i., 226.

* Nap. in Las Casas, ii., 241. Goh., i., 90. Jom., xii., 18, 20. Th., x., 336, 337.

† Jom., xii., 25, 26. St. Cyr., i., 231, 232.

spatched considerable re-enforcements and a powerful train of artillery by the Po to aid the siege of Mantua, and assembled at Turin the stores necessary for the reduction of Alexandria. Disgusted, however, with the subordinate part thus assigned to him, the Russian general abandoned to General Ott the duty of harassing the retreat of the army of Naples, and encamped with his veterans on the Bormida to await the tedious operations of the besieging forces.*

This circumstance contributed to induce an event, attended ultimately with important effects on the fate of the campaign, viz., the separation of the Austrian and Russian forces, and the rupture of any cordial concert between their respective governments. The cabinet of Vienna were too desirous of the exclusive sovereignty of the conquests in Italy to be willing to share their possession with a powerful rival, while the pride of the Russians was hurt at beholding their unconquered commander, whom they justly regarded as the soul of the confederacy, subjected to the orders of the Aulic Council, who could not appreciate his energetic mode of conducting war, and frequently interrupted him in the midst of the career of conquest. At the same time, the English government were desirous of allowing the Russian forces to act alone in Switzerland, aided by the insurrection which they hoped to organize in that country, and beheld with satisfaction the removal of the Muscotte standards from the shores of the Mediterranean, where their establishment in a permanent manner might possibly have occasioned them some uneasiness. These feelings on all sides led to an agreement between the allied powers, in virtue of which it was stipulated that the whole Russian troops, after the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, should be concentrated in Switzerland under Marshal Suwarrow; that the Imperialists should alone prosecute the war in Italy, and that the army of the Archduke Charles should act under his separate orders on the Upper Rhine. This plan itself was highly advisable; but, from the time at which it was carried into execution, it led to the most calamitous results.†

The whole forces of the Republic at this period actually on foot did not exceed 220,000 combatants; and although the new conscription was pressed with the utmost vigour, it could not be expected that it could add materially to the efficiency of the defending armies for several months, in the course of which, to all appearance, their fate would be decided.‡

The arrival of the army of Naples at Genoa in the end of July having raised the French force to forty-eight thousand men, including three thousand cavalry and a powerful artillery, it was deemed indispensable, on every account, to resume offensive operations, in conjunction with the army of the Alps, which had now been augmented to a respectable amount. Everything, accordingly, was put in motion in the valleys of the Alps and Apennines; and the French army, whose headquar-

ters were at Cornegliano, occupied at Voltri, Savona, Vado, and Loano nearly the same position which Napoleon held previous to his memorable descent into Italy in March, 1796. But it was too late; all the activity of Moreau and Joubert could not prevent the fall of the bulwarks of Lombardy and Piedmont.*

The siege of Mantua, which had been blockaded ever since the battle of Magna-^{Progress of the siege of Mantua.}no, was pressed in good earnest by General Kray after the victory of the Trebbia. The capture of Turin having placed at the disposal of the allies immense resources, both in artillery and ammunition, and the defeat of Macdonald relieved them from all anxiety as to the raising of the siege, thirty thousand men were soon collected round its walls, and the batteries of the besiegers armed with two hundred pieces of cannon. The garrison originally consisted of nearly eleven thousand men; but this force, barely adequate at first to man its extensive ramparts, was now considerably weakened by disease. The peculiar situation of this celebrated fortress rendered it indispensable that, at all hazards, the exterior works should be maintained, and this was no easy matter with an insufficient body of troops. The soldiers were provisioned for a year; but the inhabitants, thrice impoverished by enormous contributions, were in the most miserable condition, and the famine with which they were menaced, joined to the natural unhealthiness of the situation during the autumnal months, soon produced those contagious disorders ever in the rear of protracted war, which, in spite of every precaution, seriously weakened the strength of the garrison.†

Mantua, situated in the middle of a lake, formed by the Mincio in the course of its passage from the Alps to the Po, ^{Description of that fortress} depends entirely for its security upon its external works, and the command of the waters which surround its wall. Two chaussées traverse its whole extent on bridges of stone; the first leads to the citadel, the second leads to the faubourg St. George. Connected with the citadel are the external works and intrenched camp, which surround the lake, and prevent all access to its margin. These works, with the exception of the citadel, are not of any considerable strength; the real defence of Mantua consists in the command which the garrison has of the waters in the lake, which is formed by three locks. That of the citadel enables them at pleasure to augment the upper lake; that of Pradella gives them the command of the entrance of its waters into the Pajolo; while that of the port Ceresse puts it in their power to dam up the canal of Pajolo, and let it flow into inundations to obstruct the approach of the place. But, on the other hand, the besiegers have the means of augmenting or diminishing the supply of water to the lake itself, by draining off the river which feeds it above the town; and the dikes which lead to Pradella are of such breadth as to permit trenches to be cut and approaches made along it. Upon the whole, an exaggerated idea had been formed both of the value and strength of Mantua, by the importance which it had assumed in the campaign of 1796,

* Chastellair's Memoirs, 137. Jom., xii., 27, 28. Hard., vii., 250, 251.

† Archduke Ch., ii., 83, 84.

‡ Dum., i., 283.

* Dum., i., 256. Jom., xii., 29, 30. St. Cyr, i., 222.

† Dum., i., 258, 260. Jom., xii., 31, 35.

and the result of the present siege revealed the secret of its real weakness.*

Kray, taking advantage, with ability, of all the means at his disposal, had caused his flotilla to descend by Peschiera and Goito from the Lake of Guarda, and brought up many gunboats by the inferior part of the Mincio into the lower lake.

By means of these vessels, which were armed with cannon of the heaviest calibre, he kept up an incessant fire on the dikes, and at the same time established batteries against the curtain between the citadel and Fort St. George. These were intended merely as feints, to divert the attention of the besiegers from the real point of attack, which was the front of Fort Pradella.

On the night of the 14th of July, while the garrison were reposing, after having celebrated by extraordinary rejoicings the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, the trenches were opened, and after the approaches had been continued for some days, the tower of

Cerese was carried by assault, and the besiegers' guns rapidly brought close up to the outworks of the place. On the night of the 24th, all the batteries of the besiegers being fully armed, they opened their fire, from above two hundred pieces, with such tremendous effect, that the defences of the fortress speedily gave way before it; in less than two hours the outworks of Fort Pradella were destroyed, while the batteries, intended to create a diversion against the citadel, soon produced a serious impression. Nothing could stand against the vigour and sustained weight of the besiegers' fire; their discharges gradually rose from six thousand cannon-shot to twelve thousand in twenty-four hours, and the loss of the garrison from its effects was from five to six hundred a day. Under the pressure arising from so terrible an attack, the fort of St. George and the battery of Pajolo were successively abandoned, and at

length the garrison, reduced to seven thousand five hundred men, surrendered, on condition of being sent back to France, and not serving again until regularly exchanged. Hardly were the terms agreed to,

when the upper lake flowed with such violence into the under, through an aperture which the governor had cut to let in the waters, that sixty feet of the dike were carried away, and the inundation of Pajolo deepened to such a degree, that it might have prolonged for at least eight days his means of defence, and possibly, by preventing the besieging force taking a part in the battle of Novi, which shortly followed, altered the fate of the campaign.†

While the bulwark of Lombardy was thus falling, after an unexpectedly short resistance, into the hands of the Imperialists, Count Bellegarde was

not less successful against the citadel of Alexandria. Trenches were opened on the 8th of July, and in a few days eighty pieces of cannon were placed in battery; and such was the activity with which they were served, that in seven days they discharged no less than forty-two thousand projectiles. On the 21st, the garrison, consisting of sixteen hundred men, surrendered at discretion. This conquest

was of great importance to the future projects of Suwarrow, but it was dearly purchased by the loss of General Chastellar, his chief of the staff, who was severely wounded soon after the first trenches were opened; an officer whose talents and activity had, in a great degree, contributed to the success of the campaign.*

After the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, Suwarrow, faithful to the orders he had received from Vienna, to leave no fortified place in the enemy's hands in his rear, drew his forces round Coni, and commenced the siege of Tortona. His army was soon augmented by the arrival of General Kray with twenty thousand men from the siege of the latter place, who entered into line on the 12th of August. The trenches were opened before Tortona on the 5th of August, and on the 7th, the castle of Serravalle, situated at the entrance of one of the valleys leading into the Apennines, was taken after a short cannonade. But the French army, who were now concentrated under Joubert on the Apennines, was preparing an offensive movement, and the approaches to Genoa were destined to be the theatre of one of the most bloody battles on record in modern times.†

The Republicans at this epoch occupied the following positions. The right wing, fifteen thousand strong, under St. Cyr, guarded the passes of the Apennines from Pontremoli to

Torriglio, and furnished the garrison of Genoa. The centre, consisting of ten thousand, held the important posts of the Bocchetta and Campo-Freddo; while the left, twenty-two thousand strong, was encamped on the reverse of the mountains on the side of Piedmont, from the upper end of the valley of Tanaro, and both guarded the communications of the whole army with France, and kept up the connexion with the corps under Championet, which was beginning to collect on the higher passes of the Alps. On the other hand, the allies could only muster forty-five thousand in front of Tortona; General Kaim, with twelve thousand, being at Cherasco to observe the army of the Alps, and Klenau in Tuscany, with seven thousand combatants, the remainder of their great army being occupied in keeping up the communications between their widely-scattered forces.‡

The arrival of Joubert to supersede him in the command of his army had no tendency to excite feelings of jealousy in the mind of his great predecessor. Moreau was incapable of a personal feeling when the interest of his country was at stake; and with a magnanimity truly worthy of admiration, he not only gave his youthful successor the full benefit of his matured counsel and experience, but offered to accompany him for some days after he opened his campaign; contributing thus, by his advice, to the glory of a rival who had just supplanted him in the command. Joubert, on his side, not only profited by the assistance thus generously proffered, but deferred on every occasion to the advice of his illustri-

* *Jom.*, xii., 34, 35. *Dum.*, i., 262.

† *Jom.*, xii., 37, 47. *Dum.*, i., 262, 272.

* *Dum.*, i., 254, 255. *Jom.*, xii., 43, 54.

† *Jom.*, xii., 98. *Arch. Ch.*, ii., 70, 71. *Dum.*, i., 317.

‡ *Arch. Ch.*, ii., 71. *Jom.*, xii., 96, 97. *St. Cyr*, i., 221, 222.

Commencement of the siege by Kray.

Commencement of the siege of Tortona. August 2.

Aug. 12.

Position of the Republicans in front of Genoa.

Magnanimous conduct of Moreau on Joubert's assuming the command.

ous friend; and to the good understanding between these great men, the preservation of the Republican forces after the defeat at Novi and the death of Joubert is mainly to be ascribed.* How different from the presumption of Lafeuille, who a century before had caused the ruin of a French army near the same spot by neglecting the advice of Marshal Vauban before the walls of Turin.

On the 9th of August the French army commenced its forward movements†; and after debouching by the valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, and the Orba, concentrated, on the 13th, at Novi, and blockaded Serravalle, in the rear of their right wing. A fourth column, under the orders of St. Cyr, destined to raise the siege of Tortona, descended the defiles of the Bocchetta. Suwarrow no sooner heard of this advance than he concentrated his army, which, on the evening of the 14th, occupied the following positions: Kray, with the divisions of the allies, ions of Bellegarde and Ott, was encamped in two lines on the right, near the road from Novi to Bosco; the centre, consisting of the divisions of Forster and Schwiekousky, commanded by Derfelden, bivouacked in rear of Pozzolo-Formigaro, while Melas, with the left, consisting of the Austrian divisions of Frelich and Lichtenstein, occupied Rivalta. The army of Joubert was concentrated on the plateau in the rear of Novi, with his right on the Scrivia, his centre at Novi, and his left at Basaluzzo; a position which enabled him to cover the march of the columns detached from his right, which were destined to advance by Cassano to effect the deliverance of Novi. The French occupied a semicircle on the northern slopes of the Monte Rotondo; the left, composed of the divisions Grouchy and Lemoine, under the command of Perignon, extended itself, in a circular form, around Pasturana; in the centre, the division Laboissiere, under St. Cyr, covered the heights on the right and left of Novi; while the division Watrin, on the right, guarded the approaches to the Monte Rotondo from the side of Tortona, and Dombrowsky, with the Polish division, blockaded Serravalle. The position was strong, and the concentrated masses of the Republicans presented a formidable front among the woods, ravines, slopes, and vineyards with which the foot of the Apennines was broken. On the side of the French, forty-three thousand men were assembled, while the forces of the allies were above fifty-five thousand; a superiority which made the first desirous to engage upon the rugged ground at the foot of the hills, and the latter anxious to draw their opponent into the plain, where their great superiority in cavalry might give them a decisive advantage.†

Advances of the French to raise the siege. Aug. 14. Positions of the allies, ions of Bellegarde and Ott, was encamped in two lines on the right, near the road from Novi to Bosco; the centre, consisting of the divisions of Forster and Schwiekousky, commanded by Derfelden, bivouacked in rear of Pozzolo-Formigaro, while Melas, with the left, consisting of the Austrian divisions of Frelich and Lichtenstein, occupied Rivalta. The army of Joubert was concentrated on the plateau in the rear of Novi, with his right on the Scrivia, his centre at Novi, and his left at Basaluzzo; a position which enabled him to cover the march of the columns detached from his right, which were destined to advance by Cassano to effect the deliverance of Novi. The French occupied a semicircle on the northern slopes of the Monte Rotondo; the left, composed of the divisions Grouchy and Lemoine, under the command of Perignon, extended itself, in a circular form, around Pasturana; in the centre, the division Laboissiere, under St. Cyr, covered the heights on the right and left of Novi; while the division Watrin, on the right, guarded the approaches to the Monte Rotondo from the side of Tortona, and Dombrowsky, with the Polish division, blockaded Serravalle. The position was strong, and the concentrated masses of the Republicans presented a formidable front among the woods, ravines, slopes, and vineyards with which the foot of the Apennines was broken. On the side of the French, forty-three thousand men were assembled, while the forces of the allies were above fifty-five thousand; a superiority which made the first desirous to engage upon the rugged ground at the foot of the hills, and the latter anxious to draw their opponent into the plain, where their great superiority in cavalry might give them a decisive advantage.†

And of the French. Joubert, who had given no credit to the rumours which had reached the army of the fall of Mantua, and continually disbelieved the asseverations of St. Cyr, that he would have the whole allied army on his hands, received a painful confirmation of its truth by beholding the dense masses of Kray encamped opposite to his right wing. He was thrown by this unexpected discovery into the utmost perplexity; to engage with so great an inferiority of force was the height of temerity, while retreat was difficult in presence of so enterprising an enemy. In these circumstances, he resolved, late on the night of the 14th, after such irresolution as throws great doubts on his capacity as general-in-chief, whatever his talents as second in command may have been, on retiring into the fastnesses of the Apennines, and only waited for the arrival of his scouts in the morning to give the necessary orders for carrying it into effect, when the commencement of the attack by the allies compelled him to accept battle in the position which he occupied.*†

Joubert had resolved to retreat on learning the fall of Mantua. whole allied army on his hands, received a painful confirmation of its truth by beholding the dense masses of Kray encamped op-

posite to his right wing. He was thrown by this unexpected discovery into the utmost perplexity; to engage with so great an inferiority of force was the height of temerity, while retreat was difficult in presence of so enterprising an enemy. In these circumstances, he resolved, late on the night of the 14th, after such irresolution as throws great doubts on his capacity as general-in-chief, whatever his talents as second in command may have been, on retiring into the fastnesses of the Apennines, and only waited for the arrival of his scouts in the morning to give the necessary orders for carrying it into effect, when the commencement of the attack by the allies compelled him to accept battle in the position which he occupied.*†

Suwarrow's design was to force back the right of the French by means of the corps of Kray, while Bagration had orders to turn their left, and unite in their rear, under cover of the cannon of Serravalle, with that corps, while Derfelden attacked Novi in the centre, and Melas commanded the reserve, ready to support any part of the army which required his aid. In pursuance of these orders, Kray commenced the attack at five in the morning; Bellegarde attacked Grouchy, and Ott Lemoine; the Republicans were at first taken by surprise; and their masses, in great part in the act of marching, or entangled in the vineyards, received the fire of the Austrians without being able either to deploy or answer it. Notwithstanding the heroic resistance of some brigades, the Imperialists sensibly gained ground, and the heads of their columns were already mounting the plateau, when Joubert hurried in person to the spot, and received a ball in his breast when in the act of waving his hat, and exclaiming, "Forward! let us throw ourselves among the tirailleurs!" He instantly fell, and with his last breath exclaimed, "Advance, my friends, advance!"†

The confusion occasioned by this circumstance would have proved fatal, in all probability, to the French army, had the other corps of the allies been so far advanced as to take advantage of it; but, by a strange fatality, though the attacks of the allies were all combined and concentric, they were calculated to take place at different times; and while this important advantage was gained on their left, the Russians in the centre were still resting at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and Melas had merely despatched a detachment from Rivolta to observe the course of the Scrivia. This circumstance, joined to the opportune arrival of Moreau, who assumed the command and harangued the troops, restored order, and the Austrians were at length driven down to the bottom

* Jom., xii., 103. St. Cyr, i., 237, 243.

† Suwarrow's order of battle at Novi was highly characteristic of that singular warrior. It was simply this: "Kray and Bellegarde will attack the left, the Russians the centre, Melas the right." To the soldiers he said, "God wills, the emperor orders, Suwarrow commands, that to-morrow the enemy be conquered." Dressed in his usual costume, in his shirt down to the waist, he was on horseback at the advanced posts the whole preceding evening, attended by a few horsemen, minutely reconnoitring the Republican position. He was recognised from the French lines by the singularity of his dress, and a skirmish of advanced posts in consequence took place.—HARD., vii., 271. St. Cyr, i., 236. ‡ Jom., xii., 105, 107. Dum., i., 323. Th., x., 351. St. Cyr, i., 245, 246.

* Jom., xii., 97. Dum., i., 319, 320. St. Cyr, i., 222.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 71, 72. Jom., xii., 98, 103. Dum., i., 521, 523. Th., x., 349, 350. St. Cyr, i., 227, 234.

of the hill, on their second line. During this encounter, Bellegarde endeavoured to gain the rear of Pasturana by a ravine which encircled it, and was on the point of succeeding, when Perignon charged him so vigorously with the grenadiers of Partonneaux and the cavalry of Richepeause, that the Imperialists were driven back in confusion, and the whole left wing rescued from danger.*

Hitherto the right of the Republicans had not been attacked, and St. Cyr availed himself of this respite to complete his defensive arrangements. Kray, finding the whole weight of the engagement on his hands, pressed Bagrathion to commence an attack on Novi; and though the Russian general was desirous to wait till the hour assigned by his commander for his moving, he agreed to commence, when it was evident that, unless speedily supported, Kray would be compelled to retreat. The Russians advanced with great gallantry to the attack; but a discharge from the division Laboissiere of musketry and grape, at half gunshot, threw them into confusion; and, after an obstinate engagement, they were finally broken by a charge by Watrin, with a brigade of infantry, on their flank, and driven back with great loss to Pozzolo-Formigaro.†

The failure of these partial attacks rendered it evident that a combined effort of all the columns was necessary. It was now noon, and the French line was unbroken, although the superiority of numbers on the part of the allies was nearly fifteen thousand men. Suwarrow therefore combined all his forces for a decisive movement; Kray, whom nothing could intimidate, received orders to prepare for a fresh attack; Derfelden was destined to support Bagrathion in the centre, Melas was directed to break up from Rivolta to form the left of the line, while Rosenberg was ordered in all haste to advance from Tortona to support his movement. The battle, after a pause, began again with the utmost fury at all points. It was for long, however, most obstinately disputed. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Kray, who returned above ten times to the charge, the Imperialists could make no impression on the French left; in vain column after column advanced to the harvest of death: nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans; while Bagrathion, Derfelden, and Milaradowitch, in the centre, after the most heroic exertions, were compelled to recoil before the terrible fire of the infantry and batteries which were disposed around Novi. For above four hours, the action continued with the utmost fury, without the French infantry being anywhere displaced, until at length the fatigue on both sides produced a temporary pause, and the contending hosts rested on their arms amid a field covered with the slain.‡

The resolution of any other general but Suwarrow would have been shaken by so terrible a carnage without any result; but his moral courage was of a kind which nothing could subdue.

At four o'clock the left wing of the allies came up, under Melas, and preparations were instantly made to take advantage of so great a re-enforcement. Melas was directed to assail the extreme right of the Republicans, and endeavour, by turning it, to threaten the road from Novi to Genoa, while Kray again attacked the left, and Suwarrow himself, with the whole weight of the Russians, pressed the centre. The resistance experienced on the left was so obstinate, that, though he led on the troops with the courage of a grenadier, Kray could not gain a foot of ground; but the Russians, in the centre, after a terrible conflict, succeeded in driving the Republicans into Novi, from the old walls and ruined towers of which they still kept up a murderous fire. But the progress of Melas on the right was much more alarming. While one of his columns ascended the right bank of the Scrivia and reached Serravalle, another, by the left bank, had already turned the Monte Rotondo, and was rapidly ascending its sides; while the general himself, with a third, was advancing against the eastern flank of the plateau of Novi. To make head against so many dangers, Moreau ordered the division Watrin to move towards the menaced plateau; but, finding itself assailed during its march, both in front and rear, by the divisions of Melas, it fell into confusion, and fled in the utmost disorder, with difficulty cutting its way through the enemy on the road in the rear of the French position. It now became indispensable for the Republicans to retire, for Lichtenstein, at the head of the imperial cavalry and three brigades of grenadiers, was already established on the road to Gavi; his triumphant battalions, with loud shouts, were sweeping round the rear of the Republicans, while the glittering helmets of the horsemen appeared on every eminence behind their lines, and no other line of communication remained open but that which led by Pasturana to Ovada. Suwarrow, who saw his advantage, was preparing a last and simultaneous attack on the front and flanks of his opponent, when Moreau anticipated him by a general retreat. It was at first conducted in good order, but the impetuous assaults of the allies soon converted it into a rout. Novi, stripped of its principal defenders, could no longer withstand the assaults of the Russians, who, confident of victory, and seeing the standards of the allies in the rear of the French position, rushed forward with resistless fury and deafening cheers, over the dead bodies of their comrades, to the charge; Lemoine and Grouchy with difficulty sustained themselves, in retiring, against the impetuous attacks of their unwearied antagonist Kray, when the village of Pasturana, in their rear, was carried by the Russians, whose vehemence increased with their success, and the only road practicable for their artillery cut off. Despair now seized their ranks; infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and fled in tumultuous confusion across the vineyards and orchards which adjoined the line of retreat; Colli, with his whole brigade, were made prisoners; and Perignon and Grouchy, almost cut to pieces with sabre wounds, fell into the hands of the enemy. The army, in utter confusion, reached Gavi,* where it was rallied by the ef-

* Jom., xii., 106, 108. Th., x., 352. St. Cyr, i., 247, 248. † Dum., i., 323. Jom., xii., 109, 110. Th., x., 352. St. Cyr, i., 248; 250.

‡ Th., x., 353. Jom., xii., 112, 113. Dum., i., 324, 325. St. Cyr, i., 252, 254.

* Jom., xii., 104, 120. Th., x., 351, 354. Dum., i., 324, 327. Arch. Ch., ii., 72, 73. St. Cyr, i., 256, 264.

forts of Moreau, the allies being too much exhausted with fatigue to continue the pursuit.

The battle of Novi was the most bloody and obstinately contested that had yet occurred in the war. The loss of the allies was 1800 killed, 5200 wounded, and 1200 prisoners; but that of the French was much more considerable, amounting to 1500 killed, 5500 wounded, and 3000 prisoners, besides 37 cannon, 28 caissons, and 4 standards. As the war advanced, and fiercer passions were brought into collision, the carnage became daily greater; the officers were more prodigal of their own blood and that of their soldiers; and the chiefs themselves, regardless of life, at length led them on both sides to the charge, with an enthusiasm which nothing could surpass. Joubert was the victim of this heroic feeling; Grouchy charged with a standard in his hand, and when it was torn from him in the *mêlée*, he raised his helmet on his sabre, and was thrown down and wounded in the shock of the opposing squadrons; and Kray, Bagrathion, and Melas led on their troops to the mouth of the enemy's cannon, as if their duty had been that of merely commanding grenadier battalions.*

The consequences of the battle of Novi were not so great as might have been expected from so desperate a shock. On the night of the 15th, Moreau regained in haste the defiles of the Apennines, and posted St. Cyr, with a strong rear-guard, to defend the approaches to the Bocchetta. In the first moments of consternation, he had serious thoughts of evacuating Genoa, and the artillery was already collected at St. Pietro d'Arena for that purpose; but finding that he was not seriously disquieted, he again dispersed his troops through the mountains, nearly in the position they held before the battle. St. Cyr was intrusted with the right, where a serious impression was chiefly apprehended, and an attack which Klenau made on that part of the position with five thousand men was repulsed, with the loss of seven hundred men to the Imperialists. Suwarrow himself, informed of the successes of the French in the small cantons of Switzerland, immediately detached Kray with twelve thousand men to the Tessino, while he himself, in order to keep an eye on Championet, whose force was daily accumulating on the Maritime Alps, encamped at Asti, where he covered at once the blockade of Coni and the siege of Tortona.†

During the concentration of the allied forces for the battle of Novi, this active commander so ably disposed his little army, which only amounted to sixteen thousand combatants, instead of thirty thousand, as he had been promised by the Directory, that he succeeded in forcing the passage of the Little St. Bernard, and driving the Imperialists back to Susa. These successes continued even after the Russian commander took post at Asti; and in a variety of affairs of posts

in the valleys of the Alps, they succeeded in taking fifteen hundred prisoners and four pieces of cannon. But these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the fall of Tortona, which capitulated on the 25th of August, on condition that, if not relieved by the 11th of September, the place should be surrendered to the allies.* This conquest was the only trophy which they derived from the bloody battle of Novi. Moreau made an ineffectual attempt to relieve the blockade, and, finding it impossible to effect the object, retired into the fastnesses of the Apennines; while Suwarrow, who had received orders to collect the whole Russians in the Alps, set out, agreeably to the plan fixed on, with seventeen thousand men for the canton of the Tessino.*

While these great events were passing to the south of the Alps, events of still more decisive importance occurred to the north of those mountains. Immediately after the capture of Zurich and the retreat of Massena to Mount Albis, the archduke established the bulk of his forces on the hills which separate the Glatt from the Limmat, and placed a line of posts along the whole line of that river and the Aar, to observe the movements of the Republicans. Each of the opposing armies in Switzerland numbered about seventy-five thousand combatants; but the French had acquired a decided superiority on the Upper Rhine, where they had collected forty thousand men, while the forces of the Imperialists amounted in that quarter only to twenty-two thousand. Both parties were anxiously waiting for re-enforcements; but as that expected by the archduke, under Korsakow, was by much the most important, Massena resolved to anticipate his adversary, and strike a decisive blow before that dreaded auxiliary arrived. For this purpose, he commenced his operations by means of his right wing in the higher Alps, hoping, by the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountainous regions, to dispossess the Imperialists from the important position of the St. Gothard, and separate their Italian from their German armies by the acquisition of these elevated ridges, which were universally, at that period, deemed the key to the campaign.†

At the very time when the French general was making preparations for these important movements, the Aulic Council gave every possible facility to their success, by compelling the archduke to depart with his experienced troops for the Rhine, and make way for the Russians under Korsakow, equally unskilled in mountain warfare, and unacquainted with the French tactics. In vain that able commander represented that the line of the Rhine, with its double barrier of fortresses, was equally formidable to an invading as advantageous to an offensive army; that nothing decisive, therefore, could be expected in that quarter, while the chances of success were much greater from a combined attack of the Russians and Austrians on the frontier of the Jura, where no fortresses existed to impede an invading force; that fifty thousand

* Dum., i., 328, 330. Jom., xii., 121. St. Cyr, i., 264, 270. Th., i., 355.

† Jom., xii., 127, 128. Dum., i., 334, 335. St. Cyr, ii., 1, 3.

* Jom., xii., 129, 133, 138. Arch. Ch., ii., 74, 77. Dum., i., 336, 337.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 77, 81. Jom., xii., 55, 58. Dum., i., 296.

Russians in Switzerland could not supply the place of seventy thousand Austrians; and the chances, therefore, were, that some serious disaster would occur in the most important part of the line of operations; and that nothing could be more hazardous than to make a change of troops and commanders in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy, at the very time that he was meditating offensive operations. These judicious observations produced no sort of effect, and the court of Vienna ordered "the immediate execution of its will, without farther objections."^{*}†

To understand the important military operations which followed, it is indispensable to form some idea of the ground on which they took place. The St. Gothard, though inferior in elevation to many other mountains in Switzerland, is nevertheless the central point of the country, and from its sides the greatest rivers in Europe take their rise. On the east, the Rhine, springing from the glaciers of Disentis and Hinter-Rhine, carries its waters, by a circuitous course, through the vast expanse of the Lake of Constance to the German Ocean; on the north, the Reuss and the Aar, descending in parallel ravines through rugged mountains, feed the lakes of Lucerne, Thun, and Brienz, and ultimately contribute their waters to the same majestic stream; on the west, a still greater river rises in the blue and glittering glacier of the Rhone, and descending through the long channel of the Valais, expands into the beautiful Lake of Geneva while to the south, the snows of the St. Gothard nourish the impetuous torrent of the Tessino, which, after foaming through the rocks of Faido, and bathing the smiling shores of the Italian bailiwicks, swells out into the sweet expanse of the Lago Maggiore, and loses itself in the classic waves of the Po.

The line of the Limmat, which now separated the hostile armies, is composed of the Linth, which rises in the snowy mountains of Glarus, and, after forming in its course the Lake of Zurich, issues from that great sheet of water under the name of the Limmat, and throws itself into the Aar at Bruick. Hotze guarded the line of the Linth, the archduke himself that of the Limmat. Korsakow was considerably in the

rear, and was not expected at Schaffhausen till the 19th of August.*

One road, practicable for cavalry, but barely so for artillery at that period, crossed the St. Gothard from Bellinzona to Aldorf.† Ascending from Bellinzona on the southern side, it passes through a narrow defile close to the Tessino, between immense walls of rock between Faido and Airolo; climbs the steep ascent above Airolo to the inhospitable summit of the St. Gothard; descends, by a torrent's edge, its northern declivity to the elevated mountain-valley of Urseren, from whence, after traversing the dark and humid gallery of the Unnerloch, it crosses the foaming cascade of the Reuss by the celebrated Devil's Bridge, and descends, through the desolate and rugged valley of Schollenen, to Aldorf on the Lake of Lucerne. But there all vestige of a practicable road ceases; the sublime Lake of Uri lies before the traveller, the sides of which, formed of gigantic walls of rock, defy all attempt at the formation of a path, and the communication with Lucerne is carried on by water along the beautiful Lake of the Four Cantons. The only way in which it is possible to proceed on land from this point is, either by shepherds' tracks towards Stantz and the canton of Unterwalden, or by the rugged and almost impracticable pass of the Schachenthal, by which the traveller may reach the upper extremity of the canton of Glarus. From the valley of Urseren, in the heart of the St. Gothard, a difficult and dangerous path leads over the Furca and the Grimsel, across steep and slippery slopes, where the most experienced traveller can with difficulty keep his footing, to Meyringen, in the valley of Oberhasli.

The plan of the allies was, that Hotze, with twenty-five thousand Austrians, should be left on the Linth, and at the end of September a general attack should be made on the French position along the whole line. Korsakow was to lead the attack on the left with his Russian forces, Hotze in the centre with the Austrians, while Suwarow, with seventeen thousand of his best troops, flushed with the conquest of Italy, was to assail the right flank of the Republicans, and, by the St. Gothard, throw himself into the rear of their position on the Limmat. This design might have been attended with success if it had been undertaken with troops already assembled on the theatre of operations; but, when they were to be collected from Novi and Bavaria, and undertaken in presence of a general perfectly master of the ground, and already occupying a central position in the midst of these converging columns, it was evidently attended with the most imminent hazard, as, if any of the columns did not arrive at the appointed time, the whole weight of the enemy might be expected to fall on the first which appeared.‡

Massena intrusted to Lecourbe, whose skill in mountain warfare had already been amply evinced, the important duty of throwing forward his right wing, and expelling the Imperialists from the higher Alps,

* Arch. Ch., ii., 80, 91. Th., x., 407, 408.

† The relative situation and strength of the two armies at this period is thus given by the Archduke Charles:

FRENCH.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
From Huningen to the mouth of the Aar	10,991	3,208	
From the mouth of the Aar to Mount Uetli	23,792	3,239	
From Mount Albis to the Lake of Lucerne	11,761	564	
From the Lake of Lucerne to the valley of Oberhasli	7,732		
In the Valais, from Brig to St. Maurice	10,886	554	
In the interior of Switzerland	2,088	1,126	
	67,250	8,691	
Total	75,941		
ALLIES.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
Between Weiss and Wutach	4,269	1,329	
From the mouth of the Aar to the Lake of Zurich	37,053	10,458	
Between the Lake of Zurich and Lucerne	8,722	834	
From the Lake of Lucerne to the St. Gothard	4,184	175	
On the St. Gothard, the Grimsel, and the Upper Valais	5,744	150	
In the Grisons	1,168	355	
Swiss	3,453		
	64,613	13,301	
Total	77,914		

* Th., x., 409, 410. Arch. Ch., i., 96.

† The magnificent chaussee which now traverses this mountainous and romantic region was not formed till the year 1819.

‡ Th., x., 411. Arch. Ch., ii., 100, 103.

while he himself, by a false attack along the whole line, and especially upon Zurich in the centre, distracted the attention of the enemy, and prevented him from seeing the accumulation of force which was brought to bear on the St. Gothard. Early on the morning of the 14th of August, his troops were everywhere in motion. On the left the allied outposts were driven in along the whole line, and in the centre the attack was so impetuous that the Austrians were forced back almost to Zurich, where the archduke rapidly collected his forces to resist the inroad. After considerable

Aug. 17. bloodshed, as the object was gained, the Republicans drew off, and resumed their positions on the Limmat.*

The real attack of Lecourbe was attended with very different results. The forces at his disposal, including those of Thurrau in the Valais, were little short of thirty thousand men, and they were directed with the most consummate ability. General Gudin, with five battalions, was to leave the valley of the Aar, force the ridge of the Grimsel, and, forming a junction with General Thurrau in the Valais, drive the Austrians from the source of the Rhone and the Furca. A second column of three battalions, commanded by Loison, received orders to cross the ridge of the Steinen, between Oberhasli and the valley of Schollenen, and descend upon Wasen, while a third marched from Engelberg upon Erstfeld, on the Lake of Lucerne, and a fourth moved direct by the valley of Issi upon Altdorf. Lecourbe himself was to embark from Lucerne on board his flotilla, make himself master of Brunnen and Schwytz on its eastern shore, and combine with the other corps for the capture of Altdorf and all the posts occupied by the enemy in the valley of the Reuss.†

These attacks all proved successful. The Republican parties under Lecourbe and Oudinot advanced by land and water against Schwytz, and, after an obstinate combat, the united Swiss and Imperialists were driven from that canton into the Muttenthal. From Brunnen, the harbour of Schwytz on the lake, Lecourbe conducted his flotilla under the chapel of William Tell, through the sublime scenery of the Lake of Uri, beneath precipices fifteen hundred feet high, to Fluellen, where he landed with great difficulty, under a heavy fire from the Austrian troops, and, after a warm engagement, forced General Simbschen, who defended Altdorf, to retire farther up the valley of the Reuss. Meanwhile Loison, after encountering incredible difficulties, had crossed the Steinerberg and the glaciers of Susten, and not only forced the enemy back into the valley of Reuss, but, after five assaults, made himself master of the important elevated post of Wasen, in the middle of its extent, so as to expose the troops who had been driven up from Altdorf to be assailed in rear as well as front. In this extremity they had no resource but to retire by the lateral gorge of Maderaner, from whence they reached, by Tavitch, the valley of the Rhine.‡

Aug. 14. The Imperialists are forced back at all points. Aug. 15. The Devil's Bridge, where a chasm thirty feet wide, formed by the blowing up of the arch, and a murderous fire from the rocks on the opposite side of the ravine, arrested his progress. But this obstacle was not of long duration. During the night, the Republicans threw beams over the chasm; and the Austrians, finding themselves menaced on their flank by General Gudin, who was descending the valley of Urseren from the Furca by Realp, were obliged to evacuate that almost impregnable post, and retire to the heights of the Crispalt, behind the Oberalp, near the source of the Rhine. There they maintained themselves, with great resolution, against the Republican grenadiers till the evening; but on the following day, as they were assailed by the united forces of Lecourbe and Gudin, they were finally broken and driven back to Ilantz, with the loss of a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. At the same time, a detachment took possession of the summit of the St. Gothard, Gothard.

Meanwhile, successes still more decisive were achieved by the Republicans in the other parts of their mountain line. They are driven from the Grimsel and the Furca. General Thurrau, at the same hour, attacked Prince Rohan, who was stationed in the Valais, near Brig, to guard the northern approach to the Simplon, and defeated him with such loss that he was constrained to evacuate the valley of the Rhone, and retire by the terrific gorges of the Simplon to Duomo d'Ossolla, on the Italian side of the mountains. This disaster obliged Colonel Strauch, who guarded, amid snow and granite, the rugged sides of the Grimsel and the Furca with eight battalions, to fly to the relief of the Imperialists in the Upper Valais, leaving only fifteen hundred to guard the summit of that mountain. He succeeded in stopping the advance of the Republicans up the Valais, but, during his absence, the important posts of the Grimsel and Furca were lost. General Gudin, at the head of three thousand men, set out from Goutanen, in the valley of the Aar, and, after climbing up the valley, and surmounting with infinite difficulty the glaciers of Ghelmen, succeeded in assailing the corps who guarded, amid ice and snow, the rugged summit of the Grimsel from a higher point than that which they occupied. After a desperate conflict, in which a severe loss was experienced on both sides, the Imperialists were driven down the northern side of the mountain into the Valais; and Colonel Strauch, finding himself now exposed on both flanks, had no alternative but to retire by the dangerous pass called the Pas de Nuffen, over a slippery glacier, to Faido on the Tessino, from whence he rejoined the scattered detachments of his force, which had made their escape from the Valais by paths known only to chamois-hunters through the Val Formazza at Bellinzona.*

Lecourbe, ignorant of the successes of his right wing, on the succeeding day pursued his career of victory in the valley of the Reuss. Following the retiring columns of the Imperialists up the dark and shaggy pass of Aug. 15. Schollenen, he at length arrived at the Devil's Bridge, where a chasm thirty feet wide, formed by the blowing up of the arch, and a murderous fire from the rocks on the opposite side of the ravine, arrested his progress. But this obstacle was not of long duration. During the night, the Republicans threw beams over the chasm; and the Austrians, finding themselves menaced on their flank by General Gudin, who was descending the valley of Urseren from the Furca by Realp, were obliged to evacuate that almost impregnable post, and retire to the heights of the Crispalt, behind the Oberalp, near the source of the Rhine. There they maintained themselves, with great resolution, against the Republican grenadiers till the evening; but on the following day, as they were assailed by the united forces of Lecourbe and Gudin, they were finally broken and driven back to Ilantz, with the loss of a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. At the same time, a detachment took possession of the summit of the St. Gothard, Gothard.

* Dum., i., 298, 299.

† Dum., i., 299, 304-5. Ar. Ch., ii., 103. *Jom.*, xii., 77, 78.

‡ Arch. Ch., ii., 107, 108. *Jom.*, xii., 78, 80. Dum., i., 305, 307.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 105, 107. *Jom.*, xii., 80, 81. Dum., i., 308, 309. *Ebel Manuel de Voyageur en Suisse*, 325.

and established itself at Airolo, on the southern declivity of the mountain.*

While Lecourbe was gaining these great successes on the right, his left, between the Lakes of Lucerne and Zurich, was equally fortunate. General Chabran, on the extreme left, cleared the whole western bank of the Lake of Zurich as far as Weggis; the central columns drove the Imperialists from Schwytz into the Muttenthal, and defeated Jellachich at Ensiedlen; and on the following day, aided by Chabran, who moved against his flank by the Wiggisthal, they totally routed the Austrians, who fell back, with the loss of twelve hundred prisoners, by the Lake of Klonthal, into the canton of Glarus. Thus, by a series of operations, as ably executed as they were skilfully conceived, was the whole left wing of the Imperialists routed and driven back in less than forty-eight hours, with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, four thousand prisoners, and two thousand in killed and wounded, and the important post of St. Gothard, with all its approaches and lateral valleys, wrested from their hands.†

These brilliant successes, however, were only gained by Massena through the great concentration of his forces on the right wing. To accomplish this, he was obliged to weaken his left, which, lower down in the plain, guarded the course of the Aar. The archduke resolved to avail himself of this circumstance to strike a decisive blow against that weakened extremity, in which he was the more encouraged by the arrival of twenty thousand Russians of Korsakow's corps at Schaffhausen, and the important effect which success in that quarter would have in threatening the communications of the Republican army with the interior of France. For this purpose, thirty thousand men were assembled on the bank of the river, and the point selected for the passage at Gross Dettingen, a little below the junction of the Reuss and the Aar. Hotze was left in Zurich with eight thousand men, which he engaged to defend to the last extremity; while Korsakow promised to arrive at Ober Endingen, in the centre of the line, with twenty-three thousand men. The march of the columns was so well concealed, and the arrangements made with such precision, that this great force reached the destined point without the enemy being aware of their arrival, and everything promised a favourable issue to the enterprise, when it proved abortive from the difficulties of the passage, and the want of skill and due preparation in the Austrian engineers. The bridges for the crossing of the troops were commenced under such a violent fire of artillery as speedily cleared the opposite banks, but it was found impossible to anchor the pontoons in the rocky bed of the stream, and the rapidity of the current rendered it hopeless to construct the bridges in any other manner. Thus, from the want of a little foresight and a few precautions on the part of the engineers,

did a project fail, as ably conceived as it was accurately executed by the military officers, and which promised to have altered the fate of the campaign, and perhaps of the war. Had the passage been effected, the archduke, with forty thousand men, would have cleared all the right bank of the Aar, separated the French left wing on the Rhine from their centre and right in Switzerland, compelled Massena to undertake a disastrous retreat into the canton of Berne, exposed to almost certain destruction the small corps at Bâle, and opened to immediate invasion the defenceless frontier of the Jura, from the united troops of the archduke, Korsakow, and Suwarrow. The want of a few grappling-irons defeated a project on which perhaps the fate of the world depended. Such is frequently the fortune of war.*

Desirous still of achieving something considerable with his veteran troops before Aug. 19. leaving the command in Switzerland, the archduke, after his troops had resumed their position, again concentrated his left under Hotze. But the usual jealousies between the troops and commanders of rival nations prevented this project from being carried into execution; and before the end of the month, the Austrians, under their able commander, were in full march for the Upper Rhine, leaving twenty-five thousand men, under Hotze, as an auxiliary force to support Korsakow until the arrival of Suwarrow from the plains of Piedmont.†

This change of commanders and weakening of the allied forces presented too Aug. 30. Austrian left is defeated in Glarus. great chances of success to escape the observation of so able a general as Massena, whose army was now augmented, by re-enforcements from the interior, to above eighty thousand men. The movement commenced with an attack by Soult, with the right wing of the Republicans, upon Hotze, who occupied the canton of Glarus, and, after several sharp skirmishes, a decisive action took place near Naefels, in which the Austrians were defeated, and compelled to fall back to a defensive line in their rear, extending from the Lake of Zurich by Wasen through the Wallenstadter See, by Sargans to Coire, in the Grisons. It was at this critical moment that the archduke, yielding to the pressing commands of the Aulic Council, was compelled to abandon the army with the great body of his troops, leaving the united force of Korsakow and Hotze, fifty-six thousand strong, scattered over a line forty miles in length, to sustain the weight of Massena, who could bring sixty-five thousand to bear upon the decisive point around the ramparts of Zurich.‡

The arrival of the archduke was soon attended with important effects upon the Upper Rhine. The French had crossed Aug. 26. that river at Mannheim on the 26th of August, with twelve thousand men, and driving General Müller, who commanded the Imperialists, before them, laid siege to Philipsburg, on which they had commenced a furious bombardment. But the approach of the Austrian commander speed-

* Arch. Ch., ii., 108, 110. Jom., xii., 81, 82. Dum., i., 308, 309.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 212, 213. Jom., xii., 82, 84. Dum., i., 305.

‡ Many readers will recognise, in the theatre of these operations, the scenes indelibly engraven on their memory by the matchless sublimity of their features.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 119, 126. Dum., i., 311, 312. Jom., xii., 87, 92. † Jom., xii., 92, 227. Arch. Ch., ii., 129, 133.

‡ Arch. Ch., ii., 135, 139. Th., x., 412, 413. Jom., xii., 231, 284.

ily changed the state of affairs. The columns of that prince rapidly approaching, threatened to cut off their retreat to the Rhine, and they were obliged hastily to raise the siege and retire to Mannheim. The insufficient state of defence of that important place inspired the archduke with the design of carrying it by a *coup de main*. Its fortifications had, some months before, been levelled by the Republicans; but since that time they had been indefatigable in their endeavours to restore them, and they were already in a respectable state of defence. On the 17th, the Austrians, in two columns, one of 14,000 men, the other of 7000, with a reserve of 8000, moved towards Mannheim, and on the following day gave the assault. A thick fog favoured the enterprise; the Austrians got into the redoubts almost before the French were aware of their approach, and drove them over the Rhine, with the loss of 1800 prisoners and 21 pieces of cannon. This success threw a momentary lustre over the expedition, for which the allies were about to pay dear by the disasters experienced before Zurich.*

Sept. 14. After the departure of the archduke, it was concerted between Suwarrow, Korsakow, and Hotze, that the former of these commanders should set out from Bellinzona on the 21st of September, and attack the Republican position near Airole on the Tessino. On the 25th he expected to be at Altdorf, after having made himself master of the St. Gothard. From thence he was to form a junction with Korsakow at Zurich, and with their united forces assail the position of Massena on the Limmat in front, while Hotze attacked it in flank. By this means they flattered themselves that they would be able to march on the Aar with the mass of their forces, and drive the French back upon the frontier of the Jura and their own resources. This project was well conceived, in so far as turning the French position by the St. Gothard was concerned; and if it had all been executed as vigorously and accurately as it was by Suwarrow, the result might have been very different; but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, from the rugged nature of the country in which the principal operations were to be conducted, the difficulty of communicating from one valley or one part of the army to another, and the remote distances from which the corps who were to combine in the operation were to assemble. It would have been more prudent, with such detached bodies, to have chosen the Misocco and the Bernardine for the field-marshal's march, as that would have brought him down, by roads practicable for artillery, through the Via-Mala into the heart of the Austrian army, under cover of the posts which they still occupied in the Grisons; but it did not promise such brilliant results in the outset as that which he adopted, and it was more suitable to the impetuous character of the Russian veteran to throw himself at once through the narrow ravines of the St. Gothard upon the flank of his adversary's line.†

Sept. 18. Meanwhile, Korsakow collected the greater part of his forces in the neighbourhood of Zurich, where they were encamped between the ramparts of the town and the banks of the Sill. The position which they occupied, and the necessity of striking a decisive blow before the arrival of Suwarrow, suggested to Massena a plan which he conceived and executed with the most consummate ability. He had a superiority, until the arrival of Suwarrow, of ten thousand over the allies; but the corps which that commander brought with him would turn the balance as far the other way.* Now, therefore, was the moment, by a decisive blow in the centre, to ruin the allied army before the junction of that dreaded commander. But the distribution of these troops rendered this superiority still more important; for Massena could assemble thirty-nine thousand on the decisive line of the Limmat,† while Korsakow could only collect twenty-five thousand, the bulk of whom were grouped together under the cannon of Zurich, where their numbers were of no avail, and their crowded state in a narrow space only impeded any military movements.

Plan of the allies for a combined attack, by Suwarrow and Korsakow, on Massena.

The temper and feeling of the Russian troops, even more than their defective position, rendered them the ready victims of a skilful and daring adversary. Justly proud of their long series of victories over the Turks, and of the decisive impression which Suwarrow had made in the Italian campaign, they had conceived both an unreasonable confidence in their own strength, and an unfounded contempt for their enemies. This feeling was not the result of a course of successes over an antagonist with whom they had repeatedly measured their strength, but of a blind idea of superiority, unfounded either in reason or experience, and likely to lead to the most disastrous consequences. In presence of the first general then in Europe, at the head of a greatly superior force, Korsakow thought it unnecessary to adopt other measures, or take greater precautions than if he had been on the banks of the Dneister, in front of an undisciplined horde of barbarians. Thus everything, both on the French and allied side, prepared the great catastrophe which was approaching.‡

Having minutely reconnoitred the position of the enemy, Massena resolved to make only a feigned attack on Zurich, and to cross, with the bulk of his forces, farther down the river at Closter-Fahr, where it was slenderly guarded, and thus to turn the position under the ramparts of that town, and attack Korsakow, both in front and rear,§ at the same time that the Republicans had cut him off from his right wing farther down the river, and the Lake of Zurich separated him from his left in the mountains. The execution of this plan was as able as its conception was felicitous on the part of the French commander.||

Massena's able plan of attack.

* The French army in the field was 76,000: that of the allies, without Suwarrow, 70,000; with him, 88,000.—Jomini, xii., 245.

† Jom., xii., 245, 246. Arch. Ch., ii., 183, 185.

‡ Arch. Ch., ii., 161, 162.

§ Th., x., 414, 415. Jom., xii., 247, 248.

|| The presumption and arrogance of Korsakow were carried to such a pitch, that, in a conference with the Archduke

Relative situations of the French and Russian centres at Zurich

* Jom., xii., 238, 241. Arch. Ch., ii., 149, 161.

† Dum., ii., 58, 61. Arch. Ch., ii., 172, 178. Jom., xii., 241, 242.

By great exertions, the French engineers collected, by land-carriage, twelve pontoons and thirty-seven barks at Dietikon on the evening of the 24th of September, where they were concealed behind an eminence and several hedges, and brought down to the margin of the river at daybreak on the following morning. The French masked batteries were then opened, and by the superiority of their fire, the opposite bank was speedily cleared of the feeble detachments of the enemy who occupied it, and the passage commenced. Six hundred men, in the first instance, were ferried over, and the French artillery, directed by General Foy, protected this gallant band against the attacks of the increasing force of the enemy, till the boats returned with a fresh detachment. Meanwhile the pontoons arrived, at a quick trot, from Dietikon; the bridge began to be formed, and the troops, ferried over, attacked and carried the height on the opposite side, though defended with the most obstinate valour by three Russian battalions, from whence seven pieces of cannon had hitherto thundered on their crossing columns. By seven o'clock the plateau of Closter-Fahr, which commanded the passage, was carried,* with the artillery which crowned it, and before nine the bridge was completed, and Oudinot, with fifteen thousand men, firmly established on the right bank of the river.

While this serious attack was going on in the centre, General Menard on the left had, by a feigned attack, induced the Russian commander, Durassow, to collect all his forces to resist the threatened passage on the Lower Limmat, and Mortier, by a vigorous demonstration against Zurich, retained the bulk of the Russian centre in the neighbourhood of that city. His troops were inadequate to produce any serious impression on the dense masses of the Russians who were there assembled; but while he was retiring in confusion, and Korsakow was already congratulating himself on a victory, he was alarmed by the increasing cannonades in his rear, and intelligence soon arrived of the passage at Closter-Fahr, the disaster of Markoff, and the separation of the right wing under Durassow from the centre, now left to its own resources at Zurich. Shortly after, he received the most alarming accounts of the progress of Oudinot: he had made himself master of Hong, and the heights which surround Zurich on the northwest; and, in spite of a sally which Korsakow made towards evening, at the head of five thousand men, which compelled the enemy to recede to the foot of the heights to the north of the town, they still maintained themselves in force on that important position, barred the road of Winterthur, the sole issue to Germany, and all but surrounded the allied army within the walls of the city. Before nightfall, Massena, fully sensible of his

advantages, summoned the Russian commander to surrender, a proposal to which no answer was returned.*

During these disasters, the confusion in Zurich rose to the highest pitch. The immense confluence of horsemen, artillery, and baggage-wagons, suddenly thrown back upon the city, and by which its streets were soon completely blocked up; the cries of the wounded, brought in from all quarters; the trampling of the cavalry and infantry, who forced their way through the dense mass, and mercilessly trod under foot the wounded and the dying, to make head against the enemy, threatening to break in from all sides, formed a scene hitherto unexampled in the war, and for which a parallel can only be found in the horrors of the Moscow retreat. When night came, the extensive watchfires on all the heights to the north and west of the city showed the magnitude of the force with which they were threatened in that quarter; while the unruffled expanse of the lake offered no hope of escape on the other side, and the bombs, which already began to fall in the streets, gave a melancholy presage of the fate which awaited them if they were not speedily extricated from their perilous situation.†

In these desperate circumstances, Korsakow evinced a resolution as worthy of admiration as his former presumptuous confidence had been deserving of censure. Disdaining the proposal to surrender, he spent the night in making arrangements for forcing, sword in hand, a passage on the next morning through the dense masses of the Republicans. Fortunately, considerable re-enforcements arrived during the night; two strong battalions, detached by Hotze, and the whole right wing, under Durassow, successively made their appearance. He had been detained till late in the evening by the feigned attacks of Menard, but having at length learned the real state of affairs,‡ he lost no time in rejoining his commander at Zurich, by a long circuit which enabled him to avoid the French outposts. Strengthened by these re-enforcements, Korsakow resolved to attempt the passage through the enemy on the following day.

At daybreak on the 28th, the Russian columns were formed in order of battle, and attacked with the utmost impetuosity the division Lorges and the brigade Bonterns, which had established themselves on the road to Winterthur, the sole line of retreat which remained to them. The resistance of the French was obstinate, and the carnage frightful; but the Russians fought with the courage of despair, and at length succeeded in driving the Republicans before them, and opening a passage. The whole army of Korsakow was then arranged for a retreat; but, contrary to every rule of common sense, as well as the military art, he placed the infantry in front, the cavalry in the centre, and the artillery and equipages in the rear, leaving only a slender rear-

Charles, shortly before the battle, when that great general was pointing out the positions which should in an especial manner be guarded, and said, pointing to the map, "Here you should place a battalion." "A company you mean," said Korsakow. "No," replied the archduke, "a battalion." "I understand you," rejoined the other; "an Austrian battalion, or a Russian company."—HARDY, vii., 287.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 190, 193. Th., x., 415, 416. Jom., xii., 250, 252.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 194, 196. Th., x., 416, 418. Jom., xii., 254, 256.

† Jom., xii., 254, 256. Arch. Ch., ii., 195, 196. Th., x., 417, 418.

‡ Arch. Ch., ii., 197. Th., x., 418, 419.

Dreadful confusion in the town of Zurich.

Brave resolution of Korsakow to force his way through.

Sept. 28. He cuts his way through the enemy, but loses all his baggage and artillery.

guard to defend the ramparts of Zurich until the immense mass had extricated itself from the city. Massena, perceiving his intention, collected his forces to prevent or distress his retreat; but the intrepidity of the Russian infantry overthrew all his efforts, and the head of the column cut its way through all the troops which could be collected to oppose its progress. But the efforts of the Republicans against the cavalry in the centre were more successful. The divisions Lorges and Gazan, by reiterated charges on the moving mass, at length succeeded in throwing it into confusion; the disorder soon spread to the rear; all the efforts of the generals to arrest it proved ineffectual; the brave SACKEN, destined to honourable distinction in a more glorious war, was wounded and made prisoner, and, amid a scene of unexampled confusion, a hundred pieces of cannon, all the ammunition wagons and baggage of the army, and the military chest, fell into the hands of the victors. Meanwhile, the fire approached Zurich on all sides. Mortier was thundering from the other side of the Limmat, while Oudinot, carrying everything before him, pressed down from the heights on the north; the garrison defied after the main army in confusion; soon the gates were seized; a mortal struggle ensued in the streets, in the course of which the illustrious Lavater, seeking to save the life of a soldier threatened with death, was barbarously shot. At length all the troops who remained in Zurich laid down their arms; and Korsakow, weakened by the loss of eight thousand killed and wounded, and five thousand prisoners, besides his whole artillery and ammunition, was allowed to retire, without farther molestation, by Eglisau to Schaffhausen.*

While Zurich was immortalized by these astonishing triumphs, the attack of Success of Soult against Hotze above the lake. Soult on the imperial right, on the upper part of the line above the lake, was hardly less successful. Hotze had there retained only two battalions, at his headquarters at Kaltbrun; the remainder were dispersed along the vast line, from the upper end of the Lake of Zurich by Sargans, to Coire in the Grisons. Accumulating his forces, Soult skilfully and rapidly passed the Linth at three in the morning of the 25th. One hundred and fifty volunteers first swam across the river, with their sabres in their teeth, during the darkness of the night, and aided by the artillery from the French side, speedily dispersed the Austrian posts on the right bank, and protected the disembarkation of six companies of grenadiers, who soon after made themselves masters of Schenis. Wakened by the sound of the cannon, Hotze ran, with a few officers and a slender escort, to the spot, and fell dead by the first discharge of the Republican videttes. This calamitous event threw the Austrians into such consternation that they fell back from Schenis to Kaltbrun, from which they were also dislodged before the evening. At the same time, the French had succeeded in crossing a body of troops over the river a little lower down, at Shemersken, and advanced to the bridge of Grynau, where a desperate conflict ensued.

These disasters compelled the Austrians to retreat to their position at Wasen, where they were next day assaulted by Soult, and driven first behind the Thiers, and at length over the Rhine, with the loss of three thousand prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, all their baggage, and the whole flotilla, constructed at a great expense on the Lake of Wallenstadt.*

While these disasters were accumulating upon the allied force, which he was advancing to support, Suwarrow was resolutely and faithfully performing his part of the general plan. He arrived at Taverno on the 15th of August, and, despatching his artillery and baggage, by Como and Chiavenna, towards the Grisons, set out himself, with twelve thousand veterans, to ascend the Tessino, and force the passage of the St. Gothard, while Rosenberg, with six thousand, was sent round by the Val Blegno, to turn the position by the Crispalt and Disentis, and so descend into the valley of Urseren by its eastern extremity. On the 21st of September the Russian main body arrived at Airola, at the foot of the mountain, where General Gudin was strongly posted, with four thousand men, covering both the direct road over the St. Gothard and the path which led diagonally to the Furca. Two days after, the attack was commenced, with the utmost resolution, by the Russian troops; but, in spite of all their efforts, they were arrested in the steep zigzag ascent above Airola by the rapid and incessant fire of the French tirailleurs. In vain the Russians, marching boldly up, answered by heavy platoons of musketry; their fire, however sustained, could produce little impression on detached parties of sharpshooters, who, posted behind rocks and scattered fir-trees, caused every shot to tell upon the dense array of their assailants. Irritated at the unexpected obstacles, the old marshal advanced to the front, lay down in a ditch, and declared his resolution "to be buried there, where his children had retreated for the first time." Joining generalship to resolution, however, he despatched detachments to the right and left to turn the French position, and when their fire began, putting himself at the head of his grenadiers, at length drove the Republicans from their position, and pursued them, at the point of the bayonet, over the rugged summit of the St. Gothard to the valley of Urseren. At the same time, Rosenberg had assailed the French detachment on the summit of the Crispalt, and, after destroying the greater part, driven them down in great disorder into the eastern extremity of the same valley, while a detachment under Auffenberg, despatched from Disentis, was proceeding through the Maderanthal to Amsteg, to cut off their retreat by the valley of Schollenen.†

Assailed by such superior forces, both in front and flank, Lecourbe had no alternative but a rapid retreat. During the night, therefore, he threw his artillery into the Reuss, and retired down Bridge.

Operations of Suwarrow on the Tessino.

Bloody conflict above Airola. The St. Gothard is at length forced by the Russians.

Sept. 24. Dreadful struggle at the Devil's Bridge.

* Th., x., 419, 420. Arch. Ch., ii., 199, 201. Jom., xii., 257, 258. Hard., vii., 292.

* Jom., xii., 259, 263. Arch. Ch., ii., 203, 209. Dum., ii., 61, 63.

† Th., x., 421, 422. Jom., xii., 265, 266. Dum., i., 51. Arch. Ch., ii., 227, 228.

the valley of Schollenen, breaking down the Devil's Bridge to impede the progress of the enemy, while Gudin scaled the Furca by moonlight, and took post on the inhospitable summit of the Grimsel. On the following morning the united Russian forces approached the Devil's Bridge, but they found an impassable gulf, 200 feet deep, which stopped the leading companies, while a dreadful fire from all the rocks on the opposite side swept off all the brave men who approached the edge of the abyss. Hearing the firing in front, the column of Bagrathion pressed on, in double quick time, through the dark passage of the Unnerloch, and literally, by their pressure, drove the soldiers in front headlong over the rocks into the foaming Reuss. At length the officers, tired of the fruitless butchery, despatched a few companies across the Reuss to scale the rocks on the left, by which the post at the bridge was turned, and beams being hastily

thrown across, the Russian troops, with loud shouts, passed the terrific defile, and pressing hard upon the retiring column of the Republicans, effected a junction with Aufenberg at Wasen, and drove the enemy beyond Altdorf, to take post on the sunny slopes where the Alps of Surenen descend into the glassy Lake of Lucerne.*

The capture of the St. Gothard by the Russians, and the expulsion of the French from the whole valley of the Reuss, was totally unexpected by Massena, and would have been attended with important results

upon the general fate of the campaign if it had not been simultaneous with the disaster of Korsakow at Zurich, and the defeat of Hotze's corps by the Republicans on the Linth. But, coming as it did in the midst of these misfortunes, it only induced another upon the corps whose defeat was about to signalize the Republican arms. Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarrow found his progress in a direct line stopped by the Lake of Lucerne, whose perpendicular sides precluded all possibility of a farther advance in that direction, while the only outlet to join the allied forces on his right lay through the horrible defile of the Shachenthal, in which even the audacious Lecourbe had not ventured to engage his troops, however long habituated to mountain warfare. There was now, however, no alternative, and Suwarrow, with troops exhausted with fatigue, and a heart boiling with indignation, was compelled to commence the perilous journey.†

No words can do justice to the difficulties experienced by the Russians in this terrible march, or the heroism of the brave men engaged in it. Obligated to abandon their artillery and baggage, the whole army advanced in single file, dragging the beasts of burden after them, up rocky paths, where even an active traveller can with difficulty find a footing. Numbers slipped down the precipices, and perished miserably; others, worn out with fatigue, lay down on the track, and were trodden under foot by the multitude who followed after them, or fell into the hands

of Lecourbe, who closely hung upon their rear. So complete was the dispersion of the army, that the leading files had reached Mitten Sept. 28. before the last had left Altdorf; the precipices beneath the path were covered with horses, equipages, arms, and soldiers unable to continue the laborious ascent. At length the marshal reached Mitten, where the troops, in a hospitable valley, abounding with cottages and green fields, hoped for some respite from their fatigues, and where, in conformity to the plan agreed on, they were to have met the Austrian corps of Jellachich and Linken, to threaten the right of the Republicans.*

But it was too late: the disasters of the Imperialists deprived them of all hopes of relief from this quarter. Jellachich, faithful to his instructions, had broken up from Coire and the valley of the Rhine on the 25th, with eight battalions made himself master of the village of Mollis, and driven the Republicans back to Nae-fels, at the bridge of which, however, they resolutely defended themselves. But on the following day, the French, issuing from Wasen, menaced the retreat of the Austrians by the side of the Wallenstadter See; and Jellachich, informed of the disasters at Zurich, the death of Hotze, and the retreat of his corps, made haste to fall back behind the Rhine. On the same day, Linken, who had crossed from the valley of the Rhine by the valley of Sernst and the sources of the Linth, after making prisoners two battalions whom they encountered, appeared in the upper part of the valley of Glarus, so as to put Molitor between two fires. His situation now appeared all but desperate, and by a little more vigour on the part of the Russians might have been rendered so; but the retreat of Jellachich having enabled Molitor to accumulate his forces against this new adversary, he was obliged to retreat, and, after remaining inactive for three days at Schwanden, recrossed the mountains, and retired behind the Rhine.†

Suwarrow thus found himself in the Muttenthal, in the middle of the enemy's forces, having the whole of Massena's army on one side, and that of Molitor on the other. Soon the masses of the Republicans began to accumulate round the Russian marshal. Molitor occupied Mont Brakel and the Klonthal, the summit of the pass between the Muttenthal and Glarus, while Mortier entered the mouth of the valley towards Schwytz, and Massena himself arrived at Fluellen, to concert with Lecourbe a general attack on the Russian forces. In this extremity, Suwarrow having, with the utmost difficulty, assembled his wearied troops in the Muttenthal, called a council of war, and following only the dictates of his own impetuous courage, proposed an immediate advance to Schwytz, in the rear of the French position at Zurich, and wrote to Korsakow that he would hold him answerable with his head for one step farther that he continued his retreat. The officers, however, perceiving clearly the dangerous situation in which they were placed, strongly urged the necessity of an immediate

September 25.
He finds none of the expected reinforcements there.

Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarrow is forced to ascend the Shachenthal.

And is there surrounded on all sides, and reluctantly forced to retreat.

Difficult passage of that ridge to Muttenthal.

* Jom., xii., 267, 269. Th., x., 422. Dum., ii., 52, 53. Arch. Ch., ii., 229, 235.

† Jom., x., 269, 270. Dum., ii., 54, 55. Th., x., 422. Arch. Ch., ii., 236.

* Jom., xii., 270, 271. Th., x., 423. Arch. Ch., ii., 237.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 212, 220. Jom., xii., 271, 272. Dum., ii., 68, 69.

retreat into Glarus and the Grisons, in order to strengthen themselves by that wing of the allied army which alone had escaped a total defeat. At length, with the utmost difficulty, the veteran conqueror was persuaded to alter his plans, and, for the first time in his life, he ordered a retreat, weeping with indignation at thus finding the reputation of invincibility, which his marvellous successes had won for him, lost in the close of his career by the faults of the generals placed under his command.*

Preceded by the Austrian division under Auf-
Sept. 30. fenberg, the Russians ascended Mont Bragel, and chasing before them the detachments of Molitor, great part of whom were made prisoners near the Lake Klonthal, threw back that general upon the banks of the Linth. It was now the turn of the French general to feel alarm; but, calm in the midst of dangers which would have overturned the resolution of an ordinary commander, he made the

Oct. 1. most resolute defence, disputing every inch of ground, and turning every way to face the adversaries who assailed him. Determined to block up the passage to the Rus-

He crosses the mountains into Glarus. Desperate struggle at Naefels.

sians, he ultimately took post at Naefels, already immortalized in the wars of Swiss independence, where he was furiously attacked, for a whole day, by Prince Bagration. Both parties fought with the most heroic courage, regardless of ten days' previous combats and marches, in which they had respectively been engaged; but all the efforts of the Russian grenadiers could not prevail over the steady resistance of the Republicans, and towards evening, having received re-enforcements from Wasen, they sallied forth, and drove the assailants back to Glarus. On the same day, Massena, with a large force, attacked the rear-guard of the Russians, which was winding, encumbered with wounded, along the Muttenthal; but Rosenberg halting, withstood their attack with such firmness, that the Republicans were compelled to give way, and then breaking suddenly from a courageous defensive to a furious offensive, he routed them entirely, and drove them back as far as Schwytz, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, a thousand prisoners, and as many killed and wounded.†

Unable to force the passage at Naefels, the Russian general, after giving his troops some days' repose at Glarus, which was absolutely indispensable after the desperate fatigues they had undergone, resolved to retreat

over the mountains into the Grisons by Engi, Matt, and the valley of Sernst. To effect this in presence of a superior enemy, pressing on his footsteps both from the side of Naefels and the Klonthal, was an enterprise of the utmost hazard, as the path over the arid summits of the Alps of Glarus was even more rugged than that through the Shachenthal, and the horses and beasts of burden had all perished under the fatigues of the former march. Nothing could exceed the difficulties which presented themselves. Hardships, tenfold greater than those which all but daunted the Carthaginian conqueror in the outset of his career in the Pennine

Alps, awaited the Russians at the close of a bloody and fatiguing campaign, among mountains to which they were entire strangers. On the morning on which the army set out for Glarus, a heavy fall of snow both obliterated all traces of a path, and augmented the natural difficulties of the passage. With incred-
ible difficulty, the wearied column wound
its painful way among inhospitable mountains, in single file, without either stores to sustain its strength, or covering to shelter it from the weather. The snow, which in the upper parts of the mountain was two feet deep, and perfectly soft, from being newly fallen, rendered the ascent so fatiguing, that the strongest men could with difficulty advance a few miles in a day. No cottages were to be found in these dreary and sterile mountains; not even trees were to be met with, to form the cheerful light of the bivouacs; vast gray rocks, starting up among the snow, alone broke the mournful uniformity of the scene; and under their shelter, or on the open surface of the mountain, without any covering or fire, were the soldiers obliged to lie down, and pass a long and dreary autumnal night. Great numbers perished of cold, or sunk down precipices, or into crevices from which they were unable to extricate themselves, and where they were soon choked by the drifting of the snow. With incredible difficulty, the head of the column, on the following day, at
length reached, amid colossal rocks, the
summit of the ridge; but it was not the smiling plains of Italy which there met their view, but a sea of mountains, wrapped in the snowy mantle which seemed the winding-sheet of the army, interspersed with cold gray clouds, which floated round their higher peaks. The Alps of Tyrol and the Grisons, whose summits stretched as far as the eye could reach in every direction, presented a vast wilderness, in the solitudes of which the army appeared about to be lost, while not a fire nor a column of smoke was to be seen in the vast expanse to cheer the spirits of the soldiers. The path, long hardly visible, now totally disappeared; not a shrub or a bush was to be met with; the naked tops of the rocks, buried in the snow, no longer served to indicate the lying of the precipices, or rest the exhausted bodies of the troops. On the southern descent the difficulties were still greater; the snow, hardened by a sharp, freezing wind, was so slippery that it became impossible for the men to keep their footing; whole companies slipped together into the abysses below, and numbers were crushed by the beasts of burden rolling down upon them from the upper parts of the ascent, or the masses of snow which became loosened by the incessant march of the army, and fell down with irresistible force upon those beneath. All the day was passed in struggling with these difficulties, and with the utmost exertions the advanced guards reached the village of Panix, in the Grisons, at night, where headquarters were established. The whole remainder of the columns slept upon the snow, where the darkness enveloped them without either fire or covering. But nothing could overcome the unconquerable spirit of the Russians. With heroic resolution and incredible perseverance, they struggled on, through hardships which would have daunted any other sol-

* Arch. Ch., ii., 239, 240. *Jom.*, xii., 273, 275. *Dum.*, ii., 67, 68.

† *Jom.*, xii., 276, 277. *Arch. Ch.*, i., 48.

diers;* and at length the scattered stragglers were rallied in the valley of the Rhine, and headquarters established at Ilantz on the 10th, where the troops obtained some rest, after the unparalleled difficulties which they had experienced.

Meanwhile, Korsakow, having reorganized his army, and recovered in some degree from his consternation, halted his columns at Busingen, and, turning fiercely upon his pursuers, drove them back to Trullikon; but the enemy having there received re-enforcements, the combat was renewed with the utmost obstinacy, and continued, without any decisive result on either side, till nightfall. On the same day, a body of Russian and Austrian cavalry, three thousand strong, posted in the vineyards and gardens which form the smiling environs of Constance, were attacked by a superior body of Republicans, under the command of General Gazen; a furious combat commenced, in the course of which the town was three times taken and retaken, barricades were thrown up in the streets, and the unhappy citizens underwent all the horrors of a fortress carried by assault. The Archduke Charles, informed of these circumstances, hastened, with all his disposable forces, from the environs of Manheim. From the first to the 7th of October, twenty-seven battalions and forty-six squadrons arrived in the neighbourhood of Villingen, and the prince himself fixed his headquarters at Donaschingen, in order to be at hand to support the broken remains of Korsakow's army. The allies were withdrawn from the St. Gothard, and all the posts they yet occupied in Switzerland, to the Grisons, and the Rhine formed the boundary between the hostile armies, the Russians being charged with its defence from Petershausen to Diesenhosen, and the Austrians with the remainder of the line.†

While these desperate conflicts were going on in the south of Europe, England, at length rousing its giant strength from the state of inactivity in which it had so long been held by the military inexperience and want of confidence in its prowess on the part of government, was preparing an expedition more commensurate than any it had yet sent forth to the station which it occupied in the war. Holland was the quarter selected for attack, both as being the country in the hands of the enemy nearest the British shores, and most threatening to its maritime superiority, where the most vigorous co-operation might be expected from the inhabitants, and the means of defence within the power of the Republicans were most inconsiderable. By a treaty, concluded on the 22d of June, between England and Russia, it was stipulated that the former of these powers was to furnish 13,000, and the latter 17,000 men, towards a descent in Holland, and that £44,000 a month should be paid by England for the expenses of the Russian troops, and her whole naval force be employed to support the operations. To re-establish the stadtholder in Holland, and terminate the revolutionary tyran-

ny under which that opulent country groaned; to form the nucleus of an army which might threaten the northern provinces of France, and restore the barrier which had been so insanely destroyed by the Emperor Joseph; to effect a diversion in favour of the great armies now combating on the Rhine and the Alps, and destroy the ascendancy of the Republicans in the maritime provinces and naval arsenals of the Dutch, were the objects proposed in this expedition, and which, by efforts more worthy of the strength of England, might unquestionably have been attained.*

The preparations for the expedition, both in England and the Baltic, were pushed with the utmost vigour; and the energy and skill with which the naval departments and arrangements for disembarkation were made in the British harbours, were such as to extort the admiration of the French historians.† In the middle of July, Sir Home Popham sailed for the Baltic to receive on board the Russian contingent, while twelve thousand men, early in August, were assembled on the coast of Kent, and twelve thousand more were preparing for the same destination. All the harbours of England resounded with the noise of preparation; it was openly announced in the newspapers that a descent in Holland was in contemplation; and the numerous British cruisers, by reconnoitring every river and harbour along the Channel, kept the maritime districts in constant alarm from Brest to the Texel. The best defensive measures which their circumstances would admit were adopted by the Directory, and Brune, the French general, was placed at the head of the forces of both nations; but he could only collect fifteen thousand French and twenty thousand Dutch troops to resist the invasion.‡

On the 13th of August, the fleet, with the first division of the army, twelve thousand strong, set sail from Deal, and joined Lord Duncan in the North Sea. Tempestuous weather, and a tremendous surf on the coast of Holland, prevented the disembarkation from being effected for a fortnight; but at length, on the 26th, the fleet was anchored off the Helder, in North Holland, and preparations were immediately made for a descent on the following morning. At daylight on the 27th the disembarkation began, the troops led with equal skill and resolution by Sir RALPH ABERCROMBY, and the landing covered by the able exertions of the fleet under Admiral Mitchell; and never was the cordial co-operation of the land and sea forces more required than on that trying service. The naval strength of England was proudly evinced on this occasion: fifteen ships of the line, forty-five frigates and brigs, and one hundred and thirty transport vessels, covered the sea, as far as the eye could reach, with their sails. General Daendels, who was at the head of a division of twelve thousand men in the neighbourhood, marched rapidly to the menaced point; and when the first detachment of the

Treaty between Russia and England for an expedition to Holland. experience and want of confidence in its prowess on the part of government, was preparing an expedition more commensurate than any it had yet sent forth to the station which it occupied in the war. Holland was the quarter selected for attack, both as being the country in the hands of the enemy nearest the British shores, and most threatening to its maritime superiority, where the most vigorous co-operation might be expected from the inhabitants, and the means of defence within the power of the Republicans were most inconsiderable. By a treaty, concluded on the 22d of June, between England and Russia, it was stipulated that the former of these powers was to furnish 13,000, and the latter 17,000 men, towards a descent in Holland, and that £44,000 a month should be paid by England for the expenses of the Russian troops, and her whole naval force be employed to support the operations. To re-establish the stadtholder in Holland, and terminate the revolutionary tyran-

* *Jom.*, xii., 178, 179. *Ann. Reg.*, 1799, 301, and *State Papers*, 216, 217. *Dum.*, ii., 348, 349.

† *Jom.*, xii., 180, 181. *Dum.*, ii., 349, 354.

‡ *Jom.*, xii., 182, 183. *Ann. Reg.*, 301. *Dum.*, ii., 351, 352.

* *Arch. Ch.*, ii., 249, 251. *Jom.*, xii., 277, 279.

† *Arch. Ch.*, ii., 259, 264. *Jom.*, xii., 283, 286.

British, two thousand five hundred strong, was landed, it found itself assailed by a much superior force of Batavian troops; but the fire from the ships carried disorder into their ranks, and they were driven back into the sandhills on the

Action at the
Helder. De-
feat of the
Dutch.

beach, from which, after an obstinate conflict, they were expelled before six in the evening, and the debarcation of the remaining divisions effected without molestation. In the night the enemy evacuated the fort of the Helder, which was taken possession of next day by the English troops. In this affair, the loss of the different parties was singularly at variance with what might have been expected; that of the British did not exceed five hundred, while that of the Dutch was more than twice that number.*

This success was soon followed by another still more important. The position of the Dutch fleet at the Helder having been fortified, and a re-enforcement of five thousand fresh troops come up from England, the British fleet entered the Texel, of the batteries defending which they had now the command by the occupation of the Helder, and summoned the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Story, consisting of eight ships of the line, three of fifty-four guns, eight of forty-four, and six smaller frigates, who had retired into the Vietu Canal, to surrender. At the sight of the English flag, symptoms of insubordination manifested themselves in the Dutch fleet; the admiral, unable to escape, and despairing of assistance, surrendered without firing a shot; and immediately the Orange flag was hoisted on all the ships, and on the towers and batteries of the Helder and Texel. By this important success the Dutch fleet was finally extricated from the grasp of the Republicans, a circumstance of no small moment in after times, when England had to contend, single-handed, with the combined maritime forces of all Europe.†

The Russian troops not having yet arrived, the British commander, who was only at the head of twelve thousand men, remained on the defensive, which gave the Republicans time to assemble their forces; and having soon collected twenty-four thousand, of whom seven thousand were French, under the orders of VANDAMME, General Brune, who had assumed the command-in-chief, resolved to anticipate the enemy, and resume the offensive. On the 10th of September all the columns were in motion; Vandamme, who commanded the right, was directed to move along the Langdyke, and make himself master of Ennsginberg; Dumonceau, with the centre, was to march by Schorlдам upon Krabbenham, and there force the key of the position; while the left was charged with the difficult task of chasing the enemy from the Sand-dyke, and penetrating by Kamp to Petten. The contest, like all those which followed, was of the most peculiar kind; restricted to dikes and causeys, intersecting in different directions a low and swampy ground, it consisted of detached conflicts at insulated points rather than any gen-

eral movements; and, like the struggle between Napoleon and the Austrians in the marshes of Arcole, was to be determined chiefly by the intrepidity of the heads of columns. The Republicans advanced bravely to the attack, but they were everywhere repulsed. All the efforts of Vandamme were shattered against the intrepidity of the English troops which guarded the Sand-dyke; Dumonceau was defeated at Krabbenham, and Daendels compelled to fall back in disorder from before Petten. Repulsed at all points, the Republicans resumed their position at Alkmaer with a loss of two thousand men, while that of the British did not exceed three hundred.*

Instructed by this disaster as to the quality of the troops with which he had to deal, General Brune remained on the defensive at Alkmaer, while the remainder of the expedition rapidly arrived to the support of the British army. Between the 12th and the 15th of September, the Russian contingent, seventeen thousand strong, and seven thousand British, arrived, and the Duke of York took the command. The English general, finding himself now at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and being aware that extensive re-enforcements were advancing to the support of the Republicans from the Scheldt and the Meuse, resolved to move forward and attack the enemy. As the nature of the ground precluded the employment of large masses, the attacking force was divided into four columns. The first, under the command of General Hermann, composed of eight thousand Russians and a brigade of English, was destined to advance by the Sand-dyke and the Slapperdyke against the left of Brune, resting on the sea; the second, under the orders of General Dundas, consisting of seven thousand men, of whom five thousand were English, was charged with the attack on Schorlдам and the French centre; the third, under Sir James Pulteney, which required to advance along the Langdyke, which was defended by powerful intrenchments, was intended rather to effect a diversion than make a serious attack, and was not to push beyond Oude Scarpell, at the head of the Langdyke, unless in the event of unlooked-for success; while the fourth, consisting of ten thousand choice troops, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, was destined to turn the enemy's right on the Zuyder Zee.†

The action commenced at daybreak on the 19th of September with a furious attack by the Russians, under Hermann, who speedily drove in the advanced guard of the Republicans at Kamp and Groot, and pressing forward along the Sand-dyke, made themselves masters of Schorlдам and Bergen, and drove back Vandamme, who commanded in that quarter, to within half a league of Alkmaer. But the assailants fell into disorder in consequence of the rapidity of their advance, and Brune, having speedily moved up the division of Daendels, and considerable re-enforcements from his centre, to the support of his left, Vandamme was enabled to resume the

The English,
joined by the
Russians, at
length advanced.

* Ann. Reg., 1799, 302. Jom., xii., 188, 189. Dum., ii., 365, 369.

† Dum., ii., 369, 372. Ann. Reg., 1799, 303. Jom., xii., 190.

* Dum., ii., 378, 380. Jom., xii., 192, 195. Ann. Reg., 1799, 303.

† Ann. Reg., 1799, 304. Jom., xii., 198, 199. Dum., ii., 384, 385.

offensive, in consequence of which the Russians were attacked at once in front and both flanks in the village of Bergen, from whence, after a murderous conflict, they were driven at the point of the bayonet. Their retreat, which at first was conducted in some degree of order, was soon turned into a total rout by the sudden appearance of two French battalions on the flank of their column.* Hermann himself was taken prisoner, with a considerable part of his division, and General Essen, his second in command, who had advanced towards Schorl-dam, was obliged to seek shelter, under cover of the English reserve, behind the allied intrenchments of Zyp.

While the Russians were undergoing these Success of the disasters on the right, the Duke of British in the York was successful in the centre centre and left. and left. Dundas carried the villages there, after an obstinate resistance; Dumonceau was driven back from Schorl-dam, and two of his best battalions were made prisoners. At the same time, Sir James Pulteney, having been encouraged, by the imprudence of Daendels, in pursuing too warmly a trifling advantage, to convert his feigned attack into a real one, not only drove back the Dutch division, but made a thousand prisoners, and forced the whole line, in utter confusion, towards St. Pancras, under the fire of the English artillery. Abercromby had not yet brought his powerful division into action; but everything promised decisive success in the centre and left of the allies, when intelligence was brought to the Duke of York of the disaster on the right, and the rapid advance of the Republicans in pursuit of the flying Russians. He instantly halted his victorious troops in the centre, and marched upon Schorl with two brigades of English and three Russian regiments, which was speedily carried, and, if Essen could have rallied his broken troops, decisive success might yet have been attained. But all the efforts of that brave general could not restore order or rescue the soldiers from the state of discouragement into which they had fallen; and the consequence was, that, as they continued their retreat to the intrenchments of Zyp, the Republicans were enabled to accumulate their forces on the Duke of York, who, thus pressed, had no alternative but to evacuate Schorl,† and draw back his troops to their fortified line. In this battle the Republicans lost 3000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; but the British lost 500 killed and wounded, and as many prisoners, while the Russians were weakened by 3500 killed and wounded, 26 pieces of cannon, and seven standards.

While these events were in progress, the Removal of the Dutch fleet was conveyed to the Dutch fleet to British harbours. It is remarkable England. ble that this measure gave equal dissatisfaction to the sailors on both sides. The Dutch loudly complained that their ships, instead of being employed in their own country, under Orange colours, should be taken as prizes to Great Britain, while the English sailors la-

mented that a fleet which could not escape had not fallen into their hands as glorious trophies, like those at St. Vincents or Camperdown. The officers on both sides were anxious to preserve a good understanding between their respective crews, but the sailors kept up a sullen distrust: so much more easy is it to accommodate differences between rival cabinets than heal the national animosity which centuries of warfare have spread among their subjects.* Holland, however, had no reason in the end to complain of British generosity; after a decided, though unwilling hostility of twenty years, she obtained a lavish accumulation of gifts in Flanders and Java from her ancient rival, such as rarely rewards even the steadiest fidelity of an allied power.

The Duke of York was not discouraged by the issue of the attack on the 19th of September. Having been re-enforced, a few days after, by a fresh brigade of Russians and some English detachments, he arranged his army, as before, in four columns; and although the heavy rains for long prevented the projected operation from taking place, yet they were enabled to resume the offensive on the 2d of October. The recollection of the success which had everywhere crowned their efforts in the preceding action animated the English troops, while the Russians burned with anxiety to wash out the stain which their disasters on that occasion had affixed to the imperial eagles. The allied army on this occasion was about thirty thousand strong, and the Republicans nearly of equal force. At six in the morning the attack was commenced at all points. The Russian division of Essen, anxious to efface its former disgrace, supported by the English division of Dundas, advanced to the attack in the centre with such impetuosity that the villages of Schorl and Schorl-dam were quickly carried, and the Republicans driven in confusion to the downs above Bergen. An attack was there projected by the Duke of York; but Essen, who recollected the former rashness of the Russians on the same ground, refused to move till the advance of Abercromby on the right was ascertained: a circumstance which paralyzed the success of the allies in that quarter. Meanwhile, Abercromby, who commanded nine thousand men, advanced gallantly at the head of his troops along the Sand-dyke which adjoined the sea, and, notwithstanding a hot fire of musketry and grape, by which he had two horses shot under him, succeeded in forcing the French left, and expelling them from the sandhills and downs on which they rested. On the left, Sir James Pulteney had made little progress, and his measures were confined to demonstrations; but, as the English centre and right were victorious, and they had completely turned the French left, Brune retired in the night from the field of battle, and took up a fresh position, abandoning Alkmaer and all his former line. The loss sustained by the Republicans in this contest was above three thousand men and seven pieces of cannon; that of the allies about fifteen hundred. Already the attention of the French was attracted by the

The Duke of York renews the attack, and is successful.

Oct. 2.

* Jom., xii., 200, 203. Dum., ii., 387, 388. Ann. Reg., 1799, 304, 305.

† Ann. Reg., 1799, 305, 306. Jom., xii., 199, 205. Dum., ii., 387, 389.

* Dum., ii., 381, 382.

courage and address of the Highland regiments, who bravely fought up to the knees in water, and rapidly overcame the strongest obstacles in their attack on the flank of the Republicans.*

But, although they had gained this success, the situation of the Duke of York's army was far from encouraging. His critical situation notwithstanding.

The enemy's force was daily increasing, while for his own no farther re-enforcements could be expected: the autumnal rains, which had set in with more than usual severity, rendered the roads almost unpassable for artillery or chariots; the insalubrity of the climate at that period of the year was already beginning to affect the health of the soldiers, and none of the expected movements of the inhabitants or Batavian troops in favour of the house of Orange had taken place. In these circumstances, it was evident that, unless some important place could be captured, it would be impossible for the allies to retain their footing in North Holland, and Haarlem was pitched on as most likely to furnish the necessary supplies. To achieve the conquest of this important city, the allied forces were put in motion to attack the French position which occupied the narrow isthmus between Beverwick and the Zuyder Zee, by which it was necessary to pass to approach Haarlem, which was not more than three leagues distant.†

The action commenced at seven in the morning, and was obstinately contested undecisively ring the whole day. In the centre, the allies were, in the first instance,

successful; Essen bore down all opposition, and Palthed, who commanded the Republicans, was on the point of succumbing, when Brune strengthened him with the greater part of a fresh division, and a vigorous charge threw back the allies in confusion towards their own position. In their turn, however, the victorious Republicans were charged, when disordered with success, by an English regiment of cavalry, thrown into confusion, and driven back with great loss to Kastricum, where they were with difficulty rallied by Vandamme, who succeeded in checking the advance of the pursuers. The action was less obstinately contested on the right, as Abercromby, who commanded in that quarter, was obliged to detach a considerable part of his troops to re-enforce Essen, while on the left the immense inundations which covered the front of the Republican position prevented Pulteney from reaching the French right under Daendels. The loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about two thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners: that of the English alone was twelve hundred men.‡

The barren honours in this well-contested field belonged to the allies, who the retreat of had forced back the French centre to a considerable distance from the field of battle: but it is with an invading army as an insurrection, an indecisive success is equivalent to a defeat. Haarlem was the object of the English general, without the possession of which he could not maintain himself

in the country during the inclement weather which was approaching, and Haarlem was still in the hands of the Republicans. The enemy's force was hourly increasing, and, two days after the action, six thousand infantry arrived to strengthen their already formidable position on the isthmus, by which alone access could be obtained to the interior of the country; and the total absence of all the necessary supplies in the corner of land within which the army was confined, rendered it impossible to remain there for any length of time. In these circumstances, the Duke of York, with the unanimous concurrence of a council of war, resolved to fall back to the intrenchments at Zyp, there to await re-enforcements or farther commands from the British cabinet: a resolution which was strengthened by the intelligence, which arrived at the same time, of the disasters which had befallen the Russians at Zurich. On the day after the battle, therefore, the allies retired to the position they had occupied before the battle of Bergen.*

Brune lost no time in following up the retreating army. On the 8th the Republicans resumed their position in front of Alkmaar, and several sharp skirmishes ensued between the British rear-guard and the advanced posts of their pursuers.

The situation of the Duke of York was now daily becoming more desperate; his forces were reduced by sickness and the sword to twenty thousand men; the number of those in hospital was daily increasing; there remained but eleven days' provision for the troops, and no supplies or assistance could be looked for from the inhabitants for a retreating army. In these circumstances he rightly judged that it was necessary to lose no time in embarking the sick, wounded, and stores, with such of the Dutch as had compromised themselves by their avowal of Orange principles, and proposed a suspension of arms to General Brune, preparatory to the evacuation of Holland by the allied troops. Some difficulty was at first experienced from the French insisting, as a *sine qua non*, that the fleet captured at the Texel should be restored; but this the British commander firmly resisted, and at length the conditions of the evacuation were agreed on. The principal articles were, that the allies should, without molestation, effect the total evacuation of Holland by the end of November; that eight thousand prisoners, whether French or Dutch, should be restored; and that the works of the Helder should be given up entire, with all their artillery. A separate article stipulated for the surrender of the brave De Winter, made prisoner in the battle of Camperdown. Before the 1st of December all these conditions were fulfilled on both sides: the British troops had regained the shores of England, and the Russians were quartered in Jersey and Guernsey.†

Such was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbours during the war, and the only one at all commensurate to the power or the character of England. Reflections on this disaster on the nation.

Such was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbours during the war, and the only one at all commensurate to the power or the character of England.

* Dum., ii., 85, 86. Jom., xii., 207, 211. Ann. Reg., 1799, 308.

† Ann. Reg., 1799, 308, 309. Dum., ii., 308, 309. Jom., xii., 211, 212.

‡ Jom., xii., 212, 216. Ann. Reg., 1799, 309. Dum., ii., 89.

* Jom., xii., 215, 217. Dum., ii., 90, 91. Ann. Reg., 1799, 310.

† Ann. Reg., 1799, 218, 219. Dum., ii., 94, 96. Jom., xii., 216, 219.

land. Coming, as it did, after the hopes of the nation had been highly excited by its early successes, and when the vast conquests of the allies in the first part of the campaign had led to a very general expectation of the fall of the Jacobinical power in France, it produced the most bitter disappointment, and contributed, in a signal degree, both on the Continent and at home, to confirm the general impression that the English soldiers had irreversibly declined from their former renown; that the victors of Cressy and Azincour were never destined to revive; and that it was at sea alone that any hope for resistance remained to Great Britain against the power of the Republic. The opposition, as usual, magnified the public disasters, and ascribed them all to the rashness and imbecility of the administration; while the credulous public, incapable of just discrimination, and ever governed by the event, overlooked the important facts that the naval power of Republican Holland had been completely destroyed by the expedition, and that in every encounter the English soldiers had asserted their ancient superiority over those of France; and, instead of ascribing the failure of the expedition to its real causes, inadequacy of means and the jealousies incident to an allied force unaccustomed to act together, joined the general chorus, and loudly proclaimed the utter madness of any attempts, by land at least, to resist the overwhelming power of France.* The time was not yet arrived when a greater commander, wielding the resources of a more courageous and excited nation, was to wash out these stains on the British arms, and show to the astonished world that England was yet destined to take the lead, even on the Continent, in the deliverance of Europe, and that the blood of the victors of Poitiers and Blenheim yet flowed in the veins of their descendants.

While the campaign was thus checkered with disaster to the north of the Alps, Affairs of Italy after the battle of Novi. the successes of the allies led to more durable consequences on the Italian plains. The Directory, overwhelmed by the calamitous result of the battle of Novi, gave the command of both the armies of Italy and Savoy to General Championet, who could only assemble fifty-four thousand men under his banners, exclusive of six thousand conscripts, who guarded the summits of the Alps. On the other hand, General Melas, who, after the departure of Suwarrow, had assumed the chief command, had sixty-eight thousand men under his orders, independent of fifteen thousand in garrisons in his rear, and seven thousand who marched towards the Arno and the Tiber. In despair at the unpromising condition of his troops, occupying the circular ridge of the mountains from the sources of the Trebbia to the Great St. Bernard, the French general at first proposed to repass the Alps, and after leaving such a force in the Maritime Alps as might secure the south of France from insult, proceed, with the bulk of his forces, to join General Thurreau in the Valais. But the Directory refused to accede to this wise proposition, and instead, prescribed to the French general to maintain his position, and exert his utmost

efforts for the preservation of Coni, which was evidently threatened by the Imperialists.*

The cautious and minute directions of the Aulic Council having completely fettered the Austrian general, his operations were confined to the reduction of this fortress, the last bulwark in the plain of Italy still held by the Republicans, and justly regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the conquest of Genoa, from its commanding the chief communications of that city with the plain of Piedmont. With this view, both generals drew their troops towards Coni; the Austrians encircling its walls with a chain of posts in the plain, and the French accumulating their forces in the mountains which overlook it. In the desultory warfare which followed, Sept. 17.

The Imperialists were ultimately successful. Melas, with the centre, twenty thousand strong, defeated Grenier at Savigliano, while Kray threw back their left through the valley of Suza to the foot of Mont Cenis. At the same time, the Republicans were equally unsuccessful in the valley of Aosta, where the united forces of Kray and Haddick expelled them successively from Ivrea and Aosta, and forced them to retire over the Great St. Bernard to Martigny.† Relieved by these successes from all disquietude for his right flank, Melas gradually drew nearer to Coni, and began his preparations for the siege of that place. Sept. 25.

Pressed by the reiterated orders of the Directory, Championet now resolved to make an effort for the relief of Coni. His disposable force for this enterprise, even including the army of the Alps under Grenier, did not exceed forty-five thousand men; but, by a vigorous and concentric effort, there was some reason to hope that the object might be effected. St. Cyr in vain represented to the Directory that it was the height of temerity to endeavour to maintain themselves in a mountainous region, already exhausted of its resources, and that the wiser course was to fall back, with the army yet entire, to the other side of the Alps, and there assemble it in a central position. How clear soever may have been the justice of this opinion, they had not strength of mind sufficient to admit the loss of Italy in a single campaign; and the French general set himself bravely about the difficult task of maintaining himself, with an inferior and dispirited army, on the Italian side of the mountains.‡ Sept. 29.

With this view, the divisions of Victor and Lemoine, forming the centre of the army, sixteen thousand strong, were directed to move upon Mondovi; while St. Cyr, with the right, received orders to descend from the Bocchetta, and effect a diversion on the side of Novi. The movement commenced in the end of September. Vico was taken by a brigade of the Republicans; but, finding the Imperialists too strongly posted at Mondovi to be assailed with success, Championet contented

himself to effect that object. Measures to effect that object. Measures to effect that object.

Sept. 28.

* Jom., xii., 313, 317. Dum., ii., 262, 263. Arch. Ch., ii., 307, 308. St. Cyr, ii., 10, 11.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 309, 310. Jom., xii., 318, 322. Dum., ii., 263, 264. St. Cyr, ii., 12, 15.

‡ Dum., ii., 266, 267. St. Cyr, ii., 15, 19

* Ann. Reg., 1799, 312. Jom., xii., 221, 222.

himself with placing his troops in observation on the adjacent heights, while St. Cyr gained a trifling advantage in the neighbourhood of Novi. But intelligence having at this time been received of the decisive victory of Massena in Switzerland, more vigorous operations were undertaken. St. Cyr, abandoning Oct. 11.

the route of Novi, threw himself towards Bracco on the rear of the Austrians, and attacked them with such celerity that he made twelve hundred prisoners, and spread consternation through their whole line. Melas, thus threatened, concentrated the forces under his immediate command, consisting of thirty thousand men, in the finest condition, on Oct. 12. the Stura; upon which a variety of affairs of posts took place around Coni, with checked success, which gradually consumed the strength of the Republican forces. There was an essential error in these measures on the part of Championet; for the Imperialists, grouped around the fortress where they occupied a central position, could at pleasure accumulate masses sufficient to overwhelm any attack made by the Republicans, whose detached columns, issuing from the mountains, and separated by a wide distance, were unable to render any effectual assistance to each other. Nevertheless, the great abilities of St. Cyr on the right wing obtained some brilliant advantages. On the 23d of October he put himself in motion, at the head of twelve thousand men, with only a few pieces of cannon and no cavalry, and defeated the Austrians at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and occupied Marengo, taking a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. Alarmed at these repeated checks on his left, Melas withdrew the division of Haddick from the valley of Aosta, where the possession of the fort of Bard and the fall of snow in the Great St. Bernard relieved him from all disquietude, and with that re-enforcement strengthened his left wing on the Bormida.*

Meanwhile both parties gradually accumulated their forces for the important Preparations for a decisive object which the one strove to effect, battle. the other to prevent, the delivery of Coni. The French had assembled thirty-five thousand men for that purpose, but the central position of Melas long prevented them from obtaining any advantage; and in an attack of Grenier on the Austrian centre, he was repulsed with the loss of a thousand men. Having at length resolved on a decisive action, Championet made his dispositions. One column was to descend from Mont Cenis by the valley of Oct. 31. Perouse; another to advance by the left of the Stura; and a third to assail the enemy in front. By this means the French general hoped that, while he engaged the attention of the Austrians in front, he would, at the same time, turn both their flanks, forgetting that in such an attempt, with columns converging from such remote and divided quarters, the chances were that the Imperialists, from their central position, would be able to defeat one column before another could arrive to its assistance.†

Perceiving that the plan of his adversary was

to attack him on all sides, Melas wisely resolved to anticipate his movement, and with his concentrated masses assail one of the French divisions before the others could arrive to its assistance. By a rapid accumulation of force, he could, in this way, bring above thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry, to bear on the French centre, under Victor, who could not assemble above sixteen thousand to resist them. His dispositions were rapidly and ably made, and on the morning of the 4th of November the Republicans Nov. 4. were attacked at all points. Championet was so far from anticipating any such event, that his troops were already in march to effect a junction with the right wing, under St. Cyr, when they were compelled, by the sudden appearance of the Imperialists in battle array, to halt and look to their own defence. Assailed by greatly superior forces, Victor, notwithstanding, made a gallant defence; and such was the intrepidity of the French infantry, that for long the advantage seemed to lie on their side, until at noon, Melas, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in throwing them into confusion, and drove them back towards Valdiggi. Hardly was this success gained when news arrived that General Duhesme, with the Republican left, had carried the village of Savignano in his rear; but, wisely judging that this was of little importance, provided he followed up the advantage he had gained, the Austrian general merely detached a brigade to check their advance, and continued to press on the retreating centre of the enemy. Having continued the pursuit till it was dark, he resumed it at daybreak on the following morning. The enemy, discouraged by the check on the preceding day, did not make a very vigorous resistance. Grenier and Victor, driven from a post they had taken up near Murazzo, were forced to seek safety in flight; a large part of their rear-guard were made prisoners, and great numbers drowned in endeavouring to cross the Stura and regain their intrenched camp. In this decisive battle the loss of the Republicans was seven thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, while that of the Imperialists did not exceed two thousand; and Championet, with his army cut into two divisions, one of which retired towards Genoa, and the other to the Col di Tende, was obliged to seek safety in the mountains, leaving Coni to its fate.*

While Championet was thus defeated in the centre by the superior skill and combinations of his opponent, the Success of St. Cyr near Novi. talents of St. Cyr again gave him an advantage on the Bormida. The Imperialists being there restored to an equality with the Republicans, Kray attacked St. Cyr near Novi, and drove him back to the plateau in the rear of that city, so lately the theatre of a bloody and desperate conflict; but all the efforts of the Austrians were shattered against the invincible resistance of the French infantry in that strong position, and after a bloody conflict they were forced to retire, leaving five pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. St. Cyr, upon this, resumed his position in front of Novi, and Kray

Battle of Genola in which the French are defeated.

* Dum., ii., 268, 273. Arch. Ch., ii., 312, 313. Jom., xii., 326, 335. St. Cyr, ii., 25, 26.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 313, 315. Jom., xii., 337, 341. Dum., ii., 273, 275. St. Cyr, ii., 39, 41.

* Jom., xii., 340, 348. Dum., ii., 282, 285. Arch. Ch., ii., 314, 317.

fell back towards Alexandria, to be nearer assistance from the centre of the army. But this success was more than counterbalanced by fresh disasters in the centre and left. On the

Nov. 10. 10th, the division Ott attacked Richepanse at Borgo San Dalmazzo, and, after a gallant resistance, drove him into the mountains; while the other division of the Republicans was assailed at Mondovì, and, after an obstinate combat, which lasted the whole day, forced to take refuge in the recesses of the Apennines. The French were now thrown back, on the one side, to the foot of the Col di Tende, and in the valley of the Stura to their own frontiers; while on the other, Victor's division was perched on the summits of the Apennines at St. Giacomo and St. Bernardo. Nothing remained to interrupt the siege of Coni.*

The investment of this fortress was completed on the 18th of November, and the trenches opened on the 27th. The governor made a brave defence; but the ignorance and inexperience of the garrison were soon conspicuous, and a tremendous fire on the 2d of December having destroyed great part of the town, and seriously injured the

Dec. 4. works, he at length yielded to the solicitations of the miserable inhabitants, and, to preserve the city from total destruction, agreed to a surrender. The garrison, 3000 strong, with 500 sick and wounded, who had been left in the place, were marched into the interior of Austria.†

Meanwhile St. Cyr maintained himself with extreme difficulty in the Apennines in front of Genoa. The city was in the utmost state of agitation; famine began to be felt within its walls, and the French army, encamped on the higher ridges of the mountains, already suffered extremely from cold, want, and the tempests of autumn. For long their rations had been reduced to a fourth part of their usual amount; but even this miserable pittance, it was foreseen, could not last many days longer. Encouraged by their pitiable condition, Kray made an attack on their advanced posts at Novi and Acqui, expelled them from those stations, formed the blockade of Gavi, and forced back the Republicans to their old positions on the inhospitable summits of the mountains at the Bocchetta and Campo-Freddo. Such was the panic which then seized the soldiers, that they could not be retained by their officers on that important pass, but, abandoning the intrenchments on its summit, rushed down in tumultuous crowds to Genoa, exclaiming, "What can we do here? We shall soon perish of cold and famine on these desert mountains; we are abandoned, sacrificed: to France, to France!" In this extremity, St. Cyr presented himself at the gates of the city, alone, before the mutinous soldiery. "Whither do you fly, soldiers?" "To France, to France!" exclaimed a thousand voices. "Be it so," exclaimed he, with a calm voice and serene air; "if a sense of duty no longer retains you—if you are deaf to the voice of honour, listen at least to that of reason, and attend to what your own interest requires. Your

ruin is certain if you persist in your present course; the enemy who pursues you will destroy you during the confusion of a tumultuous retreat. Have you forgotten that you have made a desert between your present position and France? No, your sole safety is in your bayonets; and if you indeed desire to regain your country, unite with me in repelling far from the gates of this harbour the enemy, who would take advantage of your disorder to drive you from the walls where alone the necessary convoys or security can be found." Roused by these words to a sense of their duty, the soldiers fell back into their ranks, and loudly demanded to be led against the enemy.*

It was high time that some steps should be taken to arrest the progress of the Imperialists; for they were now at the gates of Genoa, and threatened the Republicans with immediate destruction. The Austrians, under Klenau, had penetrated by the route of the Corniche as far as St. Martin d'Albaro and Nervi, within sight of that city, while from the Bocchetta another column threatened to descend upon it. A heavy fall of snow, however, having prevented the Imperialists from crossing the pass when it was deserted by the French, the rebellious troops resumed their positions and reoccupied the intrenchments; and St. Cyr, now secure on that side, having turned all his forces against Klenau, the Austrians, assailed at once on front and flank, with difficulty cut their way through by Torriglio, and regained the banks of the Stura, leaving twelve hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, where they soon after went into winter-quarters.† Returned to Genoa, St. Cyr had still a difficult task to perform in quieting the discontents of the troops, whom long-continued privation had almost driven to desperation; but at length the long-wished-for sails whitened its splendid bay, and the Republicans, as the reward of their heroic exertions, tasted the enjoyment of plenty and repose.

While these great events were passing in the basin of Piedmont, operations of minor importance, but still conducive, upon the whole, to the expulsion of the French from the peninsula, took place in the south of Italy. The castle of St. Angelo surrendered, in the end of October, to the Neapolitan forces, whom the retreat of Macdonald left at liberty to advance to the Eternal City; and the garrison of Ancona, after a gallant defence of six weeks, four of which were with open trenches, capitulated on the 13th of November to the Russians, on condition of being sent to France, and not serving till regularly exchanged. By this success the allies were made masters of 585 pieces of cannon, 7000 muskets, three ships of the line, and seven smaller vessels. The whole peninsula of Italy, with the exception of the intrenched camp at Genoa, and the mountain roads leading to it from France, was now wrested from the Republican arms.‡

The fall of Ancona terminated this campaign

* Arch. Ch., ii., 319, 321. Jom., xii., 348, 352. Dum., ii., 285, 287. St. Cyr, ii., 42, 47.

† Dum., ii., 304, 305. Jom., xii., 354. Arch. Ch., ii., 323.

* Dum., ii., 297, 298. St. Cyr, ii., 68, 74. Hard., vii., 321.

† Jom., xii., 355, 356. Arch. Ch., ii., 324, 325. Dum., ii., 300, 302. St. Cyr, ii., 76, 84, 99. Hard., vii., 321.

‡ Jom., xii., 356, 361. Arch. Ch., ii., 326.

Position of the respective parties at the conclusion of the campaign.

in Italy, the most disastrous ever experienced by the French in that country. In the respective positions which they occupied might be seen the immense advantages gained by the allied arms during its continuance. The Imperialists, whose headquarters were at Turin, occupied the whole plain of Lombardy and Piedmont, from the stream of the Trebbia to the torrent of the Ticino, the left, under Kray, being so cantoned as to cover the valleys of the Bormida and Scrivia; the right, under Haddick and Rohan, occupying the valleys of Duomo d'Ossola and Aosta; and the centre, under Kaim, guarding the passes over the Alps and the important position of Mondovi. The Republicans, on the other hand, on the exterior of this immense circle, occupied the snowy summits of the mountains, which stood the native guardians of the plain; the left, consisting of the divisions Grenier and Duhesme, occupying the Little St. Bernard, the Mont Cenis, and the passes of the higher Alps; the centre, under Lemoine and Victor, the Col de Fenestrelles and Tende, and the passes of the Maritime Alps: while on the right, Labois-siere and Watrin held the Bocchetta and other passes leading into the Genoese states.*

Wider still was the difference between the comforts and resources of the two armies. Cantoned in the rich plains of Italy, on the banks of the Po, the Imperialists were amply supplied with all the comforts and luxuries of life, while its naviga-

ble waters incessantly brought up to the army the stores and supplies necessary to restore the losses of so active a campaign. On the side of the Republicans, again, thirty-eight thousand men, without magazines or stores of provisions, were stationed on the desolate summits of the Alps and the Apennines, shivering with cold, exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of clothing. For five months they had received hardly any pay; the soldiers were without cloaks; their shoes were worn out, and wood was even wanting to warm their frigid bivouacks. Overwhelmed with the horrors of his situation, Championet re-

tired to Nice, where he died of an epidemic disorder, which soon broke out among the troops, and swept off great multitudes; and his death dissolved the small remnants of discipline which remained in the army. The soldiers tumultuously broke up their cantonnements; crowds of deserters left their colours, and covered the roads to France; and it was only by one of those nervous flights of eloquence, which touch, even in the greatest calamities, every generous heart, that St. Cyr succeeded in stopping the return of a large body which had left Genoa, and was proceeding on the road to Provence. Alarmed at the representations which he drew of the disastrous state of the army, the government, which had now passed from the feeble hands of the Directory into the firm grasp of Napoleon, took the most active steps to administer relief; several convoys reached the troops, and Massena, sent to assume the supreme command, succeeded, in

some degree, in stopping the torrent of desertion and restoring the confidence of the army.*

At the same time, the campaign on the Rhine was drawing to a close. Notwithstanding the brilliant successes of the Republicans at Zurich, their forces in that quarter were not so

Jealousy between the Russians and Austrians.

numerous as to enable them, in the first instance, to derive any considerable fruit from their victory. But no sooner were they relieved, by the failure of the expedition in North Holland, from all apprehension in that quarter, than they resolved to concentrate all their disposable force on the Lower Rhine, of which the command was given to General Lecourbe, who had been so distinguished in the mountain warfare of Switzerland. But that which the strength of the Republicans could not effect, the dissensions of their enemies were not long in producing. The Russians and Austrians mutually threw upon each other the late disasters; the latter alleging that the catastrophe at Zurich was all owing to the want of vigilance and skill in Korsakow, and the former replying that, if Suwarrow had been supported by Hotze, as he had a right to expect, when he descended from the St. Gothard, all the misfortunes of the centre would have been repaired, and a brilliant victory on his right wing dispossessed Massena from his defensive position on the line of the Limmat. In this temper of mind on both sides, and with the jealousy unavoidable between cabinets of equal power and rival pretensions, little was wanting to blow up the combustion into a flame. A trivial incident soon produced this effect. Suwarrow, after he had rested and reorganized his army, proposed to the archduke that they should resume offensive operations against the enemy, who had shown no disposition to follow up the successes at Zurich. His plan was to abandon the Grisons, blow up the works of Fort St. Lucie, and advance with all his forces to Winterthur, where he was to form a junction with Korsakow, and attack the enemy in concert with the Imperialists.

The archduke apprehended, with too much reason, that the assembling of all the Russian troops on the banks of the Thur, in the centre of the enemy's line, which extended from Sargans to the junction of the Aar and Rhine, would be both difficult and perilous; and therefore he proposed instead, that the corps of Korsakow should march by Stockach, to join the marshal behind the Lake of Constance, and that he himself should detach a strong Austrian column to

Oct. 13.

second the operations of the Russians in Switzerland. Irritated at any alteration of his plans by a younger officer, the old marshal, already soured by the disastrous termination of the campaign in Switzerland, replied in angry terms, on the following day, that his troops were not adapted for any farther operations in the mountains, and that he himself would march to join Korsakow, and concert measures with him for the projected operations in Switzerland.† On the fol-

Oct. 30.

* Dum., ii., 310, 311. Jom., xii., 363, 365. Arch. Ch., ii., 327, 329. St. Cyr., ii., 98, 100.

† This letter Suwarrow terminated with the following expressions: "I am a field-marshal as well as you; command-

* Jom., xii., 363, 365. Arch. Ch., ii., 327, 329. Dum., ii., 307, 311.

lowing day, however, he changed his resolution; for, declaring that his troops absolutely required repose, and that they could find it only at a distance from the theatre of war, he directed them to winter-quarters in Bavaria, between the Lech and the Iller, where they were soon after joined by the artillery, which had come round by Verona and the Tyrol.*

This secession of the Russian force was not produced merely by jealousy of the Austrians, or irritation at the ill success of the allied arms in Switzerland. It had its origin also in motives of state policy, and, as such, was rapidly communicated from the field-marshal's headquarters to the cabinet of St. Petersburg. The alliance between Russia and Austria, even if it had not been dissolved by the mutual exasperation of their generals, must have speedily yielded to the inherent jealousy of two monarchies, equal in power and discordant in interest. The war was undertaken for objects which, at that time at least, appeared to be foreign to the immediate interests of Russia; the danger to the balance of power by the preponderance of France seemed to be removed by the conquest of Italy, and any farther successes of Austria, it was said, were only likely to weaken a power too far removed to be of any serious detriment to its influence, in order to enrich one much nearer, and from whom serious resistance to its ambition might be expected. The efforts for the preceding campaign, moreover, had been extremely costly, and in a great degree, notwithstanding the English subsidies, had exhausted the imperial treasury. In these circumstances, the exasperation of the generals speedily led to a rupture between the cabinets, and the Russian troops took no farther share in the prosecution of the war.†

Left to its own resources, however, the Austrian cabinet was far from being discouraged. The Archduke Charles had collected eighty thousand men between Offenburg and Feldkirch; but great as this force was, it hardly appeared adequate, after the departure of the Russians, to a renewal of active operations in the Alps, and therefore he kept his troops on the defensive. Massena, on his side in Switzerland, was too much exhausted by his preceding exertions to make any offensive movement. On the other hand, Lecourbe, whose forces on the Lower Rhine had been raised by the efforts of the Directory to twenty thousand men, passed that river in three columns, at Worms, Oppenheim, and Mayence, and moved forward against Prince Schwartzberg, who commanded the advanced guard of the right wing of the Austrians, which occupied the line of the Bergstrass from Frankfort to Darmstadt. As the French

forces were greatly superior, the Austrian general was compelled to retire, and, after evacuating Heidelberg and Manheim, to concentrate his troops to cover Philippsburg, which, however, he was soon obliged to abandon to its own resources. The archduke, though grievously embarrassed at the moment by the rupture with the Russians, turned his eyes to the menaced point, and, by rapidly causing re-enforcements to defile in that direction, soon acquired a superiority over his assailant. The Republican advanced guard was attacked and worsted at Erligheim, in consequence of which, the blockade of Philippsburg was raised; but the French having again been re-enforced, it was again invested. The archduke, however, having at length terminated his correspondence with Suwarrow, turned his undivided attention to the menaced quarter, and directed a large part of the imperial army to re-enforce his right. These columns soon overthrew the Republicans, and Lecourbe was placed in a situation of such danger, that he had no means of extricating himself from it but by proposing an armistice to Starray, who commanded the Imperialists, on the ground of negotiations being on foot between the two powers for peace. Starray accepted it, under a reservation of the approbation of the archduke; but his refusal to ratify it was of no avail; in the interval, the stratagem had succeeded; the days had been gained, during which the Republicans had leisure to defile without molestation over the Rhine.*

This closed the campaign of 1799, one of the most memorable of the whole Revolutionary war. Notwithstanding the disasters by which its latter part had been checkered, it was evident that the allies had gained immensely by the results of their operations. Italy had been regained as rapidly as it had been won; Germany, freed from the Republican forces, had rolled back to the Rhine the tide of foreign invasion, and the blood of two hundred thousand French soldiers had expiated the ambition and weakness of the Republican government. Not even in the glorious efforts of 1796 had the French achieved successes so important, or chained victory to their standards in such an unbroken succession of combats. The conquest of all Lombardy and Piedmont; the reduction of the great fortresses which it contained; the liberation of Naples, Rome, and Tuscany, were the fruits of a single campaign. Instead of a cautious offensive on the Adige, the Imperialists now assumed a menacing offensive on the Maritime Alps; instead of trembling for the Tyrol and the hereditary states, they threatened Switzerland and Alsace. The Republicans, weakened and disheartened, were everywhere thrown back upon their own frontiers; the oppressive system of making war maintain war could no longer be carried on; and a Revolutionary state, exhausted by the sacrifices of nine years, was about to feel in its own territory a portion of the evils which it had so long inflicted upon others.

The internal situation of France was even

er, as well as you, of an imperial army; old, while you are young; it is for you to come and seek me." He was so profoundly mortified with the defeat of the Russians at Zurich, that when he reached his winter-quarters he took to bed, and became seriously ill, while the Emperor Paul gave vent to his indignation against the Austrians in an angry article published in the Gazette of St. Petersburg.—HARD, *ii.*, 297, 298.

* Arch. Ch., *ii.*, 272, 274, 284, 285. Jom., *xii.*, 367, 379. † Jom., *xii.*, 370, 371. Arch. Ch., *ii.*, 272, 274. Dum., *ii.*, 317.

* Arch. Ch., *ii.*, 292, 305. Jom., *xii.*, 376, 385. Dum., *ii.*, 332, 348.

Operations on the Lower Rhine.

Oct. 31.

Nov. 7.

Dec. 2.

Reflections on the vast successes gained by the allies in the campaign.

Deplorable
internal
situation of
the Repub-
lic.

more discouraging than might have been inferred from the external aspect of its affairs. In truth, it was there that the true secret of their reverses was to be found; the bravery and skill of the armies on the frontier had long concealed, but could no longer singly sustain, the internal weakness of the state. The prostration of strength which invariably succeeds the first burst of revolutionary convulsions had now fallen upon France; and if an extraordinary combination of circumstances had not intervened to extricate her from the abyss, there can be no doubt she would have sunk forever. The ardour of the Revolution had totally subsided. Distrust and despondency had succeeded to the enthusiasm of victory; instead of the patriotism of generous, had arisen the cupidity of selfish minds. "The radical vice," says General Mathieu Dumas, "of a government without a chief was now apparent; the courage and talents of the generals, the valour and intelligence of the soldiers, who, during this dreadful campaign, had sustained this monstrous species of authority, sapped by every species of abuse and the exhaustion arising from the excess of every passion, could no longer repair or conceal the faults of those at the head of affairs. Public spirit was extinguished; the resources of the interior exhausted; the forced requisitions could no longer furnish supplies to assuage the misery of the soldiers; the veteran ranks had long since perished, and the young conscripts destined to supply their place deserted their standards in crowds, or concealed themselves to avoid being drawn; more than half the cavalry was dismounted; the state in greater danger than it had ever been since the commencement of the war."* The losses sustained by the French during the campaign had been prodigious; they amounted to above a hundred and seventy thousand men, exclusive of those who had been cut off by sickness and fatigue.† In these circumstances, nothing was wanting to have enabled the coalition to triumph over the exhausted and discordant population of France, but union, decision, and a leader of paramount authority; nothing could have saved the Republicans from their grasp but their own divisions. These were not slow, however, in breaking out; and, amid the ruinous jealousies of the allies, that mighty conqueror arose, who was destined to stifle the Democracy and tame the passions of France, and bring upon her guilty people a weight of moral retribution, which could never have been inflicted till the latent energies of Europe had been called forth by his ambition.

"The alliance between Austria and Russia," says the Archduke Charles, "blew up, like most coalitions formed between powers of equal pretensions. The idea of a common interest, the illusion of confidence based on the same general views, prepares the first advances; difference of opinion as to the means of attaining the desired objects soon sows the seeds of misunderstanding; and that envenomed feeling increases in proportion as the events of the war alter the views

of the coalesced powers, derange their plans, and undeceive their hopes. It seldom fails to break out openly when the armies are destined to undertake any operation in concert. The natural desire to obtain the lead in command, as in glory, excites the rival passions both of chiefs and nations. Pride and jealousy, tenacity and presumption, spring from the conflict of opinion and ambition; continual contradictions daily inflame the mutual exasperation, and nothing but a fortunate accident can prevent such a coalition from being dissolved before one of the parties is inclined to turn his arms against the other. In all the varieties of human events, there are but two in which the co-operation of such unwieldy and heterogeneous masses can produce great effects; the one is when an imperious necessity and an insupportable state of oppression induces both sovereigns and their subjects to take up arms to emancipate themselves, and the struggle is not of sufficient duration to allow the ardour of their first enthusiasm to cool; the other, when a state, by an extraordinary increase of power, can arrogate to itself and sustain the right to rule the opinion of its allies, and make their jealousies bend to its determination. Experience has proved that these different kinds of coalitions produce different results: almost all oppressive conquerors have been overthrown by the first; the second has been the chief instrument in the enthralment of nations."* In these profound remarks is to be found the secret both of the long disasters attending the coalition against France, of the steady rise and irresistible power of the alliance headed by Napoleon, and of his rapid and irretrievable overthrow. They should never be absent from the contemplation of the statesman in future times, either in estimating the probable result of coalitions of which his own country forms a part, or in calculating on the chances of its resisting those which may be formed for its subjugation.†

* Arch. Ch., ii., 273.

† With regret, the author must now bid adieu to the *Memoirs of the Archduke Charles*, so long the faithful guide in the German campaigns, as his invaluable annals do not come farther down than the close of the campaign of 1799. Military history has few more remarkable works of which to boast. Luminous, sagacious, disinterested, severe in judging of himself, indulgent in criticising the conduct of others; liberal of praise to all but his own great achievements, profoundly skilled in the military art, and gifted with no common powers of narrative and description, his work is a model of candid and able military disquisition. Less vehement and forcible than Napoleon, he is more circumspect and consistent; with far inferior genius, he is distinguished by infinitely greater candour, generosity, and trustworthiness. On a fact stated by the archduke, whether favourable or adverse to his reputation, or a criticism made by him on others, the most perfect reliance may be placed. To a similar statement in the *St. Helena Memoirs* implicit credit cannot be given, unless its veracity is supported by other testimony, or it is borne out, as is often the case, by its own self-evident justice and truth. In the *memoirs of these two great antagonists* may be seen, as in a mirror, the opposite principles and talents brought into collision during the Revolutionary war; on the one side, methodical judgment, candour, and honesty, without the energy requisite to command early advantage in the struggle; on the other, genius, vigour, invention, but none of the moral qualities essential to confer lasting success. Or perhaps a more profound or fanciful observer may trace in the German chief the fairest specimens of the great and good qualities which, in every age, have been the characteristic of the blue-eyed children of the Gothic race; in the French, the most brilliant assemblage that ever occurred of the mental powers of the dark-haired Celtic family of mankind.

* Dumas, ii., 235.

† See "Etat des Pertes de l'Armée Française en 1799." —HARD., vii., 473.

The passage of the St. Bernard by Napoleon has been the subject of unmeasured eulogium by almost all the French historians; but, nevertheless, in the firmness with which it was conducted, the difficulties with which it had to contend, and the resolution displayed in its execution, it must yield to the Alpine campaign of the Russian hero. In crossing from Martigny to Ivrea, the first consul had no enemies to overcome, no lakes to pass, no hostile army to vanquish, after the obstacles of nature had been surmounted; the difficulty of the ascent and the roughness of the road constituted the only serious impediments to the march; but, in passing from Bellinzona to Aldorf by the St. Gothard, Suwarrow had to encounter not merely a road of greater length and equal difficulty, but to force his way, sword in hand, through columns of the enemy, long trained to mountain warfare, intimately acquainted with the country, under a leader of pre-eminent skill in that species of tactics; and to do this with troops as ignorant of Alpine geography as those of France would have been of the passes of the Caucasus. When he descended, like a mountain torrent, to Aldorf, overthrowing everything in his course, he found his progress stopped by a lake, without roads on its sides or a bark on its bosom, and received the intelligence of the total defeat of the army with which he came to co-operate under the walls of Zurich. Obligated to defile by the rugged paths of the Shachenthal to the canton of Glarus, he found himself enveloped by the victorious columns of the enemy, and his front and rear assailed at the same time by superior forces, flushed by recent conquest. It was no ordinary resolution which in such circumstances could disdain to submit, and after fiercely turning on his pursuers, and routing their bravest troops, prepare to surmount the difficulties of a fresh mountain passage, and, amid the horrors of the Alps of Glarus, brave alike the storms of winter and the pursuit of the enemy. The bulk of men in all ages are governed by the event; and to such persons the passage of the St. Bernard, followed as it was by the triumph of Marengo, will always be the highest object of interest; but, without detracting from the well-earned fame of the French general, it may be safely affirmed that those who know how to separate just combination from casual disaster, and can appreciate the heroism of valour when struggling with misfortune, will award a still higher place to the Russian hero, and follow the footsteps of Suwarrow over the snows of the St. Gothard and the valley of Engi with more interest than either the eagles of Napoleon over the St. Bernard, or the standards of Hannibal from the shores of the Rhone to the banks of the Po.

The expedition to Holland was ably conceived, and failed only from the inadequacy of the force employed, and the inherent weakness incident to an enterprise conducted by allied forces. It was the greatest armament which had been sent from Great Britain during the war, but yet obviously inadequate, both to the magnitude of the enterprise and the resources of the state mainly in-

terested in its success. In truth, the annals of the earliest years of the war incessantly suggest regret at the parsimonious expenditure of British force, and the great results which, to all appearance, would have attended a more vigorous effort at the decisive moment. "Any person," says Mr. Burke, "who was of age to take a part in public affairs forty years ago, if the intermediate space were expunged from his memory, would hardly credit his senses when he should hear, from the highest authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this island, and that in Ireland there were at least eighty thousand more. But how much greater would be his surprise, if he were told again that this mighty force was kept up for the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence, and that, by its very constitution, the greater part was disabled from defending us against the enemy by one preventive stroke or one operation of active hostility! What must his reflections be on learning farther, that a fleet of five hundred men-of-war, the best appointed that this country ever had upon the sea, was for the greater part employed in the same system of unenterprising defence? What must be the feelings of any one who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to understand that these two islands, with their extensive seacoast, should be considered as a garrisoned seatown; that its garrison was so feebly commanded as never to make a sally; and that, contrary to all that has been hitherto seen in war, an inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost annihilated navy, may with safety besiege this superior garrison, and, without hazarding the life of a man, ruin the place merely by the menaces and false appearances of an attack!"*

If this was true in 1797, when the indignant statesman wrote these cutting remarks, how much more was it applicable in 1799, when France was reduced to extremities by the forces of Austria and Russia, and the extraordinary energy of the Revolution had exhausted itself! The Archduke Charles, indeed, has justly observed, that modern history presents few examples of great military operations executed in pursuance of a descent on the seacoast, and that the difficulties of the passage and the uncertainty of the elements present the most formidable obstacles in the way of the employment of considerable forces in such an enterprise;† but experience in all ages has demonstrated that they are not insurmountable, and that, from a military force thus supported, the greatest results may reasonably be expected, if sufficient energy is infused into the undertaking. The examples of the overthrow of Hannibal at Zama, of the English at Hastings, of the French at Cressy and Azincour, and of Napoleon in Spain and at Waterloo, prove what can be effected, even by a maritime expedition, if followed up with the requisite vigour. And, unquestionably, there never was an occasion when greater results might have been anticipated from such an exertion than in this campaign. Had sixty thousand native English, constantly fed by fresh supplies from the parent state, been sent to Holland, they would have

* Burke on a Regicide Peace, Works, viii., 374.

† Arch. Ch., ii., 165.

borne down all opposition, hoisted the Orange flag on all the fortresses of the United Provinces, liberated Flanders, prevented the accumulation of force which enabled Massena to strike his redoubled blows at Zurich, hindered the formation of the army of reserve, and intercepted the thunder of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

The rapid fall of the French military power in 1799 was the natural result of the sudden extension of the frontiers of the Republic beyond its strength, and affords another example of the truth of the maxim, that the more the ambition of a nation in a state of fermentation leads to its extension, the more does it become difficult for it to preserve its conquests.* Such a state as France then was, with a military power extending from the mouth of the Ems to the shores of Calabria, and no solid foundation for government but the gratification of ambition, has no chance of safety but in constantly advancing to fresh conquests. The least reverse, by destroying the charm of its invincibility, and compelling the separation of its

Cause of the rapid fall of the French power in 1799.

armies to garrison its numerous fortresses, leaves it weak and powerless in the field, and speedily dissolves the splendid fabric. This truth was experienced by the Directory in 1799; it was evinced on a still greater scale, and after still more splendid triumphs, by Napoleon in 1813. It is power slowly acquired and wisely consolidated, authority which brings the blessings of civilization and protection with its growth, victories which array the forces of the vanquished states in willing and organized multitudes under the standards of the victor, which alone are durable. Such were the conquests of Rome in the ancient world; such are the conquests of Russia in Europe, and England in India, in modern times. The whirlwinds of an Alexander, a Timour, or a Napoleon, are in general as shortlived as the genius which creates them. The triumphs flowing from the transient ebullition of popular enthusiasm, sink with the decay of the passion from which they spring. Nothing is durable in nature but what has arisen by slow degrees; nothing in the end obtains the mastery of nations but the power which protects and blesses them.

CHAPTER XXX.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF NAPOLEON TO THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

NOVEMBER, 1799—MAY, 1800.

ARGUMENT.

Napoleon's Letter, proposing Peace to the British Government.—Lord Grenville's Answer.—M. Talleyrand's Reply.—Debates on this Proposal in Parliament.—Arguments of the Opposition for an immediate Peace, and of Mr. Pitt and the Government for refusing to treat.—Parliament resolve to continue the Contest.—Reflections on this Decision of the Legislature.—Supplies voted by the British Parliament.—Land and Sea Forces employed.—Mr. Dundas' India Budget.—The Union with Ireland passes the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland.—Its leading Provisions.—Views of the Leaders on both Sides of Parliament on this great Change.—Great Prosperity of the British Empire at this Period.—Vast Change of Prices.—Statistical Details.—Bad Harvest of 1799, and consequent Scarcity in 1800.—Great Efforts of Government to relieve it, and noble Patience of the People.—Measures of England and Austria for the Prosecution of the War.—Treaties entered into for that Purpose with Austria and Bavaria.—Military Preparations of the Imperialists.—Discontented State of the French affiliated Republics.—Measures of Napoleon to restore Public Credit in France.—Pacification of La Vendée.—Iniquitous Execution of Count Louis Frotte.—Napoleon effects a Reconciliation with the Emperor Paul.—His energetic Military Measures.—Revival of the Military Spirit in France.—His Steps to suppress the Revolutionary Fervour of the People.—He totally extinguishes the Liberty of the Press, and fixes his Residence at the Tuileries.—Commencement of the Etiquette and Splendour of the Court there.—Recall of many Exiles banished since the 18th Fructidor.—Establishment of the Secret Police.—Napoleon's hypocritical *Eloge* on Washington.—Comparison of his System of Government with that established by Constantine in the Byzantine Empire.—Commencement of his great Designs for Architectural Embellishment at Paris.—Suppression of the *Fête* on the 21st of January, and Elevation of Tronchet.—Correspondence between Napoleon and Louis XVIII.—General Improvement in the Prospects of France.

The first step of Napoleon upon arriving at the consular throne was to make proposals of peace to the British government. The debate on that subject in Parliament is the most important that occurred during the war, and forms

the true introduction to the political history of Europe during the nineteenth century.

The letter of Napoleon to the King of England, couched in his usual characteristic language, was in these terms: Dec. 25, 1799.

"Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first station in the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication to your majesty.

"The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the globe, is it destined to be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their independence and safety requires, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, prosperity, and domestic happiness? How has it happened that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity, as well as the truest glory?

Napoleon's letter, proposing peace, to the British government.

"These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your majesty, who reign over a free nation with the sole desire of rendering it happy. You will see in this overture only the effect of a sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, implying confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, however necessary to disguise the dependance of feeble states, prove only, in those which are strong, the mutual desire of deceiving each other.

"France and England may, by the abuse of their strength, still, for a time, to the misfortune of nations, retard the period of their exhaustion; but I will venture to say the fate of

all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world."

To this letter the following answer was returned by Lord Grenville, the English minister of foreign affairs: "The king has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of secure and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He neither is, nor has been, engaged in any contest for a vain and false glory. He has had no other view than that of maintaining against all aggression the rights and happiness of his subjects. For these he has contended against an unprovoked attack, and for the same objects he is still obliged to contend; nor can he hope that this necessity could be removed by entering at the present moment into a negotiation with those whom a fresh revolution has so recently placed in the exercise of power in France, since no real advantage can arise from such negotiation to the great and desirable object of a general peace, until it shall distinctly appear that those causes have ceased to operate which originally produced the war, and by which it has been since protracted, and in more than one instance renewed. The same system, to the prevalence of which France justly ascribes all her present miseries, is that which has also involved the rest of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long since unknown to the practice of civilized nations.

"For the extension of this system, and for the extermination of all established governments, the resources of France have, from year to year, and in the midst of the most unparalleled distress, been lavished and exhausted. To this indiscriminate spirit of destruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons, his majesty's ancient allies, have been successively sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged, and Italy, though now rescued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His majesty himself has been compelled to maintain an arduous and burdensome contest for the independence and existence of his kingdoms.

"While such a system continues to prevail, and while the blood and treasure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its support, experience has shown that no defence but that of open and steady hostility can be availing. The most solemn treaties have only prepared the way for fresh aggression, and it is to a determined resistance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of security for property, personal liberty, social order, or religious freedom. For the security, therefore, of these essential objects, his majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. Such dispositions have been repeatedly held out by all those who have successively directed the resources of France to the destruction of Europe, and whom the present rulers have declared to have been, from the beginning and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity.

"Greatly, indeed, will his majesty rejoice if it shall appear that the dangers to which his own dominions and those of his allies have so long been exposed have really ceased: whenever he shall be satisfied that the necessity for

resistance is at an end; that, after the experience of so many years of crimes and miseries, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France, and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the restless schemes of destruction which have endangered the very existence of civil society, have at length been finally relinquished. But the conviction of such a change, however agreeable to his majesty's wishes, can result only from experience and the evidence of facts.

"The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home, and consideration and respect abroad. Such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory, and it would give to all the other nations in Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But, desirable as such an event must be, both to France and the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his majesty limits the possibility of secure and solid pacification. His majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. He looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his allies, and to the general safety of Europe. Whenever he shall judge that such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting either from the internal situation of the country from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of a general pacification.* Unhappily, no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability.†"

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxiv., 1799.

† To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, the French minister for foreign affairs: "Very far from France having provoked the war, she had, it must be recollected, from the very commencement of the Revolution, solemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her disinclination for conquests, her respect for the independence of all governments; and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, she would have avoided taking any part in those of Europe, and would have remained faithful to her declarations."

"But, from an opposite disposition, as soon as the French Revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its destruction. The aggression was real long before it was public; internal resistance was excited, its opponents were favourably received, their extravagant declamations were supported, the French nation was insulted in the person of its agents, and England set, particularly, this example, by the dismissal of the minister accredited by her; finally, France was, in fact, attacked in her independence and her honour, and in her safety, long before war was declared."

"Thus it is to the projects of dismemberment, subjection, and dissolution which were prepared against her, and the execution of which was several times attempted and pursued, that France has a right to impute the evils which she has suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe. Such projects, for a long time, without example with respect to so powerful a nation, could not fail to bring on the most fatal consequences. Assailed on all sides, the Republic could not but extend universally the efforts of her defence, and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that

These able state papers are not only valuable as exhibiting the arguments advanced by the opposite parties in this memorable contest, but as containing an explicit and important declaration of the object uniformly pursued by Great Britain throughout its continuance. The English ministry never claimed a right to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or dictate to her inhabitants the form of government or race of sovereigns they were to choose; the object of the war is there expressly declared to have been, what it always was, defensive. It was undertaken, not to impose a government upon France, but to prevent its imposing one upon other nations; not to partition or circumscribe its territory, but oppose a barrier to the inundation of infidel and democratical principles, by which the Republic first shook the opinions of the multitude in all the adjoining states, and then, having divided their inhabitants, overthrew their independence. The restoration of the Bourbons was held forth as the mode most likely to remove these dangers, but by no means as an indispensable preliminary to a general pacification, if adequate security against them could in any other way be obtained. Of the reality of the peril, the existence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Helvetian, Roman, and Parthenopean republics, most of whom had been revolutionized in a state of profound peace, afforded ample evidence; and it was one which increased rapidly during any interval of hostilities, because it was then that the point of the wedge was most readily inserted by the revolutionary propagandists into an unsuspecting people.

The debates, however, which followed in both houses of Parliament on this momentous subject were still more important as unfolding the real views of the contending parties, and forming the true key to the grounds on which it was thereafter rested on both sides.

she has made use of those means which she possessed in her own strength and the courage of her citizens. As long as she saw that her enemies obstinately refused to recognise her rights, she counted only upon the energy of her resistance; but, as soon as they were obliged to abandon the hope of invasion, she sought for means of conciliation, and manifested pacific intentions; and if these have not always been efficacious—if, in the midst of the critical circumstances of her internal situation, which the Revolution and the war have successively brought on, the former depositaries of the executive power in France have not always shown as much moderation as the nation itself has shown courage, it must, above all, be imputed to the fatal and persevering animosity with which the resources of England have been lavished to accomplish the ruin of France.

"But if the wishes of his Britannic majesty, in conformity with his assurances, are in unison with those of the French Republic for the re-establishment of peace, why, instead of attempting the apology of the war, should not attention be paid to the means of terminating it? The First Consul of the French Republic cannot doubt that his Britannic majesty must recognise the right of nations to choose the form of their government, since it is from the exercise of this right that he holds his crown; but he cannot comprehend how, after admitting this fundamental principle, upon which rests the existence of political societies, he could annex insinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, and which are not less injurious to the French nation and its government than it would be to England and his majesty, if a sort of invitation were held out in favour of that Republican form of government, of which England adopted the forms about the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a revolution had compelled to descend from it."*

On the part of the opposition, it was urged by Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine, "That now was the first time when the houses were assembled in a new epoch of the war; that, without annexing any epithet to it, or adverting to its unparalleled calamities, it could not be denied that a new era in any possible war, or which led to a nearer prospect of peace, was a most critical and auspicious period. That the real question was, whether the House of Commons could say, in the face of a suffering nation and a desolated world, that a lofty, imperious, declamatory, insulting answer to a proposition professing peace and conciliation, was the answer which should have been sent to France, or to any human government. That though he might not be able to determine what answer, in the circumstances of the country, should have been sent, they could, without the possibility of being mistaken, pronounce that the answer given was odiously and absurdly wrong. As a vindication of the war, it was loose, and in some parts unfounded; but as an answer to a specific proposition, it was dangerous, as a precedent, to the best interests of mankind. It rejected the very idea of peace, as if it were a curse, and held fast to war as an inseparable adjunct to the prosperity of nations.

"The French Revolution was undoubtedly, in its beginning, a great and awful event, which could not but extend its influence more or less to other nations. So mighty a fabric of despotism and superstition, after having endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concussion which the whole earth should feel; but the evil of such a revolution was only to be averted by cautious internal policy, and not by external war, unless it became impossible, from actual and not speculative aggression, to maintain the relations of peace. The question was not, whether the tendency of the Revolution was beneficial or injurious, but what was our own policy and duty as connected with its existence? In Mr. Burke's words, applied to the American Revolution, the question is not, whether this condition of human affairs deserves praise or blame, but what, in God's name, are you to do with it?

"When war was first proclaimed by this country, after the death of Louis, it was rested on 'the late atrocious act perpetrated at Paris.' Then, as now, it was provoked, and peace rejected upon general and unjustifiable objections—speculative dangers to religion and government, which, supposing them to have existed, with all their possible consequences, were more likely to be increased than diminished by the bitterness of war. At that time, ministers were implored not to invite war upon principles which made peace dependant upon systems and forms of government, instead of the conduct of nations; upon theories which could not be changed, instead of aggressions which might be adjusted. France had then, and for a long time after, a strong interest in peace; she had not then extended her conquests; but Europe combined to extinguish France, and place her without the pale of the social community; and France, in her turn, acted towards Europe on the same principles. She desolated and ravaged whatever countries she occupied, and spread her

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxiv., 1199, 1202.

conquests with unexampled rapidity. Could it be expected that so powerful a nation, so assailed, should act merely on the defensive, or that, in the midst of a revolution which the confederacy of surrounding nations had rendered terrible, the rights of nations would be respected? Ambitious projects, not perhaps originally contemplated, followed their steps; and the world was changed with portentous violence, because the government of Great Britain had resolved that, if changed at all, it should revert to establishments which had reached their period and expired.

"In 1795, without any pacific proposition from France, when the government of France was not a month old, at a time when the alarm was at its height in England, and the probable contagion of French principles, by the intercourse of peace, was not only the favourite theme of ministers, but made the foundation of a system by which some of our most essential liberties were abridged—even these ministers invited the infant, Democratic, Jacobin, regicide republic of France to propose a peace. On what principle, then, could peace now be refused, when the danger was so much diminished, because the resistless fury of that popular spirit which had been the uniform topic of declamation had not only subsided, from time and expansion, but was curbed, or rather extinguished, by the forms of the new government which invited us to peace? If Bonaparte found that his interests were served by an arrangement with England, the same interests would lead him to continue it. Surrounded with perils, at the head of an untried government, menaced by a great confederacy, of which England was the head, compelled to press heavily upon the resources of an exhausted people, it was not less his interest to propose than it was ours to accept peace.

"It is impossible to look, without the most bitter regret, on the enormities which France has committed. In some of the worst of them, however, the allies have joined her. Did not Austria receive Venice from Bonaparte? and is not the receiver as bad as the thief? Has not Russia attacked France? Did not the emperor and the King of Prussia subscribe a declaration at Pillnitz which amounted to a hostile aggression? Did they not make a public declaration, that they were to employ their forces, in conjunction with the other kings of Europe, 'to put the King of France in a situation to establish, in perfect liberty, the foundation of a monarchical government, equally agreeable to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French?' and, whenever the other princes should co-operate with them, did they not 'then, and in that case, declare their determination to act promptly, and by mutual consent to obtain the end proposed by all of them?' Can gentlemen lay their hands on their hearts, and not admit that the fair construction of this is, that whenever the other powers should concur, they would attack France, then at peace with them, and occupied only in domestic and internal regulations?

"The decree of the 19th of November, 1792, is alleged as a clear act of aggression, not only against England, but all the sovereigns of Europe. Much weight should not be attached to

that silly document, and it has been sufficiently explained by M. Chauvelin, when he declared that it never was meant to proclaim the favour of France for insurrection, but that it applied to those people only who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, should demand the assistance of the Republic. Should not a magnanimous nation have been satisfied with this explanation; and where will be the end of wars, if idle and intemperate expressions are to be made the groundwork of bitter and never-ending hostilities?

"Where is the war, pregnant with so many horrors, next to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till you establish the house of Bourbon!—and this you cherish the hope of doing, because you have had a successful campaign. But is the situation of the allies, with all they have gained, to be compared with what it was after Valenciennes was taken? One campaign is successful to you; another may be so to them; and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, hatred, rancour, which are infinitely more flagitious than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on forever, as, with such black incentives, no end can be foreseen to human misery. And all this without an intelligible motive, merely that you may gain a better peace a year or two hence. Is, then, peace so dangerous a state; war so enviable, that the latter is to be chosen as a state of probation, the former shunned as a positive evil?"*

On the other hand, it was contended by Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt, "That the same necessity which existed for the commencement and prosecution, still called for perseverance in the war. The same proneness to aggression, the same disregard to justice, still actuated the conduct of the men who rule in France. Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order, religion, and morality, would rather be a cessation of resistance to wrong than a suspension of arms in the nature of an ordinary warfare. To negotiate with established governments was formerly not merely easy, but in most circumstances safe; but to negotiate with the government of France now would be to incur all the risks of an uncertain truce, without attaining the benefits even of a temporary peace. France still retains the sentiments, and is constant to the views which characterized the dawn of her Revolution. She was innovating, she is so still; she was Jacobin, she is so still; she declared war against all kings, and she continues to this hour to seek their destruction. Even the distant Republic of America could not escape that ravaging power, and next to a state of active and inveterate war were the relations of those two commonwealths for a long time. The Republic, indeed, has frequently published her disinclination to conquest; but has she followed up that declaration by any acts indicating a similar disposition? Have we not seen her armies march to the Rhine, seize the Netherlands, and annex them to her dominions? Have we not witnessed her progress in Italy? Are not the wrongs of Switzerland recent and marked? Even into Asia she has

* Parl. Hist., xxxiv., 1291, 1398.

carried her lust for dominion, severed from the Porte, during a period of profound peace, a vast portion of its empire, and stimulated 'Citizen Tippoo' to engage in that contest which ultimately proved his ruin.

"The Republic has proclaimed her respect for the independence of all governments. How have her actions corresponded with this profession? Did not Jacobin France attempt the overthrow of every government? Did she not, whenever it suited her purpose, arm the governors against the governed, or the governed against the governors? How completely has she succeeded, during a period of profound peace, which had been unbroken for centuries, in convulsing the population, and so subduing the independence of Switzerland! In Italy, the whole fabric of civil society has been changed, and the independence of every government violated. The Netherlands, too, exhibit to mankind monuments of the awful veneration with which the Republic has regarded the independence of other states. The memorable decree of November, 1792, has not slept a dead letter in their statute book. No, it has ever since been the active, energetic principle of their whole conduct, and every nation is interested in the extinction of that principle forever.

"Every power with whom the Republic has treated, whether for the purpose of armistice or peace, could furnish melancholy instances of the perfidy of France, and of the ambition, injustice, and cruelty of her rulers. Switzerland concluded a truce with the Republic; her rulers immediately excited insurrections among her cantons, overthrew her institutions, seized her fortresses, robbed her treasures, the accumulation of ages, and, to give permanence to her usurpations, imposed on her a government new alike in form and substance. The Grand-duke of Tuscany was among the earliest sufferers by a treaty of peace with the Republic. In everything he strove to conform to the views of France; her rulers repeated to him her assurances of attachment and disinclination to conquest; but at the very time that the honour of the Republic was pledged for the security of his states, he saw the troops of his ally enter his capital, and he himself was deposed, and a democracy given to the Florentines. The King of Sardinia opened the gates of his capital to the Republican arms, and, confiding in the integrity of the French government, expected to be secured in his dominions by the treaty which guaranteed his title and his rights, and communicated to France equal advantages. He was, however, in a state of peace, invaded in his dominions, forced to fly to his insular possessions, and Turin treacherously taken possession of by the Republican troops. The change in the papal government was another part of the same system. It was planned by Joseph Bonaparte in his palace. He excited the populace to an insurrection, and effected the revolution in the capital at the head of the Roman mob. To Venice their conduct was still more atrocious. After concluding an armistice with the Arch-duke Charles, Bonaparte declared that he took the Venitians under his protection, and overturned the old government by the movements excited among the people; but no sooner was the national independence in this way destroy-

ed, than he sold them to the very imperial government against whose alleged oppression he had prompted them to take up arms. Genoa received the French as friends; and the debt of gratitude was repaid by the government being revolutionized, and, under the authority of a mock constitution, the people plundered, and the public independence subverted.

"It is in vain to allege that these atrocities are the work of former governments, and that Bonaparte had no hand in them. The worst of these acts of perfidy have been perpetrated by himself. If a treaty was concluded and broken with Sardinia, it was concluded and broken by Bonaparte. If peace was entered into and violated with Tuscany, it was entered into and violated by Bonaparte. If Venice was first seduced into revolutionary revolt, and then betrayed and sold to Austria, it was by Bonaparte that the treachery was consummated. If the papal government was first terrified into submission, and then overturned by rebellion, it was Bonaparte who accomplished the work. If Genoa was convulsed in a state of profound peace, and then sacrificed, it was by Bonaparte that the perfidious invasion was committed. If Switzerland was first seduced into revolution, and then invaded and plundered, it was by the deceitful promises and arts of Bonaparte that the train was laid. Even the affiliated republics and his own country have not escaped the same perfidious ability. The Constitution which he forced on his countrymen, at the cannon's mouth, on the 13th Vendémiaire, he delivered up to the bayonets of Augereau on the 18th Fructidor, and overturned with his grenadiers on the 18th Brumaire. The Constitution of the Cisalpine Republic, which he himself had established, was overthrown by his lieutenant Berthier. He gained possession of Malta by deceitful promises, and immediately handed it over to the Republic. He declared to the Porte that he had no intention to take possession of Egypt, and yet he avowed to his army that he conquered it for France, and instantly roused the Copts into rebellion against the Mamelukes. He declared to the Mussulmans that he was a believer in Mohammed,* thus demonstrating that, even on the most sacred subjects, truth was set at naught when any object was to be gained by its violation. Nay, he has, in his official instructions, openly avowed this system; for in his instructions to Kleber he declares, 'You may sign a treaty to evacuate Egypt, but do not execute the articles, and you may find a plausible excuse for the delay in the observation that they must be sent home to be submitted to the Directory.' What reliance can be placed on a power which thus uniformly makes peace or truce a stepping-stone to farther aggressions, and systematically uses perfidy as an allowable weapon for circumventing its enemies? And what is especially worthy of observation, this system is not that of any one man; it has been the principle of all the statesmen, without exception, who have governed France during the Revolution; a clear

* This was strictly true. "They will say I am a papist," said Napoleon. "I am no such thing. I was a Mohammedan in Egypt. I would become a Catholic here for the good of the people. I am no believer in any particular religion; but as to the idea of a God, look up to the heavens, and say who made that?"—See THIBAUDEAU *Sur le Consulat*, 153.

proof that it arises from the force of the circumstances in which they are placed, and the ruinous ascendance of irreligious principles in the people; and that the intentions of the present ruler of the country, even if they were widely different from what they are, could afford no sort of security against its continuance.

"France would now derive great advantages from a general peace. Her commerce would revive, her seamen be renewed, her sailors acquire experience; and the power which hitherto has been so victorious at land, would speedily become formidable on another element. What benefit could it bring to Great Britain? Are our harbours blockaded, our commerce interrupted, our dockyards empty? Have we not, on the contrary, acquired an irresistible preponderance on the seas during the war, and is not the trade of the world rapidly passing into the hands of our merchants? Bonaparte would acquire immense popularity by being the means of bringing about an accommodation with this country; if we wish to establish his power, and permanently enlist the energy of the Revolution under the banners of a military chieftain, we have only to fall into the snare which he has so artfully prepared. In turbulent republics, it has ever been an axiom to maintain internal tranquillity by external action; it was on that principle that the war was commenced by Brissot and continued by Robespierre, and it is not likely to be forgotten by the military chief who has now succeeded to the helm of affairs.

"It is in vain to pretend that either the allied powers or Great Britain were the aggressors in the terrible war which has so long desolated Europe. In investigating this subject, the most scrupulous attention to dates is requisite. The attack upon the Papal States, by the seizure of Avignon, in August, 1791, was attended by a series of the most sanguinary excesses which disgraced the Revolution; and this was followed, in the same year, by an aggression against the whole empire, by the seizure of Porentrui, part of the dominions of the Bishop of Bâle. In April, 1792, the French government declared war against Austria; and in September of the same year, without any declaration of war, or any cause of hostility, and in direct violation of their promises to abstain from conquest, they seized Savoy and Nice, upon the pretence that Nature had destined them to form a part of France. The assertion that this war was rendered necessary by the threatening alliance formed at Pillnitz, is equally devoid of foundation; that celebrated declaration referred only to the state of imprisonment in which Louis XVI. was kept, and its immediate object was to effect his deliverance, if a concert among the European powers could be brought about for that purpose, leaving the internal state of France to be decided by the king when restored to his liberty, with the free consent of the states of the kingdom, without one word relative to its dismemberment. This was fully admitted in the official correspondence which took place between this country and Austria; and as long as M. Delessart was minister of foreign affairs in France, there was a great probability that the differences would be terminated amicably; but the war-party excited a tumult in order to dispossess him, as they con-

sidered, in Brissot's words, that 'war was necessary to consolidate the Revolution.' Upon the King of France's acceptance of the Constitution, the emperor notified to all the courts of Europe that he considered it as his proper act, and thereby the convention of Pillnitz fell to the ground; and the event soon proved the sincerity of that declaration; for when war was declared by the French in 1792, the Austrian Netherlands were almost destitute of troops, and soon fell a prey to the Republicans.

"Great Britain at this time, and for long after, entertained no hostile designs towards France. So far from it, on the 29th of December, 1792, only a month before the commencement of hostilities, a note was sent by Lord Grenville to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, imparting to Russia the principles on which we acted, and the terms on which we were willing to mediate for peace, which were, 'the withdrawing the French arms within the limits of their territory, the abandoning their conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of other nations, and the giving, in some unequivocal manner, a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles or excite disturbances against other governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in its internal affairs.' Such were the principles on which we acted; and what, then, brought on the war with this country? The insane decrees of the 19th of November and the 15th of December, 1792, which amounted to a declaration of war against all governments, and the attack on our allies the Dutch, and the opening of the Scheldt, in open prosecution of the new code of public law then promulgated by the Republic.

"The fundamental principle of the Revolutionary party in France always has been an insatiable love of aggrandizement, an implacable spirit of destruction against all the civil and religious institutions of every other country. Its uniform mode of proceeding was to bribe the poor against the rich, by proposing to transfer into new hands, on the delusive notion of equality, and in breach of every principle of justice, the whole property of the country; the practical application of this principle was to devote the whole of that property to indiscriminate plunder, and make it the foundation of a revolutionary system of finance, productive in proportion to the misery and desolation which it created. It has been accompanied by an unwearied spirit of proselytism, diffusing itself over all the nations of the earth; a spirit which can apply itself to all circumstances and all situations; hold out a promise of redress equally to all nations; which enables the teachers of French liberty to recommend themselves to those who live under the feudal code of the German Empire, the various states of Italy, the old Republicans of Holland, the new Republicans of America, the Protestants of Switzerland, the Catholics of Ireland, the Mussulmans of Turkey, and the Hindoos of India; the natives of England, enjoying the perfection of practical freedom, and the Copts of Egypt, groaning under the last severity of Asiatic bondage. The last and distinguishing feature is a perfidy which

nothing can bind; which no ties of treaty, no sense of the principles generally received among nations, no obligation, human or divine, can restrain. Thus qualified, thus armed for destruction, the genius of the French Revolution marched forth the terror and dismay of the world. Every nation has in its turn been the witness, many have been the victims, of its principles; and it is left now for us to decide whether we will compromise with such a danger while we have yet resources to supply the sinews of war, while the heart and spirit of the country is yet unbroken, and while we have the means of calling forth and supporting a powerful co-operation in Europe. *Cur igitur pacem nolo—quia infida est, quia periculosa, quia esse non potest?**†

The house, upon a division, supported the measures of administration by a majority of two hundred and sixty-five to sixty-four.

In judging of this decision of the British government, which formed the true commencement of the second period of the war, that in which it was waged with Napoleon, it is of importance to recollect the circumstances in which he was placed, and the nature of the government which he had assumed. France had not ceased to be revolutionary, but its energies were now, under a skilful and enterprising chief, turned to military objects. He was still, however, borne forward upon the movement, and the moment he attempted to stop, he would have been crushed by its wheels. No one was more aware of this than the First Consul. "The French government," said Napoleon in 1800, "has no resemblance to those which surround it. Hated by all its neighbours, obliged to restrain many different classes of malecontents within its bosom, it stands in need of action, of *éclat*, and, by consequence, of war, to maintain an imposing attitude against so many enemies." "Your government," replied Thibaudeau, "has no resemblance to one newly established. It assumed the *toga virilis* at Marengo; and, sustained by a powerful head, and the arms of thirty millions of inhabitants, its place is already sufficiently prominent among the European powers." "Do you really think that sufficient?" replied Napoleon; "*it must be first of all, or it will perish.*" "And to obtain such a result, you see no other method than war?" "None other, citizen."† "His fixed opinion from the commencement," says Bourrienne, "was, that if stationary, he would fall; that he was sustained only by continually advancing, and that it was not sufficient to advance, but he must advance rapidly and irresistibly." "My power," said he, "depends on my glory, and my glory on the victories which I gain. My power would instantly fall if it were not constantly based on fresh glory and victories. Conquest made me what I am: conquest alone can maintain me in it. A government newly established has need to dazzle and astonish; when its *éclat* ceases, it perishes.

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxiv., 1206, 1249.

† It is impossible, in this abstract, to give any idea of the splendid and luminous speeches made on this memorable occasion in the British Parliament. They are reported at large in Hansard, and throw more light on the motives and objects of the war than any other documents in existence.

‡ Thibaudeau, *Consulat*, 393.

It is in vain to expect repose from a man who is the concentration of movement."*

Such were Napoleon's views; and that they were perfectly just, with reference to his own situation, is evident from the consideration that a revolutionary power, whether in civil or military affairs, has never yet maintained its ascendancy in any other way. But these being his principles, and the independence of England forming the great stumbling-block in his way, it is evident that no permanent peace with him was practicable; that every accommodation could have been only a truce; and that it never would be proposed, unless in circumstances when it was for his interest to gain a short breathing-time for fresh projects of ambition.† The event completely proved the justice of these views, and forms the best commentary on the prophetic wisdom of Mr. Pitt. Every successive peace on the Continent only paved the way for fresh aggressions; and at length he was precipitated upon the snows of Russia by the same invincible necessity of dazzling his subjects by the lustre of additional victories, which was felt in the commencement of his career. "His power, without and within," says Marshal St. Cyr, "was founded solely on the *éclat* of his victories. By intrusting himself without reserve to fortune, he imposed upon himself the necessity of following it to the utmost verge whither it would lead him. Unheard-of success had attended enterprises, the temerity of which was continually increasing; but thence arose a necessity to keep forever awake the terror and admiration of Europe, by new enterprises and more dazzling triumphs. The more colossal his power became, the more immeasurable his projects required to be, in order that their unexpected success should keep up the same stupor in the minds of the vulgar. Admiration, enthusiasm, ambition, the emotions on which his dominion was founded, are not durable in their nature; they must be incessantly fed with fresh stimulants; and, to effect that, extraordinary efforts are requisite. These principles were well known to Napoleon; and hence it is that he so often did evil, albeit knowing better than any one that it was evil, overruled by a superior power, from which he felt it was impossible to escape. The rapid movement which he imprinted on the affairs of Europe was of a kind which could not be arrested; a single retrógrade step, a policy which indicated a stationary condition, would have been the signal of his fall. Far, therefore, from making it subject of reproach to Napoleon that he conceived an enterprise so gigantic as

* *Bour.*, iii., 214.

† This, accordingly, was openly avowed by Napoleon himself. "England," said he, in January, 1800, "*must be overturned.* As long as my voice has any influence, it will never enjoy any respite. Yes! yes! war to the death with England forever—*ay, till its destruction.*"* He admits, in his own memoirs, that when he made these proposals to Mr. Pitt, he had no serious intention of concluding peace. "I had then," said he, "need of war; a treaty of peace which would have derogated from that of Campo Formio, and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination. Mr. Pitt's answer, accordingly, was impatiently expected. When it arrived, it filled me with a secret satisfaction. His answer could not have been more favourable. From that moment I foresaw that, with such impassioned antagonists, I would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies."—*NAP.* in *MONTH.*, i., 33, 34.

* *D'Abr.*, ii., 179, 180.

the Russian expedition, he is rather to be pitied for being placed in a situation where he was overruled by necessity; and this furnishes the true answer to those who would ascribe to chance, the rigour of the elements, or an excess of temerity, what was, in truth, but the inevitable consequence of the false position in which, for fifteen years, France had been placed.* It is this law of the moral world which rendered durable peace with that country, when headed by a revolutionary power, impossible; and which was ultimately destined to inflict an awful retribution on its guilt and its ambition.

Experience, therefore, has now proved that Mr. Pitt's view of the character of the Revolutionary war was well founded; and that the seizure of the consular throne by Napoleon only gave a new and more dangerous direction to that restless and insatiable spirit which had arisen from the convulsions which the Revolution had produced. Justice requires that it should be declared that, in espousing the cause of the enemy on this occasion, and uniformly palliating the crimes of the popular party in that country, the English opposition were led, by the spirit of party, to forget equally the duties of patriotism and the dictates of reason. No hesitation need be felt by an English writer in expressing this opinion, because the ablest of the liberal party in France themselves admit that their partisans in this country fell into this erroneous error. "Nothing," says Madame de Staël, "was more contrary to Bonaparte's nature, or his interest, than to have made peace in 1800. He could only live in agitation; and if anything could plead his apology with those who reflect on the influence of external circumstances on the human mind, it is, that he could only breathe freely in a volcanic atmosphere. It was absolutely necessary for him to present, every three months, a new object of ambition to the French, in order to supply, by the grandeur and variety of external events, the vacuum occasioned by the removal of all objects of domestic interest. 'At that epoch, unhappily for the spirit of freedom in England, the English opposition, with Mr. Fox at their head, took an entirely false view of Napoleon; and thence it was that that party, previously so estimable, lost its ascendant in the nation. It was already too much to have defended France under the Reign of Terror; but it was, if possible, a still greater fault to have considered Bonaparte as identified with the principles of freedom, when, in truth, he was their deadliest enemy.'† "The eloquent declarations of Mr. Fox," says General Mathieu Dumas, "cannot invalidate the facts brought forward by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville as to the origin of the war. The Girondists alone were the cause of its commencement. The names of those impostors who, to overturn the monarchical throne of France, prevailed on the king to declare that fatal war, should be consigned to an execrable celebrity: they alone brought down on Europe and their country a deluge of calamities."‡

War being thus resolved on, the most vigorous measures were taken, both by the Parliament and the executive, to meet the dangers with which it

might be attended. Parliament voted the sum of £500,000 to the crown, for the purpose of immediately aiding Austria in the armaments which she had in contemplation, and Mr. Pitt stated that a loan of £2,500,000 to the emperor would be advanced.* The budget brought forward by the chancellor of the exchequer exhibited a most flattering picture of the public credit, and proved that, notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the eight preceding campaigns, the national resources were still unimpaired.† The extraordinary fact which he mentioned, that in the eighth year of the war a loan of eighteen millions and a half had been obtained at the rate of four and three fourths per cent., proved the enduring credit of the government, and the almost boundless extent of the wealth of England; but both that great financier and the British public, misled by the fallacious brilliancy of present appearances, overlooked the grievous burden which the contraction of debt in the three per cents, in other words, the imposition of a burden of £100 for every £60 advanced, was ultimately to produce upon the national resources.

The land-forces of Great Britain in this year amounted to 168,000 men, exclusive of 80,000 militia, and for the service of the fleet 120,000 seamen and marines were voted. The ships in commission were no less than 510, including 124 of the line. From a table laid before Parliament in this year, it appeared that the whole

* Parl. Hist., xxxiv., 1439.

† The budget stood thus:

Receipt—Ways and Means.

Land and Malt Tax.....	£2,750,000
Lottery.....	200,000
Duties on Exports and Imports.....	1,250,000
Income Tax.....	5,300,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund.....	5,512,000
Loan by Exchequer Bills.....	3,000,000
Lent by Bank without interest.....	3,000,000
Loan for Great Britain.....	18,500,000
	£39,512,000

Expenditure.

Navy.....	£12,619,000
Army.....	11,370,000
Miscellaneous.....	750,000
Interest on Exchequer Bills.....	816,000
Deficiencies of year 1799.....	440,000
Deficiency of Malt Tax and Land do.....	350,000
Exchequer Bills.....	2,500,000
Do. for 1798.....	1,075,000
Vote of Credit.....	3,000,000
Subsidies to Germans and Russians.....	3,000,000
Annual Grant for National Debt.....	200,000
Unforeseen Emergencies.....	1,800,000
	£37,920,000

To provide for the interest of this loan, amounting in all to £21,500,000, Mr. Pitt laid on some trifling taxes on spirits and tea, amounting in all to £350,000, the interest on the bulk of the debt being laid as a charge on the income tax. The interest paid on the loan was only 4½ per cent.: a fact which he justly stated as extraordinary in the eighth year of the war. The interest on the public debt at this time was £19,700,000, and on Exchequer Bills, &c., £1,983,000, in all .. £21,683,000

Civil List ..	898,000
Civil Expenses.....	647,000
Charges of Management.....	1,779,000
Other charges on Consolidated Fund.....	239,000
	25,246,000

Total National Expenditure in 1800.....£63,166,000
—See Parl. Hist., xxxiv., 1515, and Ann. Reg., App. to Chronicle for 1800, p. 151, 152.

* St. Cyr, Hist. Mil., iii., 3, 4

† Mad. de Staël, Rév. Franç., ii., 268, 270.

‡ Dum., iv., 308, 312.

troops, exclusive of militia, which had been raised for the service of the state during the eight years from 1792 to 1800, had been only 208,000, a force not greater than might have been easily levied in a single year, out of a population then amounting to nearly sixteen millions in the three kingdoms, and which, if ably conducted, and thrown into the scale when nearly balanced between France and Austria, would unquestionably have terminated the war, at the latest, in two campaigns.*†

Several domestic measures of great importance took place in this session of Parliament. The bank charter was renewed for twenty-one years, there being twelve years of the old charter still to run; in consideration of the advantages of which, the directors agreed to give the public a loan of £3,000,000 for six years without interest; the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act was continued by a great majority in both houses of Parliament, and Mr. Dundas brought forward a full account of the affairs of India.† The union of Ireland with Great Britain was, after a stormy debate in both houses of Parliament in Dublin, carried by a large majority, chiefly through the powerful abilities, cool courage, and vigorous efforts of Lord CASTLEREEGH, who then gave the first specimen of that indomitable firmness and steady perseverance which were afterward destined, on a greater stage, to lead the coalition against France to a glorious issue in the campaign of 1814. This great measure, however, was not carried without the most violent opposition, both in the Irish Peers and Commons, and it left the seeds of an animosity between the two islands which, fostered by religious rancour and Democratic passion, produced melancholy effects in after

times upon the tranquillity and strength of the Empire.*

By the treaty of Union, the peers for the united imperial Parliament were limited, from Ireland, to twenty-eight temporal and four spiritual peers, the former elected for life by the Irish peerage, the latter by rotation; the commoners fixed at one hundred. The churches of England and Ireland were united, and provision made for their union, preservation, and the continuance of their discipline, doctrine, and worship forever. Commercial privileges were fairly communicated, the national debt of each was imposed as a burden on its own finances, and the general expenditure ordered to be defrayed, for twenty years after the union, in the proportion of fifteen to Great Britain and two for Ireland. The laws and courts of both kingdoms were maintained on their present footing, subject to such alterations as the united Parliament might deem expedient. This important step was carried in the British House of Commons by a majority of 208 to 26, and in the Lords by 75 to seven.†

The debates on this subject in the British Parliament, which, although highly important in English, are not of sufficient moment for quotation in European history, are chiefly remarkable for the complete blindness of all parties to the real and ultimate consequences of the measure which was adopted. Mr. Pitt was most desirous to show that the influence of the crown would not be unduly augmented by the Irish members in the House of Commons,† while Mr. Grey contended that, "ultimately at least, the Irish members will afford a certain accession of force to the party of every administration, and therefore forty of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off before the union takes place. He accordingly moved that it should be an instruction to the house to guard against the increase of the influence of the crown in the approaching union."§ To us, who know that by the aid of the Irish members, and their aid alone, even after the franchise had been raised from forty shillings to ten pounds by the Duke of Wellington, the great Democratic change on the British Constitution of 1832 was carried,|| these speculations as to the ultimate consequences of the union are singular monuments of the difficulty which even the greatest intellects experience in prognosticating the consequences of any considerable change in the frame of government. In truth, the decisive addition which the Irish members furnished to the Democratic party of the Empire on the first great crisis which occurred, adds another to the numerous examples which history affords of the extreme peril of applying to one country the institutions or government of another, or of supposing that the system of rep-

May 24, 1800.
Union with Ireland passes the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland

Its leading provisions.

Views of the leaders on both sides of Parliament on this great change.

* James, ii., App. No. 8. Ann. Reg., 1800, 160; and 144, App. to Chron.

† The number of troops raised yearly from the commencement of the war for the regular army was as follows—a woful picture of the ignorance which then prevailed as to the means of combating a revolutionary power:

1793	17,038	1797	16,096
1794	38,561	1798	21,457
1795	40,460	1799	41,316
1796	16,336	1800	17,124
Total in eight years.....		208,388	

Whereas the French, with a population of 28,000,000, raised in 1793 700,000, and in 1793, 1,500,000 soldiers. Prussia, with a population of 7,000,000, raised in 1813 nearly 200,000 men.—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1800, 144, *App. to Chronicle*. The population of Great Britain, according to the census of 1800, was 10,942,000, that of Ireland probably 5,000,000.

‡ From which it appeared that the total revenue in 1798-9 was £8,610,000, the local charges £7,807,000, and the interest of debt and other charges £275,000, leaving a deficiency in territorial revenue of £71,000; to cover which there were the commercial profits, amounting to £630,000, leaving a general balance in favour of the company of £558,000 yearly.

The revenue and expenditure were thus divided:

	Revenue.	Charges.
Bengal	£6,259,600	£3,952,847
Madras	2,004,993	2,857,519
Bombay	346,110	996,699
	£8,610,703	£7,807,065
Surplus	£803,638	
Interest on debt, £758,135		
Other charges, 117,160		
	875,295	
Deficiency	£71,657	
Commercial profits	£629,657	
Deduct territorial loss	71,657	
Annual surplus	£558,000	

—See *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 15.

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxiv., 1471; xxxv., 14, 15. *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 112, 116. † *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 31, 150, 195

‡ *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 47. § *Ibid.*, 101.

|| English and Scotch members for the Reform

Bill on its first division	266
Against it	251-15
Ireland, against it	37
For it	53-16

Thus it was the admission of the Irish members which effected that great alteration in the English Constitution.

resentation which the habits of centuries have moulded to a conformity with the interests of one state, can be adopted without the utmost hazard by another in an inferior stage of civilization, inheriting from its forefathers a more ardent temperament, or under the influence of more vehement passions.

Ever since the great financial crisis of 1797,

Great prosperity of the British Empire at this period.

by the act of that year, followed by the issue of two and one pound notes by the Bank of England, which immediately ensued, the prosperity of the British Empire had been steadily and rapidly increasing. The expenditure of above sixty millions a year by government, either in the current expenses or the payment of interest on debt, and the increase of issues by the bank from eleven millions to above fifteen during that period,* had produced a most extraordinary effect on the national industry. Prices of every species of produce had rapidly and steadily risen; that of grain, in 1800, exclusive of the effects of the scarcity of that year, was double what it had been in 1792, and every other article had advanced in a similar proportion.†

Vast change of prices.

The consequence was, that the industrious classes were, generally speaking, in affluent circumstances; immense fortunes rewarded the efforts of commercial enterprise; the demand for labour, encouraged by the employment of nearly four hundred thousand soldiers and sailors in the public service, was unbounded; and even the increasing weight of taxation, and the alarming magnitude of the debt, were but little felt amid the general rise of prices and incomes which resulted from the profuse expenditure and lavish issue of paper by government.‡

* Bank of England notes in circulation last quarter of

	Five pounds.	Two and one pounds.	Total.
1797.....	£10,411,700	£1,230,700	£11,642,400
1798.....	10,711,690	1,730,330	12,442,070
1799.....	12,335,920	1,671,040	13,006,960
1800.....	13,338,670	2,062,300	15,400,970

—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1800, p. 148, *App. to Chronicle*.

† Highest and lowest price of grain in five years, ending respectively

1790—from 51s. 11d. to 39s. 2d.

1795—from 74s. 2d.—to 42s. 11d.

1800—from 113s. 7d.—to 50s. 3d.

See MUNDRELL'S *Industrial Situation of Great Britain*, 53.

‡ According to Mr. Pitt's statement in 1800, the British Statistical exports, imports, shipping, tonnage, and revenue in details the under-mentioned years, stood as follows:

Imports.

On an average of 6 years ending Jan. 5, 1793,	£18,685,000
On an average of 6 years ending Jan. 5, 1801,	£25,259,000

Exports.

On an average of 6 years ending Jan. 5, 1793,	
Manufactures.....	£14,771,000
Foreign goods.....	5,468,000
	£20,239,000

On an average of 6 years ending Jan. 5, 1801,	
Manufactures.....	£20,085,000
Foreign goods.....	12,867,000
	£32,952,000

Shipping, &c.

	Ships.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
Shipping in 1788.....	13,827	1,363,000	107,925
1792.....	16,079	1,540,145	118,286
1800.....	18,877	1,905,438	143,661

Permanent taxes, exclusive of war taxes:

Year ending 5th Jan., 1793.....	£14,284,000
Do. do. 1794.....	13,941,000
Do. do. 1795.....	13,858,000
Do. do. 1796.....	13,557,000
Do. do. 1797.....	14,292,000
Do. do. 1798.....	13,332,000

One class only, that of annuitants, and all others depending on a fixed income, Bad harvest of underwent, during those years, a 1799 and consequent progressive decline of comfort, which was increased, in many cases, to the most poignant distress by the high prices and severe scarcity which followed the disastrous harvest of 1799. The attention of Parliament was early directed to the means of alleviating the famine of that year. Six reports were made by the Commons and two by the Lords on the dearth of provisions, but the government, although severely pressed by the public suffering, steadily resisted all those harsh or violent measures which procure a present relief at the expense of future confidence in the cultivators. An act was passed to lower the quality of all the bread baked in the kingdom; the importation of rice and maize encouraged by liberal bounties; distillation from grain stopped, and by these and other means an additional supply, to the enormous amount of 2,500,000 quarters, was procured for the use of the inhabitants.* By these generous and patriotic efforts, joined to the admirable patience and forbearance of the people, this trying crisis was surmounted without any of those convulsions which might have been anticipated from so severe a calamity during a period of almost universal war; and, in the latter part of the year, England, so far from being overwhelmed by its reverses, was enabled to present an undaunted front to the hostility of combined Europe.

Great efforts of government to relieve it, and noble patience of the people.

Deprived by the secession of Russia of the power from whom they had derived such efficacious assistance in the preceding campaign, Austria and England made the utmost efforts to prosecute the war with vigour. By their united influence, the German Empire was prevailed upon to sign a treaty, binding the states who composed it to furnish a contingent of three hundred thousand men for the common cause; but very few of the electors obeyed the requisition, and the troops of the Empire were of hardly any service in the succeeding campaign. To stimulate their languid dispositions, a vigorous circular was, in the beginning of December, sent by the Archduke Dec. 4, 1799.

Measures of England and Austria for the prosecution of the war.

Charles to the anterior circles of the Empire, in which he strenuously urged the formation of new levies, and pointed out, in energetic terms, the futility of the idea, that any durable peace was practicable with a country in

Year ending 5th Jan, 1799.....	14,275,000
Do. 1800.....	15,743,000

Gross receipts from taxes:

1797.....	£23,076,000
1798.....	30,175,000
1799.....	34,750,000
1800.....	33,535,000

See *Parl. Hist.*, xxv., 1563.

* The resources obtained in this way are thus detailed in the sixth report of the Commons:

	Quarters.
Importation of wheat from Jan. 1 to October 1.....	170,000
Do. of flour from America.....	580,000
Do. of flour from Canada.....	30,000
Do. of rice, equal.....	630,000
Stoppage of starch, equal to.....	40,000
Do. of distilleries.....	360,000
Use of coarse meal.....	400,000
Retrenchment.....	300,000
	2,510,000

such a state of revolutionary excitement as France, and the vanity of supposing that, by concentrating all the powers of government in the hands of a victorious chieftain, it was likely to be either less formidable or more pacific. But, although that great general was indefatigable in his endeavours to put the Imperialists on a respectable footing, and make the most active preparations for war, he was far from feeling any confidence in the issue of the approaching contest, now that Russia was withdrawn on the one side, and Napoleon was added on the other; and he earnestly counselled the Austrian cabinet to take advantage of the successes of the late campaign, and the recent changes of government in France, by concluding peace with the Republic. The cabinet of Vienna, however, deemed it inadvisable to stop short in the career of success; and not only refused to treat with Napoleon, who had proposed peace on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, but deprived the archduke, who had so candidly stated his opinion, of the command of the army in Germany, and conferred it on General Kray. Notwithstanding the great abilities of the latter general, this change proved extremely prejudicial to the imperial fortunes: the archduke was adored by the soldiers, and his retirement not only shook their confidence in themselves, but cooled the ardour of the circles in the south of Germany, to whom his great achievements in the campaign of 1796 were still the subject of grateful recollection. He retired to his government of Bohemia, from whence he had the melancholy prospect of a series of reverses, which possibly his talents might have prevented, whereby the monarchy was brought to the brink of ruin.*

By a treaty signed on the 16th of March, the Elector of Bavaria agreed to put
March 16, twelve thousand men in the pay of
1800.

Great Britain, to be employed in the common cause; and by another treaty with the Elector of Mentz and the Duke of Wirtemberg, each of these petty states agreed to furnish six thousand men, paid by the
April 30, same power, for the same purpose.
1800.

These troops, however, could not be organized in sufficient time to take a part in the early operations of the campaign, and they formed at best but a poor substitute for the sturdy Russian veterans, who were retiring towards the northern extremity of Germany, equally exasperated at their allies and their enemies.

Treaties entered into for this purpose with Austria and Bavaria.

By another and more important treaty, signed at Vienna on the 28th of June, the emperor agreed to raise his forces, both in Germany and Italy, to the greatest possible amount, and the two powers bound themselves each not to make a separate peace without the consent of the other; in consideration of which, England engaged not only to advance a subsidy of £2,000,000 sterling to the imperial treasury, but to augment as much as practicable the German and Swiss troops in the British pay in the German campaign.†

Justly proud of the glorious successes of the preceding campaign, which, in so far as its

troops were concerned, had been almost unchecked, and relying with confidence on its superb armies, two hundred thousand strong, in Germany and Italy, the cabinet of Vienna resolved on continuing the contest. But the military preparations which they made were not commensurate to the magnitude of the danger which was to be apprehended, since the First Consul was placed at the head of the French government. Their armies in Germany were raised to ninety-two thousand men, exclusive of the Bavarian and Wirtemberg contingents; but this vast body was scattered over an immense line, from the source of the Rhine to the banks of the Maine, while the centre, in the valley of the Danube, where the decisive blows were to be struck, was so weakened that no respectable force could be collected to make head against the French invasion. The army under Melas in Italy was, by great exertions, augmented to ninety-six thousand men; the Aulic Council, seduced by the recent conquest of that country, having fallen into the great mistake of supposing that the vital point of the war was to be found in the Maritime Alps or on the banks of the Var, whereas it lay nearer home, on the shores of the Danube and the plains of Bavaria. No levies in the interior were made; few points were fortified, the government sharing in the common delusion that the strength of France was exhausted, and that it would without difficulty be brought to reasonable terms of accommodation in the ensuing campaign. The foresight of the Archduke Charles alone had surrounded Ulm with a formidable intrenched camp, which proved of the most essential service after the first disasters of the campaign, and retarded for six weeks the tide of Republican conquest in the heart of Germany.*

The republics with which France had encircled her frontier had either been conquered by the allies, or were in such a state of exhaustion and suffering as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid to the parent state.

Discontented state of the French affiliated republics.

The Dutch groaned in silence under a yoke which was every day becoming more oppressive: the Democratic party looked back with unavailing regret to the infatuation with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of a power which used them only as the instruments of its ambition; while the commercial aristocracy, finding the trade of the United Provinces destroyed, abandoned every species of enterprise, and quietly awaited in retirement the return of more prosperous days. By a treaty concluded on the 5th of January, 1800, Holland agreed to pay six millions to France, and obtained in return only the restitution of the effects of the clergy and emigrants who had possessions in the United States. So violent was the hatred at France among its inhabitants, that a loan of a million sterling, which Napoleon endeavoured to negotiate among the capitalists of Amsterdam, totally failed. Switzerland was in a still more discontented state. Without any regard to the rights of the allied Republic, Massena had imposed a forced loan on Berne, Bale, and Zurich; and as the Swiss

* Dum., iii., 14, 16. Jom., xiii., 12, 16. Arch. Ch., ii., 234. Ann. Reg., 1800, 168.

† Ann. Reg., 1800, 240, 243. State Papers.

* Arch. Ch., ii., 334. Dum., iii., 14, 16. Jom., xiii., 11, 12. Nap., i., 186.

Military preparations of the Imperialists.

magistrates courageously resisted this act of oppression; an intrigue was got up by the Democratic party, and the councils were attempted to be dissolved by military force. The conspiracy failed, and Colonel Clavel, who had been appointed to execute it, was compelled to take refuge in France; but the violent party spirit which these proceedings left in Switzerland deprived it of any weight in the approaching contest, and prepared the way for its total subjugation by Napoleon.*

To make head with such feeble auxiliaries against the united force of Austria and England, with a defeated army, an exhausted treasury, and a disunited people, was the difficult task which awaited the First Consul; but he soon showed that he was equal to the attempt. The first step which he took to accomplish the gigantic undertaking was to introduce some degree of order into the finances, which the cupidity and profligacy of the Republican government had reduced to the most deplorable state. A deficit of 600,000,000 francs, or £24,000,000 sterling, existed in the revenue of the preceding year; and recovery of arrears had become impossible from the universal penury and misery which prevailed. The remnant of the public funds, though deprived of two thirds of their amount, were still at eight per cent., not more than a thirty-eighth part of their value in 1789, at the commencement of the Revolution. The public treasury was empty; sufficient funds were not to be found in it to fit out a courier. Payments of every description were made in bills or paper securities of some sort, which had already largely anticipated all the legal receipts of government. The armies were supported only by forced requisitions of horses, food, and clothing, which had become as oppressive as during the Reign of Terror. To avoid the forced loans and arbitrary taxation of the wealthier classes, expenditure of every sort had altogether ceased among the better description of citizens; and in France, after ten years of revolution, the concealment of treasure had become as common as in the pachalies of Turkey. Amid the universal dismay, extortion, pillage, and corruption were general among the servants of government. Places, clothing, provisions, stores—everything, in short, was sold to satisfy their cupidity; and while every office was openly put up to sale, enormous fortunes were amassed both by the elevated and inferior agents of corruption.†

The establishment of a firm and powerful government arrested these disorders, and re-established the finances as if by enchantment. The capitalists of Paris, long inaccessible to the demands for loans by the Revolutionary government, came forward with 12,000,000 of francs; the sale of the estates of the house of Orange produced 24,000,000 more; national domains to a great extent found purchasers, from the increasing confidence in government; and, instead of the forced loans from the opulent classes, which had utterly annihilated credit, and, by the flagrant injustice with which they were levied, recalled the worst days of the Reign of Terror, a new tax of twenty-five per

cent. on real property, though a burden that would be deemed intolerable in any state which had tasted of the sweets of real freedom, gave general satisfaction, and soon produced a large increase to the revenue. At the same time, the foundations of a sinking fund and a national bank were laid, the public forests put under a new and rigorous direction, monthly remittances from the collectors of taxes established, and the measures commenced which were calculated to revive public credit after a prostration of ten years.*†

The pacification of La Vendée was the next object of the First Consul. The law of hostages and the forced requisitions had revived the civil war in that country, and sixty thousand men were in the field; but it was a different contest from the terrible burst which, seven years before, had proved so disastrous to the Republican arms. The devastation of the country, and destruction of the population by that bloody strife, had annihilated the elements of resistance on any considerable scale, and mere guerilla bands, seldom amounting to two thousand men, traversed the fields in different directions, levying contributions, and held together as much by the love of pillage as indignation at oppression. Through the intervention of Hyde Neuville, an able young man of an ardent disposition, who, nevertheless, was not misled by the dictates of passion, a negotiation was opened with the leaders of the insurgents, and, although they paid but little attention to the first proclamations of Napoleon, yet, being soon convinced, by the tenour of his administration, that a more equitable system than that of the Revolution was about to commence, they gradually listened to his proposals. At the same time, the approach of formidable forces from all quarters convinced them that they had now a more difficult antagonist to deal with than the weak, though tyrannical Directory. Chatillon and D'Autichamps were the first to give the example of submission, and soon after, Suzanet and the Abbé Bernier concluded, at Mount Lucon, a treaty highly honourable to themselves for the termination of hostilities. Jan. 17, 1801. The able and heroic Count Louis de Frotte was not equally fortunate. He had written a letter to the Republican chief, proposing a general pacification of the Iniquitous execution of Count Louis Frotte. Chouans, and was at the place of conference, when the negotiation was protracted beyond the time assigned for the acceptance of terms of peace by the Royalists. He was then perfidiously seized, along with all his followers, on the ground of a

* Nap., i., 107, 110. Jom., xiii., 28.

† The injustice committed by these forced loans is one of the most striking instances of the monstrous effects of the Democratic ascendancy which, by the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, had obtained in France. They were laid indiscriminately on all property, movable and immovable, and were founded, 1. On the amount of the direct contribution; and, 2. On an arbitrary base. Every one who paid 500 francs was taxed at four tenths of his income; all who paid 4000 francs and upward, at its whole amount. The arbitrary base was founded on the opinion of a jury, who were entitled to tax the relations of emigrants, or any persons of noble birth, at any sum they chose. The effects of so iniquitous a system may be conceived. Property disappeared, or was concealed as studiously as in the dynasties of the East. Every branch of the public revenue was drying up from the extinction of credit.—See NAPOLEON, i., 107, note.

* Jom., xiii., 19, 28.

† Jom., xiii., 27, 29. Bour., iii., 241. Nap., i., 106.

letter he had written to an aid-de-camp during the negotiation, and brought before a military tribunal, by which they were immediately ordered to be executed. They underwent the sentence next day, and met death with the most heroic courage, standing erect, with their eyes unbanded. One of the aids-de-camp was only wounded by the first fire : he coolly ordered the men to fire again, and fell pierced to the earth. The unhappy aid-de-camp whose unfortunate discovery of the letter had occasioned this catastrophe, was seized with such despair that he blew out his brains. This murder is a lasting stain on Napoleon's administration. Frotte was not taken in arms, but perfidiously seized by a company of Republicans when under an escort of the national troops, and engaged in a negotiation for a final pacification ; but he was deemed too able to be permitted to survive, even in that age of returning clemency ; and the intercepted letter, though imprudent, contained nothing which could warrant the captive's execution. It must be added, however, in justice to Napoleon, that it contained expressions extremely hostile to the First Consul, and that, at the earnest solicitation of his secretary Bourrienne, he had actually made out an order for his pardon, which, from some delay in the transmission, unfortunately arrived too late to save the hero's life. About the same time he generously pardoned M. Deseu, a brave emigrant officer taken in arms against the state, and doomed by the cruel laws of the Republic to instant death.*

Georges, Bournont, and some others, maintained for a few weeks longer in Brittany a gallant resistance ; but, finding that the inhabitants were weary of civil war, and gladly embraced the opportunity of resuming their pacific occupations, they at length came into the measures of government, and were treated with equal clemency and good faith by the First Consul, to whom they ever after yielded a willing and useful obedience. In the end of January, General Brune announced by proclamation that the Feb. 23, 1801. pacification of La Vendée was complete, and on the 23d of the following month a general and unqualified amnesty was published. The Vendéan chiefs were received with great distinction by Napoleon at Malmaison, and generally promoted to important situations.† The curate Bernier was made Bishop of Orleans, and intrusted afterward with the delicate task of conducting the negotiation concerning the concordat with the papal government. The rapid and complete pacification of La Vendée by Napoleon proves how much the long duration of its bloody and disastrous war had been owing to the cruelty and oppressions of the Republican authorities.

The next important step of Napoleon was to detach Russia completely from the alliance with Great Britain : an attempt which was much facilitated by the angry feelings excited in the mind of the Emperor Paul and his generals by the disastrous issue of the preceding campaign, and the rising jealousy of the maritime power of Great Britain, which had sprung

up from fortuitous events in the minds of the Northern powers, and in the following year led to the most important results. Aware of the favourable turn which affairs in the Baltic had recently taken, Napoleon lost no opportunity of cultivating a good understanding with the Russian emperor, and, by a series of adroit acts of courtesy, succeeded, at length, not only in obliterating all feelings of hostility, but establishing the most perfect understanding between the two cabinets. Napoleon sent back all the Russian prisoners in France, seven thousand in number, who had been taken at Zurich and in Holland, not only without exchange, but equipped anew in the Russian uniform. This politic proceeding was not lost on the Czar, who had been already dazzled by the lustre of Napoleon's victories in Italy and Egypt ; a contest of civilities and courtesies ensued, which soon terminated in the dismissal of Lord Whitworth from St. Petersburg, and the arrival of Baron Springborton, the Russian ambassador, at Paris.* The British vessels were soon after laid under embargo in the Russian harbours, and that angry correspondence began, which was shortly terminated by the array of all the powers of the North in open hostility against Great Britain.

The military measures of Napoleon were equally energetic. Upon the refusal of Great Britain to treat, he is- His energetic military measures. sued one of his heart-stirring proclamations, which were so well calculated to rouse the ardent spirit of the French people. He told them that the English minister had rejected his proposals of peace ; that to command it he had need of money, of iron, and soldiers, and that he swore not to combat but for the happiness of France and the peace of the world. This animated address, coupled with the magic that encircled the name of Napoleon, produced an amazing effect. Victory seemed about again to attend the Republican standards, under the auspices of a leader to whom she had never yet proved faithless ; the patriotic ardour of 1793 was in part revived, with all the addition which the national strength had since received from the experience of later times. The first class of the conscription for the year 1800 was put in requisition, without any exemption either from rank or fortune : this supply put at the disposal of government one hundred and twenty thousand men. Besides this, a still more efficient force for immediate service was formed by a summons of all the veterans who had obtained furlough or leave of absence for the eight preceding years, and who, unless furnished with a valid excuse, were required again to serve : a measure which procured a supply of thirty thousand experienced soldiers. At the same time, the *gendarmes* were put on a better footing ; and various improvements effected, particularly in the artillery department, which greatly augmented the efficiency of that important arm of the public service. Twenty-five thousand horses, bought in the interior, were distributed among the artillery and cavalry on the frontier, and all the stores and equipments of the armies repaired with a celerity so extraordinary that it would have appeared incredible, if long experience had not proved that confidence in the vigour and

* Bour., iv., 8, 10. Beauch., iv., 498, 504.

† Nap., i., 129, 133. Jom., xiii., 29, 31. Dum., iii., 19, 21. Ann. Reg., 1800, 166.

* Jom., xiii., 13, 14. Bour., iii., 269, 270. Ann. Reg., 1800, 234.

stability of government operates as rapidly in increasing, as the vacillation and insecurity of Democracy does in withering the national resources.*

Far from experiencing the difficulty which had been so severely felt by the Directory in retaining the soldiers to their colours, the consular government was powerfully seconded by the patriotic efforts of all classes. Several brilliant corps of volunteers were formed, and the ranks rapidly filled up by veterans hastening to renew their toils under a leader to whom fortune had hitherto proved so propitious. In consequence, the government soon found itself at the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men to commence hostilities in Italy and Germany, while one hundred thousand conscripts were rapidly learning the rudiments of war at the depôts in the interior, and before six months might be expected to join the armies on the frontier.†

But it was not merely in such praiseworthy efforts for the security and pacification of France that the energies of the First Consul were employed. He already meditated the re-establishment of the monarchy, and early commenced that system of misleading the people by false epithets, and dazzling them by splendid pageants, which was intended to prepare them for the lustre of the throne, and induce them to concur in the reconstruction of all the parts of the social edifice which it had been the object of the Revolution to destroy.

To accomplish this object, he applied himself to what he was well aware is at all times, but especially during the decline of Revolutionary fervour, the ruling principle of human nature, viz., self-interest. All the officers of state, all the members of the legislature, were endowed with ample salaries; even the tribunate, which professed to be the barrier of the people against the encroachments of government, received above £50,000 a year among its eighty members, being at the rate of nearly £700 a year to each individual who composed it: a very large allowance in a country where the highest civil functionaries, the heads of the law and Church, received only from £300 to £600 annually.‡ From the very first he commenced the demolition of all those ensigns and expressions which recalled the idea of the liberty and equality, from the strife of which his redoubtable power had arisen. The image of the Republic, seated and holding a spear in her hand, which was at the top of all the official letters at the commencement of the consulship, was suppressed. Some doubt existed in the first instance as to which of the consuls should take the chair, and Siéyes openly asserted his pre-

tensions to it, in virtue as well of his seniority as his great services in the cause of freedom; but Napoleon cut the matter short by stepping into the chair himself, and the jealousy of the elder consul was soon removed by the grant of the large property out of the park of Versailles which has been already mentioned. At the same time, the habiliments and ensigns of authority were changed; the Greek and Roman costumes, which recalled the ideas of equality lately so much in vogue, were abolished and replaced by the military dress; the First Consul appeared on all occasions in uniform, with boots and spurs, and all the inferior military functionaries followed his example. The levees, which he held almost daily, were crowded with officers in full dress, and the court of the first magistrate of the Republic was noways distinguishable from the headquarters of its greatest general. At the same time, the institution of sabres and furs of merit, as a testimony of reward to military distinction, already shadowed out to the discerning eye the Legion of Honour, and the re-establishment of titles of rank and a hereditary nobility; while the daily reviews, with all the pomp and splendour of war, in the Place Carrousel, accustomed the people to those magnificent pageants which were destined to conceal from their gaze the chains of the Empire.*

These measures were all steps, and not unimportant ones, to the re-establishment of monarchical authority. But they were the prelude only to more important changes. In December, 1799, an important *arrêté* was published, which, on the preamble "That a part of the journals printed at Paris are instruments in the hands of the enemies of the Republic, and that it is the first duty of the government to watch over its security," decreed "That the minister of police should not suffer to be printed, during the continuance of the war, any journals but the following." Then followed a list of thirteen journals, thus invested with the monopoly of Paris; and from it were only excluded "those exclusively devoted to science, the arts, literature, commerce, or advertisements." It was decreed, by a separate article, that "any journal among those retained which inserted anything contrary to the sovereignty of the people, should be immediately suppressed." This clause, inserted to blind the people to the real tendency of the measure, received in the sequel, as was foreseen at the time, the most liberal interpretation, and was applied, contrary to its obvious meaning, to sanction the extinction of all journals contrary to the consular government. Thus early commenced the system of Napoleon for the coercion of the press: a system which received, during the remainder of his reign, such ample development, and which, as Madame de Stael justly remarks, converted that great engine, generally considered as the palladium of liberty, into the most powerful instrument of bondage, by perpetually exhibiting a series of false and delusive pictures to the human mind, and excluding all others from the view.†

* Dum., iii., 23, 25. Jom., xiii., 33, 35.

† Jom., xiii., 35. Dum., iii., 24, 25.

‡ The civil list under the First Consul was fixed at the following sums:

Legislative Body.....	2,400,000 francs.
Tribunate.....	1,312,000
Archives.....	75,000
Three Consuls.....	1,800,000
Council of State.....	675,000
Their Secretaries.....	112,500
Six Ministers.....	360,000
Minister of Foreign Affairs	90,000

6,824,500 francs, or £275,000.

—See BOURRIENNE, iii., 242.

* Thib., 2, 3. Bour., iii., 243, 255, 256. Nap., i., 243.

† De Stael, ii., 284. Bour., iii., 254.

The next step of Napoleon was to fix his residence in the Tuileries, and sleep there at the kings of France. This great change, however, required considerable caution in its accomplishment; it was so palpable an approach towards royalty, that it might shock the feeling of the people, and endanger the newly-established authority. Slowly, and with profound dissimulation, therefore, he proceeded in his advances. A fine statue of Brutus was first placed in one of the galleries of the palace: it was thought the most ardent Republicans could apprehend nothing from a change which commenced with honour done to the hero who had slain a tyrant. Orders were next given to repair and put in order the royal apartments in the Tuileries, and under the veil of these words great changes were effected. The *bonnets rouges* were all effaced; the statues which were to adorn the great gallery chosen by Napoleon himself: he selected among the ancients, Demosthenes and Alexander, Brutus and Cæsar; among the moderns, Gustavus Adolphus, Turanne, Condé, Prince Eugene, Marlborough, Marshal Saxe, Frederic, Washington, Dugommier, Dampierre, and Joubert. At length the translation of the consuls from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries took place: the royal apartments were destined for Napoleon, those in the Pavilion of Flora for the other consuls. The *cortège* set out from the Luxembourg, surrounded by a splendid train of officers and three thousand chosen troops, among whom the famous regiment of Guides was peculiarly conspicuous. Napoleon, with the two other consuls, was drawn in a magnificent chariot by six white horses, the same which the Emperor of Austria had given him after the treaty of Campo Formio: he bore in his hand the splendid sabre presented to him by the same sovereign on that occasion. The cabinet ministers followed in their carriages, the only ones which were to be seen on the occasion, for to transport the council of state they were obliged to have recourse to hackney-coaches: such was the miserable destitution in which the Revolution had left the highest civil functionaries of France!† The real luxury of that period consisted in the splendour of the troops, whose brilliant uniforms and prancing chargers formed a painful contrast to the meanness and simplicity of the civil authorities—last and sad effect of revolutionary convulsions, to cast to the earth everything but the ensigns of military prowess.

From the opening into the Carrousel, from the quay of the Tuileries to the gate of the palace, the procession passed through a double line of guards: a royal usage, which offered a singular contrast to the inscription on the guardhouse by which it passed: “10th of August, 1792—Royalty is abolished in France, and will never be re-established.” No sooner had he arrived at the foot of the great stair, than Napoleon, allowing the other consuls to ascend to the presence chamber, mounted on horseback, and, amid incessant cries of “Vive le Premier Consul!” passed in review above twenty thousand men. Murat was on his right, Lannes on his left; the brilliant staff

who surrounded him bore on their visages the marks of the sun of Italy or the sands of Egypt. When the banners of the ninetieth, the forty-third, and thirtieth demi-brigades, which exhibited only bare poles riddled with shot and surmounted by tatters black with powder, were carried past, he bowed with respect to the monuments of military valour. Enthusiastic acclamations rent the skies; and such was the universal transport, that, when the review was concluded, and the First Consul ascended to the audience chamber, and took his station in the centre of the room, his colleagues were reduced to the rank of pages following his train. On that day royalty was, in truth, re-established in France, somewhat less than eight years after it had been abolished by the revolt of the 10th of August.*†

No sooner was the First Consul established at the Tuileries, than the usages, dress, and ceremonial of a court were at once resumed. The antechambers were filled with chamberlains, pages, and esquires; footmen, in brilliant liveries, filled the lobbies and staircases; the levees were conducted with as much splendour as the dilapidated state of most fortunes would permit; and a drawing-room, composed chiefly of the wives of the young generals who had been the companions of Napoleon, and presided over by the grace and good-breeding of Josephine, already revived, to a certain degree, the lustre of a court. Napoleon was indefatigable in his attention to these matters. He deemed the colour of a livery, the cut of a court-dress not beneath his notice, endeavouring in every way to dazzle the eyes of the vulgar, and efface all recollection of the Republic before it was formally abolished by the authority of government.‡ For the same reason, he revived the use of silk stockings in dress, and re-established the balls of the opera, an event which was so great an innovation on the manners of the Republic that it created quite a sensation at that period. But Napoleon, in pursuing these measures, knew well the character of the French. “While they are discussing these changes,” said he, “they will cease to talk nonsense about my politics, and that is what I want. Let them amuse themselves—let them dance, but let them not thrust their heads into the councils of government. Commerce will revive under the increasing expenditure of the

* Bour., iii., 318, 323. Thib., 2, 3.

† On the night of his entry into the Tuileries, Napoleon said to his secretary, “Bourienne, it is not enough to be in the Tuileries, we must take measures to remain there. Who has not inhabited this palace? It has been the abode of robbers, of members of the Convention. Ah! there is your brother’s house, from which, eight years ago,* we saw the good Louis XVI. besieged in the Tuileries, and carried off into captivity. But you need not fear a repetition of the scene. Let them attempt it with me, if they dare.”†

‡ The King of Prussia was among the first to recognise the consular government, and Napoleon was highly gratified when an aid-de-camp, whom he despatched to Berlin, was admitted to the honour of dining at the royal table. M. Lucchesini, in October, 1800, was charged with a special mission to the court of the Tuileries from the Prussian government. The First Consul received him at St. Cloud, and was at the balcony when he arrived. He was much struck with the decorations which he bore, and the rich livery of the servants who attended him, and he was heard to exclaim, “That is imposing; we must have things of that sort to dazzle the people.”—See THIBAUDEAU, 14, 15.

* Bour., iii., 320, 321. Goh., ii., 15, 19. Thib., 2.

† See vol. i., 102.

† Bour.

capital. I am not afraid of the Jacobins; I never was so much applauded as at the last parade. It is ridiculous to say that nothing is right but what is new: we have had enough of such novelties. I would rather have the balls of the opera than the saturnalia of the Goddess of Reason.”*

About the same time an *arrêt* was published, which took off the sentence of banishment against a great number of those who had been exiled by the result of the 18th Fructidor. It was only provided that they should be under the surveillance of the police, and reside at the places appointed for each, respectively, in the decree. Among the persons thus restored against an unjust sentence were many of the most eminent citizens of the Republic: Carnot, Barthelemy, Boissy d'Anglas, Portalis, Villoul, Joyeuse, and above forty others. He immediately made use of the most eminent of them in the service of the state: Carnot was appointed minister at war in the absence of Berthier, and contributed in a powerful manner to the glorious issue of the succeeding campaign. Barene also was recalled, and was so desirous to receive employment that he wrote a long letter, justifying his conduct, to the First Consul, but the latter never could be persuaded to take into his service that hardened Republican. Those proscribed by the Directory were thus early admitted into favour; at a subsequent period, he received with equally open arms the Royalists and the victims of the Revolution; the only faction against which, to the last, he was inveterate, was the remnant of the Jacobin party, who retained throughout all his reign the resolution of their character and the perversity of their opinion.†

At the time when Napoleon was placed on the consular throne, he organized his *secret police*, intended to act as a check on the public one of Fouché. Duroc was at first at the head of this establishment, to which Junot, as governor of Paris, soon after succeeded. So early did this great leader avail himself of this miserable engine, unknown in constitutional monarchies, the resource of despots, inconsistent with anything like freedom, but the sad legacy bequeathed to succeeding ages by the convulsions and devastation of the Revolution. The spies and agents of this police and counter-police soon filled every coffee-house and theatre in Paris; they overheard conversations, mingled in groups, encouraged seditious expressions, were to be found in saloons and palaces, and rendered every man insecure, from the monarch on the throne to the captive in the dungeon. Lately appointed governor of Paris, Junot had a multitude of inferior agents in his pay to watch the motions of Fouché, and he, in his turn, carried corruption into the bosom of the consular family, and, by liberally supplying funds for her extravagance, obtained secret information from Josephine herself.‡ This miserable system had survived all the changes to which it gave birth; the formidable engine, organized in the heart of Paris, with its arms extending over all France, is in-

stantly seized upon by each successive faction which rises to the head of affairs; the herd of informers and spies is perpetuated from generation to generation, and exercises its prostituted talents for behoof of any government which the armed force of the capital has elevated to supreme power; the people, habituated to this unseen authority, regard it as an indispensable part of regular government; and a system, which was the disgrace of Roman servitude in the corrupted days of the Empire, is ingrafted on a government which boasts of concentrating within itself all the lights of modern civilization.*

“Augustus knew well,” says Gibbon, “that mankind are governed by names, and that they will, in general, submit to real slavery, if they are told that they are in the enjoyment of freedom.” No man understood this principle better than Napoleon. While he was preparing, by fixing his residence in the royal palace, the appointment of the legislature by the executive, the suppression of the liberty of the press, and the establishment of a vigilant police for the

* The circumstances of the Roman Empire, as remodelled by Constantine, afford a striking analogy to those of France when Napoleon ascended the throne; and it is curious to observe how exactly the previous destruction of the nobility and higher classes in the two countries paved the way, by necessary consequence, for the same despotic institutions. “The patrician families,” says Gibbon, “whose original numbers were never recruited till the end of the Commonwealth, either failed in the ordinary course of nature, or were extinguished in so many foreign or domestic wars. Few remained who could derive their genuine origin from the foundation of the city, when Cæsar and Augustus, Claudius and Vespasian, created a competent number of new patrician families. But these artificial supplies, in which the reigning house was always included, were rapidly swept away by the rage of tyrants, by frequent revolutions, the change of manners, and the intermixture of nations. Little more was left, when Constantine ascended the throne, than a vague and imperfect tradition that the patricians had once been the first among the Romans. To form a body of nobles, whose influence may restrain, while it secures the authority of the monarch, would have been very inconsistent with the character and policy of Constantine; but, had he seriously entertained such a design, it might have exceeded the measure of his power to ratify, by an arbitrary edict, an institution which must expect the sanction of time and opinion. He revived, indeed, the title of patricians; but he revived it as a *personal, not an hereditary distinction*. They yielded only to the transient authority of the annual consuls, but they enjoyed the pre-eminence over all the great officers of state. This honourable rank was bestowed on them for life, and, as they were usually favourites and ministers at the imperial court, the true etymology of the word was perverted by ignorance and flattery, and the patricians of Constantine were revered as the adopted fathers of the emperor and the Republic.

“The police insensibly assumed the license of reporting whatever they could observe of the conduct, either of magistrates or private citizens, and were soon considered as the eyes of the monarch and the scourge of the people. Under the warm influence of a feeble reign, they multiplied to the incredible number of 10,000; disdained the mild, though frequent admonitions of the laws, and exercised, in the profitable management of the posts, a rapacious and insolent oppression. These official spies, who corresponded with the palace, were encouraged with reward and favour anxiously to watch the progress of every treasonable design, from the faint and latent symptoms of disaffection, to the actual preparation of open revolt. Their careless or criminal violation of truth and justice was covered by the consecrated mask of zeal; and they might securely aim their poisoned arrows at the breast either of the innocent or the guilty, who had provoked their resentment or refused to purchase their silence. A faithful subject of Syria, perhaps, or Britain, was exposed to the danger, or, at least, to the dread, of being dragged in chains to the court of Milan or Constantinople, to defend his life and fortune against the malicious charges of these privileged informers.” This might pass for a description of the Conservative Senate and police of Napoleon.—See GIBBON, ch. xvii.

Comparison of his system of government with that established by Constantine in the Byzantine Empire.

* Bour., iii., 263, 264, 319, 326, 327. Thib., 15. D'Abr., ii., 263, 280.

† Bour., iii., 264, 267.

‡ Bour., iii., 295, 303.

overthrow of all the principles of the Revolution, he was careful to publish to the world proclamations which still breathed the spirit of Democratic freedom. Shortly before his installation in the Tuileries, intelligence arrived of the death of Washington; the illustrious founder of American independence. He immediately published the following order of the day to the army: "Washington is dead! That great man has struggled with tyranny; he consolidated the liberty of his country. His memory will be ever dear to the French people, as to all freemen in both hemispheres, who, like him and the American soldiers, have fought for liberty and equality. As a mark of respect, the First Consul orders that for ten days black crape shall be suspended from all the standards and banners of the Republic." Thus, by the skilful use of high-sounding names and heartstirring recollections, did this great master of the art of dissimulation veil his advances towards absolute power, and ingraft an enthusiastic admiration for his despotic government on the turbulent passions which had been nourished by the Revolution.*

Napoleon's hypocritical eulogy on Washington, who died Dec. the 14th, 1799.

The mind of Napoleon was equally great in everything which it undertook. He had early conceived an admiration for architectural decoration, which his residence among the stately monuments of Egypt had converted into a chastened and elevated passion. His present situation, as chief of the French government, gave him ample room for the indulgence of this truly regal disposition, and he already began to conceive those great designs for the embellishment of Paris and improvement of France which have thrown such durable lustre over his reign. The inconceivable activity of his mind seemed to take a pleasure in discovering new objects for exertion; and at a time when he was conducting the diplomacy of Europe, and regulating all the armies of France, he was maturing plans for the construction of roads, bridges, and canals through all its wide extent, and setting on foot those great works which have given such splendour to its capital. He early selected M. Fontaine and M. Perier as the instruments of his designs, and, aided by the suggestions of these able architects, the embellishment of the metropolis proceeded at an accelerated pace. The formation of a quay on the banks of the Seine, opposite to the Tuileries, near the Quai Voltaire, first removed a deformity which had long been felt in looking from the windows of the palace, and the clearing out of the Place Carrousel next suggested the idea of uniting the Louvre and Tuileries, and forming a vast square between those two sumptuous edifices. At first it was proposed to construct a building across the vacant area, in order to conceal the oblique position in which they stood to each other; but this idea was soon abandoned, as Napoleon justly observed that "no building, how majestic soever, could compensate for a vast open space between the Louvre and Tuileries." The construction of a fourth side, for the great square opposite to the picture gallery, was therefore commenced, and the demolition

of the edifices in the interior soon after began: a great undertaking, which the subsequent disasters of his reign prevented him from completing, and which all the efforts of succeeding sovereigns have not been able as yet to bring to a conclusion. The Pont des Arts, between the Louvre and the Palace of the Institute, was commenced about the same time, and the demolition of the convents of the Feuillans and Capucines made way for the Rue de Rivoli, which now forms so noble a border to the gardens of the Tuileries. Malmaison at this time was the favourite country residence of the First Consul; but he already meditated the establishment of his court at St. Cloud, and the apartments of that palace began to be fitted up in that sumptuous style which has rendered them unequalled in all the palaces of France.*

The First Consul did not, as yet, venture openly to break with the Republican party, but he lost no opportunity of showing in what estimation he held their principles. On occasion of the establishment of the Court of Cassation, the supreme tribunal of France, he said to Bourrienne, "I do not venture as yet to take any decided step against the regicides; but I will show what I think of them. To-morrow I shall be engaged with Abrial in the formation of the Tribunal of Cassation. Target, who is its president, declined to defend Louis XVI.: whom do you suppose I am about to name in his place? Tronchet, who so nobly discharged that perilous duty. They may say what they choose; my mind is made up." Tronchet accordingly received the appointment so richly deserved by his heroic conduct. The commemoration of the murder of Louis XVI. was at the same time suppressed, and concerts of sacred music were permitted on Sundays at the Opera. Thus, though the Republican calendar was still observed, an approach was made to the ancient mode of measuring time in the public amusements.†

Louis XVIII. at this time wrote several letters to Napoleon, in which he expressed the high esteem in which he held his character, and offered him any situation which he chose to fix on under the government, if he would aid in re-establishing the throne of the Bourbons. Napoleon replied in firm but courteous terms, declining to have any connexion with the exiled family.‡ He clearly foresaw, with admirable

Suppression of the fête on 21st January, and elevation of Tronchet.

Correspondence between Napoleon and Louis XVIII.

* Thib., 2, 3. Bour., iv., 46, 56.

† Bour., iv., 68, 70.

‡ The letter of Louis XVIII. was in these terms:

"For long, general, you have known the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt my gratitude, fix upon the place you desire for yourself; point out the situations which you wish for your friends. As to my principles, they are those of the French character. Clemency on principle accords with the dictates of reason.

"No—the victor of Lodi, Castiglione, and Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. But you are losing the most precious moments. We could secure the happiness of France. I say we, for I require Bonaparte for such an attempt, and he could not achieve it without me. General, Europe observes you, glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people."

Napoleon replied:

"I have received, sir, your letter. I thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding my- Sept. 24, 1800.

"You should renounce all hope of returning to France. You could not do so but over the bodies of one hundred thousand Frenchmen. Sacrifice your interest to the repose

sagacity, all the difficulties which would attend the restoration of that unfortunate family, and felt no inclination to make way for such an event. "The partisans of the Bourbons," said he, "are much mistaken if they imagine that I am the man to play the part of Monk. I am not insensible to the hazard to which France may be one day exposed from my decease without issue, as my brothers are evidently unfit for such a throne; but consider the absurdity of the propositions which they have made to me. How could we secure so many new interests and vested rights

and happiness of France. History will duly appreciate your conduct in so doing.

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family, and shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with everything which can secure the tranquillity of your retreat."

This answer was not despatched for seven months after the receipt of the letter from Louis, and when the Congress of Luneville was about to open.—See *BOURRIENNE*, iv., 77-79.

Not disconcerted with this repulse, the Bourbon family endeavoured to open a negotiation with Napoleon, through the Duchess of Guiche, a lady of great beauty and abilities, who found no difficulty in penetrating to Josephine, and conveying to her the propositions of the exiled family, which were, that he should, on restoring them, be made Constable of France, and receive the principality of Corsica. Napoleon no sooner heard of it than he ordered the fascinating duchess to leave Paris in twenty-four hours, an order which gave great satisfaction to Josephine, who already had become somewhat uneasy at the proximity of so charming a personage. It had been proposed that a splendid pillar should be erected on the Place Carrousel, surmounted by a statue of Napoleon crowning the Bourbons. "Nothing was wanting," said Napoleon, "to such a design except that the pillar should be founded on the dead body of the First Consul."—*LAS CAS*, i., 289, 290, and *CAPEFIGUE*, i., 140.

against the efforts of a family returning with eighty thousand emigrants, and all the prejudices of fanaticism! What would become of the holders of national domains, and all those who had taken an active part in the Revolution? The Bourbons would conceive they had conquered by force; all their professions and promises would give way before the possession of power. My part is taken; no one but a fool would place any reliance upon them."*

Thus, on all sides, the prospects of France rapidly brightened under the auspices of Napoleon. To the insecurity, distrust, and terror which had paralyzed all the efforts of patriotism under the Directory, succeeded confidence, energy, and hope; genius emerged from obscurity to take an active part in public affairs; corruption and profligacy ceased to poison every branch of administration. There is nothing more striking in European history than the sudden resurrection of France under the government of this great man, or more descriptive of the natural tendency of human affairs to right themselves after a period of disorder, and the general disposition of all classes, when taught wisdom by suffering, to resume that place in society for which they were destined by nature, and in which alone their exertions can add to the sum of general felicity.

General improvement in the prospects of France.

* *Bour.*, iv., 72, 83. *Capefigue*, *Hist. de la Restauration*, i., 137, 141.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO

FROM THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE ARMISTICE OF ALEXANDRIA.

MARCH—JULY, 1800.

ARGUMENT.

Disposition of the French Armies at the Opening of the Campaign.—Formation of the French Army of Reserve.—Forces of the Imperialists.—Plan of the Austrians for the Campaign, and of the First Consul.—Position of Kray's Forces in Germany, and of Moreau's Troops.—First Movements of the French General.—Irresolution of the Austrian Generals in consequence.—Moreau advances against their Centre.—Battle of Engen.—Victory of the French.—Its great Results.—Retreat of Kray.—Battle of Moeskirch.—It at length terminates in the Defeat of the Imperialists.—Perilous Situation of St. Cyr on the following Day.—Affair of Biberach.—Kray retreats to the entrenched Camp at Ulm.—Advantages of that Position.—Kray keeps the Field with Part of his Force.—Great Strength of the entrenched Camp.—Measures of Moreau to dislodge him from it.—Vigorous Stroke of the Austrian General against the left Wing of the French.—Increasing Perplexity of Moreau.—He in vain moves round to Augsburg.—He next advances on the left Bank of the Danube.—Imminent Risk of the French Left.—At length Moreau cuts off his Communications.—The Passage of the Danube is effected by the French.—Severe Action at Hochstedt.—Kray is at length obliged to evacuate Ulm, and reaches Nördlingen.—Moreau occupies Munich.—Kray crosses the Danube, and descends the right Bank to Landshut, and falls back behind the Inn.—Operations against the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol.—Feldkirch is carried by the Republicans.—Armistice of Parsdorf in Germany.—Extreme Suffering of the French on the Summit of the Maritime Alps.—Massena is appointed to the Command.—Napoleon's Proclamation to these Troops.—Energetic Measures taken to restore Order.—Positions of the Austrians.—Description of Genoa.—Measures taken for its Blockade by Land and Sea.—Successful Attack of the Imperialists on the French Position.—Suchet is separated from the main Body, and driven back towards France.—Desperate and successful Sortie of Massena.—His Disposition for reopening his Communications with Suchet.—Austrian Measures to prevent it, which prove successful.—Continued Successes of the Imperialists.—Massena is finally driven into Genoa.—Defeat of Suchet by Elinitz, who is driven over the Var into France.—General Attack by Ott on the French Positions round Genoa; which, at first successful, is finally repulsed by Massena.—Successful Sally of the French; which leads to another, in which they are defeated, and Soult made Prisoner.—Siege is converted into a Blockade.—Extreme Want of the Inhabitants.—A fresh Sortie is defeated.—Agonies endured by the Inhabitants.—Massena at length surrenders.—Melas sets out to meet Napoleon.—Allies advance to Nice.—Description of Suchet's Position on the Var.—Attack by the Austrians on it, which is repulsed.—Fresh Attack, and final Repulse of them.—Formation of the Army of Reserve by Napoleon.—Skillful Measures taken to conceal its Strength.—Description of the Passage of the St. Bernard.—Napoleon resolves to hazard the Passage.—Measures taken for the Crossing of the Artillery.—Passage of the Mountains.—Comparison of the Passage of the Alps by Hannibal, Napoleon, Suwarrow, and Macdonald.—The Army is stopped in the Valley of Aosta by the Fort of Bard.—Great Skill with which the Obstacle was evaded by the French Engineers.—Passage of the St. Gothard and Mont Cenis by the Wings of the army of Reserve.—Melas in haste concentrates his Army.—Different Plans which lay open to Napoleon.—He resolves to occupy Milan.—His Advance into Lombardy, and Capture of that City.—He spreads his Forces over Lombardy, and addresses a Proclamation to his Soldiers.—Napoleon advances to meet Melas, who concentrates his Forces at Alexandria.—The French Vanguard comes up with the Austrians at Montebello.—Desperate and Bloody Action there, in which the Austrians are worsted.—Position of the French Army in the Pass at Stradella between the Apennines and the Po.—Disastrous Retreat of Elinitz from the Var.—Gallant Resolution of Melas to cut his Way through Napoleon's Headquarters.—Preparatory Movements of both Parties.—Forces assembled on both Sides.—Battle of

Marengo.—Early Success of the Austrians.—The French Reserves are brought into Action under Desaix.—After a gallant Charge, he too is defeated.—Decisive Charge of Kellerman converts a Rout into a Victory.—Final Defeat of the Austrians.—Loss sustained on both Sides.—Melas proposes a Suspension of Arms.—Armistice of Alexandria.—Its immense Results.—Is faithfully observed by the Austrians.—Napoleon returns to Milan, and then to Paris.—Reflections on this Campaign.—Great Changes in Human Affairs are never owing to trivial Causes.—Extraordinary Resurrection of France on the Accession of Napoleon.—Causes of the Disasters of the Campaign to the Imperialists.—Important Effect of central Fortifications in a State.—Merits of Napoleon in the Campaign, and of the Austrian Commanders.—Inexpedience of receiving Battle in the Oblique Order.—Inactivity of Abercromby's Corps at this Crisis considered.

THE French forces were disposed, previous to the commencement of hostilities, in the following manner: The army of Italy, which occupied the crest of the Alps from the neighbourhood of Genoa to Mont Cenis, was thirty-six thousand strong, of which twenty-eight thousand were assembled in Liguria, from the Trebbia to the Col di Tende, to guard the passes of the Apennines, and protect Genoa from the imperial forces, which were grouped in the plain round the walls of Alexandria. These troops, however, were, for the most part, in the most miserable condition; their spirits were depressed by a campaign of unprecedented disaster, their clothing was worn out, their feet bare, their artillery broken down, their cavalry dismounted, and it required all the efforts of St. Cyr and their other officers during the winter to retain them at their colours.*

The army of Germany, which was afterwards called the army of the Danube, was 128,000 strong, including 16,000 cavalry, of which immense force 103,000 men, including 14,000 horse, could be relied on for active operations. An army of reserve of 50,000 men was at the same time formed, the headquarters of which were nominally at Dijon, but the bulk of the force was in reality disposed at Geneva, Lausanne, and the other towns which lay between the Jura and the Alps. This reserve was destined either to support the army of Italy or that of Germany, as circumstances required, and it was formed of 20,000 veteran troops, brought from Holland, under Brune, to La Vendée, which the pacification of that district rendered disposable for offensive operations, and 30,000 conscripts, directed to that quarter from the central depôts. These troops traversed France, with drums beating and colours flying, in the finest order, and their splendid appearance contributed much to revive the martial ardour of the people, which the disasters of the preceding campaigns had so seriously impaired. Berthier

* Jom., xiii., 48. St. Cyr, Hist. Mil., ii., 84, 102.

received the command of this army, and gave up the portfolio of minister of war to Carnot, whom Napoleon sought out in exile to fill that important situation.*

On the other hand, the Imperialists had collected 96,000 men in Piedmont and at the foot of the Maritime Alps, besides 20,000 who were dispersed in garrisons in the states of Venice, Lombardy, and Tuscany. Their forces in Germany were still more considerable, amounting to 92,000 men, including 18,000 superb cavalry, and they were followed by above 400 pieces of artillery. This was independent of the troops of Bavaria and the minor states in the English pay, which amounted to 20,000 more, making in all 112,000 men. This great force, however, was scattered over an immense line, 200 miles long, from the Alps to the Maine, inasmuch that, in the valley of the Danube, which was the decisive point of the whole, as it at once led to the hereditary states, Kray could only assemble 45,000 men to resist the 75,000 which Moreau could direct against that point. The great error of the Austrians in this campaign consisted in supposing that Italy was the quarter where the decisive attack was to be made, and collecting, in consequence, the greater part of their reserves in that country; whereas the valley of the Danube was the place where danger was really to be apprehended, and where the principal forces of the Republicans were collected. But they were deceived by the great successes of the preceding campaign; they were ignorant or incredulous of the rapid change produced on the French armies by the seizure of supreme power by Napoleon; and were dreaming of conquests on the Var and in Provence, when their redoubtable adversary was already meditating strokes in the heart of Bavaria.†

The plan of the Austrians was to resume the offensive vigorously in Italy, where the great numerical superiority of Melas, as well as the warlike and experienced quality of the troops he commanded, promised the most important results; to throw Massena back into Genoa, and capture that important city; drive the French over the Maritime Alps, and carry the war into the heart of Provence. To co-operate with this design, an English expedition, having twelve thousand troops on board, was to proceed to the Mediterranean, and aid the Imperialists either in the south of France or the Maritime Alps. This being the quarter where active operations were to be undertaken, the war in Germany was intended to be merely defensive, and rather to occupy a considerable army of the enemy on the Rhine than to make any serious impression on his territories in that quarter.‡

On his side, Napoleon determined to prosecute the war vigorously where the Austrians proposed only to pursue defensive measures, and to liberate Italy by the blows struck at the hereditary states in the heart of Germany. The possession of Switzerland, like a central fortress, gave the French the advantage of being able to

take the line of the enemy's operations in rear, either in Italy or Swabia. Napoleon had intrusted the command of the army of Germany to Moreau: a generous proceeding towards so formidable a rival, but which his great military talents, and the unbounded confidence of the soldiers of the army of the Rhine in his capacity, as well as the important services which he had rendered to the First Consul on the 18th Brumaire, rendered indispensable. The plan which he proposed to his great lieutenant was to assemble all his forces in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, cross the Rhine by four bridges near that town, move directly in an imposing mass on Ulm, and thus turn the left of the Imperialists, and take in rear all the Austrians placed between the Rhine and the defiles of the Black Forest. By this means he hoped that the army, in a week after the opening of the campaign, would be at Ulm, and such of the Imperialists as escaped would have no alternative but to throw themselves into Bohemia, leaving Vienna and the hereditary states to their fate. That these brilliant anticipations were not chimerical is proved by the result of the campaigns of 1805 and 1809; and so strongly was Napoleon impressed with their importance, that he at one time entertained the project of putting himself at the head of the army of the Danube, and directing the army of reserve to its support, which would have brought a force of a hundred and eighty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian line in Germany. But Moreau would not submit to the indignity of acting as second in command to his former rival;* and the disposition of his troops was too Republican, and their attachment to their general too strong, to render it prudent to run the risk of revolt in so powerful an army, even for the sake of the greatest external advantages. An angry discussion took place between the two generals, which terminated in the retention of the supreme command by Moreau, and the adoption of a modified plan for the campaign in Germany, in lieu of the brilliant but hazardous one projected by the First Consul; and in consequence, Napoleon resolved to direct the army of reserve to Italy, and in person renew the struggle on the scene of his former triumphs on the plains of Piedmont.†

At this period the army of the Rhine was far from cordially supporting the government of the First Consul. Independent of the Republican principles with which, in common with all the other French troops, they were more or less imbued, they were in a peculiar manner jealous of the audacious general who had placed himself at the head of affairs, and seized the sceptre which they thought would have been more worthily held by his more disinterested rival. Any attempt to displace Moreau from the command of this great army would probably have led to a collision, which might have proved fatal to the infant authority of Napoleon.‡

Field-marshal Kray had his headquarters at

* He said, "I have no notion of seeing a little Louis XIV. at the head of my army. If the First Consul takes the command, I will send in my resignation."—*St. Cyr*, ii., 103, *Hist. Mil.*

† *Nap.*, i., 163, 164. *St. Cyr*, ii., 103, 104. *Jom.*, xiii., 50, 57. *Dum.*, iii., 84, 85. *Bul. Feldzug, Marengo*, 17, 18.

‡ *St. Cyr*, ii., 102. *Dum.*, iii., 84, 85, 86.

* *Jom.*, xiii., 111. *Dum.*, iii., 25, 27. *St. Cyr*, i., 102.

† *Arch. Ch.*, ii., 334. *Nap.*, i., 158, 161. *Jom.*, xiii., 52, 113. *St. Cyr*, ii., 108, 137.

‡ *Nap.*, i., 162. *Jom.*, xiii., 41, 42.

Position of Kray's forces in Germany. Donauschingen, but his chief magazines were in the rear of his army, at Stockach, Engen, Moeskirch, and Eiberach. The right wing, twenty-six thousand strong, under the command of Starray, rested on the Maine; its headquarters were at Heidelberg, and it guarded the line of the Rhine from the Renchen to the Maine. The left, under the orders of the Prince of Reuss, was in the Tyrol; it consisted of twenty-six thousand men, besides seven thousand militia, and occupied the Rheintal and the shores of the Lake of Constance. The centre, forty-three thousand strong, under the command of Kray in person, was stationed behind the Black Forest, in the environs of Villingen and Donauschingen; its advanced posts occupied all the passes of that woody range, and observed the course of the Rhine from the Lake of Constance to the neighbourhood of Kehl; while fifteen thousand men, under Keimayer, guarded the passes from the Renchen to the Valley of Hell, and formed the link which connected the centre and right wing.* Thus, though the Imperialists were nearly one hundred and ten thousand strong, they were stationed at such a distance from each other as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid in case of need, and were rather to be regarded as three separate armies, the largest of which could not bring above forty thousand men into the field at any one point.

The French army, at the opening of the campaign, was also divided into three corps. The right, thirty-two thousand strong, under Lecourbe, occupied the cantons of Switzerland from the St. Gothard to Bâle, won at the expense of so much blood in the preceding campaign from the Imperialists; the centre, under Gouvion St. Cyr, who was transferred to that command from the army of Genoa, consisted of twenty-nine thousand men, and occupied the left bank of the Rhine from New Brisach to Plobsheim; the left, under Saint Suzanne, twenty-one thousand strong, extended from Kehl to Hagenau. Independent of these, Moreau himself was at the head of a reserve, consisting of twenty-eight thousand men, which was assembled in the neighbourhood of Bâle, and which, if added to either of the divisions of the army, would give it a decided preponderance over that of the enemy to which it was opposed. Thus Moreau could, by uniting the reserve and centre, bring nearly sixty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian force of forty thousand in the same quarter: an immense advantage, which was speedily turned to the best account by that able commander. Besides these great forces, the French general had at his disposal the garrisons of the fortresses of Switzerland, Landau, and Spire; the division of Mayence, commanded by Laval, and the troops of the fifth and twenty-sixth military divisions, forming an aggregate of thirty-two thousand men additional, which might be termed the reserves of the army; while the possession of the bridges of Kehl, New Brisach,† and Bâle, gave him the means of crossing the Rhine whenever he deemed it most advisable.

It was part of the plan of Napoleon to detach

sixteen thousand men under Moreau, from Lecourbe's wing stationed in Switzerland, in order to take a share in the great operations which he meditated in the Italian plains; and therefore it was of importance that Moreau should early resume the offensive, both in order to take advantage of his numerical superiority before that detachment took place, and operate as a diversion to the army of Italy, which it was foreseen would soon be hard pressed by Melas in the mountains of Genoa. Orders, therefore, were transmitted to him to open the campaign without delay, and everything was ready for a forward movement by the 24th of April. The plan finally arranged between Moreau and the First Consul was, to make a feint on the left against the corps of Keimayer and the enemy's right; and, having thus drawn their attention to that quarter, accumulate all his disposable forces against the imperial centre, and overwhelm it by a concentration of the French left wing, centre, and reserve. By this means he hoped to break through the Austrian line of defence with a preponderating force, and, after a single battle, cut off their communication with the Tyrol and Italy, and force them back, after losing their magazines at Moeskirch and Engen, to a disadvantageous defensive on the banks of the Danube.*

The better to conceal this able design, Moreau, for some days before the army was put in motion, made the greatest demonstrations against the enemy's right. Everything was prepared for the headquarters at Colmar, and it was publicly announced that the reserve was to be directed against Keimayer and the Valley of Hell. Meanwhile, the columns moved to the different points assigned to them, and on the 25th, at daybreak, Sainte Suzanne April 25. crossed the bridge of Kehl, at the head of sixteen thousand men, and drove in the advanced posts of Keimayer towards the entrance of the Black Forest. On the same day, the centre crossed at New Brisach, under the orders of St. Cyr, and advanced towards Freyburg. Kray, upon this, moved a considerable part of his centre and reserves to the support of Keimayer; but Sainte Suzanne having thus April 27. executed his feint, suddenly remeasured his steps, recrossed the Rhine at Kehl, and advanced by forced marches to New Brisach, where he crossed again, and formed a second line in the rear of St. Cyr. On the 25th Moreau also crossed at Bâle with the reserve, and moved in the direction of Lauffenburg.†

These different and apparently contradictory movements threw the Austrian generals into the greatest perplexity. Uncertain where the storm was likely really to burst, they adopted the ruinous resolution of guarding equally every point; and still inclining to the belief that the right and the Valley of Hell were really threatened, they retained thirty thousand men, under Starray and Keimayer, on the right, and twenty-five thousand on the left, in the rocks of the Voralberg, while their centre and reserve, now reduced to forty thou-

First movements of the French general.

Irresolution of the Austrian generals in consequence.

* St. Cyr, ii., 107, 108. Jom., xiii., 112, 113. Nap., i., 361, 162. † Jom., xiii., 110, 111. St. Cyr, ii., 109-110.

* Nap., i., 165. Jom., xiii., 116, 117. Dum., iii., 93, 94.

† St. Cyr, ii., 120, 129. Dum., iii., 94, 99. Jom., xiii., 120, 125.

sand men, were menaced by an attack by Sainte Suzanne, Moreau, and St. Cyr, at the head of seventy thousand combatants. The two following days were employed in concentrating his forces between Kehl and Freyburg; and the better to distract the enemy, Lecourbe soon after crossed the Rhine with the right wing, at Paradis and Richlingen, and, after throwing a bridge over at Stein, advanced towards Engen and Stockach. On the same day, the inaccessible fort of Hohenstohel capitulated without firing a shot, and the left of Lecourbe entered into

May 1. communication with Moreau and St. Cyr. Thus the whole French army, with the exception of two divisions of the left wing, which observed Keinmayer and Starray, were converging towards the imperial magazines at Engen and Moeskirch, which it was evident could not be saved but by a battle fought against most unequal odds.*

Ably profiting by the great advantages already gained, Moreau directed Lecourbe to move towards Stockach, in order to turn the centre of the enemy, and cut off their communication with the left wing under the Prince of Reuss, while he himself, with the centre, reserve, and part of Sainte Suzanne's corps, moved directly upon the town of Engen, which it was anticipated would

May 2. not be abandoned without a struggle, on account of the valuable magazines which it contained. Kray, on his part, assembled all the disposable force he could command in front of Engen, where he resolved to give battle, to gain time for the evacuation of his magazines upon Moeskirch. But while he was concentrating his forces in that central position, the Prince of Lorraine, who formed the communication between the Austrian centre and left wing, and was retiring with inferior forces before Lecourbe, was suddenly assailed by the French advanced guard under Molitor, and the cavalry of Nansouty, and entirely routed. Three thousand prisoners and eight pieces of cannon were the immediate results of this brilliant affair;† but it became still more important by the capture of Stockach, with all its magazines, directly in rear of the position of Kray in front of Engen.

On the same day on which this important success was gained on the right, the French centre, under Moreau in person, encountered the Austrian main body in the vast plain which lies before that town. Kray, with forty thousand men, was there in position, and the cavalry, above nine thousand strong, presented the most imposing spectacle, drawn up in echelon in front of the town. His design was to attack in front himself, at the head of the reserve and part of the centre, while St. Cyr, with his division, was directed to turn the left of the enemy. But that general, being five leagues in the rear, could not come up until a late hour of the day; and Moreau, apprehensive lest, if the attack were delayed, the enemy would retreat, commenced the action himself at the head of thirty-two

thousand men. The chief efforts of the French general were directed to gain possession of a plateau on the right of the Imperialists, which would both command their line of retreat and facilitate his own junction with St. Cyr; but he encountered the most stubborn resistance. Kray had skilfully availed himself of all the advantages which the ground afforded him in that quarter, and for long all the efforts of the Republicans were unable to drive back their opponents from the vineyards and wooded heights, which they had occupied in force, and surmounted with a numerous artillery. At length the French carried the peak of Hohenhowen, the most elevated point on the field of battle, and the Imperialists retired to the village of Ehingen. To restore the combat, the Austrian general strongly re-enforced that important post, while Moreau brought up his reserve to expel the enemy from it. At first the Republicans were successful, and the village was carried; but Kray having charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers, they were driven out with great slaughter, and fled to the plain in the greatest confusion. Moreau, instantly advancing to the spot, succeeded in restoring a certain degree of order, and in part regained the ground which had been lost; but the Hungarians continued to hold the village, and at nightfall all the avenues to it were still in their possession.*

Meanwhile the division of Richepanse, which had established itself on the peak of Hohenhowen, was exposed to a furious attack from the Austrian right; the summit of the mountain resembled a volcano, which vomited forth fire in every direction; and it was easy to see, from the intensity of the light, which, as the twilight approached, illuminated the heavens in that direction, that it was only by the greatest efforts that he could maintain his ground. At seven o'clock, however, the vanguard of the corps of St. Cyr, which had met with the greatest difficulties in the course of its march, and had been compelled to fight its way against Nauendorf's division through strong defiles, arrived in the field, and soon after began to take a part in the action. The combat now became more equal, and though the fire of artillery on both sides continued extremely violent, it was evident that the enemy fought only to gain time to withdraw his stores and ammunition. In fact, at this hour the Austrian general received intelligence of the defeat of the Prince of Lorraine and the capture of Stockach, which threatened his line of communications.† He therefore drew off his forces in the direction of Liptingen and Moeskirch, where he formed a junction with that prince, who had retreated with the remains of his division in the same direction.

The loss of the Austrians in this battle was above seven thousand men, and that of the French was as great, but the moral consequences of the success with which it terminated to the Republicans were incalculable. It at once raised the spirit of the army, and produced that confidence in themselves

* Nap., i., 166. Jom., xiii., 125, 129. Dum., iii., 98, 101. St. Cyr, ii., 131, 137.

† Nap., i., 167. Jom., xiii., 132, 133. Dum., iii., 107, 109. St. Cyr, ii., 157, 158.

* Dum., iii., 110, 114. Jom., xiii., 134, 139. St. Cyr, ii., 156, 161.

† Dum., iii., 114, 116. Jom., xiii., 139, 141. St. Cyr, ii., 158, 179.

which is the surest prelude to still greater success. Kray, finding that the intentions of the enemy were now fully proclaimed, and that he had on his hands the whole strength of the French army, made the utmost efforts, when too late, to concentrate his forces. Keimnayer was advancing with the greatest expedition by the Valley of Hell, while Staray had received orders to hasten to the decisive point, leaving only six thousand in the neighbourhood of Mannheim to observe the enemy's forces in that quarter. Moreau having received intelligence of this intended concentration of force, resolved to make the most of his present advantages, and attack the Austrians before they received any further re-enforcements. On the 4th of Kray, the Imperialists retired to a strong position in front of Moeskirch; the whole front of their line was covered by a great ravine, which descends from Hendorf to Moeskirch, and its left by the Ablach, a rocky stream which flows in a rapid course into the Danube; the cavalry, and a reserve of eight battalions of grenadiers, were stationed on the heights of Rohrdorf. Powerful batteries commanded the chaussée which approached the village, and by their concentric fire seemed to render all access impossible. In this formidable position were collected forty thousand foot soldiers and twelve thousand splendid cavalry, besides above two hundred pieces of cannon.*

Though Moreau had ordered Lecourbe to join him with all his disposable force, in order to take a part in the general action which was approaching, yet he had not contrived matters so as to bring all his forces into the field at the same time. The consequence was, that Lecourbe, with that portion of his corps which had not taken a part in the action of the preceding day, first commenced the attack. He advanced with the greatest intrepidity to the assault of his old antagonist, the Prince of Lorraine; but he was received by so tremendous a fire from the cross batteries which Kray had established on the heights, that his artillery was instantly dismounted, and he himself compelled to take refuge in the neighbouring woods, to avoid the merciless storm. Moreau, upon this, brought forward the division Lorges, and attacked the position by its left and the village of Hendorf; but the attacking columns having been assailed by the enemy's masses, who suddenly debouched from behind their batteries, were thrown into confusion and entirely routed. Encouraged by this success, Kray made a sally with his right wing, and advanced into the plain; but it was received in so resolute a manner by the French left, that he was not only compelled to retire, but the victorious Republicans recovered all the ground they had lost, and the village was carried by their pursuing columns, who entered pell-mell with the fugitives. At the same time, Vandamme, with the Republican right, advanced against the imperial left, and attacked the village of Moeskirch; the Austrians defended it with the utmost resolution, and it was taken and retaken several times: at length Lecourbe formed his division into four columns, which advanced simultaneously to the attack. Nothing could resist their impetuosity; they rush-

ed down the sides of the ravines, up the opposite banks, and chased the Imperialists from the plateau, while Molitor drove them out of Moeskirch, and their victorious columns met in the centre of the town.*

Kray, seeing his left forced, skilfully executed a change of position in the very middle of the battle. He drew back his left from the plateau which had been so obstinately disputed, and took up a position parallel to the Danube, with his centre still resting on the plateau of Rohrdorf. This new position brought him on the flank of the division of Lorges, who was unsupported on that side. Kray instantly saw his advantage, and charged the exposed division, which was overthrown, and driven back in such confusion that nothing but the opportune arrival of Delmas with six fresh battalions prevented the French line being entirely broken through at that point. Both parties now made the utmost efforts; the Austrians to improve the advantage they had gained, the French to re-establish their line. Moreau executed a change of front, arranging his army parallel to that of the enemy, and during the progress of this new formation, the French division Delmas was furiously assailed, but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unable to break his admirable infantry. Still, however, Kray redoubled his efforts, and charged himself, at the head of his reserve, against the division of Bastoul; Moreau also brought up re-enforcements, and the combat continued for two hours with various success, till at length the arrival of Richepanse with a fresh division induced the Austrian general to retire, which was done before nightfall, in the best order, to the heights of Bucherni and Rohrdorf.†

In this action, so obstinately contested on both sides, the loss to the contending parties was nearly equal, amounting in each to about six thousand men. The Austrians retained at the close of the day the plateau of Rohrdorf; the French slept on great part of the field of battle. But all the moral advantages of a victory were on their side; and as, on the following day, the Imperialists retired across the Danube, they in reality achieved the object for which they contended. The success was balanced chiefly in consequence of the non-arrival of St. Cyr with his division, who lingered at Liptingen: had he come up and taken part in the action, it would probably have terminated in a total defeat, the more disastrous to the Imperialists that they fought with their backs to the Danube. The cause of this inactivity in so able an officer is to be found in the nature of the first instructions he had received from Moreau, and the intercepting of the couriers who conveyed the second orders to hasten to the decisive point.‡

Following out the only orders he had received, St. Cyr, on the succeeding day, was leisurely moving parallel to the Danube, between that river and the Austrian army, when he

* *Jom.*, xiii., 146, 150. *Dum.*, iii., 126, 130. *St. Cyr*, ii., 190, 194.

† *St. Cyr*, ii., 195, 197. *Dum.*, iii., 129, 131. *Jom.*, xiii., 150, 155.

‡ *Memorial du Depoldi la Guerre*, v., 92. *St. Cyr*, ii., 199, 201. *Dum.*, iii., 129, 131; *Jom.*, xiii., 154, 156.

* *Jom.*, xiii., 144, 145. *Dum.*, iii., 124, 125.

came unawares upon their whole force, drawn up in a small but strong position in front of the bridge of Sigmaringen. The ground they occupied would barely have sufficed for the deploying of a single division, being formed by a bend of the Danube, the base of which, fronting the enemy, was covered by a formidable array of artillery, behind which the army was posted in seven lines, almost forming a close column, and protecting in this manner the passage of their stores over the river. Upon the approach of the French, the surprise was equal on both sides: Kray, much alarmed, and apprehending an immediate attack, drew up his rear-guard in battle-array, and disposed the artillery which had crossed, as well as that which remained in their front, in such a manner as to enfilade all the roads by which the position might

May 6. be approached. St. Cyr also paused; with the half of his division, which alone had come up, he did not venture to attack the whole Austrian army, but he insulted them by a battery of twelve pieces, which was pushed forward within cannon shot, and so weakened was the spirit of the Imperialists that they replied to this fire only by a discharge from their numerous batteries, instead of issuing from their lines and sweeping the pieces off by a charge of their powerful cavalry. There can be little doubt that, if Moreau, instead of lingering at Moeskirch on the field of battle, had followed the traces of the enemy, joined St. Cyr, and attacked them when backed by the Danube in this extraordinary position, he would have succeeded in destroying a large part of their army; but that general, with all his great qualities, had not the vigour in following up a success which formed the leading characteristic of his more enterprising rival.*

At Sigmaringen the Austrian general was joined by Keimayer with his whole division, and with this augmented force he recrossed the Danube and moved towards Biberach. He had resolved to retire to the shelter of the intrenched camp at Ulm; but his object in this movement was to cover the evacuation of the great magazines at Biberach upon that place. Thither he was fol-

May 9. lowed by the French army, and on the morning of the 9th of May their advanced posts found eighteen thousand Austrians posted at the entrance of the remarkable defile which leads to that town. This rear-guard was posted for the most part on a series of formidable heights behind Biberach, which could be approached only by passing through that town, and afterward traversing a road which ran through a morass. An advanced guard, consisting of ten battalions and as many squadrons, with eight pieces of cannon, was placed in front of Biberach, at the entrance of the defile: this position, apparently so hazardous, was necessary to cover the evacuation of the great magazines which that town contained, preparatory to the concentration of the whole army in the intrenched camp of Ulm. This advanced guard was attacked by St. Cyr with such superior forces that they were speedily routed, and driven in the utmost disorder across the morass. Biberach was so rapidly carried that the Austrians had not time to destroy their magazines,

which fell, in great part, entire into the hands of the victors. Transported with ardour, the French dragoons and light troops traversed the town and crossed the defile on the other side, notwithstanding a heavy and concentrated fire from the Austrian batteries: such was the intimidation produced by their audacity, that the Imperialists fired by platoons upon the light troops, as they would have done upon a regular line, instead of combating them with the same species of force. In this affair Kray lost fifteen hundred prisoners, besides Kray retreats to a thousand killed and wounded, the intrenched and five pieces of cannon; but he camp at Ulm. gained time by it for the evacuation of his magazines at Memmingen, which were transported in safety to the intrenched camp at Ulm.* There his army was all collected in two days afterward; eighty thousand infantry and twelve thousand horse were assembled; and after a campaign of unexampled activity, though only fifteen days' duration, the Republicans found their victorious columns on the banks of the Danube.

In retiring to Ulm, Kray separated himself from his left wing, twenty-five thousand strong, in the Tyrol, and the Great advance of that detached corps on the Maine; but position. the advantages of that central position were such as amply to counterbalance these circumstances. The intrenched camp, occupying both banks of the Danube and the heights of St. Michel, and connected with the fortress, was of the most formidable description. The town and *tête-du-pont* on the river were armed with a hundred and forty pieces of heavy cannon; the redoubts of the camp were complete, and lined with a proportional quantity of artillery; and not only were the magazines in the place most ample, but the extent of the works rendered all idea of a regular blockade out of the question. By remaining in this defensive position, the Austrian general not only preserved entire his own communications and line of retreat by Donawert and Ratisbon, but threatened those of his adversary, who, if he attempted to pass either on the north or south, exposed himself to the attack of a powerful army in flank. Securely posted in this central point, the Imperialists daily received accessions of strength from Bohemia and the hereditary states; while the French, weakened by the detachments necessary to preserve their communications, and observe the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol, soon began to lose that superiority which, by the skilful concentration of their force, they had hitherto enjoyed in the campaign.†

The difficulty of dislodging the Imperialists from this formidable position was much augmented by the necessity to which Moreau at this period was subjected, of detaching nearly twenty thousand men, under Moncey, to cross the Alps by the St. Gothard, and take a share in the projected operations of the First Consul in Italy. This great detachment restored the balance between the contending parties, and the spirit of the Austrians, at the same time, was so much revived by the sight of their vast

* St. Cyr, ii., 222, 228. Jom., xiii., 164, 169. Dum., iii., 138, 142. Nap., i., 171.

† Nap., i., 171, 172. Jom., xiii., 310, 313. Dum., iii., 145, 146. St. Cyr, ii., 234, 235.

* Nap., i., 169, 170. Dum., iii., 131. St. Cyr, ii., 203, 205.

forces within the intrenched camp, and the great resources which they found in the place, that Kray no longer hesitated to keep the field, and detached the corps of Starray and Keimayer, which had suffered least in the preceding operations, to the left bank of the Danube and the confluence of the Iller. Moreau accordingly found himself extremely embarrassed, and six weeks were employed in the vain attempt to dislodge a defeated army from this stronghold: a striking proof of the prophetic wisdom of the Archduke Charles in its formation, and the importance of central fortifications in arresting the progress of an invading enemy.*

As the efforts of Austria and Russia during the seven years' war were shattered against the intrenched camp of Frederic at Burtzelwitz, so this important position seemed to be the *ne plus ultra* of the Republican operations in this campaign. It was hopeless to attempt to conquer so strong a position by main force, and it was no easy matter to see by what movement the Austrian general could be compelled to abandon it. For Moreau to pass on, leaving eighty thousand men, supported by impregnable fortifications, in his rear, was impossible, as it would immediately have led to the intercepting his communications with France, while to attempt the passage of the Danube in presence of such a force, would have been in the highest degree perilous. The Austrians soon reaped the benefits of this admirably chosen stronghold; † the soldiers, lodged in excellent quarters, rapidly recovered their strength; while the *morale* of the army, which had been extremely weakened by the rapid disasters of the campaign, as quickly rose when they perceived that a stop was at length put to the progress of the enemy.

With a view to dislodge Kray, Moreau advanced with the right in front; headquarters passed the Gunz on the right bank of the Danube, St. Cyr followed with his division in echelon, while Sainte Suzanne received orders to approach Ulm on the left bank. The Republicans were masters of no bridge over the river, so that Sainte Suzanne, with his single corps, was exposed to the attack of the whole Austrian army. Finding that the distance of Moreau with the centre and right wing precluded him from giving any effectual support to his left, Kray resolved to direct all his disposable forces against that general. On the

16th, the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the splendid imperial cavalry, followed by several columns of infantry, suddenly assailed this detached corps near Erbach. The attack was so impetuous, and the surprise so complete, that the Republicans were speedily routed, and the Austrians, pressing forward with great vigour, not only drove them back in disorder above two leagues, but interposed their victorious columns between their flying divisions. Nothing but the intrepidity and presence of mind of the French generals preserved their left wing from total destruction. But while Sainte Suzanne did his utmost to

Vigorous stroke of the Austrian general against the left wing of the French.

retard the advance of the enemy, St. Cyr, alarmed by the violence and receding sound of the cannonade, which distinctly showed how much the left wing was losing ground, halted his corps, and moved it towards the scene of danger; at the same time rapidly bringing up his artillery, he placed it in batteries on the right bank of the Danube in such a manner as to enfilade the road by which the Archduke Ferdinand had issued from Ulm. Alarmed at this apparition on his left, which he feared was preparatory to a passage of the river by the French centre, the archduke drew back his victorious columns to the intrenched camp, and an action was terminated, in which, if properly supported, the Imperialists might have achieved the destruction of the whole Republican left wing, and possibly changed the issue of the campaign.*

Confounded by this vigorous stroke on his left, and made sensible, by his firm countenance, that the enemy was resolved to risk a battle rather than hazard the important position of Ulm, Moreau was thrown into a cruel perplexity. For several days he remained in a state of indecision, merely directing Sainte Suzanne to cross the Danube to the support of St. Cyr, so that of the eleven divisions of which his army was composed, six were on the right bank and five on the left. At length he resolved to resume his operations on the right bank, and after moving St. Cyr again across the river, advanced with his centre and right, followed by Sainte Suzanne with the left, along the right bank towards Bavaria. Kray, upon this, made a sortie with ten thousand men on the moving mass; he attacked Souham's division with great vigour, but after an obstinate conflict the Imperialists retired

Increasing perplexity of Moreau. He in vain moves round to Augsburg.

to Ulm, after inflicting a severe loss on the enemy. Meanwhile, Moreau continued his advance towards Bavaria, and on the 28th occupied Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Austrian army, on the high road between them and Munich. The intelligence of this event, however, had no effect in inducing the imperial general to quit his stronghold; on the contrary, wisely judging that the advance of Moreau was only to excite alarm or levy contributions, he wrote to the Aulic Council that Moreau would never advance into the hereditary states, leaving his great army in his rear, and that he would merely push forward his parties in all directions to disquiet the enemy in his advance, and intercept his communications. His firmness was completely successful; the French general did not venture to advance farther into Germany as long as the enemy remained in such force in his rear, while the lengthened stay of such immense masses in one quarter speedily rendered provisions scarce in the French army, and induced such disorders as rendered several severe examples, and a new organization of great part of their army, necessary.†

Finding that Kray had penetrated his design, and remained firm at Ulm, in such a position as to endanger his communications if he con-

* St. Cyr, ii., 245, 251. Jom., xiii., 315, 317. Nap., i., 173, 174. Dum., iv., 16, 18.

† Dum., iv., 31, 36. Jom., xiii., 319, 320. St. Cyr, ii., 258, 290. Nap., i., 174, 175.

* Jom., xiii., 312. St. Cyr, ii., 235, 236. Nap., i., 172.

† Jom., xiii., 314. Dum., iv., 12, 13. St. Cyr, ii., 241.

He next advances on the left bank of the Danube.

He continued his present advance, Moreau conceived a new and more decisive project, which was, to pass the Danube below Ulm, and cut the

Austrian army off from its great magazines in Bohemia. With this view, the advanced guard, which had occupied Augsburg, and levied a contribution of 600,000 florins (£60,000) on that flourishing city, was withdrawn, and the army was preparing to follow in this direction, when their movement was interrupted by a sudden

June 4. irruption of the Austrians on the right bank. In effect, Kray, perceiving his adversary's design, collected thirty thousand men in the intrenched camp, with which, during the night, he crossed the bridge of Ulm, and assailed, at break of day, the flank of the French army. The tempest fell on the left wing, under the orders of Richepanse; it was speedily enveloped by superior forces, broken, and placed in a state of the greatest danger. From this almost desperate condition, the Republicans were rescued by a seasonable and able attack by Ney, who, having received orders to support the menaced corps, flew to the scene of danger, and advanced with such vigour against their vanguard, posted on the plateau of Kerchberg, that it was defeated with the loss of a thousand prisoners. Imboldened by this success, Richepanse halted his retiring columns, faced about, and renewed the combat with Kray, who, finding superior forces of the enemy now accumulating, withdrew to his intrenchments. Never did the French army incur greater danger; the Austrians, in half an hour, would have gained the bridge over the Iller, cut through the middle of the Republicans, and possibly, by opening a communication with the Prince of Reuss in the mountains of Tyrol, retrieved all the disasters of the campaign.*

Heavy rains which fell at this time precluded the possibility of active operations for nearly a week to come; but Moreau, encouraged by this last success, was still intent on prosecuting his movement

June 12. At length Moreau cuts off his communications.

upon the Lower Danube. With this view, he spread his troops along the whole line of the Upper Lech; Lecourbe made himself master of Landeberg, and, continuing his march down the course of that river, entered a second time into Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Imperialists. At the same time, the centre and left descended the Kamlach and Gunz towards Krumbach, thus accumulating almost all the Republican army between the Austrians and Bavaria. Threatened by such superior forces, Starrray, who commanded the detached corps of the Austrians in that quarter, was obliged to cross to the left bank of the Danube. This able movement re-established the Republican affairs in that quarter; Kray, in his turn, now saw his connexions with the interior threatened, and himself reduced to the necessity of either abandoning his intrenchments, or making an effort with his whole disposable force to re-establish his communications.†

Finding his adversary still immovably fixed

at Ulm, Moreau, after having concentrated his forces on the southern bank of the Danube, between Gunzburg and Donawerth, resolved to attempt the passage by main force. Far from penetrating his design, Starrray, who commanded the imperial forces on the opposite bank, sent all his troops, except eight battalions and a few squadrons, towards Ulm, where Kray lay inactive, neither attempting anything against the French under Richepanse, between him and the Tyrol, nor taking any steps to secure his last and most important communications. Moreau ably profited by the supineness of his antagonist. After several unsuccessful attempts, which distracted the enemy's attention, the passage was effected on the 19th at Blindheim, with that romantic gallantry which so often, in similar situations, has characterized the French arms. The Austrians immediately hastened from all quarters to crush the enemy, before he was firmly established on the left bank; but Lecourbe, pushing on to Schwinnigen, which lay between their detachments, prevented their junction; and, after a murderous conflict, not only succeeded in maintaining his position, but made prisoners three battalions of the enemy.*

Both parties now hastened with all their disposable forces to the scene of action. Lecourbe speedily crossed over the remainder of his corps to the left bank, and advanced with fifteen thousand men to Hochstedt, while Kray detached the greater part of his cavalry and light artillery to the support of Starrray. The Austrian general, not finding himself in sufficient strength to resist the increasing masses of the enemy, retired to Dillingen, severely harassed by the French cavalry, which made above a thousand men prisoners. Kray advanced two thousand cuirassiers to extricate his infantry, and a desperate *mêlée* took place between the Republican and imperial cavalry, in which the Austrian horse maintained their high character, but could not bear up against the great superiority of the enemy. After a bloody conflict, in the course of which Moreau and Lecourbe repeatedly charged in person, the Imperialists retired behind the Brentz, leaving the enemy securely established on the left bank of the Danube.† Thus the Republican cavalry gained a glorious success on the very plains where, a century before, the presumption of Marshal Tallard had endangered the crown of Louis XIV., and brought an unheard-of disaster on the French arms.

The consequences of this victory were decisive. Twenty pieces of cannon and four thousand prisoners had been made in these continued combats; but what was of far more importance, Kray was cut off from his resources in Bohemia, and obliged to evacuate the intrenched camp of Ulm. Compelled to abandon that important position, he left a garrison of ten thousand men within its walls, and having stationed his cavalry on the Brentz, so as to cover his movement, and despatched his grand park, consisting of one hundred and sixty pieces and eight hundred cais-

The passage of the Danube is effected by the French June 19.

Severe action at Hochstedt.

Kray is at length compelled to abandon Ulm, and reaches Nordlingen. June 19.

* Jom., xiii., 326, 328. Dum., iv., 36, 37. Nap., i., 174, 175.

† Jom., xiii., 334, 335. Dum., iv., 40, 44. Nap., i., 176.

* Jom., xiii., 334, 338. Dum., iv., 44, 51. Nap., i., 178.

† Dum., iv., 51, 55. Jom., xiii., 338, 341. Nap., i., 178.

sons, on the road to Neresheim and Nordlingen, he himself followed, with the remainder of his army in three divisions, and after undergoing unparalleled fatigues and privations, during a continued forced march of four days, arrived on the 23d, late in the evening, at Nordlingen. This march of the Austrians, in a semicircle, of which the Republicans occupied the base, was performed with the greatest expedition, chiefly during the night, and a degree of military talent, which rescued them from their embarrassments, and reflects the highest honour on the capacity and determination of their commander. The opposing generals seemed to have changed places during the eventful period from the 14th to the 23d of June. The supineness of the Austrian commander during the first four days, when the able Republican movement was in preparation, exposed him to the greatest dangers, from which he was afterward extricated, not less by his own ability, when roused to a sense of the perils which surrounded him, than the tardiness and irresolution which deprived the French general of its fruits at the very moment when they were within his grasp. Had Moreau, with his victorious and concentrated army, fallen perpendicularly on the flank of the Imperialists, when performing their perilous movement to regain their communications, the vanguard would probably have been separated from the rear, great part of the park taken, and the triumph of Hohenlinden been contemporary with that of Marengo.*

During the last day's march, before arriving at Nordlingen, the imperial cavalry were severely pressed by the French, and the exhaustion of the troops was such, that the Austrian general deemed it indispensable to give them a day's rest to recover from their fatigues. Moreau, finding that the enemy had gained several marches upon him, and that he could not hope to force him to a general engagement, resolved to change his direction, and by occupying Munich, and laying Bavaria under contribution, both separate Kray irremediably from his left wing, under the Prince of Reuss, in the Tyrol, and secure for himself all the consequences of the most brilliant victory. For this purpose he detached General Decaen, with ten thousand men, who set out on the 25th from Dillingen, marched in the three following days forty leagues, and after defeating the troops of Meerfelt, stationed to protect the electoral capital, entered Munich on the 28th. The elector, taken by surprise, had hardly time to take refuge with his family behind the Iser, under the escort of the Austrian troops. At the same time, Richepanse, with his corps, invested Ulm on both sides of the Danube, and Kray leisurely continued his retreat towards the upper palatinate, abandoning the whole of Swabia and Franconia to the enemy.†

Montrichard, with the Republican vanguard, came up with the imperial rearguard, posted in front of Neuberg. Carried away by an impetuous courage, he immediately commenced an attack; but Kray, who was at

hand with twenty-five thousand men, made him repent his temerity, and, suddenly assailing the French with greatly superior forces, threw them into disorder, and drove them back above two leagues in the utmost confusion. The approach of night, and the arrival of Lecourbe with great re-enforcements, induced him to draw off his victorious troops after this success; and, finding that he could not establish himself on the Lech before the enemy, he continued his march during the night, reached Ingolstadt, repassed the Danube, and, descending the right bank of that river, advanced towards Landshut. In this engagement the Republicans had to lament the loss of the brave Latour d'Auvergne, deemed the first grenadier of France. A model of every warlike virtue, this soldier, though a captain by rank, had taken a musket on his shoulder as a private grenadier. He perished from the stroke of a lance, while repulsing in the front rank a charge of imperial cavalry. Such was the esteem in which he was held, that the whole army wore mourning for him for three days, and a monument was erected on the spot where he fell, which, according to the noble expression of General Dessoles in his order of the day on the occasion, "consecrated to virtue and courage, was put under the protection of the brave of every age and country." It was not in vain that this touching appeal was made to German honour. The Archduke Charles, at a subsequent period, when the fortune of war had restored the country where it stood to the power of the Imperialists, took it under his especial protection. It survived all the disasters which overwhelmed the throne of Napoleon, and still remains, in the midst of a foreign land, a monument honourable alike to the French who erected, and the Imperialists who protected it.*

Notwithstanding all his diligence, Kray could not reach Munich before the French; and he had the mortification, on reaching the neighbourhood of that city, of finding that it was already in the hands of the enemy, and that his communication with his left wing in the Tyrol was irrecoverably cut off. Continuing his retreat, therefore, he left the banks of the Iser for those of the Inn, and arrived in five marches by Warthenberg, Hohenlinden, and Haag, at the camp of Amfing. He was there joined by the corps of Meerfelt, which had retired from Munich; the corps of the Prince of Condé received orders to advance to his support from Salzburg, and, as he approached the hereditary states, the imperial general began to receive those re-enforcements which the patriotism of their inhabitants never fails to afford to the monarchy when seriously menaced with danger.†

Both parties, at this period, received intelligence of the battle of Marengo and armistice of Alexandria, which shall immediately be noticed; and, not doubting that it would speedily be followed by a suspension of arms in Germany as well as Italy, Moreau resolved to take advantage of the

July 1. Kray crosses the Danube, and descends the right bank to Landshut.

And falls back behind the Inn. July 7.

Operations against the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol. Feldkirch is carried by the Republicans.

* Nap., i., 178, 179. Jom., xiii., 342, 345. Dum., iv., 59, 61.

† Dum., iv., 61, 63. Jom., xiii., 350, 355. Nap., i., 178.

* Fain, MS. de 1813, ii., 431. Dum., iv., 63, 66. Jom., xiii., 354, 355.

† Jom., xiii., 355, 357. Dum., iv., 66, 71. Nap., i., 179.

short period which remained to clear his extreme right of the Prince of Reuss, who, from the mountains of Tyrol, was now in a situation, from the advance of the French army into the heart of Germany, to threaten its communications. For this purpose Lecourbe was detached, with the right wing of the army, towards Feldkirch, the formidable position which covered the northwest of that rugged district, and against which all the efforts of Massena and Oudinot had failed in the preceding campaign. The troops who garrisoned their intrenchments had been in great part drawn away to keep up the communication with the Prince of Condé, and the main body of the Imperialists on the eastern frontier of Tyrol, and those which remained were so scattered over many different points as to be incapable of rendering effectual resistance at any. After some trifling successes

at Fussen and Immenstadt, Coire and Luciensteg were abandoned to the enemy, whose superiority of force rendered opposition impossible; and, although the Austrians, in the first instance, gained some

successes before Feldkirch, they found themselves, in the end, unable to man sufficiently its extensive works, and on the following day that celebrated stronghold, which had lost much of its importance from the new theatre on which the war was carried on, was abandoned to the enemy.*

While Lecourbe was thus clearing the right of the Republican position, Sainte Suzanne, who had been despatched to the Lower Rhine to organize the French forces in that direction, was performing the same service on the banks of the Maine.† He invested Philipsburg, and advanced to Aschaffenburg, where the Imperialists were repulsed, and the Lower Maine was speedily cleared of their troops.

Matters were in this situation when the truce which had been concluded at Alexandria between France and Austria a month before, was extended to Germany, under the appellation of the armistice of Parsdorf. By this subsidiary treaty hostilities were terminated at all points in the Empire, and were not to be resumed without a notice of twelve days. The French occupied all the country from Balzers in the Grisons, on the right bank of the Rhine, to the sources of the Inn; the whole valley of that river, from it by the reverse of the mountains to the sources of the Lech, and the whole intermediate country occupied by their troops along the Iser to its junction with the Danube, and from thence, by Wessinburg and the Rednitz, to the Maine. The fortresses included within this line, still in the hands of the Imperialists, particularly Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, were to remain in their possession, on the condition, on the one hand, that their garrisons were not to be augmented, and on the other, that they were to be provisioned every ten days, at the sight of commissioners named by the belligerent powers.‡ In the circumstances in which the Austrians then were, threatened with invasion in the hereditary states in their most vulnerable quarter, the valley of the Danube, this armistice was a most fortunate

event, and gave them a breathing time, of which they stood much in need, to repair their shattered forces, and prepare for the farther struggles which awaited the monarchy.

Important as these events were, they were eclipsed by those which at the same period occurred to the south of the Alps.

An ordinary general, terrified at the dangers with which the southern departments were threatened, would have hastened with the army of reserve to the Var, in order to protect the menaced frontier of Piedmont. But Napoleon, who was well aware of the difficulties attending a front attack upon the Imperialists in that mountainous region, and appreciated, with all the force of his genius, the importance of the central position which he occupied in Switzerland, determined upon a more important and decisive operation. This was to cross the Alps by one of the central passes after the Austrians were far advanced in Piedmont, and thus interpose between them and their resources, cut them off from their communication with the hereditary states, and compel them to fight under the most disadvantageous circumstances, with their front towards Lombardy, and their rear shut in by the Mediterranean Sea and the inhospitable ridges of the Apennines.* Defeat in such circumstances could not be other than ruin, while a disaster to the French would be of comparatively little importance, as their retreat, at least for the infantry and cavalry, was secure over the passes of the St. Gothard or the Simplon into Switzerland, which was still in their hands, and where experience had proved they could resist the utmost efforts of the Imperialists.

But before this great blow could be struck, the French had a desperate and hopeless struggle to maintain on the ridges of the Apennines. During the winter months, while the Austrians were reposing from their fatigues, and repairing their losses in men, horses, and equipments, in the fertile plains of Lombardy, the French army, perched on the rugged summits of the mountains, had to contend at once with the hardships incident to those sterile regions, and the contagious maladies which they brought with them from their disastrous campaign in the plains. No words can describe the sufferings they underwent during that afflicting period: a few regiments lost two thousand men in the hospitals of Genoa in four months: the wants of the troops, without shoes, blankets, or winter clothing, produced universal insubordination, and the authority of the officers being generally lost by the common calamities, vast numbers openly abandoned their colours and returned into France. The French army was rapidly melting away under such accumulated disasters, and everything announced an easy conquest of Genoa to the Imperialists, when the torrent was arrested by the energetic measures adopted by the First Consul immediately after he assumed the reins of public affairs.†

His first care was to appoint Massena, whose

Designs of Napoleon for the reconquest of Italy.

Extreme suffering of the troops on the summits of the Maritime Alps.

* Jom., xiii., 357, 367. Dum., iv., 71, 82. Nap., i., 180.

† Jom., xiii., 367.

‡ Dum., iv., 84, 90.

* Jom., xiii., 39, 40. Nap., i., 252.

† Jom., xiii., 45, 46.

Massena is appointed to the command. Napoleon's proclamation to these troops.

abilities in mountain warfare had been so fully tried, and who was so well acquainted, from the campaigns of 1795 and 1796, with that country, to the direction of the army; and upon assuming the command, that great general issued an energetic proclamation in Napoleon's name to the troops: "The first quality of a soldier," said he, "is to bear with constancy the privations of war; valour is but a secondary consideration. Many corps have abandoned their colours; they have remained deaf to the voice of their officers. Are, then, the brave men of Castiglione, Rivoli, and Neumarkt no more? Rather than desert their colours, they would have perished at their feet. Your rations, you complain, have not been regularly distributed. What would you have done, if, like the 18th and 32d regiments, you had found yourselves in the midst of the desert, without either bread or water, having nothing but horse and camel flesh to subsist on? 'Victory will give us bread,' said they. And you desert your standards! Soldiers of Italy! a new general is to take the command of you; he was ever with the advanced guard in the days of your glory; place your confidence in him; he will again chain victory to your standards." These energetic words, and, still more, the magic of Napoleon's name, had a prodigious effect on the French soldiers, ever liable to pass with rapidity from one extreme to another. The desertion speedily diminished, and some severe examples which Massena made immediately after his arrival soon stopped it altogether. At the

same time, the vigour of the First Consul provided more substantial additions to the comforts of the men: their rations were augmented, and distributed with regularity; a portion of their arrears was discharged; and by incredible exertions, not only were ample supplies conveyed to their frigid bivouacks, but fresh clothing provided for their shivering limbs. By these means the spirit of the soldiers was in a short time so restored, that an army, which a few weeks before seemed menaced with approaching dissolution, became capable of the most persevering exertions. A new organization was completed by Massena, and four regiments which he brought with him, in the highest state of equipment from the north of Switzerland, became the model on which the army was formed. The army, which amounted to twenty-eight thousand on the summits of the Alps, from Argentièr to Mont Cenis, was divided into three corps. The right, under the command of Soult, sixteen thousand strong, occupied Gavi, the Campo-Freddo, the Bocchetta, and the summit of the valleys leading from Piedmont to Genoa; the centre, consisting of twelve thousand, guarded the ridges extending westward, from thence through Cadebone, Vado, Savona, and the Col di Tende, towards France; while the left wing, under Thurreau, perched on the summit of the Alps which form the western boundary of the plain of Piedmont, watched the important passes of Mont Cenis, the Little St. Bernard, and the Col di Genevre.*

The Austrians, cantoned in the plain below, and at the entrance of the numerous valleys which were occupied by the enemy, were so much scattered, that out of ninety-six thousand men who composed their active force, not more than sixty thousand could be assembled for operations on the Bormida and in the Apennines. This force, however, was amply sufficient for the object in view, which was the expulsion of the French from Italy; and at length the order from Vienna arrived, and active operations commenced on the 6th of April.*

The town of Genoa, against which all the efforts of the Imperialists were now directed, is situated in the centre of the gulf which bears its name, and from a very early period has occupied a distinguished place in the history of modern Europe. Placed on the southern slope of the Apennines, where they dip into the Mediterranean Sea, it exhibits a succession of lofty buildings, terraces, gardens, and palaces, rising one above another in imposing masses from the water's edge to a very great eminence. The gay and glittering aspect of the buildings, ascending in succession from the harbour to the summit of the hills which screen it from the north; the splendour of the palaces which adorn its higher quarters; the picturesque air of the towers and fortifications by which it is surrounded; the contrast between the dazzling whiteness of the edifices, and the dark green of the firs and olives by which they are shrouded; and the blue sea which washes the southern ramparts of the city, and reflects its innumerable domes and spires, form a spectacle at once so varied and gorgeous as to have early captivated the imaginations of the Italians, and secured for it the appellation of *Genova la Superba*. A double circle of fortifications surrounds this splendid city; the outer or exterior walls consist of a triangle of nine thousand toises in circumference. On the south, bounded by the sea, this line extends from the point of the Lanterne, at the mouth of the rivulet called the Polcevera, to the mouth of the Bisagno; the eastern side runs along the banks of the Bisagno to the fort of Eperon, which forms the apex of the triangle, and the western descends from that elevated point to the Lanterne along the margin of the Polcevera. The batteries on the western side command the whole valley of the Polcevera, with the long and straggling faubourg of St. Pierro d'Arena, which runs through its centre; those on the east, on the other hand, are themselves commanded by the heights of Monte Ratti and Monte Faccio, a circumstance which rendered it necessary to occupy them by detached outworks, which are called the forts of Quizzi, di Richelieu, and of San Tecla, on the Madonne del Monte. Higher up the Apennines than the Fort Eperon is the plateau of the Two Brothers, which is commanded in rear by the Diamond Fort, perched on a summit twelve hundred toises from Fort Eperon. The peculiar situation of Genoa, lying on the rapid declivity where the Apennines descend into the sea, rendered it necessary to include these mountains in its rear in the exterior line of its.

Positions of the Austrians.

Description of Genoa.

* Bot, iii., 455, 456. Nap., i., 201. Jom., xiii., 45, 48, 51. Vol. II.—M

* Jom., xiii., 53, 54.

fortifications, and to occupy so many points beyond their wide circuit by detached outworks, which give the ridges by which it is encircled the appearance of an immense castle. The interior line, which surrounds the city properly so called, is susceptible of some defence; but the possession of the outer works would render any protracted resistance impossible, as the batteries on the Lanterne and the fort of Epeiron would expose the city to the horrors of a bombardment.*

Early in March, Admiral Keith, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, established a close blockade of the harbour of Genoa and its dependencies, which promised to augment extremely the difficulties of the besieged; and in the beginning of April, General Melas, having completed his preparations, moved forward in three columns to the attack of the French defensive positions. Ott, with the left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was intrusted with the attack of the right, and the forts on Monte Faccio; Melas with the centre, consisting of twenty-four thousand, was to ascend the valley of the Bormida, and separate the centre of the enemy from their left wing; while Elnitz, with the right, amounting to eighteen thousand soldiers, was to assail their left, and to facilitate the important and decisive movements of

Melas in the centre. These attacks all proved successful. The Imperialists experienced everywhere the most vigorous resistance, and the courage and enterprise on both sides seemed exalted to the highest pitch by the great object for which they contended, and the lofty eminences, midway between the plain and the clouds, on which the struggle took place. But the resolution of the Austrians, aided by their great superiority of numbers, and the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountain warfare, at length overcame all the aid which the French derived from the possession of the heights and the fortifications by which they were strengthened. Soult, on the French right, driven from Montenotte, the first scene of Napoleon's triumphs, was

thrown back towards Genoa, while Savona, Cadebone, and Vado were occupied by the Imperialists, and their extreme left, under Suchet, altogether detached from the centre, and thrown back towards France. Hohen-zollern, who was intrusted with the attack of the Bocchetta, drove the French from the neighbourhood of Gavi far up that important pass, and with some difficulty succeeded in retaining the crest of the mountains; while on the extreme left, Klenau obtained the most important advantages. Breaking up from the valley of the Trebbia, he advanced, in three columns, up the narrow ravines which led to the eastern fortifications of Genoa, carried the summit of the mountains, drove the Republicans from the Monte Faccio and the Monte Ratti, and invested the forts of Quizzi, Richelieu, and San Tecola, within cannon-shot of the walls of Genoa. Its inhabitants were variously agitated with hopes and fears, as the firing of musketry and

cannon came nearer and nearer. At length the smoke was distinctly visible, even from the interior ramparts, and, while the broken regiments of Soult were entering the city from the westward, by the gates of the Lanterne, the whole heavens to the north and west were illuminated by the fires of the bivouacs, from the crowded summits of Monte Faccio.*

The situation of Massena was now highly critical, the more especially as a Desperate and large and influential part of the inhabitants were strongly attached to the cause of the Imperialists, and ardently desired a deliverance from the Democratic tyranny to which for four years they had been subjected. Their ardour, strongly excited by the sight of the Austrian watchfires and the sound of the tocsin, which incessantly rung to rouse the peasants on the neighbouring mountains, was with difficulty restrained even by the presence of a garrison, now increased, by the refuge from all quarters, to twenty thousand men. But Massena was not a man to be easily daunted; and on this accumulation of force in the central position of Genoa, he founded his hopes of expelling the enemy from the posts most threatening to the city. By day-break on the 7th he threw open the gates of the town, and attacked the Austrian division on the Monte Faccio with such vigour, that in a short time that important post was carried; the Imperialists were driven from the Monte Cornua, the Torriglio, and all the passes of the Apennines in that direction, and fifteen hundred men made prisoners, who were, before night-fall, marched through the astonished crowds into the interior of the city.† On the same day, a series of obstinate engagements took place on the Austrian right between Elnitz and Suchet, which, though attended with varied success, upon the whole had the effect of establishing the Imperialists in great strength on the heights of St. Jacques and Vado, and completing the separation of the French left wing from the centre of their army and the city of Genoa.

No sooner was the French general informed of this disaster, than he perceived that it was not by any transient success on the Monte Faccio, but a vigorous effort towards Savona, and the re-establishment of his communications with Suchet, that the torrent of disaster was to be arrested. With this view he divided his army into three divisions; the first under Miollis, being intrusted with the defence of the city and environs of Genoa; the second, under Gazan, was to advance from Voltri towards Sassello, while the third, under Massena in person, was to move along the sea-coast. Suchet, at the same time, received orders to suspend his retreat, and co-operate in the general attack, which, it was hoped, would lead to the capture of the Austrian division at Montenotte and Savona, and re-establish the important communication with Suchet and France. The execution of the combined attack was fixed for the 9th of April.‡

His dispositions for re-opening the communications with Suchet.

* Dum., iii., 47, 51. Nap., i., 206, 207. Jom., xiii., 53, 57. Bot., iii., 460, 462. Thib., 70, 85. Siege de Genoa.

† Bot., iii., 463. Jom., xiii., 56, 57. Nap., i., 207. Dum., iii., 61, 62. Thib., 80, 110.

‡ Jom., xiii., 60. Bot., iii., 463, 464. Nap., i., 208, 209. Thib., 110, 135.

* Nap., i., 203, 204. Jom., xiii., 88, 92. Dum., iii., 227, 231. Personal observation.

Meanwhile Melas, having so far strengthened Elnitz, on the heights of Vado, as to enable him to make head against Suchet, resolved to move with the bulk of his force against Massena at Genoa, wisely judging that the

principal efforts of his opponent would be directed to the opening a communication with France and the left wing of his army. With this view he moved forward Hohenzollern on the evening of the 8th, who, after a sharp resistance, carried the Bocchetta by moonlight, which had been abandoned after the reverse on the Monte Faccio, and drove the French down the southern side to Campo Marone. This success so entirely disconcerted Soult, who directed Gazan's division, that, though he had gained considerable advantages, he deemed it prudent to suspend the march of his troops. On the following night, however, he was strongly re-en-

forced by the general-in-chief, and on April 11. the 11th he assailed, with superior forces, the division of St. Julien at La Vereira, and after a desperate conflict routed it, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and seven standards. But this success was more than compensated by the disaster which on the same day befell the left of the French at Cogoletto, who were overwhelmed by Melas, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Massena in person, and driven back, sword in hand, to the neighbourhood of Voltri. At the same time, Elnitz and Suchet combated, with divided success, on the Monte Giacomo. At first the Republicans were victorious, and an Austrian brigade, commanded by General Ulm, separated from the main body, was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms: but this success having led

April 12. Suchet to attempt, on the following day, the attack of the Monte Giacomo itself, a lofty ridge of prodigious strength, he was repulsed with great slaughter, and after leaving the slopes of the mountain and its snowy crest covered with the dead and the dying, driven back in confusion to Melogno and Sette Pani on the seacoast.*

Thus, though the Republicans combated everywhere with rare intrepidity, and inflicted loss as great a loss on their adversaries as they received themselves, yet, on the whole, the object of their efforts was frustrated. Gigantic efforts had been made, blood had flowed in torrents, and the rival armies, amid the rocks and clouds of the Apennines, had struggled with unheard-of obstinacy, but still the Austrians retained their advantage; their columns were still interposed in strength between the French centre and left, and the multitude of killed and wounded was weakening, in an alarming degree, an army now cut off from all external assistance. Both parties now made the utmost efforts to concentrate their forces, and bring this murderous warfare to a termination. On

April 15. the 15th Melas renewed the attack with the utmost vigour at Ponte Ivrea, and at the same time re-enforced Hohenzollern on his left, and directed him to press down from the Bocchetta, and threaten the communication of the French with Genoa. Both armies, though exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of

provisions, fought with the utmost obstinacy on the following day; but at length Soult, finding that his rear was threatened by a detachment of Hohenzollern, fell back to Voltri, overthrowing in his course the Austrian brigade who endeavoured to dispute the passage. On the same day, Massena in person was repulsed by the Imperialists under Latterman, and finding his retreat also menaced by Hohenzollern, he also retreated to Voltri in the night, where the two French divisions were united on the following morning.*

But the Imperialists, who now approached from all quarters, gave the wearied Republicans no rest in this position. From the heights of Monte Fayole, Melas beheld the confusion which prevailed in the army of his opponents, while the corps of Ott, whose right wing now began to take a part in the hostilities, already threatened Sestri, and the only line of retreat to Genoa which still remained to them. A general attack was immediately commenced. Melas descended the Monte Fayole, while Ott, whose troops were comparatively fresh, assailed it from the eastern side, and by a detachment menaced the important post of Sestri in their rear. Ott forced his way to Voltri, while Soult was still resolutely combating Melas on the heights of Madonna del Acqua, at the foot of Monte Fayole, and a scene of matchless horror and confusion immediately ensued. Soult, informed that his communications were threatened, instantly began his retreat. The victorious troops of Ott were assailed at once by the flying columns of that general, who fought with the courage of despair, and the troops they had displaced from Voltri, who rallied and returned to the rescue of their comrades. After a desperate conflict, continued till nightfall, in which the French and Imperialists sustained equal losses, the passage was at length cleared, and the retreating columns, by torchlight, and in the utmost confusion, reached the Polcevera, and found shelter within the walls of Genoa.†

Thus, after a continued combat of fifteen days, maintained with matchless constancy on both sides, and in which the advantages of a fortified central position on the side of the Republicans long compensated their inferiority of force to the Imperialists, Massena, with his heroic troops, was shut up in Genoa, and all hope of co-operating with Suchet, or receiving re-enforcements from France, finally abandoned. In these desperate conflicts the loss of the French was seven thousand men, fully a third of the force which remained to their general after he was shut up in Genoa; but that of the Austrians was fully as great, and they were bereaved, in addition, of above four thousand prisoners:† a success dearly purchased by the French in a city where the dearth of provisions already began to be severely felt.

Meanwhile Suchet, having been informed by Oudinot, who had made a perilous passage by sea in the midst of the English cruisers,

Continued success of the Imperialists. April 16.

Massena finally driven into Genoa.

April 21.

* Bot., iii., 463, 465. Jom., xiii., 61, 71. Dum., iii., 53, 65. Nap., i., 210, 211. Thib., 167, 180.

* Bot., iii., 464, 465. Nap., i., 211. Jom., xiii., 71, 75. Dum., iii., 69, 73. Thib., 180, 200.

† Thib., 200, 217. Dum., iii., 74, 76. Jom., xiii., 76, 78. Bot., iii., 467. ‡ Dum., iii., 76, 77. Jom., xiii., 76, 78, 88.

April 20. De- of the desire of Massena that he
feat of Suchet should co-operate in the general at-
by Elnitz. tack, instantly made preparations
for a fresh assault on the bloodstained ridge of
the Monte Giacomo; but in the interval, Melas,
now relieved on his left by the retreat of Mas-
sena into Genoa, had re-enforced Elnitz by
three brigades, and the position of the Imperial-
ists, naturally strong, was thereby rendered im-
pregnable. The consequence was, that the
moment the Republicans made their appear-
ance at the foot of the mountain, they were at-
tacked and overthrown so completely, that it
was only owing to an excess of caution on the
part of the Imperialists that they were not
wholly cut off and made prisoners. By this
disastrous defeat Suchet lost all hope of regain-
ing his communication with Genoa, and was
compelled to fall back, for his own security,
towards the Var and the frontier of Pied-
mont.*

On the other hand, Melas, having completed
the investment of Genoa, and left Ott,
April 27. with twenty-five thousand men, to block-
ade that fortress, moved himself, with the bulk
of his forces, to re-enforce Elnitz on the Monte
Giacomo, and pursue his successes against
Suchet. To aid in the accomplishment of this
object, he moved up part of the twenty-five
thousand men, who, during this desperate strug-
gle in the Apennines, had lain inactive in Pied-
mont under Kaim. Threatened by so many
forces, Suchet retired with about ten
May 2. thousand men to Albuega, in the rear of
Loano, and took a position at Borghetto, where
Kellerman, in 1795, had so successfully ar-
rested the advance of General Divini. There,
however, he was attacked a few days after by
Melas, with superior forces, and
May 6. Who is driven over
the Var into France. loss: he endeavoured again to
make a stand on the Monte di Tor-
ria and the Col di Tende; the columns of the
Austrians turned his flanks, and drove him
across the frontier and over the Var, with the
loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and an equal
number killed and wounded. Thus the French,
after a desperate struggle, were at length driven
back into their own territories, and nothing re-
mained to them of their vast conquests in Italy
but the ground which was commanded by the
cannon of Genoa.†

While Melas was thus chasing the Republi-
can eagles from the Maritime Alps,
April 30. General attack on
the French posi-
tions round Genoa. Ott was preparing a general attack,
by which he hoped to drive the
French from the exterior line of
defence, and render their position
untenable in that important fortress. With this
view, while the English fleet kept up a severe
cannonade upon the town from the entrance of
the harbour, a general assault was planned both
against the defence of Massena on the Bisagno,
the Polcevera, and the fortified summits of
Madonna del Monte and Monte Ratti. These
attacks were all, in the first instance, successful.
Bussy, supported by the fire of the English gun-
boats, made himself master of St. Pierre d'Arena
and the valley of the Polcevera; while Palfi,

by a vigorous attack, carried the Monte Ratti,
surrounded the Fort Richelieu, surprised the
Fort Quizzi, and made himself master of all the
southern slopes of the Monte Faccio and the
Madonna del Monte. At the same time, Hohen-
zollern stormed the important plateau of
the Two Brothers, and summoned the com-
mander of Fort Diamond, now completely in-
sulated,* to surrender. The Imperialists even
went so far as to make preparations for estab-
lishing mortar batteries on the commanding
heights of Albaro, and bombarding the city over
its whole extent, so as to render the French po-
sition untenable within its walls.

Had the Austrians possessed a sufficient
force to make good the advanta-
ges thus gained, they would have
speedily brought the siege of Genoa to a conclusion, and, by a con-
centration of all their forces on the
Bormida, might have defeated the invasion by
Napoleon over the Alps, and changed the fate
of the campaign. But General Ott had only
twenty-five thousand men at his disposal, while
an equal number, under Kaim, lay inactive in
the plains of Piedmont, and this imprudent dis-
tribution of force proved in the highest degree
prejudicial to the imperial interests through the
whole campaign. Availing himself with skill
of the immense advantage which the possession
of a central position in an intrenched camp af-
forded, Massena withdrew four battalions from
the eastern side, where he judged the danger
less pressing, and despatched them, under
Soult, to regain the heights of the Two Broth-
ers, while he himself hastened, with four bat-
talions more, to re-enforce Miollis on the Monte
Albaro. The Austrians, who had gained time
to strengthen their acquisitions, received the
attack with great resolution; the fury of the
combatants was such that soon firearms be-
came useless, and they fought hand to hand
with the bayonet; for long the result was
doubtful, and even some success was gained by
the Imperialists; but at length the Republicans
were victorious, and the Monte Ratti, with its
forts and four hundred prisoners, fell into their
hands. At the same time, Soult glided round
by the ravines into the rear of the Two Broth-
ers; and the Austrians, under Hohenzollern,
assailed in front by the garrison of Fort Dia-
mond, and in the rear by these fresh troops,
were thrown into confusion, and escaped in
small parties only, by throwing themselves, with
desperate resolution, on the battalion by which
they were surrounded. By the result of this
day the Austrians lost three thousand men, of
whom eighteen hundred were made prisoners,
and they were forced to abandon all the ground
which they had gained from their opponents, ex-
cepting the Monte Faccio, while the spirits of
the French were proportionally elevated by the
unlooked-for and glorious success which they
had achieved.† Taking advantage of the con-
sternation of the besiegers, Massena, on the
following day, attempted a sally, and attacked
the fortified heights of Coronata; but after a
trifling advantage he was repulsed with great

Which, at first
successful, is
finally repul-
sed by Mas-
sena.

* Dum., iii., 79. Jom., xiii., 79, 80.

† Jom., xiii., 82, 86. Bot., iii., 467, 469. Dum., iii., 198, 200.

* Nap., i., 212. Bot., iii., 472, 473. Dum., iii., 234. Jom., xiii., 95, 96. Thib., 200, 209.

† Dum., iii., 236, 241. Jom., xiii., 97, 98. Nap., i., 212. Bot., iii., 472, 473. Thib., 210, 230.

slaughter, and compelled finally to shut himself up in the walls of Genoa.*

Nothing of moment occurred for the next ten days; but during that time, Massena, finding that famine was likely to prove even a more formidable enemy

than the Austrian bayonets, and that it was necessary, at all hazards, to endeavour to procure a supply of provisions, resolved upon a sally. The Austrians had been celebrating, by a *few-de-joie* along their whole lines, the success of Melas on the Var, when Massena determined, by a vigorous effort, both to prove that the spirits of his own garrison were not sinking, and to facilitate the meditated descent of the First Consul into Piedmont. Miollis was charged with the

May 11. attack of the Monte Faccio on the front of the Sturla, while Soult, ascending the bed of the torrent Bisagno, was to take it in flank. The attack of Miollis, commenced before Soult was at hand to second it, failed completely. He gained possession, in the first instance, of the front positions of the enemy on the slopes of the mountain, and was advancing over the ground, drenched with the blood of so many brave men of both nations, when his troops were charged by the Imperialists, in close column, with such vigour that they were instantly thrown into confusion, and driven back in the utmost disorder to the glacis of the Roman gate of Genoa, where, by the opportune arrival of the general-in-chief with a reserve, some degree of order was at length restored. The expedition of Soult was more fortunate. The Imperialists, assailed in front by the Republicans whom Massena had rallied on the Sturla, and in flank by the troops of Soult, were driven from the Monte Faccio, and were only able to force their way through their pursuers by leaving thirteen hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy.†

This brilliant success led to a still more audacious enterprise, which proved the ruin of the able and enterprising French general. This was the attack of the Monte Creto, the most important position occupied by the Austrians on the mountains in the rear of the city, and which, if successful, would have rendered it necessary for them to raise the siege. The Republicans, six thousand strong, issued by the Roman gate, and, ascending the olive-clad steep of the Bisagno, attacked the Austrians in this important post, while Gazan, at the head of eighteen hundred men, assailed them on the other side. The intrenched camp on the Monte Creto was fortified with care, and its defence intrusted to Hohenzollern, supported

by a powerful reserve. The French advanced with intrepidity to the attack, but, as they approached the intrenchments, a violent thunderstorm enveloped the mountain, the air became dark, the rain descended in torrents, and the hostile forces could only discern each other by the flashes of lightning which at intervals illuminated the gloom. In the midst of the tempest the lines met; the shock was terrible, but the Republicans insensibly gained ground. Already the first line of intrenchments was carried, and the Austrian barracks were on fire, when Hohenzollern, charging at the head of the reserve in close column, overthrew the assailants. Soult, wounded in the thigh, was made prisoner, and his troops, dispersed in the utmost confusion, fled to Genoa, with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the same time, intelligence was received of the surrender of Savona, and Massena, now severely weakened, had no alternative but to remain shut up within the walls, exposed to all the horrors of approaching famine.*

This disaster terminated the military operations of the siege of Genoa. Thenceforward it was a mere blockade; the Austrians, posted on the heights which surrounded the city, cut off all communication with the land side, while Admiral Keith, with the English fleet, rendered all intercourse impossible with the neighbouring harbour. The horrors of famine were daily more strongly felt, and in that inglorious warfare the army was called upon to make more heroic sacrifices than ever they had made in the tented field. The miserable soldiers, worn down by fatigue and extenuated by famine, after having consumed all the horses in the city, were reduced to the necessity of feeding on dogs, cats, and vermin, which were eagerly hunted out in the cellars and common sewers. Soon even these wretched resources failed, and they were reduced to the pittance of four or five ounces of black bread, made of cocoa, rye, and other substances ransacked from the shops of the city. Affairs were in these desperate circumstances, when Captain Fianeschi, who had left Na-
May 27. poleon at the foot of the St. Bernard, arrived in the roads of Genoa with despatches from the First Consul. In an open boat, with three rowers, he had succeeded, during the night, in steering through the midst of the English fleet; when day dawned, he was discovered about a mile from the shore, under the guns of their cruisers. They instantly fired, and the seamen were wounded. The brave officer stripped off his clothes, took his sabre in his teeth, and swam towards the harbour. After incredible efforts he reached the shore, and landed, almost exhausted, on the mole, whence he was immediately conducted to the general-in-chief.†

The cheering intelligence of the passage of the Alps by Napoleon, and the first May 28. A successes of Moreau in Germany, re-freshed sortie
garrison. The spectres who wandered along
vived the dying hopes of the French is defeated.

* A singular circumstance occurred at this assault of the Monte Faccio. The soldiers of two French regiments, the 25th light infantry and the 24th of the line, had been on the worst possible terms since the opening of the campaign, because during the winter, when insubordination was at its height, the former, which maintained its discipline, had been employed to disarm the latter. They had, in consequence, been carefully kept asunder from each other; but during the confusion of this bloody conflict, their ranks became intermingled. The same dangers, the same thirst for glory, animated both corps, and these generous sentiments so far obliterated their former jealousies, that the soldiers embraced in the midst of the fire, and fought side by side like brothers during the remainder of the day.—See DUMAS, iii., 245, 246.

† Jom., xiii., 101, 102. Dum., iii., 243, 247. Bot., iii., 473. Nap., i., 220. Thib., 220, 249.

* Jom., xiii., 102, 105. Dum., iii., 247, 252. Nap., i., 220. Bot., iii., 473. Thib., 249, 260.

† Dum., iii., 255. Jom., xiii., 105. Bot., iii., 474. Thib., 250, 270.

Siege is converted into a blockade. Extreme sufferings of the inhabitants.

the ramparts were animated with a passing ebullition of joy, and Massena, taking advantage of this momentary enthusiasm, commenced a general attack on the Monte Ratti and the Monte Faccio. But this effort was beyond the strength of his men. The soldiers marched out with all their wonted enthusiasm, and with a fierce countenance began the ascent of the heights; but the unusual exertion wore out their exhausted strength, and when they arrived at the foot of the redoubts, they were torn to pieces by a tremendous and well-sustained fire of grape and musketry, without the possibility of making any effort to avert their fate. Broken and dispirited, the enfeebled mass was driven back into the city, after having acquired, from sad experience, the mournful conviction that the Imperialists, whatever their reverses might have been in other situations, had abated nothing of their firm countenance in the neighbourhood of Genoa. Two days afterward, the rolling of distant thunder in the Apennines was mistaken by General Gazan for the welcome note of their approaching deliverers. Massena himself hastened, with a palpitating heart, to the heights of Tinaille; but he was there witness to the imperturbable aspect of the Austrians in their impregnable intrenchments, and the agitated crowd returned, sad and downcast, to their quarters.*

While the French garrison was alternately agonized by these hopes and fears, the wretched inhabitants were a prey to the most unparalleled sufferings. From the commencement of the siege the price of provisions had been extravagantly high, and in its latter days grain of any sort could not be had at any cost. The horrors of this prolonged famine, in a city containing above a hundred thousand souls, cannot be adequately described. All day the cries of the unhappy victims were heard in the streets, while the neighbouring rocks, within the walls, were covered with a famished crowd, seeking, in the vilest animals and the smallest traces of vegetation, the means of assuaging their intolerable pangs. At night the lamentations of the people were still more dreadful; too agitated to sleep, unable to endure the agony by which they were surrounded, they prayed aloud for death to relieve them from their sufferings. In this extremity, the usual effect of long-endured calamity was conspicuous, in closing the fountains of mercy in the human heart, and rendering men insensible to everything but their own disasters. Infants deserted in the streets by their parents, women who had sunk down from exhaustion on the public thoroughfares, were abandoned to their fate, and sought, with dying hands, in the sewers and other receptacles of filth, for the means of prolonging for a few hours a miserable existence. In the desperation produced by such prolonged torments, the more ardent and impetuous sought the means of destruction; they rushed out of the gates and threw themselves on the Austrian bayonets, or precipitated themselves into the harbour, where they perished without either commiseration or assistance. In the general agony, not only leather and skins of every kind were consumed, but the horror at human flesh

itself was so much abated, that numbers were supported on the dead bodies of their fellow-citizens. Pestilence, as usual, came in the rear of famine; contagious fevers swept off multitudes, whom the strength of the survivors was unable to inter. Death in every form awaited the crowds whom common suffering had blended together in the hospitals; and the multitude of unburied corpses which encumbered the streets threatened the city with depopulation,* almost as certainly as the grim hand of famine under which they were melting away.

Such accumulated horrors at length shook the firm spirit of Massena. The fermentation in the city had risen to an alarming height, and there was every probability that the extenuated French garrison would be overpowered by the multitudes whom despair had armed with unwonted courage. Matters were in this desperate state when the French general received a letter from Melas, couched in the most flattering terms, in which he invited him, since resistance had now become hopeless, to conclude an arrangement for the evacuation of the city. Massena at first suspected that this was merely a ruse to cover the approaching raising of the siege, and refused to accede to any terms; but a severe bombardment both by land and sea, on the night of the 31st, having convinced him that there was no intention on the part of the allies of abandoning their enterprise, and provisions, even after the most rigid economy, existing only for two days more, the negotiation was resumed, and at length, on the 4th of June, when they were totally exhausted, a capitulation was agreed to, in virtue of which the gates were surrendered to the allies on the following day at noon. It was stipulated that the garrison should evacuate Genoa, with their arms, artillery, baggage, and ammunition: they were conducted by the allies, to the number of nine thousand, by land and sea, to Voltri and Antibes. The conditions of the treaty were faithfully observed towards the vanquished, and all the stipulations in favour of the Democratic party at Genoa implemented by the Austrians with true German faith: † a trait as honourable to them, as the opposite conduct of the English admiral at Naples a year before was derogatory to the well-earned character of British integrity.

When the evacuation took place, the extent of suffering which the besieged had undergone appeared painfully conspicuous. "Upon entering the town," says the faithful annalist of this memorable siege, "all the figures we met bore the appearance of profound grief or sombre despair; the streets resounded with the most heart-rending cries; on all sides death was reaping its victims, and the rival furies of famine and pestilence were multiplying their devastation; in a word, the army and the inhabitants seemed approaching their dissolution." ‡ The allies acted generously to the heroic garrison, with their illustrious chief; while, upon the signal of a gun fired from the ramparts, innumerable barks, laden with provisions, entered the harbour, amid the transports of the inhabitants. "Your defence," said Lord Keith to

* Dum., iii., 256, 257. Bot., iii., 474. Jom., xiii., 224. Thib., 251, 260.

* Bot., iii., 476, 477. Dum., iii., 257. Jom., xiii., 224.

† Bot., iii., 478. Jom., xiii., 228, 231. Dum., iii., 260, 263.

‡ Thib., 282.

Massena, "has been so heroic, that we can refuse you nothing; yet you alone are worth an army—how can we allow you to depart?"*

It was not without reason that the Imperialists urged forward the evacuation, and granted the most favourable terms to the besieged, in order to accelerate their departure. At the very time when the negotiations were going on, a messenger arrived from Melas, with intelligence of the entry of Napoleon into Milan, and an immediate order to raise the siege. The embarrassment of the Austrian general between his reluctance to relinquish so important a conquest and his apprehensions at disobeying the orders of his superior officer was extreme, and he deemed himself happy at being able to escape from so serious a dilemma by granting the most favourable terms of capitulation to his enemy. No sooner was the place surrendered than he detached a division to Tortona and a brigade to Placentia, and set out on the following day with his remaining forces in the same direction, leaving Hohenzollern to occupy Genoa with sixteen battalions.†

Meanwhile Suchet continued his retrograde movement towards the Var, and on the 11th of May effected the passage of that river. He was closely followed by the Austrians under Melas, who on the same day entered into Nice, and took up their quarters in the territory of the Republic. The enthusiasm of the troops rose to the highest pitch: at length they found themselves on the soil of France, and that ambitious power, which had so long sent forth its armies to devastate and oppress the adjoining states, began now to experience the evils it had inflicted on others.‡

The Var is a mountain river, in general fordable, but which, like all mountain streams in those latitudes, is readily swelled by rains in a few hours into an impetuous torrent. It has always been considered as a weak part of the French frontier, because, to give solidity to its left extremity, it would be necessary to carry the line of defence far into the French Alps, at the distance of ten or twelve leagues from the sea. The portion of this line, however, which was occupied by Suchet, was much more inconsiderable, and did not extend above half a mile in breadth between the sea and the first rugged eminences. It had been fortified with care during the years 1794 and 1795, and the long bridge which traverses the river was covered by a formidable *tête-du-pont*, mounted with a plentiful array of heavy artillery. In this position Suchet hoped to arrest the enemy until the army of reserve, under Napoleon, had descended into Italy and appeared in their rear. In effect, the alarming reports which he received of the appearance of a powerful French force in the valley of Aosta induced Melas, soon after his arrival at Nice, to detach a large part of his troops in that direction; and at length, when there could not longer be any doubt of the fact, he set out in person for Piedmont, leaving Elnitz, with eighteen thousand men, to make himself

master of the bridge of the Var. Suchet had but thirteen thousand, but they were covered by formidable works, and were daily receiving additions of strength from the conscripts and National Guard in the interior. The Imperialists having at length got up their heavy artillery from Nice, unmasked their batteries on the 22d, and advanced with great intrepidity to the attack. But when Suchet evacuated the territory of Nice, he left a garrison in Fort Montauban, perched on a rock in the rear, from whence everything which passed in the Austrian lines was visible, and from which he received, by telegraph, hourly intelligence of what was preparing on the enemy's side. Thus warned, the Republicans were on their guard: the Austrian columns, when they arrived within pistol-shot of the works, were received with a tremendous fire of grape and musketry; and, after remaining long and bravely at the foot of the intrenchments, a prey to a murderous fire, which swept off numbers by every discharge, they were compelled to retire, after sustaining a considerable loss.*

Elnitz, however, was not discouraged. The accounts which he received from his rear rendered it more than ever necessary to carry this important post, in order to secure a barrier against the French, in the event of its being necessary to retire, and make head against the invasion of the First Consul. Already accounts had arrived of the descent of Thurrau upon Suza, and the capture of Ivrea by Lannes with the vanguard of Napoleon. Collecting, therefore, all his forces, he made a last effort. Twenty pieces of heavy cannon, placed in position within musket-shot, battered the Republican defences, while the English cruisers thundered on the right of the position. Under the cover of this imposing fire, the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the assault, and the sappers succeeded in breaking through the first palisades; but the brave men who headed the column almost perished at the foot of the intrenchment, and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon their enterprise. After this check, all thoughts of carrying the *têtes-du-pont* on the Var were laid aside, and the Austrians broke up during the night, and retreated, with seventeen thousand men, in the direction of Piedmont.†

It is now time to resume the operations of Napoleon and the army of reserve, which rendered these retrograde movements of the Imperialists necessary, cut short their brilliant career of victories, and ultimately precipitated them into the most unheard-of reverses. This army, which had been in preparation ever since its formation had been decreed by the consuls on the 7th of January, 1800, had been intrusted, since the commencement of April, to Berthier, whose indefatigable activity was well calculated to create, out of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, a formidable and efficient force. Thirty thousand conscripts and twenty thousand veteran troops, rendered dis-

* Jom., xlii., 229. Dum., iii., 263.

† Jom., xlii., 227, 232. Nap., i., 224.

‡ Nap., i., 217. Jom., xlii., 87.

* Jom., xlii., 200, 201. Dum., iii., 204, 211. Nap., i., 218.

† Dum., iii., 215, 216. Jom., xlii., 201

May 22. At
tack by the
Austrians on
it, which is
repulsed.

Fresh attack,
and final re-
pulse of them.

May 27.

Formation of
the army of re-
serve by Napo-
leon.

possible by the conclusion of the war in La Vendée, were directed to different points between Dijon and the Alps, to form the basis of the armament. Napoleon, whose gigantic mind was equal alike to the most elevated conceptions and the superintendence of the minutest details, was indefatigable in his endeavours to complete the preparations, and from the interior of his cabinet directed the march, provisioning, and equipment of every regiment in the army. He was at first undecided whether to direct the great reserve upon Germany or Italy; but the angry correspondence which had passed between him and Moreau, joined to the reverses experienced by Massena in the environs of Genoa, at length determined him to cross the Alps and move upon Piedmont. Reports were obtained from skilful engineers on the state of all the principal passes, from Mont Cenis to the St. Gothard. After full consideration, he determined to cross the Great St. Bernard. The advantages of this passage were obvious. It was at once the shortest road across the mountains, being directly in front of Lausanne, Vevay, and Besançon, where the greater part of the army was cantoned, and it led him, in a few days, into the rear of the army of Melas, so as to leave him no alternative but to abandon his magazines and reserves, or fight his way to them, with his face towards Milan and his back to the Maritime Alps. In such a situation, the loss of a considerable battle could hardly fail to be fatal to the imperial army, and might reasonably be expected to lead to the conquest of all Italy; whereas a reverse to the Republicans, who could fall back upon the St. Gothard and the Simplon, was not likely to be attended with any similar disaster.*

Towards the success of this great design, however, it was indispensable that the real strength and destination of the army of reserve should be carefully concealed, as the forces of the Austrians lay in the valley of Aosta, on the southern side of the St. Bernard, and by occupying in strength the summit of the mountain, they might render the passage difficult, if not impossible. The device fallen upon by the First Consul for this purpose was to proclaim openly the place where the army was collected, and the service to which it was destined, but to assemble such inconsiderable forces there as might render it an object rather of ridicule than alarm to the enemy. With this view, it was pompously announced, in various ways, that the army of reserve, destined to raise the siege of Genoa, was assembling at Dijon; and when the Austrian spies repaired thither, they found only a few battalions of conscripts and some companies of troops of the line, not amounting in all to eight thousand men, which entirely dissipated the fears which had been formed by its announcement. The army of reserve at Dijon, in consequence, became the object of general ridicule throughout Europe; and Melas, relieved of all fears for his rear, continued to press forward with perseverance his attacks on the Var, and considered the account of this army as a mere feint, to serve as a diversion to the siege of Genoa.†

The St. Bernard, which had been used for above two thousand years as the principal passage between Italy and France, lies between Martigny in the Valais, and Aosta, in the beautiful valley of the same name, on the southern side of the Alps. Though the direct communication between these countries, however, and perfectly passable for horsemen and foot-soldiers, it presented great difficulties for the transit of artillery and caissons. As far as St. Pierre, indeed, on the side of the Valais, the passage is practicable for cannon, and from Aosta to the Italian plains the road is excellent; but in the interval between these places the track consists merely of a horse or bridle path, following the sinuosities of the ravines through which it is conducted, or round the innumerable precipices which overhang the ascent. The summit of the ridge itself, which is little short of 8000 feet above the level of the sea,* consists of a little plain or valley, shut in by snowy mountains of still greater elevation, about a mile in length, with features of such extraordinary gloom as to be indelibly imprinted in the recollection of every traveller who has witnessed it. At the northern extremity, where the path, emerging from the steep and rugged ascent of the Valley of Desolation, as it is emphatically called, first enters upon the level surface, is situated the convent of St. Bernard, the highest inhabited ground in Europe, founded a thousand years ago by the humanity of the illustrious saint whose name it bears, and tenanted ever since that time by pious and intrepid monks, the worthy followers of such a leader, who there, amid ice and granite, have fixed their abode, to rescue from destruction the travellers overwhelmed by snow, amid the storms to which those elevated regions are at almost every season of the year exposed. At the southern end are still to be seen a few remains of the Temple of Jupiter Penninus, which formerly stood at the summit of the Italian side of the pass, and at its foot the cut in the solid rock through which the Roman legions defiled for centuries to the tributary provinces of the Empire on the north of the Alps. Innumerable votive offerings are found among the ruins of the solitary edifice, in which the travellers express, in simple but touching language, their gratitude to Heaven for having surmounted the dangers of the passage. In the centre of the valley, midway between the remains of heathen devotion and the monument of Christian charity, spreads out a lake, whose waters, cold and dark even at the height of summer, reflect the bare slopes and snowy crags which shut it in on every side. The descent towards Aosta is much more precipitous than on the north; and in the season when avalanches are common, travellers are often exposed to great danger from the masses of snow which, detached from the overhanging heights, sweep with resistless violence across the path, which there descends for miles down the bare and exposed side of the mountain. The climate in these elevated regions is too severe to permit of vegetation: the care of the monks has reared a few cresses and hardy vegetables in the sheltered corners of the slopes, on the northern side of the lake, but in general

* Nap., i., 252, 253. Jom., xiii., 172, 173. Dum., iii., 219.

† Jom., xiii., 175. Nap., i., 253, 254. Dum., iii.

* 7542. Saussure and Ebel, i., 178.

the mountains consist only of sterl piles of rock and snow, and not a human being is ever to be seen except a few travellers, shivering and exhausted, who hasten up the toilsome ascent to partake in the never-failing hospitality of the convent at the summit.*

This scene, so interesting from historical recollections, as well as natural sublimity, was destined to receive additional celebrity from the memorable passage of the French army.

None of the difficulties with which it was attended were unknown to their resolute chief; but, aware of the immense results which would attend an irruption into Italy, he resolved to incur their hazard. To all the observations of the engineers on the obstacles which opposed the passage, he replied, "We must surmount ten leagues of rocks covered with snow. Be it so: we will dismount our guns, and place them on sledges adapted to the rugged nature of the ascent. Nothing is to be found in these sterl mountains but a few chestnuts and herds of cattle; we will transport rice and biscuit by the Lake of Geneva to Villeneuve; every soldier will carry as much as will suffice him for six days, and the sumpter mules will transport subsistence for six days more. When we arrive in the valley of Aosta, we will hasten to the fertile banks of the Ticino, where abundance and glory will reward our audacious enterprise." In pursuance of this bold design, the most active preparations were made by Marmont to facilitate the passage. Two millions of rations of biscuit were baked at Lyons, and transported by the Lake of Geneva to Villeneuve, to await the arrival of the army; trees felled in the forests of the Jura to form sledges for the cannon, and mules and peasants summoned from all quarters to aid in the transport of the stores and ammunition. Napoleon set out from Paris on the 6th of May, and arrived at Geneva on the 8th. He instantly sent for Marescot, the chief of engineers. After listening with patience to his enumeration of the difficulties of the attempt, he said, "Is it possible to pass?" "Yes!" he replied, "but with difficulty." "Let us then set out," answered the First Consul; words eminently descriptive of the clear conception and immovable resolution which formed the leading features of that great man's character.†

At Geneva, Napoleon had an interview with M. Neckar, who had remained in retirement at his villa of Coppet, near that town, since the period of his banishment by the Constituent Assembly. He professed himself little struck with his conversation, and alleged that he did not disguise his desire to be restored to the direction of the Republican finances; but it is probable the First Consul regarded the Swiss statesman with prejudiced eyes, from his strong sense of the incalculable evils which his concessions to Democratic ambition had brought upon the French people.‡ On the 13th, he passed in review at Lausanne the vanguard of the real army of reserve, consisting of six regiments of veteran troops, newly equipped, and in the finest possible order. Shortly after, he received a visit from Carnot, the minister of war, who brought

accounts of the victory of Moeskirch, and the advance of Moreau in Germany; while the stores and artillery arrived from all quarters.

The preparations were rapidly completed. A hundred large fires were hollowed out so as to receive each a piece of artillery; the carriages were taken to pieces and put on the backs of mules; the ammunition dispersed among the peasants, who arrived from all quarters with their beasts of burden to share in the ample rewards which the French engineers held forth to stimulate their activity. Two companies of artillery workmen were stationed, the one at St. Pierre, on the north, the other at St. Remi, on the south of the mountains, to take to pieces the artillery and remount them on their carriages; the ammunition of the army was conveyed in little boxes, so constructed as to go on the backs of mules. With such admirable precision were these arrangements made, that the dismounting and replacing of the guns hardly retarded for an hour the march of the columns; and the soldiers, animated by the novelty and splendour of the enterprise, vied with each other in their efforts to second the activity of their officers. Berthier, when they reached the foot of the mountains, addressed them in the following proclamation: "The soldiers of the Rhine have signalized themselves by glorious triumphs; those of the army of Italy struggle with invincible perseverance against a superior enemy. Emulating their virtues, do you ascend and reconquer beyond the Alps the plains which were the first theatre of French glory. Conscrip! you behold the ensigns of victory: march, and emulate the veterans who have won so many triumphs; learn from them how to bear and overcome the fatigues inseparable from war. Bonaparte is with you; he has come to witness your first triumph. Prove to him that you are the same men whom he formerly led in these regions to immortal renown."* These words inflamed to the highest pitch the ardour of the soldiers, and there was but one feeling throughout the army, that of seconding to the uttermost the glorious enterprise in which they were engaged.

On the 16th of May, the First Consul slept at the convent of St. Maurice, and on the following morning the army commenced the passage of the mountain. During the four following days the march continued, and from eight to ten thousand men passed daily. The first night they slept at St. Pierre, the second at St. Remi or Etroubles, the third at Aosta. Napoleon himself remained at St. Maurice till the 20th, when the whole had crossed. The march, though toilsome, presented no extraordinary difficulties till the leading column arrived at St. Pierre. But from that village to the summit, the ascent was painful and laborious in the highest degree. To each gun a hundred men were harnessed, and relieved by their comrades every half mile; the soldiers vied with each other in the fatiguing undertaking of dragging it up the toilsome and rugged track, and it soon became a point of honour for each column to prevent their cannon from falling behind the array. To support their efforts, the music of each regiment played

May 9. Measures taken for the crossing of the artillery.

Passage of the mountain.

* Personal observation.

† Jom., xiii., 174, 176. Nap., i., 255, 256.

‡ Nap., i., 257. Bour., vii., 109.

* Bot., iv., 10, 11. Nap., i., 257. Jom., xiii., 176, 177. Dum., iii., 169, 170.

at its head, and where the paths were peculiarly steep, the charge sounded to give additional vigour to their exertions. Toiling painfully up the ascent, hardly venturing to halt to draw breath, lest the march of the column should be retarded, ready to sink under the weight of their arms and baggage, the soldiers animated each other by warlike songs, and the solitudes of the St. Bernard resounded with the strains of military music. From amid the snows and the clouds, the glittering bands of armed men appeared; and the distant chamois on the mountains above, startled by the unwonted spectacle, bounded away to the regions of desolation, and paused on the summit of its inaccessible cliffs to gaze on the columns which wound around their feet.*

After six hours of toilsome ascent, the head of the army reached the hospice at the summit; and the troops, forgetting their fatigues, traversed with joyful steps the snowy vale, or reposing beside the cool waters of the lake, rent the air with acclamations at the approaching termination of their labours. By the provident care of the monks, every soldier received a large ration of bread and cheese, and a draught of wine at the gate: a seasonable supply, which exhausted the ample stores of their establishment, but was fully repaid by the First Consul before the termination of the campaign. After an hour's rest, the columns wound along the margin of the lake, and began the steep and perilous descent to St. Remi. The difficulties here were still greater than on the northern side. The snow, hard beneath, was beginning to melt on the surface, and great numbers both of men and horses lost their footing, and were precipitated down the rapid declivity. At length, however, they reached a more hospitable region: the sterile rocks and snow gave place to herbage, enamelled with the flowers of spring; a few firs next gave token of the descent into the woody region; gradually a thick forest overshadowed their march, and before they reached Etroubles, the soldiers, who had so recently shivered in the blasts of winter, were melting under the rays of an Italian sun.†

Napoleon himself crossed on the 28th. He was mounted on a sure-footed mule, which he obtained from the priory of St. Maurice, and attended by a young and active guide, who confided to him, without knowing his quality, all his wishes, and was astonished to find them, some time after, all realized by the generous recollection of the First Consul. He rested an hour at the convent, and descended to St. Remi, over the hard and slippery surface of the snow, chiefly on foot, often sliding down, and with considerable difficulty.‡

* Nap., i., 259. Dum., ii., 170. Bot., iv., 13.

† Dum., iii., 171, 172. Bot., iv., 14, 15. Nap., i., 261.

‡ "Oh joy! the signs of life appear,
The first and single fir
That on the limits of the living world
Strikes in the ice its roots;
Another now,
And now the larch, that flings its arms
Down curving like the falling wave,
And now the aspen's glittering leaves
Gray glitter on the moveless twig,
The poplar's varying verdure now,
And now the birch so beautiful,
Light as a lady's plume."

§ Nap., i., 261.

¶ The passage of the St. Bernard has been the subject of

Lannes, who commanded the advanced guard, descended rapidly the beautiful valley of Aosta, occupied the town of the same name, and overthrew at Chatillon a body of fifteen hundred Croats who endeavoured

The army stopped in the valley of Aosta by the fort of Bard.

to dispute his passage. The soldiers, finding themselves in a level and fertile valley, abounding with trees; vines, and pasture, deemed their difficulties past, and joyfully followed the hourly-increasing waters of the Dora Baltea, when their advance was suddenly checked by the fort and the cannon of Bard. This inconsiderable fortification had wellnigh proved a more serious obstacle to the army than the whole perils of the St. Bernard. Situated on a pyramidal rock midway between the opposite cliffs of the valley, which there approach very near to each other, and at the distance of not more than fifty yards from either side, it at once commands the narrow road which is conducted close under its ramparts, and is beyond the reach of any but regular approaches. The cannon of the ramparts, two-and-twenty in number, are so disposed upon its well-constructed bastions as to command not only the great road which traverses the village at its feet, but every path on either side of the adjacent mountains by which it appears practicable for a single person to pass.* No sooner was the advanced guard arrested by this formidable obstacle, than Lannes advanced to the front, and ordered an assault on the town, defended only by a single wall. It was quickly carried by the impetuosity of the French grenadiers, but the Austrians retired in good order into the fort on the rock above, and from its secure casemates the garrison kept up an incessant fire upon every column that attempted the passage. Marescot, the chief of the engineers, reported, after a reconnaissance, that the fort could not be carried by a *coup-de-main*, while the rocky cliffs of the mountains on either side opposed the greatest difficulties to a

great exaggeration from those who are unacquainted with the ground. To speak of the French troops traversing paths known only to the smuggler or the chamois hunter, is ridiculous, when the road has been a beaten passage for two thousand years, and is traversed daily in summer by great numbers of travellers. One would suppose, from these descriptions, it was over the Col du Geant, between Chamouni and Aosta, or over the summit of the Col du Bonhomme, that the French army had passed. It will bear no comparison with the passage of Hannibal over the Little St. Bernard, opposed as it was by the mountain tribes, by paths comparatively unformed, and in the course of which the Carthaginian general lost nearly half his army. Having traversed on foot both the ground over which Napoleon's army passed at the Great St. Bernard, that traversed by Suvarrow on the St. Gothard, the Scachenthal, and the Engiberg, and that surmounted by Macdonald in the passage of the Splügen, the Monte Aprigal, and the Mont Tonal, the author is enabled to speak with perfect confidence as to the comparative merit of these different undertakings. From being commenced in the depth of winter, and over ridges comparatively unfrequented, the march of Macdonald was by far the most hazardous, so far as mere natural difficulties were concerned; that of Suvarrow was, upon the whole, the most worthy of admiration, from the vigorous resistance he experienced at every step, the total inexperience of his troops in mountain warfare, and the unparalleled hardships, both physical and moral, with which its later stages were involved. That of Napoleon over the St. Bernard, during a fine season, without any opposition from the enemy, with every aid from the peasantry of the district, and the experience of his own officers, and by a road impracticable only for carriages and cannon, must, with every impartial observer acquainted with the ground, rank as the easiest of these memorable enterprises.

Comparison of the passage of the Alps by Hannibal, Napoleon, Suvarrow, and Macdonald.

* Personal observation.

regular siege. The advance of the army was instantly checked; cannon, caissons, infantry, and cavalry accumulated in the narrow defile in the upper part of the valley, and the alarm rapidly running from front to rear, the advance of the columns behind was already suspended, from the apprehension that the enterprise was impracticable, and that they must recross the mountains.*

Napoleon, deeming all his difficulties surmountable, mounted, was advancing with joyful steps down the southern declivity of the St. Bernard, when he received this alarming intelligence. Instantly advancing to the vanguard, he ascended the Monte Albaredo, which commanded the fort on the left bank of the Dora Baltea, and with his telescope long and minutely surveyed its walls. He soon perceived that it was possible for the infantry to pass by a path along the face of the cliffs of that rugged mountain, above the range of the guns of the fort; but by no exertions was it possible to render it practicable for artillery. In vain the Austrian commandant was summoned, and threatened with an instant assault in case of refusal to surrender; he replied as became a man of courage and honour, well aware of the importance of his position, and the means of defending it which were in his power. A few

Great skill with which the obstacle was carried by the French engineers.

pieces of artillery were, by great efforts, hoisted up to an eminence on the Monte Albaredo which commanded the fort, but their fire produced little impression on the bomb-proof batteries and vaulted casemates which sheltered the garrison; a single piece only, placed on the steeple of the town, answered with effect to the fire of one of the bastions. Time pressed, however, and it was indispensable that the army should, without delay, continue its advance. Contrary to the advice of Marescot, Napoleon ordered an esplanade, and Berthier formed three columns, each of three hundred grenadiers, who advanced with the utmost resolution at midnight to the assault. They climbed in silence up the rock, and reached the works without being discovered. The outer palisades were carried, and the Austrian videttes retired precipitately to the ramparts above; but at its foot all the efforts of the Republicans were frustrated. The garrison was instantly on the alert. A shower of balls spread death through their ranks, while vast numbers of shells and hand grenades, thrown down among them,† augmented the confusion and alarm inseparable from a nocturnal attack. After sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the attempt; the passage seemed hermetically closed; the army could not advance a step farther in its progress.

In this extremity, the genius and intrepidity of the French engineers surmounted the difficulty. The infantry and cavalry of Lannes' division traversed, one by one, the path on the Monte Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley, while the artillerymen succeeded in drawing their cannon, in the dark, through the town, close under the guns of the fort, by

spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and wrapping the wheels up so as to prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner forty pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night, while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their loaded cannon, directed straight into the street where the passage was going forward. A few grenades and combustibles were merely thrown at random over the ramparts during the gloom, which killed a considerable number of the French engineers, and blew up several of their ammunition wagons, but without arresting, for a moment, the passage. Before daylight a sufficient number were passed to enable the advanced guard to continue its march, and an obstacle which might have proved the ruin of the whole enterprise was effectually overcome. During the succeeding night the same hazardous operation was repeated with equal success; and while the Austrian commander was writing to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thousand horse cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition of the army were safely proceeding on the road to Ivrea. The fort of Bard itself held out till the 5th of June, and we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion, that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success in the campaign was at an end. The presence of an Austrian division, seven thousand strong, would have equally sufficed to destroy the French troops as they emerged, without cannon, from the perilous defile of the Albaredo. On such trivial incidents do the fate and the revolutions of nations in the last result often depend.*

Meanwhile Lannes, proceeding onward with the advanced guard, emerged from the mountains and appeared before the walls of Ivrea. This place, once of considerable strength, and which, in 1704, had withstood for ten days all the efforts of the Duke of Vendôme, with a formidable train of artillery, had of late years fallen into decay, and its ruined walls, but partially armed, hardly offered an obstacle to an enterprising enemy. Lannes ordered an assault at once on the three gates of the city. He advanced himself with the column on the right, and with his own hand directed the first strokes of the hatchet at the palisades. The defences were soon broken down, the chains of the drawbridges cut, the gates blown open, and the Republicans rushed, with loud shouts, on all sides into the town. A battalion which defended the walls was forced to fly, leaving three hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and the Austrian troops drawn up behind the town retired precipitately towards Turin. They took post behind the Chinsella, spreading themselves out, according to custom, over a long line, to cover every approach to the capital of Piedmont. They were there attacked on the following day by Lannes, and a warm contest ensued. The Imperialists, confident in the numbers and prowess of their cavalry, vig-

After a short skirmish at Ivrea, the French advance to Turin.

* Nap., i., 261, 262. Jom., xiii., 182, 183. Dum., iii., 176, 177. Bot., iv., 14.

† Nap., i., 263. Jom., xiii., 185. Bour., iv., 102. Dum., iii., 176.

* Nap., i., 263, 265. Jom., xiii., 186, 188. Dum., iii., 176, 180. Bour., iv., 102, 103.

May 26. ously charged the Republicans; but though they led up their horses to the very bayonets of the infantry, they were in the end repulsed, and the bridge over the river was carried by the assailants. After this check the Austrians retired towards Turin, and Lannes, pursuing his successes, pushed on to the banks of the Po, where he made himself master

May 28. of a flotilla of boats, of the greater value to the invading army, as they did not possess the smallest bridge equipage. The whole army, thirty-six thousand strong, was assembled at Ivrea, with all its artillery, on the 28th, while the advanced guard pushed its patrols to the gates of Turin.*

While the centre of the army of reserve was thus surmounting the difficulties of the St. Bernard, the right and left wings performed with equal success the movements assigned to them.

Thurreau, with five thousand men, descended to Susa and Novalese, while Moncey, detached with sixteen thousand choice troops from the army of the Rhine, crossed the St. Gothard, and began to appear in the neighbourhood of the Lago Maggiore. At the same time, General Bethencourt, with a brigade of Swiss troops, ascended the Simplon, and, forcing the terrific defile of Gondo, appeared at Duomod 'Ossolla, and opened up the communication with the left of the army. Thus above sixty thousand men, converging from so many different quarters, were assembled in the plains of Piedmont, and threatened the rear of the imperial army, engaged in the defiles of the Apennines from Genoa to the mouth of the Var.†

No sooner did Melas receive certain information of the appearance of this formidable enemy in the Italian plains, than he despatched couriers in all directions to concentrate his troops. He himself, as already mentioned, broke up from the Var with the greater part of his forces, and orders were despatched to Ott to raise the siege of Genoa, and hasten, with all the strength he could collect, to the Bormida. The orders arrived at Genoa just at the time when the capitulation was going forward, so that the advance of the army of reserve was too late to raise the siege of that fortress; but still an important and decisive operation awaited the First Consul. To oppose him in the first instance, the Austrians had only the corps of Wukassowica, Laudohn, and Haddick, who could hardly muster eighteen thousand men in all, and not above six thousand in any one point, so widely were their immense forces scattered over the countries they had conquered; while the concentration of their troops from the Var and the coast of Genoa would require a considerable time.‡

In these circumstances the French commander had the choice of three different plans, each of which promised to be attended with important results. The first was to incline to the right, form a junction with Thurreau, and, in concert with Suchet, attack the Austrian army under Melas; the second, to cross the Po by means of the barks so opportunely thrown into his power,

and advance to the relief of Massena, who yet held out; the third, to move to the left, pass the Ticino, form a junction with Moncey, and capture Milan, with the stores and reserve parks of the Imperialists. Of these different plans the first appeared unadvisable, as the forces of Melas were superior to those of the First Consul without the addition of Moncey, and it was extremely hazardous to run the risk of a defeat while the fort of Bard still held out and interrupted the retreat of the army. The second was equally perilous, as it plunged the invading army, without any line of communication, into the centre of the imperial forces, and it was doubtful whether Genoa could hold out till the Republican eagles approached the Bocchetta. The third had the disadvantage of abandoning Massena to his fate; but, to counterbalance that it offered the most brilliant results. The possession of Milan could not fail to produce a great moral impression, both on the Imperialists and the Italians, and to renew, in general estimation, the halo of glory which was wont to encircle the brows of the First Consul. The junction with Moncey would raise the army to fifty thousand effective men, and secure for it a safe retreat, in case of disaster, by the St. Gothard and the Simplon; the magazines and parks of reserve collected by the Austrians lay exposed to immediate capture in the unprotected towns of Lombardy, while, by intercepting their communications with Germany, and compelling them to fight with their rear towards France and the Maritime Alps, the inestimable advantage was gained of rendering any considerable disaster the forerunner of irreparable ruin.*

Moved by these considerations, Napoleon directed his troops rapidly towards the Ticino, and arrived on the banks of that river on the 31st of May. The arrival of so great a force, in a quarter where they were totally unexpected, threw the Austrians into the utmost embarrassment. All their disposable infantry was occupied at Bellinzona to oppose the advances of Moncey, or had retired behind the Lago Maggiore, before Bethencourt. The only troops which they could collect to oppose the passage were the cavalry of Festenberg, with a few regiments of Laudohn, a force under five thousand men, and totally inadequate to maintain the line of the Ticino from Sesto-Calende, where it flows out of the Lago Maggiore, to Pavia, where it joins the Po, against an enemy thirty thousand strong. Unable to guard the line of the river, the cavalry of Festenberg was drawn up in front of Turbigo, when Gerard, with the advanced guard, crossed the river under cover of the French artillery, advantageously posted on the heights behind, and instantly made himself master of the bridge of Naviglio, by which the infantry of the division began to defile to his assistance. He was immediately and warmly attacked by the imperial cavalry; but though they at first had some success, yet the French having retired into a woody position deeply intersected by canals, they succeeded in maintaining their ground until the Republicans had crossed over in such numbers as to enable

* Nap., i., 266, 267. Dum., iii., 185, 187. Jom., xiii., 193, 195. † Jom., xiii., 190, 192. Dum., iii., 187, 192. ‡ Jom., Vie de Nap., i., 134.

* Nap., i., 268, 270. Jom., xiii., 190, 196.

them to carry Turbigo with the bayonet, and effectually establish themselves on the left bank of the river. At the same time, Murat effected a passage at Buffalora, on the great road from Turin to Milan, with hardly any opposition; the Austrians retired on all sides, and Napoleon, with the advanced guard, made his triumphant entry into Milan on the 2d of June, where he was received with transports of joy by the Democratic party, and the same applause by the inconstant populace which they had lavished the year before on Suwarrow.*

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the Milanese at this sudden apparition of the Republican hero. Some believed he had died near the Red Sea, and that it was one of his brothers who commanded the army.

None were aware that he had so recently crossed the Alps, and revisited the scenes of his former glory. He instantly dismissed the Austrian authorities; re-established, with more show than sincerity, the Republican magistrates; but, foreseeing that the chances of war might expose his partisans to severe reprisals, wisely forbade any harsh measures against the dethroned party. Taking advantage of the public enthusiasm which his unexpected arrival occasioned, he procured, by contributions and levies, large supplies for his troops, and augmented their numbers by the regiments of Moncey, which slowly made their appearance from the St. Gothard. On the 6th and 7th of June these troops were reviewed, and the French outposts extended in all directions. They were pushed to Placentia and the Po, the principal towns in Lombardy being abandoned, without resistance, by the Austrians. Pavia fell into their hands, with two hundred pieces of cannon, eight thousand muskets, and stores in proportion. At the same time, the following animated proclamation was addressed to the troops, and electrified all Europe, long accustomed only to the reverses of the Republicans: "Soldiers, when we began our march, one of our departments was in the possession of the enemy; consternation reigned through all the south of France. The greatest part of the Ligurian Republic, the most faithful ally of our country, was invaded. The Cisalpine Republic, annihilated in the last campaign, groaned under the feudal yoke. You advanced, and already the French territory is delivered; joy and hope have succeeded in our country to consternation and fear. You will restore liberty and independence to the people of Genoa; you already are in the capital of the Cisalpine. The enemy, terror-struck, seeks only to regain his frontiers; you have taken from him his hospitals, his magazines, his reserve parks. The first act of the campaign is finished; millions of men address you in strains of praise. But shall we allow our audacious enemies to violate with impunity the territory of the Republic? Will you permit the army to escape which has carried terror into your families? You will not. March, then, to meet him; tear from his brows the laurels he has won; teach the world that a malediction attends those who violate the territory of the

great people. The result of our efforts will be unclouded glory and a durable peace."†

While these important operations were going forward in Lombardy, Melas conceived the project of threatening his adversary's communications by a movement on Vercelli. But when on the point of executing this design, he received intelligence of the simultaneous disasters which in so many different quarters were accumulating on the Austrian monarchy; the repeated defeats of Kray in Germany, and his concentration in the intrenched camp at Ulm; the arrival of Moncey at Bellinzona, and the retreat of Wukassowich towards the Adda. In these circumstances more cautious measures seemed necessary, and he resolved to concentrate his army under the cannon of Alexandria. But while the French soldiers were abandoning themselves to the flattering illusions which this extraordinary and rapid success suggested, they received the disastrous intelligence of the surrender of Genoa; and Napoleon had the mortification of finding, from the point to which the troops who capitulated were to be conveyed, that they could be of no service to him in the decisive operations that were fast approaching. It was evident, therefore, that he would have the whole Austrian army on his hands at once, and therefore no time was to be lost in striking a decisive blow. The fort of Bard capitulated on the 5th of June, which both disengaged the troops of Chabran employed in its reduction, and opened the St. Bernard as a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. The rapid marches and countermarches of the Republicans through the plain of Lombardy had made the enemy fall back to Mantua and the line of the Mincio, and the French troops already occupied Lodi and blockaded Pizzighitone, and other fortresses on the Po; but from this dispersion of force, and eccentric direction given to a large portion of the army, arose a most serious inconvenience; it reduced to one half the mass that could be collected to make head against Melas in Piedmont. In effect, out of the sixty thousand men which he commanded in Lombardy, Napoleon could only collect thirty thousand in one body to meet the main army of the enemy; but, confident in his own abilities and the spirit of his troops, he resolved, with this inconsiderable force, to cut Melas off from his line of retreat, and for this purpose moved upon Stradella, on the right bank of the Po, which brought him on the great road from Alexandria to Mantua.‡

The French army began its march towards the Po on the 6th of June, and Lannes, commanding the advanced guard, crossed that river at St. Cipriano. At the same time, Murat, who had broken up from Lodi, attacked the *tête-du-pont* at Placentia, and drove the Austrians out of that town on the road towards Tortona, while Duhesme, not less fortunate, assailed Cremona, and expelled the garrison, with the loss of eight hundred men. The line of the Po being thus broken through at three points, the

Napoleon advances to meet Melas, who concentrates his forces at Alexandria.

The French vanguard comes up with the Austrians at Montebello.

* Nap. i., 271, 272. Dum., iii., 265, 268. Jom., xiii., 209, 210.

† Nap., i., 272, 275. Jom., xiii., 209, 210, 214, 216. Dum., iii., 269, 271, 273. Bul., 110, 117.

‡ Napoleon, i., 275, 277. Dum., iii., 276, 279. Jom., xiii., 212, 220. Bul., 124, 127.

Imperialists everywhere fell back, and abandoning all hope of maintaining their communication with Mantua and their reserves in the east of Italy, concentrated their forces towards Casteggio and Montebello. Ott there joined them with the forces rendered disposable by the surrender of Genoa, and stationed his troops on a chain of gentle eminences, in two lines, so disposed as to be able to support one another in case of need. Fifteen thousand chosen troops were there drawn up in the most advantageous position; their right resting on the heights which formed the roots of the Apennines, and commanding the great road to Tortona which wound round their feet; their left extending into the plain, where their splendid cavalry could act with effect. At the sight of such an array,

June 9. Lannes was a moment startled, but instantly perceiving the disastrous effect which the smallest retrograde movement might have on a corps with its rear resting on the Po, he resolved forthwith to attack the enemy. His forces did not exceed nine thousand men, while those of the enemy were fifteen thousand strong; but the division of Victor, of nearly equal strength, was only two leagues in the rear, and might be expected to take a part in the combat before its termination.*

The French infantry, with great gallantry, advanced in echelon, under a shower of grapeshot and musketry, to storm the hills on the right of the Austrian position, where strong batteries were placed, which commanded the whole field of battle, and succeeded in carrying the heights of Revetta; but they were there assailed, while disordered by success, by six fresh regiments, and driven with great slaughter down into the plain. In the centre, on the great road, Watrin with difficulty maintained himself against the vehement attacks of the Imperialists; and notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Lannes, defeat appeared inevitable, when the battle was restored by the arrival of a division of Victor's corps, which enabled the Republicans to rally their troops and prepare a fresh attack. New columns were immediately formed to assail the heights on the left, while Watrin commenced a furious onset in the centre; the Austrians were everywhere driven back, and the triumph of the French appeared certain, when Ott brought up his reserves from the second line, and victory again inclined to the other side. The Republicans, attacked in their turn by fresh troops, gave way, and the loud shouts of the Imperialists announced a total overthrow, when the arrival of the remainder of Victor's corps not only restored the balance, but turned it against the Austrians. Their troops, however, were too experienced, and their confidence in themselves too great, to yield without a desperate struggle: both sides were animated by the most heart-stirring recollections. The French fought to regain the laurels they had won in the first Italian campaign, the Imperialists to preserve those they had reaped in so many later triumphs; and both parties felt that the fate of the war, in a great degree, depended on their exertions; for the Austrians struggled to gain time for the

concentration of their forces to meet this new enemy, the Republicans to avoid being driven back with ruinous loss into the Po. The last reserves on both sides were soon engaged, and the contending parties fought long hand to hand with the most heroic resolution. At length, the arrival of Napoleon with the division Gardanne decided the victory.* Ott, who now saw his right turned, while the centre and left were on the point of giving way, reluctantly gave the signal of retreat, and the Imperialists, in good order and with measured steps, retired towards St. Julian, after throwing a garrison of a thousand men into the fortress of Tortona.†

In this bloody combat the Austrians lost three thousand killed and wounded, and fifteen hundred prisoners. The French had to lament nearly an equal number slain or disabled; but the moral effect of the victory was immense, and more than counterbalanced all their losses. It restored at once the spirit of their troops, which the continued disasters of the preceding campaign had severely weakened; and when Napoleon traversed the field of battle late in the evening, he found the soldiers lying on the ground and exhausted with fatigue, but animated with all their ancient enthusiasm. He halted his army at Stradella, a strong position, formed by the advance of a lower ridge of the Apennines towards the Po, where the intersected and broken nature of the ground promised to render unserviceable the numerous squadrons of the enemy. In this position he remained the three following days, concentrating and organizing his troops for the combat which was approaching, and covering by *têtes-du-pont* the two bridges over the Po in his rear—his sole line of retreat in case of disaster, or means of rejoining the large portion of his army which remained behind.‡

While Napoleon, with the army of reserve, was thus threatening Melas in front, and occupied at Stradella the sole line by which the Austrian general could re-establish his communications with the plain of Lombardy, disasters of the most formidable kind were accumulating in his rear. No sooner did Elnitz commence his retreat in the night of the 27th of May, than Suchet, re-enforced by some thousand of the National Guard in the vicinity, which raised his corps to fourteen thousand men, instantly resumed the offensive. At noon on the following day, General Menard attacked the intrenchments which covered the retreat of the Austrians, forced them, and made three hundred prisoners. Following up his successes, he advanced rapidly on the three succeeding days, and on the 31st attacked Bellegarde, and drove him from a strong position on the Col di Braus. On the next day, all the French columns were put in motion by sunrise. Garnier moved upon the Col di Tende by the Col di Rauss; Menard, by the heights of Pie-

Position of the French in the pass of Stradella, between the Apennines and the Po.

Desperate and bloody action there, in which the Austrians are worsted.

Disastrous retreat of Elnitz from the Var.

May 28.

* Nap., i., 278, 280. Bot., iv., 23, 24. Jom., xiii., 256, 260. Dum., iii., 293, 297. Bul., 137, 145.

† This was one of the most desperate actions which had yet occurred in the war. "The bones," said Lannes, "cracked in my division like glass in a hailstorm."—BOURRIENNE, iv., 112.

‡ Nap., i., 280. Dum., iii., 297, 299. Jom., xiii., 260, 261

* Bot., iv., 23. Nap., i., 279. Dum., iii., 288, 290. Jom., xiii., 257, 258.

tra Cava, directed his steps to the fort of Saorgio, now dismantled, and the camp of Mille Fourches; while Brunet attacked the Col di Brois in front, supported by a lateral column on each flank. These movements, though complicated, from the nature of the ground, were attended with complete success. The important positions of the Col di Rauss and the camp of Mille Fourches were successively carried, the troops who defended them flying towards the Col di Tende and Fontan, leaving a thousand prisoners in the hands of the Republicans; Menard descended from the heights in its rear to the romantic fort of Saorgio, which fell without any resistance; at the same time, Garnier and Lesuire established themselves on the Col di Tende, the troops intrusted with the defence of which sought refuge within the walls of Coni. The great road by the Col di Tende being thus carried, and the Austrian line broken through the middle, the usual series of disasters fell upon their scattered detachments. Elnitz, instead of uniting his forces to fall on Menard, and regain the decisive pass of Saorgio and the great road, moved to the left to Acqua Dolce, to cover the great road to Genoa. The consequence of this was, that Ulm and Bellegarde, with two Austrian brigades, were surrounded at Breglio, and being cut off by the fall of Saorgio from the great road, had no alternative but to sacrifice their artillery, consisting of twelve light pieces, and throw themselves upon the heights of Foscoire, a branch of the Mont Jove. They were there attacked on the following day by Rochambeau, and driven back to Pigna, while Suchet pursued Elnitz towards Acqua Dolce, and Menard descended from the sources of the Tanaro towards Pieve. He had hardly arrived at that place, when Ulm and Bellegarde, who, after unheard-of fatigues, had surmounted the rugged mountains which overhang Triola, arrived at the same place, exhausted with fatigue, and totally unable to make any resistance. They occupied the houses without opposition, but they soon found that the overhanging woods were filled with enemies, and, to complete their consternation, intelligence shortly after arrived that Delaunay, with an entire brigade, had cut off their only line of retreat. A panic instantly seized the troops; whole battalions threw down their arms and dispersed, and after wandering for days in the woods, were compelled by the pangs of hunger to surrender to the enemy. Of their whole force, only three hundred men, with the two generals, made their retreat by the Monte Ariolo to Latterman's camp.* Elnitz at length, with eight thousand men, reached Ceva, having lost nearly nine thousand men in this disastrous retreat; while Suchet, united at Voltri with the garrison of Genoa, landed at that place by the Austrians, and advanced with their combined forces to the heights of Montenotte.

Thus disasters accumulating, one after another, on all sides, rendered the position of Melas highly critical. In his front was Napoleon, with the army of reserve, amounting in all to sixty thousand men, while in

his rear Suchet occupied all the mountain passes, and was driving before him the scattered Imperialists like chaff before the wind. On his left, the awful barrier of the Alps, leading only into a hostile country, precluded all hopes of retreat, while on the right, the ridges of the Apennines, backed by the sea, rendered it impossible to regain by a circuitous route the hereditary states. Nothing could be more perilous than his situation; but the Austrian veteran was not discouraged, and, concentrating all his disposable forces, he resolved to give battle, and open a communication, sword in hand, with the eastern provinces of the Empire. Nor was it without reason that he ventured on this step, albeit hazardous at all times, and doubly so when retreat was impossible, and communication with the base of operations cut off. He could collect above thirty thousand veteran troops, animated with the best spirit, and proud of two campaigns of unbroken glory; his artillery was greatly superior to that of the enemy, while the plains of Bormida, where the decisive battle apparently was to be fought, seemed admirably adapted for his numerous and magnificent cavalry. Having taken his resolution, he despatched troops in all directions to concentrate his forces; Elnitz, with the broken remains of his corps, was recalled from Ceva, Hohenzollern from Genoa, the defence of which was intrusted to the emaciated prisoners, liberated from captivity by its fall,* while a courier was despatched in haste to Admiral Keith, to accelerate the arrival of a corps of twelve thousand English, who, at this decisive crisis, lay inactive at Minorca.

The post of Stradella, where Napoleon awaited the arrival of the enemy, and barred the great road to the eastward, was singularly well adapted to compensate the inferiority in cavalry and artillery of the First Consul. The right rested on impracticable morasses, extending to the Po; the centre was strengthened by several large villages; the left, commanding the great road, extended over heights, the commencement of the Apennines, crowned with a numerous artillery. Napoleon remained there, awaiting the attack, for three days; but the Austrian general had scarcely completed his operations, and he judged it not advisable to abandon the open plain, so favourable for his cavalry, for the broken ground selected by the enemy. On the 11th, Desaix, who had returned from Egypt, and performed quarantine at Toulon, arrived at headquarters with his aide-camp Savary and Rapp. They sat up all night conversing on the changes of France and the state of Egypt since they had parted on the banks of the Nile; and the First Consul, who really loved his lieutenant, and appreciated his military talents, immediately gave him the command of the division of Boudet. Finding that the Austrians were resolved not to attack him where he was, and remained grouped under the cannon of Alexandria, and fearful that they might recoil upon Suchet, or incline to the right towards Genoa, or the left to the Ticino, and threaten in turn his own communications, he resolved to give them battle in

Arrival of Desaix from Egypt at Napoleon's headquarters.

June 12.

* Jom., xiii., 234, 243. Dum., iii., 219, 227. Bot., iv., 22, 24. Bul., 187, 195.

* Dum., iii., 298, 299. Jom., xiii., 244, 248. Bul., 200, 209.

their own ground, and advanced to Voghera and the plains of MARENGO.* Ott, at his approach, retired across the Bormida, the two bridges over which were fortified, and armed with cannon.

Melas learned on the 10th, at Alexandria, the disastrous issue of the combat at Montebello, and the immense extent of the losses sustained by Elnitz. Far from being stunned by so many reverses, he only rose in firmness as the danger increased; and, after despatching a courier to Lord Keith, with accounts of his critical situation, and his resolution, in case of disaster, to fall back upon Genoa, he addressed a noble proclamation to his troops, in which, without concealing their danger, he exhorted them to emulate their past glory, or fall with honour on the field which lay before them. Napoleon, on his side, fearful that the enemy meditated a retreat, and might retire unbroken to the fast-

nesses of the Apennines, pushed forward with vigour. Lapoype, with his division, who had been left in observation on the north of the Po, received orders instantly to cross that river, and hasten to the scene of action, while Victor was directed to advance straight towards Marengo, and make himself master of the bridges over the Bormida. He successfully performed the task: Marengo, after a slight resistance, was carried, and the victorious French troops were arrested only by the fire of cannon from the *tête-du-pont* on the Bormida. The facility with which Marengo was abandoned confirmed Napoleon in his opinion that Melas meditated a retreat; and, impressed with this idea, he resolved to return during the night to Ponte Curone, and move in the direction of the Po: a resolution which would have proved fatal to his army, as it would have been attacked and routed on the following day, while executing its movement, by the Austrian general.†

The rapid swelling of the torrent of the Scrivia rendered that impossible, and induced the First Consul to fix his headquarters at Torre de Garofalo, between Tortona and Alexandria; and during the night intelligence of such a kind was received as rendered it necessary to suspend the lateral movements, and concentrate all his forces to resist the enemy.

In effect, Melas, having collected 31,000 men on the Bormida, of which 7500 were assembled on cavalry, with 200 pieces of cannon, both sides, was advancing with rapid strides towards Marengo, having finally determined, in a general council on the preceding day, to risk everything on the issue of a battle. Napoleon's troops of all arms present on the field did not exceed 29,000, of which only 3600 were horse, no less than 30,000 being in observation or garrison in the Milanese States or on the banks of the Po. The Austrian force had undergone a similar diminution from the same supposed necessity of protecting the rear: 4000 were left in Coni, and so many in Liguria, that, instead of the 30,000 who were disposable at the end of May in that quarter, only 16,000 joined the imperial headquarters. Their spirits, however, which

had been somewhat weakened by the recent reverses, were elevated to the highest degree: when the determination to fight was taken: every one returned in joyful spirits to his quarters, the camp resounded with warlike cries and the note of military preparation, and that mutual confidence between officers and men was observable which is the surest forerunner of glorious achievements.*

By daybreak on the 14th of June, the whole army of Melas was in motion: they rapidly defiled over the three bridges ^{Battle of Marengo, June 14.} of the Bormida, and, when the first rays of the sun appeared above the horizon, they glittered on twenty thousand foot-soldiers, seven thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of cannon, pressing forward in proud array over the vast field of Marengo, perhaps the only plain in Italy where charges of horse can be made in full career. The First Consul was surprised: he never anticipated an attack from the enemy; his troops were disposed in oblique order by echelon, the left in front, and the right at half a day's march in the rear, in marching order; not more than twenty-two thousand men, under Lannes and Victor, could be brought till noon into the field to withstand the shock of the whole Austrian army. The vehemence of the cannonade soon convinced him that a general battle was at hand, and he instantly despatched orders to Desaix to remeasure his steps, and hasten to the scene of action. But, before he could do this, events of the utmost importance had taken place. At eight o'clock, the Austrian infantry, under Haddick and Kaim, preceded by a numerous and splendid array of artillery, which covered the deploying of their columns, commenced the attack. They speedily overthrew Gardanne, who, with six battalions, was stationed in front of Marengo, and drove him back in disorder towards that village. They were there received by the bulk of Victor's corps, which was by this time drawn up, with its centre in the village, and its wings along the hollow of Fontanone, which separated the two armies; that of Lannes was still in the rear. For two hours Victor withstood all the efforts of Haddick and Kaim with heroic resolution, and at length the corps of Lannes came up, and the forces on both sides became more equal. The battle now raged with the utmost fury; the opposing columns stood, with invincible firmness, within pistol-shot of each other, and all the chasms produced by the dreadful discharges of artillery were rapidly filled up by a regular movement to the centre of the brave men who formed the ranks. While this desperate conflict was going on, intelligence was received that the advanced guard of Suchet had reached Acqui in the rear. Melas, uneasy for his communications, detached two thousand five hundred horse to arrest his progress: an unnecessary precaution, as he was too far off to effect anything on the field of battle, and which, perhaps, decided the fate of the day. At length the perseverance of the Austrians prevailed over the heroic devotion of the French: Marengo was carried, ^{Great success of the Austrians.} the stream of the Fontanone forced, and the Republicans were driven back to the second line they had formed in the rear. Here:

* Nap., i., 281, 283. Bot., iv., 24. Dum., iii., 299. Jom., xiii., 260, 263.

† Nap., i., 287, 288. Jom., xiii., 263, 266. Dum., iii., 303, 307. Bul., 210, 220.

* Bot., iv., 25. Jom., xiii., 270. Bul., 230, 233

they made a desperate stand, and Haddick's division, disordered by success, was repulsed across the stream by Watrin with the right of Lannes' division; but the Republicans could not follow up their advantage, as Victor's corps, exhausted with fatigue, and severely weakened in numerical strength, was in no condition to support any offensive movement. The Austrians, perceiving his weakness, redoubled their efforts; a fresh attack was made on the centre and left, by which Victor's corps, weakened by four hours' incessant fighting, was at length broken. The Imperialists pressed forward with redoubled vigour, when their adversaries gave way; their regiments were rapidly pursued, and frequently surrounded, and no resource remained but to traverse for two leagues the open plain as far as St. Julian, where the reserve under Lannes might be expected to arrive for their support. The Imperialists rapidly followed, preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, which spread death through the flying columns. Melas, with the centre, established himself at Marengo, and Lannes, now entirely uncovered on his left, was obliged to commence a retrograde movement, which at first was performed by echelon in squares with admirable discipline. Gradually, however, the retreat became more disorderly: in vain Kellerman and Champeaux, by repeated charges, arrested the imperial cavalry, which swept round the retreating columns. He could not check the Hungarian infantry, which advanced steadily in pursuit, halting at every fifty yards, and pouring in destructive volleys, while the intervals between the regiments were filled up by a powerful artillery, which incessantly sent a storm of grape-shot through the retreating masses. No firmness could long endure such a trial; gradually the squares broke; the immense plain of Marengo was covered with fugitives; the alarm spread even to the rear of the army, and the fatal cry, "*Tout est perdu, sauve qui peut*," was already heard in the ranks.*

Matters were in this disastrous state when Napoleon, at eleven o'clock, arrived on the field of battle with his guard. The sight of his staff, surrounded by two hundred mounted grenadiers, revived the spirits of the fugitives; the well-known plumes recalled to the veterans the hopes of success. The fugitives rallied at St. Julian, in the rear of those squares of Lannes which still kept their ranks, and Napoleon detached eight hundred grenadiers of his guard to the right of the army, to make head against Ott, who there threatened to turn its flank. At the same time, he himself advanced with a demi-brigade to the support of Lannes, in the centre, and detached five battalions, under Monnier, the vanguard of Desaix's division, to Castel Ceriolo, on the extreme right, to hold in check the light infantry of the enemy, which was there making serious progress. The grenadiers first advanced in square into the midst of the plain, clearing their way equally through the fugitives and the enemy; from their sides, as from a flaming castle, issued incessant volleys of musketry, and all the efforts of the Imperialists were long unable to force back this intrepid band. At length, however, they were

shaken by the steady fire of the imperial artillery, and being charged in front by the Hungarian infantry, and in flank by the Austrian husars, were broken and driven back in disorder. Their destruction appeared certain, when the leading battalions of Desaix's division, under Monnier, arrived, disengaged this band of heroes from the numerous enemies by whom they were surrounded, and advancing rapidly forward, made themselves masters of the village of Castel Ceriolo. Here, however, they were charged with fury by Vogelsang with part of Ott's division, who retook Castel Ceriolo, and separated Monnier from the grenadiers of the guard; it was soon, however, retaken by the French, and Cara St. Cyr, barricading himself in the houses, succeeded in maintaining that important post during the remainder of the day.*

While the reserves of Napoleon were thus directed to the French right, with a view to arrest the advance of the Austrians in that quarter, the left was a scene of the most frightful disorder. Then was felt the irreparable loss to the Austrians which the detachment of so large a portion of their cavalry to the rear had occasioned: had the squadrons detached to observe Suchet poured in upon the broken fugitives in that quarter, the defeat of the left and centre would have been complete, and Desaix, assailed both in front and flank, would have come up only in time to share in the general ruin. But nothing of the kind was attempted: Melas, deeming the victory gained after having had two horses shot under him, and being exhausted with fatigue, retired at two o'clock to Alexandria, leaving to his chief of the staff, Zach, the duty of following up his success; and the broken centre and left of the Republicans retired to St. Julian, leisurely followed by the Austrian army. Zach put himself at the head of the advanced guard, and at the distance of half a mile behind him came up Kaim with three brigades, and at an equal distance in his rear the reserve, composed of Hungarian grenadiers. Napoleon, on his part, had resolved to abandon the great road to Tortona, and effect his retreat by the shorter line of Sale or Castel Nuovo.†

Matters were in this desperate state, when at four o'clock the main body of Desaix at length made its appearance at St. Julian. "What think you of the day?" said Napoleon to his lieutenant, when he arrived with his division. "The battle," said Desaix, "is completely lost. But it is only four o'clock; there is time to gain another one."‡ Napoleon and he alone were of this opinion; all the others counselled a retreat. In pursuance of this resolution, the remains of Victor and Lannes' corps were re-formed, under cover of the cavalry, which was massed in front of St. Julian, a masked battery prepared under the direction of Marmont, and Desaix advanced at the head of his corps, consisting of little more than four thousand men, to arrest the progress of the enemy. Napoleon, advancing to the front, rode

* Nap., i., 290, 291. Dum., iii., 318, 321. Bot., iv., 29, 30. Jom., xiii., 279, 282. Sav., i., 176. Bul., 249, 260.

† Nap., i., 291, 292. Jom., xiii., 282, 283. Bot., iv., 29, 30. Dum., iii., 320. Sav., i., 177. Bul., 260, 264.

‡ Bour., iv., 122. Jom., xiii., 286.

* Nap., i., 289, 290. Bot., iv., 27, 28. Dum., iii., 310, 317. Jom., xiii., 272, 279. Sav., i., 174, 175. Bul., 232, 245.

along the line, exclaiming, "Soldiers! we have retired far enough. You know it is always my custom to sleep on the field of battle." The troops replied by enthusiastic shouts, and immediately advanced to the charge.

After a gallant charge, he too is defeated.

Zach, little anticipating such an onset, was advancing at the head of his column, five thousand strong, when he was received by a discharge from twelve pieces, suddenly unmasked by Marmont, while at the same time Desaix debouched from the village at the head of his division. The Imperialists, astonished at the appearance of so considerable a body, where they expected to find only fugitives in disorder, and apprehensive of falling into a snare, paused and fell back; but Zach soon succeeded in restoring order in the front, and checked the advance of the enemy. At this moment Desaix was struck by a ball in the breast, and soon after expired. His last words were, "Tell the First Consul that my only regret in dying is to have perished before having done enough to live in the recollection of posterity." This catastrophe, however, was far from weakening the ardour of his soldiers. The second in command, Boudet, succeeded in inspiring them with the desire of vengeance, and the fire rolled rapidly and sharply along the whole line. But the Imperialists had now recovered from their surprise; the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the charge; the French, in their turn, hesitated and broke, and victory was more doubtful than ever.*

At this critical moment, a happy inspiration seized Kellerman, which decided the fate of the day. The advance of Zach's column had, without their being aware of it, brought their flank right before his mass of cavalry, eight hundred strong, which was concealed from their view by a vineyard, where the festoons, conducted from tree to tree, rose above the horses' heads, and effectually intercepted the sight. Kellerman instantly charged, with his whole force, upon the flank of the Austrians, as they advanced in open column, and the result must be given in his own words.† Zach's grenadiers, cut through the middle by this unexpected charge, and exposed to a murderous fire in front from Desaix's division, which had rallied upon receiving this unexpected aid, broke and fled. Zach himself, with two thousand men, were made prisoners; the remainder, routed and dispersed, fled in the utmost disorder to the rear, overthrowing in their course the other divisions which were advancing to their support.‡

* Jom., xiii., 287, 289. Nap. i., 292, 293. Dum., iii., 324, 325. Sav., i., 178. Bul., 260, 271.

† "The combat was engaged," says Kellerman; "Desaix soon drove back the enemy's tirailleurs on their main body: but the sight of that formidable column of 6000 Hungarian grenadiers made our troops halt. I was advancing in line on their flank, concealed by the festoons; a frightful discharge took place; our line wavered, broke, and fled; the Austrians rapidly advanced to follow up their success, in all the disorder and security of victory. I see it; I am in the midst of them; they lay down their arms. The whole did not occupy so much time as it took me to write these six lines."—See DUMAS, v., 361. The Duchess of Abrantes states also that she repeatedly heard the battle of Marengo discussed by Lannes, Victor, and the other generals engaged, at her own table, and that they all ascribed the victory to Kellerman's charge.—D'ABRANTES, iii., 44, 45.

‡ Sav., i., 178, 179. Bul., 271, 275. Nap., i., 292, 293.

This great achievement was decisive of the fate of the battle. The remains of Victor and Lannes' corps no sooner beheld this success than they regained their former spirit, and turned fiercely upon their pursuers. The infantry of Kaim, overwhelmed by the tide of fugitives, gave way; the cavalry, which already inundated the field, was seized with a sudden panic, and, instead of striving to restore the day, galloped off to the rear, trampling down in their progress the unfortunate fugitives who were flying before them. A general cry arose, "To the bridges! to the bridges!" and the whole army disbanding, rushed in confusion towards the Bormida. In the general consternation Marengo was carried, after a gallant defence, by the Republicans; the cannoniers, finding the bridges choked up by the fugitives, plunged with their horses and guns into the stream, where twenty pieces stuck fast and fell into the hands of the enemy. At length Melas, who hastened to the spot, rallied the rear-guard in front of the bridges, and by its heroic resistance gained time for the army to pass the river; the troops, regaining their ranks, re-formed upon the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the day; and after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the sun set upon this field of carnage.*

Such was the memorable battle of Marengo; one of the most obstinately contested which had yet occurred during the war, in which both parties performed prodigies of valour, and which was attended with greater results, perhaps, than any conflict that had yet occurred in modern Europe. The Imperialists had to lament the loss of seven thousand men killed and wounded, besides three thousand prisoners, eight standards, and twenty pieces of cannon. The French sustained an equal loss of killed and wounded, besides one thousand prisoners taken in the early part of the day. But, although the disproportion was not so great in the trophies of victory, the difference was prodigious in the effect it produced on the respective armies and the ultimate issue of the campaign. The Austrians had fought for life or death, with their faces towards Vienna, to cut their way, sword in hand, through the French army. Defeat, in these circumstances, was irreparable ruin. By retiring either to Genoa or the Maritime Alps, they ran the risk of being cooped up in a corner of a hostile territory, without any chance of regaining their own country, and the certainty of

Final defeat of the Austrians.

Loss sustained on both sides.

Dum., iii., 324, 325. Jom., xiii., 288, 289. Bot., iv., 30, 31. Mém. du Dépôt de la Guerre, iv., 272.

* Bul., 275, 280. Sav., i., 179. Nap., i., 293, 294. Jom., xiii., 290, 294. Dum., iii., 325, 326. Bot., iv., 31. Saalfeld, iv., 230, 231. Gaz. Mil. d'Autriche, Ann. 1823.

† There is a most extraordinary similarity between the crisis of Marengo and that of Waterloo, with this difference, that the rout of the French was complete before the arrival of Desaix, while not an English square was broken before the final charge of the old guard. But the defeat of the last attacks in both battles was accomplished in the same way. The rout of Zach's columns by the fire of Desaix's division in front, aided by the charge of Kellerman in flank, was precisely similar to the defeat of the old guard at Mount St. John by the English Guards, aided by the happy flank attack of Major Gawler with the 53d and 71st regiments, and the gallant charge of Sir Hussey Vivian with the 10th and 18th Hussars. In both cases, the overthrow of the last columns of attack drew after it the total defeat of the army.—See "Crisis of Waterloo," by MAJOR GAWLER and SIR H. VIVIAN. United Service Journal, July, 1833.

depriving the Empire of the only army capable of defending its Italian possessions. The French, on the other hand, had now firmly established themselves in the plains of Piedmont, and could, by merely retaining their present position, effectually cut off the Imperialists, and hinder their rendering any assistance to the hereditary states. In these circumstances, the victory gave the Republicans, as that under the walls of Turin had given the Imperialists a century before, the entire command of Italy. Such a result was in itself of vast importance; but coming, as it did, in the outset of Napoleon's career as First Consul, its consequences were incalculable. It fixed him on the throne, revived the military spirit of the French people, and precipitated the nation into that career of conquest which led them to Cadiz and the Kremlin.*†

United with the great qualities of Napoleon's character was a selfish thirst for glory, and consequent jealousy of any one who had either effectually thwarted his designs, or rendered him such services as might diminish the lustre of his own exploits. His undying jealousy of Wellington was an indication of the first weakness, his oblivion of Kellerman's inappreciable service an instance of the second. When this young officer was brought into the presence of the First Consul after the battle, he coolly said, "You made a good charge this evening;" and immediately turning to Bessières, added, "The guard has covered itself with glory." "I am glad you are pleased," replied Kellerman, "for it has placed the crown on your head." He repeated the same expression in a letter, which was opened at the postoffice and brought to Napoleon. The obligation was too great to be forgiven. Kellerman was not promoted, like the other generals, and never afterwards enjoyed the favour of the chief on whose brow he had placed the diadem.‡

While nothing but congratulation and triumph were heard in the French lines, the Austrian camp exhibited the utmost consternation. The time was spent in re-forming the regiments, repairing the losses of the artillery, and replenishing the exhausted stores of ammunition. A council of war was summoned; the majority, thunderstruck by the magnitude of the disaster and the hopeless nature of their situation, inclined for a treaty to evacuate the Piedmontese territory. "If we cut our way through," said they, "supposing us to be successful, we must sacrifice ten thousand men left in Genoa, and

as many in the fortresses of Piedmont, and shall not be the less compelled to take refuge under the cannon of Mantua. It is better to save these twenty thousand men than to preserve towns for the King of Sardinia." In conformity with these views, a flag of truce was despatched on the following morning to the French headquarters to propose terms of capitulation. He arrived at their outposts just at the time when an attack on the *têtes-du-pont* June 15, on the Bormida was preparing; and, after some difficulty, the terms of the treaty were agreed upon between the two generals.*

By this convention it was provided that "there should be an armistice between the two armies till an answer was obtained from the court of Vienna. That in the mean time the imperial army should occupy the country between the Mincio and the Po; that is, Peschiera, Mantua, Borgoforte, and from it the left bank of the Po, and on its right bank, Ferrara, Ancona, and Tuscany; that the French should occupy the district between the Chiesa, the Oglio, and the Po, and the space between the Chiesa and the Mincio should not be occupied by either army. That the fortresses of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighitona, Arona, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, Urbino, Coni, Alexandria, and Genoa, should be surrendered to the French, with all their artillery and stores, the Austrians taking with them only their own cannon." The evacuation of all these places, and the final retreat of the Austrian army, were to be completed by the 24th of June.†

Thus the complete reconquest of Piedmont and the Milanese, the cession of twelve fortresses, armed with fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, and the advance of the Republican eagles to the Mincio, were the immediate effect of the stubborn resistance of Desaix and the happy charge of Kellerman. A few battalions and eight hundred horse changed the face of the world. But Napoleon must not be deprived of his share in these glorious results. These incidents were but the last steps in a chain of causes which his genius had prepared, and his skill brought to bear upon the final issue of the campaign. He had thrown himself upon his adversary's communications without compromising his own, and thence its astonishing consequences. Defeated at Marengo, Napoleon could still have retired upon an equal force detached in his rear, and, in the worst event, have retired over the St. Gothard and the Simplon with no other sacrifice but his artillery. To have achieved such results, at so inconsiderable a risk, is the greatest triumph of genius in the science of war.‡

The convention of Alexandria was religiously observed by the Austrian commanders. The English expedition served by the under Abercromby, with twelve thousand men, arrived in the Bay of Genoa just in time to see that important city surrendered to the Republican commanders; but, notwithstanding that important succour, German integrity swerved nothing from its good faith.

* Nap., i., 294. Jom., xiii., 295, 296. Dum., iii., 328, 329. Bot., iv., 32, 34. Austrian Official Account, Gaz. Mil. d'Autriche, 1823. Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre, iv., 333. Bul., 280, 281.

† In the preceding account of the battle of Marengo, the author has corrected the various French and German accounts of the engagement hitherto published, by some manuscript notes by General Kellerman, who had so great a share in achieving the success, written on the margin of the collection of the various accounts of the battle contained in the "Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre," iv., 269, 343. For these valuable manuscript notes the author is indebted to the kindness of his esteemed friend Captain Basil Hall.

‡ Bour., iv., 125. Bot., iv., 34.

§ Napoleon, at the same time, was perfectly aware of the immense service rendered by the charge of Kellerman, for he said in the evening to Bourrienne, "That little Kellerman made a happy charge. He struck in at the critical moment; we owe him much. On what trivial events do affairs depend!"—BOURRIENNE, iv., 124.

* Jom., xiii., 296, 391. Nap., i., 294. Bul., 281, 287.

† Nap., i., 295, 296. Jom., xiii., 300.

‡ Jom., xiii., 301, 302.

cure asylums, round which the national strength is agglomerated in the last struggle for national independence, and the retreating army finds itself strengthened in the heart of the empire by the garrisons of the interior fortresses and the new levies who are disciplined within their walls, while their fortifications form an imposing stronghold, to the siege of which the largest armies are hardly adequate: the latter prove an impassable barrier only to armies of inconsiderable magnitude; and if, by an overwhelming force, the protecting army is compelled to retire, it too often finds itself severely weakened by the great detachments doomed thereafter to useless inactivity in the frontier fortresses. When Napoleon was struck to the earth in 1814, he still held the fortresses on the Elbe and the Rhine: above a hundred thousand veteran troops were there immured, when he maintained an unequal conflict with fifty thousand in the plains of Champagne; and that which he boasted triple line of fortresses could not do for France, would have been certainly effected by an intrenched camp, like that at Ulm, on Montmartre and Belleville. The conclusion to be drawn from that is, not that frontier fortresses are totally useless, and central ones are alone to be relied on, but that the combination of the two is requisite to lasting security; the former to cover the provinces and impede an inconsiderable enemy, the latter to repel those desperate strokes which are directed by a gigantic foe at the vitals of the state.

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CHAPTER XXXII.

CAMPAIGN OF HOHENLINDEN.

FROM THE ARMISTICE OF ALEXANDRIA TO THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE.

JUNE, 1800—FEBRUARY, 1801.

ARGUMENT.

Universal Joy in France at the Victory of Marengo.—Treaty previously signed between Austria and England.—Good Faith of the Imperial Government in adhering to it.—Count St. Julien arrives at Paris and signs Preliminaries, which are disavowed by the Imperial Cabinet.—Negotiations with England for an Armistice, which fail from the unreasonable Demands of France.—Conspiracy to assassinate Napoleon.—Preparations of France for a Renewal of Hostilities, and of Austria, but Russia and Prussia keep aloof from the Contest.—English Expedition under Sir James Pulteney fails at Ferrol, and from Dread of the Plague declines to attack Cadiz.—Surrender of Malta to the British blockading Squadron.—Affairs of Italy.—Election of Pope Pius VII. at Venice.—Hostilities of Naples, and Insurrection of Piedmont against France.—The French crush the Insurrection in the Tuscan States with great Cruelty.—Leghorn is seized, and the English Merchandise confiscated.—Last Remnant of Swiss Independence is destroyed.—Capture of Surinam and Demerara by the English Squadrons.—Permanent Incorporation of the Netherlands with France.—Description of the Line of the Inn.—Project of the Imperialists.—Hostilities on the Lower Rhine.—The Austrians advance into Bavaria.—Movements of Moreau.—Great Success of the Austrians in the Outset.—French retire to Hohenlinden.—Description of the Field of Battle.—Able Plans of Moreau.—Battle of Hohenlinden.—Dreadful Struggle at the Entrance of the Forest.—Decisive charge of Richpanse.—The Austrian Line of Communication is intercepted.—Great Victory gained by the French.—Its prodigious Consequences.—Merits of Moreau in gaining it.—The Austrians retire behind the Inn.—Skillful manœuvre by which the Passage of that River was effected by Moreau.—Rapid Advance of the French towards Salzburg.—They are defeated by the Austrian Cavalry in Front of that Town, but the Imperialists are nevertheless obliged to retire.—Moreau pushes on towards Vienna.—Great Successes gained by his advanced Guard.—The Archduke joins the Army, but cannot arrest the Disaster.—An Armistice is agreed to.—Operations of the Army on the Maine and in the Grisons.—Designs of Napoleon there.—Description of the Ridges to be surmounted.—Napoleon's Design for the Passage of that Mountain.—Preparations of Macdonald for crossing it.—Description of the Passage of the Splügen.—Extreme Difficulties experienced by the French Troops in the Passage.—Heroism of Macdonald in persisting notwithstanding.—He arrives at Chiavenna, on the Lake of Como.—Unworthy Jealousy of this Passage displayed by Napoleon.—He is placed under the orders of Brune.—Difficult Passage of the Col Apriga.—Attack on the Mont Tonal, in which the French are repulsed.—Positions and Forces of the French and Austrians in Italy.—First Operations of Brune.—Passage of the Mincio.—Desperate Conflict of the Troops who had passed over.—Brune at length relieves them, and the Passage is completed.—Great Losses of the Imperialists.—Bellegarde retires to Caldiero.—Advance of the Republicans in the Valley of the Adige.—Alarming Situation of Laudohn on the Upper Adige.—Macdonald makes his Way into the Italian Tyrol.—Laudohn is surrounded at Trent.—He escapes by a lateral Path to Bassano.—Bellegarde retires to Bassano and Treviso.—Armistice concluded at the latter Place.—Insurrection breaks out in Piedmont.—Neapolitans invade the Roman States, and are totally defeated.—Queen of Naples flies to St. Petersburg to implore the Aid of Paul.—Napoleon willingly yields to his Intercession.—Peace between France and Naples at Foligno.—Its Conditions.—French take Possession of the whole Neapolitan Territories.—Siege of Elba.—Its gallant Defence by the English Garrison.—Treaty of Luneville.—The Emperor subscribes for the Empire as well as Austria.—Extravagant Joy excited by this Peace at Paris.—Important Consequences of this Treaty on the internal Situation of Germany.—Reflections on this Campaign.—The real Object of the War was already gained by the Allies.—Evidence of Napoleon's implacable Hostility to England.—Increasing and systematic Pillage of the People by

the Republican Armies.—Symptoms of patriotic and general Resistance spring up.

FRANCE soon experienced the beneficial results of the triumphs in Italy and the successes in Germany. More passionately desirous than any other people in Europe of military glory, its citizens received with the utmost enthusiasm the accounts of their victories; and the angry passions of the Revolution, worn out by suffering, willingly turned into joyful comparison of their present triumphs with the disasters which had preceded the return of the First Consul. The battle of Marengo fixed Napoleon on the consular throne. The Jacobins of Paris, the Royalists of the West, were alike overwhelmed by that auspicious event; and two English expeditions, which appeared, as usual too late, on the coast of Brittany and La Vendée, under Sir Edward Pellew and Sir James Pulteney,* were unable to rouse the inhabitants to resistance against the triumphant authority of the capital.

Two days before intelligence was received of the battle of Marengo, a treaty for the farther prosecution of the war had been signed at Vienna between Austria and Great Britain. By this convention it was provided that within three months England was to pay to Austria a loan of £2,000,000 sterling, to bear no interest during the continuance of the war, and that neither of the high contracting parties should make any separate peace with the enemy during the period of one year from its date.†

The disastrous intelligence of the defeat at Marengo, and the armistice of Alexandria, followed up, as it soon was, by similar and still more pressing calamities in Germany, could not shake the firmness or good faith of the Austrian cabinet. The inflexible Thugut, who then presided over its councils, opposed to all the representations with which he was assailed as to the perils of the monarchy, the treaty recently concluded with Great Britain, and the disgrace which would attach to the imperial government if, on the first appearance of danger, engagements of such long endurance and so solemnly entered into were to be abandoned. Nor did the situation of affairs justify any such desponding measures. If the battle of Marengo had lost Piedmont to the allied powers, the strength of the imperial army was still unbroken; it had exchanged a disadvantageous offensive position in the Ligurian Mountains for an advantageous defensive one on the frontiers of Lombardy; the cannon of Mantua, so formidable to France in

* Ann. Reg., 1800, 212, 213. Jom., xiv., 4, 5.

† Ann. Reg., 1800, 241. State Papers.

1796, still remained to arrest the progress of the victor; and the English forces of Abercromby, joined to the Neapolitan troops and the imperial divisions in Ancona and Tuscany, would prove too formidable a body on the right flank of the Republicans to permit any considerable advance towards the hereditary states. Nor were affairs by any means desperate in Germany. The advance of Moreau into Bavaria, while Ulm and Ingolstadt were unreduced, was a perilous measure; the line of the Inn furnished a defensive frontier not surpassed by any in Europe, flanked on one side by the mountains of Tyrol, and on the other by the provinces of Bohemia, both in the possession of the imperial forces; the strength of the monarchy would be more strongly felt, and re-enforcements more readily obtained, when the enemy approached its frontiers, and the ancient patriotism of the inhabitants were called forth by the near approach of danger; and the disastrous issue of the campaign of 1796 to the Republican forces proved how easy was the transition from an unsupported advance to a ruinous retreat. Finally, the treaty of Campo Formio had only been signed after a whole campaign of disasters, and when the standards of France were almost within sight of Vienna; and it would be disgraceful to subscribe the same conditions when the imperial banners were still on the Mincio, or lose the fruits of a long series of triumphs in the terror produced by a single misfortune.*

Influenced by these considerations, the Austrian cabinet resolved to gain time; and if they could not obtain tolerable terms of peace, run all the hazards of a renewal of the war.

Count St. Julien arrived at Paris on the 21st of July, as plenipotentiary on the part of Austria, bearing a letter from the emperor, in which he stated, "You will give credit to everything which Count St. Julien shall say on my part, and I will ratify whatever he shall do." In virtue of these powers, preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris in a few days by the French and Austrian ministers. The "treaty of Campo Formio was taken as the basis of the definitive pacification, unless where changes had become necessary; it was provided that the frontier of the Rhine should belong to France, and the indemnities stipulated for Austria by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio were to be given in Italy instead of Germany.†

As this treaty was signed by Count St. Julien in virtue of the letter from the emperor only, and without an exchange of full powers, it was provided that "these preliminary articles shall be ratified, and that they shall not bind their respective governments till after the ratification." The cabinet of Vienna availed themselves of this clause to avoid the ratification of these preliminary articles, in subscribing which their plenipotentiary had not entered into the views of his government. He was accordingly recalled, and the refusal to ratify notified on the 15th of August, the appointed time; by Count Lehrbach, accompanied, however, by an intimation of the wish of the imperial cabinet to make peace, of the treaty which bound them

not to do so without the concurrence of Great Britain, and of the readiness of the latter power to enter into negotiations, on authority of a letter from Lord Minto, the British ambassador at Vienna, to Baron Thugut.*

Napoleon either was, or affected to be, highly indignant at the refusal by Austria to ratify the preliminaries, and he immediately gave notice of the termination of the armistice on the 10th of September, and sent orders for the second army of reserve, which was organizing at Dijon, to enter Switzerland on the 5th of that month, and ordered Augereau, with eighteen thousand men from Holland, to take a position on the Lahn, in order to co-operate with the extreme left of Moreau's army. But he soon returned to more moderate sentiments, and despatched full powers to M. Otto, who resided at London as agent for the exchange of prisoners, to conclude a *naval armistice* with Great Britain. The object of this proposal, hitherto unknown in European diplomacy, was to obtain the means, during the negotiations, of throwing supplies into Egypt and Malta, the first of which stood greatly in need of assistance, while the latter was at the last extremity, from the vigilant blockade maintained for nearly two years by the British cruisers.†

No sooner was this proposal received by the English government, than they proceeded to signify their anxious desire to be included in the general pacification, and proposed, for this purpose, that passports should be forwarded for Lord Grenville's brother to proceed, in the character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain, to the congress at Luneville; but they declined to agree to a naval armistice, as a thing totally unknown, till the preliminaries of peace had been signed. Napoleon, however, resolutely bent on saving Malta and Egypt, continued to insist on the immediate adoption of a naval armistice as a *sine qua non*, and signified that, unless it was agreed to before the 11th of September, he would recommence hostilities both in Italy and Germany.‡

The urgency of the case, and the imminent danger which Austria would run, if the war were renewed on the Continent at so early a period, induced the cabinet of London to forego the advantages which a declination of the proposals of the First Consul promised to afford to the maritime interests of Great Britain. On the 7th of September, therefore, they presented to M. Otto a counter project for the general suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers. By this it was proposed that an armistice should take place by sea and land, during which the ocean was to be open to the navigation of trading vessels of both nations; Malta and the harbours of Egypt were to be put on the same footing as Ulm, Philipsburgh, and Ingolstadt, by the armistice of Parsdorf; that is to say, they were to be provisioned for fourteen days, from time to time, during the dependance of the negotiation. The blockade of Brest and the maritime ports was to be raised, but the British squadrons were to remain on their sta-

* Dum., v., 8, 9. Nap., ii., 2, 3.

† Parli. Hist., xxxv., 540, 542. Dum., xiv., 3, 4. Dum., v., 9, 10. Ann. Reg., 1800, 214.

‡ Parli. Hist., xxxv., 544, 550. Dum., v., 10, 11. Ann. Reg., 1800.

* Jom., xiv., 7, 8.

† 28th July, 1800. State Papers, Ann. Reg., 180, 278.

tions off their mouths, and ships of war were not to be permitted to sail. Nothing could be more equitable towards France, or generous towards Austria, than these propositions. They compensated the recent disasters of the Imperialists by land with concessions by the British at sea, where they had constantly been victorious, and had nothing to fear; they placed the blockaded fortresses which the French retained on the ocean on the same footing with those which the Imperialists still held in the centre of Germany, and abandoned to the vanquished on one element those advantages of a free navigation, which they could not obtain by force of arms, in consideration of the benefits accruing from a prolongation of the armistice to their allies on another.*

Napoleon, however, insisted upon a condition which ultimately proved fatal to the negotiation. This was, that the French ships of the line only should be confined to their ports, but that frigates should have free liberty of egress; and that six vessels of that description should be allowed to go from Toulon to Alexandria without being visited by the English cruisers. He has told us in his "Memoirs" what he intended to have done with these frigates. They were

20th Sept. to be armed *en flute*, and to have carried out three thousand six hundred troops, besides great military stores, to Alexandria. What rendered this condition peculiarly unreasonable was, that at the moment (20th September) when M. Otto declared to the British government that the condition as to these frigates was

Which fail, from the unreasonable demands of France.

a *sine qua non* for the continuation of the negotiation, he addressed to Moreau a telegraphic despatch "not to agree to a prolongation of the armistice but on condition that Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philippsburgh were placed in the hands of the French as a guarantee." Thus, at the very time when the First Consul made a condition for the preservation of the maritime blockaded fortresses a *sine qua non* with the British government, he made immediate cession of the corresponding blockaded ones on the Continent an indispensable condition of a continuation of the armistice with the Austrian cabinet. In these simultaneous propositions is to be seen little of that spirit of moderation which he so loudly professed, but much of that inflexible desire for aggrandizement, which so long was attended with success, but ultimately occasioned his ruin.†

The Imperialists, with the dagger at their throats, were in no condition to resist the demands of the victor. A new convention was therefore concluded at Hohenlinden 28th Sept. on the 28th of September, by which the cession of the three German fortresses was agreed to, and the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days. A similar convention, signed at Castiglione a few days afterward, extended the armistice for the same period to the Italian peninsula.‡

The English government, however, was under no such necessity; and as Napoleon peremptorily refused to abandon his condition as to despatching six frigates to Egypt, the nego-

tiation was broken off, the cabinet of the Oct. 9. Tuileries having declared that they would treat only with each of the two courts separately. This was equivalent to its total abandonment, as both the allied powers had intimated to France that they were bound by the recent convention to treat only in concert with each other.*

No sooner was it evident that Great Britain would not consent to the demands Oct. 8. Conspiracy to assassinate Napoleon. of the First Consul, than he resolved to prosecute the war with vigour against Austria. On the 8th of October, accordingly, the portfolio of the war-office was put into the hands of Carnot, with instructions to redouble his exertions to put all the armies immediately on a footing to resume hostilities. On the same day on which this took place, a plot to assassinate Napoleon at the opera was discovered by the police; Cérachi and Demerville, the leaders of the conspiracy, and both determined Jacobins, were arrested and executed. It originated in the remains of the Democratic faction, and served to increase the already formed exasperation of the First Consul at that party.†

During the interval of hostilities, both parties made the most indefatigable efforts to put their armies on a respectable footing, and prepare for a vigorous prosecution of the war. A corps Oct. 8. Preparations of France for a renewal of hostilities.

of fifteen thousand men was formed at Dijon, under the name of the second army of reserve, the command of which was intrusted to General Macdonald, already well known by his campaign in Naples and the battle of the Trebbia. The official reports gave out that it was to consist of thirty thousand, and even Macdonald himself was led to believe it amounted to that force; the object in spreading this delusion was to augment the troops, which the Austrians, recollecting what the first army of reserve had effected, would deem it necessary to watch his operations. It was destined to penetrate through the Grisons into the Tyrol, and threaten the flank of the Imperialists either in Italy or Germany, as circumstances might render advisable. Another army, twenty thousand strong, was assembled, under Augereau, on the Maine; it was intended to advance along the course of that river to Wurtzburg, and threaten Bohemia, so as to prevent the troops in that province from undertaking anything against the flanks or rear of the grand army under Moreau in Bavaria. That army was raised to above 110,000 men, all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; the soldiers were all newly clothed, the artillery and cavalry remounted, and all the matériel in the finest possible state; the Republic had never, since the commencement of the war, had on foot an army so perfect in its composition, so admirably organized, and so completely furnished with all the appointments requisite for carrying on a campaign. The army of Italy was re-enforced to eighty thousand men; its cavalry and artillery were in an especial manner augmented; and, besides these great forces, a reserve of ten thousand chosen troops was formed at Amiens, to watch the movements of the English expeditions, and which, as soon as

* Parl. Hist., xxxv., p. 551, 555. Dum., v., 11, 12. Ann. Reg., 1800, 215.

† Parl. Hist., xxxv., 566, 583. Nap., ii., 8, 9. Dum., v., 12, 14. Ann. Reg., 1800, 215.

‡ Jom., xiv., 15.

* Dum., v., 13, 14. Nap., ii., 9.

† Jom., xiv., 24.

they proceeded to the coast of Spain, was moved to the south to support the army of Italy in the Grisons. In all, the Republic had 240,000 men in the field, ready for active operations;* and besides this, there was nearly an equal force in Egypt, Malta, in the dépôts of the interior, or stationed along the coasts.

Austria, on her part, had made good use, during the four months of the armistice, of the resources of the monarchy and the subsidies of England. Never, on any former occasion, had the patriotic spirit of her inhabitants shone forth with more lustre, nor all ranks co-operated with more enthusiastic zeal, in the measures for the common defence. No sooner was it announced, by the refusal of Napoleon to treat with either court separately, that peace was no longer to be hoped for, than the generous flame, like an electric shock, burst forth at once in every part of the monarchy. The Archduke Palatine repaired to Hungary, decreed the formation of a levy *en masse*, and threw himself on those generous feelings which, in the days of Maria Theresa, had saved the throne. The emperor announced his resolution to put himself at the head of the army, and actually repaired to the Inn for that purpose. His presence excited to the highest degree the spirit of the people and the soldiers. The Archduke Charles, in his government of Bohemia, pressed the organization of twelve thousand men, destined to co-operate with the army on the Inn in resisting the menaced invasion; and the empress sent to that accomplished prince a helmet set with magnificent jewels. These warlike measures excited the utmost enthusiasm among all classes; the peasantry everywhere flew to arms; the nobles vied with each other in the equipment of regiments of horse, or the contribution of large sums of money; every town and village resounded with the note of military preparation. But, unfortunately, the jealousy, or erroneous views of the Aulic Council, were but ill calculated to turn to the best account this general burst of patriotic spirit; the Archduke Charles, indeed, in accordance with the unanimous wishes of the army, was declared generalissimo, but instead of being sent to head the forces on the Inn, he was retained in his subordinate situation of the government of Bohemia. Kray, whose talents at Ulm had so long arrested the progress of disaster, was dismissed to his estates in Hungary, while the command of his army was given to the Archduke John, a young man of great promise and thorough military education, but whose inexperience, even though aided by the councils of Lauer, the grand-master of artillery, was but ill calculated to contend with the scientific abilities of Moreau.†

Before the renewal of hostilities, Austria had greatly augmented her forces in all quarters. Five thousand additional troops in the English pay had been obtained from Bavaria; the cession of Philippsburgh, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, had rendered disposable 18,000 more; and the recruits from the interior amounted to 15,000 men. These additions had so far counterbalanced the heavy losses sustained during the campaign by sickness, fatigue, and the sword,

that the Imperialists could reckon upon 110,000 effective men on the Inn to defend the frontiers of the hereditary states. But this great force, after the usual system of the Austrians, was weakened by the vast extent of country over which it was spread. The right, twenty-seven thousand strong, occupied Ratisbon and the Palatinate; the left, consisting of eighteen thousand men, under Hiller, was stationed in the German Tyrol; so that not more than sixty thousand combatants could be relied on to maintain the important line of the Inn. In Italy, Field-marshal Bellegarde had 100,000 under his command; but they, too, were weakened by the immense line they had to defend; 15,000 were in the Italian Tyrol, under Davidowich; 10,000 in Ancona and Tuscany; 20,000 were formed of the Neapolitan troops, who could be little relied on; so that, for the decisive shock on the Mincio, not more than 60,000 effective men could be assembled.*

Nor was the imperial cabinet less active in its endeavors to awaken the northern powers to a sense of the dangers which menaced them, from the great abilities and evident ambition of the First Consul. Special envoys were despatched to St. Petersburg and Berlin to endeavour to rouse the Russian and Prussian cabinets into activity, but in vain. Frederic William persisted in the system of neutrality which he had so long pursued, and was destined so bitterly to expiate; and the Emperor Paul, intent upon his newly-acquired ideas of the freedom of the seas, refused to embroil himself with France, and in the pursuit of the imaginary vision of maritime independence, fixed upon Europe the real evils of territorial slavery. He retained a hundred and twenty thousand men inactive, under Kutusoff and Count Pahlen, on the frontiers of Lithuania, who, if thrown into the scale at this critical moment, might have righted the balance when it was beginning to decline, and saved Russia from the rout of Austerlitz and the conflagration of Moscow.†

It is painful to be obliged to add, that the military efforts of England, though intended to follow out the true spirit of the alliance, were not better calculated to aid the common cause. On the 4th of June an attack was made on the forts in Quiberon Bay, by the squadron under the command of Sir Edward Pellew; but after gaining a trifling success, and dismantling the fortification, they embarked without making any permanent impression. Early in July a secret expedition, under the command of Sir James Pulteney, consisting of eight thousand men, sailed for the coast of France.

It first appeared off Belleisle; but as the strong works on that island rendered any attack a difficult enterprise, it shortly made sail from the coast of France, and landed in the neighbourhood of Ferrol. After two skirmishes, in which the Spaniards were defeated, the British took possession of the heights which overlook the harbour, and everything promised the immediate reduction of that important fortress, with the fleet within its walls, when the English commander, intimidated by the

* Nap., ii., 20, 21. Dum., v., 16, 17. Jom., xiv., 63, 65.
† Dum., v., 21, 27, 80, 81. Jom., xiv., 13, 14.

* Nap., ii., 19, 20. Jom., xiv., 72, 73. Dum., v., 20, 21.
† Dum., v., 21, 22. Jom., xiv., 23, 24.

rumour of re-enforcements having reached the town, withdrew his forces, and made sail for Gibraltar, where Abercromby, with the expedition which had so long lain inactive at Port Mahon, awaited his arrival.*

The union of two squadrons, having on board above twenty thousand English troops, in the Straits of Gibraltar, excited the utmost alarm through the whole Peninsula. This armament, the greatest which had yet sailed from the British shores during the whole war, menaced alike Carthage, Seville, and Cadiz. Re-enforcements from all quarters were hastily directed to the lines of St. Roche in front of Gibraltar; vessels were sunk at the entrance of the harbour of Cadiz, and all the means adopted which could be thought of to repel the threatened attack. The British commanders, instead of making sail, the moment they arrived, for the isle of St. Leon, lay above a fortnight inactive in the Straits of Gibraltar, and at length appeared off Cadiz on the 5th October. Oct. 5. Never was a more formidable armament assembled; the naval forces consisted of twenty sail of the line, twenty-seven frigates, and eighty-four transports, having on board above twenty thousand foot-soldiers. As far as the eye could reach, the ocean was covered by the innumerable sails of the British armada, which seemed destined to revenge on Spain the terrors of the celebrated armament which had been baffled by the firmness of Elizabeth. Noways intimidated by the formidable spectacle, the Spanish governor wrote a touching letter to the British commanders, in which he adjured them not to add to the calamities which already overwhelmed the inhabitants, from an epidemic which carried off several hundreds of persons daily. They replied that the town would not be attacked if the ships of war were delivered up; and as this was not acceded to, preparations were made for landing the troops; but before they could debark, the accounts received of the yellow fever within its walls were so serious, that the British commanders apprehended that if the city were taken, the ulterior objects of the expedition might be frustrated by the effect of the contagion among the troops, and withdrew from the infected isle to the Straits of Gibraltar.†

But while the honour of the British arms was tarnished by the failure of such mighty forces on the western coast of Europe, an event of the utmost importance to the future progress of the maritime war occurred in the Mediterranean. Malta, which for above two years had been closely blockaded by the British forces by land and sea, began, in the course of this summer, to experience the pangs of hunger. Two frigates sailed from the harbour in the end of August with part of the garrison, one of which was speedily taken by the British cruisers. At length, all their means of subsistence having been exhausted, a capitulation was entered into in the middle of September, in virtue of which the French were to be conveyed as prisoners of war, not to serve till regularly

exchanged, to Marseilles; and this noble fortress, embracing the finest harbour in the world within its impregnable walls, long the bulwark of Christendom against the Turks, and now the undisputed mistress of the Mediterranean, was permanently annexed to the British dominions.*

The hopes of the imperial cabinet, in the event of a renewal of the war, were not a little founded on the hostile attitude of the south of Italy, which, it was hoped, the arrival of the English expedition under Abercromby would give a certain degree of consistency. Pope Pius VI. had sunk under the hardships of his captivity in France, and died in March of this year. The choice of the Roman conclave, assembled, under the imperial influence, at Venice, fell on the Cardinal Chiaramonte, who assumed the tiara under the title of Pius VII. At the time when he ascended the papal throne the inhabitants of Rome were suffering severely under the exactions of the Neapolitans, and he wisely resolved to do his utmost to alleviate their misfortunes. Without, therefore, engaging openly in the war, he lent a willing ear to the propositions which the First Consul, who was extremely desirous of the support of the supreme pontiff, instantly made to him. But the other parts of Italy were in the most hostile state. A body of ten thousand Neapolitans had taken a position on the Tronto between the Upper Abruzzes and the march of Ancona; a Neapolitan division, under Count Roger de Damas, was in the Roman States; Piedmont, in consternation at the recent annexation of the Novarese territory to the Cisalpine Republic, and the innumerable oppressions of the French armies, was in so agitated a state, that a spark might blow it into open combustion; while the peasants of Tuscany, in open insurrection to support the imperial cause, presented a tumultuary array of seven or eight thousand men. These bands, it is true, were little formidable to regular troops in the field; but as long as they continued in arms, they required to be watched by detachments, which diminished the strength of the army; and it was one of the motives which induced Napoleon to accede to the prolongation of the armistice with Austria, that it would give him time, during its continuance, to clear his flank of these troublesome irregulars.†

As the armistice, by a strange oversight, did not extend to the Italian powers, and the English expedition was detained in useless demonstrations on the coast of Spain, it was no difficult matter for the French troops to effect this object. General Summariva, to whom the Grand-duke of Tuscany had intrusted the military forces of his states, was rapidly proceeding with the organization of the peasants in the Apennines, when Dupont, early in October, intimated to him that, unless the insurrection was forthwith disbanded, he would move against Tuscany with a formidable force. As

And from dread of the plague, declines to attack Cadiz.

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* Ann. Reg., 1800, 212, 213. Jom., xiv., 46, 47. Dum., v., 42.

† Ann. Reg., 1800, 216. Jom., xiv., 47, 48. Dum., iv., 242, 247.

* Ann. Reg., 1800, 215. Jom., xiv., 13, 14. Bot., iv., 49, 50.

† Bot., iv., 49, 50. Dum., v., 62, 63. Nap., ii., 11. Jom., xiv., 141, 142.

Affairs of Italy. Election of Pius VII. at Venice.

Hostility of Naples, and insurrections in Piedmont against France.

The French crush the Tuscan states with great cruelty.

these summonses met with no attention, the French troops advanced in great force, in three columns. After a vain attempt to defend the

Oct. 15. Apennines, Florence was occupied on the 15th. The Austrians, under Summariva, retired towards Ancona, and the greater part of the insurgents retired to Arezzo,

Oct. 18. where they resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. An attempt to force open the gates having failed, the French General Mounier made preparations for a general assault, which took place on the following morning at five o'clock. No-

Oct. 19. thing could resist the impetuosity of the French columns; the grenadiers mounted the scaling ladders amid a shower of balls; quickly they made themselves masters of the rampart, and chasing the unhappy peasants from house to house, and street to street, soon filled the town with conflagration and carnage. The slaughter was dreadful; a few escaped by subterraneous passages, and made good their flight into the country; others retired into the citadel, which was soon obliged to surrender at discretion, and was razed to the ground; but by far the greater number perished in the town, under the sword of an irritated and relentless victor.*

This bloody stroke proved fatal to the Tuscan insurrection. The fugitives who escaped the carnage spread far and wide the most dismal accounts of the fate of their unhappy comrades, and the peasants, thunderstruck with the rapidity and severity of the blow, lost no time in deprecating the wrath of an enemy who appeared irresistible. Sommariva, fettered by the armistice with Austria, retired entirely from the Tuscan States, and the inhabitants, left to their own means of defence, had no resource but in immediate submission. A strong division was immediately despatched to Leghorn, which entered the place without opposition, and after the barbarous method of carrying on war now adopted by the First Consul, instantly confiscated the whole English property in the harbour and town. Forty-six vessels, with their cargoes, besides 750,000 quintals of wheat and barley, and 90,000 quintals of dried vegetables, were thus obtained for the use of the army, an acquisition of great importance to its future operations;† but which, like all other ill-gotten gains, in the end recoiled upon the heads of those who acquired them, and contributed to form that deep and universal hatred at the French dominion which at length precipitated Napoleon from the throne.

At the same period, the Swiss, whose divisions and Democratic transports had exposed their country to the severities of Republican conquest, were doomed to drain to the

Oct. 16. dregs the cup of misery and humiliation. The shadow even of their independence vanished before the armed intervention of the First Consul. The numerous insurrections of the peasants against the enormous requisitions of the Republican agents; the obstinate resistance of the partisans of the ancient constitutions; the general

anarchy and dissolution of government which prevailed, loudly called for a remedy. Napoleon applied it, by causing his minister Reinhard to declare to the Democratic despots who ruled the country, that he would recognise no authority but that of the executive commission to whom he transmitted his orders: a declaration which at once brought the whole country under the immediate sway of the central government at the Tuileries.*

The English in the course of this year made themselves masters of Surinam, Capture of Surinam and Demerara. Berbice, St. Eustache, and Demerara, Dutch settlements on the mainland and in the islands of the West Indies.

At the same time, Napoleon published an edict, permanently incorporating the provinces acquired by the Republic on the left bank of the Rhine, and extending the French laws and institutions to these valuable acquisitions. Thus, while England was extending its mighty arms over both hemispheres,† France was laying its iron grasp on the richest and most important provinces of Europe. The strife could not be other than desperate between two such powers.

Such was the state of Europe when the armistice of Hohenlinden was denounced Nov. 28. by the First Consul, and hostilities recommenced at all points in the end of November.

Had the Aulic Council determined to remain on the defensive, no line was more Description of the line of the resistance to the invader than that Inn.

of the Inn. That river, which does not yield to the Rhine either in the impetuosity or the volume of waters which it rolls towards the Danube, meanders in the Tyrol as far as Kufstein, between inaccessible ridges of mountains, whose sides, darkened with pine forests, are surmounted by bare peaks, occasionally streaked, even in the height of summer, with snow. From thence to Muhldorf it flows in a deep bed, cut by the vehemence of the torrent through solid rock, whose sides present a series of perpendicular precipices on either bank, excepting only in a few well-known points, which were strongly guarded and armed with cannon. This powerful line, supported on the left by the fortress of Kufstein, and on the right by that of Braunau, both of which were in a formidable state of defence, was flanked on either side by two immense bastions, equally menacing to an invading enemy; the one formed by the Tyrol, with its warlike and devoted population and inaccessible mountains, the other by Bohemia and the chain of the Bohmerwald, which skirts the Danube from Lintz to Straubing, where the Archduke Charles was organizing a numerous body of forces.‡

Had the Austrians, headed by the Archduke Charles, remained on the defensive in this strong position, it is probable that all the disasters of the campaign would have been avoided. It was next to impossible to force such a central line, defended by eighty thousand men, under the direction of that great commander; while to attempt to turn it, either by the Tyrol

* Bot., iv., 50, 55. Dum., v., 67, 68. Jom., xiv., 144.

145. Nap., ii., 18, 19.

† Dum., v., 69. Nap., ii., 18. Jom., xiv., 145, 146.

* Dum., v., 71.

† Dum., v., 24, 25.

‡ Personal observation. Jom., xiv., 73, 74. Dum., v., 82. Nap., ii., 27.

or Bohemia, would have been equally perilous. To detach thirty thousand men into the defiles leading into Bohemia would have been immi- nently hazardous, when so large a force threat- ened the centre of the invader; while a similar movement into the Tyrol, besides being attend- ed with the same danger, would have incurred the hazard of being defeated by the Prince of Reuss, who occupied the impregnable passes and fortresses which guarded the entrance into that difficult country. But from these difficul- ties the French were relieved by the resolution of the Imperialists to cross the Inn, and carry the war vigorously into the heart of Bavaria: a project which might have led to victory if con- ducted by the experience and ability of the Archduke Charles, but terminated in nothing but disaster in the hands of his brave but inex- perienced successor.*

Although the offensive movement of the Im- perialists led to such calamitous re- sults, it was skilfully combined, and promised in the outset the most brilliant success. The Republican right, under Lecourbe, stretched through the Vorarlberg Mountains to Feldkirch in the Tyrol; the centre, under Moreau in person, was in position at Ebersberg, on the high road leading from Mu- nich to Haag; the left, commanded by Grenier, was stationed at Hohenlinden, on the road to Muhlendorf. The project of the Imperialists was to detach Klenau from Ratisbon towards Land- shut, where he was to be joined by Keimayer with twenty thousand men;† meanwhile the centre was to advance by echellons towards Hohenlinden, and bear the weight of their forces on the Republican left, where the least re- sistance might be expected.

Hostilities were commenced by Augereau, who was at the head of the Gallo-Bata- vian army. He denounced the armi- stance four days before his colleagues, and ad- vanced, at the head of twenty thousand men, from Frankfort by the course of the Maine to- wards Wurtzburg. Though the imperial forces in that quarter were nearly equal to his own, they opposed but a feeble resistance, from being composed chiefly of the troops recently levied in Bohemia and the states of Mayence, little calculated to resist the French veterans. After

Operations a slight combat the Imperialists were on the Low- repulsed at all points: the Baron Al- der Rhine. bini, after an ephemeral success at Aschaffenburg, was driven with loss out of that town, and forced back to Schweinfurth, while Dumonceau pushed on to Wurtzburg and summoned the garrison, which shut itself in the citadel. The first effect of these disasters was to dissolve the insurrectionary troops of May- ence under Albin, who never appeared again during the campaign. The Austrian general Simbschen, reduced by this defection to thirty- Dec. 3. teen thousand men, took a position at Bourg-Eberach to cover Bamberg; he was there attacked on the following day by Augereau, and, after an obstinate conflict, driv- en back to Pommersfeld. Satisfied with this success, the French general established his troops behind the Regnitz to await the fall of the citadel of Wurtzburg, which Dumonceau

was beginning to besiege in regular form.* These advantages were much more important upon the issue of the campaign than might have been supposed from the quality and num- bers of the troops engaged; for, by clearing the extreme left of Moreau, they permitted him to draw his left wing, under Sainte Suzanne, nearer to his centre, and re-enforce the grand army on the Inn, in the precise quarter where it was menaced by the Imperialists.

Meanwhile, operations of the most decisive importance had taken place on the Nov. 27. The Inn. On the 27th of November the Imperialists broke up to exe- Austrians ad- cuate their intended concentration vance into Ba- varia. on the right towards Landshut; but the heavy rains which fell at that time retarded consider- ably the march of their columns, and it was not till the 29th that their advanced guard reached that place. At the same time, Moreau concentrated his forces in the centre, and ad- vanced by Haag towards Amping and Muhl- dorf. Fearful of continuing his flank move- ment in presence of a powerful enemy, who threatened to fall perpendicularly on his line of march, the archduke arrested his columns, and ran the hazard of a general battle on the direct road to Munich. They accordingly, on the 30th, retraced their steps, and moved through crossroads towards Amping and Dorfen. This lateral movement, performed amid torrents of rain, and in dreadful roads, completed the ex- haustion of the Austrian troops, but it led, in the first instance, to the most promising re- sults.†

By a singular accident, Moreau had heard nothing of the advance of the Impe- rialists towards Landshut, far less of Movements of Moreau. their cross movement to Amping; but some confused accounts had merely reached the Republican headquarters of considerable assemblages of the enemy towards Muhlendorf, and the French general, desirous to explore his way, pushed forward strong reconnoitring parties in that direction. His right occupied Rosenheim, his left and centre were gradually ap- proaching the Austrian columns by Haag and Wasserbourg. The effect of this movement was to bring the imperial army, sixty thousand strong, and massed together, perpendicularly against the left of the French, who, ignorant of their danger, were advancing in straggling and detached columns to discover where they were.‡

The effect of this state of things, and of the able manœuvre of the archduke, speedily show- ed itself. The French army, turned and out- generalled, was exposed to be cut up in detail, while separated in a line of march by an Dec. 1. enemy drawn up in battle-array on one of its flanks. Grenier, who was the first in advance, was leisurely approaching Amping, when he was suddenly assailed by vast masses of the enemy, in admirable order and battle- array: he was speedily thrown into confusion and put to the rout. In vain Ney Great success displayed all his talent and resolu- of the Austri- tion to sustain the weight of the im- ans in the out- perial columns: his troops, after a set.

* Dum., v., 86, 95. Nap., ii., 23, 24. Jom., xiv., 81, 85.

† Jom., xiv., 85, 87. Dum., v., 100, 105.

‡ Nap., ii., 30. Jom., xiv., 88, 90. Dum., v., 104, 105.

* Jom., xiv., 76. † Jom., xiv., 79. Dum., v., 96, 97.

brave resistance, were broken and driven back upon the division of Grandjean, while that of Hardy, which advanced to its support, shared the same fate. At the same time, Legrand, after a sharp conflict in the valley of Issen, was constrained to fall back to the neighbourhood of Dorfen. The Imperialists were everywhere successful. They had attacked, in compact and regular masses, the enemy's divisions while in march and separated, and spread alarm and discouragement from the general's tent to the sentinels' outposts.*

So far the most brilliant success had attended the Austrian advance, and if it had been vigorously followed up by a general capable of appreciating the immense advantages which it offered, and forcing back the enemy's retreating columns without intermission upon those which came up to their support, it might have led to the total defeat of the French army, and changed the whole fortune of the campaign. But the Archduke John, satisfied with this first advantage, allowed the enemy to recover from their consternation. On the following day no forward movement was made, and Moreau, skilfully availing himself of that respite, retired through the forest of HOHENLINDEN to the ground which he had originally occupied, and carefully studied as the probable theatre of a decisive conflict.†

The space which lies between the Inn and the Isar, which is from twelve to fifteen leagues in breadth, is intersected in its centre by this forest, now celebrated not less in history than in poetry.‡ Parallel to the course of the two rivers, its woods form a natural barrier or stockade six or seven leagues long, and from a league to a league and a half broad. Two great roads only, that from Munich to Wasserbourg, and from Munich to Muhlendorf, traverse that thick and gloomy forest, where the pine-trees approach each other so closely as in most places to render the passage of cavalry or artillery, excepting on the great roads, impossible. The village of Hohenlinden is at the entrance on the Munich side of the one defile, that of Matenpot at the mouth of that leading to Muhlendorf. The village of Ebersberg forms the entrance of the other defile leading to Wasserbourg. Between these two roads the broken and uneven surface of the forest is traversed only by country paths, almost impracticable during the storms of winter even to foot-soldiers.§

Moreau, with his staff, had carefully reconnoitred this ground; and as soon as it became evident that the archduke was to advance through its dangerous defiles, he prepared, with the art of a consummate general, to turn it to the best account. Rapidly concentrating his forces in the plain at the entrance of the defiles on the Munich side, he at the same time gave orders to Richepanse, with his division, to advance across the forest, so as to fall, early on the morning of the 3d, perpendicularly on the line of the great road from Hohenlinden to Muhlendorf. He naturally

anticipated that this movement would bring him on the flank of the Austrian centre, when entangled in the defile, with its long train of artillery and chariots; and that, if the Republican force at the entrance of the pass could only maintain its ground till this side attack took place, the ruin of the whole column, or, at least, the capture of all its cannon, would be the result. To effect this object, he concentrated all the forces he could command at the mouth of the defile; but so unforeseen was the attack, that not above two thirds of his army could take a part in the action; neither the right wing under Lecourbe, nor the half of the left, under Sainte Suzanne, could be expected to arrive so as to render any assistance.*

The Imperialists had committed the great error of allowing the surprised Republicans all the 2d to concentrate their scattered forces; but they did not, on the following day, repeat their mistake. Early on the morning of the 3d, a day ever memorable in the military annals of France, all their troops were in motion, and they plunged, in three great columns, into the forest to approach the enemy. The centre, forty thousand strong, advanced by the great road from Muhlendorf to Munich, the only road which was practicable, in the dreadful state of the weather, for artillery; above a hundred pieces of cannon and five hundred chariots encumbered its movements. The infantry marched first; then came the long train of artillery and caissons; the cavalry closed the procession. The right wing, under the command of General Latour, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, followed the inferior road leading from Wasserbourg to Munich; Keim Mayer moved on the flank of that column, with his light troops, through the forest; while the left wing, under Riesch, was directed to proceed by a crosspath by Albichen to St. Christophe. The imperial columns, animated by their success on the preceding days, joyfully commenced their march over the yet unstained snow two hours before it was daylight, deeming the enemy in full retreat, and little anticipating any resistance before their forces were united and disposed in battle-array, in the open plain, on the Munich side of the forest.†

From the outset, however, the most sinister presages attended their steps. During the night the wind had changed; the heavy rain of the preceding days turned into snow, which fell, as at Eylau, in such thick flakes as to render it impossible to see twenty yards before the head of the column, while the dreary expanse of the forest presented, under the trees, a uniform white surface, on which it was impossible to distinguish the beaten track.‡ The crosspaths between the roads which the troops followed, bad at any time, were almost impassable in such a storm; and each body, isolated in the snowy wilderness, was left to its own resources, without either receiving intelligence or deriving assistance from the other. The central column,

* Nap., ii., 31, 32. Jom., xiv., 94, 96. Dum., v., 111, 112. Mém. du Dépôt de la Guerre, v., 242.

† Nap., ii., 33. Mém., v., 251. Dum., v., 114, 116. Jom., xiv., 95, 97.

‡ "On Linden, when the sun was low,
All bloodless lay the untrodden snow,
And dark as winter was the flow
Of Isar rolling rapidly."

* Jom., xiv., 90, 91. Nap., ii., 30, 31. Dum., v., 104, 109.
† Nap., ii., 31. Dum., v., 107, 108. Jom., xiv., 91, 92.
‡ The reader will recollect Mr. Campbell's noble Ode to Hohenlinden. § Dum., v., 109, 110. Pers. observation.

which advanced along the only good road, outstripped the others, and its head had traversed the forest, and approached Hohenlinden about nine o'clock. It was there met by the division of Grouchy, and a furious conflict immediately commenced; the Austrians endeavouring to debouch from the defile and extend themselves along the front of the wood, the French to coerce their movements and drive them back into the forest. Both parties made the most incredible efforts; the snow, which fell without interruption, prevented the opposing lines from seeing each other; but they aimed at the flash which appeared through the gloom, and rushed forward with blind fury to the deadly charge of the bayonet. Insensibly, however, the Austrians gained ground; their ranks were gradually extending in front of the wood, when Generals Grouchy and Grandjean put themselves at the head of fresh battalions, and by a decisive charge drove them back into the forest. The imperial ranks were broken by the trees, but still they resisted bravely in the entangled thickets; posted behind the trunks, they kept up a murderous fire on the enemy; and the contending armies, broken into single file, fought, man to man, with invincible resolution.*†

While this desperate conflict was going on in front of Hohenlinden, the leading ranks of the Austrian right began to appear at the entrance of the forest, on the other road. Ney instantly repaired with his division to the scene of danger, and by a vigorous charge on the flank of the enemy's column, which was in the act of deploying, not only drove it back into the wood, but captured eight pieces of cannon and a thousand prisoners.‡

The effect of these vigorous efforts on the part of Moreau, in preventing the deploying of the heads of the imperial columns from the forest, was to introduce vacillation and confusion into the long train in their centre, which, unable to advance from the combat in its front, and pressed on by the crowd in its rear, soon began to fall into confusion. They were in this state, jammed up amid long files of cannon and wagons, when the division of Richepanse, which had broken up early in the morning from Ebersberg, on the Munich side of the one defile, and struggled on, with invincible resolution, through dreadful roads across the forest, arrived in the neighbourhood of Matenpot, on the Muhl-dorf side of the other, directly in the rear of the centre of the Austrian army, and at the close of its protracted array. But just as it was approaching this decisive point, and slowly advancing in open column through the forest, this division was itself pierced through the centre, near St. Christophe, by the Austrian left wing, under Riesch, which, moving up by the valley of Albichen to gain the chaussée of Wasserbourg, by which it was destined to pierce through the forest, fell perpendicularly on its line of march. Thus Richepanse, with half his division, found him-

self irretrievably separated from the remainder; the manœuvre which he was destined to have performed on the centre of the Imperialists was turned against himself, and with a single brigade he was placed between that immense body and their left wing. An ordinary general, in such alarming circumstances, would have sought safety in flight, and thus, by allowing the imperial centre to continue its advance, endangered the victory; but Richepanse, whose able mind was penetrated with the importance of his mission, bravely resolved to push on with the single brigade which remained under his command, and fall on the rear of the grand column of the enemy. He sent orders, therefore, to his separated brigade to maintain itself to the last extremity at St. Christophe, and advanced with the utmost intrepidity towards Matenpot and the line of march of the grand Austrian column.*

When the troops approached the great road, they came upon the cuirassiers of The Austrian line of communication is intercepted. Lichtenstein, who formed part of that vast body, who had dismounted; and were reposing leisurely under the trees until the great park of artillery and the reserves of Kollowrath had passed the defile. It may easily be imagined with what astonishment they beheld this new enemy on their flank, who was the more unexpected, as they knew that their left wing, under Riesch, had passed through the forest, and they deemed themselves perfectly secure on that side. They made, in consequence, little resistance, and were speedily driven off the chaussée. Not content with this success, Richepanse left to his cavalry the charge of keeping off the imperial cuirassiers, and advanced himself with the two remaining regiments of infantry to attack the rear of the imperial centre in the forest of Hohenlinden. The appearance of this force, amounting to nearly three thousand men, behind them, excited the utmost alarm in the Austrian column. The troops of that nation are proverbially more sensitive than any in Europe to the danger of being turned when in a line of march. A brigade of the Bavarian reserve was speedily directed to the menaced point, but it was overwhelmed in its advance by the crowds of fugitives, and thrown into such disorder by the overturned cannon and caissons which blocked up the road, that it never reached the enemy. Three Hungarian battalions were next brought up, but after resisting bravely, amid the general consternation around them, they too at length were broken and fled. This little action decided the victory; the whole Austrian artillery lay exposed to the attacks of the victor in a situation where it was incapable of making any resistance.†

Moreau, at the entrance of the defile in front of Hohenlinden, was still maintaining an anxious conflict, when the sound of cannon in the direction of Matenpot, and the appearance of hesitation and confusion in the enemy's columns, announced that the decisive attack in the chaussée behind them, by Richepanse, had taken place. He instantly directed Grouchy and

* "Tis morn, but scarce yon level sun
Can pierce the war clouds rolling dun,
Where furious Frank and fiery Hun,
Shout in their sulphurous canopy."

† Dum., v., 117, 118. Jom., xiv., 96, 97. Mém., v., 260, 267. Nap., ii., 32, 33.

‡ Ney's Mem., ii., 48, 57. Nap., ii., 34. Dum., v., 118.

* Nap., ii., 34, 35. Jom., xiv., 97, 99. Dum., v., 119, 120. Mém., v., 270, 274.

† Nap., ii., 35, 36. Jom., xiv., 99, 100. Dum., v., 121, 122.

Ney to make a combined charge in front on the enemy. The French battalions, which had so long maintained an obstinate defence, now commenced a furious onset, and the Austrian centre, shaken by the alarm in its rear, was violently assailed in front. The combined effort was irresistible. Ney, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, pressed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, along the chaussée, until the loud shouts of the troops announced that they had joined the victorious Richepanse, who was advancing along the same road to meet him, as fast as its innumerable encumbrances would permit. No words can paint the confusion which now ensued in the Austrian column. The artillery-drivers cut their traces, and galloped in all directions into the forest; the infantry disbanded and fled; the cavalry rushed in tumultuous squadrons to the rear, trampling under foot whatever opposed their passage; the wagons were abandoned to their fate, and amid the universal wreck, 97 pieces of cannon, 300 caissons, and 7000 prisoners fell into the enemy's hands.*

While this decisive success was gained in the centre, the columns of Latour and Keinmayer, who had succeeded in debouching from the forest, and united in the plain on its other side, violently assailed the Republican left, where Grenier, with inferior forces, defended the other road to Munich. Notwithstanding all his efforts, and the assistance of a part of the division of Ney, he was sensibly losing ground, when the intelligence of the defeat of the centre compelled the enemy to abandon his advantages, and retire precipitately into the forest. Grenier instantly resumed the offensive, and by a general charge of all his forces, succeeded in overwhelming the Austrians while struggling through the defile, and taking six pieces of cannon and fifteen hundred prisoners. At the same time, General Decaen, with a fresh brigade, disengaged the half of Richepanse's division, cut off during his absence, which was hard pressed between General Riesch's corps and the retiring columns of the centre, who still preserved their ranks. Before night, the Republicans, at all points, had passed the forest. Four of their divisions were assembled at Matenpot, and the headquarters were advanced to Haag, while the Imperialists, weakened by the loss of above 100 pieces of cannon and 14,000 soldiers, took advantage of the night to withdraw their shattered forces across the Inn.†

Such was the great and memorable battle of Hohenlinden, the most decisive, with the exception of that of Rivoli, which had yet been gained by either party during the war, and superior even to that renowned conflict in the trophies by which it was graced, and the immense consequences by which it was followed. The loss of the French on that and the preceding days was 9000 men, but that of the Imperialists was nearly twice as great, when the deserters and missing were taken into account; they lost two thirds of their artillery, and the moral consequences of the de-

feat were fatal to the campaign. The victory of Marengo itself was less momentous in its military consequences. It merely gave the Republicans possession of the Sardinian fortresses and the Cisalpine Republic; but the disaster of Hohenlinden threw the army of Germany without resource on the hereditary states, and at once prostrated the strength of the monarchy.*

Common justice must award to Moreau the merit of skilful combination, and ad-^{Merit of Mo-}mirable use of the advantages of Moreau in gain-^{ing it.} ground in this great victory; but it is, at the same time, manifest that he owed much to chance, and that fortune crowned a well-conceived plan of defence by a decisive offensive movement. The whole arrangements of the French general were defensive; he merely wished to gain time, in order to enable his right and left wings, under Lecourbe and Sainte Suzanne, to arrive and take a part in the action. By the movements on previous days he was so far outgeneralled, that, though his army, on the whole, was greatly superior to that of his opponents, he was obliged to fight at Amping with an inferiority of one to two, and at Hohenlinden on equal terms. The movement of General Richepanse, however well conceived to retard or prevent the passage of the forest by the Austrian army, could not have been reckoned upon as likely to produce decisive success; for if he had advanced half an hour later, or if Riesch's column, which it should have done, according to the Austrian disposition, had arrived half an hour sooner, he would have fallen into the midst of superior forces, and both his division and that of Decaen, which followed his footsteps, would probably have perished. The imprudence of the Austrians in engaging in these perilous defiles in presence of the enemy's army, and not arranging matters so that all their columns might reach the enemy at the same time, undoubtedly was the principal cause of the disaster which followed; but although Moreau's arrangements were such as would probably, at all events, have secured for him the victory, it was the fortunate accidents which occurred during the action which occasioned its decisive result.†‡

Thunderstruck by this great disaster, the whole imperial army retired behind the Inn, and made a show of maintaining itself on that formidable line of defence. But it was but a show. From the first the disposition of its columns, disposed in part in echelon along the road to Salzbouurg, indicated an intention of retreating in that direction. After maturely weighing all the circumstances of the case, Moreau resolved to force the passage of the Upper Inn, on the road to Salzbouurg; but, in order to deceive the enemy, he caused all the boats of the Iser to be

The Austrians retire behind the Inn.

* *Jom.*, xiv., 107. *Nap.*, ii., 131. *Dum.*, v., 129.

† *Jom.*, xiv., 106, 107. *Nap.*, ii., 52, 54.

‡ Napoleon's observations on this battle, and the whole campaign of Moreau, have been here adopted only in so far as they appear to be consonant to reason and justice. They are distinguished by his usual ability, but strongly tinged by that venomous feeling towards his great rival which formed so powerful a feature in his character. Jealousy towards every one who had either essentially injured or rivalled his reputation, and a total disregard of truth when recounting their operations, are two of the defects in so great a man, upon which it is at once the most necessary and the most painful duty of the historian to dwell.

* *Jom.*, xiv., 99, 101. *Mém.*, v., 272, 284. *Dum.*, v., 121, 124. *Nap.*, ii., 36, 37.

† *Nap.*, ii., 36, 37. *Dum.*, v., 127, 128. *Jom.*, xiv., 101, 105. *Mém.*, v., 280, 285.

assembled at Munich, collected the bulk of his forces in that direction, and gave out that he was about to cross the lower part of the river. By adopting this line of advance, the French general had the prospect of cutting off the Imperialists from their left wing, hitherto untouched, in the Tyrol; menacing Upper Austria and Vienna, and endangering the retreat of Bellegarde from the plains of Italy. These advantages were so important that they overbalanced the obvious difficulties of the advance in that direction, arising from the necessity of crossing three mountain streams, the Inn, the Alza, and the Salza, and the obstacles that might be thrown in their way from the strength of the mountain ridges in the neighbourhood of Salzburg.*

While the boats of the Iser were publicly conducted, with the utmost possible *éclat*, to the Lower Inn, Lecourbe caused a bridge equipage to be secretly transported in the night to Rosenheim, on the road to Salzburg, and having collected thirty-five thousand men in the neighbourhood, established a battery of twenty-eight pieces during the night of the 8th of December at Neuperen, where the Inn flows in a narrow channel, and which is the only point in that quarter where the right bank is commanded by the left. At six o'clock on the following morning, while it was yet pitch-dark, the French cannon, whose arrival was wholly unknown to the Austrian videttes, opened a furious fire, so well directed that the Imperialists were obliged to retire, and the Republicans instantly constructed a bridge, and threw across so strong a body of troops as gave them a solid footing on the left bank. At the same time, a battery was placed in front of the bridge at Rosenheim, in order to prevent the burning of the remaining arches of that wooden structure, of which one only had been destroyed; but the corps of the Prince of Condé, which was stationed on the opposite bank, faithfully discharged its duty, and the whole bridge was soon consumed. In consequence of this circumstance, Lecourbe's troops were obliged to make a circuit by the passage at Neuperen, but so dilatory were the movements of the Imperialists that no sufficient force could be collected to oppose their progress; a second bridge of boats was constructed near Rosenheim, by which Richepanse's division was passed over, and the Austrians, abandoning the whole line of the Upper Inn, retired behind the Salza. Thus was one of the most formidable military lines in Europe broken through in the space of a few hours, without the loss of a single man.†

This extraordinary success was chiefly owing to the Imperialists having been led, by the demonstrations of Moreau against the Lower Inn, to concentrate the right wing of their army, which had suffered least in the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden, in that quarter, which removed it three or four marches from the scene where the real attack was made. No sooner did they receive intelligence of the passage of Lecourbe over the Upper Inn, than they hastily moved

all their disposable troops towards the menaced point; but finding that the enemy were established on the right bank in too great force to be dislodged, they fell back on all sides, and, abandoning the whole line of the Inn, concentrated their army behind the Alza, between Altemarkt and the Lake of Sine, to cover the roads to Salzburg and Vienna.*

Moreau, conceiving with reason that the spirit of the Austrian army must be severely weakened by such a succession of disasters, resolved to push his advantages to the utmost. The

Rapid advance of the French towards Salzburg.

Austrians now experienced the ruinous consequences attending the system of extending themselves over a vast line in equal force throughout, which, since the commencement of the war, they had so obstinately followed; they found themselves unable to arrest the march of the victor at any point, and, by the rapid advance of Lecourbe, were irrecoverably separated from their left wing in the Tyrol. Moreau having resolved not to allow them to establish themselves in a solid manner behind the Salza, pushed rapidly forward across the Achen and the Traun to Salzburg. He experienced no considerable opposition till he reached Dec. 12. the neighbourhood of that town, but when Lecourbe, with the advanced guard, approached the Saal, he found the bulk of the Austrian army, thirty thousand strong, including ten thousand cavalry, posted in a strong position covering the approach to Salzburg. Its front was covered by the Saal, the rapid course of which offered no inconsiderable obstacle to an attacking force; its right rested on inaccessible rocks, and its left was protected by the confluence of the Saal and the Salza. But this position, how strong soever, had its dangers; it was liable to be turned by a passage of the Salza, effected below the town between Lauffen and Salzburg, in which case the army ran the risk of being cut off from Vienna, or thrown back in disorder upon the two bridges of boats which preserved its communication with the right bank of the river.†

Lecourbe commenced the attack with his accustomed vigour; Gudin carried the Dec. 13. village of Salzbourghoffen, and made six hundred prisoners; but Monrichard was so rudely handled by the imperial cavalry, that he was driven back in disorder, with the loss of five hundred men. But this success was of little avail, for Moreau ordered Decaen to cross the Salza at Lauffen, an operation which was most successfully performed. While the attention of the Imperialists was drawn to the broken arches of the bridge by a violent cannonade, this able general directed four hundred chosen troops to a point a little lower down, who, undeterred by the violence and cold of the winter torrent, threw themselves into the stream, swam across, and made themselves masters of some boats on the opposite side, by which the passage was speedily effected. Moreau was no sooner informed of this success, than he pushed Richepanse, with two fresh divisions, across at this place, and advanced against Salzburg by the right bank. Encouraged by this

* Jom., xiv., 111, 112. Dum., v., 133, 134, 135.

† Dum., v., 134, 140. Jom., xiv., 112, 115. Nap., ii., 33, 39.

* Jom., xiv., 114, 116. Dum., v., 141, 143.

† Jom., xiv., 115, 116. Dum., v., 195, 197. Nap., ii., 39, 40.

Dec. 14. They were defeated by the Austrian cavalry in front of that town. support, Lecourbe, on the day following, renewed his attack on the Austrian rear-guard, commanded by the Archduke John in person, posted in front of Salzbouurg. His troops advanced in two columns, one by the road of Reichenthal, the other formed in front of Vaal; a thick fog covered the ground, and the French tirailleurs advanced inconsiderately to the attack, deeming the Austrians in full retreat, and desirous of having the honour of first reaching Salzbouurg. They were received by the fire of thirty pieces of cannon, whose discharges soon dissipated the mist, and discovered two formidable lines of cavalry drawn up in little array. Lecourbe brought up his horse, but they were overwhelmed by the first line of the imperial cavalry, which broke into a splendid charge when the Republicans approached their position. Lecourbe, finding himself unequal to the task of opposing such formidable forces, drew back his wings behind the Saal, and posted his infantry in the rear of the village of Vaal. He there maintained himself with difficulty till the approach of night, glad to purchase his safety by the loss of two thousand men left on the field of battle.*

Had it not been for the passage of the river at Lauffen, this brilliant achievement might have been attended with important consequences; but that disastrous circumstance rendered the position at Salzbouurg no longer tenable. Moreau, at the head of twenty thousand men, was rapidly advancing up the right bank, and the Archduke John, unable to oppose such superior forces, was compelled to retire during the night, leaving that important town to its fate. Decaen, with the advanced guard of Moreau, took possession of Salzbouurg, without opposition, on the following morning, and the Republican standards for the first time waved on the picturesque towers of that romantic city.†

The occupation of Salzbouurg, and the abandonment of the line of the Salza, decided the fate of the monarchy. The shattered remains of the grand army, which had been unable to maintain the formidable lines of two such rivers, broken in numbers, subdued in spirit, were unable thereafter to make any head against a numerous enemy, flushed with victory, and conducted with consummate military skill. Imboldened by the unexpected facility with which he had passed these considerable rivers, Moreau resolved to give the enemy no time to recover from his consternation, but to push on at once towards Vienna, and decide the war in the centre of the predatory states, before the other French armies had begun seriously to skirmish on the frontier. He disquieted himself little about the forces in the Tyrol, deeming the troops in that province sufficiently occupied with the invasion of Lombardy by Brune, and the march of Macdonald through the Grisons, which shall immediately be noticed. Satisfied with the precautions, therefore, of leaving on the right small bodies as he advanced, to mark the principal passes into that mountainous region, and on the left of detaching Sainte Suzanne with his

wing to watch the motions of Klenau, who was threatening the Gallo-Batavian army at Wurtzburg, he himself pushed on with his whole centre and right wing in pursuit of the enemy.*

Richepanse, who conducted his advanced guard, marched with so much expedition, that he came up with the Austrian rear at Herdorf. Notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, who the day before had marched twelve leagues, he attacked the enemy at daybreak, routed them, and made a thousand prisoners. The two following days was a continued running fight; the Austrians retired, combating all the way, to Schwanstadt. This indefatigable leader was closely followed by Decaen and Grouchy, who came up to his support the moment that any serious resistance arrested his columns; while Lecourbe, at the head of the other wing of the invading army, advanced by the mountain road, in order to turn the streams where they were easily fordable, and constantly menace the left flank of the enemy. In front of Schwanstadt the Imperialists made an effort to arrest this terrible advanced guard. Three thousand cavalry, supported by rocky thickets, lined with tirailleurs on their flank, stood firm, and awaited the onset of the Republicans; but they were now in a state of exultation which nothing could resist. The infantry advanced to within three hundred paces of that formidable mass of cavalry, without noticing the tirailleurs, who rattled incessantly on either flank, and then breaking into a charge, approached the horse with levelled bayonets with so much resolution, that the

Austrians broke and fled, and nearly a thousand men were killed or made prisoners. On the following day a scene of dreadful confusion ensued when the Austrian rear-guard crossed the Traun. A column of twelve hundred, under Prince Lichtenstein, stationed in front of the town of Lambach, where the passage was going forward, made such a heroic resistance as gave time to the greater part of the cannon and baggage to defile over the bridge; but at length it fell a victim to its devotion, and was almost all slain or made prisoners. Immediately the whole remaining Imperialists who had not passed fled towards the defile: they were rapidly followed by the Republicans. A scene of indescribable horror ensued; in the *mêlée* of fugitives, carriages, and trampling squadrons, the arches were fired, and multitudes threw themselves into the stream; but such was the resolution of the French grenadiers, that, regardless alike of the flames and the discharges of grape from the opposite bank, they rushed across; by their exertions the bridge was preserved from destruction, and was speedily passed by the triumphant French battalions.†

Affairs were in this disastrous state when the Archduke Charles, whom the unanimous cries of the nation had called to the post of danger as the only means left of saving the monarchy, arrived, and took the command of the army. The arrival of that distinguished

* *Jom.*, xiv., 121, 123. *Dum.*, v., 207, 208.

† *Nap.*, ii., 40, 41. *Dum.*, v., 208, 214. *Jom.*, xiv., 125, 128.

* *Nap.*, ii., 40, 41. *Jom.*, xiv., 116, 120. *Dum.*, v., 198, 200.

† *Nap.*, ii., 40. *Dum.*, v., 200, 207.

leader, who brought with him a few battalions, for a moment revived the spirits of the soldiers; but that gleam was of short duration. He had flattered himself that he would be able to arrest the progress of the enemy in Upper Austria, while Klenau made a diversion on the side of Bohemia, and Hiller on that of Tyrol, so as to menace his communications in Bavaria and Swabia. But the appearance of the army as it crossed the Traun rendered it evident to his experienced eye that it was too late to calculate on the success of these movements. Instead of the proud battalions whom he had led to victory at Stockach and Zurich, the archduke beheld only a confused mass of infantry, cavalry, and artillery covering the roads; the bands of discipline were broken; the soldiers neither grouped around their colours nor listened to the voice of their officers; dejection and despair were painted in every countenance. Even the sight of their beloved chief, the saviour of Germany, could hardly induce the extenuated veterans to lift their eyes from the ground. He saw that it was too late to remedy the disorder, but still he bravely resolved to do his utmost to arrest it, and rather give battle under the walls of Vienna, than purchase, by an ignominious peace, the retreat of the conqueror.*

The spirits of the troops, revived for a moment by the arrival of their favourite leader, were irretrievably damped by the order to continue the retreat, after the passage of the Traun, to Steyer. The archduke gave the most pressing orders to hasten the advance of the Hungarian insurgents, and urge forward the armaments in the capital; but in the midst of these energetic measures, the rout of the rear-guard under Prince Schwartzberg, who was overwhelmed at Kremsmünster, on the Steyer, with the loss of twelve hundred men, gave him melancholy proof that the troops were so completely dejected that no reliance could be placed on their exertions. Penetrated with grief at this disaster, he despatched a messenger to Moreau, soliciting an armistice, which, after some

hesitation, was signed on the 25th by the French general, and repose given to the troops, worn out by a month's incessant marching and misfortunes.†

To complete the picture of the memorable Operations of campaign of 1800 in Germany, it the army on only remains to notice the concluding the Maine, operations of the Gallo-Batavian army on the Maine. After the action at Bourg-Eberach and the investment of the citadel of Wurtzburg, Augereau endeavoured to put himself in communication with the grand army under Moreau. His situation soon became critical, when the advance of that army, after the battle of Hohenlinden, left him entirely to his own resources; and it was rendered doubly so by the approach of Klenau, with ten thousand regular Austrian troops, on his right flank, while Simbschen, with twelve thousand troops, menaced his left. The danger soon became pressing; a division of his troops was attacked on the 18th in front of Nuremberg by Klenau, and, after a gallant resistance,

forced to retreat, while his left with difficulty maintained itself against Simbschen. Discouraged by these simultaneous attacks, the French general on the two following days retired behind the Rednitz. On the 21st he was again attacked and defeated at Neukirchen by the united imperial generals; but they were unable to follow up their advantages, from having received orders on the night of their victory to retire to Bohemia, in order to succour the heart of the monarchy, now violently assailed by the enemy.* They were in the course of executing these orders, when the armistice of Steyer put a period to their operations.

Thus the Republican army, in a short campaign of little more than three weeks, in the middle of winter, and in the most severe weather, marched ninety leagues; crossed three considerable rivers in presence of the enemy; made twenty thousand prisoners; killed, wounded, and dispersed as many; captured 150 pieces of cannon, 400 caissons, and 4000 carriages; and never halted till its advanced guard, arrested by an armistice, was within twenty leagues of Vienna. Such results require no eulogium; the annals of war have few such triumphs to recount, and they deservedly placed Moreau in the very highest rank of the captains of the eighteenth century.†

While these great events were in progress in Germany, operations inferior indeed in magnitude, but equal in the heroism with which they were conducted, and superior in the romantic interest with which they were attended, took place in the snowy amphitheatre of the Alps. It has been already noticed, that the second army of reserve, consisting of fifteen thousand men, was moved forward, in October, to the valley of the Rhine, in the Grisons; and that it was destined to menace the rear of the imperial army on the Mincio, while Brune attacked it in front. This auxiliary corps would probably have rendered more essential service if it had been directed to the grand army of Moreau, which was destined to operate in the valley of the Danube, the true avenue to the Austrian states; but such a disposition would ill have accorded with the views of the First Consul, who was little anxious to put a preponderating force, so near their frontier, into the hands of a dreaded rival, and destined for himself the principal part of the campaign, with the troops which he was to lead by the Noric Alps to Vienna. Independently of this secret feeling, which undoubtedly had its weight, Napoleon was misled by the great results of the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and the paralyzing effect of the march of the army of reserve across the St. Bernard in the present year. He conceived that Italy was the theatre where the decisive events were to take place, and had yet to learn the superior importance of the valley of the Danube, in which he himself, on future occasions, was destined to strike such redoubtable blows.‡ It is fortunate for the historian, that this destination of MacDonald's corps took place, as it brought to light the intrepidity and heroism of that gallant offi-

* *Jom.*, xiv., 129. *Dum.*, v., 217, 218.

† *Dum.*, v., 221, 222. *Nap.*, ii., 41, 42. *Jom.*, xiv., 130, 131.

* *Nap.*, ii., 25, 26. *Dum.*, v., 229, 241. *Jom.*, xiv., 131.

137. † *Jom.*, xiv., 137, 139.

‡ *Jom.*, xiv., 64. *Arch. Ch.*, i., 264. *Nap.*, ii., 61.

cer, of whose descent Scotland has so much reason to be proud; while it led to the interesting episode of the passage of the Splügen, perhaps the most wonderful achievement of modern war, and which has been portrayed by one of its ablest leaders with the fidelity of Xenophon and the pencil of Livy.*

The army of Macdonald, which was announced to consist of forty thousand men, and was furnished with staff and other appointments adequate to that number, in reality amounted only to fifteen thousand troops. Macdonald no sooner discovered this great deficiency than he made the most urgent representations to the First Consul, and requested that the chosen reserve of ten thousand men, which Murat was leading from the camp at Amiens to the plains of Italy, should be put under his orders. But Napoleon, who intended this corps in the Alps to operate on the campaign more by the apprehensions it excited among the Imperialists than its actual achievements in the field, refused to change the destination of Murat's division, and it continued its route for the banks of the Mincio. He still believed that the frontier of the Inn would sufficiently cover the hereditary states on that side, and that it was by accumulating ninety thousand men in the southern Tyrol and Italy that the decisive blow against the Austrian power was to be struck. The command of this great army, destined to dictate peace under the walls of Vienna, he ultimately designed for himself.†

Of all the passages from Switzerland to Italy, there was none which presented more serious natural obstacles, and was more carefully guarded by the enemy, than that which leads over the Splügen into the Italian Tyrol. It is first necessary to pass from the valley of the Rhine, near its source, over the Splügen into that of the Adda, which descends in a rapid course from the Julian Alps to Chiavenna and the Lake of Como; from thence, if an advance to the eastward is required, the Col Apriga, a steep ridge entangled with wood and lofty chestnuts, must be surmounted, which brings the traveller into the valley of the Oglio, between which and the stream of the Adige there is interposed the rugged ridge of the Monte Tonal, whose snowy summit was occupied and had been carefully fortified by the Austrian troops.‡ Macdonald no sooner was made acquainted with these obstacles than he despatched his chief of the staff, General Mathieu Dumas, to lay before the First Consul an account of the almost insuperable difficulties which opposed his progress. No man could be better qualified than the officer whose graphic pencil has so well described the passage to discharge this delicate mission; for he was equally competent to appreciate the military projects of the general-in-chief, and to portray the physical obstructions which opposed their execution. Napoleon listened attentively to his statement; interrogated

him minutely on the force and position of Hiller's corps, and the divisions of Laudohn, Davidowich, and Wukassowich, which were

stationed near the head of the valleys which in that part of the Alps separate Italy from Germany, and then replied, "We will wrest from them without a combat that immense fortress of the Tyrol; we must manœuvre on their flanks; menace their last line of retreat, and they will immediately evacuate all the upper valleys. I will make no change in my dispositions. Return quickly; tell Macdonald that an army can always pass, in every season, where two men can place their feet. It is indispensable that, in fifteen days after the commencement of hostilities, the army of the Grisons should have seen the sources of the Adda, the Oglio, and the Adige; that it should have opened its fire on the Monte Tonal which separates them; and that, having descended to Trent, it should form the left wing of the army of Italy, and threaten, in concert with the troops on the Mincio, the rear of Bellegarde's army. I shall take care to forward to it the necessary reinforcements; it is not by the numerical force of an army, but by its destination and the importance of its operations, that I estimate the merit due to its commander."*

Having received these verbal instructions, Macdonald prepared, with the devotion of a good soldier, to obey his commands. His troops advanced, the moment the armistice was denounced, into the Upper Rheinthal, and concentrated between Coire and Tüsis, at the entrance of the celebrated defile of the Via Mala, which is the commencement of the ascent of the Splügen, while, at the same time, to distract the enemy, and conceal his real designs, demonstrations were made towards Feldkirch, as if it was intended to break into the Tyrol in that quarter. A few days were spent at Tüsis in organizing the army, and making the necessary preparations for the formidable undertaking which awaited them, of crossing, in the depth of winter, the snowy summit of the mountains. All the artillery was dismounted and placed on sledges constructed in the country, to which oxen were harnessed; the artillery ammunition was divided and placed on the backs of mules, and in addition to his ordinary arms, ball cartridge and knapsack, every soldier received five days' provisions and five packets of cartridges to bear on his shoulders over the rugged ascent. Had he lived to see the French infantry preparing, in the middle of December, under the weight of these enormous burdens, to cross the snow-clad ridges of the Rætian Alps, by paths hardly accessible at that season to the mountaineers of the country, the eloquent historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire would have expunged from his immortal work the reflection on the comparative hardihood of ancient and modern times.†

Tüsis is situated at the confluence of the Albula and the Rhine, at the foot of a range of pine-clad cliffs of great elevation, which run across the valley, and in former times had formed a barrier, creating a lake in the valley of Schams, a few miles farther up its course. Through this enormous mass, three or four miles broad, the

Preparations of Macdonald for crossing the Splügen.

Description of the road over the Splügen.

Napoleon's designs for the passage of that mountain.

* Count Mathieu Dumas.

† Dum., v., 148, 149. Nap., ii., 61.

‡ Personal observation.

* Dum., v., 153, 154.

† Dum., v., 154, 161. See Gibbon, chap. i. Jom., xiv., 146, 147.

Rhine has in the course of ages found its way in a narrow bed, seldom more than thirty or forty, sometimes not more than eight or ten yards broad, shut in on either side by stupendous cliffs, which rise to the height of two or three thousand feet above its rocky channel. The road, conducted along the side of these perpendicular precipices, repeatedly crosses the stream by stone bridges, of a single arch, thrown from one cliff to the other, at the height of three or four hundred feet above the raging torrent. Innumerable cascades descend from these lofty precipices, and are conducted in subterraneous channels under the road, or lost in the sable forests of pine which clothe their feet. Impetuous as the Rhine is in this extraordinary channel, the roar of its waters is scarcely heard at the immense elevation above it at which the bridges are placed. The darkness of the road, overshadowed by primeval pines of gigantic stature, conducted through galleries cut out of the solid rock, or on arches thrown over the awful abyss, the solitude and solemnity of the impenetrable forests around, the stupendous precipices above and beneath, which make the passenger feel as if he were suspended in middle air, conspire to render this pass the most extraordinary and sublime in the whole amphitheatre of the central Alps.*†

Emerging from this gloomy defile, the road traverses for two leagues the open and smiling valley of Schams; it next ascends by a winding course the pine-clad cliffs of La Rofa, and at length reaches, in a narrow and desolate pastoral valley, the village of Splügen, situated at the foot of the ascent of the mountain of the same name. Here the road, leaving the waters of the Rhine, which descend cold and clear from the glaciers of Hinter Rhin, turns sharp to the left hand, and ascends a lateral valley as far as its upper extremity, when it emerges upon the bare face of the mountain above the region of wood, and by a painful ascent, often of forty-five degrees elevation, reaches the summit in an hour and a half. This description applies to the old road as it stood in 1800. The new road, over the same ground, is wound gradually up the ascent, with that admirable skill which has rendered the works of the French and Italian engineers in the Alps the object of deserved admiration to the whole civilized world. The wearied traveller then beholds with joy the waters flowing towards the Italian streams, in a narrow plain about four hundred yards broad, situated between two glaciers at the base of overhanging mountains of snow. From thence to Isola, on the Italian side of the declivity, is a descent of two leagues, conducted in many places down zig-zag slopes, attended with great danger. On the right, for several miles, is a continued pre-

cipice or rocky descent, in many places three or four hundred feet deep, while on the left the road is cut out of the solid rock, on the bare face of the mountain, exposing the traveller to be overwhelmed by the avalanches, which, loosened on the heights above by the warmth of the southern sun, often sweep with irresistible violence to the bottom of the declivity.*

In summer, when the road is well cleared, it is possible to go in three hours from the village of Splügen to the hospice on the summit; but when the newly-fallen snow has effaced all traces of the path in those elevated regions, above the zone of the arbutus and rhododendron—when the avalanches or the violence of the winds have carried off the black poles which mark the course of the road, it is not possible to ascend with safety to the higher parts of the mountain. The traveller must advance with cautious steps, sounding as he proceeds, as in an unknown sea beset with shoals: the most experienced guides hesitate as to the direction which they should take, for in that snowy wilderness the horizon is bounded by icy peaks, affording few landmarks to direct their steps, even if they should be perceived for a few minutes from amid the mantle of clouds which usually envelop their summits.†

It may easily be conceived, from this description, what labours are requisite during the winter season to open this passage. It is necessary, for an extent of five leagues, from the village of Splügen to that of Isola, either to clear away the snow so as to come to the earth, or to form a passable road over its top; and the most indefatigable efforts cannot always secure success in such an enterprise. The frequent variations of the atmosphere, the clouds which suddenly rise up from the valleys beneath, the terrible storms of wind which arise in these elevated regions, the avalanches which descend with irresistible force from the overhanging glaciers, in an instant destroy the labour of weeks, and obliterate, by a colossus of snow, the greatest efforts of human industry.‡

Such were the difficulties which awaited Macdonald in the first mountain-ridge which lay before him in the passage of the Alps. He arrived with the advanced guard, on Nov. 25, the evening of the 26th, at the village of Splügen, the point where the mountain passage, properly speaking, begins, with a company of sappers, and the first sledges conveying the artillery. The country guides placed poles along the ascent; the labourers followed and cleared away the snow; the strongest dragoons next marched to beat down the roads by their horses' feet; they had already, after incredible fatigue, nearly reached the summit, when the wind suddenly rose, an avalanche fell from the mountain, and, sweeping across the road, precipitated thirty dragoons at the head of the column into the gulf beneath, where they were dashed to Nov. 27. pieces between the ice and the rocks. General Laboissiere, who led the van, was ahead of the cataract of snow, and reached the hospice; but the remainder of the column, thunderstruck

Extreme difficulties experienced by the French troops in the passage.

* Personal observation. Dum., v., 151. Ebel. Art. Via Mala.

† The defile of the Via Mala is not so celebrated as its matchless features deserve; but the admirable road which is now conducted through its romantic cliffs, and over the Splügen, must ultimately bring it into more general notice. It exceeds in sublimity and horror any scene in the Alps. There is no single pass in the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Great St. Bernard, the Little St. Bernard, the St. Gothard, the Bernhardin, the Brenner, or the Col di Tende, which can stand in comparison. It approaches more nearly to the savage character of the Breach of Roland, or the Circle of Gabarue in the Pyrenees, but exceeds in stupendous features either of these extraordinary scenes.

* Dum., v., 164, 165. Personal observation.

† Dum., v., 164.

‡ Id. ib., 165.

by the catastrophe, returned to Splügen; and the wind, which continued for the three succeeding days to blow with great violence, detached so many avalanches, that the road was entirely blocked up in the upper regions, and the guides declared that no possible efforts could render it passable in less than fifteen days.*

Macdonald, however, was not to be daunted by any such obstacles. Independently of his anxiety to fulfil his destined part in the campaign, necessity forced him on, for the unwonted accumulation of men and horses in those

Dec. 1. elevated Alpine regions promised very soon to consume the whole subsistence of the country, and expose the troops to the greatest dangers from actual want. He instantly made the best arrangement which circumstances would admit for re-opening the passage. First marched four of the strongest oxen that could be found in the Grisons, led by the most experienced guides; they were followed by forty robust peasants, who cleared or beat down the snow; two companies of sappers followed and improved the track; behind them marched the remnant of the squadron of dragoons, which had suffered so much on the first ascent, and who bravely demanded the post of danger in renewing the attempt. After them came a convoy of artillery and a hundred beasts of burden, and a strong rear-guard closed the party. By incredible efforts, the head of the column, before night, reached the hospice, and although many men and horses were swallowed up in the ascent, the order and discipline so necessary to the success of the enterprise were maintained throughout. They here joined General Laboissiere, who continued the same efforts on the Italian side, and led this adventurous advanced guard in safety to the sunny fields of Campo Dolcino at the southern base of the mountain. Two other columns, arrayed in the same order, followed on the 2d and 3d of December, in clear frosty weather, with much less difficulty, because the road was beaten down by the footsteps of those who had preceded them, but several men died of the excessive cold on the higher parts of the mountain.†

Encouraged by this success, Macdonald advanced with the remainder of his army to Splügen on the 4th of December, and, leaving only a slight rear-guard on the northern side of the mountain, commenced his march on the morning of the 5th, at the head of seven thousand men. Though no tempest had been felt in the deep valley of the Rhine, the snow had fallen during the night in such quantities, that from the very outset the traces of the track were lost, and the road required to be made anew, as at the commencement of the ascent. The guides refused to proceed; but Macdonald insisted upon making the attempt, and, after six hours of unheard-of fatigues, the head of his column succeeded in reaching the summit. In the narrow plain between the glaciers, however, they found the road blocked up by an immense mass of snow, formed by an avalanche newly fallen, upon which the guides refused to enter, and, in consequence, the soldiers return-

ed, unanimously exclaiming that the passage was closed. Macdonald instantly hastened to the front, revived the sinking spirits of his men, encouraged the faltering courage of the guides, and, advancing himself at the head of the column, plunged into the perilous mass, sounding every step as he advanced with a long staff, which often sunk deep into the abyss. "Soldiers," said he, "the army of reserve has surmounted the St. Bernard; you must overcome the Splügen; your glory requires that you should rise victorious over difficulties to appearance insuperable. Your destinies call you into Italy: advance and conquer, first the mountains and the snow, then the plains and the armies."** Put to shame by such an example, the troops and the peasants redoubled their efforts; the vast walls of ice and snow were cut through, and, although the hurricane increased with frightful rapidity, and repeatedly filled up their excavations, they at length succeeded in rendering the passage practicable. The tempest continued to blow with dreadful violence during the passage to the hospice and the descent of the Cardinal; the columns were repeatedly cut through by avalanches, which fell across the road,† and more than one regiment was entirely dispersed in the icy wilderness. At length, by the heroic exertions of the officers, whom the example of their general had inspired with extraordinary ardour, the headquarters reached Isola, and rested there during the two succeeding days, to rally the regiments, which the hardships of the passage had broken into a confused mass of insulated men; but above one hundred soldiers, and as many horses and mules, were swallowed up in the abysses of the mountains, and never more heard of.‡

* A parallel incident occurred in ancient times, and, what is very extraordinary, during the decay of Roman virtue. "The Emperor Majorian," says Gibbon, "led his troops over the Alps in a severe winter. The emperor led the way on foot, and in complete armour, sounding with his long staff the depth of the ice or snow, and encouraging the Scythians, who complained of the extreme cold, by the cheerful assurance that they should be satisfied with the heat of Africa."—*Decline and Fall*, c. xxxv.

† Bot., iv., 59. Jom., xiv., 156, 157. Dum., v., 171, 174.

‡ Bot., iv., 59. Jom., xiv., 156, 157. Dum., v., 171, 174.

§ The passage of the Splügen by Macdonald is the most memorable and extraordinary undertaking of unworthy jealousy the kind recorded in modern war, so far as the obstacles of Nature are concerned. It yields only to the march of Suvarrow over the St. Gothard, the Seacenthal, and the Engiberg, where, in addition to similar natural difficulties, the efforts of an able and indefatigable enemy were to be overcome. The passage of the St. Bernard by Napoleon in fine weather, and without opposition, will bear no comparison with either the one or the other. That he himself was conscious of this, is obvious from the striking terms of disparagement in which he speaks of Macdonald's exertions in this passage: an instance of that jealousy of every rival in any of his great achievements, which is almost inconceivable in so great a man. "The passage of the Splügen," says he, "presented, without doubt, some difficulties; but winter is by no means the season of the year in which such operations are conducted with most difficulty; the snow is then firm, the weather settled, and there is nothing to fear from the avalanches, which constitute the true and only danger to be apprehended in the Alps. In December you often meet with the finest weather on these elevated mountains, of dry frost, during which the air is perfectly calm."—*NAPOLÉON*, II., 61, 62. Recollecting that this was written after the First Consul had received the full details from Macdonald of the extraordinary difficulties of the passage, it is inexcusable, and clearly betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of his own passage over the St. Bernard. In his official despatch, by orders of the First Consul, to Macdonald, Berthier says, "I have received the relation which the chief of your staff has transmitted to me relative to the passage of the Splügen by

* Jom., xiv., 154, 155. Dum., v., 168, 169.

† Dum., v., 170, 171. Jom., xiv., 156. Bot., iv., 58, 59.

Heroism of
Macdonald in
persisting notwithstanding.

Late on the evening of the 6th of December, the greater part of the troops and a large part of the artillery had passed the mountain, and headquarters were advanced to Chiavenna, at the upper extremity of the Lake of Como. No sooner did Hilliers hear of this advance, than he moved forward his columns towards the head of the valley of the Inn to assail him; but the intelligence of the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden arrived that very day, and, by rendering it evident that all the forces of the monarchy would be required to defend the capital, precluded the possibility of following up any distant enterprises. The Austrians, therefore, took post on the summits of the Albul, the Julierberg, and the Brogio, the three ridges which separate the Italian from the German side of the mountains in the quarter, and strongly re-enforced the division on the Tonal, the only pass between the valley of the Oglio, to which Macdonald was hastening, and that of the Adige, which was the ultimate object of his efforts.*

While still on the banks of the Adda, the French general had the misfortune to receive intelligence of the capture of a battalion of dismounted hussars, which negligently lay in the elevated valley at its upper extremity, by a well-concerted surprise from the imperial forces in the Engadine. At the same time, he received orders from the First Consul to place himself under the command of General Brune, of whose army he was to form the left wing; a mortifying circumstance to a general who had just achieved so important a service in a separate command as the passage of the Splügen, but which abated nothing of his zeal in the public cause. He suggested to Brune that two divisions should be detached from the army of Italy to re-enforce his corps, and thus, with a body of twenty-four thousand men, he would advance across the mountains to Trieste, and effect a decisive

the army which you command. I have communicated the details to the consuls, and they have enjoined me to make known to you their high satisfaction at the intrepidity and heroic constancy which the officers, and soldiers, and generals have evinced in this passage, which will form a memorable epoch in our military annals. The consuls, confident in your talents, behold with interest the new position of the army of the Grisons. I impatiently expect the details of the celebrated passage of the Splügen, and the losses which it occasioned, to enable them to appreciate the admiration and gratitude which is due to the chiefs and soldiers of your army."†

It was equally unworthy of Napoleon to say in his memoirs, "The march of Macdonald produced no good effect, and contributed in no respect to the success of the campaign: for the corps of Baraguay d'Hilliers, detached into the Upper Engadine, was too weak to effect anything of importance. Macdonald arrived at Trieste on the 7th of January, when the enemy was already chased from it by the left of the army of Italy, by the corps under the orders of Moncey and Rochambeau."‡ Had Napoleon forgotten that Macdonald's advance, by paralyzing Laudohn and Wukassowitch, enabled Brune to achieve the passage of the Mincio; and that, if it had not been for the credulity of Moncey, he would have compelled the surrender of the former at La Pietra with 7000 men? The great truth, "Magna est veritas et prevalebit," does not seem ever to have crossed Napoleon's mind: he never contemplated the minute examination to which his account of transactions would be exposed by posterity, and thought he could deceive future ages, as he did his own, by means of sycophantish writers and an enslaved press.

* Jom., xiv., 158, 159. Dum., v., 174, 175.

† 14th Dec., 1800. See Dum., vi., 255. Fieles Just. ‡ Nap., ii., 62, 63.

operation on the rear of the imperial army. But the general-in-chief refused to comply with this request, which was evidently hazardous, as exposing to overwhelming attacks in detail two separate armies, too far severed from each other to be able to render any effectual assistance in case of need.*

Napoleon's orders had directed Macdonald to penetrate as soon as possible into the valley of the Adige, in order to threaten the flank and rear of the Imperialists on the Mincio. For this purpose it was necessary to cross the Col Apriga, which lay between the valley of the Adda and that of the Oglio, and afterward surmount the icy summit of Mont Tonal, between the latter stream and that of the Adige. The passage of the Monte Apriga, though considerably less elevated than the Splügen, was even more difficult by reason of the extreme steepness of the ascents, the entangled wood which encumbered its lower region, and the dreadful nature of the road, which in many places is little better than the bed of a torrent. In seven hours, however, all these difficulties were overcome; the army found itself on the banks of the Oglio, and extended its outposts as far as Bormio, at the upper extremity of the valley.†

There still remained, however, the Herculean task of surmounting the Tonal, a mountain ridge of great elevation, which could be reached at that rude season only by a path through the snow, in which the troops were confined to single files. The summit, as usual in these elevated regions, consisted of a small plain three hundred yards broad, situated between two enormous and inaccessible glaciers. Across this narrow space the Austrians had drawn a triple line of intrenchments, faced for the most part by enormous blocks of ice, cut in the form of regular masonry, and even more difficult to scale than walls of granite. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the French grenadiers, after a painful ascent by the narrow and slippery path, reached the front of the intrenchments. Though received by a shower of balls, they succeeded in forcing the external palisades; but all their efforts were ineffectual against the walls of ice which formed the inner strength of the works. They were, in consequence, obliged to retreat, and brought back the disheartening report that this important position was impregnable.‡

Sensible, however, of the vital importance of forcing this passage, Macdonald resolved to make another attempt. Eight days afterward another column was formed, under the command of Vandamme, and approached the terrible intrenchments. The Austrians had, in the interval, added much to the strength of the works; but they were assaulted with so much vigour, that two external forts were carried; still, however, when they approached the principal intrenchment, the fire from its summits, and from a blockhouse on an elevated position in its rear, was so violent, that all the efforts of

* Jom., xiv., 159, 161. Dum., v., 176, 178, 184, 185.

† Jom., xiv., 158, 159. Dum., v., 180, 182. Bot., iv., 61.

‡ Jom., xiv., 161, 162. Dum., v., 186, 188. Bot., iv., 61.

Personal observation.

the Republicans were again ineffectual, and they were forced to retire, after staining with their bravest blood the cold and icy summit of the mountain. Macdonald was in some degree consoled for this disaster by the success of his left wing, which spread itself into the Engadine, driving the Imperialists before it, and made itself master of the well-known stations of Glurens and Martinsbruck, on the Tyrolean side of the mountains.*

The importance of these operations, and the obstinacy with which the attack and defence of the inhospitable Alpine ridges were conducted at this inclement season, will be best understood by casting a glance over the positions and movements of the contending armies in the Italian plains at this period.

When hostilities were recommenced to the south of the Alps by the denunciation of the armistice, the imperial army, sixty-five thousand strong, of which fifteen thousand were cavalry, occupied the formidable line of the Mincio, covered by a hundred pieces of cannon, flanked on the one extremity by the Po, on the other by the Lake of Guarda, and strengthened by the strong fortress of Mantua, and the inferior fortifications of Peschiera and Borghetto, which gave them the immense advantage of being able to debouch at pleasure on either side of the river.† The Imperialists had received orders to remain on the defensive in this excellent position until their flanks were secured, and the prospect of an advantageous attack was afforded by the advance of the Neapolitan troops over the hills of Tuscany, and the descent of Laudohn and Wukassowich from the mountains of Tyrol.

The French forces in Italy were immense. In the peninsula altogether there were 95,000 men, besides 27,000 who encumbered the hospitals. Of this great body, 61,000 infantry, 9000 cavalry, and 178 pieces of cannon, were ready for active operations on the Mincio, while the remainder occupied Tuscany, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria. During the five months that these troops had occupied the fertile plains of the Po, they had profited to an extraordinary degree by the resources of the country. The soldiers had been completely new clothed, the artillery horses renewed, the cavalry was admirably mounted, the magazines were full, the troops in the highest state of discipline, spirits, and equipment. But these vast supplies, wrung by the terrors of military execution from an unhappy and impoverished people, had excited the utmost discontent in the peninsula. The inhabitants compared the high-sounding proclamations of the invaders with the sad consequences which had followed their footsteps, and, rendered more sullen by the disappointment of their hopes than even the serious injuries they had undergone, were ready, upon any reverse, to have risen unanimously upon their oppressors. This state of things was well known to the French commanders, and to secure their flanks and rear they were obliged to detach twenty-five thousand from the grand army on the Mincio, how well soever they were

aware that it was there the fate of Italy was to be decided.*

Hostilities were first commenced by Brune, who found the spirit of his troops so much elevated by the intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, and the passage of the Spugen by Macdonald, that their ardour could no longer be restrained. The firing commenced on the 16th, but nothing except inconsiderable skirmishes ensued before the 28th. The Mincio, in its course of twenty miles from the Lake of Guarda to Mantua, though fordable in many places in summer, was absolutely impassable in winter; and the five bridges which were thrown over its current at Peschiera, Salconzo, Valleggio, Volta, and Goito were either within the walls of fortifications, or strongly intrenched and barricaded. The left bank, in the hands of the Austrians, was generally more elevated than the right, in the possession of the Republicans; but at Mozambano and Molino, near Pozzuolo, the right had the advantage, which evidently pointed out these stations as the most advantageous for forcing a passage. For these reasons they had been fortified with care by the Austrian engineers, who had pushed their intrenchments, which were occupied by twenty thousand combatants under Hohenzollern, to a considerable distance from the right bank of the river; and against these advanced works it first behoved Brune to direct his efforts.†

On the 20th the whole French army approached the Mincio in four columns. The right, under Dupont, moved towards the shores of the Mantuan lake: the centre, under Suchet, advanced direct upon Volta; the third column, destined to mask Peschiera, was ordered to take post near Ponti; the left and the reserve were directed against Mozambano. The French general had intended to have made feigned attacks only on the centre and right, and to have attempted to force the passage in good earnest near the Lake of Guarda and at the foot of the mountains; but the course of events fell out otherwise. As the Republicans approached the Mincio, the Imperialists, who had orders not to engage in any serious affair on the right bank, seeing they had the whole French army on their hands, successively abandoned all the positions they had fortified with so much care, and withdrew to the other side, leaving only detachments to occupy Valleggio and the *tête-du-pont* of Borghetto, on the Republican side. The French patrols, in consequence, everywhere approached the river, and Dupont, ignorant that the attack on his side was intended only to be a feint, and that the left was the real point of attack, made the most active preparations for effecting a passage. He succeeded so well, that, early on the morning of the 25th, he had thrown a battalion over, near Molino, which speedily established a bridge, and soon enabled a whole division to obtain a firm footing on the left bank. Hardly was the passage completed when orders arrived from the commander-in-chief to cover, by a fire of cannon, merely the bridge which had been es-

Dec. 16. First operations of Brune.

Passage of the Mincio. Dec. 20.

Dec. 25.

* *Jom.*, xiv., 162, 163. *Dum.*, v., 188, 191. *Bot.*, iv., 61. † *Dum.*, v., 243, 244. *Jom.*, xiv., 166, 167. *Bot.*, iv., 63.

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* *Bot.*, iv., 62, 63. *Jom.*, xiv., 164, 166. *Nap.*, ii., 64, 65. † *Nap.*, ii., 66, 67. *Bot.*, iv., 62, 63. *Jom.*, xiv., 174, 175. *Dum.*, v., 243, 244.

tablished, and allow no troops to pass over to the other side. But this despatch arrived too late: the division of Watrin was already over, the enemy's troops opposed to it were hourly and rapidly increasing, and any attempt to fall back to the bridge would have exposed it to certain and irremediable ruin. In these trying circumstances, Dupont conceived that the execution of his orders had become impossible, and resolved to retain the advantage he had gained by aiding Watrin with his remaining troops. In this resolution he was confirmed by Suchet, who was no sooner informed that the passage was irrevocably engaged on the right, than he resolved to support it with all his forces, and, hastening to the bridge at Molino, crossed over with his whole corps. On their side, the Imperialists, who had judiciously placed the bulk of their army in mass, a little in the rear of the centre of the line, no sooner heard of the passage at Molino than they directed an overwhelming force to assail the advanced guard of the ene-

Desperate conflict of the troops who had crossed over.

my. But for the timely assistance afforded by Suchet, Dupont's troops would have been totally destroyed; as it was,

a furious combat ensued, which continued with various success till night, in which the Republicans only maintained their ground by the sacrifice of the bravest of their men. For long the French infantry repulsed with invincible firmness the repeated and vehement charges of the Austrian cavalry; but at length they were driven, by a desperate effort of the Hungarian grenadiers, out of the village of Pozzuolo, and forced in disorder to the water's edge. All seemed lost, when the Imperialists, checked by a terrible discharge of grape from the batteries on the French side, hesitated in their advance; and Dupont took advantage of their irresolution to animate his men, and lead them back to the charge, which was executed with such vigour that Pozzuolo was regained, and the Imperialists repulsed with the loss of seven hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, however, brought up fresh troops; Pozzuolo was again carried at the point of the bayonet; Suchet advanced with his division and retook it; it was again carried by the Imperialists, and continued to be alternately conquered and reconquered till nightfall, when it finally remained in the hands of the Austrians.* Even the darkness of a winter night could not suspend this terrible combat: between eleven and twelve, the fitful gleams of the moon, through a tempestuous and cloudy sky, enabled the Republicans to perceive two deep masses of grenadiers who silently approached their intrenchments. They were received with a general discharge of firearms of all sorts; the batteries thundered from the opposite bank; for a few minutes a volcano seemed to have burst forth on the shores of the Mincio; but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unavailing, and, after a gallant struggle, they were obliged to retire, leaving the French in possession of their bloodstained intrenchments.†

Brune, during this bloody conflict, remained in a state of the greatest irresolution, hesitating between his original design of effecting a passage at Mozambano, and the new project to which he was urged, of supporting the ground, won at so dear a price, in the lower part of the stream. He thus ran the risk of losing his whole right wing, which was, in truth, only saved by the desperate valour of the troops of which it was composed.* At length he resolved to pursue his original design, and force a passage at Mozambano. For this purpose, Marmont, at daybreak on the 26th of Dec. 26. December, established a battery of forty pieces of cannon on the heights above that place, which commanded the left bank, and despatched orders to Dupont and Suchet to keep themselves within their intrenchments until they heard the firing warmly engaged on their left. Under cover of a thick fog, the passage was speedily effected, and the French advanced guard soon after came to blows with the enemy. It was evident, however, that they

Brune at length relieves them, and the passage is completed.

fought only to cover their retreat: Oudinot, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, bravely resisted till sufficient re-enforcements passed over to enable them to resume the offensive, which they did with such vigour that the Imperialists were driven back to Valleggio, from whence they continued their retreat in the night, leaving Borghetto to its fate, which, next day, after repulsing an assault with great loss, surrendered with the garrison of eight hundred men. In effect, Bellegarde, conceiving the passage of the river effected by the bridge established at Molino, had resolved upon a general retreat: his troops fell back in all quarters towards the Adige, leaving garrisons in Mantua, Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera, which reduced his effective force to forty thousand combatants.†

In the passage of the Mincio the Austrians lost above seven thousand men, of whom one half were prisoners, and of Great losses, forty pieces of cannon; but its moral consequences, as is generally the case with a first decisive success, determined the fate of the campaign. The French resumed the career of victory with their wonted alacrity; the Imperialists fell into the despondency which is the sure prelude to defeat; and the disastrous intelligence they received from the Bavarian frontier contributed to spread the disheartening impression that the Republicans were invincible under their new leader, and that no chance of safety remained to the monarchy but in a speedy submission to the conqueror.‡

Brune, however, advanced cautiously after his victory. Leaving detachments to Bellegarde mask Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera, he approached the Adige in the end of December. To effect the passage of that river, the French general made use of the same stratagem which had been attempted for the passage of the Mincio, viz., to make demonstrations both against the lower and upper part of the stream; and while the enemy were dis-

* Bellegarde says it remained in the hands of the Austrians: Oudinot affirms it was ultimately carried by the French. The well-known veracity of the German character makes it probable the former was the true account.

† Nap., ii., 67, 75. Bot., iv., 63, 64. Dum., v., 251, 266. Jom., xiv., 175, 185.

* For this he incurred the just and merited censure of the First Consul.—See NAPOLEON, ii., 75, 76.

† Jom., xiv., 188, 192. Dum., v., 268, 275. Nap., ii., 76, 78. Bot., iv., 64, 65.

‡ Dum., v., 275, 276. Jom., xiv., 192, 193. Nap., ii., 80.

tracted in their attention by a multiplicity of attacks, the artillery and bridge equipage were secretly conducted to Bassolengo. Sixty pieces of cannon were established there in battery, on the heights of the right bank, on the morning of the 1st of January, which opened

Jan. 1, 1801. their fire at daybreak, under cover of which a bridge was speedily constructed, without opposition from the enemy. The troops passed over, and established themselves on the left bank without firing a shot; the Imperialists were much less solicitous about interrupting their operations than effecting a junction with the corps of Wukassowich and Laudohn, which were hastening by the defiles of the Brenta towards the plain of Bassano. Bellegarde withdrew his forces on all sides, and concentrated them in the strong position of Caldiero, already signalized by a victory over Napoleon, while the Republicans closely followed his footsteps, extending their left up the rocky gorge of the Adige, made themselves masters, after severe combats, of the narrow defile of Corona and the immortal plateau of Rivoli.*

The Republicans, under Monecy, pursued their advantages; the Imperialists, under Laudohn, long and obstinately defended the town of Alta, in the valley of the Adige, but were driven from it with the loss of five hundred prisoners; they again held firm in the intrenchments of St. Marco, but were at length forced to retreat, and took refuge in the defile of Calliano, already celebrated by so many combats. At the same

Jan. 2. time, the Italian division of Count Theodore Lecchi ascended the valley of the Oglio, and entered into communication with Macdonald's corps immediately after its repulse from the icy ramparts of Mont Tonal; while detachments in the rear formed the blockade of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago. Laudohn retired with six thousand men to Roveredo, from whence he was soon after driven, and fell back, disputing every inch of ground, to the foot of the fort of Pietra, overhanging the deep and rapid stream of the Adige between that town and Trent.†

Bellegarde, finding his force so materially weakened by the garrisons which he was obliged to throw into the fortified towns on the Mincio, and the losses sustained in the passage of that river, had given orders to Wukassowich and Laudohn, whose united forces exceeded twenty thousand men, to fall back from the Italian Tyrol, through the defiles of the Brenta, and join him in the plains of Bassano, in the rear of Calliano; and it was to give them time to accomplish this junction that he took

post on the almost impregnable heights of Calliano. Laudohn was commencing this movement when he was rudely assailed by the division of Monecy, and harassed in his retreat up the valley of the Adige in the manner which has been mentioned. But a greater danger awaited him. On the very day on which he retired to the castellated defile of La Pietra, he received the alarming intelligence that Trent, directly in his rear, and by which he required to pass to gain

the upper extremity of the Brenta, was occupied by Macdonald, at the head of nine thousand men! To understand how this happened it is necessary to resume the narrative of the army of the Grisons, after its repulse from the glaciers of Mont Tonal.*

After that check, Macdonald had collected in the Val Camonica, including the Italian division of Lecchi, above Macdonald makes his way into the Italian Tyrol. nine thousand men, and with them he eagerly sought for some defile or mountain-path by which to penetrate across the rocky chain which separates that valley from that of the Sarca, from whence he could reach Trent and the banks of the Adige. But these rugged cliffs, which push out, with hardly any declivity, almost to Brescia, in the plain of Lombardy, defeated all his efforts; and it became necessary to turn their southern extremity by Pisogno, at the head of the Lake of Iseo, from thence across the Col di San Zeno, into the valley of Sabia, and again surmount another ridge into the Val Trompia, in order to ascend by the beautiful sides of the Chiesa into the valley of Sarca. This long circuit, which would have been completely avoided by forcing the passage of Mont Tonal, irritated to the highest degree the French troops, who had expected at once, after surmounting the Splügen, to take a part in the glories of the campaign. Their impatience increased when, on their arrival at Pisogno, Macdonald received and published the account of the passage of the Mincio, and the retreat of the imperial army towards the Adige. He was there joined by General Rochambeau with three thousand men from Brune's army, who had at length become sensible of the importance of the operations in the Alps on the flanks and rear of the retreating army, and received the most pressing invitation to accelerate his march so as to cut off some of its detached columns. The difficulties of the ridge of San Zeno, however, had almost arrested the soldiers whom the snows of the Splügen had been unable to overcome; a few horses only could be got over by cutting through blocks of ice as hard as rock on the summit, and the greater part of the cavalry and artillery required to descend by the smiling shores of the Lago Iseo to Brescia, and ascend again the vine-clad banks of the Chiesa. Such, however, was the vigour of the Republican troops, that they overcame all these obstacles; on the 6th of January they arrived at Storo in the Italian Tyrol, while the left wing, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, surmounted the higher ridges at the sources of the Adige, and, following the retreating Austrian columns, descended by Glurens and Schlanders upon Meran on the banks of the Upper Adige.† Thus, after surmounting incredible difficulties, the object of the First Consul was at length gained; the whole mountain ridges were crossed, and the Imperialists turned by the upper extremity of all the valleys where their forces in the Italian Tyrol were situated.

The approach of these different columns, amounting in all to twenty-five thousand men, and conducted with equal skill and vigour, from the north, at Trent.

* Jom., xiv., 196, 197. Dum., v., 276, 290. Nap., ii., 78, 79. Bot., iv., 66.
Jom., xiv., 198, 199. Dum., v., 288, 290.

* Bot., iv., 66, 67. Jom., xiv., 198, 199. Dum., v., 284, 285.
† Dum., v., 285, 287. Jom., xiv., 198, 199. Bot., iv., 67.

south, and west, convinced the Austrian generals that they had not a moment to lose in concentrating their troops at Trent, and regaining, by the defile of the Brenta, the army of Bellegarde at Bassano. If Wukassowich ascended towards Bolzano to aid in repelling Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was descending the Adige, he ran the risk of leaving Laudohn to be overwhelmed by Moncey; if he moved towards Roveredo to the support of the latter, he abandoned the avenues of Trent and the line of communication in his rear to Macdonald. In these critical circumstances he rapidly withdrew his right to Trent, ordered the troops who covered La Sarca to defend that city against Macdonald as long as possible, and enjoined Laudohn to maintain himself till the last extremity in the important defile of La Pietra. But Macdonald, who was now fully aware of the situation of Laudohn, made incredible exertions; in one day he marched forty miles; crossed the Col Vezzano; forced the passage of the Adige, and entered Trent. Wukassowich hastily retired by the great road to the defiles of the Brenta; but Laudohn, with seven thousand men, Jan. 7. who was still posted at La Pietra, was left to his fate, with a superior enemy in his front, and the army of the Grisons in his rear, occupying the only road by which he could retreat.*

The only remaining chance of safety to Laudohn was by a rugged path, which He escapes by a lateral path to Bassano. leads over the mountains from Pietra to Levico on the Brenta. It was impossible that his corps could retire by this defile, passable only by single file, if they were attacked either by Moncey or Macdonald, and Laudohn was well aware that the former, with fifteen thousand men, was preparing to assail him on the following morning, and that the latter, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, had already pushed a patrol beyond Trent, on the road to Roveredo, and would advance to the support of his comrade the moment that the combat was seriously engaged. In this extremity he made use of a *ruse de guerre*, if that name can properly be applied to a fabrication inconsistent with the proverbial German faith. He sent an officer of his staff to Moncey, announcing the conclusion of an armistice between Brune and Bellegarde, similar to that already concluded in Germany, and proposing a suspension of arms. Moncey, suspecting no deceit, fell into the snare; he agreed to the proposal, upon condition that the pass of La Pietra and the town of Trent should be placed in his hands, which being agreed to, and its execution prepared for the following day, Laudohn, in the mean time, in the night, withdrew his troops, man by man, through the narrow straits of Caldonazzo, by paths among the rocks, where two file could not pass abreast, to Levico, on the shores of the Brenta in the Val Sugana; and the French advanced guard, proceeding next day to take possession of Trent, was astonished to find it already in the hands of Macdonald, and discover the extent of the danger from which their unsuspecting honesty had delivered the imperial general.†

Bellegarde, finding that Wukassowich and

Laudohn had effected their junction in the valley of the Brenta, deemed it no longer necessary to retain his position on the heights of Caldiero, but retired leisurely, and facing about at every halt, to Bassano, where he effected his junction with the divisions which had descended from the Tyrol. This great re-enforcement gave him a marked superiority over his adversary; and though he fell back to the neighbourhood of Treviso, he was making preparations to give battle in front of that town, when operations on both sides were concluded by the armistice of Treviso, which at length put a Jan. 16. period to this murderous contest.

By this convention, the Austrians agreed to give up Peschiera, Verona, Legnago, Ancona, and Ferrara, which Armistice of Treviso. gave Brune an excellent base for future operations; but they retained possession of Mantua, the key of Lombardy, and the great object of the First Consul's desires. This was the more irritating to Napoleon, as Murat's corps, twelve thousand strong, had already reached the Italian plains, and Brune himself had written to government, only three days before, that he would agree to no armistice, unless Mantua, as well as the other fortresses, were put into his hands. The truth is, that in the interval circumstances had changed; the Imperialists were concentrated in the immense plains of Treviso, where their cavalry could act with peculiar effect; the divisions from Tyrol had joined their ranks; while Brune, whose army was severely weakened by the numerous blockading divisions left in his rear, could not oppose to them an equal force. But Napoleon, whose impatient spirit, fed by repeated victories, could brook no obstacle, was indignant at this concession to the Imperialists: he manifested his high displeasure at Brune, whom he never again employed in an important command, and announced to his ministers at Luneville that he would instantly resume hostilities, both in Germany and Italy, unless Mantua were abandoned. The disastrous state of affairs in the former country had taken away from the Austrians all power of resistance; they yielded to his desires, and a few days afterward the peace of Luneville put an end to the disastrous war of the second coalition.*

Before proceeding to the conditions of this celebrated treaty, it is necessary to resume the thread of the events in the southern part of the Italian peninsula previous to the general pacification.

At the moment when this double armistice consolidated the French power in Italy and Germany, a dangerous insurrection broke out in Piedmont. The people of that country were exasperated to the highest degree at the endless and vexatious requisitions of the French troops; the most ardent Democrats were thunderstruck by the annexation of the territory of Vercelli to the Cisalpine Republic, and the clergy and nobles justly apprehensive of the extinction of their rights and properties, from the continued ascendancy of France. Fed by so many sources, the flame of discontent, though long smothered,

January 10.
Bellegarde retreats to Treviso.

Armistice of Treviso.

* Dum., v., 285, 292. Jom., xiv., 201, 202. Bot., iv., 67.
† Bot., iv., 67. Dum., v., 292, 295. Jom., xiv., 202, 203.

* Nap., ii., 80, 82. Bot., iv., 68, 69. Jom., xiv., 209, 210
Dum., v., 300, 303.

at length broke out; the peasants of the Valley of Aosta took up arms, expelled the French detachments, and shut up their depôt of conscripts in the fortress of Ivrea, while symptoms of insurrection appeared at Turin.* But the vigour of Soult overcame the danger: he speedily surrounded and disarmed the insurgent quarter of the capital, and the appearance of Murat, who at that moment descended from the mountains in their rear, extinguished the revolt in the Alpine valleys. The Revolutionary party of Piedmont found themselves inextricably enveloped in a despotic net from which it was impossible to escape.

The cannon of Marengo had shaken the throne of the Two Sicilies; the court of Naples was conscious that the sanguinary executions which had disgraced its return to the shores of Campania had exposed it to the

utmost danger from the vengeance of the popular party, and that it had little to hope from the mercy of the First Consul if the imperial standards were finally chased from Italy. Feeling its very existence thus endangered, the cabinet of Ferdinand IV. had made exertions disproportioned to the strength of the kingdom. An army sixteen thousand strong, splendid in appearance, and formidable, if numerical strength only were considered, under the command of Count Roger de Damas, had advanced through the Roman States and taken post on the confines of Tuscany, ready to foment the discontent of its inhabitants, which the enormous requisitions of the French authorities had exasperated to the greatest degree, and act in conjunction with the Imperialists at Sommariva, whose headquarters were at Ancona. The weakness of Miollis, the French commander in

Jan. 10. Tuscany, whose forces had been reduced by the garrisons left in Lucca, Leghorn, and Florence, to four thousand men, encouraged them to attempt an offensive movement. They advanced to Sienna, which rose in insurrection against the French, while Arezzo, supported by detachments from Ancona, again displayed the standard of revolt. But on this, as on every other occasion during the war, the utter loss of military character by the Neapolitans was painfully conspicuous. Miollis collected six thousand veterans from the neighbouring garrisons and advanced against the invaders. The van-

Jan. 11. guard of Ferdinand fled at the bare sight of the enemy. In vain the infantry were formed into squares and encouraged to stand: they broke at the first charge of the Piedmontese columns, supported by a single squadron and three companies of French grenadiers; the superb hussars fled in confusion, trampling under foot their own flying regiments, and the whole army soon became a useless crowd of fugitives, which hastened, like a flock of sheep, towards the Roman frontier, without having sustained any serious loss. On this occasion the French hardly fired a shot, and the Neapolitans were discomfited by the mere sight of the Piedmontese levies: a striking proof how much more rapidly military virtue had declined in the south than the north of the Peninsula.†

Even, however, if the Neapolitan troops had combated with the valour of the ancient Samnites, the result would have been the same. Sommariva no sooner heard of this disaster at Sienna than he retraced his steps towards Ancona; the insurgents at Arezzo made haste to offer their submission to the conqueror; Murat's corps, ten thousand strong, was approaching Parma; and the armistice of Treviso, a few days after, put a final period to the co- Jan. 16. operation of the Imperialists. Ancona was delivered up agreeably to the convention; Ferras passed into the hands of the Republicans; southern Italy lay open to the invader; and the unwarlike Neapolitans were left alone to combat a power before which the veteran bands of Austria and Russia had fallen.* Napoleon openly expressed his determina- Jan. 20. tion to overturn the throne of the Two Sicilies, and Murat, at the head of an army of twenty-eight thousand men, composed of his own corps, that of Miollis, and two divisions of veterans from the Mincio, soon after crossed the Apennines, to carry into execution the mandates of Republican vengeance.

But the court of Naples had not trusted merely to its military preparations: the Queen of Naples flies to St. Petersburg to implore the aid of Paul. address of the queen extricated the throne from the imminent danger to which it was exposed, and gave it a few years longer of a precarious existence. No sooner had the battle of Marengo and the armistice of Alexandria opened the eyes of this able and enterprising, though vehement and impassioned woman, to the imminence of the danger which threatened the Neapolitan throne, if it were left alone to resist the redoubtable forces of France, than she adopted the only resolution which could ward off the impending calamities. Setting off in person from Palermo shortly before the winter campaign commenced, she undertook a journey to St. Petersburg to implore the powerful intercession of the Czar, should events prove adverse, to appease the wrath of the conqueror. It soon appeared how prophetic had been her anticipations. The Emperor Paul, whose chivalrous character and early hostility to the principles of the Revolution had been by no means extinguished by his admiration for Napoleon, was highly flattered by this adventurous step. The prospect of a queen setting out in the depth of winter to undertake the arduous journey from Palermo to St. Petersburg to implore his aid, was as flattering to his vanity as the renown of upholding a tottering throne was agreeable to his romantic ideas of government.† He warmly espoused the cause of the unfortunate princess, and not only promised to intercede with all his influence in her favour with the First Consul, but forthwith despatched M. Lowascheff, an officer high in his household, and who enjoyed his intimate confidence, to give additional weight to his mediation with the cabinet of the Tuileries.

Napoleon had many reasons for yielding to the efforts of the Northern emperor. A conqueror who had recently usurped the oldest throne in Europe was naturally desirous to ap-

* Jom., xiv., 210, 211. Bot., iv., 69. Dum., v., 321, 322. † Bot., iv., 70. Dum., v., 314, 329. Jom., xiv., 214, 215. Nap., ii., 84, 85.

* Nap., ii., 84, 85. Dum., v., 328, 331. Jom., xiv., 215, 217. Bot., iv., 70, 71. † Bot., iv., 71. Dum., v., 317, 319. Jom., xiv., 211, 212.

Napoleon willingly yields to his intercessions.

appear on confidential terms with its greatest potentate, and the sovereign who had just placed himself at the head of the northern maritime coalition against England could hardly be expected to intercede in vain at the court of its inveterate enemy. For these reasons M. Lowascheff was received with extraordinary distinction at Paris. On the road to Italy he was treated with the honours usually reserved for crowned heads, and the Italians, who recollected the desperate strife between the Russians and Republicans, beheld with astonishment the newborn harmony which had risen up between their envoys. He arrived at Florence at the same time that General Murat made his entry. The city was brilliantly illuminated in the evening; everywhere in public they appeared together, overshadowed by a tricolour and a Russian standard; and the Russian envoy declared to the bewildered Florentines "that two great nations should forever be united for the repose of mankind."[†]

Backed by such powerful influence, and the terrors of thirty thousand French soldiers on the Tiber, the negotiation was not long of being brought to a termination. Napoleon had directed that the affairs of Naples should be altogether excluded from the articles of the armistice at Treviso, in order that he might alone regulate the destinies of a kingdom, the old ally of England, and the impassioned enemy of the Revolution. The terms prescribed to Murat, and embodied in the armistice of Foligno, were less distinguished by severity towards the Neapolitans than hostility to the English; and this treaty is remarkable as containing the first official enunciation of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which, through the whole remainder of his career, he so inflexibly adhered, and which had so large a share, through the misery which it occasioned, in bringing about his ultimate overthrow.*

By the armistice of Foligno it was provided that the Neapolitan troops should forthwith evacuate the Roman States, but that, even after their retreat, the Republicans should continue to occupy Narni and the line of the Nera to its junction with the Tiber; that "all the ports of Naples and Sicily should instantly be closed against English vessels of merchandise as well as war, and remain shut till the conclusion of a general peace; that all prosecutions on account of political offences should cease, and the scientific men, unworthily detained at Naples on their return from Egypt, should be instantly set at liberty."[†]

By the treaty of Foligno, which was signed soon afterward, the ambitious projects of the First Consul were completely developed, and the first indications were manifested of that resolution to envelop the Continent in an iron net which was afterward so completely carried into effect. By this treaty it was provided that "all the harbours of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily

should be closed to all English or Turkish vessels until the conclusion of a general peace; that Porto Longone in the island of Elba, Piombino in Tuscany, and a small territory on the seacoast of that duchy, should be ceded to France; that all political prosecutions should cease, and the sum of 50,000 francs be paid by the Neapolitan government to the victims of former disorders on the return of the court of Sicily; that the statues and paintings taken from Rome by the Neapolitan troops should be restored; and that, in case of a menaced attack from the troops of Turkey or England, a French corps, equal to what should be sent by the Emperor of Russia, should be placed at his disposal." Under these last words was veiled the most important article in the treaty, which was speedily carried into effect, and revealed the resolution of the French government to take military possession of the whole peninsula. On the 1st of April, only three days after the signature of this treaty, and before either any requisition had been made by the Neapolitan government or any danger menaced their dominions, a corps of twelve thousand men, under the command of General Soult, set out from the French lines, and before the end of the same month took possession of the fortresses of Tarentum, Otranto, Brindisi, and all the harbours in the extremity of Calabria. By a secret article in the treaty, the Neapolitan government were to pay 500,000 francs (£20,000) a month for the pay and equipment of this corps, besides furnishing gratis all the provisions it might require.* The object of this occupation was to facilitate the establishment of a communication with the army in Egypt, and it excited the utmost solicitude in the breast of Napoleon. His instructions to Soult are extremely curious, as proving how early he had embraced the new political principles on which his government was thereafter founded. Among other things, he directed that the general "should engage in no revolution, but, on the contrary, severely repress any appearance of it which might break out; that he should communicate to all his officers that the French government had no desire to revolutionize Naples; that, with all his staff, he should go to mass on every festival with military music, and always endeavour to conciliate the priests and Neapolitan authorities; that he should maintain his army at the expense of Tuscany and Naples, as the Republic was so overwhelmed by the return of its armies to the territory of France that he could not send them a single farthing." Finally, he gave minute directions for the reduction of Porto Ferrajo and the island of Elba, little anticipating that he was seeking to acquire for the Republic his own future place of exile.[†]

This little island, which has since acquired such interest from the residence of Napoleon in 1814, was at first deemed an easy conquest by the French general. But he soon found that he had a very different enemy to deal with from the pusillanimous troops of Naples. The English garrison of Porto Ferrajo consisted merely of three hundred British soldiers, of eight hundred Tuscan troops, and four hundred Corsi-

* Jom., xiv., 217, 218. Dum., v., 333, 334. Bot., iv., 71.

† Jom., xiv., 219, 220. Dum., v., 341, 342. Bot. iv., 72, 73.

‡ Dum., v., 341.

* Dum., vi., 268. Pièces Just.

† Dum., vi., 270, 280. Pièces Just. Nap., ii., 69.

cans in the pay of Great Britain; but into this motley assemblage the governor, Colonel Airley, had infused his own undaunted resolution. At first the French commenced the siege with fifteen hundred men only; but finding that number totally inadequate, they gradually augmented their force to six thousand men, while three frigates maintained a strict blockade, which soon reduced the garrison to great straits from want of provisions. But in the end of July, Sir John Borlase Warren hove in sight with an English squadron; the French cruisers instantly took refuge in the harbour of Leghorn; and the Republicans, in their turn, began to experience the hardships of a blockade. Three French frigates were captured in endeavouring to convey supplies across the Straits of Piombino to the besiegers; but as, in spite of these disasters, the labours of the siege advanced, a general effort was made on the 13th of September to destroy the works. Two thousand men, consisting of the Swiss regiment of Watteville and detachments from the marines of the fleet, were landed, and attacked the Republicans in rear, while Airley, by a vigorous sortie, assailed them in front. The attack was at first successful, and some of the batteries which commanded the entrance of the harbour were taken and spiked; but the Republicans having returned in great force, the besieged were obliged to retire, and the troops who had landed were again embarked. Notwithstanding this, however, the most vigorous defence was made; the terrors of a bombardment were tried in vain to shake the resolution of the garrison; and after a siege of five months, the governor had the glory of surrendering the fortress intrusted to his charge only in consequence of an express condition in the treaty of Amiens.* This successful resistance by a handful of men to the troops who had vanquished the greatest military monarchies of Europe, excited a great sensation both in England and on the Continent, and served as a presage of that desperate struggle which awaited them, when, after trampling under foot the Southern hosts, they encountered the stubborn valour of Northern freedom. "It was," says the impartial French historian, "an extraordinary spectacle in the midst of the triumphal songs, and in the bosom of a Continental peace, so long desired, so painfully acquired, to hold an island, of easy access and almost touching the Continent, the scene of a long-continued and doubtful strife;† and Europe beheld with amazement, in that island, a single fortress arrest the arms which the forces of the coalition had been unable to subdue."

By the treaty of Luneville, which the Emperor, Feb. 9, 1801, or Francis was obliged to subscribe, "not only as Emperor of Austria, but in the name of the German Empire," Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the boundary between it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was

guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine Republic; the Grand-duke of Tuscany, the emperor's brother, gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of the Spanish family, on the promise of an indemnity in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these forts should remain in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared "to have the power of choosing whatever form of government they preferred."‡

These conditions did not differ materially from those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those offered by Napoleon previous to the renewal of the war: a remarkable circumstance, when it is recollected how vast an addition the victories of Marengo, Hohenlinden, and the Mincio had since made to the preponderance of the French arms.

The article which compelled the emperor to subscribe this treaty, as head of the Empire as well as Emperor of Austria, gave rise in the sequel, as shall be shown, to the most painful internal divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the Empire, the emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was the head, without either their concurrence, or express powers to that effect previously conferred. The want of such powers had rendered inextricable the separate interests referred to the congress at Rastadt; but Napoleon, whose impatient disposition could not brook such formalities, cut the matter short at Luneville by throwing his sword into the scale, and insisting that the emperor should sign for the Empire as well as himself; leaving him to vindicate such a step as he best could to the princes and states of the imperial confederacy. The emperor hesitated long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be found. He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified letter, dated 8th of February, 1801, the day before that when the treaty was signed, in which, after premising that his imperial authority was restrained by the Germanic constitutions on that point in a precise manner, and therefore that he had been compelled to sign, as head of the Empire, without any title so to do, he added, "But, on the other hand, the consideration of the melancholy situation in which, at that period, a large part of Germany was placed, the prospect of the still more calamitous fate with which the superiority of the French menaced the Empire if the peace was any longer deferred;† in fine, the general wish, which was loudly expressed, in favour of an instant accommodation, were so many powerful motives which forbade me to refuse the concurrence of my minister to this demand of the French plenipotentiary." The electors and princes of the Empire

* Article 7, Treaty of Amiens.

† Dum., vi., 353, 359. *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, p. 179. *Jom.*, iv., 371, 374.

* See the Treaty in Dumas, vi., 282, et seq. *Pièces Just.*

† See the original, Dum., vi., 298. *Pièces Just.*

felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of the Empire, assembled after the treaty of Luneville was signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on the extraordinary situation in which the emperor was then placed. But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid of that league to support separate interests which afterward, under the name of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, so well served the purposes of French ambition, and dissolved the venerable fabric of the German Empire.*†

The winter-campaign of 1800 demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the justice of the observation by the Archduke Charles, that the valley of the Danube is the quarter where vital blows against the Austrian monarchy are to be struck, and the importance of frontier or central fortifications to arrest the march of a victorious invader. The disaster of Marengo was soon repaired, and did not prevent the Austrians again taking the field at the head of an army which almost balanced the Republican forces; but the battle of Hohen-

linden at once laid open the vitals of the monarchy. The reason is to be found in the numerous fortresses which covered the imperial frontiers in Lombardy, and the total want of any such barrier between Austria and Bavaria. After the passage of the Mincio, the army of Brune was so severely weakened by the detachments left in the rear to blockade the fortresses on that river, that he was unequal to any farther offensive movements, and if the war had continued, he would probably have been compelled to retreat; but after the battle of Hohenlinden, the undiminished battalions of Moreau poured in resistless strength into the undefended hereditary states. The Archduke Charles had long before foreseen this; by the fortifications of Ulm he enabled Kray for six weeks to arrest the victor in the middle of his career; and so sensible was Napoleon of their importance, that his first measure, when they fell into his hands, was to level them with the ground.

The peace of Luneville was the first considerable pause in the Continental strife; and already it had become manifest that the objects of the war had been changed, and that hostilities were now to be carried on for the subjugation of a different power from that which was at first contemplated.

The extinction of the Revolutionary spirit, the stoppage of the insidious system of propagandism, by which the French Democracy were shaking all the thrones, and endangering all the institutions and liberties of Europe, was the real object of the war. The restoration of the Bourbons was never considered of importance farther than as affording a guarantee, and what at first appeared the best guarantee, against that tremendous danger. By the result of a struggle of nine years' duration, this object had been gained, not indeed in the way which at first would have been deemed most likely to effect it, but in a manner which experience soon proved was far more efficacious. The restoration of a brave and honourable, but weak and unwarlike race of monarchs, would have been but a feeble barrier against the turbulent spirit of French Democracy; but the elevation of an energetic and resolute conqueror to the throne, who guided the army by his authority, and dazzled the people by his victories, proved perfectly sufficient to coerce its excesses. Napoleon said truly, "that he was the best friend which the cause of order in Europe ever had, and that he did more for its sovereigns, by the spirit which he repressed in France, than evil by the victories which he gained in Germany." The conquests which he achieved affected only the external power or present liberty of nations; they did not change the internal frame of government, or prevent the future resurrection of freedom; and when his military despotism was subverted, the face of European society reappeared from under the mask of slavery without any material alteration; but the innovations of the National Assembly totally subverted the fabric of a constitutional monarchy, and by destroying all the intermediate classes between the throne and the peasantry, left to the people of France no alternative for the remainder of their history but American equality or Asiatic despotism. The cause of order and freedom, therefore, gained immensely

Reflections on this campaign.

the most striking manner, the justice of the observation by the Archduke Charles, that the valley of the Danube is the quarter where vital blows against the Austrian monarchy are to be struck, and the importance of frontier or central fortifications to arrest the march of a victorious invader. The disaster of Marengo was soon repaired, and did not prevent the Austrians again taking the field at the head of an army which almost balanced the Republican forces; but the battle of Hohen-

* Dum., vi., 29, 30. Hard., viii., 52.

† This glorious peace excited, as might well have been expected, the most enthusiastic joy in Paris. It was announced in these terms to the inhabitants by Napoleon: "A glorious peace has terminated the Continental war. Your frontiers are extended to the limits assigned to them by nature; nations long separated from you rejoice in their brethren, and increase by a sixth your numbers, your territory, and your resources. This success you owe chiefly to the courage of your soldiers, to their patience in fatigue, their passion for liberty and glory; but you owe it not less to the happy restoration of concord, and that union of feelings and interests, which has more than once saved France from ruin. As long as you were divided, your enemies never lost the hope of subjugating you; they hoped that you would be vanquished by yourselves, and that the power which had triumphed over all their efforts would crumble away in the convulsions of discord and anarchy. Their hope has been disappointed: may it never revive. Remain forever united by the recollection of your domestic misfortunes, by the sentiment of your present grandeur and force. Beware of lowering by base passions a name which so many exploits have consecrated to glory and immortality.

"Let a generous emulation second our arts and our industry; let useful labours embellish that France which external nations will never mention but with admiration and respect; let the stranger who hastens to visit it, find among you the gentle and hospitable virtues which distinguished your ancestors. Let all professions raise themselves to the dignity of the French name; let commerce, while it reforms its relations with other people, acquire the consistency which fixes its enterprises, not on hazardous speculations, but constant relations. Thus our commerce will resume the rank which is due to it; thus will be fortified the bonds which unite us to the most enlightened people of the Continent; thus will that nation, even, which has armed itself against France, be taught to abjure its excessive pretensions, and at length learn the great truth, that, for people as individuals, there can be no security for real prosperity but in the happiness of all."* It is curious to observe how early, amid his Continental triumphs, the ambition of the First Consul was directed to commercial and maritime greatness, in the effort to attain which he was led to indulge in such implacable hostility to this country.

* Dum., vi., 296. Fleesch Just.

The real object of the war was already gained by the allies

by the accession of Napoleon to the throne. Great as were the dangers to the independence of the surrounding states from the military power which he wielded, they were trifling in comparison of the perils to the very existence of liberty which arose from the Democratic innovations of his predecessors.

But though the cause of liberty was thus relieved from its most pressing dangers, the moment that the First Consul seized the helm, the peril to the independence of the surrounding states, and of England in particular, became extreme. His conduct soon showed, what his memoirs have since confessed, that he had formed, from the very commencement, a resolution to make France the first of European powers, and turn all the energies of their combined forces against the existence of Great Britain. Already his measures were all directed to this end; he made it the first condition of peace to all the vanquished nations, that they should exclude English ships from their harbours, and he had contrived, by flattering the vanity of the Emperor of Russia, and skilfully fomenting the jealousy of the neutral states, to combine a formidable maritime league against England in the north of Europe. Thus, as time rolled on, the war totally altered its object, and the danger of subjugation changed sides. Commenced to stop the revolutionary propagandism of France, it terminated by being directed against the maritime preponderance of Great Britain; and England, which set out with heading the confederacy, ended by finding herself compelled to combat for her existence against the power of combined Europe.

In the progress of the conflict, also, a change not less important in the mode of carrying on the war had arisen; and the Revolutionary armies, compelled by the penury of their domestic resources, had adopted a system of extorting supplies from the vanquished states, hitherto unknown in modern warfare. It is the boast of the philosophic historian, that civilization had softened even the rude features of war in modern Europe; that industry securely reaped its harvest amid hostile squadrons, and the invaded territory felt the enemy's presence rather by the quickened sale for its produce than the ruthless hand of the spoiler.* But, though this was true when Gibbon wrote, the French Revolution had introduced a very different system, and made war retrograde to the rapine and spoliation of barbarous times. The Revolutionary armies issued from the Republic as the Goths from the regions of the North, powerful in numbers, destitute of resources, starving from want, but determined to seek for plenty, at the sword's point, from the countries through which they passed; the principle on which they uniformly acted was to make war maintain war, and levy in its theatre, whether a hostile or neutral territory, the means of carrying on the contest. They formed no magazines; brought with them no money; paid for nothing; but by the terrors of military execution wrung from the wretched inhabitants the most ample supplies: "The army of Moreau," says General Mathieu Dumas, "ransacked the country between the Rhine and the Inn, de-

voured its subsistence, and reduced the inhabitants to despair, while it maintained the strictest discipline. The devastation of war for centuries before, even that of the Thirty Years, was nothing in comparison. Since the period when regular armies had been formed, the losses occasioned by the marches and combats of armies were passing evils; the conquest of a country did not draw after it its ruin. If a few districts, or some towns carried by assault, were abandoned to the fury of the soldiers, the inexorable pen of history loaded with reproaches the captains who permitted, or the sovereigns who did not punish such outrages. But Moreau's army levied, in a few months, above twenty millions in requisitions; enormous contributions were unceasingly exacted; the people were overwhelmed; the governments of the oppressed states entirely exhausted. It was reserved for our age to witness, in the midst of the rapid progress of civilization, and after so many eloquent declamations in favour of humanity, the scourge of war immeasurably extended; the art of government become in the hands of the conqueror an instrument of extortion, and systematic robbery be styled, by the leaders of regeneration, the right of conquest."^{*}

Even in this gloomy state of the political horizon, however, the streaks of light were becoming visible which were destined to expand into all the lustre of day. The invasion of the French troops, their continued residence in other states, had already gone far to dispel those illusions in their favour, to which, even more than the terror of their arms, their astonishing successes had been owing. Their standards were no longer hailed with enthusiasm by the people who had experienced their presence; the declaration of war to the palace and peace to the cottage had ceased to deceive mankind. The consequences of their conquests had been felt; requisitions and taxes—merciless requisitions, grievous taxes—had been found to follow rapidly in the footsteps of these alluring expressions; penury, want, and starvation were seen to stalk in the rear of the tricolour flag. Already the symptoms of POPULAR RESISTANCE were to be seen; the peasantry even of the unwarlike Italian peninsula had repeatedly and spontaneously flown to arms; the patriotic efforts of Austria had recalled the glorious days of Maria Theresa, and the heroic sacrifices of the forest cantons had emulated the virtues, if not the triumphs, of Sempach and Morgarten. Unmarked as it was amid the blaze of military glory, the sacred flame was beginning to spread which was destined to set free mankind; banished from the court and the castle, the stern resolution to resist was gathering strength among the cottages of the poor. It is in such reflections that the philosophic mind best derives consolation for the many evils arising from the ambition of the rulers and the wickedness of the agitators of mankind; and by observing how uniformly, when oppression becomes intolerable, an under current begins to flow, destined ultimately to correct it, that the surest foundation is laid for confidence in the final arrangements of Supreme Wisdom, amid the misfortunes or the vices of the world.

Evidence of Napoleon's implacable hostility to England.

Symptoms of patriotic and general resistance springing up.

Increasing and systematic pillage by the Republican armies.

* Gibbon.

* Dum., v., 72, 73.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

FROM THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN MARITIME CONFEDERACY.

NOVEMBER, 1799—MAY, 1801.

ARGUMENT.

Origin of the Difference between the Laws of War at Sea and Land.—Early Usages of War on both Elements.—Gradual Change at Land.—Original Customs still kept up at Sea.—Common Maritime Law of Europe as to Neutral Vessels.—Principles of that Law.—It was universal in Europe prior to 1780; but these Rights were sometimes abated by special Treaty.—Origin of Resistance to them.—Armed Neutrality.—Subsequently abandoned by the Northern Powers in their own Case.—Treaties with Russia, Sweden, and America since 1780, recognising this Right to England; but Neutrals suffered severely in the Close of the War.—Excessive Violence of the Directory against America.—Napoleon terminates the Differences of France with that Power.—Maritime Treaty between France and America.—Revival of the Principles of the Armed Neutrality.—Lord Whitworth is sent to Copenhagen, and enters into an Accommodation.—Growing Irritation of the Emperor Paul at the Allies.—Political Conduct of Napoleon.—Difference about Malta.—Violent Proceedings of Paul against England.—He is joined by Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia.—His warm Advances to Napoleon.—General Maritime Confederacy signed on the 16th of December.—Its threatening Consequences to England.—Measures of Retaliation by Mr. Pitt.—Diplomatic Debate with the Neutral Powers.—Hanover is invaded by Prussia.—Meeting of Parliament.—Perilous Situation of England.—Debates on the Neutral Question.—Mr. Pitt resigns in Consequence of the Catholic Claims; but this was only the ostensible Ground.—Vigorous Measures of his Successors for the Prosecution of the War.—Prosperous State of Great Britain at this Period.—Its Income, Expenditure, Exports, and Imports.—Naval Forces of the Confederacy.—Energetic Measures of the British Government.—Nelson appointed Second in Command of the Fleet destined for the Baltic.—British Fleet sails from the Downs, and approaches the Sound.—Splendid Appearance of that Strait.—Undaunted Spirit of the Danes.—Passage of the English Fleet.—Preparations of the Danes.—Nelson's Plan of Attack.—Great Difficulty Experienced by the Pilots in conducting the Fleet to the Enemy.—Battle of Copenhagen.—Heroic Deeds on both Sides.—Nelson's Proposal for an Armistice.—Melancholy Appearance of the Danes after the Battle.—Armistice agreed on for fourteen Weeks.—Hanover overrun by Prussia.—Designs of Paul and Napoleon against British India.—Death of the Emperor Paul.—Causes of that Catastrophe.—General Irritation at the Czar.—Symptoms of Insanity in his Conduct.—Conspiracy among the Nobles for his Dethronement.—Particulars of his Assassination.—Accession of Alexander.—Immediate Approach to an Accommodation with England.—His Character, and early pacific and popular Measures.—Nelson sails for Cronstadt.—His conciliatory Steps there.—Peace with Russia, and Abandonment of the Principles of the Armed Neutrality.—Napoleon's Indignation at it.—Dissolution of the Naval Confederacy.—Reflections on these Events.

THERE arises, from the very nature of the elements on which they are respectively exercised, an essential difference between the laws of war at sea and at land. Territorial conquests are attended by immediate and important advantages to the victorious power; it gains possession of a fruitful country, of opulent cities, of spacious harbours, and costly fortresses; it steps at once into the authority of the ruling government over the subject state, and all its resources, in money, provisions, men, and implements of war, are at its command. But the victor at sea finds himself in a very different situation. The most decisive sea-fights draw after them no acquisition of inhabitants,

wealth, or resources; the ocean is unproductive alike of taxes or tribute, and among the solitary recesses of the deep you will search in vain for the populous cities or fertile fields which reward the valour of terrestrial ambition. The more a power extends itself at land, the more formidable does it become, because it unites to its own the forces of the vanquished state; the more it extends itself at sea, the more is it weakened, because the surface which it must protect is augmented, without any proportional addition to the means by which its empire is to be maintained.

In the infancy of mankind the usages of war are the same on both elements. Alike at sea as on shore, the persons and property of the vanquished are at the disposal of the conquerors; and from the sack of cities and the sale of captives, the vast sums are obtained which constitute the object and the reward of such inhuman hostility. The liberty for Early usages of war on both elements. which the Greeks and Romans contemplated was not mere national independence or civil privileges, but liberation from domestic or predial servitude, from the degradation of Helots or the lash of patricians. Such is to this day the custom in all the uncivilized portions of the globe, in Asia, Africa, and among the savages of America, and such, till comparatively recent times, was the practice even among the Christian monarchies and chivalrous nobility of modern Europe. But with the growth of opulence and the extension of more humane ideas, these rigid usages have been universally softened among the European nations. As agriculture and commerce improved, it was found to be as impossible as it was inhuman to carry off all the property of the vanquished people, the growth, perhaps, of centuries of industry. The revenue and public possessions of the state furnished an ample fund to reward the conquering power, while the regular pay and fixed maintenance at the public expense of the soldiers took away the pretext for private pillage as a measure of necessity. All nations, subject in their turn to the vicissitudes of fortune, found it for their interest to adopt this lenient system, which so materially diminished the horrors of Gradual war; and hence the practice became change general, excepting in the storming of at land. towns and other extreme cases, where the vehemence of passion bid defiance to the restraints of discipline, to respect private property in the course of hostilities, and look for remuneration only to the public revenue or property of the state. It is the disgrace of the leaders of the French Revolution, amid all their declamation in favour of humanity, to have departed from these beneficent usages, and, under the specious names of contributions, and of making war support war, to have

restored at the opening of the nineteenth the rapacious oppression of the ninth century.

Humanity would have just reason to rejoice if it were practicable to establish a similar system of restrained hostility at sea; if the principle of confining the right of capture to public property could be introduced on the one element as well as the other, and the private merchant were in safety to navigate the deep amid hostile fleets, in the same manner as the carrier on land securely traverses opposing armies. But it has never been found practicable to introduce such a limitation, nor has it ever been attempted, even by the most civilized nations, as a restraint upon their own hostilities, however loudly they may sometimes have demanded it as a bridle upon those of their enemies. And when the utter sterility of the ocean, except as forming a highway for the intercourse of mankind, is considered, it does not appear probable that, until the human heart is essentially changed, such an alteration, how desirable soever by the weaker states, ever will be adopted. It may become general when ambition and national rivalry cease to sway the human heart, but not till then. Certain it is, that of all nations upon earth, revolutionary France had the least title to contend for such a change; she having not only introduced new usages of unprecedented rigour in modern times, at least in her warfare at land, but issued and acted upon edicts for her maritime hostility on principles worthy only of Turkish barbarity.*

But it is not merely with the subjects of nations in a state of hostility that belligerents are brought in contact during modern warfare; they find themselves continually in collision also with NEUTRAL VESSELS trading with their enemies, and endeavouring, from the prospect of high profits, to furnish them with those articles which they are prevented from receiving directly from the trade of their own subjects. Here new and important interests arise, and some limitation of the rigour of maritime usage evidently becomes indispensable. If the superior power at sea can at pleasure declare any enemy's territory in a state of blockade, and make prize of all neutral vessels navigating to any of its harbours, it will not only speedily find itself involved in hostilities with all maritime states, but engaged in a species of warfare from which itself, at some future period, may derive essential injury. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to maintain that the vessels of other states are to be entirely exempted from restraint in such cases, or that a belligerent power, whose warlike operations are dependant, perhaps, upon intercepting the supplies in progress towards its antagonist, is patiently to see all its enterprises defeated merely because they are conveyed under the cover of a

neutral flag instead of its enemy's bottoms. Such a pretension would render maritime success of no avail, and wars interminable, by enabling the weaker power, under fictitious cover, securely to repair all its losses. These considerations are so obvious, and are brought so frequently into collision in maritime warfare, that they early introduced a system of international law, which for centuries has been recognised in all the states of Europe, and is summed up in the following propositions by the greatest masters of that important branch of jurisprudence that ever appeared in this or any other country.

1. That it is not lawful for neutral nations to carry on, in time of war, for the advantage or on the behalf of one of the belligerent powers, those branches of their commerce from which they are excluded in time of peace. Principles of that law.

2. That every belligerent power may capture the property of its enemies wherever it shall meet with it in the high seas, and may for that purpose detain and bring into port neutral vessels laden wholly or in part with any such property.

3. That under the description of contraband of war, which neutrals are prohibited from carrying to the belligerent powers, the law of nations, if not restrained by special treaty, includes all naval as well as military stores, and generally all articles serving principally to afford to one belligerent power the instrument and means of annoyance to be used against the other.

4. That it is lawful for naval powers, when engaged in war, to blockade the ports of their enemies by cruising squadrons *bona fide* allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution. That such blockade is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port, fort, or arsenal to which it is applied; and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given thereof to neutral powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with, and shall be found to have been destined to such port, under the circumstances of the fact and notice of the blockade.

5. That the right of visiting and searching neutral vessels is a necessary consequence of these principles; and that, by the law of nations (when unrestrained by particular treaty), this right is not in any manner affected by the presence of a neutral ship of war, having under its convoy merchant ships, either of its own nation or of any other country.*

In these propositions are contained the general principles of the maritime code of the whole European nations, as it has been exercised by all states towards each other, and laid down by all authorities on the subject from the dawn of civilization. The special application of these principles to the question immediately at issue between the contending powers in 1801 is contained in the following propositions, laid down as incontestable law by that great master of maritime and international law, Sir William Scott:

1. "That the right of visiting and searching

* Lord Grenville's speech, 13th Nov., 1801, on the convention with Russia. *Parl. Hist.*, *xxvi.*, 211, 212.

* The decree of the Directory, the 16th of January, 1798, declares, that all vessels found on the high seas with any English goods whatever on board, to whomsoever belonging, shall be good prize; that neutral sailors found on board English vessels shall be put to death; and that the harbours of France shall be shut against all vessels which had touched at an English harbour; and it requires certificates of origin, under the hands of French consuls, exactly as the Berlin and Milan decrees afterward did.—ROBINSON'S *Admiralty Reports*, i., 341.

Sir William Scott's exposition of the maritime law. merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation.*

2. "That the authority of the sovereign of the neutral country being interposed in any matter of mere force cannot legally vary the rights of a legally commissioned belligerent cruiser, or deprive him of his rights to search at common law.†

3. "That the penalty for the violent contravention of this right is the confiscation of the property so withheld from visitation and search.‡

4. "That nothing farther is necessary to constitute blockade than that there should be a force stationed to prevent communication, and a due notice or prohibition given to the party.§

5. "That articles tending probably to aid the hostilities of one of the belligerents, as arms, ammunition, stores, and, in some cases, provisions, are contraband of war, and, as such, liable to seizure by the vessels of the other party, with the vessel in which they are conveyed."¶

* "This right of search," says Sir William Scott, "is clear in practice, which is uniform and universal upon the subject. The many European treaties which refer to this right refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it. Hall writes upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception even of Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges. In short, no man, in the least conversant in subjects of this kind, has ever, that I know of, breathed a doubt upon it."—*Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, i., 60.—*The Maria*.

† Two sovereigns may agree, as in some instances they have agreed by special covenant, that the presence of one of their armed ships along with their merchant ships is to be held as a sufficient guarantee that nothing is to be found in that convoy of merchant ships inconsistent with amity or neutrality; but no sovereign can, by the common law of nations, legally compel the acceptance of such a security by mere force, or compel the belligerent to forego the only security known in the law of nations upon this subject, independent of special covenant, the right of personal visitation.

‡ Sir William Scott in the *Maria*. *Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, i., 359, 363. § *Ibid.*, i., 86.

¶ *The Jounge Margareta*, *ibid.*, i., 190, 191.

¶ The judgments of Sir William Scott are here referred to with perfect confidence, as explaining, not merely the English understanding of the maritime law, but that which for centuries has been recognised and admitted by all the European states. "In forming my judgments," says that great authority, "I trust it has not for one moment escaped my anxious recollection, that the duty of my station calls me to consider myself not as stationed here to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out, *without distinction*, to independent states—some happening to be neutral and some belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations, but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine the question exactly as he would determine it if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretension on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden as a neutral country which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character."* And of the impartiality with which this great duty at this period was exercised by this distinguished judge, we have the best evidence in the testimony of another eminent statesman, the warm advocate of neutral rights, and certainly no conceder of undeserved praise to his political opponents. "Nothing," says Lord-chancellor Brougham, "can be more instructive than the decisions of our prize courts on this point (the right of search), and nothing can give us more gratifying views of the purity with which those tribunals administer the law of nations, and their impartiality in trying the delicate

These rights had never formed any peculiar or exclusive privilege, which the English claimed alone of all other nations. On the contrary, under the equitable modifications introduced by the common maritime law, they had, from the dawn of European civilization, been universally acknowledged and maintained equally by the courts and the lawyers of Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and England.* Authors there were, indeed, who contended in their studies for a different principle, and strenuously asserted that the flag should cover the merchandise; but these innovations never received any sanction from the maritime law or practice of Europe, or the practice, independent of express treaty, of belligerent states; and, accordingly, various treaties were entered into among different powers, restraining or limiting the right of search between their respective subjects,† precisely because they knew that, but for that special stipulation, the common maritime law would admit it. So strongly was this felt by the English lawyers, who, in the House of Commons, espoused the cause of the neutral powers previous to the maritime confederacy in 1800, that they admitted the right of Great Britain to search neutral ships for the goods of an enemy, and that the northern confederacy contended for a principle which militated against the established law of nations, as laid down with universal assent by that great master of the maritime law, Lord Mansfield; and maintained merely that it would be prudent to abate somewhat of former pretensions in the present disastrous crisis of public affairs.‡

questions which come before them, between their own sovereign or their own countrymen, and the rulers or the people of other states. It is with pleasure, therefore, that we have to consider how anxiously and rigorously at this period (1799–1800) the principles for which we are contending have been enforced in the High Court of Admiralty under the presidency of Sir William Scott."—*Edin. Review*, vol. xix., 298, 299.

* Sir William Scott. *Robinson*, i., 360. Lord Eldon. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 886.

† Per Sir W. Grant. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 922.

‡ See Sir W. Grant. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 922; and Dr. Lawrence, 919, 920.

§ The hardihood with which it is constantly asserted by the foreign diplomatists and historians, that the principles of maritime law for which England contends are a usurpation on her part, founded on mere power, and unsanctioned either by the usage of other states or the principles of maritime jurisprudence, renders it important to lay before the reader a few of the authorities of foreign legal writers on the subject.

Eineccius says, "Idem statuendum arbitramur, si res hostiles, in navibus amicorum reperiantur. *Ulas capi possi nemo dubitat*, quia hosti in res hostiles omnia licent, eatenus ut eas ubicunque reptas res possit vindicare."—*De Navibus ob. vict.*, c. ii., sec. 9.

"I believe it cannot be doubted," says President Jefferson, "that, by the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessels of an enemy are free; and the goods of an enemy found in the vessels of a friend are good prize."—*JEFFERSON'S Letter to GENET*, 24th of July, 1797.

"The ordinances of the old French marine, under the monarchy, direct that not only shall the enemy's property, found on board a neutral vessel, be confiscated, but the neutral ship itself be declared lawful prize." The practice of England has always been to release all neutral property found on board an enemy's ship; but France always considered it as lawful prize.—*Ordonnance de Marine*, Art. 7, *Yalin*, 284.

"Les choses qui sont d'un usage particulier pour la guerre, et dont on empêche le transport chez un ennemi, s'appellent marchandises de contrebande. Telles sont les armes, les munitions de guerre, les bois, et tout ce qui sert à la construction et à l'armement des vaisseaux de guerre."—*VATTELL*, c. vii., sect. 112.

* *Robinson's Reports*, i., 350.

From motives of policy, indeed, England had repeatedly waived or abated this right of search in favour of particular states by special agreement. This was done towards Dec. 11, 1674. Holland in 1674, to detach that power from France, and in the belief that the United States would never be neutral when England was at war; and to France, by the commercial treaty of 1787, under the influence of the same idea, that she would never be neutral when Great Britain was in a state of hostility. But, in the absence of such express stipulation, these rights were invariably exercised both by England towards other nations, and other nations towards England; particularly by Lord Chatham during the whole course of the seven years, and the ministers of Anne during the long war of the succession, without any complaint whatever from the neutral states.* And of the disposition of England to submit in her turn to the maritime law which she requires from others, no better instance can be desired than occurred during the Duke of Wellington's administration, when the English government declined to interfere in the capture of a British merchantman trying to elude the blockade of Terceira, though a few English frigates would have sent the whole Portuguese navy to the bottom.

The obvious disadvantage, however, to which such a maritime code must occasionally expose neutral states, by sometimes depriving them of a trade at the very time when it is likely to be most

Origin of
resistance
to these
rights.

In their letter to Mr. Pinckney, January 16, 1797, the American government expressly declare that, "by the law of nations, timber and other naval stores are contraband of war."—See *Parl. Hist.*, xxvii., 213, note.

"On ne peut empêcher le transport des effets de contrebande. Si l'on ne visite pas les vaisseaux neutres que l'on rencontre en mer, on est donc en droit de les visiter."—VATTELL, c. liii., s. 114.

"Tout vaisseau qui refusera d'amener ses voiles après la sommation qui lui en aura été faite par nos vaisseaux ou ceux de nos sujets, armés en guerre, pourra y être contraint par artillerie ou autrement, et en cas de résistance et de combat, il sera de bonne prise."—*Ordonnance de la Marine de France*.—Tit. Procès, art. 12. The Spanish ordinance of 1718 has an article to the same effect.

"Other nations," says Heeren, "advanced similar claims in maritime affairs to the English; but, as they had not the same naval power to support them, this was of little consequence."—*European States System*, ii., 41.

The claims of neutrals for the security of their commerce are stated by Lynkershoek, as limited to this, that they may continue to trade in war as they did in peace. But this claim, he adds, is limited by the rights of a belligerent. "Queritur quid facere aut non facere possunt inter duos hostes; omnia forte iniques quæ potuerunt ausi pass esset inter eos, quos inter nunc est bellum."—BYNKERSHOEK, *Quæst. Juris*, Pub. i., 9.

These principles were fully recognised in various treaties between England and other maritime states. In article 12 of the treaty of 1661, between Sweden and England, it was provided, "But lest such freedom of navigation and passage of the one confederate should be of detriment to the other while engaged in war, by sea or land, with other nations, and lest the goods or merchandises of the enemy should be concealed under the name of a friend and ally, for the avoiding all suspicion and fraud of such sort, it is agreed that all ships, carriages, wares, and men, belonging to either of the confederates, shall be furnished in their voyages with certificates, specifying the names of the ships, carriages, goods, and masters of the vessels, together with such other descriptions as are expressed in the following form, &c., and if the goods of an enemy are found in such ship of the confederate, that part only which belongs to the enemy shall be made prize, and what belongs to the confederate shall be immediately restored." There is a similar clause in article 20 of the treaty between England and Denmark in 1760.—See *Parl. Hist.*, xxvii., 226.

* Per Sir W. Grant. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 922.

lucrative; and the natural jealousy at the exercise of so invidious a right as that of search, especially when put in force by the stronger against the weaker power, had long led to complaints against belligerent states. In 1740, the King of Prussia disputed the right of England to search neutral vessels, though without following up his protest with actual resistance; and in 1762, the Dutch contended that it could not be admitted by their vessels when sailing under convoy. But nothing serious was done to support these novel pretensions till the year 1780, when the Northern powers, seeing England hard pressed by the fleets of France and Spain at the close of the American war, deemed the opportunity favourable to establish, by force of arms, a new code of maritime laws; and, accordingly, entered into the famous confederacy, known by the name of the ARMED NEUTRALITY, which was the first open declaration of war by neutral powers against Great Britain and the old system of maritime rights. By this treaty, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark proclaimed the principles, that free ships make free goods; that the flag covers the merchandise; and that a blockaded port is to be understood only when such a force is stationed at its entrance as renders it dangerous to enter.*†

So undisguised an attack upon the ancient code of European law, which England had so decided an interest to maintain, because its abandonment placed the defeated in as advantageous circumstances as the victorious power, in fact amounted to a declaration of war against Great Britain; but her cabinet were compelled to dissemble their resentment at that time, in consequence of the disastrous state of public affairs at the close of the American contest. They contented themselves, therefore, with protesting against these novel doctrines at the Northern capitals, and had influence enough at the court of the Hague, soon after, to procure their abandonment by the United States. The Baltic powers, however, during the continuance of the American war, adhered to the principles of the armed neutrality, although no allusion was made to it in the peace which followed; but they soon found that it introduced principles so much at variance with the practice of European warfare, that they were immediately obliged, when they, in their turn, became belligerents, to revert to the old system. In particular, when Sweden went to war with Russia in 1787, she totally aban-

Subsequently
abandoned by
the Northern
powers in
their own case.

* Ann. Reg., 1780, 205, 348.

† The words of the proclamation are, 1. That all neutral ships may freely navigate from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war. 2. That the effects belonging to the subjects of the said warring powers shall be free in all neutral vessels, except contraband merchandise. 3. That the articles are to be deemed contraband which are mentioned in the 10th and 11th articles of her treaty of commerce with Great Britain. 4. That to determine what is meant by a blockaded port, this only is to be understood of one which is so well kept in by the ships of the power which attacks it, and which keep their places, that it is dangerous to enter into it.—See *Declaration of Russia*, 23d of April, 1780. Ann. Reg., xxxv., 348, *State Papers*. It is worthy of observation, as Sir William Scott observes, that even in this manifesto no denial of the right of search is to be found, at least to the effect of determining whether or not the neutral has contraband articles on board.—See ROBINSON'S Reports, i., 360.—*The Maria*.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1780, 206, 207.

doned the principles of the armed neutrality, and acted invariably upon the old maritime code. Russia, in the same year, reverted to the old principles, in her war with the Turks, and in 1793 entered into a maritime treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly gave up the principles of the year 1780, and engaged to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the high seas or in the harbours of that country. Both Denmark and Sweden were bound, by the treaties of 1661 and 1670, with England, to admit the right of search, and to give up the pretension to carry enemy's property;

Treaties with Russia, Sweden, and America, recognising this right to England.

and by a convention entered into between these two powers in 1794, which was communicated by them to the British government, they bound themselves "to claim no advantage which is not clearly and unexceptionably founded on their respective treaties with the powers at war, and not to claim, in cases not specified in their treaties, any advantage which is not founded on the universal law of nations, hitherto acknowledged and respected by all the powers and all the sovereigns of Europe, and from which they can as little suppose that any of them will depart, as they are incapable of departing from it themselves."*

Farther, both Russia† and Denmark had issued edicts at the commencement of the war, in which they prohibited their subjects from taking on board contraband articles;‡ while America, in the

same year, had entered into a maritime treaty with England, in which the right of search was expressly admitted.* Both by the common maritime law and by the force of recent and subsisting treaties, therefore, the right of search, claimed by Great Britain, was founded on an unquestionable basis.

But this pacific state of matters was totally altered by the result of the maritime war, and especially the decisive battle of the Nile. These great events, by entirely sweeping the French flag from the ocean, left them dependant on other powers for the supplies necessary for their navy; and the Republican government saw the necessity of relaxing the rigour of their former proceedings against neutrals, in order, through their intervention, to acquire the means of restoring their marine. The intemperate conduct of the Directory, and the arbitrary doctrines which they enforced in regard to neutrals, had all but involved the Republic in open hostilities with America, Denmark, and Sweden; and on the accession of the First Consul, he found an embargo laid on all the ships of these powers in the French harbours.† The *arrêts* of the Directory of the 18th of January and the 29th of October, 1798, were, to the last degree, injurious to neutral commerce, for they deemed every vessel good prize which had on board any quantity, however small, of British merchandise; and in virtue of that law, numbers of American vessels were seized and condemned in the French harbours. Adding insult to injury, the Directory, in the midst of these piratical proceedings, gravely

But neutrals suffered severely in the close of the war.

* Convention 27th of March, 1794. *Ann. Reg.*, 1794, 238.

† In 1793, the Empress of Russia herself proposed and concluded a treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly engaged to unite with his Britannic majesty "all her efforts to prevent other powers not implicated in the war from giving any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce and property of the French on the sea or in the ports of France;" and, in execution of this treaty, she sent a fleet into the Baltic and North Seas, with express orders "to seize and capture all the ships bearing the pretended French flag, or any other flags which they may dare to hoist; and to stop also and to compel all neutral vessels bound to or freighted for France, according as they shall deem it most expedient either to sail back or enter some neutral harbour."

—Note, 30th of July, 1793, by the Russian Ambassador to the High-chancellor of Sweden, *Ann. Reg.*, 1793, p. 175, *State Papers*. A similar note was presented to the court of Denmark at the same date, and both Denmark and Sweden, in their treaty with each other, on July 6th, 1794, Prussia in her treaty with America in 1797, Russia in her war with the Turks in 1787, and Sweden in her war with Russia in 1789, promulgated and acted upon these principles, diametrically opposite to the doctrines of the armed neutrality.*

With such ardour was this system acted upon by the Emperor Paul, that he threatened the Danes with immediate hostilities in 1790 on account "of their supplying assistance and protection to the trade of France, under the neutral colours of the Danish flag;" and he was only prevented from carrying these threats into immediate execution by the amicable interference of Great Britain: a seasonable interposition, which Denmark repeatedly acknowledged with becoming gratitude.—*Ann. Reg.*, 1800, p. 91. In the following year the same system was acted on. In 1794 the empress notified to the Swedish court that "the Empress of Russia has thought proper to fit out a fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, with frigates proportional, to cruise in the North Seas, for the purpose (in conjunction with the English maritime forces) of preventing the sending of any provisions or ammunition to France; the empress therefore requests the King of Sweden not to permit his ships of war to take any Swedish merchantmen laden with any such commodities under their convoy. Her imperial majesty farther orders all merchant ships which her squadron may meet in those seas to be searched, to see if their cargoes consist of any such goods." A similar declaration was made by the court of Russia to that of Denmark, both dated August 6th, 1794.—*Ann. Reg.*, 1794, p. 241, *State Papers*.

‡ We, Christian VII., king of Denmark, order that,

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 203.

July 7, 1798, proposed to the Americans that they should lend them 48,000,000 francs; insinuating, at the same time, that the loan should be accompanied with the sum of 1,200,000 francs (£48,000), to be divided between Barras and Talleyrand. These extravagances so irritated the Americans, that, by an act of the Legislature, they declared the United States "liberated from the stipulations in the treaty of 1778 with France, and authorized the president to arm vessels of war to defend their commerce against the French cruisers;" grounding these extreme measures upon the narrative that the French had confiscated the cargoes of great numbers of American vessels having enemy's property on board, while it was expressly stipulated, by the treaty of 1778, that the flag should cover the cargo; had equipped privateers in the ports of the Union contrary to the rights of neutrality, and treated American seamen found on board

Excessive violence of the Directory against America.

"should any vessel bound to a neutral harbour take in such goods or merchandise as, if they were consigned to any harbour of the belligerent powers, would be contraband, and, as such, stipulated in the treaties between those powers and us, and mentioned in our orders and proclamations of the 22d and 25th of February, 1793, besides the oath of the master and freighter of the ships, there shall be made a special declaration conformable to the invoice and bills of lading," to show the destination of the said ship.—*Ann. Reg.*, 1794, p. 240, 241, *State Papers*.

* "In the event of vessels being captured, or detained on suspicion of having enemy's property on board, such property alone is to be taken out, and the vessels are to be permitted to proceed to sea with the remainder of their cargo."—Art. 17, *Treaty between Great Britain and America*, 19th of May, 1795. Article 18 specifies what articles are to be deemed contraband.—*Ann. Reg.*, 1795, p. 296, 297, *State Papers*. † Bignon's *Hist. de Franç.*, i., 260.

enemy's ships as pirates. This led, in its turn, to an embargo in the French harbour on all American vessels,* and nothing but the Atlantic which rolled between them, and the British cruisers which prevented them reaching each other, prevented these two Democratic states from engaging in fierce hostility with each other.

But this state of mutual hostility was soon terminated after the accession of the First Consul to the helm. He at once perceived the extreme impolicy of irritating, by additional acts of spoliation, a power recently at war with Great Britain, and still labouring under a strong feeling of hostility towards that state; the firm ally, in better times, of France, and one of the most important of the maritime league which

he already contemplated against the English naval power. He received, therefore, with distinguished honour, the American envoys who were despatched from New-York in the end of 1799, to make a last effort to adjust the difference between the two countries, and published a warm eulogium on the great Washington, when intelligence arrived in France, early in the spring following, of the death of that spotless patriot. At the same time, the embargo on American vessels was taken off in the French harbours, and every

Napoleon terminates the differences of France with America.

possible facility given to the commencement of negotiations between the two powers. Prospective arrangements were readily agreed on, both parties having an equal interest to establish the new maritime code of the armed neutrality; but it was not found so easy a matter to adjust the injuries that were past, or reconcile the consular government to those indemnities which the Americans so loudly demanded for the acts of piracy long exercised upon their commerce. At length it was agreed to leave these difficult points to ulterior arrangement in a separate convention, and conclude a treaty for the regulation of neutral rights in future times. By this treaty, signed at Morfontaine on the 30th of September,

Sept. 30, 1800. Maritime treaty with America.

1800, the new code was fully established. It was stipulated, 1st, That the flag should cover the merchandise. 2d, That contraband of war should be understood only of warlike stores, cannon, muskets, and other arms. 3d, That the right of search to ascertain the flag and examine whether there were any contraband articles on board should be carried into effect, out of cannon-shot of the visiting vessel, by a boat containing two or three men only; that every neutral ship should have on board a certificate, setting forth to what country it belonged, and that that certificate should be held as good evidence of its contents; that if contraband articles were found on board, they only should be confiscated, and not the ship or remainder of the cargo; that no vessels under convoy should be subject to search, but the declaration of the commander of the convoy be received instead; that those harbours only should be understood to be blockaded where a sufficient force was stationed at their mouth to render it evidently dangerous to attempt to enter; and that ene-

my's property on board neutral vessels should be covered by their flag, in the same manner as neutral goods found on board enemy's vessels. So far the French influence prevailed in this convention; but they failed in their attempt to get the Americans openly to renounce the treaty concluded in 1794 with Great Britain, which could not have been done without at once embroiling them with the British cabinet.* A similar convention had previously been entered into on the same principles between the United States and the Prussian government.†

Circumstances at this period were singularly favourable to the revival of the principles of the armed neutrality.

Revival of the principles of the armed neutrality.

A recurrence of the same political relations had restored both the grievances and the ambition which, at the close of the American war, had led to that formidable confederacy. Neutral vessels, endeavouring to slide into the lucrative trade which the destruction of the French marine opened up with that country, found themselves perpetually exposed to inquisition from the British cruisers; and numerous condemnations had taken place in the English courts, which, though perfectly agreeable to the law of nations and existing treaties, were naturally felt as exceedingly hard by the sufferers under them, and renewed the ancient and inextinguishable jealousy of their respective governments at the British naval power. In December, 1799, an altercation took place in the Straits of Gibraltar between some English frigates and a Danish ship, the *Hausen*, in which the Dane refused to submit to a search of the convoy under his command; but the conduct of the captain in this instance was formally disavowed by his government, and the amicable relations of the two countries continued unchanged. But the next collusion of the same kind which took place occasioned more serious consequences. On the 25th of July, 1800, the commander of the Danish frigate *Freya* refused to allow his convoy to be searched, but agreeably to the recent stipulations in the treaties between France and America, offered to show his certificates to the British officer; intimating, at the same time, that if a boat was sent to make a search it would be fired upon. The British captain, upon this, laid his vessel alongside the Dane, and resistance being still persisted in, gave her a broadside, and, after a short action, brought her into the Downs.‡

The English cabinet at this time had received intelligence of the hostile negotiations which were going on in the Northern courts relative to neutral rights, and deeming it probable that this event would be made the signal for openly declaring their intentions, they wisely resolved to anticipate an attack. For this purpose, Lord Whitworth was sent on a special message to Copenhagen; and to give the greater weight to his representations, a squadron of nine sail of the line, four bombs, and five frigates, was

Lord Whitworth is sent to Copenhagen. Aug. 23, 1800.

* Treaty Articles 18, 19. Ann. Reg., 1800, 268, 289. Nap., ii., 122, 123. Bign., i., 277, 278. Dum., vi., 96.

† On July 11, 1799. See State Papers, Ann. Reg., 1800, 294, 295. Articles 13, 14, 15.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1800, 94, 95. Nap., ii., 117, 118. Bign., 292. Hard., vii., 444, 445.

* Nap., i., 109; ii., 110, 111; iii., 112. Bign., i., 275, 276.

despatched to the Sound, under the command of Admiral Dickson. They found four Danish line-of-battle ships moored across the strait, from Cronenberg Castle to the Swedish shore; but the English fleet passed without any hostilities being committed on either side, and cast anchor off the harbour of Copenhagen. The Danes were busily employed in strengthening their fortifications; batteries were erected on advantageous situations near the coast, and three floating bulwarks moored across the mouth of the harbour; but their preparations were not yet complete, and the strength of the British squadron precluded the hope of successful resistance. An accommodation

And enters
into an ac-
commoda-
tion.

was therefore entered into, the principal conditions of which were, "that the frigate and convoy carried into the Downs should be repaired at the expense of the British government; the question as to the right of search was to be adjourned for farther consideration to London. Until this point was settled, the Danish ships were to sail with convoy only in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of protection from the Barbary cruisers, and in the mean time their other vessels were to be liable to be searched as heretofore."*

Situated as Great Britain was, this treaty was a real triumph to her arms, and reflected no small credit on the vigour and ability of the government by which this delicate matter had been brought to so favourable a conclusion. It might have been adjusted without any farther effusion of blood, had it not been for a train of circumstances which, about the same time, alienated the vehement and capricious Emperor of Russia from the British alliance. The Northern autocrat had been exceedingly irritated at the ill success of the combined operations both in Switzerland and Holland; the first of which he ascribed to the ill conduct of the German, the latter of the British auxiliaries. This feeling was increased by the im-

Growing irri-
tation of the
Emperor Paul
at the allies.

politic refusal of the British government to include Russian prisoners with English in the exchange with France: a proposal which, considering that they had fought side by side in the Dutch campaign, in which English interests were mainly involved, it was perhaps imprudent to have declined, although the dubious conduct of Paul, in having withdrawn his troops from the German alliance, and broken with Austria, gave him no title to demand such an act of generosity. Napoleon, as already observed, instantly and adroitly availed himself of this circumstance to appease the Czar. He professed the utmost indignation that the gallant Russians should remain in captivity from the refusal of the British government to agree to their liberation for French prisoners; set them at liberty without exchange, and not only sent them back to their own country, but restored to them the arms and standards which they had lost, and clothed them anew from head to foot in the uniform of their respective regiments. These courteous proceedings produced the greatest impression on the Czar, the more so as they were contrast-

Politic conduct
of Napoleon.

ed with the imprudent refusal of the English government to include them in their exchange: they led to an interchange of good offices between the two courts, which was soon ripened into an alliance of the strictest kind, in consequence of the impetuous character of the emperor, and the unbounded admiration which he had conceived for the First Consul.*

Another circumstance at the same time occurred, which contributed not a little to widen the breach between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and London. Disengaged from his war with France, and ardently desirous of warlike renown, the emperor had revived the idea of the armed neutrality of 1780, and made proposals, in May and June, 1800, to the cabinets of Stockholm and Copenhagen to that effect, which had produced the sudden change in the Danish instructions to their armed vessels to resist the search of the British cruisers. The island of Malta, it was foreseen, would soon surrender to the British squadron, and it was easy to anticipate that the English cabinet would not readily part with that important fortress; while the Emperor conceived that, as grand-master of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, to which it had formerly belonged, he was bound to stipulate its restoration to that celebrated order.†

Matters were in this uncertain state at the court of St. Petersburg, when the arrival of the British squadron in the Sound brought them to a crisis. The Czar, with that vehemence which formed the leading feature of his character, instantly ordered an em-

bargo on all the British ships in the Russian harbours; and, in consequence, nearly three hundred vessels, most of them with valuable cargoes on board, were forcibly detained till the frost had set in and the Baltic had become impassable. Nor was this all. The crews were, with Asiatic barbarity, in defiance of all the usages of civilized states, marched off into prisons in the interior, many of them above a thousand miles from the coast, while the whole English property on shore was put under sequestration. Several British vessels at Narva weighed anchor and escaped the embargo; this so enraged the autocrat, that he ordered the remaining ships in the harbour to be burned; and in the official gazette, published a declaration that the embargo should not be taken off till Malta was given up to Russia. This demand was rested on the allegation that the restitution of that island to the Order of Jerusalem was agreed upon in the convention, December, 1798, between Great Britain and Russia, whereas that treaty contained no such stipulation. These proceedings on the part of the Emperor Paul were in a peculiar manner arbitrary and oppressive, not merely as contrary to the general practice of civilized states, which never authorizes such severity against the crews of merchant ships or goods on shore, but as directly in the face of an express article in the existing treaty, 1793, between Great Britain and Russia, in which it was stipulated that, "in the event of a rupture

Differences
about Malta

August 28,
1800. Violent
proceedings
of Paul
against Eng-
land.

Nov. 5, 1800

Nov. 21

Malta surren-
dered to Eng-
land on Sept
15, 1800.

* Ann. Reg., 1800, 93, 97. Nap., ii., 117, 119. Big., i., 292.

* Big., i., 287, 289. Jom., xiv., 234. Nap., ii., 128.

† Big., i., 287, 290. Hard., vi., 446.

between the two powers, there should be no embargo laid on vessels in the harbours of either, but the merchants on both sides have a year to convey away or dispose of their effects.*

Nothing more than the support of Russia was necessary to make the Northern powers, who derived such benefits from the lucrative neutral trade which had recently fallen into their hands, combine for the purpose of enforcing a new maritime code, which might extend its advantages to the whole commerce of the belligerent states. The King of Sweden, young and high-spirited, entered, from the very first, warmly and readily into the views of the emperor; but Denmark, which, during the long continuance of the war, had obtained a large share of the carrying trade, and whose capital lay exposed to the first strokes of the English navy, was more reserved in her movements. The arrogance with which an immediate accession to their views was urged upon the court of Copenhagen by the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Stockholm for some time defeated its own object, and Denmark even hesitated whether she should not throw herself into the arms of England, to resist the dictation of her imperious neighbours, and preserve the lucrative trade from which her subjects were deriving such immense advantages. But the Russians soon found means to assail her in the most vulnerable quarter. Prussia had lately become a considerable maritime power, and from the effect of the same interests, she had warmly embraced the views of the Northern confederacy. Her influence with Denmark was paramount, for the most valuable Continental possessions of that power lay exposed, without defence, to the

Prussian troops. In the beginning of October, a Prussian vessel, the *Triton*, belonging to Emden, laden with naval stores, and bound for the Texel, was taken and carried into Cuxhaven, a port belonging to Hamburg, by a British cruiser. The Prussian government eagerly took advantage of that circumstance to manifest their resolution; they marched a body of two thousand men into the neutral territory, and took possession of Cuxhaven; and although the senate of Hamburg purchased the vessel from the English captain and restored it to the owners, and Lord Carysfort, the British ambassador at Berlin, warmly protested against the occupation of the neutral territory after that restitution, the Prussian troops were not withdrawn. A month before, a most unjustifiable act had been committed by the British cruisers off Barcelona, who took possession of a Swedish brig, and under its neutral colours sailed into the harbour of that town, and captured by that means two frigates which the King of Spain had built for the Batavian Republic.†

Though everything was thus conspiring to forward the views of France, and advances to augment the jealousy of the maritime powers of Great Britain, the course of events by no means kept pace with the impatient disposition of the Czar. He suspected Prussia of insincerity, and openly charged Denmark with irresolution, because they did not

embark headlong in the projects which he himself had so recently adopted. Impatient of delay, he wrote in person to the First Consul in these terms: "Citizen First Consul—I do not write to you to open any discussion on the rights of men or of citizens; every country chooses what form of government it thinks fit. Wherever I see at the head of affairs a man who knows how to conquer and rule mankind, my heart warms towards him. I write to you to let you know the displeasure which I feel towards England, which violates the law of nations, and is never governed but by selfish considerations. I wish to unite with you to put bounds to the injustice of that government."** At the same time, with that candour and vehemence which distinguished his character, he published a declaration in the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, in which he stated, "Being disappointed in his expectations of the protection of commerce by the perfidious enterprises of a great power which had sought to enchain the liberty of the seas by capturing Danish convoys, the independence of the Northern powers appeared to him to be openly menaced; he consequently considered it to be a measure of necessity to have recourse to an armed neutrality, the success of which was acknowledged in the time of the American war." And shortly after he published a ukase, Oct. 29, 1800 in which he directed that all the English effects seized in his states, either by the sequestration of goods on land or the embargo on goods afloat, should be sold, and their produce divided among all Russians having claims on English subjects! Napoleon was not slow in turning to the best account such an unlooked-for turn of fortune in his favour, and redoubled his efforts Nov. 17, 1800. with the neutral powers to induce them to join the maritime confederacy against Great Britain. To give the greater éclat to the union of France and Russia, an ambassador, Count Kalitcheff, was despatched from St. Petersburg to Paris, and received there with a degree of magnificence well calculated to captivate the Oriental ideas of the Seythian autocrat.†

Pressed by Russia on the one side and France on the other, and sufficiently disposed already to regard with a jealous eye the maritime preponderance of Great Britain, the fears and irresolution of the Northern powers at length gave way. On the 16th of December a maritime confederacy was signed by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, and on the 19th of the same month by Prussia as an acceding party. The principles of this league were in substance the same as those of the armed neutrality in 1780, with a slight variation in favour of belligerent powers. A minute specification was given of what should be deemed contraband articles, which included only arms of all sorts, with saddles and bridles, "all other articles not herein enumerated shall not be considered as war or naval stores, and shall not be subject to confiscation, but shall pass free and without restraint." It was stipulated "that the effects which belong to the subjects of belligerent pow-

* Nap., ii., 129.

† Dum., vi., 121, 123. Ann. Reg., 1801, 98, and 1800 State Papers.

* Big., i., 296, 297. Ann. Reg., 1801, 237, 99. State Papers. Dum., vi., 127. † Dum., vi., 88. Big., i., 298.

ers in neutral ships, with the exception of contraband goods, shall be free;" that no harbour shall be deemed blockaded unless the disposition and number of ships of the power by which it is invested shall be such as to render it apparently hazardous to enter; that the declaration of the captains of ships of war having convoy, that the convoy has no contraband goods, shall be deemed sufficient; that "the contracting parties, if disquieted or attacked for this convention, shall make common cause to defend each other," and that "these principles shall apply to every maritime war by which Europe may unhappily be disquieted."*

This convention was naturally regarded with the utmost jealousy by the British government. Under cover of a regard for the rights of humanity and the principles of justice, it evidently went to introduce a system hitherto unheard-of in naval warfare, eminently favourable to the weaker maritime power, and calculated to render naval success to any state of little avail, by enabling the vanquished party, under neutral colours, securely to repair all its losses. It was evident that, if this new code of maritime law were introduced, all the victories of the British navy would go for nothing; France, in neutral vessels, would securely regain her whole commerce; under neutral flags she would import all the materials for the construction of a navy, and in neutral ships safely exercise the seamen requisite to navigate them. At the close of a long and bloody war, waged for her very existence, and attended with unexampled naval success, England would see all the fruits of her exertions torn from her, and witness the restoration of her antagonist's maritime strength by the intervention of the very powers for whose behoof, as well as her own, she had taken up arms.

England at this period was not, as at the close of the American war, obliged to dissemble her indignation at a proceeding which was evidently prejudicial to her national interests, and the first stroke levelled by Continental jealousy at her national independence. The statesman who first held the helm was a man who disdained all temporary shifts or momentary expedients; who, fully appreciating the measure of national danger, boldly looked it in the face; who knew that from humiliation to subjugation in nations is but a step; and that the more perilous a struggle is, the more necessary is it to engage in it while yet the public resources are undiminished, and the popular spirit is not depressed by the appearances of vacillation on the part of government. On these prudent not less than resolute principles, Mr. Pitt was no sooner informed of the signature of the armed neutrality, than he took the most decisive steps for letting the Northern powers feel the disposition of the nation they had thought fit to provoke. On the 14th of January, 1801, the British government issued an order for a general embargo on all vessels belonging to any of the confederated powers, Prussia alone excepted, of whose accession to the league intelligence had not as yet been received. Letters of

marque were at the same time issued for the capture of the numerous vessels belonging to these states who were working to the Baltic; and with such vigour were these proceedings followed up, that nearly one half of the merchant ships belonging to the Northern powers at sea found their way into the British harbours.*

These hostile proceedings led to a warm debate between the British ambassadors and those of the neutral powers, which was conducted with great ability on both sides. That between Lord Carysfort, the English ambassador at Berlin, and Count Haugwitz, the minister for foreign affairs at that capital, embraced the principal arguments urged in this important controversy.

It was stated by the British government "That a solemn treaty had been entered into between Russia and Great Britain, calculated completely to secure their trade, in which it was stipulated that, in case of a rupture, not only no embargo should be laid on, but the subjects on both sides should have a year to carry away their effects; that, in violation of these sacred stipulations, the ships of British merchants had been seized, their crews sent to prison in the interior, and their property sequestered and sold by Russia; that these acts of violence, as well as the conclusion of a hostile confederacy, which the Emperor of Russia has formed for the express and avowed purpose of introducing those innovations into the maritime code which England has ever opposed, have led to an open war between Great Britain and Russia; that these measures openly disclose an intention to prescribe to the British Empire, on a subject of the greatest importance, a new code of laws, to which she never will submit; that the confederacy recently signed by the Baltic powers had for its object the establishment of these novel principles of maritime law, which never had been recognised by the tribunals of Europe, which the Russian court, since 1780, had not only abandoned, but, by a treaty still in force, she had become bound to oppose, and which were equally repugnant to the express stipulations of the treaties which subsist between the courts of Stockholm and Denmark and the British Empire; that, in addition to this, the parties to the confederacy were pursuing warlike preparations with the utmost activity, and one of them had engaged in actual hostilities with Great Britain. In these circumstances, nothing remained to the British government but to secure some pledge against the hostile attacks which were meditated against their rights, and therefore they have laid an embargo on the vessels of the Baltic powers, but under such restraints as would guard to the utmost against loss and injury to individuals; that the King of Great Britain would never submit to pretensions which were irreconcilable to the true principles of maritime law, and strike at the foundation of the greatness and maritime power of his kingdoms; and that, being perfectly convinced that his conduct towards neutral states was conformable to the recognised principles of law and justice, and the decisions of the admiralty courts of all the powers of Europe, he would allow of no measures which had for their

* Convention December 16, 1800. Ann. Reg., 1800, 266, 270. State Papers.

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 103.

object to introduce innovations on the maritime law now in force, but defend that system in every event, and maintain its entire execution as it subsisted in all the courts of Europe before the confederacy of 1780.*

On the other hand, it was answered by Prussia and the neutral powers, "The British government has in the present, more than any former war, usurped the sovereignty of the seas, and by arbitrarily framing a naval code which it would be difficult to unite with the true principles of the law of nations, it exercises over the other friendly and neutral powers a usurped jurisdiction, the legality of which it maintains, and which it considers as an imprescriptible right, sanctioned by all the tribunals of Europe. The neutral sovereigns have never conceded to England the privilege of calling their subjects before its tribunals and of subjecting them to its laws, but in cases in which the abuse of power has got the better of equity, which, alas! are but too frequent. The neutral powers have always taken the precaution to address to its cabinet the most energetic remonstrances and protests; but experience has ever proved them to be entirely fruitless, and it is not surprising if, after so many repeated acts of oppression, they have resolved to find a remedy against it, and for that purpose to establish a well-arranged convention, which fixes their rights, and places them on a proper level with the powers at war. The naval alliance, in the manner in which it has just been consolidated, was intended to lead to this salutary end, and the king hesitates not to declare that he recognises in it his own principles; that he is fully convinced of its necessity and utility; that he has formally acceded to the convention of the 16th of December, and has bound himself not only to take a direct share in all the events which interest the cause of the neutral powers, but, in virtue of his engagements, to maintain that connexion by such powerful measures as the impulse of circumstances may require. It is not true that the confederated powers have for their object to introduce a new code of maritime rights hostile to the interests of Great Britain; the measures of the Danish government are purely defensive, and it cannot be considered as surprising that they should have adopted them when it is recollected what menacing demonstrations that court had experienced from Great Britain on occasion of the affair of the Freya frigate."† The Prussian government concluded by urging the English government to take off the embargo on the Danish and Swedish vessels as the first and necessary step to an amicable settlement of the difficult question, without making any such stipulation in regard to that laid on Russian ships, and thereby, in effect, admitting the justice of the measure of retaliation adopted in regard to the latter power.‡

These hostile declarations were soon followed up by measures which demonstrated that Prussia was not inclined to be merely a passive spectator of this

great debate. On the 30th of March, a declaration was issued by the King of Prussia to the government of Hanover, in which he stated that he was to take possession, provisionally, of the English dominions in Germany; and the Hanoverian States being in no condition to resist such an invasion, they submitted, and the Prussian troops entered the country, laid an embargo on British shipping, and closed the Elbe and the Weser against the English flag. At the same time, a body of Danish troops took possession of Hamburg, and extended the embargo to that great commercial emporium, while Denmark and Sweden had, a short time before, also laid an embargo on all the ports of their dominions. Thus March 25. the British flag was excluded from every harbour, from the North Cape to the Straits of Gibraltar, and England, which a year before led on the coalition against France, found herself compelled to make head against the hostility of combined Europe,* with an exhausted treasury, and a population suffering under the accumulated pressure of famine and pestilence.†

Never did a British Parliament meet under more depressing circumstances than that which commenced its sittings in February, 1801. After ten years of a war, costly and burdensome beyond example, the power of France was so far from being weakened, that she had extended her sway over all the south of Europe. The strength of Austria was, to appearance at least, irrecoverably broken; Italy and Switzerland crouched beneath her yoke; Spain openly followed her banners, and Holland was indissolubly united with her fortunes. Great Britain, it is true, had been uniformly, and to an unparalleled extent, victorious at sea, and the naval forces of her adversary were almost destroyed; but the Northern confederation had suddenly and alarmingly altered this auspicious state of things, and not only were all the harbours of Europe closed against her merchant vessels, but a fleet of above a hundred ships of the line, in the Baltic, was preparing to assert principles subversive of her naval power. To crown the whole, the excessive rains of the two preceding autumns had essentially injured two successive crops; the price of all sorts of grain had reached an unprecedented height,‡ and the people, at the time when their industry was checked by

Meeting of Parliament. Perilous situation of England.

* Ann. Reg., 1800, 107.

† It deserves to be recorded to the credit of Prussia in this transaction, that, being well aware how severely Great Britain was suffering at this time under an uncommon scarcity of provisions, she permitted the vessels having grain on board to proceed to the places of their destination, notwithstanding the embargo: a humane indulgence, which forms a striking contrast to the violent and cruel proceedings of the Emperor Paul on the same occasion. The conduct of the neutrals, with the exception of Russia, in this distressing contest, was distinguished by a moderation and firmness worthy of states contending for the introduction of a great general principle. That of the cabinet of St. Petersburg was widely different; but it would be unjust to visit upon that gallant people the sins of their chief, who about that period began to give symptoms of that irritability of disposition and mental alienation which so soon brought about the bloody catastrophe which terminated his reign.*

* In the winter 1800-1801, wheat rose to £1 4s. the bushel, being more than quadruple what it had been at the commencement of the war; and all other species of food were high in proportion. Large quantities of maize and rice were imported, and contributed essentially to relieve the public distress.

* Dum., vi., 167. Ann. Reg., 1800, 107.

* Lord Carysfort's notes, Jan. 27 and Feb. 1, 1801. Ann. Reg., 1801, 229, 237. State Papers.

† Baron Haugwitz's answer. Ann. Reg., 1801, 241. State Papers.

‡ Baron Haugwitz's answer. Ann. Reg., 1801, 241. State Papers. Nap., ii., 133

the cessation of commercial intercourse with all Europe, were compelled to struggle with a famine of unusual severity.*

This subject of the Northern coalition was fully discussed in the Parliamentary debates which took place on the king's speech at the opening of the session. It was urged by Mr. Grey and the opposition, "That although, without doubt, the Emperor of Russia had been guilty of the grossest violence and injustice towards Great Britain in the confiscation of the property of its merchants, yet it did not follow that ministers were free of blame. He accuses them of having violated a convention in regard to the surrender of Malta to him as a reward for his co-operation against France: did such a convention exist? The Northern powers have, along with Russia, subscribed a covenant, the professed object of which is to secure their commerce against the vexations to which they have hitherto been subject; and it is impossible to discover anything either in the law of nations or practice of states, any law or practice universally acknowledged, the denial of which is tantamount to a declaration of war against this country. It is a mistake to assert that the principles of the armed neutrality were never heard of till they were advanced in the American war. In 1740 the King of Prussia disputed the pretensions of this country on the same grounds as the armed neutrality; and in 1762 the Dutch resisted the claim of right to search vessels under convoy. In 1780 these objections assumed a greater degree of consistency, from their principles being publicly announced by all the powers in Europe.

"There is one principle which should ever be considered as the leading rule by which all questions of this sort should be determined, and that is the maxim of *justice*. Can, then, the pretensions of Great Britain bear the test of this criterion? Our naval ascendancy, indeed, should ever be carefully preserved, as the source of our glory and the bulwark of our safety; but sorry should I be if, to preserve the rights and interests of the British nation, we should be compelled to abandon the rules and maxims of justice, in which alone are to be found true and permanent greatness, true and permanent security.

"Even supposing the pretensions of England to be just, are they expedient? Its maritime superiority is of inestimable value, but is this claim, so odious to our neighbours, essential to its existence? Let the advantage, nay, the necessity, of the privilege be clearly demonstrated before we engage in a universal war for its defence, and purchase it at the price of blood. Admitting even that the right was just and useful, circumstances may occur which would justify and warrant a relaxation in its rigour. Supposing even the concession of the claim of the Northern powers would have enabled them to supply France with many articles necessary for their navy, what would have been the inconvenience thence arising? France, destitute of seamen, her fleets without discipline, what the better would she be of all the naval stores of the north of Europe? What, on the other hand, is the consequence of our dispute with

the Northern powers? Do we not, in a moment, double her marine, and supply her with experienced sailors? Do not the navies of Europe now outflank us on every side; and has not France, therefore, gained the inestimable advantage of acquiring the seamen from the Baltic, which could not otherwise be obtained, and is not that the real object which she requires? And if our commerce is excluded from every harbour in Europe, if every market is shut against us, what is to become of the invaluable sources of our splendour and security? Independently of naval stores, can we forget how important it is, in the present depressed and starving situation of the country, that the supply from the Baltic should not be lost? A little moderation in the instructions to our naval officers would have avoided all these dangers. Lord North was never arraigned as a traitor to his country because he did not drive matters to extremities in 1780; and in the peace of 1783, the question of the armed neutrality was wholly omitted. In subsequent commercial treaties with different countries, the question of neutral rights has been settled on the principles of the armed neutrality; and there is, at least, as much reason for moderation now as there was at the close of the American war."

To these arguments Mr. Pitt and Sir William Grant replied: "It has only been stated as doubtful whether the maritime code contended for by Great Britain is founded in justice; but can there be the smallest hesitation on a subject which has been acknowledged and acted upon by the whole courts, not only of this country, but of Europe, and on which all the wars, not of this island merely, but of every belligerent state in Europe, have been constantly conducted? The advocates for the neutral powers constantly fall into the error of supposing that every exception from the general law by a particular treaty proves the law to be as stated in that treaty; whereas the very circumstance of making an exception by treaty proves that the general law of nations would be the reverse but for that exception. We made a concession of this description to France in the commercial treaty of 1787, because it was supposed that that power would never be neutral when we were at war; but was it ever for one moment imagined that by so doing we could be understood to have relinquished our maritime rights with reference to other states?

"With respect to the Baltic powers, the case of the neutral advocates is peculiarly untenable. Nobody here has to learn that the treaties of 1661 and 1670 are in full force with respect to Sweden and Denmark, and in those treaties the right of carrying enemy's property is expressly given up. With respect to Russia, the right of search was never abandoned. On the contrary, in the convention signed between this country and that power at the commencement of the present war, the latter bound herself not merely to observe this principle herself, but to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the seas or in its harbours. Even, therefore, if the general principles of maritime law were as adverse as in reality they are favourable to Great Britain, still the treaties with the Baltic powers are in full force, and how can they now contend for a

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 117.

code of laws against England, in opposition to that to which they are expressly bound with her?

"Denmark, in August last, with her fleets and her arsenals at our mercy, entered into a solemn pledge not again to send vessels with convey until the principle was settled; and yet she has recently bound herself by another treaty, founded upon the principles of 1780, one of the engagements of which treaty is, that its stipulations are to be maintained by force of arms. Is this, or is it not, war? When all these circumstances are accompanied by armaments, prepared at a period of the year when they think they have time for preparation without being exposed to our navy, can there be the slightest doubt that, in justice, we are bound to take up arms in our own defence?

"As to the question of expenditure, the matter is, if possible, still less doubtful. The question is, whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be supplied and recruited; whether we are to suffer blockaded forts to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions; whether we are to allow neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing-boat, to convey the treasures of South America to the harbours of Spain, or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest or Toulon? The honourable gentleman talks of the destruction of the naval power of France; but does he imagine that her marine would have decreased to the degree which it actually has, if, during the whole of the war, this very principle had not been acted upon? And if the commerce of France had not been destroyed, does he believe that, if the fraudulent system of neutrals had not been prevented, her navy would not now have been in a very different situation from what it actually is? Does he not know that the naval preponderance which we have by this means acquired has since given security to this country, amid the wreck of all our hopes on the Continent? If it were once gone, the spirit of the country would go with it. If, in 1780, we were not in a condition to assert the right of this country to a code of maritime law, which for centuries has been acted upon indiscriminately by all the European States, we have not now, happily, the same reason for not persisting in our rights; and the question now is, whether, with increased proofs of the necessity of acting upon that principle, and increased means of supporting it, we are forever to give it up?"*

The House of Commons supported ministers by the majority of 245 to 63.†

The union of Ireland with England, from which such important results were anticipated, proved a source of weakness rather than strength to the Empire at this important crisis.

By a series of concessions, which commenced soon after, and continued through the whole reign of George III., the Irish Catholics had been nearly placed on a level with their Protestant fellow-subjects, and they were now excluded only from sitting in Parliament, and holding about thirty of the principal offices in the state. When Mr. Pitt, however, carried through the great measure of the Union, he gave the Catholics reason to expect that a complete removal of all disabilities would follow the union,

not, indeed, as a matter of right, but of grace and favour. This understood pledge, when the time arrived, he found himself unable to redeem. The complete removal of Catholic disabilities, it was soon found, involved many fundamental questions in the Constitution; in particular, the Bill of Rights, the Test and Corporation Acts, and, in general, the stability of the whole Protestant Church establishment; and for that reason it might be expected to meet with a formidable opposition from the aristocratic party in both houses; and in addition to this, it was discovered, when the measure was brought forward in the cabinet, that the king entertained scruples of conscience on the subject, in consequence of his oath at the coronation "to maintain the Protestant religion established by law," which the known firmness and integrity of his character rendered it extremely improbable he would ever be brought to abandon. In these circumstances, Mr. Pitt stated that he had no alternative but to resign his official situations. On the 10th of February it was announced in Parliament that ministers only Feb. 10. held the seals till their successors were appointed, and shortly after Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Earl Spenser, Mr. Dundas, and Mr. Windham resigned, and were succeeded by Mr. Addington, then speaker of the House of Commons, as First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Hawkesbury, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a new ministry, taken, however, entirely from the Tory party.*†

It has long been the practice of the administration of Great Britain not to resign upon the real question which only the ostensible ground. But this was only the ostensible ground. lect some minor point, which is held forth to the public as the ostensible ground of the change; and this custom is attended with the great advantage of not implicating the crown or the government openly in a collision with either house of Parliament. From the circumstance of Mr. Pitt having so prominently held forth the Catholic Question as the reason for his retirement, it is more than probable that this was not the real ground of the change; or that, if it was, he readily caught at the impossibility of carrying through any farther concessions to

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 966. *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 117, 121.

† In a paper circulated at this period, in Mr. Pitt's name, it was stated, "The leading part of his majesty's ministers finding innumerable obstacles to the bringing forward measures of concession to the Catholic body while in office, have felt it impossible to continue in office under their inability to propose it, with the circumstances necessary to carry the measure with all its advantages; and they have retired from his majesty's service, considering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to its ultimate success. The Catholic body may with confidence rely on the zealous support of all those who retire, and of many who remain in office, where it can be given with a prospect of success. They may be assured that Mr. Pitt will do his utmost to establish their cause in the public favour, and prepare the way for their finally attaining their objects." In his place in the House of Commons on February 16, Mr. Pitt said, "With respect to the resignation of myself and some of my friends, I have no wish to disguise from the house that we did feel it an incumbent duty upon us to propose a measure on the part of government, which, under the circumstances of the union so happily effected between the two countries, we thought of great public importance, and necessary to complete the benefits likely to result from that measure; we felt this opinion so strongly, that when we met with circumstances which rendered it impossible for us to propose it as a measure of government, we equally felt it inconsistent with our duty and our honour any longer to remain a part of that government."—See *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 966, 970.

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 895, 915.

† *Ibid.*, 934.

Mr. Pitt resigns in consequence of the Catholic claims.

the Catholics of Ireland as a motive for resignation, to prevent the approach to other and more important questions which remained behind. There was no necessity for bringing forward the Catholic claims at that moment, nor any reason for breaking up an administration at a period of unparalleled public difficulty, merely because the scruples in the royal breast prevented them from being at that time conceded. But the question of peace or war stood in a very different situation. Mr. Pitt could not disguise from himself that the country was now involved in a contest, apparently endless, if the principles on which it had so long been conducted were rigidly adhered to; that the dissolution of the Continental coalition and the formation of the Northern confederacy had immensely diminished the chances, not merely of success, but of salvation during its future continuance. As it was possible, therefore, perhaps probable, that England might be driven to an accommodation at no distant period, and the principles he had so long maintained might prove an obstacle to such a necessary measure, Mr. Pitt took the part of retiring with the leading members of his cabinet, and was succeeded by other inferior adherents of his party, who, without departing from his principles altogether, might feel themselves more at liberty to mould them according to the pressure of external circumstances. In doing this, the English minister acted the part of a true patriot. "He sacrificed himself," says the chosen historian of Napoleon, "to the good of his country and a general peace. He showed himself more than a great statesman—a good citizen."*

But, though Mr. Pitt retired, he left his mantle to his successors; neither timidity nor vacillation appeared in the measures of government towards foreign states. For both the land and sea forces a larger allowance was provided than in any previous year since the commencement of the war. For the navy there was voted 139,000 seamen and marines, and 120 ships of the line were put in commission. The land-troops altogether amounted to 300,000 men;† and the navy, in service and ordinary, amounted to the prodigious force of above 200 ships of the line and 250 frigates.‡ Mr. Pitt, on February 18th, brought forward the budget immediately before he surrendered the seals to his successors. The charges of the army and navy were each of them above £15,000,000; and the

total expenditure to be provided for by the United Kingdom amounted to £42,000,000, besides above £20,000,000 as the interest of the debt. To provide for these prodigious charges, war-supplies to the amount of £17,000,000 existed; and to make up the difference, he contracted a loan of £25,500,000 for Great Britain; while Ireland, according to the agreement of the Union, was to provide 2-17ths of the whole expense, or £4,300,000. To provide for the interest of the loan, and the sinking fund applicable to its reduction, new taxes, chiefly in the excise and customs, were imposed, to the amount of £1,794,000. These additional taxes, according to the admirable system of that great financier, were almost all laid on in the indirect form, being intended to be a permanent burden on the nation till the principal was paid off; and a sinking-fund of £100,000 a year was provided for this purpose in the excess of the additional taxes above the interest of the debt.*†

Notwithstanding the unexampled difficulties which had beset the British Empire in the years 1799 and 1800, from the extreme severity of the scarcity during that period, and the vast expenditure which the campaigns of these two years had occasioned, the condition of the Empire in 1801 was, to an unprecedented degree, ^{Prosperous state of Great Britain at this period.} wealthy and prosperous. The great loan of twenty-five millions of that year was borrowed at a rate of interest under six per cent., although loans to the amount of above two hundred millions had been contracted in the eight preceding years; the exports, as compared with what they were at the commencement of the war, had tripled, and the imports more than tripled, in addition to the vast sums of money which the nation required for its loans to foreign powers, and payments on account of its own forces in foreign parts. Nearly a fourth had been added to the tonnage of the shipping and the seamen employed in it during the same period; while the national expenditure had risen to above sixty-eight millions, of which nearly forty millions were provided from permanent or war-

* Parl. Deb., xxxv., 974, 978.

† Mr. Pitt stated the War Revenue of the Nation, for the year 1801, as follows:

Sugar, Malt, and Tobacco.....	£2,750,000
Lottery.....	800,000
Income Tax.....	4,260,000
Duty on Exports and Imports.....	1,250,000
Surplus of the Consolidated Fund.....	3,300,000
Irish Taxes and Loan.....	4,324,000
Balance not issued for Subsidies.....	500,000
Surplus of Grants.....	600,000
	£16,744,000

Loan.....	25,500,000
Ways and Means.....	£42,244,000

Charges.

Navy.....	£15,800,000
Army and Extraordinary.....	15,902,000
Ordnance.....	1,938,000
Miscellaneous.....	757,000
Unforeseen Emergencies.....	800,000
Permanent Charges of Ireland.....	390,000
Deficiency of Income-Tax.....	1,000,000
Discount on Loan.....	200,000
Deficiency of Malt Duty.....	400,000
Deficiency of Assessed Taxes.....	350,000
Deficiency of Consolidated Fund.....	150,000
Exchequer Bills of 1799.....	3,800,000
Sinking Fund.....	200,000
Interest of Exchequer Bills.....	460,000
Charges.....	£42,147,000

* Bign., i., 406. Ann. Reg., 1800, 119, 120.

† Viz: Regular Forces.....193,000
Militia.....78,000
Fencibles.....31,000
Total.....302,000

The expense of maintaining which was estimated at £12,940,000. The total forces, both of land and sea, in 1792, was not 120,000; a signal proof what much greater efforts than she was generally supposed capable of, England could really make, and of the overwhelming force with which, at the commencement of the war, she might, by a proper exertion of her strength, have overwhelmed the Revolutionary volcano.—See Ann. Reg., 1800, p. 142, and JOMINI, xiv., 251

‡ Ships of the line, in commission and ordinary...205
Building.....36
Fifty-gun ships.....27
Frigates.....257
Brigs and sloops.....312
Total.....837

—See JAMES'S *Naval Hist.* iii., Table ix., and JOMINI, xiv., 252.

taxes.* Contrary to all former precedent, the country had eminently prospered during this long and arduous struggle. Notwithstanding the weight of its taxation, and the immense sums which had been squandered in foreign loans or services, and, of course, lost to the productive powers of Great Britain, the industry of the nation in all its branches had prodigiously increased, and capital was to be had in abundance for all the innumerable undertakings, both public and private, which were going forward.

Its income, expenditure, exports, and imports.

* Mr. Chancellor Addington, on June 29, 1801, brought forward a series of finance resolutions, which, as fully explaining the situation of the British Empire at that period, are well deserving of attention. Their material parts are as follows:

1. Expenditure for 1801.

Interest of debt and sinking fund	£20,144,000
Additional interest on loans of 1801	1,812,000
Civil list, share of Great Britain	1,376,000
Civil government pensions, charges, &c., in Scotland	635,000
Charges of collection	1,351,000
Great Britain's share of the war charges of 1801	39,338,000
Advances to Ireland from England	2,500,000
Interest on imperial loans	497,000
Total charges	£69,153,000

2. Income for 1801.

Permanent Revenue, as in 1800	£27,419,000
Produce of first quarter's taxes, 1801	1,000,000
Income-tax	5,822,000
Exports and Imports	1,200,000
Repayments from Grenada	800,000
Loan	25,500,000
Loan for Ireland	2,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on supplies of 1802	2,000,000
Additional produce of taxes deficient in 1800	1,100,000
Unpaid part of German loan	560,000
Redeemed land tax	62,000
Total income	£67,963,000

3. Public Debt

Public debt on the 5th of January, 1793	£227,000,000
Annuities at same period	1,293,000
Public debt created from the 5th of Jan., 1793, to the 1st of Feb., 1801	214,661,000
Annuities created since the same period	302,000
Debt redeemed from 1793 to 1801	59,281,000
Drawn by land-tax redeemed	16,083,000
Total public debt on the 1st of Feb., 1801	400,709,000
Annuities existing then	1,540,000
Annual charge of debt incurred before 1793, with sinking fund	10,325,000
Ann. charge of debt since 1793, with do.	10,395,000

4. Sinking Fund.

Am't of sinking fund in 1786	£1,000,000, or 1-238 of debt.
..... in 1793	1,427,000, or 1-160 of do.
..... in 1801	5,300,000, or 1-76 of do.

5. Produce of Taxes.

Years.	Permanent taxes.	Years.	Permanent taxes.
Ending Jan. 5, 1793,	£14,284,000	1798,	£13,332,000
..... 1794,	13,941,000	1799,	14,275,000
..... 1795,	13,658,000	1800,	15,743,000
..... 1796,	13,557,000	1801,	14,194,000
..... 1797,	14,292,000		
War taxes of 1801, £8,079,000.			

6. Imports and Exports.

Average of six years ending Jan. 5, 1784	Imports.
..... 1793	£12,122,000
..... 1798	18,685,000
..... 1801	25,259,000
Real value of exports in 1801	54,500,000
	Foreign goods exported.
Av. of 6 years ending Jan. 5, 1784,	£4,263,080
..... 1796,	5,468,000
..... 1801,	17,166,000
Real value of exports in 1801	16,300,000
	British manufactures exported.

7. Shipping.

Registered vessels.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
1788	13,827	1,363,000
1792	16,079	1,540,000
1800	18,877	1,905,000

The vast increase of exports, imports, and shipping between 1793 and 1800, and especially since the Bank Restriction Act in 1797, is particularly worthy of observation. —See *Parl. Hist.*, xxiv., 1561, 1567.

Agriculture had advanced in a still greater degree than population; the dependance of the nation on foreign supplies was rapidly diminishing; and yet the United Kingdom, which had added nearly a sixth to its inhabitants since 1791, numbered above fifteen million of souls in the British Isles.* The divisions and disaffection which prevailed during the earlier years of the war had almost entirely disappeared; the atrocities of the French Revolution had weaned all but a few inveterate Democrats from Jacobinical principles; the imminence of the public danger had united the great body of the people in a strong attachment to the national colours; the young and active party of the population had risen into manhood since the commencement of the contest, and imbued with their mother's milk the enthusiastic feelings it was calculated to awaken; while the incessant progress and alarming conquests of France had generally diffused the belief that no security for the national independence was to be found but in a steady resistance to its ambition. A nation animated with such feelings, and possessed of such resources, was not unreasonably confident in itself when it bade defiance to Europe in arms.

England, however, had need of all its energies, for the forces of the maritime league were extremely formidable. The confederated Russia had eighty-two sail of the line and forty frigates in her harbours, of which forty-seven line-of-battle ships were in the Baltic and at Archangel, but of these not more than fifteen were in a state ready for active service, and the crews were extremely deficient in nautical skill. Sweden had eighteen ships of the line and fourteen frigates, besides a great quantity of small craft, in much better condition, and far better served, than the Russian navy; while a numerous flotilla, with ten thousand men on board, was prepared to defend its shores, and twenty thousand troops, stationed in camps in the interior, were ready to fly to any menaced point. Denmark had twenty-three ships of the line and fourteen large frigates, which the brave and energetic population of Zealand had made the utmost efforts to equip and man, to resist the attack which was shortly anticipated from the British arms. Could the three powers have united their forces, they had twenty-four ships of the line ready for sea, which might in a few months have been raised with ease to fifty, besides twenty-five frigates, a force which, combined with the fleet of Holland, might have raised the blockade of the French harbours, and enabled the confederated powers to ride triumphant in the British Channel.†

In these circumstances everything depended on England striking a decisive blow in the outset, and anticipating, by the celerity of her movements, that combination of force which otherwise might prove so threatening to her national

* Population in 1801 :

England	8,331,000
Wales	541,000
Scotland	1,599,000
Ireland	4,500,000
Army and navy	470,000
	15,441,000

—See *PEPPER'S Tables*, 332, and *Population Returns*.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 109. *Dum.*, vi., 169, 172. *Nap.*, ii., 137, 138. *Southey's Life of Nelson*, ii., 94.

independence. Fortunately, the government were fully aware of the necessity of acting vigorously at the commencement, and, by great exertions, a powerful squadron was assembled at Yarmouth in the beginning of March. It consisted of eighteen ships of the line, four frigates, and a number of bomb vessels, in all

Nelson appointed second in command of the fleet destined for the Baltic.

fifty-two sail. This powerful force was placed under the command of Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson for his second in command. The hero of the Nile had good reason to be dissatisfied at finding himself placed under the command of an officer who, though respectable, and his superior in rank, was comparatively unknown in the annals of naval glory; but he was not a man to allow any personal feelings to interfere with his duty to his country. Though sensible of the slight, therefore, he cheerfully accepted the subordinate command. When he arrived at Yarmouth, he "found the admiral a little nervous about dark nights and fields of ice; but we must brave up," said he; "these are no times for nervous systems. I hope we shall give our Northern enemies that hailstorm of bullets which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea. All the devils in the North cannot take it from us, if our wooden walls have fair play."*

The British fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March; but, soon after putting to sea, it sustained a serious loss in the wreck of the *Invincible*, which struck on one of the sandbanks in that dangerous coast, and shortly sunk, with a large part of the crew. Mr. Vansittart accompanied the squadron in the capacity of plenipotentiary, to endeavour to arrange the differences by negotiation, which, unfortunately, proved totally impossible. It arrived on the 27th off Zealand, and Sir Hyde immediately despatched a letter to the governor of Cronenberg Castle, to inquire whether the fleet would be allowed, without molestation, to pass the Sound. The governor having replied that he could not allow a force whose intentions were unknown to approach the guns of his fortress, the British admiral declared that he took this as a declaration of war. By the

And passes the Sound.

earnest advice of Nelson, it was determined immediately to attempt the passage: a resolution which, in the state of the Northern powers, was not only the most gallant, but the most prudent that could have been adopted.† On the 30th of March the British fleet entered the Sound, with a fair wind from the northwest, and, spreading all sail, proudly and gallantly bore up towards the harbour of Copenhagen.‡

The scene which opened upon the British fleet when it entered this celebrated passage was

every way worthy of the cause in which it was engaged, and the memorable events of which it was soon to become the theatre. Nothing in the north of Europe can be compared to the prospect afforded by the channel which lies between the opposite shores of Sweden and Denmark. On the left, the coast of Scandinavia exhibits a beautiful assemblage of corn lands, pastures, and copses, rising into picturesque and varied hills; while on the right, the shores of Zealand present a continued succession of rich plains, woods, meadows, orchards, villas, and all the accompaniments of long-established civilization. The isles of Huen, Saltholm, and Amack appear in the widening channel; the former celebrated as bearing the observatory of the great Tycho Brahe, and where most of his discoveries were made, the latter nearly opposite to Copenhagen. At the foot of the slope, on the Swedish side, is situated the old city of Helsingborg, with its picturesque battlements and mouldering towers; while on the south, the castle of Cronenberg and city of Elsinore rise in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of Denmark over the straits. Both are associated with poetic and historical recollections. Elsinore is familiar to every reader of Hamlet, and has recently been celebrated in thrilling strains by the greatest of modern lyric poets;* while Cronenberg Castle was the scene of a still deeper tragedy. There Queen Matilda was confined, the victim of a base court intrigue, and enlivened the dreary hours of captivity in nursing her infant; there she was separated from that, the last link that bound her to existence; and on these towers her eyes were fixed, as the vessel bore her from her country, till their highest pinnacle had sunk beneath the waves, and her aching sight rested only on the waste of waters.†

To one approaching from the German Ocean, the fortresses of Helsingborg, Elsinore, and Cronenberg seem to unite and form a vast castellated barrier on the northeast of an inland lake; but as he advances, the vista opens, the Baltic is seen, and the city of Copenhagen, with its Gothic spires and stately edifices, appears crowding down to the water's edge. Its harbour, studded with masts; its arsenals, bulwarks, and batteries; its lofty towers and decorated buildings, render it one of the most striking cities in the north of Europe. During summer, the Sound exhibits an unusually gay and animated spectacle; hardly a day elapses in which a hundred vessels do not pass the straits, and pay toll to Denmark at Elsinore; and in the course of the season, upward of ten thousand ships, of different nations, yield a willing tribute in this manner to the keeper of the beacons which warn the mariner from the dangerous shoals of the Cattegat. But never had so busy or brilliant a spectacle been exhibited

* Southey, ii., 95.

† Nelson, on this occasion, addressed Sir Hyde as follows: "The more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in my opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. They will every day be stronger and stronger; we shall never be so good a match for them as at the present moment. Here you are with almost all the safety, certainly all the honour of England, more intrusted to you than ever yet fell to the lot of a British officer. On your decision depends whether our country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or rear her head higher than ever."—See SOUTHEY, ii., 98, 99.

‡ Southey, ii., 100, 104. Ann. Reg., 1801, 109, 110.

* "Now joy, old England, raise!
For the tidings of thy might,
By the festal cities' blaze,
While the wine-cup shines in light;
And yet amid that joy and uproar,
Let us think of them that sleep,
Full many a fathom deep,
By thy wild and stormy steep,
Elsinore!"

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.
† Southey, i., 108, 109. Ann. Reg., 1801, 111.

there as on this day, when the British fleet prepared to force a passage where, till now, all ships had lowered their topsails to the flag of Denmark. Fifty vessels, of which seventeen were of the line, spread their sails before a favourable wind, and pressing forward under a brilliant sun, soon came abreast of Cronenberg Castle. The splendour of the scene, the undefined nature of the danger which awaited them, the honour and safety of their country intrusted to their arms, the multitude who crowded every headland on the opposite shores, conspired to awaken the most thrilling emotions in the minds of the British seamen. Fear had no place in those dauntless breasts; yet was their patriotic ardour not altogether unmixed with painful feelings. The Danes were of the same lineage, and once spoke the same language as the English; the two nations had for centuries been united in the bonds of friendship; and numbers who now appeared in arms against them were sprung from the same ancestors as their gallant opponents. The effect of this common descent has survived all the divisions of kingdoms and political interest; alone, of all the Continental states, an Englishman finds himself at home in that part of Jutland from whence the Angles originally sprung;* and even the British historian, in recounting the events in this melancholy contest, feels himself distracted by emotions akin to those of civil warfare, and dwells with nearly the same exultation on the heroism of the vanquished as the prowess of the victors.†

Though they had enjoyed profound peace for nearly a century, and during that time had been ruled by a government in form absolute, the Danes had lost none of the courage or patriotism by which their ancestors, in the days of Canute and the Sea-kings, had been distinguished. Never was the public spirit of the country evinced with more lustre than in the preparations for, and during the perils of, this sanguinary struggle. All classes made the utmost exertions to put their marine in a respectable condition; the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants, vied with each other in their endeavours to complete the preparations for defence. The prince royal set the example by presiding at the labours of his subjects; workmen presented themselves in crowds to take a share in the undertakings; children even concealed their age in order to be permitted to join in the patriotic exertion; the university furnished a corps of twelve hundred youths, the flower of Denmark; the merchants, including those whose fortunes were at stake from the English embargo, came forward with liberal offers; the peasants flocked from the country to man the arsenals; the workmen in the dockyards refused to leave their station, and continued labouring by torch-light during the whole night, with relays merely of rest, as in a man-of-war. Battalions were hastily formed; batteries manned with inexperienced hands; muskets made, and all kinds of warlike stores provided with astonishing celerity.‡ History has not a more touching ex-

ample of patriotic ardour to commemorate, nor one in which a more perfect harmony prevailed between a sovereign and his subjects for the defence of rights naturally dear to them all.

From a praiseworthy but ill-timed desire to avoid coming to extremities, the British armament had given a long delay to the Danes, which was turned to good account by their indefatigable citizens, and occasioned, in the end, an unnecessary effusion of blood. They had arrived in the Cattegat the 20th of March, and on the same day Mr. Vansittart proceeded ashore with a view to settle matters without having recourse to extremities; but, nevertheless, it was not till the 30th that the passage of the Sound was attempted. In the interval, the Danes had powerfully strengthened their means of defence; the shore was lined with batteries, and Cronenberg Castle opened a heavy fire, from above a hundred pieces of cannon, upon the leading ships of the squadron when they came within range. Nelson's division led the van, Sir Hyde's followed in the centre, while Admiral Graves brought up the rear. At first they steered through the middle of the channel, expecting to be assailed by a destructive fire from both sides; but finding, as they advanced, that the batteries of Helsingborg did not open upon the squadron, they inclined to the Swedish shore, and were thus enabled to pass almost without the reach of the Danish guns. The cannon-balls and shells fell short of the line-of-battle ships, and did little injury even to the smaller craft, which were placed nearer the Danish coast, affording no small merriment to the sailors, whose minds were in an unusual state of excitement from the novel and perilous enterprise on which they had entered. The passage lasted four hours, and about noonday the fleet came to anchor opposite the harbour of Copenhagen.*

The garrison of this city consisted of ten thousand men, besides the battalions of volunteers, who were still more numerous. All possible precautions had been taken to strengthen the sea defences; and the array of forts, ramparts, ships of the line, fireships, gunboats, and floating batteries, was such as would have deterred any other assailant but the hero of the Nile. Six line-of-battle ships and eleven floating batteries, besides a great number of smaller vessels, were moored in an external line to protect the entrance to the harbour, flanked on either side by two islands called the Crowns, on the smaller of which fifty-six, while on the larger sixty-eight heavy cannon were mounted. To support these, four other sail of the line were moored within across the harbour mouth; and a fort, mounting thirty-six heavy cannon, had been constructed in a shoal, supported on piles. The fire of these formidable works crossed with that of the batteries on the island of Amack and the citadel of Copenhagen; it seemed hardly possible that any ships could endure, for a length of time, so heavy and concentric a discharge. But, tremendous as these dangers appeared, they were neither the only nor the greatest with which the British fleet had to contend. The channel by which alone the har-

* Clarke's Travels, i., 284.

† Ann. Reg., 1801, 111. Southey, ii., 108.

‡ Dum., vi., 172. Jom., xiv., 252, 253. Southey, ii., 115, 330.

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 110. Southey, ii., 109, 111. Dum., vi., 183, 184. Jom., xiv., 252, 253.

bour could be approached was little known and extremely intricate; all the buoys had been removed, and the sea on either side abounded with shoals and sandbanks, on which, if any of the vessels grounded, they would instantly be torn to pieces by the fire from the Danish batteries. The Danes considered this obstacle insurmountable, deeming the narrow and winding channel impracticable for a large fleet in such circumstances. Nelson was fully aware of the difficulty of the attempt, and a day and night were occupied by the boats of the fleet in making the necessary soundings, and laying down new buoys in lieu of those which had been taken away. He himself personally assisted in the whole of this laborious and important duty, taking no rest night or day till it was accomplished. "It had worn him down," he said, "and was infinitely more grievous than any resistance he could experience from the enemy."*

No sooner were the soundings completed, than Nelson, in a council of war, suggested the plan of operations, which was, to approach from the south, and make the attack on the right flank of the enemy. The approach of the Danish exterior line was covered by a large shoal called the Middle Ground, exactly in front of the harbour, at about three quarters of a mile distant, which extended along the whole sea-front of the town. As this sandbank was impassable for ships of any magnitude, he proposed to follow what is called the King's Channel, lying between it and the town, and thus interpose, as at Aboukir, between the Danish line and the entrance of the harbour. On the morning of the first of April the whole fleet anchored within two leagues of the town, off the northwest end of the Middle Ground, and Nelson, having completed his last examination, hoisted the signal to weigh anchor. It was received with a loud shout from his whole division of the fleet, which consisted of twelve sail of the line, besides some smaller vessels. The remainder, under Sir Hyde Parker, were to menace the Crown batteries on the other side, threaten the four ships of the line at the entrance of the harbour, and lend their aid to such of the attacking squadron as might come disabled out of action. The small craft, headed by Captain Riou, led the way, most accurately threading their dangerous and winding course between the island of Saltholm and the Middle Ground; the whole squadron followed with a fair wind, coasting along the outer edge of the shoal, doubled its farther extremity, and cast anchor, just as darkness closed, off Draco Point, not more than two miles from the right of the enemy's line. The signal to prepare for action had been made early in the evening, and the seamen passed the night in anxious expectation of the dawn which was to usher in the eventful morrow.†

This was a night of anxiety and trepidation, but not of unmanly alarm, in Copenhagen. The citizens saw evidently that the attack would be made on the following day, and, amid the tears of their mothers and children, bravely repaired to their appointed stations. Few eyelids were

closed, save among those about to combat, in all its peopled quarters, so strongly was the solemnity of the occasion, and the coming dangers to all they held dear, impressed on the minds of the citizens. Nelson sat down to supper with a large party of his officers. He was, as he was ever wont to be on the eve of a battle, in high spirits; the mortal fatigue of the preceding days seemed forgotten, and he drank to a leading wind and the success of the morrow. After supper, Captain Hardy went forward in a boat to examine the channel between them and the enemy. He ap- Great difficulty experienced by the pilots. proached so near as to sound round their leading ship with a pole, lest the noise of throwing the lead should alarm its crew, and returned about four with a valuable report to the admiral. Meanwhile, Nelson, though he lay down, was too anxious to sleep. He dictated his orders till past one, and during the remainder of the night incessantly inquired whether the wind was south. At daybreak it was announced that it had become perfectly fair; the order was given for all the captains to come on board, and when they had received their final instructions, he made the signal for action.*

The pilots who were to conduct the fleet soon showed by their indecision that, in the absence of the buoys to which they had been accustomed to look, they hardly knew what course to follow; and Nelson experienced the utmost agony of mind from their failure, as the wind was fair, and there was not a moment to lose. At length the master of the *Bellona* declared he was prepared to lead the fleet, and put himself at its head accordingly. Captain Murray, in the *Edgar*, led the line-of-battle ships. The *Agamemnon* was next in order; but, in attempting to weather the shoal, she struck aground, and became immovable, at the time her services were most required. The *Bellona* and *Russell* soon after grounded also, but in a situation which enabled them to take a part, though not the one assigned them, in the battle. The want of these three ships at their appointed stations was severely felt in the action, as they were intended to have silenced the crown batteries, and would have thereby prevented a heavy loss on board the *Defiance* and *Monarch*, who were exposed to their fire without the possibility of making any return. In advancing to take up their ground, each ship had been ordered to pass her leader on the starboard, because the water was supposed to get shallower on that side. Nelson, while advancing in the *Elephant* after these two ships which had struck on the sandbank, made a signal to them to close with the enemy, not knowing that they were aground, but when he perceived they did not obey the signal, he ordered the *Elephant's* helm to starboard, and passed within these ill-fated vessels. By this happy act of presence of mind he saved the whole fleet from destruction, for the other ships followed the admiral's track, and thereby keeping in deep water, arrived opposite to their appointed stations, anchored by the stern, and presented their broadsides at the distance of half a cable's length from the Danes.†

* Southey, ii., 112, 113. Ann. Reg., 1801, 112, 113. Dum., vi., 186, 187. Jom., xiv., 256, 257.

† Southey, ii., 113, 115. Ann. Reg., 1801, 112. Dum., vi., 187. Jom., xiv., 257, 258. James, iii., 99, 100.

* Southey, ii., 117, 119. Ann. Reg., 1801, 112. James, iii., 99, 100.

† Southey, ii., 119, 123. Ann. Reg., 1801, 112. Dum., vi., 189. James, iii., 101.

Battle of Copenhagen.

The action began at five minutes past ten, and was general by eleven. Nine only of the line-of-battle ships could reach the station allotted to them; only one of the gun-brigs could stem the current so as to get into action; and only two of the bomb-vessels were enabled to take up their appointed position on the Middle Ground. Captain Riou, with his squadron of frigates, undertook the perilous task of fronting the crown batteries: a duty to which the three standard ships of the line would have been hardly adequate, and in the discharge of which that gallant and lamented officer lost his life. Nelson's agitation was extreme when, at the commencement of the action, he found himself deprived of three of his best ships of the line; but no sooner had he reached the scene of danger, where his squadron was assailed with a fire of above two thousand guns, than his countenance brightened, and he became animated and joyous. The cannonade soon became tremendous; above two thousand pieces of cannon on the two sides poured forth death within a space not exceeding a mile and a half in breadth; from the city on the one side, and the remainder of the squadron, under Sir Hyde, on the other, the hostile fleets seemed wrapped in one dazzling conflagration. For three hours the fire continued without any appearance of diminution on either side; and Sir Hyde, seeing three ships aground under the iron tempest of the crown batteries, and being unable, from the wind and current, to render any assistance, made the signal of recall, generously supposing that, if Nelson was in a situation to continue the contest, he would disobey the order, but that, if he was not, his reputation would be saved by the signal for retreat having been made by his superior officer.*

In the midst of this terrific cannonade, Nelson was rapidly walking the quarter-deck. A shot through the mainmast scattered splinters around; he observed to one of his officers with a smile, "This is warm work, and this day may be the last to any of us in a moment; but mark me, I would not be elsewhere for thousands." About this time the signal-lieutenant called out that the signal for discontinuing the action had been thrown out by the commander-in-chief, and asked if he should repeat it. "No," he replied; "acknowledge it." He then continued walking about in great emotion; and, meeting Captain Foley, said, "What think you, Foley, the admiral has hung out No. 39.† You know I have only one eye; I have a right to be blind sometimes;" and then putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, "I really don't see the signal. Keep mine for closer battle still flying. That's the way I answer such signals. Nail mine to the mast." Admiral Graves and the other ships, looking only to Nelson, continued the combat with unabated vigour; but the order to retire was seen in time to save Riou's little squadron, though not to preserve its gal-

lant commander. "What will Nelson think of us," was that brave man's mournful exclamation, as, with a heavy heart, he gave orders to draw off. His clerk was soon after killed by his side, and several marines swept away by a discharge from the crown batteries. "Come, then, my boys, let us all die together," said Riou; and, just as the words were uttered, he was cut in two by a chain-shot.*†

But it was not on the English side alone that heroic deeds were performed; the Danes, in that trying hour, sustained the ancient reputation of the conquerors of the North. From the prince royal, who, placed on one of the principal batteries, was the witness of the glorious resistance of his subjects, to the humblest citizen, one heroic mind and purpose seemed to animate the whole population. As fast as the crews of the guard-ships were mowed down by the English fire, fresh bands of undaunted citizens crowded on board, and, unappalled by the dreadful spectacle, calmly took their station on decks choked by the dying and flooded with blood. Captain Lassen, in the Provensten, continued to fight till he had only two pieces standing on their carriages, and a few men to work them; he then spiked these guns, and, throwing himself into the sea, swam at the head of his brave followers towards the isle of Amack. Captain Thura, in the Indosforetten, fell early in the action; her colours were shot away, and a boat was despatched to the prince royal to inform him of her situation. "Gentlemen," said he, "Thura is killed: which of you will take the command?" "I will," exclaimed Schroedersee, a captain who had recently resigned on account of extreme ill health, and instantly hastened on board. No sooner had he arrived on the deck than he was struck on the breast by a ball and perished; a lieutenant who had accompanied him then took the command, and fought the ship to the last extremity. The Dannebrog sustained for two hours, with great constancy, the terrible fire of Nelson's ship; at length, after two successive captains and three fourths of the crew had been swept away, she took fire, and the gallant survivors, precipitating themselves into the sea, left the vessel to its fate, which soon after blew up with a tremendous explosion.‡ But all these efforts, how heroic soever, were of no avail; the rapidity and precision of the British fire were irresistible; at one o'clock the cannonade of the Danish fleet began to slacken; loud cheers from the English sailors announced every successive vessel which struck; and before two, the whole front line,

Heroic deeds on both sides.

* Southey, ii., 126, 129. Jom., xiv., 259. Ann. Reg., 1801, 112. James, ii., 104, 107.

† It is needless to say from whom the chief incidents in the actions of Nelson are taken. Mr. Southey's incomparable life is so deservedly popular, that his descriptions have become almost as firmly rooted in the public memory as the events they describe, and deviation from the one is as unpardonable as from the other.

‡ The gallant Welmoes, a stripling of seventeen, stationed himself on a small raft, carrying six guns, with twenty-four men, right under the bows of Nelson's ship; and though severely galled by the musketry of the English marines, continued, knee deep in dead, to keep up his fire to the close of the heroic conflict. Nelson embraced him at the repast which followed in the palace ashore, and said to the crown prince he should make him an admiral. "If, my lord," replied the prince, "I were to make all my brave officers admirals, I should have no captains or lieutenants in my service."—*Naval Chronicle*, xiv., 308.

* Southey, ii., 125. Ann. Reg., 1801, 112. Dum., vi., 189, 190. Jom., xiv., 259. James, iii., 101, 104.

† "The fire," he said, "is too hot for Nelson to oppose; a retreat must be made." I am aware of the consequences to my own personal reputation; but it would be cowardly in me to leave Nelson to bear the whole shame of the failure, if shame it should be deemed.—See SOUTHLEY, ii., 125.

‡ The signal for discontinuing action.

consisting of six sail of the line and eleven huge floating batteries, was all either taken, sunk, burned, or destroyed.*

In this desperate battle, the loss on board the British fleet was very severe, amounting to no less than 1200; a greater proportion to the number of seamen engaged than in any other general action during the whole war. On board the *Monarch* there were 210 killed and wounded; she had to support the united fire of the *Holstein* and *Zealand*, besides being raked by the crown battery.† But the situation of the crews of the Danish vessels was still more deplorable. Their loss in killed and wounded had been above double that of the British; including the prisoners, it amounted to 6000; and the line had completely ceased firing; but the shot from the crown batteries and the isle of Amack still continued to fall upon both fleets, doing as much injury to their friends as enemies, while the English boats sent to take possession of the prizes were fired on by the Danish batteries, and were unable to extricate them from destruction. In this extremity, Nelson retired into the stern gallery, and wrote to the crown prince in these terms: "Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare

Nelson's proposal for an armistice.

Denmark when she no longer resists.

The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set fire to all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies, of the English." A wafer was brought him: he ordered a candle from the cockpit, and sealed the letter deliberately with wax. "This is no time," said he, "to appear hurried and informal." At the same time, the *Ramillies* and *Defence*, from Sir Hyde's squadron, worked up near enough to silence the remainder of the Danish line to the eastward of the *Trekroner* battery; but that tremendous bulwark was comparatively uninjured, and to the close of the action continued to exert, with unabated vigour, its giant strength.‡

In half an hour the flag of truce returned; the crown batteries ceased to fire; and the action closed after four hours' continuance. The crown prince inquired what was the English admiral's motive for proposing a suspension of hostilities. Lord Nelson replied: "Lord Nelson's object in sending the flag of truce was humanity; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease, and that the wounded Danes may be taken ashore. And Lord Nelson will take his prisoners out of the vessels, and burn or carry off the prizes, as he shall think fit. Lord Nelson will consider this the greatest victory he has ever gained, if it shall be the means of re-establishing a good understanding between his own sovereign and the King of Denmark." The Danish prince made a reply, which was

forwarded to the commander-in-chief; and Nelson, skillfully availing himself of the breathing time thus afforded, made the signal for the squadron to weigh anchor in succession. The *Monarch* led the way, and touched in rounding the shoal, but was got off by being taken in tow by two other ships; but Nelson's own ship, the *Elephant*, and the *Defiance*, grounded about a mile from the crown batteries, and remained fast, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of their wearied crews. With these two exceptions, however, the whole fleet got clear off from the perilous shoals, and rejoined Sir Hyde's squadron in the middle of the straits: a fact which demonstrates that, though some of the British ships might have been lost if the action had continued, it could have made no difference on the ultimate result after the Danish line of defence had been destroyed.*

The scene which now presented itself was heart-rending in the highest degree. The sky, heretofore so brilliant, became suddenly overcast; white flags were flying from the

Melancholy appearance of the Danes after the battle.

mastheads of the Danes; guns of distress were occasionally discharged from those scenes of woe; while the burning vessels which had floated to a distance threw an awful and lurid light over the melancholy scene.† The English boats, with generous but undeserved humanity, covered the sea, rendering all the assistance in their power to the Danes who had escaped from the flaming wrecks; and the wounded men, as fast as the ships could be evacuated, were sent ashore; but great numbers perished; for such had been the unprepared ardour of the enemy, that hardly any surgeons were provided to stanch the wounds of the numerous victims to patriotic duty. At daybreak on the following morning, the *Elephant*, to the infinite joy of Nelson, was got afloat; and the boats of the fleet being all manned, the prizes were brought away, including the *Zealand* of seventy-four guns, from under the cannon of the redoubted *Trekroner* battery. Thus terminated this murderous battle, one of the most obstinately contested ever fought by the British navy. Nelson said "he had been in above a hundred engagements, but that of Copenhagen was the most terrible of them all."‡

Next day was Good Friday; but all distinctions were forgotten in the universal grief which prevailed in the capital of Denmark. Every house was filled with mourners; the streets were occupied with the weeping crowds which attended the dead to their long home, or the still more distracted bands which bore the wounded back to the hearths which they had so nobly defended. At midday Nelson landed, attended by Captains Hardy and Freemantle; he walked slowly up from the quay through the crowded

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 113. Southey, ii., 140, 141. Jom., xiv., 261. James, iii., 115.

† "Again, again, again,
And the havoc did not slack,
Till a feeble cheer the Dane
To our cheering sent us back;
Their shots along the deep slowly boom:
Then ceased, and all is wail,
As they strike the shattered sail,
Or, in conflagration pale,
Light the gloom."

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.

‡ Southey, ii., 143, 147. Ann. Reg., 1801, 113.

* Jom., xiv., 259, 260. Southey, ii., 130, 134. Dum., vi., 190. Ann. Reg., 1801, 112. James, iii., 105, 111.

† A singular piece of coolness occurred on board this vessel. A four-and-twenty pounder from the crown battery struck the kettle, and dashed the pease and pork about; the sailors picked up the fragments, and ate while they were working the guns.—SOUTHEY, ii., 130.

‡ Southey, ii., 135, 137. Ann. Reg., 1801, 113. Jom., xiv., 260. Dum., vi., 191, 192. James, iii., 109, 111.

and agitated streets. The behaviour of the people was such as became a gallant nation, depressed, but not subdued by misfortune. "They did not," says the Danish chronicler, "either disgrace themselves by acclamations, nor degrade themselves with murmurs; the admiral was received as one brave enemy ever should receive another—he was received with respect." During the repast which followed, the particulars of the convention, which ultimately took place, were arranged. Nelson told the prince the French fought bravely, but they could not have stood for one hour the fight which the Danes had supported for four. Melancholy tributes were paid by the people of Copenhagen to the brave men who had fallen in the conflict; a public mausoleum was erected on the spot where the slain had been interred; a monument raised in the principal church, surmounted by the Danish colours; young maidens, clothed in white, stood round its base, with the widows or the orphans of those who had fallen; while a funeral sermon was delivered, and suitable patriotic strains were heard. The people were in that state of mingled grief and exultation, when the bitterness of individual loss is almost forgotten in the sympathy of general distress or the pride of heroic achievement.*

Of all the vessels taken, the Holstein, of sixty-four guns, was alone brought to England; the remainder, being rendered unserviceable by the fire, were sunk or burned in the roads of Copenhagen. The negotiation which followed was attended with considerable difficulty, and Nelson was obliged to threaten to renew hostilities that very night unless the armistice was concluded. The Danes candidly stated their fears of Russia; and the English admiral avowed that his object in wishing to make the armistice as long as possible was, that he might have time to go to Cronstadt before returning to Copenhagen. At length it was agreed that it should last for fourteen weeks, and not be broken without a fortnight's previous notice; that the armed ships of Denmark should remain, during its continuance, *in statu quo*; that the principles of the armed neutrality should, in the mean time, be suspended as to Danish vessels; that the British fleet should obtain supplies of every sort from the island of Zealand;† and that the prisoners and wounded should be sent ashore, to be carried to the credit of England in the event of hostilities being renewed.

On the same day on which the English fleet forced the passage of the Sound, Hanover over-ruled by Prussia. The Prussian cabinet made a formal demand on the regency of Hanover, to permit the occupation of the electorate and disband a part of their forces, and supported the proposition by an army of twenty thousand men. The Hanoverian government, being in no condition to withstand an invasion from such a force, was compelled to submit, and Hanover, Bremen, and Hameln were immediately occupied by the Prussian troops. At the same time, the Danes took possession of Hamburg and Lubeck, so as to close the mouth of the Elbe against the English commerce, while, on the

other hand, a British squadron, under Admiral Duckworth, reduced all the Swedish and Danish islands in the West Indies.*

During the brief period the alliance between Paul and Napoleon lasted, they had made great progress in maturing the favourite project of both these powers, for the overthrow of the British power in India. A formal agreement for this purpose had been made between the two cabinets; thirty-five thousand French, under Massena, were to have embarked at Ulm, on the Danube, and to have been joined by as many Russian troops, and fifty thousand Cossacks. The King of Persia had agreed to give them a passage through his dominions; and they were to have proceeded by land, or embarked in the Persian Gulf, according to circumstances. Whether this plan would have succeeded, if attempted entirely with land-forces, must always be considered extremely doubtful, when it is recollected what formidable deserts and mountains must have been overcome, which have never been attempted by an army encumbered with the artillery and caissons necessary for modern warfare; but that it was perfectly practicable, if accomplished by embarking in the Persian Gulf, is self-evident; and it is extremely doubtful whether, if the Northern confederacy had not been dissolved, Great Britain could have relied upon maintaining a permanent naval superiority in the Indian seas.†

* Jom., xiv., 261, 262. Ann. Reg., 1801, 114. Southey, ii., 151, 153.

† Nap. in O'Meara, i., 381. Hard., vii., 479.

‡ The plan agreed on was in these terms:

"A French army, 35,000 strong, with light artillery, under the command of Massena, shall be moved from Feb. 23, 1801. France to Ulm, from whence, with the consent of Austria, it shall descend the Danube to the Black Sea.

"Arrived there, a Russian fleet will transport it to Taganrok, from whence it shall move to Tarizint, on the Volga, where it shall find boats to convey it to Astrakhan.

"There it will find a Russian army of 35,000 men, composed of 15,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 Cossacks, amply provided with artillery, and the horses necessary for its conveyance.

"The combined army shall be transported by the Caspian Sea from Astrakhan to Astrabat, where magazines of all sorts shall be established for its use.

"This march from the frontiers of France to Astrabat will be made in eighty days; fifty more will be requisite to bring the army to the banks of the Indus, by the route of Herat, Peshawar, and Candahar." Paul afterward agreed to increase the Cossacks to 50,000.—See HARDENBERG, vii., 497.

In forming an opinion on the probable result of such an expedition, no conclusion can be drawn from the successful irruptions of Alexander, Timour, Gengis Khan, or Nadir Shah, because their armies were unencumbered with the artillery and ammunition-wagons indispensable to modern warfare.

It appears from Colonel Connolly's Travels over this country, that for ten days' journey the army must subsist only on chopped straw, carried with itself, and that in that desert there is little or no water, and no road for wheel carriages. Still the difficulties of the transit, according to him, are great rather than insuperable.* The point is most ably discussed in a learned article in the *United Service Journal*, where all the authorities and historical facts bearing on the subject are accumulated, and the conclusions drawn apparently equally just and irresistible.† In considering the probable success of Russia in such an undertaking, it is worthy of notice that she never brought more than 35,000 men into the field at any one point in the late war with Turkey, nor so many as 10,000 in that with Persia; facts singularly illustrative of the difficulty of pushing forward any considerable force to such distant regions by overland passage. On the other hand, the red-coats, natives and Europeans, assembled for the siege of Bhurtpore, were as numerous as those which fought at Waterloo (36,000 men), and 160 cannons were planted in the trenches, and that, too, during the hottest of the struggle in the Burmese Empire. Still, as the popula-

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 114. Southey, ii., 146, 147.

† Ann. Reg., 1801, 114. Southey, ii., 149, 153. Dum., vi., 193, 194.

* Connolly, ii., ad fin.

† United Service Journal, No. 63

But, while everything thus announced the commencement of a desperate and bloody war between England and the Northern powers, an event took place within the palace of St. Petersburg which at once dissolved the Northern confederacy, defeated the sanguine hopes of Napoleon, and changed the face of the world. This was the death of the Emperor Paul, which took place on the night of the 23d of March, and led immediately to the accession of his son ALEXANDER, and a total change of policy on the part of the cabinet of St. Petersburg.

Napoleon announced this important event to the French in these words: "Paul I. died on the night of the 23d of March. The English fleet passed the Sound on the 30th. History will unveil the connexion which may have existed between these events." In truth, there was a connexion, and an intimate one, between them, though not in the way insinuated by the First Consul. The connexion was that between flagrant misgovernment and Oriental revolution.*

In every country, how despotic soever, there is some restraint on the power of government. When oppression or tyranny have reached a certain height, a spirit of resistance is inevitably generated, which leads to convulsion, and this is the case equally in Oriental as European monarchy, in the age of Nero as that of James II. It is the highest glory and chief benefit of representative governments to have given a regular and constitutional direction to this necessary element in the social system, to have converted a casual and transitory burst of revenge into a regular and pacific organ of improvement; and, instead of the revolutions of the seraglio, introduced the steady opposition of the British Parliament.

In Russia, this important element was unknown. No regular or useful check existed: the will of the Czar was omnipotent. Measures the most hurtful might emanate from the palace without any constitutional means of redress existing; and if the conduct of the emperor had risen to a certain degree of extravagance, no means of arresting it existed but his destruction. Many concurring causes had conspired to irritate the Russian noblesse at the Emperor Paul, and yet the vehemence of his character precluded all hope of a return to more rational principles of administration. The suspension of the commercial intercourse with England, by cutting off the great market for their crude produce, had injured the vital interests of the Russian landed

proprietors; the embargo on English shipping, laid on in defiance of all the laws of war as well as the usages of humanity, had inflicted as deep a wound on their mercantile classes. The aristocracy of the country beheld with undisguised apprehension all the fixed principles of Russian policy abandoned, and a close alliance formed with a formidable Revolutionary Continental state, to the exclusion of the maritime power on whom they depended for the sale of almost all the produce which constituted their wealth, while the merchants felt it to be impossible to enter into any safe speculation when the conduct of the Czar was so variable, and equal vehemence was exhibited in conducting war against an old ally as in forming peace with a deadly foe. The internal administration of the Empire was in many respects tyrannical and capricious; and although that might not, by itself, have led to a revolt in a country so habituated to submission as Muscovy, yet, combined with other and deeper causes of irritation, it produced a powerful effect. The French dress had been rigidly proscribed at the capital; the form of a coat might bring the wearer into peril of a visit to Siberia; and the Czar had renewed the ancient custom, which the good sense of preceding sovereigns had suffered to fall into desuetude, of compelling the noblesse, of whatever rank or sex, to stop their carriages and alight when they met any of the imperial family. These causes, affecting equally the interests, the habits, and the vanity of the most powerful classes, had produced that general feeling of irritation at the government, which in free states leads to a change of ministers, in despotic to a dethronement of the sovereign.*

Latterly, the conduct of the emperor had been so extravagant as to have given rise to a very general belief that he laboured under a certain degree of insanity. This was confirmed not less by his private than his public conduct. The state papers and articles in the St. Petersburg Gazette, which avowedly issued from his hand, or were prepared under his direction, bore evident marks of aberration. When despatches of importance were presented to him from the British government, containing terms of conciliation, he returned them unopened, after piercing them with his penknife. In the Court Gazette of December 30, 1800, he published an invitation to all the sovereigns of Europe to come to St. Petersburg, and settle their disputes by a combat in a *champs clos*, with their ministers, Pitt, Thugut, Bernstorff, and Talleyrand, for esquires.† He was so much enraged at Prussia for not instantly falling into his vehement hostility towards Great Britain, that he threatened some months before to put a stop to all intercourse between his subjects and the north of Germany, and immediately before his death entertained seriously the project of closing all the harbours in Europe against the British commerce, and overwhelming her Indian possessions by a cloud of Tartars and Kalmucs.‡

tion of Russia is doubling every half century, and she will soon have the force of Persia at her command, the British government cannot too soon take measures, by alliance and otherwise, to guard against such a danger. Perhaps, however, the real peril lies nearer home, and our splendid Indian Empire is destined to be dissolved by domestic rather than foreign causes. Considering the slender tenure which we have of that magnificent dominion, and its direct exposure, since the dissolution of the India Company, to British legislation, in an assembly where its interests are neither directly or indirectly represented, it is impossible to contemplate without alarm the probable effect upon its future destinies of the Democratic influence which has recently received so great an increase.

* Dum., vi., 193. Jom., xiv., 263. Ann., Reg., 1801, 115. Bign., i., 47.

* Bign., i., 430, 433. Nap., ii., 152, 153.

† "Latterly," said Napoleon, "I think Paul was mad."

—O'MEARA, i., 380.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1801, 114, 115. Jom., xiv., 265. Hard., vii., 41.

Alarmed at this perilous crisis of public affairs, several of the leading nobles of Russia entered into a conspiracy, the object of which, at first, was to dethrone the Czar merely, without depriving him of life; but experience in every age has confirmed the adage, that from the prisons to the graves of princes is but a step. The governor of St. Petersburg, Count Pahlen, a minister high in the confidence of the emperor, was deeply implicated in the conspiracy; and General Bennigsen, who afterward bore a distinguished part in the war against France, is supposed to have taken a leading share in carrying it into execution. The plot was communicated to Paul's two sons, the Grand-duke Alexander and Constantine, though without any insinuation that it would be attended with danger to their father's life, it being merely held out that the safety of the Empire indispensably required that the emperor's insanity should be prevented from doing any farther detriment to the public interests. The apprehension of private danger induced the young princes to lend a more willing ear than they might otherwise have done to these proposals; for, independent of the natural violence of their father's temperament, with which they were well acquainted, they were aware that he had become lately prejudiced against his nearest relatives, and had dropped hints to the Princess Gagarin, the object of his chivalrous devotion, of his intention of sending Alexander to Siberia, immuring Constantine in a fortress, and the empress-mother in a cloister. But, notwithstanding this danger, it was with great difficulty that the young princes could be brought to give their consent to the conspiracy; and Alexander in particular, the eldest son, only yielded on condition that his father's life should be spared.*

On the evening before his death, Paul received a note, when at supper with his mistress, warning him of the danger with which he was threatened. He put it in his pocket, saying he would read it on the morrow.† He retired to bed at twelve. At two in the morning, Prince Subof, whose situation and credit in the palace gave him access at all times to the imperial chambers, presented himself, with the other conspirators, at the door. A hussar, who refused admission, was cut down on the spot, and the whole party entered and found the royal apartments empty. Paul, hearing the noise, had got up, and hid himself in a press. "He has escaped," said some of the conspirators. "That he has not," returned Bennigsen. "No weakness, or I will put you all to death." At the same time, Pahlen, who never lost his presence of mind, put his hand on the bedclothes, and feeling them warm, observed that the emperor could not be far off, and he was soon discovered and dragged

from his retreat. They presented to the emperor his abdication to sign. Paul refused. A contest arose, and in the struggle an officer's sash was passed round the neck of the unhappy monarch, and he was strangled after a desperate resistance.* The two grand-dukes were in the room below. Alexander eagerly inquired, the moment it was over, whether they had saved his father's life. Pahlen's silence told too plainly the melancholy tale, and the young prince tore his hair in an agony of grief, and broke out into sincere and passionate exclamations of sorrow at the catastrophe which had prepared the way for his ascent to the throne. The despair of the empress and the Grand-duke Constantine was equally vehement; but Pahlen, calm and collected, represented that the Empire indispensably required a change of policy, and that nothing now remained but for Alexander to assume the reins of government.†

The evident symptoms of insanity which this ill-fated monarch evinced towards the close of his reign, his fickleness of conduct, tyrannical usage of British seamen, and general extravagance of demeanour, must not throw into the shade the good qualities which at an earlier period he displayed, and the important ameliorations which he effected in his country. He first established the hereditary succession to the crown; a matter of infinite importance in a government partaking so largely of the Oriental character. His improvements in the administration of the army were immense, and laid the foundation of the rapid strides which it made under his more fortunate successor. His prodigalities even contributed to the circulation of wealth, and sensibly augmented the public improvement. He was vehement, inconstant, and capricious, but not without a large intermixture of generous feeling, and occasionally capable of heroic actions.‡

The influence of the causes which had occasioned this violent and frightful revolution speedily appeared in the measures which the young emperor pursued on his accession to the throne. The conspirators were invested with the chief offices of state, and the Czar was compelled to take counsel from those whose hands had recently been imbrued in his father's blood, in everything connected with the government of the Empire.§ The new emperor, on the day succeeding his elevation to the throne, issued a proclamation, declaring his resolution to govern according to the maxims and system of his august grandmother Catharine; and one of the first acts of his reign was to give orders that the British sailors and captains, who had been taken from the ships laid under sequestration, and marched into the interior, should be

* The dress of Ouvraro, one of the conspirators, caused him to be mistaken by the emperor for his son Constantine; and the last words which the unhappy monarch uttered were, "And you too, my Constantine!"

† Bign., i., 438, 439. O'Meara, i., 380. Hard., viii., 86, 87.

‡ Hard., viii., 91.

§ A lady of rank and wit wrote to Fouché, on occasion of a public ceremony at which the emperor was present soon after his accession, "The young emperor walked, preceded by the assassins of his grandfather, followed by those of his father, and surrounded by his own." "There," said Fouché, "is a woman who speaks Tacitus."—See BIGN., i., 445. HARD., viii., 103.

* Bign., i., 434, 435. Hard., viii.

† Prince Mechercki wrote a letter to Paul in the early part of that day to warn him of his danger, and reveal the names of the conspirators. He delivered the letter into the hands of Koutaisoff, another courtier, who put it in his coat pocket, and forgot it there when he changed his dress to dine with the emperor. He returned to get it; but Paul, growing impatient, sent for him in a hurry, and the trembling courtier came back without the epistle on which so much depended.—HARD., viii., 6.

set at liberty, and carefully conducted, at the public expense, to the ports from which they had been severally taken. At the same time, all prohibitions against the export of corn were removed; a measure of no small importance to the famishing population of the British Isles, and hardly less material to the gorged proprietors of Russian produce. The young emperor shortly after wrote a letter, with his own hand, to the King of England, expressing, in the warmest terms, his desire to re-establish the amicable relations of the two empires; a declaration which was received with equal shouts of joy in London as St. Petersburg.*†

Perhaps no sovereign, since the days of the Antonines, ever was called to higher destinies, or more worthily filled an important place in the theatre of the world, than the Emperor Alexander. Placed at the head of the most powerful and rising empire in existence, stationed midway between ancient civilization and barbaric vigour, he was called to take the lead in the great struggle for European freedom; to combat with the energy and enthusiasm of the desert the superiority of advanced information, and meet the condensed military force of a revolution which had beat down all the strength of Continental power with the dauntless resolution and enduring fortitude which arise in the earlier ages of social existence. Well and nobly he fulfilled his destiny. Repeatedly defeated, never subdued, he took counsel, like his great predecessor, from misfortune, and prepared in silence those invincible bands which, in the day of trial, hurled back the most terrible array which ambition had ever marshalled against the liberties of mankind. A majestic figure, a benevolent expression of countenance, gave him that sway over the multitude which ever belongs to physical advantages in youthful princes; while the qualities of his understanding and the feelings of his heart secured the admiration of all whose talents fitted them to judge of the affairs of nations. Misunderstood by those who formed their opinion only from the ease and occasional levity of his manner, he was early formed to great determinations, and evinced, in the most trying circumstances during the French invasion and the congress of Vienna, a solidity of judgment equalled only by the strength of his resolution. A disposition naturally generous and philanthropic, moulded by the precepts of La Harpe, had strongly imbued his mind with liberal principles, which shone forth in full lustre when he was called on to act as the pacificator of the world after the fall of Paris; but subsequent experience convinced him of the extreme danger of prematurely transplanting the institutions of one country into another in a different stage of civiliza-

tion; and his latter years were chiefly directed to objects of practical improvement,* and the preparation of his subjects, by the extension of knowledge and the firmness of government, for those privileges which, if suddenly conferred, would have involved in equal ruin his empire and himself.

The first measures of his administration were eminently calculated to win that ^{His early popularity which, notwithstanding the proverbial fickleness of the multitude, never afterward forsook him.} By a ukase, published on the 14th of April, he restored to the nobility their privileges and prerogatives, such as they had been in the time of the Empress Catharine, re-established the rights of municipalities, abolished secret proceedings in criminal cases, awarded a general amnesty, and stopped all the state prosecutions which had been commenced. Indulgences were at the same time granted to the clergy, and measures taken to reopen those vents for the crude produce of the state, the closing of which had occasioned so much alarm. Independent of his letter to the King of England, the emperor wrote to Sir Hyde Parker, expressing an anxious wish to close with the amicable propositions made by the British government to his predecessors, provided it could be done without violating his engagements to his allies, and entreating him, in the mean time, to suspend hostilities, and conveying the pleasing intelligence that orders had been given that the British seamen sent to prison by Paul were set at liberty.† At the time when this letter arrived at the British fleet, Sir Hyde had not been recalled by the English ministry: and Nelson, wisely judging that the best way of forwarding a pacific negotiation was to support it by a hostile demonstration, made sail with all his ^{April 18, Nelson} squadron to Carlsrona, where, in ^{son sails for} answer to a message inquiring ^{Cronstadt.} whether the Swedish government was willing to be included in the armistice concluded with Denmark, he received an answer that they "could not listen to separate proposals, but would close with any equitable offers made by Great Britain to the united Northern powers." This reply, coupled with the well-known pacific inclinations of the court of Stockholm, led the English admiral to conclude that he would experience no difficulty in arranging an accommodation with the whole Baltic States, if the disputes with the cabinet of St. Petersburg could be adjusted; and therefore he proposed instantly to sail for Revel, where a large portion of the Russian fleet lay in an open bay, exposed to his attacks, and unable from the ice to make their escape. But Sir Hyde, who trusted that the death of Paul would immediately lead to a settlement of all the differences, insisted upon returning to Kiøge Bay, where he cast anchor, and remained till the 5th of May, when he was recalled by the British government, and ^{May 7.} Nelson appointed to the command in chief. No sooner was he the unfettered master of his own actions, than he set sail for the Gulf of Finland. But when he arrived there he found that, in the interval, the enemy had escaped; they had cut through the ice in the

* Jom., xiv., 268, 269. Ann. Reg., 1801, 116.

† The empress-mother, a woman of heroic spirit and noble character, and who possessed the greatest influence through life over her son, openly and uniformly avowed her horror at Paul's murder; and shortly after that event had a picture painted, representing him on his deathbed, and publicly exposed at the Foundling Hospital, which was under her peculiar charge. Prodigious crowds having been attracted by the sight, Count Pahlen became alarmed at the consequences, and prevailed on Alexander to request his mother to have it removed. But the princess was not to be shaken. "My son," said she, "you must choose between Pahlen and me." The painting remained, and the minister was soon after dismissed from his situations.—D'AER., vi., 342.

* Jom., xiv., 270. Hard., viii., 96. 104.

† Ukase, April 7, 1801. State Papers, 1801, 256.

mole, six feet thick, on the 3d of May, and were now safe under the cannon of Cronstadt. Thither they were followed by the infantry meas- defatigable Nelson, who saluted the forts when he approached, and wrote to the emperor, congratulating him on his accession, and urging the immediate release of the British subjects and property. A friendly intercourse was immediately established, between the British admiral and the Russian authorities; but as the emperor expressed great uneasiness at the presence of the English squadron, and it was evident that the negotiation would proceed more favourably if this cause of irritation was removed, Nelson stood out to sea, and proceeded down the Baltic, leaving only a brig to bring off the provisions which had been contracted for. This judicious and conciliatory conduct was met with a corresponding disposition on the part of Russia. When at anchor off Rostock, he received an answer to his letter to the emperor, couched in the most flattering terms, and containing the important intelligence that the British vessels and crews which had been detained were ordered to be liberated. On his return to Copenhagen, he found that the conduct of Denmark during his absence had been actuated by very different principles; the most hostile preparations had been going forward, in defiance of the treaty, and ample grounds existed, if the English government had been inclined, to renew hostilities, and utterly destroy the Danish naval power. But the death of Paul had dissolved the confederacy; conciliatory measures were now the most prudent course which could be adopted, and Nelson, wisely dissembling his resentment, proceeded to England to receive the thanks of a grateful nation, which his valour and skill had brought victorious out of a state of unprecedented danger.*

The British cabinet immediately sent Lord St. Helens to St. Petersburg; and soon after his arrival at that capital, he signed a treaty as glorious to England as it was confirmatory of the correctness of the view she had taken of the law of nations in this great question. By this convention it was provided, "That the right of searching merchantships belonging to the subjects of one of the contracting powers, and navigating under a ship-of-war of the same power, shall only be exercised by ships-of-war of the belligerent party, and shall never extend to the fitters out of privateers or other vessels which do not belong to the imperial or royal fleet of their majesties, but which their subjects shall have fitted out for war; that the effects on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war and of enemy's property; and it is agreed not to comprise in the number of the latter the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war, which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be transported for their account." And the contraband articles between the two powers were declared to be the same as those specified in the treaty of the 10th of February, 1797, viz., "cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pis-

tols, bombs, grenades, balls, firelocks, flints, matches, sulphur, helmets, pikes, swords, sword-belts, pouches, saddles, and bridles, excepting such quantity of the said articles as may be necessary for the defence of the ship and crew." And "that, in order to determine what shall be deemed a blockaded port, that denomination only is given to such a one where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering."* By this treaty the right of search was placed upon its true footing; it was divested of the circumstances most likely to occasion irritation in neutral vessels, and not stipulated in favour of either party as a new right, but merely recognised as a privilege already existing, necessarily inherent by the practice of maritime states in every belligerent power, and subjected to such restraints as the enlarged experience of mankind had proved to be expedient.

Napoleon has observed upon this agreement, "Europe beheld with astonishment this ignominious treaty signed by Russia, and which, by consequence, Denmark and Sweden were compelled to adopt. It was equivalent to an admission of the sovereignty of the seas in the British Parliament, and the slavery of all other states. This treaty was such that England could have desired nothing more, and a power of the third order would have been ashamed to have signed it." A stronger panegyric could not have been pronounced on this memorable convention, or a more valuable eulogium on the firmness of the cabinet and the intrepidity of the seamen by whom these important advantages had been secured. The First Consul early despatched Duroc to St. Petersburg to endeavour to counterbalance the influence of Great Britain, and bring Alexander back to the footsteps of his predecessor; but, though he received the most flattering reception, he could effect nothing against the ascendancy of Nelson; and the treaty was signed, to the universal joy of both nations.†

Sweden and Denmark were not expressly included in the convention of the May 19, 1801. Dissolution of the naval confederacy. Sweden and Denmark were not expressly included in the convention of the 17th of June, but they were compelled to follow the example of Russia. Unable of themselves to contend with the naval power of England, the anticipated loss of all their colonies, and the certainty of being deprived of their whole commerce if they continued the contest, ultimately overcame the influence of France, and the recollection of their recent wounds at Copenhagen. On the 20th of May, a convention was agreed to by the Danish government, in virtue of which the city of Hamburg was, three days afterward, evacuated by the Danish troops, and the free navigation of the Elbe restored; and on the 19th, the embargo was raised both in Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. These measures were immediately met by corresponding steps on the part of the British government; the embargo on all the ships of the Baltic powers in the harbours of Great Britain was raised; and the expense both of putting it on and taking it off, so far as Danish vessels were concerned, defrayed

* Southey, ii., 162, 171. Bign., i., 443, 446. Jom., xiv., 272, 274. Nap., ii., 154, 156.

* Convention June 17, 1801, Articles 3, 4. State Papers, 213. Ann. Reg., 1801.

† Nap., ii., 159. Bign., i., 451, 452. Hard., viii., 62.

by the English treasury. Prussia had been unwillingly drawn into the struggle, and took the first opportunity of escaping from its effects. Under the mediation of Russia, an arrangement was concluded, by which the Prussian troops were to evacuate Hanover, and restore the free navigation of the Weser.*

Thus was dissolved, in less than six months after it had been formed, the most formidable confederacy ever arrayed against the English maritime power. Professedly contracted in order to obtain the liberty of the seas, it was really directed against the grandeur and prosperity of Great Britain; breathing only the sentiments of freedom and justice, it was, in truth, intended to divide among the coalesced states the power and the ascendancy of a more fortunate rival. The rapidity with which this powerful alliance was broken up by England, at the conclusion of a long and burdensome war, and when her people were labouring under the combined pressure of severe want and diminished employment, is one of the most remarkable features of this memorable contest; and, perhaps more than any other, characteristic of the vast ascendancy, moral as well as political, which she has acquired among the other nations in the world. It is in vain to say the dissolution of the confederacy was owing to the death of Paul; the revolution at St. Petersburg was itself the result of the influence of Great Britain; of that

vast commerce, which has made her intercourse essential to the very existence of the most haughty Continental states; and that moral sway, which ranges under her banners the most powerful and important classes of distant nations. The conduct of the English government and people, during this trying crisis, was a model of firmness and moderation, and was deservedly crowned by one of the most glorious triumphs recorded in their history. Disdaining to submit to the menaces even of combined Europe, they boldly fronted the danger; anticipated by the rapidity of their movements the junction of their adversaries, paralyzed by the thunder of their arms the first of their opponents, and at the same time holding out the olive-branch, succeeded in detaching the greatest power from the confederacy, and ultimately dissolving it, without the abandonment of one principle for which the war had been undertaken. The convention of the 17th of June fixed the maritime question upon its true basis; it arrogated no peculiar privilege to Great Britain, subjected to no exclusive humiliation the neutral states, but prescribing one equal rule for all belligerent powers, and imposing one equal obligation upon all neutrals, settled the right of search and blockade upon that equitable footing which, alike obligatory upon England and inferior nations, must ever remain the law of the seas, while ambition and revenge continue to desolate the world.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT—CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

AUGUST, 1799—OCTOBER, 1801.

ARGUMENT.

State of the Egyptian Army when left by Napoleon.—Desponding Letter of Kleber to the Directory.—It falls into the Hands of the English, who forward it to Napoleon.—Mourad Bey issues from the Desert, and is defeated.—Advance of the Turkish Force.—Defeat of a Detachment at the Mouth of the Nile.—Convention of El-Arish.—The British Government had previously prohibited such a Convention.—Hostilities are in consequence resumed.—Battle of Heliopolis.—Total Defeat of the Turks.—Desperate Situation of the Garrison at Cairo.—Storm and Massacre at Boulak.—Cairo is retaken.—Defeat of the Turks in every Quarter.—Improved Condition of the French Army.—Assassination of Kleber.—His Designs when he fell.—Menou takes the Command.—Preparations for the English Expedition.—Magnificent Conception of the Attack.—Whole Contest falls on Abercromby's Corps.—Sir Ralph resolves to make the Attack alone.—Arrival of the Expedition on the Coast of Egypt.—Landing of the Troops.—Severe Action on the Sand-hills, and Defeat of the French there.—Cautious Measures of the English General.—Bloody Encounter with the French advanced Guards.—Description of the Ground now taken up by the British Army.—Position of the French.—Interesting Recollections connected with the Spot.—Battle of Alexandria.—Wound and Death of Sir Ralph Abercromby.—Immense moral Effects of this Victory; but its first Results are not equally decisive.—Surrender of Damietta.—Divisions break out among the French Generals.—Indecisive Measures of Menou.—General Hutchinson assumes the Command of the English Army, and advances towards Cairo.—Capture of Ramieh.—General Belliard is repulsed near Cairo, which is invested.—Advance of Sir David Baird's Division from the Red Sea.—Their March from Cossier to Thebes across the Desert.—General Hutchinson moves against Menou at Alexandria.—Progress of the Siege.—Surrender of Menou.—Change in the Government of Egypt, which falls into the Hands of the Turks.—Extravagant Rejoicings in Constantinople and London at these Events.—Great mar-

itime Exertions of Napoleon to preserve Egypt.—Naval Action in the Bay of Algesiraz.—The English are worsted.—Second Battle of Algesiraz.—Terrible Catastrophe of the Spanish Vessels, and Defeat of the French.—Attack of Napoleon on Portugal.—Treaty with Spain for this Purpose.—The Portuguese apply to the English for Aid, but can make no resistance to France.—Peace concluded, which the First Consul refuses to ratify.—A French Army invades Portugal.—Peace purchased by enormous pecuniary Spoliation.—Napoleon offers Hanover to Prussia, which declines the Proposal.—Preparations for the invasion of England.—Apprehensions of the British Government.—Attack on the Flotilla at Boulogne by Lord Nelson, which is defeated.—Negotiations for Peace between France and England.—First Proposals of England, which are refused.—Preliminaries signed at London.—Transports of Joy on the Occasion, both in France and England, but it is severely stigmatized by many in England.—Arguments urged against it in the Country.—Arguments urged in support of it by the Administration.—Peace between France and Turkey, and Treaties between France, and Bavaria, and America.—Important Treaty between France and Russia.—Debates on the Peace in the British Parliament.—Arguments urged against it by the Opposition.—Answer made by the Government and Mr. Pitt.—Reflections on the Peace, which appears to have been expedient.—Vast increase of the Naval and Military Resources of England during the War, as compared with those of France.—Comparative Increase in the Revenue of France and England during its Continuance.—Public Debt, Exports, Imports, and Shipping of the two Countries during its Continuance.—General Result of these Details.—Reflections on the immense Efforts made by England at the Close of the War, compared with the niggardly Exertions at its commencement.—Great Part of this Prosperity was owing to the Paper Currency.—Its Effects on Prices.—Glorious State and Character of England at the Conclusion of the Contest.

WHEN Napoleon quitted the Egyptian shores and the career of Asiatic glory, to follow his fortunes on the theatre of Europe, he left Kleber

* Jom., xiv., 275, 276. Bign., i., 451, 452. Ann. Reg., 1801, 116.

State of the
Egyptian army
when left
by Napoleon.

in the command of the army, and addressed to him a long letter, containing minute directions for the regulation of his conduct in all possible emergencies which might occur. As it was evident that the victory of the Nile had completely cut off all chance of maintaining a regular intercourse with France, and it was therefore more than probable that the Egyptian army would be compelled to capitulate, he distinctly authorized his successor to conclude a convention for the evacuation of Egypt, if he received no succours or assistance from France during the following year, and the deaths by the plague should amount to above fifteen hundred persons. Immediately after being invested with the command, Kleber wrote a letter to the Directory, in which he gave the most desponding view of the situation of the army; asserted that it was reduced to half its former amount; was destitute of everything, and in the lowest state of depression; that the manufactories of powder and arms had totally failed; that no resources existed to replace the stores which had been expended; that General Bonaparte, so far from leaving any money behind him to maintain the troops, had bequeathed to them only a debt of 12,000,000 of francs (£480,000), being more than a year's revenue of the province; that the soldiers were 4,000,000 (£160,000) in arrear of their pay; that the Mamelukes were dispersed, not destroyed; and that the grand vizier and Djezzar Pacha had arrived at Acre at the head of 30,000 men. He concluded in these terms: "Such are, Citizen Directors, the circumstances under which General

Desponding
letter of Kle-
ber to the Di-
rectory.

Bonaparte has laid upon me the enormous burden of the army of the East. He saw the fatal crisis was approaching; your orders doubtless prevented him from attempting to surmount it. That the crisis was at hand is attested equally by his letters, his instructions, his negotiations. It is notorious to all the world, and, unhappily, as well known to our enemies as to the French in Egypt. In these circumstances, I think the best thing I can do is to continue the negotiations commenced by Bonaparte, even if it should lead to no other result than to gain time. I have annexed the letter I have written to the grand vizier, sending him, at the same time, the duplicate of that of Bonaparte."*†

* Napoleon and Kleber's letters, in *Dum.*, iv., 110, 125.

† The letter which Napoleon had addressed to the grand vizier previous to his departure from the East, is one of the most characteristic of all his compositions. "Alas!" said he, "why are the Sublime Porte and the French nation, after having been friends for so many years, now at war with each other? Your excellency cannot be ignorant that the French nation has ever been warmly attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as your excellency is with the most distinguished talents, it cannot have escaped your penetration that the Austrians and Russians are united in a perpetual league against the Turkish Empire, and that the French, on the other hand, have done everything in their power to arrest their wicked designs. Your excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mussulman faith; and that the Emperor Paul, as grand-master of Malta, has solemnly sworn enmity to the race of Osmanlis. The French, on the other hand, have abolished the Order of Malta, given liberty to the Mohammedan prisoners detained there, and profess the same belief as themselves, 'That there is no God but the true God.' Is it not strange, then, that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friend, and contract alliance with the Russians and Germans, its implacable enemies?"

That this letter contained an exaggerated picture of the circumstances and sufferings of the army, is abundantly proved by the condition in which it was found by the English troops when they landed at Alexandria eighteen months afterward. In truth, Kleber wrote under a bitter feeling of irritation at Napoleon for having deserted the Egyptian army; and his letter is tinged by those gloomy colours in which all exiles, but in an especial manner the French, regard the country of their banishment. It fell into the hands of the English during its passage across the Mediterranean, and was by their government forwarded to the First Consul after his accession to supreme authority; and it is not the least honourable trait in that great man's character, that he made allowance for the influence of the desponding feelings which he had so repeatedly witnessed in the Egyptian officers, and never sought to revenge upon his absent lieutenant the spiteful expressions which, in an official despatch to government, he had used towards himself.*

But although Kleber, under the influence of these gloomy views, addressed proposals of accommodation to the grand vizier, he made the most vigorous preparations to repel the attack with which he was threatened from the Ottoman army. The greater part of the French troops were stationed at El-Arish and the eastern frontier to watch the motions of the Syrian host, while six thousand were scattered along the course of the Nile, from the cataracts to the ocean, to overawe the Mamelukes, and guard the seacoast from Turkish invasion. Encouraged by the approach of the grand vizier's army, the indefatigable Mourad Bey again issued from the Desert, at the head

It falls into the
hands of the
English, who
forward it to
Napoleon.

Mourad Bey issues
from the
Desert, and is
defeated.
Aug. 6, 1799.

"As long as the French were of the sect of the Messiah, they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; nevertheless, that power declares war against them. This has arisen from the error into which the courts of England and Russia have led the Turkish divan. We had informed it by letter of our intended expedition into Arabia; but these courts found means to intercept and suppress our letters; and although I had proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of any part of its dominions, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it, his most glorious majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and with unaccountable precipitance declared war on the French, his ancient allies. Though informed of this war, I despatched an ambassador to avert it; but he was seized and thrown into prison, and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the Desert, and carry the war into Syria.

"Though my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea, full of courage; though I have fortresses and castles of prodigious strength; though I have no fear or apprehension of any sort; yet, out of commiseration to the human race, and, above all, from a desire to be reunited to the first and most faithful of our allies, Sultan Selim, I now make known my disposition for peace. If you wish to have Egypt, tell me so. France never entertained an idea of taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte and swallowing it up. Give authority to your minister who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt with full powers, and all shall be arranged without animosity, and agreeably to your desires."

Under such a specious guise did Napoleon conceal his ambitious designs on the East; his resolution, so early formed and steadily adhered to, of making Egypt a French colony; his unprovoked seizure of that country while at peace with the Ottoman Empire, and his attempt which, but for the repulse at Acre, would in all probability have succeeded, of revolutionizing the whole of Asia Minor, and mounting himself on the throne of Constantine.—See the *Original Letter in Ann. Reg.*, 1800, 218, 219.

* *Dum.*, iv., 130, 131. *Jom.*, iv., 376. *Nap. in Month.*, ii., 215.

of two thousand Mamelukes; but he was attacked by Desaix, early in August, at Siout, and obliged to fall back. Following up his success, the French general mounted his infantry on dromedaries, and, at the head of a chosen band, pursued the Mameluke chief into his farthest recesses. The latter, conceiving he had only to deal with horsemen, charged the attacking column with great impetuosity; but the cavaliers instantly dismounted, placed their dromedaries in the centre, and formed a square, with the front rank kneeling, as at the battle of the Pyramids. The Mamelukes were received with the murderous rolling fire of Sultan Kebir, and, after charging repeatedly on every side, they fled in disorder into the Desert, and did not again appear on the theatre of Egyptian warfare.*

The Turkish army which Napoleon destroyed at Aboukir was but the advanced guard of the vast force which the Sublime Porte had collected to recover Egypt from the Republican arms. Their main body, consisting of twenty thousand janizaries

and regular soldiers, and twenty-five thousand irregular troops, arrived in the end of October in the neighbourhood of Gazah, on the confines of the Desert which separates Syria from Egypt. At the same time, a corps of eight thousand janizaries, under the convoy of Sir Sidney Smith, arrived at the mouth of the Nile, to effect a diversion in that quarter. The leading division, consisting of four thousand men, landed, and made themselves masters of the tower of Bogaz, at the mouth of the Nile, where they immediately began to fortify themselves; but before their works had made any progress, they were attacked by General Verdier, at the head of a thousand French, routed, and driven into the sea, with the loss of five pieces of cannon and all their standards.†

Relieved by this decisive victory from all apprehensions in that quarter, Kleber turned his whole attention to the great array which was approaching from the Syrian Desert. The check at the mouth of the Nile rendered the grand vizier more disposed to enter into negotiations, while the declining numbers and desponding spirits of the French rendered them desirous on any terms to extricate themselves from a hopeless banishment, and revisit their beloved country. Napoleon had made propositions for an accommodation so early as the 17th of August; and Sir Sydney Smith had warned Kleber that, in virtue of the treaty of the 5th of January, 1799, Turkey could no longer make peace with France but in concert with Russia and Great Britain. An unexpected reverse facilitated the negotiation; the grand vizier, having crossed the Desert, laid siege to El-Arish. The operations were conducted by Major Douglas and other British officers, and the fort carried, during a tumult of Dec. 29. insubordination on the part of the garrison, on the 29th of December. After their means of defence were exhausted, the garrison capitulated; but the terms were disregarded by the unruly crowd of Mussulmans, and, in

spite of the utmost efforts of the British officers, above three hundred French were put to the sword. The capture of this stronghold, which Napoleon termed one of the keys of Egypt, and the proof it afforded of the degree to which the spirit of the troops had been shaken, had a powerful effect in accelerating the negotiations; and a convention was signed at El-Arish about a month afterward, by Jan. 24, 1800. which it was stipulated that the French army should return to Europe with its arms and baggage, on board its own vessels, or those furnished by the Turkish authorities; that all the fortresses of Egypt, with the exception of Alexandria,* Rosetta, and Aboukir, where the army was to embark, should be surrendered within forty-five days; that the prisoners on both sides should be given up, and that the grand vizier should pay £120,000 during the three months that the evacuation was going forward.

This convention was not signed by the British admiral, Sir Sydney Smith, nor was he vested either with express authority to conclude such a treaty, nor with such a command as necessarily implied such a power. It was, however, entered into with his concurrence and approbation, and, like a man of honour, he felt himself as much bound to see it carried into effect as if his signature had been affixed to the instrument. But the British government had, three months before, sent out orders to Lord Keith, commanding the English fleet in the Mediterranean, not to consent to any treaty in which it was not stipulated that the French army were to be prisoners of war; and Lord Keith, on the 8th of January, a fortnight before the convention of El-Arish was signed, had sent a letter from Minorca to Kleber, warning him that any vessels having on board French troops, returning home in virtue of a capitulation other than an unconditional surrender, would be made prisoners of war.†

No sooner was this letter received by General Kleber, in February following, than he was filled with indignation, despatched instant orders to put a stop to the evacuation of the country, which had commenced, and resolved to resume hostilities. In an animated proclamation to his troops, he declared: "Soldiers! we can only answer such insolence by victories: prepare to combat."‡ This announcement was received with loud shouts by the troops, who had already become highly dissatisfied at the humiliating convention which had been concluded, and they joyfully prepared to forget all their cares in the excitement of a battle.§

The British government had previously prohibited such a convention.

Hostilities in consequence resumed.

* Jom., xiv., 402. Ann. Reg., 1800, 219. State Papers, 223. Berth., 310, 313.

† See Lord Keith's letter in Berthier, 391.

‡ Jom., xiv., 404, 405. Dum., iv., 136. Berth., 392.

§ The Continental historians of every description are loud in their abuse of the English government for what they call their bad faith in refusing to ratify the convention of El-Arish. The smallest attention to dates must be sufficient to prove that these censures are totally destitute of foundation. The convention was signed at El-Arish on January the 24th, 1800, and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that the British government would agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, January the 8th, 1800, or sixteen days before the signature of the treaty. This letter was founded on instructions sent out by the English cabinet to Lord Keith, dated December the 17th, in consequence of the intercepted letters of Kleber, which had fallen into their-

* Jom., xiv., 377, 378. Dum., iv., 151. Berth., 198.

† Ann. Reg., 1799, 217. Dum., iv., 132, 133. Jom., xiii., 396, 397.

Kleber drew up his army, which had now arrived from all parts of Egypt, and was twelve thousand strong, by moonlight, on the night of the 19th of March, in four squares, in the plain of Koubbe, in front of the ruins of Heliopolis. The heavens, ever serene in those latitudes, enabled them to perform the movement with precision, though the light was too feeble to permit the enemy to perceive what was going forward. In front were stationed the four squares, with artillery at the angles, and the cavalry in the intervals. Companies of grenadiers doubled the corners of each square, and were ready to be employed either in resisting an attack, or offensive movements. Order, silence, and regularity prevailed in the European army; the solemnity of the occasion had subdued the usual vivacity of the French character: they felt that the moment had arrived when they must either conquer or die. The Turks, on the other hand, were encamped, after the manner of Asiatics, in confused masses, in the neighbourhood of El-Hanka; six thousand janizaries lay in the village of Matarieh, where they had thrown up some rude fortifications; their numerous cavalry, with the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, extended on the right of that advanced guard as far as the banks of the Nile. Their whole force amounted to nearly fifty thousand men; but more than half of this array consisted of irregulars, upon whom little reliance was to be placed, and the situation of the regular corps in the village of Matarieh suggested the hope that they might be cut off before the remainder of the army could come up to their support. For this purpose, General Friant advanced before daybreak straight towards that village, while Regnier, with his division, moved forward in front of the ruins of Heliopolis, to cut off the communication between their detached corps and the bulk of the Turkish army. No sooner did the janizaries

perceive that the enemy were approaching their intrenchments, than they sallied forth with their redoubtable cimeters in their hands, and commenced a furious attack on the French squares. But Asiatic valour could effect nothing against European steadiness and discipline: the Ottomans were received in front by a murderous rolling fire, and charged at the same time, while disordered by their rush forward, in flank. In a few minutes they were mown down and destroyed, the ditches filled by their wounded fugitives, and over the breathing and bleeding mass the French grenadiers pressed on and scaled the works. Instantly the camp of the janizaries was carried: cannon, ammunition, tents, all fell into the hands of the victors; and the small remnant who fled towards the main army were swept away by the fire of Friant's division, or cut down by the charges of the French cavalry.*

The grand vizier no sooner saw his advanced guard destroyed, than he moved forward with his whole army to avenge their loss. The French were reposing after the fatigues of their first onset, when the rays of the newly-risen sun were intercepted by a cloud of dust in the east. It was the Ottoman army, still forty thousand strong, which was approaching to trample under their horses' hoofs the diminutive band of Franks which had dared to await their charge. Immediately the French order of battle was formed; the troops were drawn up in squares, Friant on the left, Regnier on the right; the cannon advanced into the intervals between the masses; the cavalry remained close behind, ready to break through the moment a favourable opportunity occurred. The cannonade soon became extremely warm on both sides; but the balls of the Ottomans, ill directed, flew over the heads of the Republicans, while their own artillery was rapidly dismounted by the well-directed fire of their adversaries, and even the grand vizier's staff was melting away under the deadly tempest of bombs. Torn to pieces by the hailstorm of bullets, the Osmanlis prepared for a general charge. The concentration of their standards along their whole line gave the French warning that it was approaching; a cloud of dust filled the sky, the earth trembled as if shaken by an earthquake, and the roar of twenty thousand horsemen at full speed was enough to have struck terror into the most dauntless breasts. But nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans. As the enemy approached, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape-shot; their front rank almost all fell under the fatal storm; the rear wheeled about and fled, and in a few minutes the mighty array had disappeared, without a single musket having been fired by the French infantry. The vizier rallied his troops, and brought them up again to the attack; but they were unable to break those flaming citadels, from which a devouring fire issued on every side. Surrounded by an innumerable multitude, not one of the balls from the French squares fell without effect, and in a short time the carnage became intolerable, and the Ottomans fled in indescribable confusion towards the Desert. Kleber, following up his

hands immediately after Napoleon's return. Kleber no sooner received Lord Keith's letter than he resumed hostilities, and fought the battle of Heliopolis with his wonted precipitance, without once reflecting on the fact that the letter on which he founded so much was written not only long before intelligence of the treaty had reached England, but from Minorca, sixteen days before the treaty itself was signed. "No sooner, however," said Mr. Pitt, in his place in Parliament, "was it known in England that the French general had the faith of a British officer pledged to him, and was disposed to act upon it, than instructions were sent out to have the convention executed, though the officer in question had, in fact, no authority to sign it."† Orders, accordingly, were sent out to execute the treaty, and they arrived in Egypt in May, 1800, long after the battle of Heliopolis; and Kleber had consented to a renewal of the treaty, when it was interrupted by his assassination at Grand Cairo on June 14, 1800.† Sir Sidney Smith had no authority to agree to the convention, nor was he the commanding officer on the station, in whom that power necessarily resided, but a mere commodore in command of a ship of the line and two frigates, Lord Keith being the head of the squadron in the Mediterranean. This conduct, in agreeing, contrary to their obvious interests, to restore to France a powerful veteran army, irrecoverably separated from the Republic at the very time when it most stood in need of its assistance, in consequence of a convention acceded to, without authority, by a subordinate officer, is the strongest instance of the good faith of the English cabinet, and affords a striking contrast to the conduct of Napoleon soon after, in refusing to ratify the armistice of Treviso, concluded, with full powers, by his general Brune, a proceeding which the French historians mention not only without disapprobation, but manifest satisfaction.—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1800, 220, and *NAPOLEON*, ii., 134.

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 590.

† *Jom.*, xii., 421.

* *Berth.*, 399, 400. *Jom.*, xiii., 406, 407. *Dum.*, iv., 137, 138.

success, advanced rapidly to El-Hanka; the Turks fled the moment the French bayonets appeared; the whole army pressed forward, and before nightfall they had made themselves masters of the Ottoman camp, and reposed in the splendid tents where the luxury of the East had displayed all its magnificence.*

While these important events were going forward in the plain of Heliopolis, the garrison of Cairo were reduced to the last extremity. Two thousand men had been left in that city, under the command of Generals Verdier and Zayoncheck, with orders, if a general insurrection broke out, to retire into the forts which had been constructed to overawe its turbulent population. A corps of Mamelukes and Turks was detached during the battle, and by a circuitous route reached Cairo, where it excited a

Desperate situation of the garrison at Cairo.

revolt. The French were shut up in the forts, and it was only by a vigorous defence that they maintained themselves against the furious attacks of the Mussulmans. When the firing had ceased on the plain of Heliopolis, the sound of a distant cannonade, in the direction of Cairo, informed the victors of what was going forward at the capital. They instantly despatched a corps at midnight, which, traversing the Desert by starlight, arrived in time to rescue

the brave garrison from their perilous situation. Kleber, at the same time, pursued the broken army to Balbier, which surrendered, though strongly garrisoned, at the first summons; and soon after, the grand vizier, abandoning all his artillery, baggage, and ammunition, retired across the Desert, actively pursued by the Arabs, and his mighty host was speedily reduced to a slender train of followers.†

The Turks, under Ibrahim Bey, who had been detached to Cairo, agreed to evacuate the town when they were informed of the result of the battle of Heliopolis; but it was found impracticable to bring the insurgent population to terms of surrender, and it was necessary, at all hazards, to strike terror into the country by a sanguinary example near the capital. Boulak, a Storm and fortified suburb of Cairo, was surmascare at rounded, and the inhabitants having Boulak.

refused to capitulate, it was carried by storm, and every soul within the walls put to the sword. The French troops, who came back from the pursuit of the grand vizier, soon

after surrounded the city of Cairo, and summoned it to surrender. A refusal having been returned, a severe bombardment and cannonade was kept up for some hours, until several practicable breaches were made, when a general assault took place. In vain

the Mussulmans defended the walls with the courage which they have so often displayed in similar situations; after a bloody contest,

the French entered on all sides, and a desperate struggle took place in the streets and houses, which was only terminated by the approach of night. On the following morning, however, the Turkish

leaders, seeing their defences forced, and being apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Boulak if the resistance was any longer

continued, made terms of capitulation; and Kleber, delighted at the prospect of terminating so bloody a strife, granted them favourable terms, and soon after, the division of the army which had entered Cairo took the route of the Desert, escorted by the French troops, and the insurgents of the capital purchased their lives by consenting to an enormous contribution. At the same time, the Turks who had landed in the Delta were driven into Egypt in ev-Damietta, where they surrendered every quarter. to General Belliard; and Mourad Bey, seeing all hope at an end, concluded an honourable convention with Kleber, in virtue of which he was permitted to retain the command of Upper Egypt. Within a month after the battle of Heliopolis the crisis was entirely surmounted, and the French had quietly resumed possession of all their conquests.*

This great victory completely re-established the French affairs on the banks of the Nile. The troops, recently so gloomy and depressed, returned to their quarters joyous and triumphant; the stores and ammunition were repaired from the spoils of the defeated army; the booty obtained by the soldiers was immense; and from the contributions levied on the rebellious cities, funds were obtained to clothe and equip the whole troops anew. Cairo expiated its offence by a contribution of twelve million francs, or £480,000; the other towns paid in the same proportion; and from the money thus acquired, means were obtained not only to discharge all the arrears due to the troops, but to remount the cavalry and artillery, restore the hospitals, and replace all the other establishments requisite for the comfort of the soldiers. Such was the affluence which prevailed at headquarters, that Kleber was enabled to make his captives participate in his good fortune; and, by promising half pay to the Turks made prisoners at Aboukir and Heliopolis, recruited his army by a crowd of active horsemen, anxious to share in the fortunes of the victorious army. The Egyptians, confounded by the astonishing successes of the French, quietly resigned themselves to a fate which seemed inevitable, and their dominion was more firmly established than it had ever been since the disastrous expedition into Syria.†

It was in the midst of these pacific labours, and when he was just beginning to reap the fruits of his intrepidity and judicious conduct, that Kleber was cut off, by an obscure assassin named Souleyman. This fanatic was stimulated to the atrocious act by religious persuasion, and the prospect of obtaining a sum of money to liberate his father who was in confinement. He remained a month in Cairo watching his opportunity, and at length concealed himself in a cistern in the garden of the palace which the general occupied, and darting out upon him as he walked with an architect, stabbed him to the heart. The assassin was brought before a military commission, and ordered to be impaled alive: a shocking punishment, the disgrace of the French general.

Assassination of Kleber.

June 14, 1800.

* Berth., 400, 403. Jom., xiii., 407, 408. Dum., iv., 138.

† Berth., 403, 405. Jom., xiii., 409, 410. Dum., iv., 140, 142.

* Berth., 413, 427. Jom., xiii., 414, 415. Dum., iv., 141, 142.

† Berth., 427, 433. Jom., xiii., 416, 417. Dum., iv., 145, 146. Reg., 64.

als, which he endured with unshrinking fortitude for three days together, evincing alike in his examinations and his last moments a mixture of fanatical spirit and filial piety, which would be deemed incredible if it had not occurred in real life.*

The premature death of this distinguished general was a clap of thunder to the Egyptian army, and was attended with important effects upon the issue of the war. He had formed many important designs for the regulation of his colony, which, if they could have been carried into effect, might perhaps have long preserved that important acquisition to the French Empire. It was his intention to have Kleber when he fell. distributed the lands of the conquered country among his soldiers, after the manner of the Roman veterans; to have enlisted the Greeks, Mamelukes, and Copts extensively in his service; disciplined them after the Western fashion; and on the stock of a formidable European infantry, ingrafted the fire and celerity of the Asiatic horse. These designs were calculated unquestionably to have formed a native force on the banks of the Nile, which might, in time, have rivalled that which England has brought to such perfection on the plains of Bengal; and the revenue of Egypt, under a regular government, would soon have been equal to the support of 30,000 or 40,000 auxiliary troops of that description;† but it is extremely doubtful whether, by these or any other measures, it would have been possible to have preserved this colony while England held Malta, and retained the command of the sea, if she were resolutely bent upon rescuing it from their hands.‡

Upon Kleber's death, Menou, the governor of Cairo, and the oldest of the generals of division, assumed the command. Intoxicated with the prosperity of his situation, and carried away by the idea that he would succeed in amalgamating the French and Egyptians so as to render them impervious to any foreign attacks, he declined all steps towards an accommodation, rejected the new overtures of the grand vizier to evacuate the country at the conclusion of a general peace, and refused to listen to the proposals of Sir Sydney Smith, who was now empowered by his government to carry into effect the unauthorized convention of El-Arish. At the same time, he exasperated the inhabitants by the imposition of additional imposts to meet the expenses of government, which had increased 400,000 francs (£16,000) a month since the death of his predecessor, and vainly flattered himself that, by assuming the title of Abdallah (the servant of God), wearing the Oriental costume, and embracing the religion of Mohammed, which he publicly did, he would succeed in maintaining the country against the united hostility of the Turks and English.§||

Menou takes the command.

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But the time was now approaching when the Republicans were to pay dear for their resolution to maintain themselves in Egypt, and that glorious train of military triumphs was to commence, which was destined to throw into the shade the disasters of former years, and terminate in the final overthrow of Napoleon on the field of Waterloo. The English, government no sooner received intelligence of the resolution of Menou to decline the execution of the convention of El-Arish, than they put in motion all their resources to effect the ex- Preparations pulsion of the French from that for the English important settlement. For this expedition.

purpose, their ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Elgin, received orders to use his utmost efforts to induce the Turks to make a grand exertion in conjunction with the forces of Great Britain; the corps of Abercromby, so long doomed to hurtful inactivity in the Mediterranean, was to bear the brunt of the contest, and an English expedition from India was to ascend the Red Sea, cross the Desert, descend by the waters of the Nile, and display the standards of Brama on the shores of Alexandria. So great and extensive a project Magnificent had never been formed by any na- conception of tion, ancient or modern; and it was the attack. not the least marvellous circumstance of this eventful period, that a remote province of the Roman Empire should have assembled at the foot of the Pyramids the forces of Europe, Asia,

really rests. The convention was signed at El-Arish on January 24, 1800, and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that he could agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, January 8, more than a fortnight before the convention was signed, founded on orders dated the 15th of December, 1799, from the British government. Sir Sydney Smith, on the 21st of February, 1800, stated, in a letter to General Kleber, that he had received such instructions as prevented him from acquiescing in the convention of El-Arish. He adds, "You will observe that the despatches I enclose are of old date (1st of January), written after orders transmitted from London on the 15th or 17th of December, evidently dictated by the idea that you were about to treat separately with the Turks, and to prevent the execution of any measure contrary to our treaty of alliance. But, now that my government is better informed, and that the convention is really ratified, I have not the slightest doubt that the restriction against the execution of the treaty will be removed before the removal of the transports."¶ In this expectation of what he might expect from the probity of the English cabinet, Sir Sydney was not mistaken; for Mr. Pitt stated in Parliament, that, though they had previously resolved to agree to no treaty between the Turks and French, in which the latter did not surrender as prisoners of war, yet, "the moment we found that a convention had been assented to by a British officer, though we disapproved of it, we sent orders to conform to it."‡ Lord Keith communicated the previous orders he had received, not only to the Turks, but to the French on the same day; but the English did nothing to dissolve the treaty; the French broke the armistice, and the battle of Heliopolis was the consequence. These orders to ratify the treaty as soon as they heard it had been assented to by an English officer, arrived in due time in Egypt, and were communicated by Sir Sydney Smith to General Menou. Let us hear his conduct from the mouth of General Regnier. "On the 9th Messidor (22d of August), M. Wright, lieutenant on board the Tiger, arrived with a flag of truce from the Desert, with despatches from the grand vizier and Sir Sydney Smith. He announced that England had delivered to him passports necessary to carry into execution the treaty of El-Arish. He had presented himself at Alexandria, but was refused admittance, and he had come round by the Desert. He had endeavoured to induce the troops to revolt against the generals who refused to lead them back to France. *He was sent back.*" And this is what the French call the British want of faith in refusing to ratify the treaty of El-Arish! and yet their declamations on this subject received frequent and able support from the opposition in the English Parliament. — See *Parl. Debates*, xxxv., 595, 598, and 1436, 1438.

* Sir Robert Wilson's Egyptian Campaign, 184. Dum., vi., 148.

† The revenues obtained by Menou from Egypt, even after all the disasters of the war, amounted to 21,000,000 francs, or £840,000. The present pacha has raised it to £2,500,000. — See REGNIER, 122.

‡ Jom., xiii., 422. Regn., 85, 86.

§ Dum., iv., 150, 151. Regn., 93, 97. Jom., xiv., 312. Bign., ii., 28.

|| The admission of the French themselves will show with whom the blame of resiling from the convention of El-Arish

* Berth., 354, 355.

† Parl. Hist., xxxv., 596, 597.

and Africa in one combined enterprise, and brought to the shores of the Nile tribes unknown to the arms of Cæsar and Alexander.*

Agreeably to this plan, the corps of SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, which had so long been tossed about by the winds in the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean Sea, set sail from Malta on December 10th, and after a tedious voyage of six weeks, and remounting two hundred of its cavalry with Turkish horse, arrived at Marmarice, in the Levant, in the beginning of February. Eight thousand men, under Sir David Baird, were to embark at Bombay at the same time, and proceed by the Red Sea to Suez, while the army of the grand vizier, which was to be re-enforced since its late disasters, was to break up from Acre, and again cross the Desert which separates Egypt from Syria. The project was magnificently conceived, but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, and it was easy to perceive that the weight of the contest would fall upon Abercromby's forces. To combine an attack with success from various quarters, on an enemy in possession of a central position, from whence he can, at pleasure, crush the first which approaches, is at all times a difficult and hazardous operation. But what must it be when the forces brought together for the enterprise are drawn from different quarters of the globe, and the tumultuary levies of Asia Minor were to be supported by the infantry of England and the sable battalions of Hindostan †?

The English army had long delayed the commencement of operations in Egypt, in order to await the reorganization of the Turkish forces, and give time to the Grand Signior to collect an armament of the promised strength on the Syrian side of the Desert. But when the fleet approached the Levant, they learned that no reliance could be placed on any co-operation in that quarter. The Ottoman forces, notwithstanding all the levies ordered in Asia Minor, did not yet amount to twelve thousand men, and they were all in the most wretched state of discipline and equipment. So completely had their spirit been broken by the recent disasters, that they anticipated with the utmost dread a renewal of the contest, and it was extremely doubtful whether they ever could be brought to face the French infantry. To complete their inefficiency, the plague had broken out in the camp, and rendered their co-operation a subject of dread rather than ambition; a frightful epidemic ravished Palestine; the most violent discord raged between the grand vizier and the pacha of Acre, and a re-enforcement of ten thousand men, who had been collected at Aleppo to repair their losses, received a different destination, from the alarming rebellion of Oglou Pacha, one of the Eastern satraps of the Turkish Empire.‡

Deprived of all hope of co-operation in this quarter, and unable to rely on the distant and uncertain aid of the Red Sea expedition, Sir Ralph Abercromby perceived that the success of this great enterprise, on which the hopes of the nation had so long been set, and on which, in some measure, the fate of the war was in-

volved, would depend on his own troops. Fortunately, he was of a character not to be intimidated by the prospect of danger; and although the forces at his disposal were little more than half of those which it was ultimately proved were in the hands of his adversary, he gallantly resolved, alone and unaided, to make the attempt. Orders, therefore, were given to the fleet to weigh anchor; and although the weather was still very tempestuous, and the Greek pilots unanimously declared that it was impracticable to attempt a landing on the Egyptian coast till the equinoctial gales were over, the admiral stood out to sea, bearing with him a noble array of two hundred ships.*†

On the 1st of March the leading frigate made a signal for land, and on the following morning the whole fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay, precisely on the spot where Nelson's great victory had been gained three years before. The remains of that terrible strife were still visible: the Foudroyant chafed her cables against the L'Orient's wreck, and soon after fished up her anchor. A nobler sight could hardly be imagined; two hundred vessels covered the ocean almost as far as the eye could reach; the sandhills of Egypt were already covered with cannon and hostile troops; while every heart beat high with exultation at the prospect of soon measuring their strength with the enemy, and engaging in a contest on which the whole eyes of the world were fixed. The state of the weather for several days prevented the possibility of landing; but at length, the wind having abated, the preparations were completed on the evening of the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, at two o'clock, the first division, five thousand five hundred strong, assembled in the boats, one hundred and fifty in number, which were prepared to convey them to the shore. The clear silence of the night, the solemnity of the scene, the magnitude of the enterprise on which they were engaged, the unknown dangers to which they were approaching, filled every mind with anxious suspense; and thousands of brave hearts

Sir Ralph resolves to make the attack alone. Feb. 22, 1801.

March 1. Arrival of the expedition on the coast of Egypt.

March 8. Landing of the troops.

* Wils. 7. Ann. Reg., 1801, 226.

† The forces on board the fleet, and those to which they were opposed in Egypt, stood as follows:

English.	French.
Infantry.....15,463	Infantry.....23,690
Cavalry.....472	Cavalry.....1,250
Artillery.....578	Artillery.....1,100
16,513	Dismounted Cavalry 480
Sick.....999	26,520
	Sick.....996
Total.....17,512*	Total.....27,516†

There were 999 sick in the British army when it landed, and 996 in the French, so that this diminution left the relative forces of the two nations the same as before.

The French troops who capitulated at Cairo were 13,672
And at Alexandria.....10,508
24,180

So that, supposing 4000 had been lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners during the campaign, the total force at its commencement must have been from 27,000 to 28,000 men. The force under Sir David Baird which ultimately landed at Suez was 5500 men, and as they could not be entirely neglected, and the French required to maintain garrisons in the interior, the active forces that could be relied on for immediate operations were nearly equal, and they proved exactly so in the decisive battle of Alexandria.—See JOMINI, xiv., 316; SIR R. WILSON, 167, and REGNIER, p. 412. *Tableau*, No. 2.

* Wilson's Egypt, 3. Jom., xiv., 308.

† Wils., 4, 5. Ann. Reg., 1801, 226. Jom., xiv., 309.

‡ Wils., 6. Dum., iv., 154. Regn., 146.

* Sir Ralph Abercromby's Return. Wilson, 270, 273. † Jom., xiv., 316.

then throbbed with emotion, who were yet destined to astonish Europe by their gallant bearing when the hour of trial approached. But not a vestige of confusion or trepidation appeared in the conduct of the debarkation; silently the troops descended from their transports, and took the places assigned them in the boats; and not a sound was heard as they approached the coast but the measured dip of thousands of oars in the water, incessantly urging towards the shore the flower of the British Empire.*

The French on the heights were about two thousand strong, posted in a concave semicircle about a mile in length, supported by twelve pieces of artillery on the one side, and the castle of Aboukir on the other. The boats remained for some time in the middle of the bay, menacing different points of the coast, and at length, the whole being assembled, the signal was made to advance at nine o'clock. One hundred and fifty boats, each filled with fifty men, instantly moved forward with extraordinary rapidity, while the armed vessels which covered their flanks began to cannonade the batteries on shore. The French allowed them to approach within easy range, and then opened at once so heavy a fire that the water seemed literally to be ploughed up with shot, and the foam raised by it resembled a surf rolling over breakers. Silently the boats approached the tempest, the sailors standing up and rowing with uncommon vigour, the soldiers sitting with their arms in their hands, anxiously awaiting the moment to use them. When they reached the fire, several boats were sunk, and the loss among their crowded crews was very severe; but, notwithstanding this, the line pressed forward with such precision, that the prow of almost all the first division struck the sand at the same time. The troops instantly jumped out into the water, and rapidly advancing to the beach, formed before they could be charged by the enemy; the 42d, 23d, and 40th regiments rushed up the steep front of the heights with fixed bayonets, and carried them in the most gallant style; the guards followed, and though disordered for a moment by a charge of horse before their formation was completed, made good their ground, and drove back the enemy, while the 54th and Royals landed in time to defeat a column which was advancing through a hollow against the flank of their newly established line. In an hour the whole division was established on the heights, though weakened by five hundred men killed and wounded; the enemy retired with the loss of three hundred, and left eight pieces of cannon in the hands of the victors.†

This brilliant opening had the most important effects on the fate of the campaign. The gallant conduct of the troops, the splendid spectacle which their landing in presence of the enemy had afforded, the rapidity of their success in the sight of the whole fleet, filled both the soldiers and sailors

with exultation, and already began to produce that confidence in their own prowess, which, in military affairs as well as elsewhere in life, is not the least important element in success. Sir Ralph hastened to profit by his good fortune, by landing the other divisions of the army, which was effected in the remainder of the day with the greatest expedition. Some uneasiness was at first experienced by the want of water; but Sir Sydney Smith soon relieved their anxiety by telling them that, wherever date-trees grew, water must be near; a piece of grateful information, which, like every other furnished by that enterprising officer, proved to be correct.*

It is now ascertained, that if the English army had pushed vigorously on before the enemy had time to recover from their consternation, they might soon have taken Alexandria with very little difficulty; and had they been as well aware of their prowess as they have since become, they would probably have done so.† But they were then only novices in the military art, and naturally distrustful of themselves when opposed to the far-famed veterans of France. Abercromby therefore advanced with caution. His first care was to complete the disembarcation of the troops, can- ^{Cautious measures of the English general.} non, and stores, a service of considerable difficulty and danger, from the tempestuous state of the weather, and which occupied the three following days. The castle of Aboukir was at the same time invested, and intrenchments thrown up round the camp. It then appeared how much reason the British had to congratulate themselves on the supineness of Menou in retaining his principal force at Cairo, when so formidable an enemy was establishing himself in his colony; for had he appeared with eighteen thousand men on the heights of Aboukir, the only point on the coast where a descent was practicable, the landing could never have been attempted, or if it had, it would, in all probability, have terminated in disaster. The truth was, the French general, like all his contemporaries at that period, greatly underrated the British military forces, and he gladly heard of their debarkation from a belief that they would soon become prisoners of war. Thus, while the English, from not being aware of their own strength, lost the opportunity of taking Alexandria in the outset of the campaign, the French, from an overweening confidence in theirs, reduced themselves, in the end, to the humiliation of the Caudine Forks.‡

The preparations being at length completed, the army moved forward, on the evening of the 12th, to Mandora Tower, where they encamped in three lines. The enemy had by this time been considerably re-enforced from Cairo and Rosetta, so that their force amounted to five thousand four hundred infantry, six hundred cavalry, and twenty-five pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the smallness of their numbers, Generals Friant and Lanusse resolved to make good their ground against the invaders, trusting to their great superiority in cavalry, the strength of their position in front of an old Roman camp, and the facility of retiring to Alexandria in case of disaster. The English

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 227. Wils., 12, 13. Jom., xiv., 322.
† Regn., 205, 209. Wils., 14, 15. Ann. Reg., 1801, 227, 228.

‡ "This debarkation," said General Bertrand, "was admirable; in less than five or six minutes they presented 5500 men in battle array; it was like a movement on the opera stage; three such completed the landing of the army."
—LAS CASAS, i., 242.

* Wils., 17, 18. Ann. Reg., 1801, 228.

† Regn., 209. Dum., iv., 157.

‡ Dum., iv., 158. Wils., 18, 19. Jom., xiv., 324, 325.

general advanced cautiously, at daybreak on the morning of the 13th, in three lines; the enemy's force was unknown, and it was in an especial manner necessary to take precaution against his decided superiority in horse. The first line, when it came within range of the enemy, was received with a heavy fire of grape and musketry, while a regiment of cavalry impetuously charged its flank; but both attacks were gallantly repulsed by the 90th and 92d regiments, and the advance of the second line soon compelled the Republicans to retreat. Then was the moment to have followed up their success, and by a rapid charge completed the defeat of the enemy, in which case Alexandria would probably have fallen an easy conquest; but the English were still ignorant of their own powers, and the want of cavalry prevented them from taking the advantage which they might have derived from their victory. They contented themselves, therefore, with occupying the ground so easily won, and halted within cannon-shot of their second line of defence; and it was not till the enemy had established themselves on the heights in their rear, in front of Alexandria, that they again moved forward to the charge. They then advanced with admirable coolness, and in parade order, under a murderous fire of cannon-shot; but the attack was not conducted with the vigour and rapidity necessary to ensure decisive success, nor was any attempt made to turn a position which his great superiority of numbers would have enabled the English general so easily to outflank. The consequence was, that the British sustained a loss double that of their adversaries;* and though the second position was at length abandoned by the French, who withdrew the bulk of their forces within the walls of the town, yet this was done in perfect order, and without any loss of artillery; whereas, had Abercromby possessed the confidence in himself and his soldiers which subsequent triumphs gave to Wellington or Picton, he would have carried the position of the enemy by a combined attack in front and flank† in half an hour, and entered Alexandria along with their broken battalions.

The position now occupied by the British was by nature strong: the right was advanced before the rest of the line nearly a quarter of a mile, on high ground, and extended to the large and magnificent ruins of a Roman palace within fifty yards of the sea; their left rested on the Lake Maadieh; the intervening space, about a mile in breadth, consisted of a succession of low sandhills. In front of the position was a level sandy surface, which commenced before the left, and extended as far as the French lines; on this plain cavalry could act; but, as they approached the British videttes, they found the ground strewed with large stones, the remains of Roman edifices which formerly had covered all that part of the

shore. Gunboats in the sea and the Lake Maadieh protected each flank; on the left, in front of the lines occupied by the troops, was a redoubt mounted by twelve pieces of cannon; two were placed on the ruins of the Roman palace, and in the centre slight works were thrown up, to aid the fire of the musketry. In this position, the British army, now reduced by sickness, the sword, and detachments to the rear to 11,500 men, with thirty-six pieces of cannon, awaited the attack of the enemy.*

The position of the French was still stronger. A high ridge of hills extended from the sea to the canals of Alexandria; along this elevated ground their troops were placed, with Fort Breton rising in deceitful grandeur in the centre, and Fort Caffarelli in the rear of the left. Their generals were at first fearful that the advance of the English had cut off the dikes which formed their line of communication with Menou; but that commander discovered a circuitous route, by which he was enabled to reach Alexandria, and on the evening of the 19th, the whole disposable French troops, 11,000 strong, including 1400 cavalry, with 46 pieces of cannon, were drawn up on this imposing position. Everything conspired to recommend early and decisive operations: the ancient fame and tried prowess of the Egyptian army left no room for doubt that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; while, by protracting operations, time would be afforded for the grand vizier to cut off the garrisons on the frontier of Syria, and the Indian army to menace their rear from the Red Sea.†

The ground occupied by the two armies was singularly calculated to awaken the most interesting recollections. England and France were here to contend for the empire of the East in the cradle of ancient civilization, on the spot where Pompey was delivered up to the victorious arms of Cæsar, and under the walls of the city which is destined to perpetuate to the latest generation the prophetic wisdom of Alexander. Every object which met the eye was fraught with historic renown. On the right of the French line rose Pompey's Pillar, on the left Cleopatra's Needle; in the distance were seen the mouldering walls and Eastern domes of Alexandria, while on the extreme horizon, stretching into the sea, appeared the far-famed tower of Pharos. The British, as well as their antagonists, felt the influence of the scene and the grandeur of the occasion, and these ancient rivals in military renown prepared to join in their first serious contest since the Revolution* with a bravery worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and the animating presence in which they stood.

On the 20th, the castle of Aboukir, with its garrison of 190 men, surrendered. On the morning of the 21st, the army was under arms at three o'clock, eagerly expecting the attack which the movements of the preceding evening had led them to anticipate. A gloomy mist covered the plain, through which every eye was painfully striving

* The English lost 1200, the French 500 men in this affair. It is impossible to refuse a tribute of admiration to the skill of the generals and valour of the soldiers, which, with such inferior forces, enabled the Republicans, at so slight a cost, to inflict so serious a loss upon their adversaries.—See WILSON, 23; REGNIER, 217, 219; and *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 227.

† Wils., 20, 23. *Regn.*, 215, 219. *Jom.*, xiv., 327, 328. *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 229.

* Wils., 24, 25, 30. *Regn.*, 220, 222. *Jom.*, xiv., 330. *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 232.

† Wils., 25. *Jom.*, xiv., 329, 330. *Regn.*, 222, 223. *Hard.*, viii., 152. *Wils.*, 25.

to pierce; every ear was straining to catch the smallest sound; the eastern horizon was anxiously regarded, but, though the gray of the morning was perceptible, it seemed reluctant to break. Suddenly the report of a musket was heard, followed by two cannon shots on the left: the officers, thinking the attack was to commence there, were already galloping in that direction, when a sharp rattle broke out on the right, followed by the loud shouts which too surely announced that the attack had begun in that quarter. In fact, the enemy, under Lanusse, were advancing in great force against the Roman ruins, where the 58th and 23d regiments were placed; the English officers no sooner saw the glazed hats of the Republicans emerging through the mist, than they poured in a fire by platoons, so heavy and well-directed that the French were compelled to swerve to their left, and, in making this movement, the brave Lanusse received a mortal wound. His division was so disconcerted by this event and the fire of the English, which was kept up with uncommon vigour, both on their front and flank, that they broke, and fled in confusion behind the sandhills. But at this instant General Rampon advanced at the head of a fresh column two thousand strong, and, joining the broken remains of Lanusse's division, renewed the attack with greater force, and succeeded in turning the Roman ruins so as to take the troops which defended them both in front and flank. Menou supported this attack by a grand charge with all his cavalry. No sooner did Sir Ralph perceive it advancing, than he moved up the 42d and 28th regiments from the second line to the support of the menaced wing; but, soon after it arrived in the fire, the first of these corps was suddenly charged in flank by the Republican horse and broken. Notwithstanding this, the brave Highlanders formed in little knots, and, standing back to back, resisted the cavalry when they endeavoured to cut them down. The 28th regiment was maintaining a severe action in front, when they were startled by hearing French voices behind their line; the rear rank had just time to face about, when it was assailed by a volley from a regiment which had got round under cover of the mist; and these gallant troops, without flinching, stood back to back, and maintained this extraordinary contest for a considerable time. But this bold irruption of the French soon exposed them to the same dangers with which they had threatened the English. The British reserve advanced in admirable order, and threw in a close and well-directed fire upon the attacking column; the Republicans, in their turn, were assailed at once in front and flank, and driven into the ruins, where a battalion which, by its great success in the Italian wars, had acquired the surname of the Invincibles, was obliged to lay down its arms, after having lost above two thirds of its numbers. The French cavalry also, having now lost half their force by the close and murderous fire of the English infantry, prepared to cut their way back to their own lines. For this purpose, they charged the English reserve with the utmost fury; but those steady men, with admirable coolness, opened their ranks so as to let the squadrons sweep through, and instantly closing them again, and

wheeling about, threw in so deadly a fire upon the disordered horsemen, that they almost all, with their commander Roize, perished on the spot. The remnant, both foot and horse, of the force which had made this formidable attack, escaped in confusion from the scene of slaughter, and regained in dismay the French position.*

The defeat of this desperate attack terminated the important operations of this eventful day. On the left of the English position the operations of the Republicans were confined to a distant cannonade; and a more serious attack on the centre was repulsed by the close and destructive fire of the English Guards. At length Menou, finding that all his efforts had proved unsuccessful, ordered a general retreat, which was effected in the best order, to the heights of Nicopolis on his rear, under cover of the cannon placed on that formidable position. The loss of the English amounted to 1500 in killed and wounded; that of the French to above 2000; but this was of comparatively little importance. They had lost the character of invincibles; the charm which had paralyzed the world was broken; and on the standards taken by the victors, they pointed with exultation to the names "Le Passage de la Scrivia, le Passage du Tagliamento, le Passage de l'Isonzo, la Prize de Gratz, le Pont de Lodi."†

But this important triumph was mingled with one mournful recollection. Sir Ralph Wound and Abercromby, who had the glory of death of Sir first leading the English to decisive Ralph Abercromby, victory over the arms of revolution, and, in consequence, received a mortal wound in the early part of the day, of which he died a few days afterward. No sooner did that gallant veteran hear of the furious irruption of the French cavalry into the lines on the right, than he mounted his horse and galloped in that direction; he arrived while it was yet dark, when almost unattended by his aids-de-camp, whom he had despatched in various directions, on the ground over which the cavalry were sweeping, and was assailed by the French dragoons, one of whom he disarmed in a personal conflict; but soon after he received a wound from a musket-shot on the thigh, which compelled him to dismount, and walk to the redoubt on the right of the guards, where he remained for the rest of the day, walking about, exposed to a terrible cannonade, insensible alike to the pain of his wound and the danger of his situation. With anxious hopes he watched the progress of the action, every part of which was visible from that elevated station, and had the satisfaction of seeing the French retire and the victory finally decided before the loss of blood began to darken his eyes. He lived till the morning of the 29th, expressing no solicitude but for the issue of the contest; he bore a painful operation for the extraction of the ball with the greatest firmness; but it could not be reached by the skill of the surgeons, and he sunk at length in the arms of glory, leaving a name enshrined in the grateful recollection of his country.‡

* Wils., 31, 33. Ann. Reg., 1801, 230, 231. Regn., 226, 227. Jom., xiv., 334, 335.

† Wils., 33, 38. Regn., 228, 231. Ann. Reg., 1801 232. Jom., xiv., 335, 337. Hard., viii., 153, 154.

‡ Wils., 48. Ann. Reg., 1801, 232.

The battle of Alexandria not only delivered Egypt from the Republican yoke; it decided, in its ultimate consequences, the fate of the civilized world. The importance of a triumph is not always measured by the number of troops engaged: twenty-four thousand Romans, under Cæsar at Pharsalia, changed the face of antiquity; thirty thousand Republicans, at Marengo, seated Napoleon on the consular throne, and established a power which overturned all the monarchies of Europe. The contest of

immense moral consequences of this victory.

twelve thousand British, with an equal number of French, on the sands of Alexandria, in its remote effects overthrew a greater empire than that of Charlemagne, and rescued mankind from a more galling tyranny than that of the Roman emperors. It first elevated the hopes and confirmed the resolution of the English soldiers; it first broke the charm by which the Continental nations had so long been enthralled; it first revived the military spirit of the English people, and awakened the pleasing hope that the descendants of the victors at Cressy and Agincourt had not degenerated from the valour of their fathers. Nothing but the recollection of this decisive trial of strength could have supported the British nation through the arduous conflict which awaited them on the renewal of the war, and induced them to remain firm and unshaken amid the successive prostration of every Continental power, till the dawn of hope began over the summit of the Pyrenees, and the eastern sky was reddened by the conflagration of Moscow. The Continental nations, accustomed to the shock of vast armies, and to regard the English only as a naval power, attached little importance to the contest of such inconsiderable bodies of men on a distant shore; but the prophetic eye of Napoleon at once discerned the magnitude of its consequences, and he received the intelligence of the disaster at Alexandria with a degree of anguish equalled only by that experienced from the shock of Trafalgar.*†

But, though destined in its ultimate effects to produce these important consequences, the victory of Alexandria was not at first attended by results at all commensurate to the ardent anticipations of the English people. The movements of the English army were for long cautious and dilatory; but, though their operations were not brilliant, they were skilful, and ultimately produced the desired results. For some days after the battle they remained on the ground where they had so bravely combated, and the French

occupied the heights of Nicopolis—both parties being busied in repairing their losses, and restoring the strength of their forces. At length a re-enforcement of six thousand Albanians having arrived in the Bay of Aboukir, they were joined by a British detachment of a thousand men, and the combined forces approached Rosetta, situated on one of the mouths of the Nile. On their approach the French garrison retired to Damietta, leaving a hundred and fifty men in Fort Julien, who, after a April 19. Sur-spirited resistance, surrendered on render of Da-mietta.

the English army was re-enforced by three thousand men, who landed at Aboukir in the beginning of May, and General Hutchison,* who had now succeeded to the command, resolved to commence offensive operations.

Meanwhile, divisions, the natural result of such unwonted disasters, broke out among the French generals. Divisions break out among the French generals.

the expedience of leaving garrisons only in Alexandria, Cairo, and other important points, and concentrating the mass of the troops at Ramanieh in a situation either to fall upon the English army if they should leave their lines to attack Rosetta or Alexandria, or crush the grand vizier if he should attempt to cross the Desert. But nothing could induce Menou to adopt anything but half measures. He detached four thousand troops to relieve Rosetta, who arrived on the Nile too late to disengage that place, and retired to El-Aft, where they threw up intrenchments, and awaited the movements of the English; but himself remained

at Alexandria, obstinately persisting in the belief that the grand vizier would never cross the Desert, that the English would not venture to quit their position, and that, if he remained firm a little longer, they would again betake themselves to their vessels. Meanwhile, General Hutchison was rapidly circumscribing his limits at Alexan- April 13.

dria; he cut the isthmus which separated the Lake Maadih from the dried bed of the Lake Mareotis, and filled with the sea that monument of ancient industry, which in a great degree isolated Alexandria from the rest of Egypt, while the British flotilla ascended the Nile, and captured an important convoy descending that river for the use of its garrison. These disasters produced the greatest discouragement in the French army;† the dissensions among the officers increased in vehemence, and General Regnier's language, in particular, became so menacing, that the commander-in-chief, apprehensive that he might, with the concurrence of the army, assume the command, had him arrested and sent back to France.‡

* Bour., iv., 299. D'Abr., v., 202. Jom., xiv., 336.

† "I can with safety affirm," said Junot, "that Napoleon's design was to have made Egypt the point from which the thunderbolt was to issue which was to overwhelm the British Empire. I can easily sympathize, therefore, with the cruel agony which he underwent when he pronounced these words, 'Junot, we have lost Egypt.' The First Consul never let those around know to what a degree he was afflicted by the stroke which he received from England on that occasion. Junot alone was fully acquainted with it; it was only to the eyes of those who had enjoyed his early intimacy that he raised the veil which concealed the anguish of his heart. Junot wept like a child when he recounted what the First Consul had said during the two hours that he was with him after he received intelligence of that disastrous event. 'My projects, alike with my dreams, have been destroyed by England,' said that great conqueror."—DUCHESS OF ABRANTES, v., 202, 203.

* Ann. Reg., 1801. 233. Jom., xiv., 338, 339.

† Jom., xiv., 339, 340. Regn., 235, 252. Wils., 56.

‡ The characters of Menou and Regnier are thus given by Napoleon: "Menou appeared to have all the qualities fitted for the command; he was learned, upright, and an excellent civil governor. He had become a Mussulman, which, how ridiculous soever, was agreeable to the natives of the country; a doubt hung over his military capacity, but none over his personal courage; he had acted well in La Vendée and at the assault of Alexandria. General Regnier was more habituated to war, but he wanted the chief quality in a general-in-chief, excellent when second in command, he was unfit to take the lead. His character was silent and solitary, having no knowledge of the means of

The detachment of La Grange, with four thousand men, having reduced the garrison of Alexandria to little more than six thousand, General Hutchison at length moved forward, with the main body of his forces, towards Ramanieh, in order to menace Cairo, and carry the war into the upper parts of Egypt. Four thousand British and six thousand Turks, in the first instance, advanced against the intrenched position of La Grange at El-Aft. On the approach of such considerable forces, he retired to the fortified position of Ramanieh, an important post on the Nile, from which the canal branches off which connects it with Alexandria, where he collected four thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon. After a sharp skirmish, however, this position was abandoned, and the advance of Hutchison having cut off their retreat to Alexandria, the Republicans were compelled to fall back upon Cairo, which they reached a few days afterward. The capture of Ramanieh was an important step in the campaign, as it completely isolated the troops at Cairo from those at Alexandria, cut off the chief supplies from the latter city, and rendered all attempt at co-operation impossible between them. The fruits of this acquisition soon appeared in the capture of a convoy of four hundred men and six hundred camels, bound for Alexandria, which, in the pathless solitude of the Desert, fell a prey to the industry and vigilance of the English cavalry.*

May 7. Meanwhile the grand vizier, encouraged by the unwonted intelligence of the defeat of the French forces, and relieved by the cessation of the plague in his army, one great cause of his weakness, mustered up courage to cross the Desert, and in the middle of April drew near to the French fortified position, on the frontiers of Syria, at the head of twelve thousand men. At his approach, the Republicans evacuated Salahieh and Balbeis, on the edge of the Desert, and Damietta, at the mouth of one of the branches of the Nile, and drew back all their forces to Cairo. The arrival of La Grange with the troops from Ramanieh having increased the disposable force of General Belliard to ten thousand veterans, he moved forward at the head of six thousand chosen troops to El-Hanka, to meet the Turkish force. But the Mussulmans were now under very different direction from that which led them to destruction at Heliopolis. Major Hope, afterward one of the most distinguished lieutenants of Wellington, was with the artillery, and Major Holloway directed all the movements of the grand vizier. These able officers brought up the Turkish artillery and infantry to the fight in a wood of date-trees, where the superiority of European discipline was not so decisive as in the open plain, while a skilful movement of the cavalry towards their rear threatened to cut off the enemy's retreat to Cairo. The consequence was, that after an indecisive action of five hours, Belliard retreated

to the capital; a result so different from any which had yet attended their warfare with the Republicans, that it elevated immensely the spirits of the Ottomans, and, what was of still greater consequence, disposed them to resign themselves implicitly to the guidance of the British officers attached to their staff.*

This important advantage having thrown the enemy on all sides back into the capital, and the success of the Turks having proved that, under proper guidance, some reliance could be placed upon them in active operations, General Hutchison resolved to advance immediately against Cairo, although the promised co-operation of the troops from the Red Sea could not be calculated upon, as, from the prevalence of contrary winds in that dangerous strait, they had been detained much beyond the appointed time. The English army invested Cairo on the 20th of May on the left, while the grand vizier did the same on the right bank of the Nile. The fortifications of the town, begun by Kleber, had been assiduously continued by Menou; but they were too extensive, stretching over a circumference of fourteen miles, to be adequately guarded by nine thousand men, to which the effective part of the garrison was now reduced; and although General Baird, with the Indian army, had not yet arrived, there could be no doubt that they would make their appearance in the rear if the siege were continued for any length of time. Impressed with these considerations, and fearful that by delay he might not obtain equally favourable terms, Belliard, on the day following, proposed a capitulation, on the same conditions as had been agreed to the year before at El-Arish, viz., that the army should be conveyed to France within fifty days, with their arms, artillery, and baggage. This was immediately agreed to. The troops embarked on the Nile in virtue of this capitulation, amounting to 13,672, besides the civil servants, and they left in the hands of the British 320 pieces of heavy cannon, besides the field-pieces of the corps which they carried with them; an astonishing conquest to have been achieved by a European force of smaller amount, and a lasting monument of the important triumph gained by the British arms on the sands of Alexandria.†

Shortly after this capitulation was signed, the army of General Baird, six thousand four hundred strong, of whom 3600 were British, and 2800 sepoys, appeared on the banks of the Nile from India.‡ They had sailed from Bombay in the end of December; but, unfortunately, the monsoon had set in before they arrived at the mouth of the Red Sea, which rendered it impossible for them to reach their original destination, which was Suez, in time to operate as a diversion to the British force when it first landed at the mouth of the Nile. After struggling hard with contrary winds for above two months, in the course of which two transports were lost, the expedition arrived at Cosseir, in Upper Egypt, in the beginning of

General Belliard is defeated near Cairo. relieved by the cessation of the plague in his army, one great cause of his weakness, mustered up courage to cross the Desert, and in the middle of April drew near to the French fortified position, on the frontiers of Syria, at the head of twelve thousand men. At his approach, the Republicans evacuated Salahieh and Balbeis, on the edge of the Desert, and Damietta, at the mouth of one of the branches of the Nile, and drew back all their forces to Cairo. The arrival of La Grange with the troops from Ramanieh having increased the disposable force of General Belliard to ten thousand veterans, he moved forward at the head of six thousand chosen troops to El-Hanka, to meet the Turkish force. But the Mussulmans were now under very different direction from that which led them to destruction at Heliopolis. Major Hope, afterward one of the most distinguished lieutenants of Wellington, was with the artillery, and Major Holloway directed all the movements of the grand vizier. These able officers brought up the Turkish artillery and infantry to the fight in a wood of date-trees, where the superiority of European discipline was not so decisive as in the open plain, while a skilful movement of the cavalry towards their rear threatened to cut off the enemy's retreat to Cairo. The consequence was, that after an indecisive action of five hours, Belliard retreated

electrifying, ruling, or guiding mankind."—NAP. in MONTH, i., 73, 74.

* Journ., xiv., 339, 341. Wils., 84, 96. Ann. Reg., 1801, 234.

* Journ., xiv., 342, 343. Ann. Reg., 1801, 235. Wils., 110, 111.

† Journ., xiv., 345, 346. Wils., 157, 265. Ann. Reg., 1801, 236, 237. ‡ Wils., 168, 169.

Cairo is invested.

May 20.

Capitulation of Cairo.

May 22.

Advance of Sir David Baird's division from the Red Sea.

July 9.

July, and preparations were instantly made for crossing the Desert which separates the Red Sea from Thebes. This passage is one hundred and forty miles long; and as it was the first instance recorded in history of a European army, with the artillery and encumbrances of modern warfare, crossing one of the Eastern deserts, it is in a peculiar manner worthy of observation.

July 29. Their march from Cosseir to Thebes across the Desert.

The first detachment began its march from Cosseir, and in nine days it arrived at Kinneh on the Nile. The road across the arid wilderness lies almost the whole way through a succession of ravines, winding among hills varying from five to fifteen hundred feet in height. These hills are very remarkable, rising often perpendicularly on either side of the valley, as if they had been scarped by art; here, again, rather broken and overhanging, as if they were the lofty banks of a mighty river, and the traveller traversing its dry and naked bed. Now you are quite land-locked; now, again, you open on lateral valleys, and see upon heights beyond small square towers. Depôts of provisions had been provided at the eight stations where the army halted, and wells dug by the Arabs, from which a tolerable supply of water was obtained, though in many places rather of a brackish quality. Not a dwelling was to be seen, and hardly any traces of vegetation were discovered along this dreary tract; nothing met the eye but bare and arid rocks in the mountains, and loose sand or hard gravel in the hollows. The sufferings of the soldiers from heat and thirst were very great; for, though they marched only during the night, yet the atmosphere, heated to 115 degrees of Fahrenheit in the shade during the day, was at all times sultry and oppressive in the highest degree. It was soon found that it was impossible by drinking to allay the thirst, and that indulgence in that respect only augmented the desire; a little vinegar mixed with water proved the only effectual relief. Everywhere the cannon and ammunition wagons passed with facility, drawn by oxen brought from India. No words can describe the transports of the soldiers when, at Rensch, they first came in sight of the Nile, flowing in a full, majestic stream in the green plain at their feet; the bonds of discipline were unavailing to prevent a tumultuous rush of men, horses, camels, and oxen, when they approached its banks, to plunge into the waves. At length, by great efforts, the army was assembled at Thebes with very little loss, considering the arduous service they had undergone. They there gazed with wonder at the avenues of sphinxes and stately temples which are destined to transmit to the latest posterity the wonders of ancient Egypt, and embarking on the Nile, fell down in boats in nine days, a distance of three hundred miles, to Grand Cairo, where they arrived on the 10th of August. There, for the first time in the history of the world, the sable Hindoos from the banks of the Ganges, the swarthy Asiatics from the plains of the Euphrates, and the blue-eyed English from the shores of the Thames, met in arms at the foot of the Pyramids.*†

When Menou was informed of the capitulation of Cairo, he professed himself highly incensed at its conditions, and loudly proclaimed his resolution to bury himself under the ruins of Alexandria. He refused to take advantage, in consequence, of the proposal made to him to accede to the capitulation of the capital, and embark on the same terms for France. This determination was founded on intelligence he had received by the brig Lodi, which had eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers and penetrated into Alexandria, of the approach of Admiral Gantheaume with seven sail and five thousand men, accompanied with the most peremptory orders from the First Consul to hold out to the last extremity. Finding that the reduction of this last stronghold could only be effected by force, General Hutchison, after the embarkation of General Belliard and his division, brought down the greater part of his troops from Cairo; and, in the beginning of August, commenced active operations, at the head of sixteen thousand men, against Alexandria. A flotilla was rapidly collected on the Lake Mareotis; but, to complete the investment of the place, it was necessary to reduce Fort Marabon, situated on a tongue of land which unites the town to the opposite side of the lake, and by which alone the garrison received supplies of provisions from the Arabs. Four thousand men were embarked on the flotilla, and landed near the fort on the 17th, while a feint was made of a general attack on the heights of Nicopolis by General Hutchison. These operations were completely successful; the landing of the troops was effected with very little opposition; batteries were rapidly constructed, and so heavy a fire kept up, both by land and sea, that the fort was soon reduced to a heap of ruins, and the garrison, consisting of a hundred and sixty men, was compelled to capitulate. At the same time, some of the advanced batteries of the Republicans were carried on the heights near the sea, and a column of six hundred men, detached by Menou to recover them, driven back by Colonel Spencer, at the head of seven companies of the 30th, with the most distinguished gallantry. In endeavouring to set fire to the English flotilla, the French burned their own schooners on the lake, while the light vessels of the fleet boldly sailed into the harbour of Alexandria, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy's squadron in the inner port. On the following day, General Coote followed up his success, and, advancing along the isthmus beyond Marabon, opened his trenches in form against Fort Le Turc, which was soon breached by a formidable artillery. These disasters at length wakened Menou from his dream of security; he forgot his resolution to conquer or die, and agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which the French were to surrender Alexandria, with all its artillery, and be transported back to France, with their arms, baggage, and ten pieces of cannon only. It was

General Hutchison moves against Menou at Alexandria.

Progress of the siege.

Aug. 27.

Aug. 31.

Surrender of Menou.

the sepoy regiments came to the monuments of ancient Egypt, they fell down and worshipped the images; another proof, among the many which exist, of the common origin of these early nations. I have heard this curious fact from several officers who were present on the occasion.

* Scherer's Egypt, 68, 69. Wils., 171, 173. Ann. Reg., 1801, 237.

† A singular incident occurred on this occasion. When

agreed between the military commanders that the collections of antiquities and drawings which had been made by the artists and learned men who accompanied the expedition should be surrendered to the British; but as they made the most vigorous remonstrances against such a condition, and threatened to destroy them rather than that they should fall into the hands of the victors, General Hutchison, with a generous regard to the interests of science and the feelings of these distinguished persons, agreed to depart from the stipulation, and allow those treasures of art to be forwarded to France. The sarcophagus of Alexander, however, was retained by the British, and formed the glorious trophy of their memorable triumph.*

The military results of this conquest were very great. Three hundred and twelve pieces of cannon, chiefly brass, were found upon the works of Alexandria, besides seventy-seven on board the ships of war. No less than 195,000 pounds of powder and 14,000 gun cartridges were taken in the magazines; while the soldiers who capitulated were 10,011, independent of 500 sailors and 665 civil servants. The total troops who capitulated in Egypt were nearly 24,000, all tried veterans of France: an astonishing success to have been achieved by a British force which had hardly ever seen a shot fired, and even including those who came up from India six weeks after Cairo had surrendered, never amounted to the same numerical strength.†

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 238, 239. Wils., 194, 212. Jom., xiv., 850, 853. Regn., 280, 288.

† Wils., 179, 216, 217. Ann. Reg., 1801, 239. Jom., xiv., 352, 353. Regn., 280, 289.

‡ The troops who capitulated at Cairo, exclusive of civil servants, were

At Alexandria	13,672
At Alexandria	10,528
	24,200*

which, supposing 4000 lost in the previous engagement, leaves a total of 28,000 men to oppose the British in Egypt, having at their command, in heavy cannon and field-pieces, above 700 guns. The amount of the force which the French had in this contest is ascertained by the best possible evidence, that of an unwilling witness, perfectly acquainted with the facts, and never disposed to exaggerate the amount of his beaten troops. "In March, 1801," says Napoleon, "the English disembarked an army of 18,000 men, without artillery or cavalry horses: it should have been destroyed. The army, vanquished after six months of false manoeuvres, was disembarked on the shores of Provence still 24,000 strong." When Napoleon quitted it, in the end of August, 1799, it amounted in all to 28,500 men. As the British and allied forces did not enter simultaneously into action, but, on the contrary, at an interval of several months from each other, the victory must have remained with the French if they had had a general of capacity at their head, who knew how to avail himself skilfully of the advantages of his central position.† The British forces which came with Sir Ralph Abercromby were

Landed in April	16,599
Came with Sir David Baird	3,000
	5,919
Total British and Indian troops	25,518‡

The army of the grand vizier, which advanced against Cairo after the battle of Alexandria, was only 14,000 strong, and in such a state of disorganization as to be capable of effecting very little in the field; and the corps which landed at Rosetta was only 6000 men, and effected very little against the enemy. When, therefore, it is recollected that the campaign was really concluded by the capitulation of General Belliard at Cairo on the 26th of June, that the forces from the Red Sea only landed at Cosseir on the 8th of July, and arrived at Cairo on the 10th of August, and, consequently, that the contest was decided by 19,500 British against 28,000 French, having the advantage of a central position and possession of all the fortified places in the country, it must be admitted that modern history has few more glorious achievements to commemorate.

After the reduction of Alexandria, the greater part of the army, with General Hutchison, returned to England, leaving twelve thousand men, including the Indian troops, to secure the country until a general peace. The European officers and soldiers were much struck by the luxury of their comrades in the Indian service, and, accustomed to sleep on the bare sand, with no other covering than a tented canopy, beheld with astonishment the numerous retainers and sumptuous equipages which attested the magnificence of Asiatic warfare. But Sir David Baird soon showed, that if they had adopted the pacific habits of the soldiers of Darius, they had not forgotten the martial qualities of those of Alexander, and their morning exercises in the camp of Alexandria exhibited a combination of activity and discipline never surpassed by the finest troops of the Western world.*

The expulsion of the French from Egypt was followed by a piece of treachery on ^{Attempted} the part of the Ottomans, which, if treachery of not firmly resisted by the English ^{Turks.} commander, would have brought indelible disgrace on the British name. The Turkish government, aware of the insecure tenure by which their authority in Egypt was held, as long as the beys retained their ascendancy in the country, had secretly resolved upon extirpating them; and, in order to carry their design into effect, seven of the chiefs were invited to Alexandria to hold a conference with the capitan-pacha, by whom they were received with every demonstration of respect, and invited on board a British vessel. But when they got into the boats which were to convey them thither, they took

This being the first great disaster which the Republicans had sustained by land since the commencement of the Revolution, and it having fallen on so distinguished a portion of their army as that which had gone through the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, they have been indefatigable in their endeavours to underrate the credit due to the English troops on the occasion; forgetting that, if the British acted feebly, what must the French have been, when, with such a superiority of force, they were compelled to capitulate. It is true that the movements of Hutchison after the battles of the 21st of March were slow and cautious; but that they were not unreasonably so is proved by the consideration that he had to advance with less than half his army against a force at Grand Cairo which amounted to 13,000 men, and could send 10,000 into the field, and that even, after all, he arrived at the scene of action, and concluded the capitulation of Cairo six weeks before the arrival of the troops from the Red Sea, with no more than 4500 Europeans and a disorderly rabble of 25,000 Turks, hardly provided with any battering train.* All the ingenuity of the French cannot obviate the important fact that, by Hutchison's advance to Rammanieh, he separated their armies at Cairo and Alexandria from each other, and enabled him, with a force greatly inferior to the two taken together, to be superior to both at the point of attack, the surest test, as Napoleon justly observes, of a good general. The British officers, after Alexandria was taken, discovered that the works on the heights of Nicopolis, and, in particular, forts Cretin and Caffarelli, were in such a state that they could have opposed no effectual resistance to a vigorous attack, and they were thus led to regret that they had been induced by their imposing appearance to relinquish the active pursuit of their advantages before Menou's arrival on the 13th of March;† but if they had done so, and Alexandria had thereby fallen, it is doubtful whether the ultimate success of the expedition would not have been endangered, as it would have only deprived the enemy of 4000 men, and led to the concentration of the remainder, above 20,000 strong, in the central position at Cairo, from whence they might have destroyed either the grand vizier, Sir D. Baird, or General Hutchison, as they successively approached the interior of Egypt, whereas, by the retention of Alexandria, that dispersion of force was occasioned which ultimately proved fatal to them in the campaign.

* Wils., 177. Ann. Reg., 1801, 239.

* Wils., 173, 217.

† Wils., 270, 308.

‡ Nap. in Month., i., 80, 81, and ii., 216.

§ Wils., 116.

* Wils., 168.

† Wils., 212.

fright, and desired to be returned ashore, and this having been refused, a struggle ensued, in the course of which three of the beys were killed and four wounded. This frightful violation of all public faith, though by no means unusual among Asiatic despots, excited the most lively indignation in the British army; General Hutchison immediately put his troops under arms, and made such energetic remonstrances to the capitan-pacha that he was obliged to surrender up the four beys who had been wounded, and the bodies of the slain, who were interred with military honours at Alexandria. This resolute conduct completely cleared the British from all imputation of having been accessory to the intended massacre, though it was far from allaying the indignant feelings of the English officers, many of whom openly declared that the capitan-pacha should have been seized in the centre of his camp, and hung at the yardarm of the frigate to which he intended to have conveyed the victims of his treachery.*

When left to their own resources, however, the Mameluke chiefs were totally unable to maintain their former government in Egypt. Many of them had fallen in the contest with France; their redoubtable cavalry

had perished, and out of the whole militia of the province scarcely two thousand could be mustered in arms when the Europeans withdrew. They were compelled to relinquish, therefore, their old feudal sovereignty on the banks of the Nile, and accept the offer of the Grand Signior to surrender on favourable terms the province into the hands of the Osmanlis. A pacha was established, who soon became the real sovereign of the country, and long contrived, by the regular payment of his tribute, to maintain himself undisturbed in his dominions. Under his able and undivided administration, order began to reappear out of chaos; life became comparatively secure, though excessive taxation was established, and the national resources were prodigiously augmented. By this means one singular and lasting consequence resulted from the French residence in Egypt. The old anarchical tyranny of the Mamelukes was destroyed; a powerful government established on the banks of the Nile, which, in the end, crushed the Wahabees in Arabia, extended itself over Syria as far as the defiles of Mount Taurus, and was only prevented, by the intervention of France and Russia, from utterly overturning the dominion of the Osmanlis. Thus everything conspired to bring about the great Oriental Revolution of the nineteenth century; the power of the Turks, the chief bulwark of Mohammedanism, was weakened alike by the victories of the French and the conquests of their opponents, and the crescent, long triumphant in the East, was at length struck down, not less by the ultimate effects of the ambition of the Republicans, who ridiculed every species of devotion, than the devout enthusiasm of the Moscovites, who sought an entrance to Paradise through the breach of Constantinople.

But neither of the victorious states foresaw

those remote consequences which as yet lay buried in the womb of fate, and the demonstrations of joy at the surrender of Alexandria were as ardent on the shores of the Bosphorus as the banks of the Thames. The cannon of the seraglio were fired, the city was splendidly illuminated, medals were struck to be distributed among the English who had served in Egypt, and a palace built for the British ambassador at Pera, as a lasting monument of the gratitude of the Ottoman Empire. In London, the public thankfulness, if less noisy, was still more sincere. The people of England hailed this great achievement as a counterpoise to all the disasters of the war; as a humiliation of France on that element where it had been so long victorious, and a check to its ambition in that quarter where its hopes had been most sanguine; and as the harbinger of those greater triumphs which would await them if the enemy should carry into execution their long-threatened invasion of the British islands. Under the influence of these sentiments, the early disasters of the war were forgotten; the fears, the asperity of former times were laid aside, and the people, satisfied with having redeemed their honour in military warfare by one great triumph, looked forward without anxiety to the cessation of the contest, in the firm belief that they could renew it without apprehension whenever the national safety required that it should be resumed.*

Although the French were thus expelled from Egypt, it was not without the great-
est efforts on the part of Napoleon
to preserve so important an acqui-
sition that it eluded his grasp. By
great exertions, a squadron of seven ships of the line and five frigates, having on board six thousand men and vast supplies of all sorts, was made ready for sea, and sailed from Brest in the beginning of January; it eluded the vigilance of two British squadrons which were detached in pursuit, under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, passed the Straits of Gibraltar, and crept along the coast of Africa almost to within sight of the Pharos of Alexandria; but there one of its frigates, the *Africaine*, was encountered and captured by the English frigate *Phæbe*, of equal force; and the admiral, discouraged by this disaster, and alarmed at the accounts he received of the strength of Lord Keith's squadron off the coast of Egypt, which, united to that of Bickerton, now amounted to seventeen sail of the line, renounced his enterprise and returned to Toulon. One of his frigates, however, the *Régénère*, passed, under false colours, through the British fleet, and made his way into Alexandria; and this the First Consul considered as decisive evidence that the whole, if directed with equal skill, might have reached the same destination. Ganteaume, therefore, received positive orders to put again to sea, and at all hazards attempt the relief of Egypt. He set sail, accordingly, on the 20th of March, avoid-
ed Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, which he met off Sardinia, and continued his route towards the coast of Africa; but Warren

Extravagant rejoicings in Constantinople and London at these events.

Jan. 7. Great naval exertions of Napoleon to preserve Egypt.

March 20.

* Wils., 245. Ann. Reg., 1801, 240. Dum., iv., 173, 174.

* Ann. Reg., 1801, 239.

instantly made sail in the same direction, and arrived off Alexandria on the 23d of April. No sooner was Gantheaume informed of this, than he again turned about, and regained Toulon without any disaster. Irritated beyond measure by these repeated failures, Napoleon transmitted peremptory orders to the admiral to put to sea a third time, and endeavour, at all hazards, to convey the re-enforcements he had on board into Alexandria; he set sail, accordingly, May 20.

on the 20th of May; threw succours, in passing, to the Republican force besieging Porto Ferrajo in the Isle of Elba; increased his squadron by three frigates prepared for him by General Soult at Brundisium, and arrived in sight of the coast of Egypt, for the third time, on the 8th of June. One of his brigs, the *Heliopolis*, reached Alexandria on the day following; but when Gantheaume was making preparations for landing the troops on the sands to the westward of that town, his lookout frigates made signals that the English fleet, consisting of forty sail, of which eighteen were of the line, was approaching. It was no longer possible to effect the object of the expedition; in a few hours longer the squadron would be enveloped in the enemy's fleet, and the landing of the troops on the desert shore, without stores or provisions, would expose them to certain destruction. Gantheaume, therefore, refused to accede to the wishes of the officers of the army, who were desirous to incur that perilous alternative, and made sail again for the coast June 24.

of France. On his route homeward he fell in with the *Swiftsure*, of seventy-four guns, which Captain Hollowell defended long with his accustomed gallantry, but he was at length obliged to surrender to the vast superiority of the Republican force, and with this trophy the admiral regained the harbour of Toulon. The French journals, long accustomed to continued disasters at sea, celebrated this gleam of success as a memorable triumph, and loudly boasted of the skill with which their fleet had traversed the Mediterranean and avoided the English squadrons: "a melancholy reflection," says the historian of Napoleon, "for a country and its admirals, when skill in avoiding a combat is held equivalent to a victory."*

This effort, however, was not the only one made by the First Consul for the relief of Egypt. His design was to support Gantheaume by a combined squadron of fifteen ships of the line, drawn from the harbours of France and Spain. For this purpose great efforts had been made by the Spanish marine; six ships of the line at Cadiz had been placed under the orders of the French admiral D'Amanoir, and six others had reached that harbour from Ferrol, while the English blockading squadrons, under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, had left their stations off these harbours in search of Admiral Gantheaume; and Admiral Linois, with three ships of the line, was to join them from Toulon. The British government, justly alarmed at such a concentration of force in the Isle of León, hastily despatched Sir James Saumarez, with seven ships of the line and two frigates, to resume the blockade of Cadiz, and he had hardly arrived off the harbour's mouth

when advices were received that Ad- June 13
miral Linois, with three ships of the line and one frigate, was approaching from the Mediterranean. No sooner did the French admiral find that the blockade of Cadiz had been re-established by a force superior to his own, than he abandoned all hope of effecting the prescribed junction, and fell back to Algesiraz Bay, where he took shelter under the powerful batteries which defend its coast. Thither he was followed by Sir James Saumarez, whose squadron was now reduced to six ships of the line by the detachment of one of his vessels to the mouth of the Guadalquivir; and the British admiral resolved upon an immediate attack, notwithstanding that the forts and batteries and gunboats, now manned by gunners from the French ships, presented the most formidable appearance. The British fleet stood into the bay, headed by Captain Hood in the

Venerable, with springs on their cables, and in a short time the action began, the Audacious and Pompey successively approaching, and taking their stations alongside of the French vessels, between them and the batteries on shore. The wind, however, fell, shortly after the leading ships got into action, so as to prevent the remainder of the squadron from advancing to their support; and when, at length, a light breeze from the south enabled the Hannibal to work into the scene of danger, she grounded in such a situation as to be exposed to the shot of the French squadron on one side, of the formidable batteries of Almirante and St. Jago on the other, while fourteen gunboats, securely posted under her stern, kept up, with great vigour, a destructive raking fire. To complete the disaster, the wind totally failed soon after, so as to render it impossible for the other vessels, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, to render any effectual assistance; and the boats, which had been destined to storming the batteries on the islands, were all required to tow the line-of-battle ships which were still afloat, so as to bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy. After several gallant attempts, therefore, on the part of Sir James Saumarez and his squadron, to throw themselves between the batteries and the grounded vessel, they were compelled to draw off, leaving her to her fate, and, after an honourable resistance, she was obliged to strike her colours.*†

The loss of the British in killed and wounded in this action was 361, that on Great rejoicing in France.
the part of the French and Spaniards 586; but the unwonted occurrence of the retreat of the former, and the capture of one of their line-of-battle ships, diffused the most extraordinary joy throughout.

* James, iii., 164, 172. Ann. Reg., 1801, 249. Dum., vii., 118, 121. Jom., xiv., 366, 368.

† An incident highly characteristic of the English sailors occurred in this action. In its voyage through the Mediterranean, the French fleet had fallen in with, and captured, the brig *Speedy*, of fourteen guns, commanded by Captain Lord COCHRANE, and that gallant officer, with his little crew, was on board the *Formidable* when the action took place in the Bay of Algesiraz. At every broadside the vessel received from the English, these brave men gave three cheers, regardless alike of the threats of instant death from the French if they continued so unseemly an interruption, and the obvious danger that they themselves might be sent to the bottom by their friendly discharges.

* Bign., ii., 34, 36. Jom., xiv., 363, 365. Dum., vii., 108, 112. Ann. Reg., 1801, 248.

France, in which the First Consul warmly participated.* It was publicly announced at their theatres, and in the gazette published on the occasion, that three French sail of the line had completely defeated six British, and captured one of their number, without the slightest mention of the batteries on shore, to which the Spanish official account, with more justice, ascribes the failure of the attack.† But these transports were of short duration, and an awful catastrophe was destined to close the naval strife between the two nations. After the battle, the English fleet repaired to Gibraltar, and the utmost efforts were made, night and day, to get the squadron ready for sea, but it was found that the Pompey was so much damaged that she could not be set afloat in time, and therefore her crew was distributed through the other vessels, and the fleet stood out to sea to avenge the affront they had received on the morning of the 12th of July. Meanwhile, the Spanish squadron at Cadiz, consisting of six ships of the line and three frigates, two of which bore 112 guns each, had joined the shattered French fleet in Algeiraz Bay, and the combined force was moving towards the Isle of Leon at the time that the English squadron, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, were working out of the harbour of Gibraltar.‡

Nothing in war could be conceived more animating than the circumstances under which the British fleet then set forth to redeem the honour of their flag. The combined squadron, consisting of nine ships of the line and four frigates, was proudly and leisurely moving towards Cadiz, with all sails set and a favourable wind, bearing with them their prize, the Hannibal, which they had contrived to get afloat, in tow of the Indienne frigate; the anxiety of the sailors to rescue her from their hands was indescribable; the day was clear, the rock covered with spectators, and loud shouts announced every successive British vessel which cleared the pier-head of Gibraltar to proceed on the perilous service. The mole, the quays, the batteries, the cliffs, were crowded with anxious multitudes, eager to witness the approaching conflict; the band of the admiral's ship, the Cæsar, played the

popular air, "Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer," while the military bands of the garrison made the rock re-echo with the notes of "Britons, strike home!" So thrilling was the interest of the scene, so overpowering the feelings which it excited, that the foreigners who witnessed it wished they had been Englishmen; and even the wounded begged to be taken on board, to share in the honours of the approaching conflict.*

It was, in truth, a proud sight for the English garrison to behold their fleet of five ^{The British fleet again} ships of the line, only ten days after ^{sails from} a bloody encounter, again put to sea ^{Gibraltar.} to give chase to an enemy's squadron

of nine line-of-battle ships, six of whom were perfectly uninjured, and which contained two three-deckers of stupendous magnitude. The Hannibal soon fell astern, and with the frigate which had her in tow, returned to Algeiraz; but the remainder of the squadron cleared Ca-

britta point, and stood away, as darkness set in, with all sail towards Cadiz. At ^{Second battle} ten at night, a fresh breeze filled the ^{of Algeiraz.} sails of the English fleet; they gained rapidly on the enemy, and Sir James gave orders that they should engage the first vessels which they could overtake. At eleven, the leading ship, the Superb, opened its fire upon the Real Carlos, of 112 guns, and after three broadsides she was seen to be on fire. Deeming this gigantic adversary so far disabled that she must fall into the hands of the remainder of the fleet as they came up, the Superb passed on, and in half an hour overtook and engaged the St. Antoine, of 74 guns, which soon struck her colours. The Cæsar and Venerable came up in succession, and the chase was continued all night, in the midst of a tempestuous gale, by the light of the discharges which at intervals flashed through the gloom. But while the sailors were making the greatest efforts, and constantly nearing the enemy, a terrible catastrophe occurred, which for a moment daunted the stoutest hearts. The Superb, after having disabled the Real Carlos on her starboard, passed on, poured a broadside on the larboard into the San Hermenegildo, also of 112 guns, and soon outstripped both her first-rate antagonists. In

the darkness of the night, these ^{Terrible catastrophe of the} two Spanish ships, mutually mis- ^{Spanish ves-} taking each other for the enemy, ^{sels.} were involved in a mortal combat; the violence of the winds spread the flames from the one to the other, the heavens were illuminated by the awful conflagration, and at midnight they both blew up, with an explosion so tremendous as to shake Cadiz to its foundation, and spread a thrill of horror through every soul that witnessed it. Out of two thousand men of which their crews consisted, not more than 250 were saved by the English boats: the remainder were blown into the air, or perished in the waves on that tempestuous night.†

When morning dawned, both fleets were extremely scattered; the Venerable and Thames were far ahead of the rest of the British squadron, and the Formidable, of eighty guns, was seen in the rear of the French fleet. The Brit-

* "The First Consul," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "recounted this triumph to us with the most lively satisfaction, with eyes literally overflowing with joy at this unlooked-for event. Naval victories were rare at that period, and Napoleon felt the full satisfaction arising from this one. Admiral Linois received the sole recompense which it was in his power at that period to bestow, a sabre of honor. All those who have narrowly studied the character of Napoleon must have seen that the ruling passion of his great mind was the humbling of England. It was his constant object of study; and I can safely affirm that, during the fourteen years that he held the reins of power, during which I certainly saw him very frequently, he was constantly set upon that object, and passionately desirous of the glory which it would produce. He constantly thought that he could give France the means of combating that power on equal terms, and subduing it; all his measures tended towards that end." — D'ABRANTES, v., 254, 256.

† "The action," says the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, "was very obstinate and bloody on both sides, and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day. It is to the hot and sustained fire of Fort St. Jago that we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manoeuvre of attempting to pass between the French admiral's ship and the shore made her ground, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible, and the fire of the batteries very soon compelled her to strike." — See JAMES, iii., 173.

‡ James, iii., 179, 181. Ann. Reg., 1801, 252. Jom., xiv., 369. Dum., vii., 128.

* Braston, iii., 39. James, iii., 180.

† James, iii., 180, 183. Ann. Reg., 1801, 253. Jom., xiv., 369. Dum., vii., 130, 132.

ish ships instantly gave chase, and soon brought her to action. It began within musket shot; and shortly the two ships were abreast of each other, within pistol range, and a tremendous fire was kept up on both sides. Undismayed by the magnitude of the force brought against him, the French captain, Tronde, made the most gallant resistance, which was soon rendered equal by the Thames unavoidably falling behind, and dropping out of the action. The fire of the Venerable, however, directed at the hull of her opponent, was beginning to tell severely on the enemy's crew, when the French gunners, by a fortunate discharge, succeeded in bringing down her mainmast, and with it most of her rigging, so that she fell behind, and soon after her other masts went by the board, and she struck on the shoals of San Pedro. In this desperate situation Captain Hood still maintained a contest with the stern chasers of the Formidable,* and gave time for two other ships of the line to come up; upon the appearance of which, the enemy relinquished their design of attacking the disabled vessel, and crowding all sail, stood in for Cadiz harbour, where they were soon after moored in safety.

The intelligence of this bold and fortunate engagement, in which a British fleet so severely handled an enemy's squadron of nearly double its own force, excited the greater joy in Great Britain, because the preceding failure in Algieraz Bay had somewhat mortified a people, nursed by long-continued success to unreasonable expectations of constant triumph on their favourite element. On the other hand, the frightful catastrophe of their two first-rate men-of-war spread the utmost consternation through the Spanish peninsula, and increased that strong repugnance which the Castilian youth had long manifested for the naval service.†

Contemporaneous with these maritime operations was a measure, from which Napoleon anticipated much more in the way of forming a counterpoise to the vast colonial acquisitions made by Great Britain during the war, and this was an attack upon Portugal, the ancient and tried ally of England. The French, according to their own admission, had no cause of complaint against that power; the only motive of the war was to provide an equivalent to the maritime conquests of England. "We only wished," says Bignon, "to enter into that kingdom in order to leave it, and stipulate for that retreat some considerable concession from Great Britain." The most obvious means of effecting this object was to interest Spain in its execution, and this was adroitly managed by the First Consul. In the Treaty with treaty of Luneville, as already observed, it was stipulated that the grand-duchy of Tuscany should be ceded by the Austrian family, and erected into a separate principality in favour of Don Louis, a prince of the Spanish family; and that the duchy was soon after erected into a royalty, under the title of the Kingdom of Etruria. Europe was at a loss, at first, to divine what was the motive of this sudden condition in favour of the Spanish house of Bourbon; but it was

soon made manifest, when it appeared that a treaty had been concluded Oct. 1, 1800. between France and Spain, the object of which was "to compel the court of Lisbon to separate itself from the alliance of Great Britain, and cede, till the conclusion of a general peace, a fourth of its territory to the French and Spanish forces."‡

This flagrant and unprovoked invasion of the rights of a pacific state took place at the very time when France was loudly proclaiming the principles of the armed neutrality, and the utter injustice of one belligerent interfering with the trade or alliances of independent powers. But it soon appeared that the First Consul's tenderness for neutral rights was all on one element, where he was weakest; and that on the other, where his power was wellnigh irresistible, he was prepared to go the utmost length of belligerent aggression, and compel every other state to enter into his projects of universal hostility against Great Britain. So early as Dec., 1800. December, 1800, when the victory of Hohenlinden had relieved him of all anxiety on the side of Germany, he had given orders for the formation of an army of observation at Bordeaux, which gradually drew towards the Pyrenees, and was increased to twenty thousand men; and this was followed, some months afterward, by a declaration March 3, 1801.

of war on the part of Spain against the court of Lisbon. The ostensible grounds of complaint on which this step was rested were the refusal by the court of Lisbon to ratify a peace with France, signed by its plenipotentiary in 1797; accompanied with a complaint that she had furnished protection to the English fleets and sailors, and insulted the French in the harbour of Carthagena. The real reasons for the war were very different. "The courts of Lisbon and Madrid," says the French historian, "united by recent intermarriages, had no real subjects of dispute. They were drawn into the contest, because the one was attached to the political system of France, the other to that of Great Britain."§ Spain was at this time entirely under the guidance of the Prince of Peace, a vain and ambitious favourite, who had risen from an obscure origin, by court intrigue, to an elevation little short of the throne, and threw himself willingly into the arms of France, in order to seek an effectual support against the pride and patriotism of the Castilian noblesse, who were exceedingly jealous of his authority. Guided by such a ruler, Spain made herself the willing instrument of France in this tyrannical aggression. She afterward expiated her faults in oceans of blood.¶

In this extremity, the Portuguese government naturally turned to England for support, and offered, if she would send an army of twenty-five thousand men, to give her the command of the native forces. Had it been in the power of Great Britain to have acceded to this offer, the desperate struggle of the Peninsula might have been accelerated by eight years, and the triumphs of Busaco and Vimiera graced the conclusion of the first part of the war. But it was

* James, iii., 184, 185. Ann. Reg., 1801, 258. Jom., xiv., 368, 371. Dum., vii., 132, 135. Bign., ii., 38, 39. † Jom., xiv., 371. Ann. Reg., 1801, 253, 254.

* Bign., ii., 10. Ann. Reg., 1801, 256. † Bign., ii., 11. ‡ Jom., xiv., 289, 290. Ann. Reg., 1801, 256. Dum., vii., 61, 62.

¶ The Portuguese apply to England for aid.

impossible to make such an effort : her only disposable force was already engaged in Egypt, and the great contest in the North, as yet undecided, required all the means which were at the disposal of the government. All that could be done, therefore, was to send a few regiments to Lisbon, with a loan of £300,000, in order, if possible, to procure a respite from the impending danger till the general peace, which it was already foreseen could not be far distant.*

Deprived in this manner of any effectual external aid, the Portuguese government, to appearance at least, was not wanting to its ancient renown. An animated proclamation was put forth, in which the people were reminded of their ancestors' heroic resistance to the Romans, and their imperishable achievements in the southern hemisphere; new armaments were ordered, works hastily constructed, a levy *en masse* called forth, and plate borrowed from the churches to aid government in carrying on the means of defence. But, during all this show of resistance, there was a secret understanding between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid; the regular troops on the frontier, about twenty thousand strong, were hardly increased by a single soldier; and when, in the end of May 20.

May 20. The Spanish army of thirty thousand combatants invaded the country, they experienced hardly any resistance. Jurumenha and Olivenza at once opened their gates; Campo Mayor, though amply provided with everything requisite to sustain a siege, only held out a fortnight; and the Portuguese, flying in disorder, made haste to throw the Tagus between them and the enemy. Even Elvas, which never lowered its colours in a more glorious strife, surrendered, and, in a fortnight after the war commenced, this collusive contest was terminated by the signature of preliminaries of peace at Abrantes. By this treaty, which was ratified on the 29th of September, Olivenza, with its circumjacent territory, was ceded to Spain, and the ports of Portugal were shut against the English flag.†

No sooner were the terms of this treaty known in France, than the First Consul refused to ratify them. Not that he had either any animosity or cause of complaint against the cabinet of Lisbon, but that by this pacification the main object of the war was missed, namely, the occupation of such a portion of the Portuguese territory by the French troops as might give weight to the demands of France for restitution of her conquered colonies from Great Britain.‡

The French army of observation, accordingly, under Leclerc and St. Cyr, five-and-twenty thousand strong, which had advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo, entered Portugal, invested Almeida, and threatened both Lisbon and Oporto. The Portuguese government now made serious preparations; six sail of the line were detached from Lisbon to re-enforce the English blockading squadron off Cadiz, and such efforts as the war would admit made to re-enforce the army on

the frontier. But the contest was too unequal, and England, anticipating the seizure of the continental dominions of the house of Braganza, had already taken possession of the island of Madeira, to secure its colonial dominions from insult, when the tempest was averted by external events. The near approach of an accommodation between France and July 23. England made it a greater object for the First Consul to extend his colonial acquisitions than enlarge his conquests on the continent of Europe; while the arrival of a convoy with a great supply of silver from Brazil gave the Portuguese government the means both of satisfying his pecuniary demands, and gratifying the cupidity of his inferior agents. To use the words of a French historian, "The Portuguese government holding the purse, threw it at the feet of the robbers, and thus saved itself from destruction."* Bribes were liberally bestowed on the French generals;† and so completely did this seasonable supply remove all difficulties, that a treaty was soon concluded, in virtue of which, Olivenza, with its territory, was confirmed to Spain; the harbours of Portugal were closed against English ships, both of war and commerce; one half of Guiana, as far as the Carapanatuba stream, was ceded to France, and the commerce of the Republic was placed on the footing of the most favoured nations.‡ By a less honourable and secret article, the immediate payment of 20,000,000 francs was made the condition of the retreat of the French troops.§

As the war approached a termination, the anxiety of Napoleon to procure equivalents for the English transatlantic acquisitions became more vehement. With this view, he made propositions to Prussia to seize Hanover; an insidious though tempting offer, which would have rendered that power permanently a dependant on France, and totally altered the balance of European politics. But the Prussian cabinet had good sense enough, at that time at least, to see that no such gratuitous act of spoliation was likely to prove a permanent acquisition, and to decline the proposal.||

Meanwhile, Napoleon, relieved by the treaty of Luneville from all apprehensions of a serious Continental struggle, bent all his attention to the shores of Great Britain, and made serious preparations for invasion on his own side of the Channel. Though not of the gigantic character which they assumed in a later period of the contest, after the renewal of the war, these efforts were of a kind to excite the serious attention of the English government. From the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Garonne, every creek and headland was fortified, so as to afford protection to the small craft which were creeping round the shore from all the harbours of the kingdom, to the general rendezvous of Dunkirk and Boulogne. The latter harbour was the general point of assemblage; gunboats and flat-bottomed praams were collected in great quantities, fur-

Peace concluded by enormous pecuniary spoliation.

Napoleon offers Hanover to Prussia, which they decline.

Preparations for the invasion of England.

* Bign., ii., 13. note.

† Leclerc got 5,000,000 francs, or £200,000, for his own share.—HARD., viii., 136.

‡ See the treaty in Dum., vii., 264. Pi ces Just

§ Bign., ii., 14. HARD., vii., 136.

|| Bign., ii., 17, 18. HARD., viii., 34, 35.

* Ann. Reg., 256, 257. Dum., vii., 63. Jom., xiv., 294. † Bign., ii., 12, 13. Jom., xiv., 298, 299. Ann. Reg., 1801, 258. ‡ Bign., ii., 13.

aces heated for red-hot shot, immense batteries constructed, and every preparation made, not only for a vigorous defence, but the most energetic offensive operations. By an ordinance of July 12th, the flotilla was organized in nine divisions, and to them were assigned all the boats and artillerymen which had been attached to the armies of the Rhine and the Maine, which had been brought down those streams to the harbours on the Channel. The immensity of these preparations was studiously dwelt upon in the French papers; nothing was talked of but the approaching descent upon Great Britain; and Fame, ever the first to sound the alarm, so magnified their amount, that when a few battalions pitched their tents on the heights of Boulogne, it was universally credited in England that the army of invasion was about to take its station preparatory to the threatened attempt.*

Though not participating in the vulgar illusion as to the imminence of the danger, the English government had various weighty reasons for not disregarding the preparations on the southern coast of the Channel. The fleets of Great Britain in the narrow seas were indeed so powerful that no attempt at invasion by open force could be made with any chance of success;† but it was impossible to conceal the alarming fact, that the same wind which wafted the French flotilla out of its harbours might chain the English cruisers to theirs; and the recent expeditions of Gantheaume in the Mediterranean, and of Hoche to the coast of Ireland, had demonstrated that, notwithstanding the greatest maritime superiority, it was impossible at all times to prevent a vigilant and active enemy from putting to sea during the darkness of autumnal or winter months. It was easy, too, to foresee, that even although ultimate defeat might attend a descent, incalculable confusion and distress would necessarily follow it in the first instance. It was to be expected, also, that the destruction of the armament might influence the issue of the negotiations for peace; and that, if the First Consul saw that his flotilla was not secure from insult even in his own harbours, he would probably abate of the pretensions which his extraordinary successes had induced him to bring forward.‡

Influenced by these views, the British government prepared a powerful armament of bombs and light vessels in the Downs, and intrusted the command to Lord Nelson, whose daring and successful exploits at Aboukir and the Nile pointed him out as peculiarly fitted for an enterprise of that description. On the 1st of August he set sail from Deal, at the head of three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five bombs, brigs, and smaller vessels, and stood over to the French coast. He himself strongly urged that the expedition, aided by a few thousand troops, should be sent against Flushing; but the cabinet resolved that it should proceed against Boulogne, and thither, accordingly, he

went, much against his inclination. After a reconnoissance, attended with a slight cannonade on both sides, soon after his arrival, a more serious attack took place on the night of the 15th of August. But in the interval the French line of boats had been rendered wellnigh unassailable. Every vessel was defended by long poles, headed by iron spikes, projecting from their sides; strong nettings were braced up to their lower yards; they were moored head and stern across the harbour-mouth in the strongest possible manner, chained to the ground and each other, and on board each was from fifty to a hundred soldiers, each provided with three muskets, as in defending a breach threatened with assault. In addition to this, the whole were immediately under the guns of the batteries on shore, and every eminence capable of bearing a cannon had been armed with a powerful array of artillery. Notwithstanding these formidable circumstances, Nelson commenced the attack at midnight in four divisions of boats. The second division, under Captain Parker, first closed with the enemy, and in the most gallant style instantly endeavoured to board. But the strong netting baffled all their efforts, and, as they were vainly endeavouring to cut their way through it, a discharge of musketry from the soldiers on board killed or wounded above half their number, including their gallant leader, Captain Parker, who was desperately maimed while cheering on his men. The darkness of the night, and the rapidity of the tide, which prevented the other divisions from getting into action at the same time as Captain Parker's, rendered the attack abortive, notwithstanding the most gallant efforts on the part of the seamen and marines engaged in the service. One of the commanders of the French division behaved like a generous enemy. He hailed the boats as they approached, and called out in English, "Let me advise you, brave Englishmen, to keep off; you can do nothing here; it is only shedding the blood of brave men to attempt it." After four hours of gallant but unequal combat, the assailants were obliged to retire, with the loss of 172 men killed and wounded; but Nelson declared that, "If all the boats could have arrived at their destined points at the periods assigned to them, not all the chains in France could have prevented our men from bringing off the whole of the vessels."*

A singular circumstance occurred at this time, which demonstrates how little the clearest intellect can anticipate the ultimate result of the discoveries which are destined to effect the greatest changes in human affairs. At the time when all eyes in Europe were fixed on the Channel, and the orators in the French tribunate were wishing for "a fair wind and thirty-six hours," an unknown individual presented himself to the First Consul, and said, "The sea which separates you from your enemy gives him an immense advantage. Aided alternately by the winds and the tempests, he braves you in his inaccessible isle. This obstacle, his sole strength, I engage to overcome. I can, in spite of all his fleets, at any time, in a few hours,

* Dum., vii., 140, 144. Jom., xiv., 380, 381. Ann. Reg., 1801, 263.

† England at this period had fourteen ships of the line, under Admiral Cornwallis, off Brest, and seventeen in the German Ocean observing the Dutch harbours.—JAMES, iii., Ap. No. 2. and DUMAS, vii., 144.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1801, 266. Jom., xiv., 385.

* Southey, ii., 176, 180. Ann. Reg., 1801, 271. Jom., xiv., 387. Dum., vii., 149, 159. Big., ii., 59, 60.

† Fulton.

transport your armies into his territory, without fearing the tempests or having need of the winds. Consider the means which I offer you." The plan and details accompanying it were received by Napoleon, and by him remitted to a commission of the most learned men which France could produce, who reported that it was visionary and impracticable, and, in consequence, it at that time came to nothing.* Such was the reception which STEAM NAVIGATION received at the hands of philosophy; such is the first success of the greatest discovery of modern times since the invention of printing, of one destined, in its ultimate effects, to produce a revolution in the channels of commerce, alter the art of naval war, work out the overthrow of empires, change the face of the world. The discovery seemed made for the age, and yet genius and philosophy rejected it at the very time when it was most required, and when it seemed calculated to carry into effect the vast projects which were already matured by its great leader. But the Continental writers were in error when they suppose that this vast acquisition to nautical power would, if it had been fully developed at that time, have led to the subjugation of Britain; the English maritime superiority would have appeared as clearly in the new method of carrying on naval war as the old: Albion would have been encircled by steam vessels: if the French boats, aided by such auxiliaries, could have braved the wind and the tide, the English cruisers would have been equally assisted in the maintenance of their blockade; the stoutest heart and the last guinea would have finally carried the day, whatever changes occurred in the mode of carrying on the contest; and even if their wooden walls had been broken through, the future conquerors of Vittoria and Waterloo had no cause for despondency if the war came to be conducted by land-forces on their own shores.

But these warlike demonstrations were a mere cover, on both sides, to the real intentions of the two cabinets; and in the midst of the hostile fleets and armies which covered the Channel and the coasts of France, couriers were incessantly passing, carrying despatches, containing the negotiations for a general peace. In truth, the war had now ceased to have any present or definite object with both the powers by whom it was maintained, and they were driven to an accommodation from the experienced impossibility of finding any common element in which their hostilities could be carried on. After the loss of all her colonies, the ruin of her commerce, and the disappearance of her flag from the ocean, it was as impossible for France to find a method of annoying Great Britain, as it was for England to discover the means of reducing the Continental power of her enemy, after the peace of Luneville had prostrated the last array of the military monarchies of Europe. Even if their mutual hostility were inextinguishable, still both had need of a breathing-time to prepare for a renewal of the contest; the former that she might regain the commerce and colonies on which her naval strength depended, the latter that she might restore the finances

which the enormous expenses of the contest had seriously disorganized.

So early as the 21st of March, the British cabinet had signified to M. Otto, who still remained in London to superintend the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, that they were disposed to renew the negotiations which had so often been opened without success; and it was agreed between the two governments that, without any general suspension of arms, the basis of a treaty should be secretly adjusted. When the terms, however, came to be first proposed, there appeared to be an irreconcilable difference between them; nor was this surprising, for both had enjoyed a career of almost unbroken success upon their separate elements, and each was called on to make sacrifices for peace which it was quite evident could not be exacted from them by force of arms if the contest was continued. Lord Hawkesbury's first proposals were, that the French should evacuate Egypt, and that the English should retain Malta, Ceylon, Trinity, and Martinique, and evacuate all the other colonies which they had conquered during the war; acquisitions which, how great soever, did not seem disproportionate to the vast Continental additions received by France in the extension of her frontier to the Rhine, and the establishment of a girdle of affiliated republics round the parent state. But to these conditions the First Consul refused to accede. "The resolution of the First Consul," says the historian of his diplomacy, "was soon taken. France could neither surrender any part of its ancient domains nor its recent acquisitions."*

The views of Napoleon were developed in a note of M. Otto, on the 23d of July, after the dissolution of the Northern confederacy had relieved England of one of the greatest of her dangers, and disposed France to proceed with more moderation in the negotiation; and their defeat in Egypt had deprived them of all hopes of retaining that colony by force of arms. He proposed that Egypt should be restored to the Porte; that the republic formed of the seven Ionian Islands should be recognised; that the harbours of Italy should be restored to the pope and the King of Naples; Port Mahon ceded to Spain, and Malta to the Knights of Jerusalem, with the offer to raze its fortifications. In the East Indies, he offered to abandon Ceylon to Great Britain upon condition that all the other colonial conquests of England, in both hemispheres, should be restored, and in that event agreed to respect the integrity of Portugal.† Lord Hawkesbury, in answer, suggested some arrangement by which Malta might be rendered independent of both parties, and insisted for the retention of some of the British conquests in the West Indies.‡ The negotiations were prolonged for several months, but at length the difficulties were all adjusted, and the preliminaries of a general peace signed at London on the 1st of October.§

By these articles it was agreed that hostilities should immediately cease, by land and sea, between the contracting parties; that Great Brit-

* Big., ii., 61, 62.

* Jom., xiv., 379. Big., ii., 68.

† Note, 23d July.

‡ Note, 5th August. § Big., ii., 73, 76. Jom., xiv., 383.

Oct. 1, 1801.
Preliminaries
signed at Lon-
don.

ain should restore its colonial conquests in every part of the world, Ceylon in the East and Trinidad in the West Indies alone excepted, which were ceded in entire sovereignty to that power; that Egypt should be restored to the Porte, Malta and its dependancies to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, the Cape of Good Hope to Holland, but opened alike to the trade of both the contracting powers; the integrity of Portugal guaranteed; the harbours of the Roman and Neapolitan states evacuated by the French, and Porto Ferraio by the English forces; a compensation provided for the house of Nassau; and the Republic of the Seven Islands recognised by the French Republic. The fisheries of Newfoundland were restored to the situation in which they had been before the war, reserving their final arrangement to the definitive treaty.*†

Though the negotiations had been so long in dependence, they had been kept a profound secret from the people of both countries, and their long continuance had sensibly weakened the hope of their being brought to a satisfactory result. Either from accident or design, this impression had been greatly strengthened recently before the signature of the preliminaries, and the very day before, the report had gone abroad in London that all hope of an amicable adjustment was at an end, and that interminable war was likely again to break out between the two nations. In proportion to the desponding feelings occasioned by this impression were the transports of joy excited by the appearance of a London Gazette extraordinary on the 2d of October, announcing the signature of the preliminaries on the preceding day. The three per cents. instantly rose from 59 to 66; the *tiers consolidate*, at Paris, from 48 to 53.

Universal joy pervaded both capitals. These feelings rapidly spread through the whole British nation, as the arrival of the post announced the joyful intelligence; and the public satisfaction was at its height when, on the 12th of the same month, Colonel Lauriston arrived, bearing the ratification of the treaty by the French government. Never, since the restoration of Charles II., had such transports seized the public mind. The populace insisted on drawing the French envoys in their carriage; and they were conducted by this tumultuary array, followed by a guard of honour from the household brigade, through Parliament-street to Downing-street, where the ratifications were exchanged, and at night a general illumination gave vent to the feelings of universal exhilaration. Nor was the public joy manifested in a less emphatic manner at Paris. Hardly had the cannon of the Tuileries and the Invalides announced the unexpected intelligence, when every one stopped in the streets and congratulated

his acquaintance on the news; the public flocked in crowds to the theatres, where it was officially announced, and in the evening the city was universally and splendidly illuminated. There seemed no bounds to the prosperity and glory of the Republic, now that this auspicious event had removed the last and most inveterate of its enemies.*

But, while these were the natural feelings of the inconsiderate populace, who are ever governed by present impressions, and were, for the most part, destitute of the information requisite to form a rational opinion on the subject, there were many men, gifted with greater sagacity and foresight, in Great Britain who deeply lamented the conditions by which peace had been purchased, and from the very first prophesied that it could be of no long endurance. They observed that the war had been abruptly terminated without any one of the objects being gained for which it was undertaken; that it was entered into in order to curb the ambition and stop the Democratic propagandism of France, and in an especial manner prevent the extension of its authority in the Low Countries; whereas, by the result, its power was immensely extended, its frontier advanced to the Rhine, its influence to the Niemen, and a military chieftain placed at its head, capable of wielding to the best advantage its vast resources. That, supposing the destruction of some, and the humiliation of other powers, had absolved England from all her ties with the Continental states, and left her at full liberty to consult only her own interest in any treaty which might be formed, still it seemed, at best, extremely doubtful whether the preliminaries which had been signed were calculated to accomplish this object; that they contributed nothing towards the coercion of France on one element, while they gave that power the means of restoring its fleets and recruiting the sinews of war on another; and that then the result necessarily would be, that England would be compelled to renew the contest again, and that, too, at no distant period, in order to maintain her existence, and she would then find her enemy's resources as much strengthened as her own were weakened during its cessation; that during the struggle we had deprived France of all her colonies, blockaded her harbours, ruined her commerce, and almost annihilated her navy, and, therefore, had nothing to fear from her maritime hostility; but could this be affirmed if, in pursuance of this treaty, we restored almost all her colonial possessions, and enabled her, by a successful commerce, in a few years to revive her naval power? If, therefore, the principle, so long maintained by Great Britain, had any foundation, and the hostility of revolutionary France was implacable, it was evident that she has everything to fear and nothing to hope from this pacification; and while England unlooses her own armour and lays aside her sword, she will, in truth, place in the hands of her redoubtable adversary the weapons, and the only weapons, by which, ere long, she will be enabled to aim mortal strokes at herself.

* Big., ii., 77. Jom., xiv., 393, 394.

† The clause regarding Malta, which became of so much importance in the sequel, from being the ostensible ground of the rupture of the treaty, was in these terms: "The island of Malta, with its dependancies, shall be evacuated by the English troops, and restored to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. To secure the absolute independence of that isle from both the contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee of a third power, to be named in the definitive treaty."—DUMAS, vii., 319, and *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 13, 19.

* Dum., vii., 208, 209. Ann. Reg., 1801, 277. Jom., xiv., 394, 395.

The partisans of administration, and the advocates of peace throughout the country, opposed to these arguments considerations of another kind, perhaps still more specious. Arguments urged in support of it by the administration.

They contended that the real question was not, what were the views formed or the hopes indulged when we entered into the war, but what were the prospects which could rationally be entertained now that we had reached its tenth year? That, without pretending to affirm that the resources of Great Britain were worn out, or peace had become a matter of necessity, still it was impossible to dispute that, in consequence of the cessation of Continental hostilities, and the dissolution of the last coalition, the prospect of effectually reducing the military power of France had become almost hopeless; that thus the question was, whether, after it had become impossible, by the disasters of our allies, to attain any one object of the war, we should obstinately and single-handed maintain the contest, without any definite end to be gained by its prosecution; that, though the frontiers of France had been extended, and her power immensely increased, still the revolutionary mania, by far the greatest evil with which Europe was threatened, had been at length effectually extinguished. That thus the contest had ceased to be, as at first, one of life and death to England, and returned to the usual state of warfare between regular governments, in which the cost of maintaining it was to be balanced by the advantages to be gained from its prosecution; that, without doubt, the return of peace and the restoration of her colonies would give France the means of increasing her naval resources, but it would probably do the same in an equal or greater degree to Great Britain, and leave the maritime power of the two countries in the same relative situation as before; that it was impossible to remain forever at war, lest your enemy should repair the losses he had sustained during the contest, and the enormous expenses with which the struggle was attended would, if much longer continued, involve the finances of the country in inextricable embarrassment; that it was surely worth while trying, now that a regular government was established in the Republic, whether it was not possible to remain with so near a neighbour on terms of amity; and it would be time enough to take up arms again if the conduct of the First Consul demonstrated that he was not sincere in his professions, and that a renewal of the contest would be less perilous than a continuance of peace.*

The termination of hostilities between France and England speedily drew after it the accommodation of the differences of the minor powers engaged in the war. No sooner were the preliminaries signed with Great Britain, than Napoleon used his utmost efforts to conclude a treaty on the most favourable terms with the Ottoman Porte. On this occasion the finesse of European diplomacy prevailed over the plain sense and upright dealing of the Osmanlis. The news of the surrender of Alexandria reached Paris on the 7th of October, six days after the preliminaries had been signed with England; instantly the Turkish ambassador, Esseyd Ali

Effendi, who had long been in a sort of confinement, was sent for, and before he was aware of the important success which had been gained by his countrymen, persuaded to agree to a treaty, which was signed two days afterward. In this negotiation, the French diplomatists made great use of their alleged moderation in agreeing to the restoration of Egypt, which they knew was already lost, and so worked upon the fears of the ambassador by threats of a descent from Ancona and Otranto, that he agreed to give to the Republican commerce in the Levant the same advantages which the most favoured nations enjoyed; and, at the same time, the Republic of the Seven Ionian Islands was recognised. Thus, by the arts of M. Talleyrand, were the French, who, in defiance of ancient treaties, had done all in their power to wrest Egypt from the Turks, placed on the same footing with the English, by whose blood and treasure it had been rescued from their grasp.*

In the end of August a definitive treaty was concluded between France and Bavaria, Aug. 24 by which the latter power renounced in favour of the former all their territories and possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and received, on the other hand, a guarantee for its dominions on the right bank.† The preliminaries, signed at Morfontaine on September 30, 1800, between France and America, were ratified by a definitive treaty, which somewhat abridged the commercial advantages stipulated in favour of the Republic, although it placed Sept. 9. the French on the footing of the most favoured nations.‡ But, notwithstanding all his exertions, the First Consul was obliged to forego the peculiar advantages which, in the treaty of 1778, the gratitude of the Americans to Louis XVI. had granted to the subjects of France. Finally, a treaty of peace was, on October the 8th, concluded between France and Russia, and on December the 17th between the same power and the Dey of Algiers.§||

* *Jom.*, xiv., 398. *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 280, and *State Papers*, 292. † *State Papers*. *Ann. Reg.*, 1801, 297.

‡ *Jom.*, xiv., 399.

§ *Ann. Reg.*, 1801. *State Papers*, 291, 300.

|| The public articles of this treaty merely re-established the relations of the two empires on the footing on which they stood prior to the commencement of hostilities; but they contained also several secret articles, which ultimately became of the greatest importance in the complicated system of European diplomacy. The first article related to the division of the indemnities provided by the treaty of Lunéville for the princes dispossessed on the left bank of the Rhine. The two cabinets bound themselves "to form a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to adopt their principles, which are to preserve a just equilibrium between the houses of Austria and Prussia." The second article provided that the high contracting parties should come to an understanding to terminate, on amicable terms, the affairs of Italy and of the Holy See. The sixth article provides, "The First Consul and the Emperor of Russia shall act in concert in relation to the King of Sardinia, and with all the regard possible to the actual state of affairs." The ninth article guaranteed the independence of the Republic of the Seven Islands; "and it is specially provided that those islands shall contain no foreign troops." Finally, the eleventh article, the most important of the whole, declares: "As soon as possible after the signature of the present treaty and these secret articles, the two contracting parties shall enter upon the consideration of the establishment of a general peace, upon the following basis: 'To restore a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, and to ensure the liberty of the seas, binding themselves to act in concert for the attainment of these objects by all measures, whether

The preliminary articles of peace underwent a protracted discussion in both houses of Parliament immediately after the opening of the session in November, 1801. The eyes of all the world were fixed on the only assembly in existence where the merits of so important a treaty, and the mighty interests it involved, could receive a free discussion.

It was urged by Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and the war party in both Houses on the houses, "By the result of this treaty, we are, in truth, a conquered people. Bonaparte is as much our master as he is of Spain or Prussia, or any of those countries which, though nominally independent, are really subjected to his control. Are our resources exhausted? Is the danger imminent, that such degrading terms are acceded to? On the contrary, our wealth is unbounded, our fleets are omnipotent, and we have recently humbled the veterans of France, even on their own element! We now make peace, it seems, because we foresee a time, at no distant period, when we shall be obliged to do so; we capitulate, like General Menou, when we have still some ammunition left. The first question for

Arguments against the every independent power inheriting a glorious name to ask itself is, 'Is peace the part I am to act consonant to the high reputation I have borne in the world?' Judging by this standard, what shall we say of the present treaty? France gives up nothing, for Egypt, at the time of its conclusion, was not hers to give. England, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon, gives up everything. By the result of the treaty, France possesses in Europe all the Continent excepting Austria and Prussia; in Asia, Pondicherry, Cochín, Negapatam, and the Spice Islands; in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, and Senegal; in the Mediterranean, every fortified port excepting Gibraltar, so that that inland sea may now be truly called a French lake; in the West Indies, part, at least, of St. Domingo, Martinique, Tobago, St. Lucie, Guadeloupe, Curacao; in North America, St. Pierre and Miguelon, Louisiana, in virtue of a secret treaty with Spain; in South America, Surinam, Demarara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Guiana, as far as the river of the Amazons. Such is the power which we are required to contemplate without dismay, and under the shadow of whose greatness we are invited to lie down with perfect tranquillity and composure. What would the Marlboroughs, the Godolphins, the Somers, or such weak and deluded men as viewed with jealousy the power of Louis XIV., have said to a peace which not only confirms to France the possession nearly of the whole of Europe, but extends her empire over every other part of the globe?

"But it is said that France and the First Consul will stop short in the career of ambition; that they will be satisfied with the successes they have gained, and that the progress of the Rev-

olution will stop at the elevation it has already attained. Is such the nature of ambition? Is it the nature of French revolutionary ambition? Does it commonly happen that either communities or single men are cured of the passion for aggrandizement by unlimited success? On the contrary, if we examine the French Revolution, and trace it correctly to its causes, we shall find that the scheme of universal empire was, from the beginning, what was looked forward to as the consummation of its labours; the end first in view, though the last to be accomplished; the *primum mobile* that originally set it in motion, and has since guided and governed all their movements. The authors of the Revolution wished, in the first instance, to destroy morality and religion, but they wished these things, not as ends, but as means in a higher design. They wished for a double empire, an empire of opinion and an empire of political power, and they used the one of these as the means of effecting the other. When there is but one country intervenes between France and universal dominion, is it to be supposed that she will stop of her own accord, and quietly surrender all the fruits of her efforts when they are just within her grasp?

of conciliation or vigour, mutually agreed on between them, for the good of humanity, the general repose, and the independence of governments.'" So early had these great potentates taken upon themselves to act as the arbiters of the whole affairs of the civilized world! These secret articles were, in the end, the cause of all the differences which ensued between those powers, and brought the French to Moscow and the Russians to Paris. So often does overweening ambition outvault itself, and fall on the other side.—See BIGNON, ii., 90, 93.

"But the peace is founded, it would appear, on another hope; on the idea that Bonaparte, now that he has become a sovereign, will no longer be a supporter of revolutionary schemes, but do his utmost to maintain the rank and authority which he has so recently acquired. But, although nothing seems more certain than that, in that quarter at least, the Democratic mania is for the present completely extinguished, yet it by no means follows from that circumstance that it does not exist, and that, too, in a most dangerous form, in other states in close alliance with the present ruler of France. Though the head of an absolute monarchy in that kingdom, he is adored as the essence of Jacobinism in this country; and maintains a party here, only the more dangerous that its members are willing to sacrifice to him not only the independence of their country, but the whole consistency of their previous opinions. If any doubt could exist in any reasonable mind that the grand object of the First Consul, as of all preceding governments in France, has been the destruction of this country, it would be removed by the conduct which has been pursued, and the objects that have been insisted for in this very treaty. What can be the object of demanding so many settlements in South America and the West Indies, the Cape, and Cochín China, and Malta, so recently won by our arms, if not of building up a maritime and colonial power, which may, in time, come to rival that of this country? It does not augur very favourably of the intentions of a party in any transaction, that his conduct throughout has been marked by the clearest proofs of duplicity and fraud. Now what shall we think of the candour and fairness which, in a treaty with us, proposes the evacuation of Egypt at the very time when they knew, though we did not, that at that moment all their soldiers in Egypt were prisoners of war? Where was their good faith to the Turks, when in the same circumstances they, knowing the fact and the Turks not, took credit from them for this very evacuation? What is this but ensuring the

II.—A A

lottery-ticket at the moment when they know it to be drawn!

"What, it is said, are we to do? War cannot be eternal, and what prospect have we of reaching a period when it may be terminated under circumstances, upon the whole, more favourable? The extent to which this delusion has spread may truly be said to have been the ruin of the country. The supporters of this opinion never seem to have apprehended the important truth, that if France is bent upon our destruction, there must be perpetual war till one or other is destroyed. This was the conduct of the Romans, who resolved that Carthage should be destroyed, because they were sensible that, if that was not done, it would speedily be their own fate. If we are to come at last only to an armed truce, would it not have been better to have suspended the war at once in that way, than taken the roundabout course which has now been adopted? The evils of war are indeed many; but what are they compared to those of the armed, suspicious, jealous peace which we have formed? Against all its own dangers war provided; the existence of our fleets upon the ocean shut up at once all those attempts which are now let loose upon our possessions in every quarter of the globe. In peace, not the least part of our danger will arise from the irreligious principles and licentious manners which will be let loose upon our people, and spread with fatal rapidity, from the profligacy of the neighbouring capital. French Jacobinism will soon break through stronger bulwarks than the walls of Malta. The people of this country have enjoyed, in such an extraordinary degree, all the blessings of life during the war, public prosperity has increased so rapidly during its continuance, that they have never been able to comprehend the dangers which they were engaged in combating. If they had, we never should have heard, except among the ignorant and disaffected, of joy and exultation through the land at a peace such as the present. When a great military monarch was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes, and had sustained a defeat which seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, we wrote from the field of battle, 'We have lost all except our honour.' Would to God that the same consolation, in circumstances likely to become, in time, not less disastrous, remained to Great Britain!

"France, it is true, has made great acquisitions; she has made the Rhine the boundary of her empire; but on our side we have gained successes no less brilliant and striking: we had multiplied our colonies, and our navy rode triumphant; we had rescued Egypt, we had captured Malta and Minorca, and the Mediterranean was shut up from the ships of France and Spain. In the East Indies we had possessed ourselves of everything except Batavia, which we should have taken if it had been worth the cost of an expedition. We had made ourselves masters of the Cape, an important and necessary step towards Eastern dominion. In the West Indies we had everything desirable—Martinique, Trinidad, St. Lucie, and Guadaloupe; while on the Continent of South America we had an absolute empire, under the name of Surinam and Demerara, almost equal to the European power to whom we have now restored it. But what

have we done with these immense acquisitions, far exceeding, in present magnitude and ultimate importance, all the conquests of France on the Continent of Europe? Have we retained them as pledges to compel the restoration of the balance of European power, or, if that was impossible, as counterpoises in our hands to the acquisitions of France? No! we have surrendered them all, at one fell swoop, to our implacable enemy, who has thus made as great strides towards maritime supremacy in one single treaty as he had effected towards Continental dominion in nine successful campaigns."*

To these powerful and energetic arguments, it was replied by Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington, who on this occasion found an unexpected but powerful ally in Mr. Pitt, "That after the conclusion of peace between France and the great Continental powers; after the dissolution of the confederacy of the European monarchies—a confederacy which government had most justly supported to the utmost of their power—the question of peace became merely one of time, and of the terms to be obtained for ourselves. With regard to the terms which were obtained, they were, perhaps, not so favourable as could have been wished, but they were decidedly preferable to a continuance of the contest, after the great objects for which it was undertaken were no longer attainable; and the difference between the terms we had obtained, and those of retaining all we had given up, would not have justified us in protracting the war. Minorca was a matter of little importance; for experience has proved that it uniformly fell to the power which possessed the preponderating naval force in the Mediterranean; and although it was certainly a matter of regret that we could not have retained so important an acquisition as Malta, yet, if we could not do this, no better arrangement could have been made as to its future destination than had been made in the present treaty. Ceylon in the East, and Trinidad in the West Indies, are both acquisitions of great value; and although it would be ridiculous to assert that they afforded any compensation for the expense of the war, yet if, by the force of external events, over which we had no control, the chief objects of the struggle have been frustrated, it becomes a fit subject of congratulation that we have obtained acquisitions and honourable terms for ourselves at the termination of a contest which, to all our allies, had been deeply checkered by disaster.

"The great object of the war on the part of Great Britain was *security*: defence of ourselves and our allies in a war waged against most of the nations of Europe, and ourselves in particular, with especial malignity. In order to obtain this, we certainly did look for the subversion of the government which was founded on revolutionary principles; but we never insisted as a *sine qua non* on the restoration of the old government of France; we only said, at different times, when terms of accommodation were proposed, there was no government with which we could treat. It doubtless would have been more consistent with the wishes of ministers, and the interest and security of this country, if such a

Answer made by the government and Mr. Pitt.

* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 86, 139, 165, 174.

restoration could have taken place, and it must ever be a subject of regret that efforts corresponding to our own were not made by the other powers of Europe for the accomplishment of that great work; but in no one instance did we ever insist upon restoring the monarchy. There were periods during the continuance of the war in which we had hopes of being able to put together the scattered fragments of that great and venerable edifice; to have restored the exiled nobility of France; to have re-established a government, certainly not free from defects, but built upon regular foundations instead of that mad system of innovation which threatened, and had nearly effected, the destruction of Europe. This, it was true, had been found not attainable, but we had the satisfaction of knowing that we had survived the revolutionary fever, and we had seen the extent of its principles abated. We had seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination; we had seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it had shown itself to be capable of destroying only, but not of building, and that it must necessarily end in military despotism.

"But being disappointed in our hopes of being able to drive France within her ancient limits, and to make barriers against her future incursions, it became then necessary, with the change of circumstances, to change our plans; for no error could be more fatal than to look only at one object, and obstinately pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it became impossible for us to obtain the full object of our wishes, wisdom and policy both required that we should endeavour to obtain that which was next best. In these propositions there was no inconsistency, either in the former conduct or language of ministers, in refusing to treat with the person who now holds the destiny of France; for it was even then announced, that if events should take the turn they have since done, peace would no longer be objectionable.

"Much exaggeration prevails as to the real amount of the additional strength which France has acquired during the war. If, on the one hand, her territorial acquisitions are immense, it must be recollected, on the other, what she has lost in population, commerce, capital, and industry. The desolation produced by convulsions such as France has undergone cannot be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory. When, on the other hand, we contemplate the immense wealth of this country, and the natural and legitimate growth of that wealth, so much superior to the produce of rapacity and plunder, it is impossible not to entertain the hope, founded in justice and nature, of its solidity. When to these we add the great increase of our maritime power, the additional naval triumphs we have obtained, the brilliant victories of our armies, gained over the flower of the troops of France, we have the satisfaction of thinking, that if we have failed in some of our wishes, we have succeeded in the main object, of adding strength to our security, and, at the same time, shed additional lustre over our national character. Nor are our colonial acquisitions to be overlooked in estimating the consolidation of our resources. The destruction of the power of Tippoo Saib in India, who has fallen

a victim to his attachment to France and his perfidy to us, cannot be viewed but as an important achievement. The union with Ireland, effected at a period of uncommon gloom and despondency, must be regarded as adding more to the power and strength of the British Empire than all the conquests of France have effected for that country. If any additional proof were required of the increase of national strength to England, it would be found in the unparalleled efforts which she made in the last year of the war, contending at once against a powerful maritime confederacy in the North, and triumphing over the French on the sands of Egypt; while, at the same time, the harbours of Europe were so strictly blockaded that not a frigate even could venture out to sea but under the cover of mist or darkness. Finally, we have seen that proud array of ships, got together for the invasion of this country, driven for shelter under their own batteries, and only preserved from destruction by the chains and nets thrown over them at their harbour mouths.

"After nine years of ceaseless effusion of blood; after contracting an increase of debt to the amount of above two hundred millions; after the indefatigable and uninterrupted exertions of this country, and, it may be added, after its splendid and unexampled achievements, there is no one who can deny that peace is eminently desirable, if it can be purchased without the sacrifice of honour. This country never volunteered into a war with France; she was drawn into it against her will by the intrigues of the Republicans in her own bosom, and the disaffection, sedition, anarchy, and revolt which they propagated, without intermission, in all the adjoining states; but that danger has now totally ceased; the revolutionary fervour of France is coerced by a military chieftain, far more adequate to the task than the exiled race of monarchs would have been; and the only peril that now exists is that arising from her military power. But if war is to be continued till adequate security against that danger is obtained, when will it terminate! Where are the elements to be found of a new coalition against France; and how can Great Britain, burdened as she is with colonial possessions in every part of the world, descend single-handed into the continental arena with her first-rate antagonist!

"Peace can now, for the first time since the commencement of the war, be obtained without compromising the interests of any existing ally of England. Austria, Sardinia, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Holland, the original parties to the alliance, have successively, at different periods, dropped out of it, and requested to be liberated from their engagements. We did not blame them for having done so; they acted under the influence of irresistible necessity; but, unquestionably, they had thereafter no remaining claim upon Great Britain. In so far, therefore, as we stipulated anything in favour of powers which had already made peace, we acted on large and liberal grounds, beyond what we were bound to have done either in honour or honesty. In this respect the stipulations in favour of Naples, which had not only excluded our shipping from her harbours, but joined in an alliance against us, were highly honourable to the Brit-

ish character. The like might be said of the stipulations in favour of Portugal; while the Ottoman Porte, the only one of our allies who remained fighting by our side at the conclusion of the contest, has obtained complete restitution. The Seven Islands of the Adriatic, originally ceded by France to Austria, and again transferred by Austria to France, might, from their situation, have been highly dangerous in the hands of the latter power to the Turkish dominions, and therefore they have been erected into a separate republic, the independence of which is guaranteed. We have even done something in favour of the house of Orange and the King of Sardinia, although, from having left the confederacy, they had abandoned every claim excepting on our generosity. And thus, having faithfully performed our duties to all our remaining allies, and obtained terms which, to say the least of them, took nothing from the security of this country, was it expedient to continue the contest for the sake of powers who had abandoned our alliance, and themselves given up as hopeless the objects we had originally entertained, and in which they were more immediately interested than ourselves? Compare this peace with any of those recorded in the former history of the two nations, and it will well bear a comparison. By the treaty of Ryswick and Aix-la-Chapelle we gained nothing; by that of Versailles we lost considerably: it was only by the peace of Utrecht in 1713, and that of Paris in 1763, that we made any acquisitions; but if we compare the present treaty with either of these, it will be found that it is by no means inferior either in point of advantage or the promise of durability. Minorca and Gibraltar, obtained by the former, and Canada and Florida, by the latter, will not bear a comparison with Ceylon, the Mysore, and Trinidad, the glorious trophies of the present contest.”*

In the Commons no division took place on the preliminaries. In the Lords the house divided, 114 to 10, in favour of the ministers; but in the minority were found the names of Earls Spencer, Grenville, and Caernarvon.†

The definitive treaty of peace was signed at Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802. Its conditions varied in no material circumstance from the preliminaries agreed to at London nine months before. The fisheries in Newfoundland were replaced in the condition in which they were before the war;‡ an “adequate compensation” was stipulated for the house of Orange,§ and it was agreed that Malta should be placed in a state of entire independence of both powers; that there should be neither English nor French *langues*, or branches of the order; that a Maltese *langue* shall be established, and the King of Sicily invited to furnish a force of 2000 men to form a garrison to the fortresses of the island and its dependancies, along with the grand-master and order of St. John; and that “the forces of his Britannic majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependancies within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner, if it can be done.” The cession of Ceylon and Trinidad to Great Britain, and the restoration of all the other conquered colonies to France

and Holland, the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, and the recognition of the Republic of the Seven Islands, were provided for as in the preliminary articles.*

A long debate ensued in both houses on the definitive treaty, in which the topics already adverted to were enlarged on at great length. Government was supported by a majority of 276 to 20 in the lower, and 122 to 16 in the upper house.†

Such was the termination of the first period of the war, and such the terms on which Great Britain obtained a temporary respite from its perils and expenses. On calmly reviewing the arguments urged, both in the legislature and in the country, on this great question, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the advocates of peace were well-founded in the views they entertained of the interests of the country at that period. Even admitting all that Mr. Wyndham and Lord Grenville so strongly advanced as to the magnitude of the sacrifices made by Great Britain, and the danger to which she was exposed from the territorial acquisitions and insatiable ambition of France to be well founded, still the question remained, was it not incumbent on a prudent government to make, at least, the trial of a pacification, and relieve the country for a time even from the burdens and anxiety of a war, on the faith of a treaty solemnly acceded to by its new ruler. The government of the First Consul, compared to any of the revolutionary ones which had preceded it, was stable and regular; and the revolutionary fervour, the continuance of which had so long rendered any safe pacification out of the question, had exhausted itself, and given place to a general and anxious disposition to submit to the ruling authority. The dissolution of the last coalition had rendered hopeless, at least for a very long period, the reduction of the military power of France; and the maritime superiority of England was so decided as to render any danger to her own independence a distant and problematical contingency. In these circumstances, it seems indisputable that it was the duty of government, if it could be done without dishonour, to bring to a conclusion a contest of which the burdens were certain and immediate, and the advantages remote, if not illusory, and put the sincerity of the First Consul's professions of moderation to such a test as might relieve them of all responsibility in the event of their being obliged, at a subsequent period, to renew the contest. The fact of this having ultimately been found to be the case, and of the peace of Amiens having turned out only an armed truce, is no impeachment whatever of the justice of these views; it, on the contrary, affords the strongest corroboration of them, for England lost none of her means of defence during the intermission of hostilities, and she avoided the heavy responsibility, which otherwise would have lain upon her to the latest generation, of having obstinately continued the war when peace was within her power, and compelled Napoleon, although otherwise inclined, to continue a contest which ultimately brought such

Reflections on the peace, which appears to have been expedient.

* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 36, 38.
† Art. 15.

† Ibid., 191.
‡ Art. 18.

* See the treaty in Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 559. Ann. Reg., 1802. State Papers, 62. † Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 733, 827.

unparalleled calamities on the civilized world. Nor could the terms of the treaty be impugned as disgraceful, with any degree of justice towards Great Britain, when she terminated a strife, which had proved so disastrous to the greatest Continental states, with her Constitution untouched, and without the cession of a single acre which belonged to her at its commencement; while France, accustomed to such large acquisitions at every pacification, was compelled to surrender territories, belonging to herself or her allies, larger than the whole realm of England, and, even in their existing state, of first-rate importance.

For these important advantages Great Britain was indebted to the energy of her population, and the happy circumstances of a maritime situation, which enabled her to augment her commerce and increase her resources at the very time when those of all the other belligerent powers were wasting away under the influence of a protracted and desolating contest. The increase of the wealth, population, commerce, and industry of these islands was unprecedented during its whole continuance, and was so great as fully to justify Mr. Pitt's observation, that it left the relative strength of the two powers nearly the same at its termination as at its commencement.* Great as the increase of the French army was, that of the British had been still greater, and but for the immense surface which she had to defend, and the vast colonial possessions to protect, England might have descended with confidence into the continental arena, and measured her strength, single-handed, with the conqueror of Europe.†

* On the 1st of February, 1793, the British navy consisted of 135 sail of the line and 153 frigates, whereas at its close it numbered no less than 202 sail of the line and 277 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen and marines.* The navy of France was, at the commencement of the war, 73 sail of the line and 67 frigates, manned by 80,000 seamen; at its termination it consisted only of 39 sail of the line and 35 frigates.† That is, at the outset, the English sail of the line and frigates together were not double those of the enemy, whereas at its close they were above six times their number.‡ Napoleon calculates a fleet of 30 ships of the line, and frigates in proportion, as equal to an army of 120,000 men: measured by that standard, the British navy in 1801 was equivalent to a land-force of above 800,000 men.

Nor had the military resources of the Empire increased in a less striking manner. In 1793, the army amounted only to 64,000 regular soldiers and 12,000 fencibles in the British isles and its colonial dependencies,‡ whereas in 1801 they had increased to the immense force of 168,000 men and 80,000 militia,|| exclusive of the sepoys in the service of the East India Company, who amounted to 130,000 men, and above 100,000 volunteers in the British islands.¶ The French army in 1793 consisted of 150,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery,** exclusive of 77,000 provincial troops; in 1801 they amounted to 350,000 regular soldiers, exclusive of the National Guards.††

† General Mathieu Dumas estimates the regular force of France, after the peace of Luneville, at 277,000 men, exclusive of the coast guards, the gendarmerie, the dépôts of the corps, and the National Guard on active service. It is a most moderate computation to take them at 73,000 more.

In 1805, the military establishment of France consisted of the following forces:

* The total navy on the 1st of October, 1801, was:	
Line in commission	104
Line in ordinary, and building	88
Frigates in commission	128
Frigates in ordinary, and building	151
Sloops, brigs, &c.	302
Total	761

—See James, vol. iii., tab. 10, ad fin.
 † Parli. Hist., xxxvi., 47.
 ‡ Ann. Reg., xxiii., 250.
 § Parli. Hist., xxxv., 15.
 ** Jom., i., 224. St. Cyr, i., 36. Introd. etat de France, 673.
 †† Dum., vi., 70, 71.

During the war the British navy increased a half, while the French declined to a half. The British army was more than doubled, and the French increased in nearly the same proportion. The French revenue, notwithstanding all its territorial acquisitions, was diminished, while the permanent income of England was more than doubled; the French debt, by the destruction of a large portion of its proprietors, was diminished, while that of England was doubled; the French exports and imports were almost annihilated, while the British exports were doubled, and the imports had increased more than fifty per cent.; the French commercial shipping was almost destroyed, while that of England had increased nearly a third.*

Infantry of the line	341,000	Light cavalry	60,500
Light infantry	100,000	Heavy cavalry	17,000
Infantry	441,000	Cavalry	77,500
Foot and horse artillery, pontooners, engineers, &c.	53,500		
Imperial guard	8,500		
Gendarmerie	15,600		

This would amount to a total of—			
Infantry	441,000		
Cavalry	77,500		
Artillery and Engineers	53,500		
Imperial guard	8,500		
Gendarmerie	15,600		

Total 596,100 men.
 —See DUMAS, vi., 70, 71, and PEUCHET, *Statistique de la France*, 576, 580.

* The regular revenue of France in 1789 (for no approximation even to a correct estimate can be informed of its amount during the period of confiscation and assignats) had reached of France and 469,000,000 francs, or £18,800,000,* while that of England amounted to £16,382,000.

At the termination of the war, the revenue of France was 450,000,000 francs, or £18,000,000, and its total expenditure 560,000,000 francs, or £22,400,000; while the permanent revenue of England at the same period amounted to £28,000,000, exclusive of £8,000,000 war taxes, and its total expenditure to £61,617,000.††

The public debt of France, which, at the commencement of the Revolution, was 3,567,000,000 francs, or £249,000,000, and occasioned an annual charge of 259,000,000 francs, or £10,450,000, was still very considerable, amounting to 1,380,000,000 francs, or £55,000,000, and occasioning an annual charge of 69,000,000 francs, or £2,800,000, at the termination of the war, notwithstanding the extinction of two thirds of its amount during its continuance, and the unexampled measures of spoliation by which its expenses had been defrayed.‡ The public debt of England in 1792 was £244,440,000, and occasioned an annual charge, including the sinking fund, of £9,317,000; while, at the termination of the war in 1801, it had risen to £484,465,000, funded and unfunded, of which £447,000,000 was funded, and £37,318,000 unfunded. The annual charge of this immense burden has swelled to £21,661,000, of which £8,653,000 was for the debt existing before 1792, £13,025,000 for that created since that period, and £4,649,000 for the sinking fund.||

* Lac., vi., 110. *Etat de la Dette Publique*, 8. Young, i., 557.
 † Ann. Reg., 1793, 250. Moreau and Febr's Tables. Feb., 154. Bign., ii., 130, 131.

‡ M. Neckar, in 1788, estimated the total revenue of Old France at 550,000,000 francs; whereas, in 1801, notwithstanding the great addition to its territory which the Republic had received from the Low countries, Savoy, Nice, and the frontier of the Rhine, which yielded an addition of 100,000,000 francs yearly, it had fallen to 450,000,000 francs, a striking proof how immensely the resources of the country had diminished during the Revolution. Before the increase of its territory, the territorial revenue of France was 1,200,000,000; after it had been swelled by a fifth of superficial surface, it was only 550,000,000. Greater lightness of taxation was certainly not the cause of this diminution, for the direct land and window tax of that latter year amounted to 565,000,000, or 10,750,000l., a sum equivalent to at least double that amount in the British islands. If the difference of the value of money in the two countries is taken into account, Dupin estimates the income derived from the soil in France in 1825 at 1,626,000,000 francs, or 65,000,000l. Supposing the increase of cultivation between 1801 and 1828 to counterbalance the reduction of territory by the peace of Paris in 1815, it follows that the French landholders in 1801 paid about a sixth, or sixteen per cent. on their incomes.—See Neckar's *Compte Rendu*, 1785; *Stat. de la France* 514; Gaeta, i., 189, 310; Bignon, ii., 130; and Dupin, *France, Commerce de France*, ii., 266.

§ *Etat de la Dette Pub.*, 8. 9. Gaeta, i., 199. Peuchet, 500. Young, ii., 578.
 || Moreau's Tables. Feb. 154, 246.
 ¶ In 1789, according to the Duke of Gaeta, a deficit of 54,000,000 francs, or 2,150,000l. yearly, was made "the apology for the Revolution." In 1801, when it was closed, it was above 100,000,000 francs annually, or 4,000,000l. sterling.—Gaeta, i., 189.

Nothing but this continual and rapid increase in the resources of the British Empire, during the course of the struggle, could have accounted for the astonishing exertions which she made towards its close, and the facility with which, during its whole continuance, the vast supplies required for carrying it on were raised without any sensible inconvenience to the country. When we reflect that, during a war of nine years' duration, the yearly expenditure of the nation varied from forty to sixty millions; that loans to the amount of twenty or thirty millions were annually contracted; and that the British fleets covered the seas in every quarter of the globe, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the efforts made by a state so inconsiderable in extent, and with a population, even at the close of the period, and including Ireland, not exceeding fifteen millions.* But the phenomenon becomes still more extraordinary when the efforts made at the termination of the struggle are considered, and the British Empire, instead of being exhausted by eight years' warfare, is seen stretching forth its giant arms at once into every quarter of the globe, striking down the throne of Tippoo Saib by as great a force as combated under the standards of Napoleon at Marengo;† while it held every hostile harbour in Europe blockaded by its fleets, and sending forth Nelson to crush the confederacy of the Northern powers at the very moment that it accumulated its forces, in Europe and Asia, against the Republican legions on the sands of Egypt. It had been frequently asserted that the naval forces of England were equal to those of the whole world put together; but the matter was put to the test in the spring of 1801, when,

The imports of France in 1787 amounted to 349,725,000 francs, or about £14,000,000; the exports to 310,000,000 francs, or £12,500,000.* At the same period, the exports of British manufactures were £14,700,000, and of foreign merchandise £5,460,000, and the imports £18,680,000.† In 1801, the French imports and exports were almost annihilated: the imports from the West Indies had fallen to £61,000, and the exports to the same quarter to £41,000;‡ whereas the British exports in that year were £24,440,000 manufactures, and £17,166,000 foreign and colonial produce, and the imports £29,900,000, amounting in real value to about £54,000,000.§ Nor had the British shipping undergone a less striking increase: the tonnage, which at the commencement of the war was 1,600,000 tons, having risen, in 1801, to 2,100,000; and the mercantile seamen, who at the former period were 118,000, having at the latter increased to 143,000, exclusive of 120,000 seamen and marines employed in the royal navy.||¶

* Population of Great Britain in 1801.....10,942,000

“ Ireland, about 4,000,000

14,942,000

—See PEBBEE'S *Tables*, 332.

† Thirty-five thousand British and sepoy troops formed the siege of Seringapatam in May, 1799. Thirty-one thousand French combated under the First Consul at Marengo.

* Young's *Travels*, ii., 501.

† Mr. Addington's finance resolutions. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 1563.

‡ *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 787. § *Id.*, xxxv., 1563. PEBBEE'S *Tables*, 340.

|| *Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 1563, and xxxvi., 787.

¶ The revenue and charges of the Indian Empire in the years 1793, 1799 and 1800, were as follows:

	1793.	1799.	1800 & 1801.
Revenues—Bengal . . .	1,545,400	1,629,000	1,639,000
Madras . . .	1,996,000	2,004,000	3,273,000
Bombay . . .	147,000	846,000	300,475
	1,697,000	2,899,000	1,939,475
Charges—Bengal . . .	1,313,000	1,352,000	1,432,000
Madras . . .	1,678,000	2,857,000	3,723,000
Bombay . . .	324,000	996,000	1,051,000
	1,523,000	17,807,000	1,916,000
Surplus . . .	1,684,000	893,000	716,475

—*Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 15. *East India Budget, and Ann. Reg.*, 1799, p. 78, and 1801, p. 164, *Sp. to Chronicle*.

without raising the blockade of a single harbour from the Texel to Calabria, she sent eighteen ships of the line with Abercromby to the mouth of the Nile, while nineteen, under Nelson, dissolved by the cannon of Copenhagen the Northern confederation. The annals of Rome contain no example of a similar display of strength, and few of equal resolution in exerting it.

The contemplation of this astonishing display of strength at the close of the struggle, compared with the feeble and detached exertions made at its commencement, is calculated to awaken the most poignant regret at the niggardly use of the national resources so long made by government, and the inexplicable insensibility to the magnitude of the forces at their command, which so long paralyzed the might of England during the earlier years of the war. From a return laid before the House of Commons, it appears that the number of men that had been raised for the service of the army from the commencement of hostilities down to the close of 1800, was 208,808, being at the rate of 26,000 a year on an average during its continuance.* France, with a population hardly double that of Great Britain, raised 1,500,000 men in 1793 alone. It is in the astonishing disproportion of the land-forces of this country either to her naval armaments, her national strength, or the levies of her antagonist, that the true secret of the long duration, enormous expenditure, and numerous disasters of the war is to be found. Secure in her insular situation, protected from invasion by invincible fleets, and relieved from the most disastrous consequences which resulted from defeat to the Continental powers, England was at liberty to employ her whole disposable force against the enemy, yet she never brought 25,000 native troops into the field at any one point. Had she boldly levied 100,000 men in 1793, and sent them to Flanders after the route in the camp of Cæsar, when the French troops were shut up in their intrenched camps, and could not be brought by any exertions to face the allies in the field, she would, beyond all question, have encamped under the walls of Paris in two months, and the Royalists of the south and west would have obtained a decisive superiority over the anarchical faction in the capital. During the nine years of the war, upward of £100,000,000 was paid in the army, and a still larger sum in naval expenses; while in 1793 the military charges were not £4,000,000, and in the latter and more expensive years of the war, only amounted annually to £12,000,000. If a fifth part of this total sum had been expended in any one of the early years in raising the military force of England to an amount worthy of her national strength and ancient renown, triple the British force which overthrew Napoleon at Waterloo might have been assembled on the plains of Flanders, and the war terminated in a single campaign.†

* *Parl. Ret.*, Dec. 31, 1800. *Ann. Reg.*, 1800, 40.

† The expenses of the army and navy during the war were as follows:

	Army.	Ordinance.	Navy.
1792.....	£1,819,000	£422,000	£1,485,000
1793.....	3,993,000	783,000	3,971,000
1794.....	6,641,000	1,345,000	5,525,000
1795.....	11,610,000	2,321,000	6,315,000

Compared with the niggardly exertions at its commencement.

If the rapid growth of wealth, power, and prosperity in the British Islands during this memorable contest had been all grounded on a safe and permanent foundation, it would have presented a phenomenon unparalleled in such circumstances in any age or country. But, though part of this extraordinary increase was undoubtedly a real and substantial addition to the industry and resources of the Empire, arising from the vast extension of its colonial possessions, and the monopoly of almost all the trade of the world in its hands,* yet part was to be ascribed to other causes, attended in the outset with deceptive and temporary advantages, and in the end with real and permanent evils. Like an extravagant individual, who squanders in the profusion of a few years the savings of past centuries and the provision of unborn generations, the government of England threw a fleeting lustre over its warlike administration, by trenching deep on the capital of the nation, and creating burdens little thought of at the time when the vast expenditure was going forward, but grievously felt in subsequent years, when the excitation of the moment had passed away, and the bitter consequences of the debt which had been contracted remained. But this was not all. England, during those eventful years, drank deep at the fountains of paper currency, and derived a feverish and unnatural strength from that perilous but intoxicating draught. From the accounts laid before Parliament, it appears that the notes of the Bank of England in circulation had increased upward of a half from 1793 to 1801, and that the commercial paper under discount at the same establishment, during the same period, had more than tripled.† The ef-

fect of this great increase speedily appeared in the prices of grain, and every other article of life. Wheat, which, on an average of five years prior to 1792, had sold at 5s. 4d. a bushel, had risen, on an average of five years ending with 1802, to 10s. 8d., and on an average of five years ending 1813, to 14s. 4d. a bushel.*† Thus, during the progress of the war, the prices of the necessaries of life were at one time nearly tripled, and even at the peace of Amiens had permanently more than doubled. The effect of this, of course, was, that the money-price of all the other articles of life rapidly rose in the same proportion; rents advanced; all persons who lived by buying and selling found their commodities constantly rising in value; credit, both public and private, immensely improved; industry was vivified by the progressive rise in the value of its produce; and difficulties were overcome by the rapid diminution in the weight of money-debts. It is to the influence of this cause, combined with the vast expenditure of government, and the concentration of almost all the colonial trade of the world in Great Britain, in consequence of her maritime superiority, that the extraordinary prosperity of the Empire during the latter years of the war is to be ascribed. But it was not unmixed good which accrued to the nation, even for a time, from these violent changes; the whole class of annuitants, and all dependant on a fixed money income, suffered as much as the holders of commodities gained by their effects; creditors were defrauded as much as debtors were relieved, and almost as great a transference of property was ultimately effected by the silent operation of the alternation of prices which followed this great experiment, as was produced in other countries by the direct convulsions of a revolution.

But, without anticipating these ultimate effects, which as yet lay buried in the womb of time, and might, perhaps, have been avoided by a more manly adherence to the principles of Mr. Pitt's financial policy than was deemed practicable in later times, it is impossible to conclude the history of this first period of the war without rendering a just tribute to the memory of those illustrious and high-minded men who bore the British nation victorious through the greatest perils which had assailed it since the Norman Conquest; who, clearly perceiving, amid all the delusion of the times, the disastrous tendency of the revolutionary spirit, "struggled with it when it was strongest, and ruled it when it was wildest;" who, amid the greatest perils, disdained to purchase safety by submission, and undismayed alike by foreign disaster and domestic treason, held on their glorious way conquering and to conquer. No other monument is required to the memory of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke but the British Empire, as they left it at the peace of Amiens, unconquered by

Glorious state and character of England at the conclusion of the contest.

1796.....	14,911,000.....	1,954,700.....	11,833,000
1797.....	15,488,000.....	1,643,000.....	13,033,000
1798.....	12,852,000.....	1,303,000.....	13,449,000
1799.....	11,840,000.....	1,500,000.....	13,642,000
1800.....	11,941,000.....	1,695,000.....	13,619,000
1801.....	12,117,000.....	1,639,000.....	15,857,000

—See PEBBER'S Tables, 154.

* The operation of these causes appeared, in an especial manner, in the vast increase of our export of foreign and colonial merchandise during the war, which, on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January, 1793, was £3,468,000; and in the year ending the 5th of January, 1801, had risen to the enormous sum of £17,166,000, being more than triple its amount at the commencement of the contest.—See MR. ADDINGTON'S Finance Resolutions, 1801.—*Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 1564.

	Notes.	Commercial Paper Discounted at the Bank.	Gold Coin-counted at the Bank.
1792.....	£11,006,000		£1,171,000
1793.....	11,888,000	No acc't. kept.	2,747,000
1794.....	10,744,000		2,558,000
1795.....	14,017,000	£2,946,000	493,000
1796.....	10,729,000	3,505,000	464,000
1797, Feb. 28.....	9,674,000	3,350,000	2,000,000
1798, Aug. 31.....	11,114,000	5,870,000	2,067,000
1798.....	13,095,000	4,490,000	449,000
1799.....	13,389,000	5,403,000	189,000
1800.....	16,844,000	6,401,000	450,000
1801.....	16,213,000	7,905,000	437,000

—See Appendix to Report on Bank, 1832, and PEBBER'S Tables, 254, 260, and 279.

The slightest consideration of this most instructive table is sufficient to demonstrate to what source the crisis of February, 1797, was owing. The paper of the bank was then contracted from fourteen millions, its amount in 1795, to nine millions. This was doubtless owing to necessity, but it unavoidably brought about the general panic which rendered the suspension of cash-payments in that month unavoidable, and landed the nation in the bottomless pit of paper currency, unconvertible into gold, and all the prodigious change of prices with which it was necessarily attended.

* Lords' Report on Banks, Ap. No. 39, and Lords' Report on Corn, 1814, No. 12.

† The prices of wheat from 1790 to 1801 were as follows:

	Per Quarter.		Per Quarter.
1790.....	£2 13 2	1796.....	£3 12 0
1791.....	2 7 0	1797.....	2 12 0
1792.....	2 2 4	1798.....	2 9 8
1793.....	2 8 8	1799.....	3 7 4
1794.....	2 11 0	1800.....	5 12 8 scarcity
1795.....	4 7 0	1801.....	5 18 0 scarcity.

—See Ann. Reg., 1801, 167, App. to Chron.

force, undivided by treason, unchanged in constitution, untainted in faith, the bulwark of order, the asylum of freedom, the refuge of religion; contending undauntedly against the world in arms, covering the ocean with its fleets, encircling the earth in its grasp; the ark to which the fortunes of humanity were committed amid the waves of the Deluge, the polar star to which alone the eye of hope was turned, from all the suffering realms of the earth.*

CHAPTER XXXV.

RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE BY NAPOLEON.

FROM THE CONTINENTAL PEACE TO HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL CROWN.

OCTOBER, 1801—MARCH, 1804.

ARGUMENT.

Deplorable internal State of France when Napoleon succeeded to the Helm.—Means which were at his disposal to reconstruct Society, and Difficulties which he had to encounter.—He resolves to make the Attempt.—Constitutional Freedom was then impossible in France.—Explosion of the Infernal Machine.—Napoleon at once ascribes it to the Jacobins.—Speech which he made on the Occasion to the Authorities of Paris.—He refuses to listen to any Attempts to exculpate them.—A *coup d'état* is resolved on against the Jacobins.—Terms of the Senatus Consultum ordaining it, and 130 Persons are transported.—It is afterward discovered that the Chouans were the really guilty Parties.—Napoleon creates the King of Etruria.—Parallel of Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon.—Debate on the lists of Eligibility in the Council of State.—Decision on it by the Legislature.—Legion of Honour.—Napoleon's Argument in Favour of it in the Council of State.—Argument against it by Thibaudeau.—Napoleon's Reply.—It is adopted by the Legislature.—General opposition which it experienced; but it is nevertheless carried into Execution.—Napoleon is created First Consul for ten Years additional.—Grounds set forth in the Senatus Consultum on the Occasion.—State of Religion in France at this Period.—Napoleon's Views on this Subject.—Arguments in the Council of State against an Established Church.—Napoleon's Reply.—Concordat with the Pope.—Its Provisions in Favour of the Gallican Church.—General Dissatisfaction which it occasioned.—Ceremony on the Occasion in Notre Dame, and general Discontent which it produced.—Constrained religious Observances at Paris.—Great Joy at the Change in the rural Departments.—Prudence of Napoleon in restraining the High Church Party.—His admirable Proclamation on the Subject to the People of France.—General Satisfaction which the Measure excited in foreign Countries.—Subsequent Views of Napoleon on the Subject.—Renewed Indulgence towards the Emigrants.—Senatus Consultum proclaiming a general Amnesty.—Inadequacy of these Measures to heal the Evils of Revolutionary Confiscation.—Immense Extent of this Evil in France, and its Irremediable Effects.—Measures to promote public Instruction.—Trial of public Feeling by the Royalists.—Measures for recruiting the Army and Navy.—Debate on that Subject in the Council of State.—Discussion there on the *Ecole Militaire*.—Speech of Napoleon on the Government of the Colonies.—Finances of France.—General Valuation, or *Cadaastre*.—Statistical Details.—Indignation of Napoleon at the Language used in the Tribune.—Important Change in the Municipal Government carried in Spite of that Body.—Debate on the Tribune in the Council of State.—Napoleon's Speech on the Subject.—He resolves to make himself Consul for Life.—Incessant Efforts of Government to spread Monarchical Ideas.—Strong Opposition of Josephine to these Attempts.—The Project at first fails in the Council of State.—Means adopted to ensure its Success.—The Question is directly submitted to the People.—Result of the Appeal, and great Satisfaction which it gave.—Letter of Lafayette when he declined to vote for it.—Answer of the First Consul to the Address of the Senate on the Occasion.—His Ideas on the Lists of Eligibility.—Great Changes on the Constitution.—Their Acceptance by the Senate.—Aspect of Paris and its Society at this Period.—Generous Conduct of Mr. Fox in defending Mr. Pitt to the First Consul.—Great Satisfaction which these Changes give in foreign Courts.—Rapid Increase of the central Executive Power.—Infamous Proposals made to Josephine regarding an Heir to the Throne.—Suppression of the Ministry of Police, and Disgrace of Fouché.—Changes in the Constitution of the Senate.—Renewed Correspondence between Louis XVIII. and Napoleon.—Formation of the Code Napoleon.

—Reflections on the Difficulty of this Subject.—Discussions on it in the Council of State.—Law of Succession as finally fixed by Napoleon.—Sketch of the French Revolutionary System of Inheritance.—Prodigious Effects of this Change in subdividing Land in France.—Singular Attachment of the modern French to this Law, which precludes the Possibility of real Liberty.—Law regarding Divorce.—Great Effects of these Salutary Changes of Napoleon.—Magnificent public Works set on Foot in France.—Vast Improvements of Paris.

WHEN Napoleon seized the reins of power in France, he found the institutions of civilization and the bonds of society dissolved to an extent of which the previous history of the world afforded no example. Not only was the throne overturned, the nobles exiled, their landed estates confiscated, the aristocracy destroyed, but the whole institutions of religion, law, commerce, and education had been overturned. There remained neither nobles to rule, nor priests to bless, nor teachers to instruct the people; commerce no more spread its benign influence through the realm, and manufacturing industry, in woful depression, could not maintain its numerous inhabitants. The great cities no longer resounded with the hammer of the artisan, and the village bells had ceased to call the faithful to the house of God; the chateaux, in ruins, existed only to awaken the melancholy recollection of departed splendour, and the falling churches to attest the universal irreligion of its inhabitants; the ocean was no more whitened by the sails of its commerce, nor the mountains enlivened by the songs of its shepherds. Even the institutions of charity, and the establishments for the relief of suffering, had shared in the general wreck; the monastery no longer spread its ample stores to the poor, and the hospital doors were closed against the numerous supplicants who laboured under wounds or disease; hardened by want, and steeled against pity by the multiplicity of its objects, humanity itself seemed to be closing in the human heart; and every one, engrossed in the cares of self-preservation, and destitute of the means of re-

* In making these observations, the author is fully aware of the burdens consequent on Mr. Pitt's administration, and the disastrous effects which have, in the end, followed the change of prices begun in 1797. What he rests upon is, that this change was forced upon the British statesmen by overwhelming necessity, and that Mr. Pitt had provided a system of finance, which, if steadily adhered to by his successors, as it might have been, would have discharged the whole debt contracted in the Revolutionary war before the year 1835; that is, in the same time that it was created.—See below, on Mr. Pitt's financial policy, chapter 39.

believing others, turned with callous indifference from the spectacle of general misery. In one class only the spirit of religion glowed with undecaying lustre, and survived the wreck of all its institutions. Persecuted, reviled, and destitute, the Sisters of Charity still persevered in their pious efforts to assuage human suffering, and sought out the unfortunate alike among the ranks of the Republicans who had overthrown, as the Royalists who had bled for the faith of their fathers.*

To restore the institutions which the insanity of former times had overturned, and draw close again the bonds which previous guilt had loosened, was the glorious task which awaited the First Consul. The powers which he possessed for it were great, but the difficulties attending its execution were almost insurmountable. On the one hand, he was at the head of a numerous, brave, and experienced army, flushed by victory, and obedient to his will; the whole remaining respectable classes of the state had rallied round his standard; and all ranks, worn out with Revolutionary contention and suffering, were anxious to submit to any government which promised them the first of social blessings, peace and protection. On the other, almost all the wealth, and all the nobility of the state, had disappeared during the Revolution; the church was annihilated; and great part of the landed property of the country had passed into the hands of several millions of little owners, who might be expected to be permanently resolute in maintaining them against the dispossessed proprietors. That society could not long go on, nor any durable government be established, without some national religion, or some connexion between the throne and the altar, was sufficiently evident; but how was either to be reconstructed in the midst of an infidel generation, and by the aid of the very men who had contributed to their destruction? That a constitutional monarchy could not exist without a representative system, founded on all the great interests of the state, and tempered by the steadiness of an hereditary aristocracy, was indeed apparent; but where were the elements of it to be found, when the former had almost all been crushed during the convulsions of the Revolution, and the latter, destitute and exiled, was the object of inveterate jealousy to the numerous classes who had risen to greatness by its overthrow?

These difficulties were so great that they would probably have deterred any ordinary conqueror from the attempt; and he would have been content to accept the crown which was offered to him, and leave to others the Herculean task of closing the wounds of the Revolution. But Napoleon was not a man of that character. He

believed firmly that he was the destined instrument in the hand of Providence to extinguish that terrible volcano, and he was conscious of powers equal to the undertaking. From the very outset, accordingly, he began, cautiously indeed, but firmly and systematically, to coerce the Democratic spirit, and reconstruct those classes and distinctions in society which had disappeared during the preceding convulsions, but were the indispensable bulwarks of the throne. The success with which his efforts were attended is a more glorious monument to his memory than all the victories which he won.

Those who reproach Napoleon with establishing a despotic government, and not founding his throne on the basis of a genuine representation of the people, would do well to show how he could have framed a counterpoise to Democratic ambition, or a check on regal oppression, out of the representatives of a community from which all the superior classes of society had been violently torn; how the turbulent passions of a Republican populace could have been moulded into habitual subjection to a legislature, distinguished in no way from their own members, and a body of titled senators, destitute of wealth, consideration, or hereditary rank; how a constitutional throne could have subsisted without either any support from the altar, or any foundation in the religious feelings of its subjects; and how a proud and victorious army could have been taught that respect for the majesty of the legislature which is the invaluable growth of centuries of order, but which the successive overthrow of so many previous governments in France had done so much to destroy. After its patricians had been cut off by the civil wars of Sylla and Marius, Rome sunk necessarily and inevitably under the despotic rule of the emperors. When Constantine founded a second Rome on the shores of the Bosphorus, he perceived it was too late to attempt the restoration of the balanced constitution of the ancient Republic. On Napoleon's accession to the consular throne, he found the chasms in the French aristocracy still greater and more irreparable. The only remaining means of righting the scale was by throwing the sword into the balance. The total failure of all subsequent attempts to frame a constitutional monarchy out of the elements which the Revolution had left in the society of France, proves that Napoleon rightly appreciated its political situation, and seized upon the only means of restoring order to its troubled waters.*

Circumstances soon occurred which called forth the secret but indelible hatred of the First Consul at the Jacobin faction. The conspiracy of Arena and Ceracchi, which failed at the opera, had been traced to some ardent enthusiasts.

* It is not to be supposed that the Revolutionary governments had done nothing for education. On the contrary, the Polytechnic School, and many other institutions, particularly a school of medicine, and the Institute itself, were owing to their exertions. But in the distracted state of the country, and when the care of self-preservation came home to every one, little attention could be paid to the education of the young; and, by destroying every sort of religious tuition, the Convention had cut off the right hand of public instruction, the only branch of it which is of paramount importance to the poor.—See *THIS*, 123.

* "There is in the English Constitution," said Napoleon, "a body of noblesse which unites to the lustre of descent a great part of the landed property of the nation. These two circumstances give it a great influence over the people, and interest attaches it to the government. In France, since the Revolution, that class is totally wanting. Would you re-establish it? If you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it would be necessary to concentrate in their hands a large portion of the national property, which is now impossible. If it were composed of the ancient noblesse, it would soon lead to a counter revolution."—See *THIS*, 291.

of that class; and soon after, a more formidable attempt at his assassination gave rise to a wider proscription of their associates. On the day on which the armistice of Steyer was signed Napoleon went to the opera. Berthier, Lan-
Dec. 24, 1800. nes, and Lauriston were with him

in the carriage. In going from the Tuileries to the theatre, in the Rue de Richelieu, his carriage passed through the Rue St. Nicaise; an overturned chariot in that narrow thoroughfare almost obstructed the passage, but the coachman, who was driving rapidly, had the address to pass it without stopping.

Explosion of the infernal machine. Hardly had he got through, when a terrible explosion broke all the win-

dows of the carriage, struck down the last man of the guard, killed eight persons, and wounded twenty-eight, besides occasioning damage to the amount of 200,000 francs (£8000) in forty-six adjoining houses. Napoleon drove on, without stopping, to the opera, where the audience were in consternation at the explosion, which was so loud as to be heard over all Paris; every eye was turned to him when he entered, but the calm expression of his countenance gave not the slightest indication of the danger which he had escaped. Speedily, however, the news circulated through the theatre, and the First Consul had the satisfaction of perceiving, in the thunders of applause which shook its walls, the most fervent expressions of attachment to his person.*

Before the piece had terminated, Napoleon returned to the Tuileries, where a crowd of public functionaries were assembled, from every part of Paris, to congratulate him on his escape. He anticipated all their observations by commencing in a loud voice, "This is the work of the Jacobins; it is they who Napoleon at once ascribes it to the Jacobins. Neither the nobles, nor the priests, nor the Chouans had any hand in it. I know on what to form my opinion, and it is in vain to seek to make me alter it. It is the Septemberiers, those wretches steeped in crime, who are in a state of permanent revolt, in close column against every species of government. Three months have hardly elapsed since you have seen Ceracchi, Arena, and their associates attempt to assassinate me. Again, it is the same clique, the bloodsuckers of September, the assassins of Versailles, the brigands of the 31st of May, the authors of all the crimes against government, who are at their hellish work. It is the tribes of artisans and journalists, who have a little more instruction than the people, but live with them, and mingle their passions with their own ardent imaginations, who are the authors of all these atrocities. If you cannot chain them, you must exterminate them; there can be no truce with such wretches; France must be purged of such an abominable crew." During this vehement harangue, delivered with the most impassioned gesticulations, all eyes were turned towards Fouché, the well-known leader of that party, and stained, at Lyons and the Loire, with some of its most frightful atrocities. Alone, he stood in a window recess, pale, dejected, hearing everything, answering nothing. The crowd of cour-

tiers broke into exclamations, the echo of the First Consul's sentiments. One, gifted with more courage than the rest, approached, and asked the minister of police why he made no reply. "Let them go on," said he; "I am determined not to compromise the safety of the state. I will speak when the proper time arrives. He laughs securely who laughs the last."*

On the following day a public audience was given to the prefect of the Seine and the twelve mayors of Paris. Speech which he made on the occasion to the authorities of Paris. Napoleon said: "As long as that handful of wretches attacked me alone, I left to the laws the charge of chastising their offences; but since, by a crime without example, they have endangered the lives of a part of the population of Paris, their punishment must be as rapid as extraordinary. They consist of a hundred miscreants who have brought disgrace on liberty by the crimes committed in its name; it is indispensable that they should be forthwith deprived of the means of inflicting farther injuries on society." This idea was more fully unfolded at a meeting of the Council of State which took place on the same day. It was proposed to establish a special commission to try the offenders; but this was far from meeting Napoleon's views, who was resolved to seize the present opportunity of inflicting a deathblow on the remnant of the Jacobin faction. "The action of a special tribunal," said he, "would be too slow; we must have a more striking punishment for so extraordinary an offence; it must be as rapid as lightning; it must be blood for blood. As many of the guilty must be executed as there fell victims to their designs, say fifteen or twenty; transport two hundred, and take advantage of this event to purge the Republic of its most unworthy members. This crime is the work of a band of assassins, of Septemberiers,† whose hands may be traced through all the crimes of the Revolution. When that party sees a blow struck at its headquarters, and that fortune has abandoned its chiefs, everything will return to established order; the workmen will resume their labours, and ten thousand men, who in France are ranged under its colours, will abandon it forever. That great example is necessary to attach the middling classes to the throne; the industrious citizens can have no hope as long as they see themselves menaced by two hundred enraged wolves, who look only for the proper moment to throw themselves on their prey.

"The metaphysicians are the men to whom we owe all our misfortunes. Half measures will no longer do; we must either pardon everything, like Augustus, or adopt a great measure which may be the guarantee of the social order. When, after the conspiracy of Catiline, Cicero caused the guilty to be strangled, he said he had saved his country. I should be unworthy of the great task which I have undertaken, and of my mission, if I evinced less firmness on this trying occasion. We must regard this affair as statesmen, not as judges. I am so convinced of the necessity of making a great example, that

* Thib., 27, 28. Bour., iv., 201, 202. D'Ab., iv., 110, 114.

† In allusion to the massacres in the prisons in September, 1792.

* Thib., 23, 24. Bour., iv., 199, 200. D'Ab., iv., 108, 110.

I am ready to call the accused before me, interrogate them, and myself subscribe their condemnation. It is not for myself that I speak; I have braved greater dangers; my fortune has preserved me, and will preserve me; but we are now engaged with the social order, with the public morality, the national glory."

In the midst of this energetic harangue, it was evident that Napoleon was losing sight of the real point to be first considered, which was, who were the guilty parties. Truguet alone had the courage to approach this question, by suggesting that there were different classes of guilty persons in France; that there were fanatics as well as Jacobins who misled the people, and that the priests, whose denunciations against the holders of the national domains had already appeared in several recent publications, might possibly be the authors of the infernal project. Napoleon warmly interrupted him:

"You will not make me alter my opinion by such vain declamations; the wicked are known; they are pointed out by the nation. They are the Septemberists, the authors of every political crime in the Revolution, who have ever been spared or protected by the weak persons at the head of affairs. Talk not to me of nobles or priests. Would you have me proscribe a man for a title, or transport ten thousand gray-haired priests? Would you have me prosecute a religion still professed by the majority of Frenchmen and two thirds of Europe? La Vendée never was more tranquil; the detached crimes which still disgrace its territory are the result merely of ill-extinguished animosities. Would you have me dismiss all my counsellors excepting two or three; send Portalis to Sinnamary, Devain to Madagascar, and choose a council from the followers of Babeuf. It is in vain to pretend that the people will do no wrong but when they are prompted to it by others. The people are guided by an instinct, in virtue of which they act alone. During the Revolution they frequently forced on the leaders who appeared to guide them; the populace is a tiger when he is unmuzzled. I have a dictionary of the men employed in all the massacres. The necessity of the thing being once admitted, our duty is to attain it in the most efficacious way. Do they take us for children? Do not hope, Citizen Truguet, that you would, in the event of their success, be able to save yourself by saying, 'I have defended the patriots before the Council of State.' No, no. The patriots would sacrifice you as well as us all." He then broke up the council, and when passing Truguet, who was endeavouring to say something in his vindication, said aloud, "Come, now, citizen, all that is very well for the *soirées* of Madame Condorcet or Maille-Garat, but it won't do in a council of the most enlightened men of France."*

These vehement apostrophes, from a man vested with despotic authority, cut short all discussion, and the council found itself compelled, notwithstanding a courageous resistance from some of its members, to go into the arbitrary designs of the First Consul. The public mind was prepared for some great catastrophe by repeated articles in the public journals, drawn up by Fouché, in which that astute counsellor, sup-

pressing his private information, directed the thunders of the executive against his former associates.* But while these measures were in preparation, Fouché and the First Consul received decisive information that it was the

A coup d'état is resolved on against the Jacobins.

Royalists, and not the Jacobins, who were the real authors of the conspiracy, and a clew was obtained which promised soon to lead to the discovery of the guilty parties. The minister of police, therefore, received secret instructions not to allude, in his report against the Republicans, to the affair of the infernal machine, but to base the proposed *coup d'état* generally on the numerous conspiracies against the public peace, and on this report Napoleon urged the immediate delivery to a military commission of eighteen, and transportation of above a hundred persons, without either trial or evidence taken against them. In vain Thibaudeau and Roederer urged in the Council of State that there was no evidence against the suspected persons, and that it was the height of injustice to condemn a crowd of citizens, untried and unheard, to the severe punishment of transportation. The First Consul, though well aware that they had no connexion with the late conspiracy, was resolved not to let slip the opportunity of getting quit at once of so many dangerous characters. "We have strong presumptions, at least," said he, "if not proofs against the Terrorists. The Chouannerie and emigration are maladies of the skin, but terrorism is a malady of the vital parts. The minister of police has purposely omitted the mention of the late conspiracy, because it is not for it that the measure is proposed. If that reserve were not observed, we would compromise our character. The proposed step is grounded upon considerations independent of the late event; it only furnished the occasion for putting them in force. The persons included in the lists will be transported for their share in the massacres in the prisons on September the 2d; for their accession to the Jacobin revolt of the 31st of May; for the conspiracy of Babeuf, and all that they have done since that time. Such a step would have been necessary without the conspiracy, but we must avail ourselves of the enthusiasm it has excited to carry it into execution." In pursuance of these views, an arrest was proposed by the Council of State, and adopted by the senate, which condemned to immediate transporta-

And one hundred and thirty persons are transported.

* In one of these, the minister of police addressed the following report to the First Consul:

"It is not against ordinary brigands, for whose coercion the ordinary tribunals are sufficient, and who menace only detached persons or articles of property, that the government is now required to act; it is the enemies of entire France, who are now at the bar; men who threaten every instant to deliver it up to the fury of anarchy.

"These frightful characters are few in number, but their crimes are innumerable. It is by them that the convention has been attacked with an armed force in the bosom of the sanctuary of the laws; it is they who have endeavoured so often to render the committees of government the agents of their atrocious designs. They are not the enemies of this or that government, but of every species of authority.

"They persist in an atrocious war, which cannot be terminated but by an extraordinary measure of the supreme police. Among the men whom the police has denounced, many were not found with the poniard in their hands, but all were equally capable of sharpening and using it. In disposing of them, we must not merely punish the past, but look to a guarantee of social order in future."—See THIBAudeau, 43, 44, and BOURRIENNE, iv., 204, 205.

* *Thib.*, 33, 34.

tion no less than a hundred and thirty individuals, among whom were nine persons who had been engaged in the massacres of September, and several members of the convention, Choudien, Taillefer, Thirion, and Talot, Felix Lepelletier, and Rossignol, well known for his cruelty in the war of La Vendée. The decree was forthwith carried into execution, and thus did the arbitrary tyranny which the Jacobins had so long exercised over others, at length, by a just retribution, recoil upon themselves.*†

In less than a month afterward Fouché made a second report upon the conspiracy of the infernal machine, in which he admitted that, when these measures of severity were adopted against the Jacobins, he had other suspicions; that George Cadouhal and other emigrants had successively disembarked from England; and that the horse attached to the machine had furnished a clew to its authors, who had at length been detected in the house of certain females of the Royalist party. Saint Jan. 13, 1801. Regent and Carbon, accordingly, the really guilty persons, were tried by the ordinary tribunals, condemned, and executed. Not a shadow of doubt could now remain that the conspiracy had been the work of the Royalists; but Napoleon persisted, though he saw that as clearly as any one, in carrying into effect the sweeping decree of transportation against the Jacobins. "There is not one of them," he said to those who petitioned for a relaxation of the sentence in favour of certain individuals, "who has not deserved death a hundred times over, if they had been judged by their conduct during the Revolution; these wretches have covered France with scaffolds, and the measure adopted in regard to them is rather one of mercy than severity; the attempt of the infernal machine is neither mentioned as a motive nor the occasion of the *senatus consultum*; with a company of grenadiers I could put to flight the whole Faubourg St. Germain, with its Royalist *coteries*; but the Jacobins are men of determined character, whom it is not so easy to make retreat. As to the transportation of the Jacobins, it is of no sort of consequence; I have got quit of them; if the Royalists commit any offence, I will strike them also."‡§

The next important step of Napoleon was the

* Thib., 42, 51. Bour., iv., 205, 206.

† The *senatus consultum* was in these terms: "Concerning the measures necessary to be taken in certain emergencies; that in the absence of any express directions, the senate is called upon to give effect to the wishes of the people, expressed by that branch of the Constitution of which it is the organ; that, according to that principle, the senate is the natural judge of any conservative measures proposed in perilous circumstances by the government; and considering that the measure proposed by the Council of State seems to be based on necessity and public expedience, the senate declares that that measure is conservative of the Constitution." Upon this decree being obtained, the Council of State decided that their resolution was obligatory on the constituted authorities, and that it should be promulgated, like the laws and acts of the government, but without receiving the sanction of the Legislative Body and the Tribunal: and it was immediately put in force without their concurrence.—See THIBAUDEAU, 51, 52.

‡ Thib., 51, 62. Bour., iv., 212, 213, 214.

§ It is a curious and instructive fact, that no sooner was the determination of the First Consul, in regard to the Jacobins, known, than a multitude of revelations flowed in from the prefects, mayors, and magistrates over all France, impli-

cating the Republicans still farther in the conspiracy, and detailing discoveries of the vast Jacobin plot which was to have burst forth in every part of the country the moment intelligence was received of the leading stroke given in the capital! A striking instance of the distrust with which the officious zeal of such authorities should be received, and of the necessity of the executive not letting their wishes be known, if they would in such circumstances preserve the semblance even of justice in their proceedings.—See THIBAUDEAU, 53, 63; BOURRIENNE, iv., 212.

May, 1801.
Napoleon creates the Kingdom of Etruria.

By a convention with Spain, it was stipulated that the province of Tuscany, ceded to the Infanta of Spain, Marie Louise, third daughter of Charles IV., and the Duke of Parma, her husband, should be erected into a monarchy, under the title of the Kingdom of Etruria. In May, 1801, the newly-created king, Louis I., with his young bride, arrived in Paris, on his way from Madrid to Florence, and was received with extraordinary distinction both on the road and in the capital. Numerous *fêtes* succeeded each other in honour of the royal pair, among which those of M. Talleyrand, in his villa at Neuilly, was remarked as peculiarly magnificent. The young king early evinced symptoms of that imbecility of character by which he was afterward distinguished; but it was deemed of importance to accustom the court of the First Consul to the sight of royalty, and the Parisians to the intoxicating idea that, like the Roman Senate, they were invested with the power of making and unmaking kings. Napoleon received the reward of this policy in the transports with which, when he was present, the celebrated line of *Œdipus* was received at the theatre:

"J'ai fait des souverains, et n'ai pas voulu l'être."

But it was not merely by such exhibitions of royalty that Napoleon endeavoured to prepare the French nation for his own assumption of the crown. At the time when the public mind was strongly excited by the danger which the state had run from the success of the infernal machine, a pamphlet appeared, with the title, "Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte," in which the cause of royalty and hereditary succession was openly advocated. It excited at first a great sensation, and numerous copies were sent to the First Consul from the prefects and magistrates, with comments on the dangerous effects it was producing on the public mind. Fouché, however, soon discovered that it had issued and been distributed from the office of the minister of the interior, and shortly after that it came from the pen of Lucien Bonaparte. Napoleon affected to be highly indignant at this discovery, and reproached Fouché with not having instantly sent his imprudent brother to the Temple; but the cautious minister was too well informed to put the hint in execution, as Lucien had shown him the original manuscript, corrected by the hand of the First Consul himself. However, it was necessary to disavow the production, as its effect proved that it had prematurely disclosed the designs of the fortunate usurper, and therefore Lucien was sent into an honourable exile, as ambassador at Madrid, with many reproaches from Napoleon for having allowed the device to

creating the Republicans still farther in the conspiracy, and detailing discoveries of the vast Jacobin plot which was to have burst forth in every part of the country the moment intelligence was received of the leading stroke given in the capital! A striking instance of the distrust with which the officious zeal of such authorities should be received, and of the necessity of the executive not letting their wishes be known, if they would in such circumstances preserve the semblance even of justice in their proceedings.—See THIBAUDEAU, 53, 63; BOURRIENNE, iv., 212.

* Thib., 64, 69. Bour., iv., 270, 273.

be discovered. "I see," said Napoleon to his secretary, "that I have been moving too fast; I have broken ground too soon; the pear is not yet ripe." He received secret instructions to exert all his influence at the court of Spain to induce that power to declare war against Portugal, in order to detach the whole Peninsula from the alliance with England, and shut its harbours against the British flag.*

The numerous complaints against the lists of eligibility which formed so important and remarkable an effect in the Constitution under the Consulate, induced Napoleon to bring them again under the consideration of his state council. It was justly objected against this institution, that it renewed, in another and a more odious form, all the evils of privileged classes which had occasioned the Revolution; that to confine the seats in the Legislature, and all important offices under government, to five thousand individuals out of about thirty millions of souls, was to the last degree unjust, and seemed peculiarly absurd at the close of a revolution, the main object of which had been to open them indiscriminately to all the citizens. It became necessary to consider whether these complaints should be attended to, as the time was approaching when a fifth of the legislative body and tribunate were to be renewed, in terms of the Constitution, and therefore the lists, already formed, were about to be forwarded to the electors. It was urged by the advocates for a change in the Council of State, that "public opinion had strongly pronounced itself against these lists, because they at once deprive a great body of citizens of that result of the Revolution which they most prized, eligibility to every public function. Out of delicacy to five thousand persons, who are inscribed on the highest class of these lists, you leave the seeds of a dangerous discontent in a hundred times that number. Doubtless it is not impossible from these lists to make, for a few years, a suitable choice of representatives; but such a result would only the more confirm a system radically vicious, and augment the difficulty which will hereafter be experienced in correcting it."

The First Consul replied: "The institution of the lists is objectionable. It is an absurd system, the growth of the ideology which, like a malady, has so long overspread France. It is not by such means that a great nation is re-organized. Sovereignty is inalienable. Nevertheless, bad as the system is, it forms part of the Constitution: we are only intrusted with its execution. It is impossible, besides, to let the people remain without any species of organization: better a bad one than none at all. It is an error to suppose that the people are organized merely because the Constitution has created the powers of government. The supreme authority must have intermediate supports, or it has neither any stability nor any hold of the nation. We must not think, therefore, of abandoning the lists without substituting something else in their room. It is admitted that they form at present a sufficient body out of which to choose the Legislature; the Constitution has established them; they form an organic law of the state; all France has

aided in their construction; in the rural districts, in particular, they are universally approved of. Why, then, should we overlook the people of France, and their expressed approbation, merely because Paris has made a bad choice for her share of the list, and her citizens reckon the departments as nothing? It is better for the government to have to deal with a few thousand individuals than a whole nation. What harm can there be in going on for two or three years longer with these lists? They form the sole channel by which the influence of the people is felt on the government. It will be time enough at the close of that period to consider what changes should be made on it." Guided by these considerations, the council resolved that the lists should remain unchanged. They were already regarded as the nucleus of a new nobility instead of that which had been destroyed, and as an indispensable attendant on the throne which was anticipated for the First Consul.*

But Napoleon's views in this important particular went much farther, and he resolved to establish an order of nobility under the title of the *Legion of Honour*, which should gradually restore the gradation of ranks in society, and at the same time attach the people to its support. This important matter was brought before the Council of State in May, 1801. It met with more opposition than any other measure of the Consulate; the debates on it in the Council of State were in the highest degree curious and instructive.

"The eighty-seventh article of the Constitution," said Napoleon, "sanctions the establishment of military honours, but it has organized nothing. An *arrêt* has established arms of honour, with double pay as a consequence; others with a mere increase; there is nothing formal or regular constructed. The project I propose to you gives consistence to the system of recompenses; it is the beginning of organization to the nation." It was proposed by General Mathieu Dumas that the institution should be confined to military men, but this was strongly combated by the First Consul. "Such ideas," said he, "might be well adapted to the feudal ages, when the chevaliers combated each other man to man, and the bulk of the nation was in a state of

May 4, 1801.
Napoleon's arguments in favour of it, in the Council of State.

* Thib., 69, 74.

† The subject of the lists was warmly debated both in the Council of State and before the Legislature, and Decision on it the maintenance of the existing system only carried by the Legislature by a majority of 56 to 26 in the Tribunate, and 259 to 36 in the Legislative Body. It is not surprising that it excited a violent opposition in the popular party, seeing that it overturned the whole objects for which the nation had been fighting during the Revolution. "The law," says Thibaudau, "called to the honours and the advantages of eligibility for offices in the communes 50,000 individuals; to eligibility for offices in the departments, 50,000; to eligibility for the Legislature or national offices, 5000. The whole of the other inhabitants were altogether excluded both from the rights of election and eligibility. The partisans of representative governments regarded this as far too narrow a circle in a country embracing thirty millions of souls. But the public in general took very little interest in this matter, justly observing that, as the electors were no longer intrusted with the choice of representatives, or of persons to fill any offices, but only of a large body of candidates from whom the selection was to be made by the government, it was of very little consequence whether this privilege was confined to many or few hands."—THIBAUDAU, 200.

slavery; but when the military system changed, masses of infantry, and phalanxes constructed after the Macedonian model, were introduced, and after that it was not individual prowess, but science and skill, which determined the fate of nations. The kings themselves contributed to the overthrow of the feudal régime by the encouragement which they gave to the commons; finally, the discovery of gunpowder, and the total change it induced in the art of war, completed its destruction. From that period, the military spirit, instead of being confined to a few thousand Franks, extended to all the Gauls. It was strengthened rather than weakened by the change; it ceased to be exclusive in its operation, and, from being founded solely on military prowess, it came to be established also on civil qualities. What is it now which constitutes a great general? It is not the mere strength of a man six feet high, but the *coup d'œil*, the habit of foresight, the power of thought and calculation; in a word, civil qualities, not such as you find in a lawyer, but such as are founded on a knowledge of human nature, and are suited to the government of armies. The general who can now achieve great things is he who is possessed of shining civil qualities; it is their perception of the strength of his talents which makes the soldiers obey him. Listen to them at their bivouacs; you will invariably find them award the preference to mental over physical qualities. Mourad Bey was the most powerful man among his Mamelukes; without that advantage he never could have been their leader. When he first saw me, he could not conceive how I could preserve authority among my troops; but he soon understood it when he was made acquainted with our system of war.

"In all civilized states, force yields to civil qualities. Bayonets sink before the priest who speaks in the name of Heaven, or the man of science who has gained an ascendancy by his knowledge. I predicted to all my military followers that a government purely military would never succeed in France till it had been brutalized by fifty years of ignorance. All their attempts to govern in that manner accordingly failed, and involved their authors in their ruin. It is not as a general that I govern, but because the nations believe me possessed of the ability in civil matters necessary for the head of affairs; without that I could not stand an hour. I knew well what I was about, when, though only a general, I took the title of member of the Institute; I felt confident of being understood by the lowest drummer in the army.

"We must not reason from ages of barbarity to these times. France consists of 30,000,000 of men, united by intelligence, property, and commerce. Three or four hundred thousand soldiers are nothing in such a mass. Not only does the general preserve his ascendancy over his soldiers chiefly by civil qualities, but when his command ceases he becomes merely a private individual. The soldiers themselves are but the children of citizens. The tendency of military men is to carry everything by force; the enlightened civilian, on the other hand, elevates his views to a perception of the general good. The first would rule only by despotic authority, the last subject everything to the

test of discussion, truth, and reason. I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying, that if a preference was to be awarded to the one or the other, it belongs to the civilian. If you divide society into soldiers and citizens, you establish two orders in what should be one nation. If you confine honours to military men, you do what is still worse, for you sink the people into nothing."*

Moved by these profound observations, the council agreed that the proposed honours should be extended indiscriminately to civil and military distinction.

But the most difficult part of the discussion remained, the consideration of the expedience of the institution itself, even in its most extended form. Great opposition was manifested to it in the capital, from its evident tendency to counteract the levelling principles of the Revolution. It was strongly opposed, accordingly, in the Council of State, the Tribunate, and the Legislative Body, and all the influence of the First Consul could only obtain, in these different assemblies a feeble majority.†

* *Thib.*, 75, 81.

† It was urged in the Council of State by Thibaudeau, and the opponents of the measure, "That it was diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution. The abolition of titles did not take place during those disastrous days which threw into discredit everything, even of the best character, which was then established; it was the Constituent Assembly who made the change at one of the most enlightened periods of the Revolution. The nation is profoundly influenced by the feeling of honour; but that principle, strong as it is, yields to the universal passion for equality. It was these two powerful motives, combined with the love of freedom and the feelings of patriotism, which gave its early and astonishing victories to the Republic. I do not see that the Legion of Honour could have made the public spirit greater. Considered as a guarantee of the Revolution, the institution appears to me to run counter to its object, and as laying the foundation of an intermediate body between the throne and the people, to involve a principle inconsistent with the representative system, which can recognise no distinction but that which flows from the choice of the citizens. I fear that the desire of possessing these ribands may weaken the feelings of duty and honour, instead of strengthening them. I have the highest respect for the motives which have led to this proposition, but I have still great doubts, and it seems highly desirable that such an institution should not be established but after the decided approbation of the great bodies in the state.

"In the theory which is presented for our consideration on this subject, representative governments are confounded with monarchical. It is quite true that distinctions of rank are indispensable in a monarchy, in order to counterbalance, by intermediate bodies, the weight of the throne; but in a republic they are a never-failing source of irritation, because they destroy that equality among the citizens which is the foundation of all such institutions. In a monarchy, the safeguard of the people is to be found in a multitude of obstacles which restrain the inclinations of the ruler; in representative states, sovereign power is divided, the people are subjected only to magistrates of their own selection, and know of none but those whom the Constitution recognises. By placing in the state the proposed institution, you voluntarily admit a patriciate, of which the immediate and inevitable tendency will be, to run into a military and hereditary nobility.*

"The Legion of Honour involves within itself all the elements which have elsewhere led to a hereditary nobility, individual distinction, power, honours, titles, and fixed revenues. Hardly anywhere has a hereditary noblesse commenced its career with such advantages. It is in vain to pretend that the progress of intelligence and the lights of the age are a sufficient guarantee against any such abuse. The human heart is ever the same; a renewal of the same circumstances will reproduce the same errors and the same desires. From the institution of the legion will spring up afresh all the ancient prejudices, and these prejudices will fortify the military spirit and the respect for nobility, and introduce a separate in the midst of the general interest. Under pretence of effacing the last traces of nobility, it will establish a new one, and strongly confirm the old. Con-

* *Dum.*, viii., 105.

Notwithstanding the profound and unanswerable observations by which he supported it, it was by a very slender majority that the

sidered as an intermediate body, the Legion is, to say the least of it, a perfect superfluity. Such intermediate bodies are of some use in despotic countries; but in a representative state, and among a nation fortunate enough to possess a free discussion on public affairs, the sole intermediate body which is required, or should be tolerated, is the representatives of the people. The institution proposed is alike contrary to the principles of the Revolution and the text of the Constitution. The proposed order leads directly to a monarchy. Crosses and ribbons are the pillars of a hereditary throne: they were unknown to the Romans who conquered the world.*

Napoleon replied: "We are always referred by the opposition to the Romans. It is singular that, as an argument against distinctions, reference should so frequently be made to the nation that ever existed in which they were most firmly established. The Romans had patricians, the equestrian order, citizens and knights; for each class they had a separate costume, different habits. To reward achievements, they awarded all sorts of distinctions, surnames recalling great services, mural crowns, triumphs. Superstition was called in to lend her aid to the general impression. Take away the religion of Rome, and nothing remains. When that fine body of patricians was destroyed, Rome was torn in pieces; there successively arose the fury of Marius, the proscriptions of Sylla, the tyranny of the emperors. Brutus is continually referred to as the enemy of tyrants, and yet Brutus was the greatest of all aristocrats. He slew Caesar only because he wished to degrade the influence of the senate and exalt that of the people. This is the use which the spirit of party makes of history.*

"I defy you to show me a republic, ancient or modern, where distinctions have not prevailed. They call them bawbles—well, it is with bawbles that you govern mankind. I would not say that at the Tribune, but in a council of state nothing should be concealed. I have no conception that the passion for liberty and equality is to be lasting in France. The French have not been so far changed by ten years of revolution; they are still as gallant and volatile as their Gaulish ancestors. They have but one prevailing sentiment, and that is honour; everything should be done, therefore, to nourish and encourage that principle. Observe how forcibly the people have been struck by the decorations of the strangers among us; that revealed their secret predilections.

"Voltaire called soldiers Alexanders at five sous a day. He was right; they really are so. Do you believe that you would ever make a man fight by abstract principles? Never; such views are fit only for the scholar in his study. For the soldier, as for all men in active life, you must have glory and distinction; recompenses are the food which nourish such qualities. The armies of the Republic have done such great things, because they were composed of the sons of labourers and substantial farmers, and not the mere rabble; because the officers stepped into the situations of those of the old régime, and were animated by the same sentiments of honour. It is the same principle which led to all the triumphs of Louis XIV. You may call, if you please, the Legion of Honour an order: it matters not; names will not alter the nature of things. For ten years you have been constantly speaking of institutions, and what, after all, have you done? Nothing. The moment had not yet arrived. The Republicans proposed to unite the people to the country by assembling them in churches, where, dying of cold, they were made to listen to the reading and exposition of the laws; it may easily be imagined what effect such an institution had in attaching them to their government. I am well aware that, if you judge of this institution according to the prejudices produced by ten years of a revolution, it must appear worse than useless; but if you consider that we are placed after a revolution, and called upon to reconstruct society, a very different opinion will be formed. Everything has been destroyed; we must commence the work of creation. We have, indeed, a nation and a government, but they are united by a rope of sand. There exist at the same time among us several of the old privileged classes, organized from the unity of their principles and interests, and who will always pursue one definite object. But we are scattered, without union, system, or lasting bond of connexion. As long as I survive I will answer for the Republic; but we must consider what is likely to occur after my death. Do you suppose the Republic is definitely established? You never were more mistaken. We have the means

institution of the Legion of Honour passed the great bodies of the state.* So strongly implanted were the principles of the Revolution even in the highest functionaries of the realm, and so difficult was it to extinguish that hatred at distinctions or honours, which formed so leading a feature in the passions by which it was at first distinguished. No measure during the Consulate experienced nearly so powerful an opposition. Napoleon was much struck with this circumstance, and confessed, in private, that he had precipitated matters, and that it would have been better to have waited before so obnoxious a change was introduced.†

General opposition it met with, but is carried into execution.

It was carried into execution, however, with all those circumstances of pomp and ceremony which Napoleon well knew are so powerful with the multitude. The inauguration of the dignitaries of the order took place, with extraordinary magnificence, in the Church of the Hôtel des Invalides, in presence of the First Consul and of all the great functionaries of the Republic; and the decorations soon began to be eagerly coveted by a people whose passion for individual distinction had been the secret cause of the Revolution.‡

The event, however, proved that Napoleon had rightly appreciated the true character of the revolutionary spirit. The leading object in the Revolution was the extinction of *castes*, not of ranks; equality of rights, and not of classes; the abolition of hereditary, not personal distinction. § "Vanity," as Napoleon elsewhere observed, "is the ruling principle of the French, and was at the bottom of all the convulsions of the Revolution; it was the sight of the noblesse enjoying privileges and distinctions to which they could not aspire, which filled the Tiers Etat with inextinguishable and natural animosity."|| But an institution which conferred lustre on individuals and not on families, and led to no hereditary distinctions, was so far from running counter to this desire, that it afforded it the highest gratification, because it promised the objects of this passion to any, even the humblest of the citizens, who was worthy of receiving it. The Legion of Honour, accordingly, which gradually extended so as to embrace two thousand persons of the greatest eminence in every department, both civil and military, in France, became an institution in the highest degree both useful and popular;

of doing so, but we have not yet done it, and never will do it, till we have scattered over the surface of France some masses of granite. Do you suppose you can trust the people for the preservation of your institutions? Believe me, you are mistaken. They will exclaim in a short time, 'Vive la Roi' or 'Vive la Ligue' with as much alacrity as they now cry 'Vive la République!' It is necessary, therefore, to give a lasting direction to the public impulse, and to prepare instruments for that purpose. In the war of La Vendée, I have seen forty men obtain the absolute direction of a department: that is the system that we must make use of."*

* The numbers were:

	Ayes.	Noes.	
In the Council of State.....	14	10	It is adopted
" of Tribunal.....	56	38	by the Legis-
" Corps Legislatif.....	166	110	lature.
	236	158	
Majority.....	78†		

† Thib., 91, 92. Bour., iv., 357, 358.

‡ D'Ab., vi., 21.

§ Jom., Vie de Nap., i., 526.

|| D'Ab., vii., 169, 170.

Thib., 83, 85.

† Id., 82.

* These observations of Napoleon are very remarkable. They show how much more clearly his natural sagacity, even amid all the tumult of camps, had apprehended the truth of ancient history, than the numerous declaimers who, through the whole of the Revolution, had decanted on its examples.

and served as the forerunner to that new nobility which Napoleon afterward created as safeguards to his imperial throne.

When so many institutions were successively arising which pointed to the establishment of a regular government, it was impossible that its head could remain in a precarious situation. Napoleon accordingly was created, by the obsequious legislature, First Consul for ten years, beyond the first ten fixed at his original appointment; an appointment which, although far from coming up to the anticipations and wishes of the First Consul, was yet important as a step to the establishment of perpetual and hereditary succession in his family.*†

But all these measures, important as they were, yielded to the great step, which at the same time was adopted, of re-establishing the Catholic religion in France, and renewing those connexions with the pope which had been violently broken during the fury of the French Revolution.

Although the institutions of religion had been abolished, its ministers scattered, and its property confiscated by the different revolutionary assemblies who had governed the country, yet a remnant of the Christian faith still lingered in many parts of the rural districts. When the horrors of Robespierre ceased, and a government comparatively lenient and regular was established under the Directory, the priests obtained leave to open their churches, provided they undertook to maintain them at their own expense, and a considerable number returned from exile, and commenced, in poverty and obscurity, the reconstruction of religious observances. They were again exposed to persecution and danger after the 18th Fructidor, and being destitute of any species of property, and entirely dependant upon the voluntary contributions of their flocks, they were totally unequal to the Herculean task of combating the irreligious spirit which had acquired such strength during a revolutionary interregnum of ten years. A remnant of the faithful, composed for the most part of old women, attended the churches on Sunday, and marked by their fidelity an institution which might otherwise have been totally forgotten; but they were hardly observed amid the crowds who had discarded every species of devotion;

* Bour., iv., 361.

† The grounds of this change are thus ably set forth in the *senatus consultum* which introduced it: "Considering that, in the existing circumstances of the Republic, it is the first duty of the Conservative Senate to employ all the means in its power in order to give to the government the stability which can alone augment the national resources, inspire confidence without, establish credit within, reassure our allies, discourage our secret enemies, remove the evils of war, bring to maturity the fruits of peace, and leave to the wisdom of administration the selection of the proper period for bringing forward all the designs which it may have in view for the happiness of a free people," &c. Napoleon replied in the following words, which subsequent events rendered prophetic: "Fortune has hitherto smiled on the Republic, but she is inconstant; and how many are there whom she has overwhelmed with her favours that have lived too long by a few years! The interests of my glory and happiness seem to have marked as the termination of my public career the moment when a general peace was signed. But you deem a new sacrifice necessary on my part. I will not scruple to undertake it, if the wishes of the people prescribe what four suffrages authorize."—DUMAS, viii., 98, 99.

and a great proportion of the churches, both in the towns and the country, had either been pulled down or converted to secular purposes during the Revolution; while of those which remained, a still greater number were in such a state of dilapidation, from the total absence of any funds for their support, as to threaten speedily to become unserviceable for any purpose whatever. In this general prostration of the Christian faith, the bewildered multitude had sought refuge in other and extravagant creeds; the sect of the Theophilanthropists had arisen, whose ravings amid fruits and flowers were listened to by a few hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the credulous or enthusiastic of Paris; while the great majority of the people, educated without any religious impressions, quietly passed by on the other side, and lived altogether without God in the world.*

Although neither a fanatic, nor even a believer in Christianity, Napoleon was too sagacious not to perceive that such a state of things was inconsistent with anything like a regular government. He had early, accordingly, commenced a negotiation with the pope; and the head of the Church, delighted at finding such a disposition in a revolutionary chief, had received the advances with the utmost cordiality. Cardinal Gonzalvi, who, with singular ability, directed the conclave, had, in the name of the supreme pontiff, written to General Murat, when advancing towards the Roman States after the armistice of Treviso, to express "the lively admiration which he felt for the First Consul, to whose fortunes were attached the tranquillity of religion not less than the happiness of Europe." The views of Napoleon on that matter were strongly expressed to the councillors of state with whom he conversed on the subject. "Yesterday evening," said he, "when walking alone in the woods, amid the solitude of Nature, the distant bell of the Church of Ruel struck my ear. Involuntarily I felt emotion, so powerful is the influence of early habits and associations. I said to myself, if I feel thus, what must be the influence of such impressions on simple and credulous men? Let your philosophers, your *ideologues*, answer that if they can. It is absolutely indispensable to have a religion for the people; and not less so, that that religion should be directed by the government. At present, fifty bishops, in the pay of England, direct the French clergy; we must forthwith destroy their influence; we must declare the Catholic the established religion of France, as being that of the majority of its inhabitants; we must organize its Constitution. The First Consul will appoint the fifty bishops; the pope will induct them. They will appoint the parish priests; the people will defray their salaries. They must all take the oath; the refractory must be transported. The pope will, in return, confirm the sale of the national domains. He will consecrate the Revolution; the people will sing, God save the Gallican Church. They will say I am a papist: I am no such thing. I was a Mohammedan in Egypt; I will become a Catholic here for the good of my people. I am no believer in particular

* D'Abr., vi., 38, 41. Thib., 151, 152. Jom., Vie de Nap., i., 489

creeds; but as to the idea of a God, look to the heavens, and say who made that."*†

Notwithstanding these decided opinions of the First Consul, the negotiations with the court of Rome were attended with considerable difficulty, and proved very tedious. At length, however, they were brought to a conclusion, and, despite the opposition of a large portion of the council, and a still larger proportion of the Legislature, the concordat with the pope passed into a law, and the Christian religion was re-established through the French territory.‡

By this memorable law the Catholic religion was declared that of the French people. Ten archbishops and fifty bishops were established,

the former with a salary of 15,000 francs (£600) a year, the latter with one of 10,000, or £400. It was provided that there should be at least a parish priest in every district of a *juge de paix*, with as many additional ministers as might be deemed necessary; the bishops and archbishops were to be appointed by the First Consul; the bishops nominated the parish priests and inferior clergy, subject to the approbation of the same authority. The salary of the priests in the larger parishes was fixed at 1600 francs, or £60 a year; in the smaller, 1200, or £48. The departmental councils were charged with the procuring of houses, or lodgings and gardens, for the bishops, priests, and curates. The churches which had survived the Revolution were placed at the disposal of the bishops, and provision made for the repair, at the expense of the department, of such as were ruinous. Such was the establishment which in France emerged from the chaos of the Revolution, and such the provision for the ministers of religion made by the nation which, in the outset of the convulsions, had confiscated the vast possessions of the Church, on the solemn assurance contained in the decree of the Constituent Assembly, that it "committed the due and honourable maintenance of religion and its ministers to the honour of the French people."*†

Although the opposition in the Legislature was not nearly so formidable to the concordat as to the Legion of Honour, a much stronger feeling of discontent was excited by the change in the Revolutionary party and the army. "Bonaparte," said they, "is striving in vain to destroy the remains of the Revolution, and to close every avenue against the anti-revolutionary party, when by his concordat he opens to the latter an ample gateway, and with his own hands digs the mine which is to blow his edifice into the air." In truth, such was the extraordinary and unprecedented extent to which irreligion had spread under the Republican gov-

General dissatisfaction which it occasioned.

* Thib., 152, 153. Nap., ii., 88.

† "To discuss the necessity of a religion," replied the opponents of the establishment, "is to mistake the question. There can be no doubt on that subject; but the point is, cannot religion exist without an established church? There is to be found in the clergy one hierarchy, one spirit, one object. If this colossus had for its head the chief of the state, the evil would exist only in half; but if a foreign potentate, the pope, is its leader, a schism is introduced into the community. Never will you attach the clergy sincerely to the new order of things. The Revolution has despoiled them both of their honours and their property; they will never pardon those injuries; eternal war is sworn between the rival powers. The clergy will be less dangerous when they are detached from each other than when organized in one body. It is not necessary either to persecute or transport a single individual; all that is required is to let them say mass as they choose, and allow every citizen to go either to church or the philanthropic temples, as suits his inclination. If the incompatibility between priests and the Republic becomes so evident as to disturb the public tranquillity, we must never hesitate to banish them: you must either proscribe them or the Revolution. The spirit of the age is wholly opposed to a return to Catholicism. We are nearer the truths of Christianity than the priests of Rome. You have but to say the word, the papacy is ruined, and France takes its place as a Protestant state."

"You are deceived," said Napoleon; "the clergy exist, and ever will exist; they will exist as long as the people are imbued with a religious spirit, and that disposition is permanent in the human heart. We have seen republics and democracies; history has many examples of such governments to exhibit, but none of a state without an established worship, without religion, and without priests. Is it not better to organize the public worship, and discipline the priests, than to leave both entirely emancipated from the control of the state? At present the clergy openly preach against the Republic, because they experience no benefit from it. Should we transport them? Unquestionably not! for what alone constitutes their authority in the wreck of their fortunes is the fidelity with which they adhere to the church of their fathers, and that will be increased rather than diminished by all the sufferings they undergo. You may send into exile the English or the Austrians, for they are bound by no ties to our country; but the French, who have families here, and are guilty of no offence but an adherence to their religious opinions, must be treated differently. You cannot extinguish their opinions; you must therefore attach them to the Republic. If the Protestant faith is proclaimed, one half the country will adopt that creed, and the other half remain Catholic; we shall have the Huguenot wars over again, and interminable divisions. We have nothing to take from the clergy, and as little to ask from them. The affair is entirely a political matter, and the line I have adopted appears the safest that could have been chosen."*

‡ The numbers were:

	For,	Against,
Tribunate.....	78	7
Legislative body.....	228	21
	306	28

whereas the Legion of Honour was only carried by a majority of 236 to 158: a striking proof how much more strenuous the opposition was to any approach towards the re-establishment of a nobility than even the Christian religion, which was held forth as so much the object of obloquy.—THIBAUDEAU, 210.

* See the Concordat and Articles Organiques, in Nap. Mélanges, i., 297, et seq.

† Some very important articles were included in the same treaty relative to the independence of the Gallican Church. It was provided, "1. That no bull, brief, rescript, decree, mandate, or provision, or other writing whatever, emanating from the court of Rome, even concerning individuals, should be received, published, printed, or put in execution, without the authority of government. 2. That no individual announcing himself as legate, vicar, or commissioner of the Holy See, should, without the same authority, exercise on the French territory or elsewhere, any function relative to the affairs of the Gallican Church. 3. That the decrees of foreign convocations, not excepting even those of general councils, should not be published in France without a previous examination by the government, to ascertain whether they were in harmony with the laws and institutions of the French Republic, or were in any way calculated to affect the public tranquillity. 4. That no national or metropolitan council, diocesan synod, or other deliberative assembly, should be held without the express authority of government. 5. That an appeal should lie to the Council of State in every case of alleged abuse or misgovernment on the part of the superior ecclesiastical authorities; and that under this head should be included every infraction of the rules established in the councils of the Church, every attempt calculated to injure the liberties of the Gallican Church, every infringement on the liberty of public worship, or of the rights which the laws secured to its ministers."* By these articles, the Church in France was, practically rendered nearly as independent of the papal authority as the Protestant establishment of Great Britain.

* Thib., 163, 157.

* Nap., Mélanges, i., 301.

ernment, that "two thirds of the French people," according to the admission of their own historians, "were ignorant of the principles on which such a measure was founded, and regarded it as a strange and dangerous innovation." The opposition which it experienced was, indeed, almost inconceivable, and afforded the clearest evidence of the pernicious tendency of those measures of extermination which former governments had adopted against the possessions of the Established Church, and how rapidly the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, founded on the pretence of applying it to purposes of beneficence and public instruction, leads to the total destruction of every species of religious belief. Universally the opinion prevailed that the restoration of the altar was but a prelude to that of the throne, and that the concordat was to be regarded as a solemn pledge for the speedy re-establishment of the ancient *régime*, a manifesto against all the principles of the Revolution. These feelings were in an especial manner prevalent among the military and Democratic parties. Moreau, Lannes, Oudinot, Victor, and many others, openly expressed their repugnance to the measure, and declined to join the ceremony which took place in *Nôtre Dame* on the occasion of its solemn proclamation. "Never," said the soldiers, "have the Republican arms been adorned by so many laurels as since they ceased to receive the benediction of the priests."*

Napoleon, however, remained firm, notwithstanding all the opposition which took place, and the loud discontents of the capital; the re-establishment of public worship was announced by a proclamation of the consuls, and on the following day a grand religious ceremony took place, in honour of the occasion, in *Nôtre Dame*. All the great bodies in the state, all the constituted authorities attended, and proceeded in great pomp to the Cathedral. On this occasion, for the first time, the servants of the First Consul appeared in livery; the foreign ambassadors were invited to appear, with all their attendants arrayed in the same manner, and a similar recommendation was addressed to such of the public functionaries as had carriages of their own; but so few of them were possessed of that luxury, that the equipages made a very indifferent appearance. The military, however, were obliged to attend in great numbers, and the brilliancy of their uniforms more than compensated the want of civil decoration. Such, however, was the repugnance of many of the generals to the ceremony, that it required all the authority of the First Consul to make Lannes and Augereau remain in the carriage when they perceived they were going to hear mass. It proceeded, nevertheless, with great *éclat* in the Cathedral of *Nôtre Dame*, which only eight years before had been polluted by the orgies of the Goddess of Reason. "What thought you of the ceremony?" said Napoleon to General Delmas, who stood near him, when it was concluded. "It was a fine piece of mummery," replied he. "Nothing was wanting but the million of men who have perished in order to destroy what you have now re-established." It was at first intended to have

had the standards blessed by the archbishop, but the government were obliged to abandon the design, from being given to understand that, if this was done, the soldiers would trample them under their feet.* So difficult is it to eradicate the passions which have been nursed up during the phrensy and convulsions of a revolution, and so obstinately do mankind, under the influence of prejudice, sometimes resist the establishment of those very institutions from which they are themselves destined to receive the most unalloyed advantages.†

Immediately after this great change, the observance of Sunday was to a certain degree resumed. It was provided in the concordat that the government offices should be closed on Sunday, and this was immediately done. Shortly after, a decree of the consuls directed that all marriages should be proclaimed on that day, and the daily service of mass began in the Tuileries. Encouraged by so many symptoms of returning favour, the clergy made the utmost efforts to induce the First Consul to join publicly in the more solemn duties which the Church prescribed; but to this he never could be brought to consent. "We are very well as we are," said he; "do not ask me to go farther; you will never obtain what you wish; I will not become a hypocrite; be content with what you have already gained." Mass, however, was regularly performed at the Tuileries in the morning. The First Consul went to it on Sunday, and remained during the service, which seldom exceeded ten minutes, in an adjoining apartment, with the door open, looking over papers, or engaged in his usual occupations. He had considerable difficulty in preserving the balance so imperiously required in the head of the state, during the first return to religious observances after the Revolutionary fever, yet by great firmness he succeeded, during his whole reign, in maintaining a just equilibrium between the impassioned characters on both sides.‡

* *Thib.*, 163, 164. *Bour.*, iv., 279. *Big.*, ii., 199.

† Rapp, one of Napoleon's aids-de-camp, who was a Protestant, positively refused to attend the ceremony, even when requested to do so by the First Consul himself. "Provided," said he, "you do not make these priests your aids-de-camp or your cooks, you may do with them what you please." The well-known devotion of Rapp to his general procured him impunity for this sort of speeches, which he very frequently made; but Delmas was not so fortunate. The First Consul was extremely irritated at his reply, which made a great noise at the time, and he was soon after sent into exile in consequence.—See *ТАИВ.*, 164.

‡ *Bour.*, iv., 281, 282. *Thib.*, 166.

§ The wisdom with which Napoleon restrained the imprudent zeal of the Church party appears in the proceeding which took place on the death of Mademoiselle Chameroi, a celebrated opera-dancer. The priest of St. Roche refused to receive the body into his church, or celebrate over it the solemnities of interment, and this gave rise to a vehement dispute between the artists who accompanied the body and the clergy. It came to be discussed in the Council of State. "It amounts to nothing," said the senator Monge, "but a dispute of one set of comedians with another." "What?" said the First Consul, with a severe air. "Yes, citizen consul," replied Monge, "we may say that when the grand crosses do not hear us." But Napoleon viewed the matter in a very different light, and on the following day an article appeared in the *Moniteur* which bore internal marks of his composition. "The curate of St. Roche, in a moment of hallucination, has refused to pray for Mademoiselle Chameroi, or to admit her body into the church. One of his colleagues, a man of sense, received the procession into the church of the Filles St. Thomas,

* *Big.*, ii., 198, 199. *Norr.*, ii., 166, 167. *Jom.*, xiv., 404.

But although the opposition which the restoration of religion met with in the corrupted population and revolutionary circles of Paris was very powerful, it was viewed in a very different light in the rural districts of France. The peasants beheld with undisguised delight the re-establishment of the priests, from whose labours and beneficence they had gained so much in former times; and the sound of the village bells again calling the faithful to the house of God was hailed by millions as the dove with the olive-branch which first announced peace to the "green undeluged earth." The restoration of Sunday as a day of periodical rest was felt as an unspeakable relief by the labouring population, who had never been able to establish the exemption from work on the tenth day, which the Convention had prescribed, and were broken down by years of continued and unbroken toil.* But the pernicious effect of the total cessation of all religious instruction and observances for nine years could not so easily be eradicated. A generation had been educated who were ignorant of the very elements of the Christian faith; the phrensy of the Revolution had snapped asunder a chain which had descended unbroken from the apostolic ages. The consequences of this chasm have been to the last degree pernicious to the existing generation, and are, it is much to be feared, now irreparable. It is to this cause that we are to ascribe the spirit of irreligion which has since been so peculiarly the characteristic of the higher and urban classes of French society, and which has worked out its natural consequences throughout all the subsequent periods of the Empire and the Restoration. A nation which, in its influential classes at least, has lost all respect for religion, is incapable of freedom, and can be governed only by force. "Natura, tamen," says Tacitus, "infirmittatis humanæ, tardiora sunt remedia quam mala, et ut corpora, lente augescunt, cito extinguuntur, sic ingenia

where the service was performed with all the usual solemnities. The Archbishop of Paris has suspended the curate of St. Roche for three months, to give him time to recollect that Jesus Christ commanded us to pray even for our enemies; and that, being recalled by meditation to a proper sense of his duties, he may learn that all these superstitious observances, the offspring of an age of credulity or of crazed imaginations, tend only to the discredit of true religion, and have been proscribed by the recent concordat of the Gallican Church."—THIBAUDEAU, 166, 168.

* The conclusion of the concordat was announced in these eloquent words in a proclamation issued by the First Consul: "An insane policy has sought, during the Revolution, to smother religious dissensions under the ruins of the altar, under the ashes of religion itself. At its voice all those pious solemnities ceased in which the citizens called each other by the endearing name of brothers, and acknowledged their common equality in the sight of Heaven. The dying, left alone in his agonies, no longer heard that consoling voice which calls the Christian to a better world. God himself seemed exiled from the face of nature. Ministers of the religion of peace, let a complete oblivion veil over your dissensions, your misfortunes, your faults; let the religion which unites you bind you by indissoluble cords to the interests of your country. Let the young learn from your precepts that the God of peace is also the God of arms, and that he throws his shield over those who combat for the liberties of France. Citizens of the Protestant faith, the law has equally extended its solicitude to your interests; let the morality, so pure, so holy, so brotherly, which you profess, unite you all in love to your country, and respect for its laws; and, above all, never permit disputes on doctrinal points to weaken that universal charity which religion at once inculcates and commands."—See DUMAS, viii., 95, 96.

studiaque opprimeris facilius quam revocaveris."

To foreign nations, however, who could not foresee the deplorable internal effects of this long interruption in religious instruction, the spectacle of France again voluntarily returning to the Christian faith was in the highest degree acceptable. Contrasting it with the monstrous profanations and wild extravagances of the irreligious fanaticism which had prevailed during the revolution, they deemed it the harbinger of tranquillity to its distracted people, and peace to Europe. It contributed, more than any circumstance, to weaken the horror with which the revolutionary government had so long been regarded, and opened the way to the establishment of more kindly relations, not only with the governments, but the people of foreign states. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia publicly expressed their satisfaction at the auspicious event, forgetting, in their joy at the restoration of so important a member to the Christian family, the jealousy with which a change so likely to consolidate the power of the First Consul might possibly have been regarded. The Emperor of Austria styled it, with great felicity of expression, "a service truly rendered to all Europe;" and the thoughtful and religious everywhere justly considered the voluntary return of a great nation to the creed of its fathers, from the experienced impossibility of living without its precepts, as the most signal triumph to the Christian faith which had occurred since it ascended the imperial throne under the banners of Constantine.*

It was the first step in a great political improvement, and as closing the door against the worst principles of the Revolution, that Napoleon, in spite of so much opposition from his own subjects, undertook and carried through the concordat with Rome. Many persons urged him to complete the system; separate the Church of France from the pope, and at once declare himself its head. These persons, however, did not know the real state of the country, and still less the character of the First Consul. So far from thinking that he could dispense with the court of Rome in settling this matter, he openly declared, "That if the pope had not existed, it would have been well to have created him for that occasion, as the Roman consuls created a dictator in difficult circumstances." The concordat, indeed, recognised a foreign authority in religious matters which might possibly disturb the Republic on some future occasion, but it did not create it, and, on the contrary, brought it under restraints more favourable than could possibly have been expected to the interests of the reigning power in France. By connecting the Church with the state, Napoleon hoped to withdraw it from foreign or English influence, while by the conquest of Italy he expected to make the pope the ready instrument of his will. He has himself told us that he never repented of this great step. "The concordat of 1801," says he, "was necessary to religion, to the Republic, to the government; the churches were closed, the

General satisfaction which the measure excited in foreign countries.

Subsequent opinions of Napoleon on the subject.

priests persecuted, part of the bishops were in exile and in the pay of England, part merely apostolic vicars, without any bond to unite them to the state. The concordat put an end to these divisions, and made the Catholic apostolic Church emerge from its ruins. Napoleon restored the altars, caused the disorders to cease, directed the faithful to pray for the Republic, dissipated the scruples of the purchasers of national domains, and broke the last thread by which the exiled dynasty communicated with the country, by dismissing the bishops who resisted the reconciliation with the court of Rome, and holding them out as rebels to the Holy See, who preferred their temporal interests to the eternal concerns of religion.*†

Connected with the revival of religion was a great and generous design of the First Consul, which it would have been well for him if he could have carried into complete effect, viz., the complete restoration of all the unalienated national property to the original proprietors. His first project was to make the restitution to that extent complete, with the single exception of the buildings devoted to public establishments, and even to restore the two thirds which had been cut off from the public creditors by the barbarous decree of 1797. He never contemplated, however, the restoration of the alienated property, being well aware of the inextricable difficulties with which that question was involved. But when the subject was brought forward in the Council of State, he found the opposition so great that he was compelled to modify the project so much as amounted almost to its total abandonment. The severity of the laws against the emigrants had been gradually relaxed by successive edicts. An important change was first made by the *arrêt* of the 28th Vendémiaire (26th of November, 1800), which divided the emigrants into two classes, from the first and most numerous of which the prohibition was removed.‡ They returned, in consequence, in crowds; and the gates were opened still more widely by the lenient policy of the government, which directed the minister of police to grant passports of admission to almost all who applied for them, without regard to the formal distinctions established by the decree of the First Consul. In granting these indulgences Napoleon was influenced by more than a feeling of pity for the exiled families; he al-

ready looked forward to them as the firmest support of his throne. But it was not without difficulty that these concessions were made to the aristocratic party; the executive even was divided, and the second consul said to him at the Council of State, "The existence of the government will be always precarious when it has not around itself several hundred revolutionary families, uniting in themselves the principal fortunes and offices of the state, to counterbalance the influence of the emigrant noblesse."*

On the 29th of April, 1802, a general amnesty was published by a *senatus consultum*, which reduced the exiled persons to about a thousand, and the melancholy list was, by the indulgence of the police, soon after reduced to a few hundreds. Above a hundred thousand emigrants, in consequence, returned to their native country, happy again to tread the soil and breathe the air of France, though deprived, for the most part, of all their possessions, and in a deplorable state of destitution. The *senatus consultum* restored to every emigrant who was permitted to return such part of his former property as had not been alienated by the state; but as it was soon found that they began, in consequence, to cut the forests to a great extent, in order to relieve their necessities, it became necessary to put a restriction upon this liberality, and a subsequent *arrêt* prohibited the removal of the sequestration on the woods belonging to emigrants, amounting to three hundred arpents and upward.† By a subsequent decree of the Legislature, it was provided, through the urgent representations of the First Consul, that all successions to which the Republic had acquired right as coming in place of the emigrants prior to the 1st of September, 1802, and were unalienated, should be restored to the persons having right to them; that all claims of the Republic on the emigrants prior to the amnesty should be extinguished; and that the goods of emigrants which had devolved to the Republic, and were unalienated, should be declared liable to the claims of their creditors.‡

These measures, how humanely and wisely soever designed by Napoleon, proved almost totally inadequate to remedy the dreadful evils produced by the barbarous confiscation of property during the Revolution. He admits this himself. "My first design," says he, "was to have thrown the

Renewed in
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wards the
emigrants

April 29, 1802.
Senatus consultum
proclaiming
a general am-
nesty,

Aug. 4, 1802.

Sept. 5, 1802.

Inadequacy of
these measures
to heal the evils
of revolution-
ary confiscation.

* Nap., i., 115, *Mélanges*.

† Mr. Fox, after the peace of Amiens, ventured to blame Napoleon, in conversation, for not having permitted the marriage of priests in his dominions. "I then had," he replied, "and still have, need to pacify. It is with water, and not oil, that you must extinguish theological volcanoes. I would have had less difficulty in establishing the Confession of Augsburg in my empire."—*NAPOLEON, Mélanges*, i., 121.

‡ When this *arrêt* was under discussion in the Council of State, Napoleon observed, "There are above 100,000 names on these unhappy lists; it is enough to turn one's head. In the general calamity, the most elevated and dangerous characters can alone extricate themselves; they possess the means of purchasing testimony in their favour. Thus the practical result is, that a duke is struck off the list while a poor labourer is kept on it. We must extricate the matter by classing the emigrants according to certain distinctions, which may admit equally persons of all descriptions. The lists must be reduced by three fourths of their number to the names of such as are known to be hostile to the government. Having effected such a diminution, we shall be better enabled to distinguish the really dangerous characters; they will no longer escape notice in the troubled flood of misfortune."—*THIBAUDEAU*, 95.

* *Thib.*, 96, 103. *Bour.*, iv., 333, 334.

† On this occasion, the First Consul said in the Council of State, "The emigrants who have been struck out of the lists are cutting their woods, partly from necessity, partly to transport their money to foreign states. We cannot allow the greatest enemies of the Republic, the defenders of old prejudices, to recover their fortune and despoil France. I am quite willing to receive them, but the nation is interested in the preservation of the forests. The navy requires them; their destruction is contrary to every principle of good government. We must not, however, keep the woods without giving an indemnity to their proprietors; but we will pay them gradually, and as we acquire funds, and the delay of payment will prove a powerful means of rendering the claimants obedient to the government."—*THIBAUDEAU*, 98.

‡ *Thib.*, 98, 105.

whole unalienated property of the emigrants into a mass, or syndicat, and divided it according to a certain proportional scale among the restored families. I met with so much resistance, however, that I was induced to abandon that design; but I soon found that, when I came to restore individually to each what belonged to him, I made some too rich and many too insolent. Those who had received the greatest fortunes proved the most ungrateful. It was a sense of this which induced me to pass the *arrêté*, which suspended the operation of the restitution contained in the act of amnesty as to all woods above a certain value. This was a deviation undoubtedly from the letter of the law; but circumstances imperiously required it; our error consisted in not having foreseen it before the original law was framed. This reaction, however, on my part, destroyed all the good effect of the recall of the emigrants, and alienated from me all the great families. I would have avoided all these evils if I had followed out my original design of a syndicat; instead of one discontented great family, I would have made a hundred grateful provincial nobles, who, being all dependant on my government for their subsistence, could have been relied on to the last. It is evident that the emigrants had lost their all; that they had embarked their property on board the same vessel, and what was rescued from the waves should have been proportionally divided. It was a fault on my part not to have done so, which is the more unpardonable that I entertained the idea; but I was alone, surrounded by thorns; every one was against me, time pressed, and still more important affairs imperiously required my attention."*

But, in truth, even if the projects of Napoleon could have been carried into complete effect, they would have remedied but a small part of the evils consequent on the frightful confiscation of private property which took place during the Revolution. From a report made by M. Ramel[†] on the finances of the Republic, it appears that, before the year 1801, there had been sold national domains to the enormous amount of 2,555,000,000 francs, or above £100,000,000 sterling; and that there

remained to sell property to the amount of 700,000,000 francs, or £28,000,000 sterling. When it is recollected that, during the greater part of this period, the national domains, from the insecure tenure by which they were held, and the general confusion, were sold for a few years' purchase, it may be conceived what a prodigious mass of landed property must have been torn from the rightful proprietors in this way, and how fatal was the wound thus inflicted on the social system of France. Mr. Burke declared, at the outset of the Revolution, that without complete restitution or indemnification to all the dispossessed proprietors, it would be impossible to construct a stable constitutional monarchy in France,* and the result has now completely established the justice of his opinion. The want of a landed aristocracy, to coerce the people on the one hand, and restrain the executive on the other, has ever since been felt as the irreparable want in the monarchy; its absence was bitterly lamented by Napoleon,† and all the attempts of subsequent governments to construct a constitutional throne, or establish public freedom on a durable basis, have failed from the absence of that element. Neither Napoleon nor the Bourbons were ever strong enough to attempt the restitution of the confiscated estates at the expense of the four millions of landed proprietors among whom they were now divided. The conclusion to be drawn from this, however, is not that Mr. Burke's and Napoleon's opinion were erroneous, or that the fabric of liberty can be erected on the basis of robbery and spoliation, but that the national sins of France had been so great that reparation or restitution was impossible, and she has received the doom of perpetual servitude in consequence.

When so many great ideas were passing through the mind of the First Consul, the important subject of public instruction, and the progress of sci-

Measures to promote public instruction.

* Burke, v., 289, et seq.

† "I am now convinced," said he, "that I was in the wrong in my arrangements with the Faubourg St. Germain. I did too much and too little; enough to excite jealousy in the opposite party, and not enough to attach to my interest the restored noblesse. There were but two lines to take, that of extirpation or fusion. The first could not, for a moment, be entertained; the second was by no means easy, but I do not think it was beyond my strength. I was fully aware of its importance. It was incumbent on us to complete the fusion; to cement the union at all hazards; with it we should have been invincible. The want of it has ruined us, and will for long prolong the misfortunes and agony of unhappy France. An aristocracy is the true support of the throne—its moderator, its lever, its fulcrum; the state without it is a vessel without a rudder—a balloon in the air. But the whole advantage of an aristocracy, its magic, consists in its antiquity; that was the precise thing, and the only thing, which I could not create: I did not possess the intermediate elements. A reasonable democracy will not seek more than equal capacity in all to rise to the highest dignities; the true course would have been to have employed the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and spirit of democracy. Above all, it was desirable to have assembled together the ancient families, the names celebrated in our history; that was the only way to have conferred an air of grandeur on our modern institutions."—LAS CASAS, iii., 28. How exactly have all men of a certain elevation of thought concurred, in all ages and countries, in the same opinions on this subject. "With the government of the multitude and the destruction of the aristocracy," says Polybius, "commences every species of violence; they run together in tumultuous assemblies, and are hurried into every excess, assassinations, banishments, and divisions of lands, till, being reduced at last to a state of savage anarchy, they once more find themselves under a master and monarch, and submit to arbitrary sway."—POLYBIUS, vi., ex. l.

* Las Cas., ii. 221, 222.

† Considerable alarm was excited among the holders of national domains by these proceedings in favour of the emigrants. To allay them, the following article appeared in the *Moniteur*: "The first duty of the French people, the first principle of the Republic, ever must be, to preserve untouched, and without any sort of distinction, the purchasers of national domains. In truth, to have trusted the fortunes of the Republic, when it was assailed with the united forces of Europe, to have united their private fortunes to those of the state in such a period of anxious alarm, must ever constitute a claim on the gratitude of the state and the people."—THIBAUDEAU, 176.

‡ The periods during which this prodigious confiscation of private property took place were as follow:

	Francs.
From 17th May, 1790, to 18th Jan., 1795, the sales of national domains, chiefly Church property, produced	1,500,000,000, or £60,000,000
From Jan. 18, 1795, to Sept. 20, 1795	611,438,000, or 24,500,000
From Sept. 20, 1795, to Nov. 25, 1797	316,464,000, or 12,750,000
From Nov. 25, 1797, to June 30, 1801	127,231,000, or 5,800,000
	2,555,133,000, or £103,050,000

—See *Compte Rendu de Ramel, Stat. de la France*, 545.

ence, could not long remain unnoticed. Insatiable in his desire for every species of glory, he aspired, like Charlemagne, not only to extend the frontiers and enhance the renown of the Republic, but to construct a monument to science which should perpetuate its fame to the latest generation. When he ascended the consular throne, the state of knowledge and public instruction was in the highest degree deplorable. The old establishments of education, which were for the most part in the hands of the clergy, and endowed from ecclesiastical foundations, had shared the fate of all the feudal institutions, and perished alike with their blessings and their evils. During the long interregnum of ten years which intervened under the revolutionary government, public instruction was generally neglected, and religious education, by far its most important department, entirely ceased, except in a small and persecuted class of society. Not that the convention had overlooked this great subject of general instruction; on the contrary, they were fully aware of its importance, and had done their utmost, during the distracted and stormy period that they held the reins of government, to fill up the chasm. They established several seminaries of medicine, the Polytechnic School, which afterward attained such deserved celebrity, various schools of rural economy, and a complete system for the instruction of the young men destined for the artillery, the engineers, the mines, and the naval service. Central schools were also introduced by their exertions in each department, and to them is due the formation of the Institute, which so long kept alive the torch of science during the melancholy night of modern civilization. But these efforts, how meritorious soever, were wholly inadequate to remedy the evils which the Revolution had produced. The distracted state of the country, after the subversion of all its institutions, caused no education to be of any value but such as tended at once to military advancement; and the abolition of religious instruction rendered all that was or could be taught to the great body of the people of no practical benefit. Under Democratic rule, France, amid incessant declamations in favour of general illumination, and pompous eulogies on the lights of the times, was rapidly sinking into a state of darkness deeper than the gloom of the Middle Ages.*†

By directions from the First Consul, Chaptal presented to the Council of State a project for a general system of public instruction. It was founded on singular principles: distrust of the general education of the people, especially in the rural districts, and an anxiety to train up a body of favoured young men in the interests of the government, were its leading features.

Schools of primary instruction in the communes were everywhere permitted, but government contributed nothing to their support, and the teachers were left to such remuneration as they could obtain

from their scholars. Secondary schools, the next in gradation, were placed on the same footing, with this difference, that they could not be established without the special authority of government. The favour of the executive was reserved for academies of the higher kind, which, under the names of lyceums and special schools, were established, to the number of thirty, in different parts of the Republic, and at which not only were the masters paid by the state, but the scholars, 6400 in number, were also maintained at the public expense. The teachers in these institutions were required to be married; a regulation intended to exclude the priests from any share in the higher branches of tuition, and no mention whatever was made of religion in any part of the decree: a striking proof of the continued influence of the infidel spirit which had grown up during the license and sins of the Revolution, and which rendered the whole establishment for education of little real service to the labouring classes of the community.*†

Following out the same plan of concentrating the rays of government favour upon Oct. 4, 1802. the higher branches of knowledge, the sum of 60,000 francs (£2400) was set aside to encourage the progress of French philosophy in electricity and galvanism; a galvanic society was instituted; a senatus consultum awarded the rights of French citizenship to every stranger who had resided a year in its territory, and had deserved well of Oct. 18, 1802. the Republic by important discoveries in science or art; the Institute was divided into four classes, and each member received a pension of 1500 francs, or £60 a year; while a chamber of commerce was established in Dec. 24, 1802. each considerable city of the Republic, and a council-general of commerce at Paris.‡

The rapid succession of objects tending to monarchical ideas encouraged the Trials of public Royalists in the capital to make a feeling by the trial of their influence over the Royalists. public mind. Duval composed a play, entitled "Edward in Scotland," which Napoleon resolved to see performed before he determined whether or not it should be allowed to be represented. He listened attentively Oct. 9, 1802. to the first act, and appeared even to be interested in the misfortunes of the exiled prince; but the warm and enthusiastic applauses which ensued, as the piece advanced, convinced him that it could not be permitted without risk. It was interdicted, and the author counselled to improve his health by travelling; he retired to Russia, and remained there for a year.§

* Thib., 134, 135. Big., ii., 212.

† It was a fundamental rule of these establishments to admit no young man whose family was not attached to the principles of the Revolution. "We must never," said Napoleon, "admit into these schools any young man whose parents have combated against the Republic. There could be no concord between officers of such principles and the soldiers of the army. I have never appointed even a sub-lieutenant, to my knowledge, unless he was either drawn from the ranks, or was the son of a man attached to the Revolution. The lion of the Revolution sleeps; but if these gentlemen were to waken him, they would soon be compelled to fly with their best speed." How much attached soever to his favourite system of fusing together the opposite parties in the Revolution, Napoleon had no notion of extending it to the armed force of the state.—THIBAUDEAU, 130, 131.

‡ Thib., 134, 141. Norv., ii., 189, 190.

§ Thib., 147, 148. Bour., v., 257.

* Thib., 122, 125. Big., ii., 211.

† These observations apply to France as a nation. The splendid discoveries and vast talent displayed in mathematics and the exact sciences by the Institute throughout all the Revolution, can never be too highly eulogized, and will be fully enlarged upon in treating of the French literature during its progress.

A general system was now set on foot for the maintenance of the requisite forces by sea and land, and the instruction of the young officers in the rudiments of the military art. A levy of 120,000 men was ordered, one half of which was destined to replace the discharged veterans, and the other to form an army of reserve.* At the same time, a project was discussed for the formation of a fixed body of seamen, divided into regiments, and allotted to each vessel in the navy. Truguet observed,

“If you have only commerce you will never want sailors, and they will cost nothing; it is only when a nation has no trade that it is necessary to levy sailors; much longer time is required to form a sailor than a soldier; the latter may be trained to all his duties in six months.”

Napoleon replied, “There never was a greater mistake; nothing can be more dangerous than to propagate such opinions; if acted upon, they would speedily lead to the dissolution of our army. At Jemappe there were fifty thousand French against nine thousand Austrians; during the first four years of the war, all the hostile operations were conducted in the most ridiculous manner. It was neither the volunteers nor the recruits who saved the Republic; it was the 180,000 old troops of the monarchy, and the discharged veterans whom the Revolution impelled to the frontiers. Part of the recruits deserted, part died; a small proportion only remained, who, in process of time, formed good soldiers. Why have the Romans done such great things? Because six years’ instruction were with them required to make a soldier. A legion composed of three thousand such men was worth thirty thousand ordinary troops. With fifteen thousand men such as the Guards, I would anywhere beat forty thousand. You will not soon find me engaging in war with an army of recruits.”

“In this great project we must not be startled by expense. No inland boatmen will ever voluntarily go to the seaports. We must make it a matter of necessity. The conscription for the marine should commence at ten or twelve years of age; the men should amount to twelve thousand, and serve all their lives. We are told there is no such naval conscription in England; but the example is not parallel. England has an immense extent of coasts, which furnish her with abundance of seamen. We have a comparatively small coast, and but few seamen. Nature has been niggardly to us in this particular; we must supply its defects by artificial means.” In pursuance of these principles, an *arrêt* appeared upon the 4th of October, which laid the foundation of the conscription for the naval service of France.†

* *Thibault*, 107, 109.

† The establishment of the *Ecole Militaire* at the same time underwent a discussion at the Council of State. Napoleon observed, “This institution diminishes the severity of the conscription. It enables the young man to complete his education, which the conscription would otherwise prevent, at the same time that he is learning the rudiments of the military art. I know of no other school equally well constituted; it will raise the organization of our army to the very highest point. The army under the Republic was for long supported by the youths who in 1793 issued from this establishment. All the commanders of corps feel the want of skilled young men; I can appoint them, but if they are ig-

About the same time, a project was brought before the council for the establishment of chambers of agriculture in the colonies. They were decreed, but the war which soon afterwards broke out prevented the plan being carried into execution. The principles, however, advanced by Napoleon in support of the proposal, are admirable for their wisdom and sagacity. “Doubtless,” said he, “you must govern the colonies by force; but there can be no force without justice. Government must be in-

formed as to the real situation of the colonies, and for this purpose must patiently hear the parties interested; for it is not sufficient to acquire the character of justice that the ruling power does what is right. It is also necessary that the most distant subjects of the Empire should be convinced that this is the case, and this they will never be unless they are sensible that they have been fully heard. Were the Council of State composed of angels or gods, who could perceive at a glance everything that should be done, it would not be sufficient, unless the colonists had the conviction that they had been fully and impartially heard. All power must be founded on opinion; it is in order to form it that an institution similar to that proposed is indispensable. At present there is no constitutional channel of communication between France and the colonies; the most absurd reports are in circulation there as to the intentions of the central government, and it is as little informed as to the real wants and necessities of its distant possessions. If government had, on the other hand, a colonial representation to refer to, it would become acquainted with the truth, it would proclaim it, and transmit it in its despatches to its colonial subjects.

“Commerce and the colonies have opposite interests; the first is that of purchasers and consumers, the latter that of raisers and producers. No sooner is it proposed to impose duties on colonial produce, than I am besieged with memorials from all the chambers of commerce in France, but no one advances anything in behalf of the colonies; the law, whatever it is, arrives there in unmitigated rigour, without the principles which led to it being explained, or their receiving any assurance that their interests have been balanced with those of the other side. But the colonists are Frenchmen and our brothers; they bear a part of the public burdens, and the least that can be done for them in return is to give them such a shadow of a representation.

“Many persons here see only in the colonies the partisans of the English; that is held out merely as a pretext for subjecting them to every species of insult. Had I been at Martinique, I should have espoused the cause of the English, for the first of social duties is the preservation of life. Had any of your philanthropic liberals come out to Egypt to proclaim liberty to the blacks or the Arabs, I would have hung him from the masthead. In the West Indies similar enthusiasts have delivered over the whites to the ferocity of the blacks, and yet they com-

norant of the duties of the private soldier, it is felt as an injustice by the common men. The *Ecole Militaire* furnishes scholars instructed in both departments, and therefore its great excellence.”

Nov. 9, 1802.
Speech of Napoleon on the government of the colonies.

plain of the victims of such madness being discontented. How is it possible to give liberty to the Africans when they are destitute of any species of civilization, and are ignorant even of what a colony or a mother-country is? Do you suppose that, had the majority of the Constituent Assembly been aware what they were doing, they would have given liberty to the blacks? Certainly not; but few persons at that time were sufficiently far-sighted to foresee the result, and feelings of humanity are ever powerful with excited imaginations. But now, after the experience we have had, to maintain the same principles cannot be done in good faith; it can be the result only of overweening self-confidence or hypocrisy.* Words of true political wisdom, which demonstrate how admirably qualified Napoleon was to have held, with just and even hands, the reins of power in a vast and varied empire, and which have since become of still greater value from the contrast they afford to the measures subsequently pursued by another state in regard to far greater colonial dependancies, and with the lamentable result of former rashness even more forcibly brought before its eyes.†

Finances of France. France, both under the monarchy and during the course of the Revolution, like every other country which has fallen under despotic power, had become burdened with an enormous and oppressive land-tax. The clear produce of the direct contributions in the year 1802 was 273,600,000 francs, or £11,000,000 sterling, which, on the nett amount of agricultural labour in the Republic, was about twenty per cent.‡ This immense

* Thib., 117, 121.

† It is observed by Mr. Hume, that the remote provinces and colonial dependancies of a despotic empire are always better administered than those of a popular government, and that the reason is, that an uncontrolled monarch being equally elevated above all his subjects, and not more dependant on one class than another, views them all, comparatively speaking, with equal eyes; whereas a free state is ruled by one body of citizens who have obtained the mastery of another, and govern exclusively the more distant settlements of the Empire, and are consequently actuated by personal or patrimonial interests, in their endeavours to prevent them from obtaining the advantage of uniform and equal legislation. The admirable wisdom of the principles of colonial government thus developed by Napoleon, compared with the unjust and partial principles of administration which have so long been adopted by Great Britain towards her West Indian settlements, afford a striking illustration of the justice of this remark. England will ultimately lose her splendid colonial empire from the same cause which proved fatal to that of Athens, Carthage, and Venice, viz., the selfish system of legislation exclusively adapted to the interests, or directed by the prejudices, of the holders of political power in the centre of the state, and the general neglect of the wishes of its remote and unrepresented colonial dependancies.

Statistical details.	Francia.	
	Total agricultural produce of France, in	
1805, at	2,750,000,000	or £110,000,000
Nett produce, deducting cost of production	1,200,000,000	or 48,000,000
Direct Taxes falling on land	250,000,000	or 10,000,000
Indirect Taxes	350,000,000	or 14,000,000
Drawn by the owners of the soil	600,000,000	or 24,000,000

So that of the nett produce of the soil one half was absorbed in taxation, and no less than 20 per cent. taken from the proprietors in a direct form; a signal proof how little the French peasantry had gained, in alleviation of burdens at least, by the result of the Revolution.—See PEUCHET, *Stat. de la France*, 286, 287.

The committee of the Constituent Assembly, who reported in 1790 on this subject, estimated the nett territorial revenue of France at 1,500,000,000, or £60,000,000. M. Gai-nihl, after various laborious calculations, estimates it, in

burden was levied according to a scale, or "cadastre," at which it was estimated the land was worth; and as the smiles of government favour were bestowed on the official persons employed in making the surveys, in a great degree, in proportion to the amount to which they contrived to bring up the revenue of their districts, the oppression exercised in many parts of the country was extreme, and the less likely to be remedied that it fell on a numerous body of detached little proprietors, incapable of any effective or simultaneous effort to obtain redress. The "cadastre," or scale of General valuation, had been of very old standing in France, as it regulated the *taille* and *vingtièmes*, which constituted so large a portion of the revenue of the monarchy.* By a decree of the National Assembly of the 16th of September, 1791, sanctioned by the king on the 23d of September in the same year, the method prescribed for fixing the valuation was as follows: "When the levy of the land-tax in the territory of any community shall commence, the surveyor charged with the operations shall make out a scheme in a mass, which shall exhibit the general result of the valuation, and its division in sections. He shall then make out detailed plans, which shall constitute the parcelled valuations of the community." These directions were justly and impartially conceived, but the difficulty of forming just and equal valuations, in a country so immensely subdivided and of such vast extent as France, was extreme, and, during the license and tyranny of the Revolution, the most flagrant inequality prevailed in the land-tax paid in different parts of the country. We have the authority of Napoleon's finance minister in 1802 for the assertion that, in every district of France, "there were some proprietors who were paying the fourth, the third, and even the half of their clear revenue, while others were only rated at a tenth, a twentieth, a fiftieth, or a hundredth."† The gross injustice of such a system naturally produced the most vehement complaints when the restoration of a regular government afforded any prospect of obtaining redress. The consular government, during the whole of 1802, was besieged with memorials from all quarters, setting forth the intolerable injustice which prevailed in the distribution of the land-tax, the utter inefficacy of all attempts which had been made, in preceding years, to obtain from the councils or prefects of the departments anything like equality in the valuation, and the complete disregard which both the convention and Directory had evinced towards the loud and well-founded complaints of the country.‡

The matter at length became so pressing that it was brought before the Council of State. The magnitude of the evil did not escape the

1816, at 1,300,000,000, or £52,000,000; while the Duke de Gaeta, in 1817, fixed it at 1,323,000,000, or £53,000,000.—See DUC DE GAETA, ii., 289.

* The Constituent Assembly, in 1790, estimated the territorial revenue at 1,500,000,000 francs, or £60,000,000 annually, but took the cadastre or valuation at 1,200,000,000 francs, or £48,000,000, and fixed the land-tax at 240,000,000 francs, or £9,200,000, and, with the expenses of collection, 300,000,000 francs, or £12,000,000, being a fourth of the income of every landed proprietor.*

† Duc de Gaeta, ii., 261.

‡ Ibid., ii., 257.

* Duc de Gaeta, ii., 288. Peuchet, *Stat. de France*, 624.

penetration of the First Consul.* The formation of a valuation was decreed, proceeding on a different principle. This was to adopt as the basis of the scale a valuation, laid, not on parcels of ground, but on masses of the same kind of cultivation. This system, however, although in appearance the most equitable, was found by experience to be attended with so many difficulties, that its execution did not proceed over above a fifth of the territory of the Republic, and it was at length abandoned from the universal complaints of its injustice. The discussion of the cadastre was again brought forward, and made the subject of anxious consideration in 1817, but the inequality of the valuation still continued, and is the subject of loud and well-founded complaints at this hour. In truth, such are the obstacles thrown in the way of an equal valuation by individual interests, and such the difficulties with which the execution of such a task is attended, from the variation in the amount of the produce of the soil, and the prices which can be got for it at different times and seasons, that it is not going too far to pronounce it to be impossible. Inequality, severity, and oppression are the invariable and inevitable attendants of direct taxation wherever established, and even under the very best system of local administration. The only taxes which are, comparatively speaking, equal, just, and unfelt, are indirect burdens, which, being laid on consumption, are voluntarily incurred, disguised under the price of the article, and accurately proportioned to the amount of expenditure of each individual.†

But in the midst of these great designs of Napoleon for the reconstruction of society in France, he experienced the greatest annoyance from the independent, and sometimes cutting

language used by the popular orators in discussing the projects sent from the Council of State to the Tribunal. Though friendly to a free and unreserved discussion of every subject in the first of these bodies, which sat with closed doors, the First Consul was irritated to the last degree by the opposition which his measures experienced in the only part of the Legislature which retained a shadow even of popular constitution, and openly expressed his resolution to get quit of an institution which reminded the people of the dangerous powers which they had exercised during the anarchy of the Revolution. He loved unfettered arguments in presence only of men competent to judge of the subject, but could not endure the public harangues of the tribune, intended to catch the ears or excite the passions of an ignorant populace.*† On various occasions during the course of 1802, his displeasure was strongly excited by the ebullitions of Republican spirit or spleen which occasionally took place in the Tribunal. An expression in the treaty with Russia roused the indignation of the veteran Democrats of the Revolution. It was provided that "the two contracting parties should not permit their respective subjects to entertain any correspondence with foreign powers." When the treaty came to be discussed at the Tribunal, this expression gave rise to an angry discussion. Thibaut exclaimed, "The French are citizens, and not subjects." Chenier observed, "Our armies have combated ten years that we should remain citizens, and we have now become subjects. Thus are accomplished the wishes of the two coalitions." Napoleon was highly displeased with these symptoms of a refractory spirit. "What," said he, "would these declaimers be at? It was absolutely necessary that my government should treat on a footing of equality with that of Russia. I would have become contemptible in the eyes of all foreign nations if I had yielded to these absurd pretensions on the part of the Tribunal. These gentlemen annoy me to such a degree that I am strongly tempted to be done at once with them."‡

* "Your system of land-tax," said he, in the Council of State, "is the worst in Europe. The result of it is, that there is no such thing as property or civil liberty in the country; for what is freedom without security of property? There can be no security in a country where the valuation on which the tax proceeds can be changed at the will of the surveyors every year. A man who has 3000 francs of rent a year (£120), cannot calculate upon having enough next year to exist; everything must be swept away by the direct tax. We see every day questions about fifty or a hundred francs gravely pleaded before the legal tribunals, and a mere surveyor can, by a simple stroke of the pen, surcharge you several thousand francs. Under such a system, there cannot be said to be any property in the country. When I purchase a domain, I know neither what I have got, nor what I should do in regard to it. In Lombardy and Piedmont there is a fixed valuation; every one knows what he is to pay; no extraordinary contributions are levied but on extraordinary occasions, and by the judgment of a solemn tribunal. If the contribution is augmented, every one, by applying it to his valuation, knows at once what he has to pay. In such a country, therefore, property may truly be said to exist. Why is it that we have never had any public spirit in France? Simply because every proprietor is obliged to pay his court to the tax-gatherers and surveyors of his district; if he incurs their displeasure, he is ruined. It is in vain to talk of appealing; the judgments of the courts of review are arbitrary. It is for the same reason that there is no nation so servilely submissive to the government as France, because property depends entirely upon it. In Lombardy, on the other hand, a proprietor lives on his estate without feeling any disquietude as to who succeeds to the government. Nothing has ever been done in France to give security to property. The man who shall devise an equal law on the subject of the cadastre will deserve a statue of gold." What an instructive testimony as to the amount of security which the Revolution had conferred upon property in France, and the degree of practical freedom which had been enjoyed, or public spirit developed, under its multifarious Democratic administrations! † Gaeta, ii., 258.

Another law was brought forward about the same time, which excited a still more Important change in municipal government carried in spite of that of individuals and the municipal police. These powers were, by the existing law, invested in the hands of the *juges du paix*, who were still appointed by the people; the proposed change took this branch of jurisdiction from these functionaries, and vested it in a small number of judges appointed for that special purpose by the government, who were to take cognizance of the crimes of robbery, house-breaking, and some others, without a jury. The importance of this change, which so nearly concerned the personal liberty of every individual,

* Bour., v., 85. Thib., 198.

† He often said to the leading orators of the Tribunal, "Instead of declaiming from the tribune, why do you not come to discuss the points under deliberation with me in my cabinet? We should have family discussions, as in my Council of State."—THIBAUDAU, 198.

‡ Bour., i., 85, 87. Thib., 108, 207.

* Bign., i., 221. Thib., 179

was at once seen, and the public indignation, in an especial manner, roused by a clause which subjected every citizen to arrest by the simple authority of the minister of police, and took away all personal responsibility on the part of the members of administration, on account of any acts infringing on the liberty of the subject which they may have committed. The storm was so violent, and the complaints on this point especially so well founded, that government was obliged to withdraw the obnoxious article; but the necessity of the case, and the universal knowledge which prevailed of the total insecurity to life and property, from the height to which outrage and violence still existed in the interior, prevailed over the opposition, and the

law passed after a strenuous resistance. Napoleon's displeasure was so great that he could not conceal it, even in an audience to which the senate was admitted on this subject. Speaking of the Tribunal, he said, with the utmost energy, "There are assembled within its walls a dozen or fifteen metaphysicians; they are fit only to be thrown into the Seine. They are a kind of vermin who have overrun my dress. But don't let them imagine I will suffer myself to be attacked like Louis XVI.; I will never allow matters to come to that."*

His opinions on this subject were emphatically expressed, and the grounds of them powerfully urged in the Council of State, when the project for the renewal of the Constitution was brought forward. "We must make a change," said he; "the example of England must not mislead us; the men who compose its opposition are neither emigrants who regret the feudal régime, nor Democrats who seek to revive the Reign of Terror. They feel the natural weight of talent, and are chiefly desirous to be bought at a sufficient price by the crown. With us the case is very different; our opposition is composed of the remnant of the privileged classes and of the outrageous Jacobins. They by no means limit their ambition to an accession to place or office; the one half would be satisfied with nothing but a return to the ancient régime, the other the reign of Democratic clubs. No two things are more opposite than the effects of free discussion among a people long habituated to its excitement, and in a country where freedom has only commenced. Once admitted into the Tribunal, the most honourable men aim only at success, without caring how violently they shake the fabric of society. What is government? Nothing, if deprived of the weight of opinion. How is it possible to counterbalance the influence of a Tribunal always open for the most inflammatory speeches? When once the patrician classes are destroyed, the freedom of the tribune must, of necessity, be suppressed. The circumstances were widely different at Rome; yet even there the tribunes of the people did infinite mischief. The Constituent Assembly placed the king in a secondary position; they were right, for he was the representative of the feudal régime, and was supported by all the weight of the nobles and the clergy. At present the government is the representative of the people. These observa-

tions may appear foreign to the subject in hand, but in reality they are not so; they contain the principles on which I am persuaded government must now be conducted, and I willingly throw them out, in order that they may be more largely disseminated by the intelligent circle which I see around me."

In conformity with these principles, the First Consul brought forward his plan, which was to divide the Tribunal into five sections, corresponding to the divisions of the Council of State; that the proposed laws should be *secretly* transmitted from the section of the Council of State to the corresponding section of the Tribunal; that they should be *secretly* discussed in the Tribunal, and between the Tribunal and the Council of State by three orators appointed on both sides; and no public discussion take place except by three orators, mutually in like manner chosen, between the Tribunal and the government pleaders before the Legislature. It was strongly objected to this change that it tended to destroy the publicity of proceedings in the only quarter where it still existed, and eradicated the last remnants of a free Constitution. Napoleon replied: "I cannot see that. Even if it were so, a Constitution must be moulded by circumstances, modified according to the results of experience, and ultimately constructed in such a way as not to impede the necessary action of government. My project secures a calm and rational discussion of the laws, and upholds the consideration of the Tribunal. What does the Tribunal mean? Nothing but the tribune, that is, the power of rational discussion. The government has need of such an addition to its means of information: but what is the use of a hundred men to discuss the laws introduced by thirty? They declaim, but do nothing of real utility. We must at length organize the Constitution in such a manner as to allow the government to advance. No one seems yet sufficiently impressed with the necessity of giving unity to the executive; until that is effected, nothing can be done. A universal disquietude prevails; speculation, exertion of every kind, is arrested. In a great nation, the immense majority of mankind ever are incapable of forming a rational opinion on public affairs. Every one must contemplate, at some period or another, the death of the First Consul; in that case, without a cordial union of the constituted authorities, all would be lost."*

The opposition, however, was very powerful against these great alterations; and Napoleon, whose prudence in carrying through political changes was equal to his sagacity in conceiving them, contented himself, at the annual renewal of the Constitution, with an *arrêt* of the senate, that thenceforward the duties of the Tribunal and the Legislative Body should be exercised only by the citizens who were inscribed on the two lists as the first elected to continue the exercise of the national functions. The great change of the Constitution involved in the mutilation of the Tribunal was reserved for the period when Napoleon was to be elected first consul for life—an event which soon afterward took place.†

Influenced not merely by ambition, but a pro-

* *Thib.*, 204.

* *Thib.*, 229, 231.

† *Ibid.*, 232.

Debates on the Tribunal in the Council of State.

He resolves to make himself consul for life. found and philosophic view of the existing state of France, Napoleon had firmly resolved to convert the Republic into a monarchy, and not only seat himself on the throne, but render the dynasty hereditary in his family, or those whom he might designate as his successors. Nothing could be more apparent to an impartial spectator of the state of France and the adjoining nations, than that it was utterly impossible that republican institutions could exist in a country so situated. Destitute of any of the elevated or ennobled classes which alone, in a great and powerful community, can give stability to such institutions; exposed to all the sources of discord and corruption arising from a powerful military force, selfish and highly civilized manners, and the influence of a vast revenue; placed in the midst of the great military monarchies of Europe, who were necessarily hostile to such institutions, from the experience they had had of the evils with which they were attended to all the adjoining states, France could not, by possibility, avoid falling under the government of a single individual. Napoleon had no alternative but to restore the Bourbons or seat himself on the throne.*

During the whole of 1802, the efforts of government were incessant to extend monarchical ideas by means of the press, and the private influence of all persons in official situations. Lucien Bonaparte has been already noticed as one of the earliest and most zealous propagators of these new opinions a year before; but as they came forth at too early a period, and somewhat startled the public, he was rewarded for his services by an honourable exile as ambassador at Madrid. But in the succeeding season, the change of the public mind had become so evident, that it was no longer necessary to veil the real designs of government; and the appointment of Napoleon to the consulship for life was accordingly zealously advocated by all persons in prominent situations. Roederer supported it with all the weight of his acute metaphysics; Talleyrand gained for it the suffrages of the whole diplomatic body. Arbitrary power advanced with rapid steps in the midst of general declamations in favour of order and stability; whoever spoke of liberty or equality was forthwith set down as a Jacobin, a Terrorist, and looked on with suspicious eyes by all the servants of government. The partisans of revolution, finding themselves reduced to a miserable minority, retired into the obscurity of private life, or consoled themselves for the ruin of their Republican chimeras by the personal advantages which they derived from situations round the consular throne.†

* Big., ii., 231. Thib., 236.

† Big., ii., 231, 232. Thib., 236.

‡ It is remarkable, that while all around the First Consul beheld with undisguised satisfaction his approaching elevation to the throne, the individual in existence who, next to himself, was to gain most by the change, was devoured with anxiety on the subject. All the splendour of the throne could not dazzle the good sense of Josephine, or prevent her from anticipating, in the establishment of the Napoleon dynasty, evident risk to her husband, and certain downfall to herself. "The real enemies of Bonaparte," said she to Roederer, "who was advocating the change," "are those who put into this head ideas of hereditary succession, dynasty, divorce, and marriage." She employed all the personal influence

The project for appointing Napoleon consul for life had failed a few months before, when the prorogation of that appointment for ten years took place. Napoleon affected at that period to decline such an elevation; the two other consuls, acquainted with his real desires, insisted that it should be forced upon him; and it was so carried in the Council of State by a majority of ten to seven. Lanfrede, who brought up the report of the committee of the senate on the subject, and was not in the secret, proposed only a temporary prorogation; Despinasse moved that it should be for life. But Tronchet, who was president, and whose intrepidity nothing could overcome, held firm for the first proposal, and it was carried by a majority of sixty to one, Languinais alone voting in the minority. Tronchet was neither a Republican nor a courtier; he preferred a monarchy, but notwithstanding his admiration for Napoleon, he feared his ambition. He said of Napoleon, in a company where several senators were assembled, "He is a young man; he has begun like Cæsar, and will end like him; I hear him say too frequently that he will mount on horseback and draw his sword."* What a glorious distinction for the same individual, to have with equal courage pleaded the cause of Louis XVI. in the Temple, and restrained the career of Napoleon on the throne; and how noble a contrast to the baseness of so many of the popular faction, who then showed as great vehemence in the persecution of a falling, as they now displayed servility in the adulation of a rising monarch!†

The design of making Napoleon consul for life having thus failed in the senate, probably from misapprehension of what he really desired, the method of attaining the object was changed. He began, as he usually did in such cases, to blame severely those who had been most prominent in urging forward the plan, and in an especial manner animadverted on Roederer, whose efforts to procure his elevation had been peculi-

The attempt at first fails in the senate.

Means adopted to ensure its success.

which she possessed with the First Consul and his most intimate counsellors to divert him from these ideas, but in vain. "I do not approve the projects of Napoleon," said she; "I have often told him so; he hears me with attention, but I can plainly see that I make no impression. The flatterers who surround him soon obliterate all I have said. The new honours which he will acquire will augment the number of his enemies; the generals will exclaim that they have not fought so long to substitute the family of the Bonapartes for that of the Bourbons. I no longer regret the want of children; I should tremble for their fate. I will remain attached to the destiny of Bonaparte, how dangerous soever it may be, as long as he continues to me the regard which he has hitherto manifested; but the moment that he changes I will retire from the Tuileries. I know well how much he is urged to separate from me."—See *BOURRIENNE*, v., 44, 47. *THIBAUDEAU*, 237, 242.

* Thib., 245. *Bour.*, v., 17, 18.

† So far did the spirit of servility proceed among the courtiers of the Tuileries, that they seriously proposed to Napoleon to restore the ancient titles of honour, as being more in harmony than Republican forms with the power with which he was now invested. But Napoleon had too much sense to disclose at once the whole of his designs. "The pear," said he to Bourrienne, "is not yet ripe. All that will come in good time; but it is essentially requisite that I myself, in the first instance, assume a title, from which those which I bestow on others may naturally flow. The most difficult part is now over; no one can be deceived; everybody sees there is but a step which separates the consulship from the throne. Some precautions are still requisite; there are many fools in the Tribunal, but let me alone, I will overcome them."—*BOURRIENNE*, v., 17.

arly conspicuous. But in the midst of his seeming displeasure at the proposal which had been made, the most efficacious means were taken to secure its adoption. In reply to the address of the senate, which prorogated his power for ten years beyond the term originally assigned, he observed, "The suffrages of the people have invested me with the supreme authority; I should not deem myself sufficiently secured in the new proof which you have given me of your esteem if it were not sanctioned by the same authority." Under cover of this regard for popular sovereignty, the partisans of Napoleon veiled a design of conferring on him hereditary power. It was proposed in the Council of State that the people should be consulted on the question whether the consulship for life should be conferred upon him. Roederer said, "A prorogation of the consulship for ten years gives no stability to government. The interests of credit and of commerce loudly demand a stronger measure. The senate has limited its appointment to ten years, because it conceived it did not possess power to confer authority for a longer period; but we should submit to the people the question whether the First Consul should be nominated for life, and invested with the right to appoint his successor."* So clearly was the design seen through, that the proposal was carried without a division, though some of the popular members abstained from voting. In conformity with this resolution of the Council of State,

The question is directly submitted to the people.

and without any authority from the other branches of the Legislature, the question was forthwith submitted to the people, "Shall Napoleon Bonaparte be consul for life?" Registers were directed to be opened in every commune to receive the votes of the citizens. Napoleon declined the addition of the question whether he should be invested with the right to nominate his successor, deeming the inconsistency too glaring between a refusal to accept a prorogation for ten years from the senate, if not confirmed by the people, and the demand of a right to nominate a successor to the throne of France.†

The result of this appeal was announced by the senatus consultum of August 2. Aug. 2, 1802. Result of the appeal, and great satisfaction which it gave. It appeared that 3,557,885 citizens had voted, of whom 3,368,259 were for the affirmative. This is one of the most remarkable events recorded in the history of the Revolution, and singularly descriptive of that longing after repose, that invincible desire for tranquillity, which uniformly succeeds to revolutionary convulsions, and so generally renders them the prelude to despotic power. The rapid rise of the public funds demonstrated that this feeling was general among the holders of property in France. They advanced with every addition made to the authority of the successful general; as low as eight before the 18th Brumaire, they rose at once to sixteen when he seized the helm, and after the consulship for life was proclaimed, reached fifty-two. Contrast this with the rise of the public securities, thirty per cent., on the day on which Necker was restored to the ministry on the shoulders

of the people,* to carry through the convocation of the States-General, and observe the difference between the anticipation and the experience of a revolution.†

The answer of the First Consul to the address of the senate on this important occasion is valuable, as illustrating the great views which he already entertained of his mission, to extinguish the discord which had preceded him, and restore the reign of order upon earth. "The life of a citizen," said he, "belongs to his country; the French people have expressed a wish that mine should be solely devoted to it; I obey their will. In bestowing upon me a new, a permanent pledge of their confidence, the nation has imposed upon me the duty of moulding the system of its laws, so as to bring it into harmony with durable institutions. By my exertions, aided with your assistance, citizen senators, by the concurrent voice of all the authorities, by the trust and the will of the whole people, the liberty, the prosperity, the equality of France will be established beyond the reach of chance. The most distinguished of people will be the most fortunate, and their prosperity will secure that of all Europe. Content to have been called by the will of Him from whom everything emanates to bring back the reign of justice, order, and equality upon the earth, I will hear the voice which summons me hence without regret, and without disquietude on the opinion of future generations."‡

Answer of the First Consul to the address of the senate on the occasion.

* Bour., v., 55. Norv., ii., 129. Thib., ii., 81.

† In the midst of the general unanimity, M. Lafayette had the courage to vote against the appointment of the First Consul for life. Letter of Lafayette to his vote these words: "I cannot vote for such a magistracy until public freedom is sufficiently guaranteed; when that is done, I give my voice to Napoleon Bonaparte." In a letter addressed to the First Consul, he fully expressed the grounds of his jealousy: "When a man," said he, "penetrated with the gratitude which he owes you, and too much enamoured with glory not to admire that which encircles your name, has given only a conditional vote, it is the less suspected that no one will rejoice more than himself to see you the first magistrate for life in a free Republic. It is impossible that you, general, the first in that class of men who occasionally arise at the interval of ages, should wish that such a revolution, illustrated by so many victories, stained by so many crimes, should terminate only in the establishment of arbitrary power: patriotic and personal motives would lead me to desire for you that compliance to your glory which the consulship for life would afford; but the principles, the engagements, the actions of my life forbid me to wish for any such appointment if not founded on a basis worthy of you." In a private conversation with the First Consul, he added: "A free government, and you at its head; that comprehends all my desires." The veteran Republican did not perceive, what, indeed, none of the enthusiasts of his age were aware of, that the establishment of the freedom to which he was so warmly attached had been rendered impossible by the crimes of the Revolution in which he had borne so conspicuous a part. He was taught the same truth in a still more striking manner thirty years afterward by the result of the Revolution which overturned the Restoration; but it is seldom that political fanatics, how sincere or respectable soever, are taught even by the most important lessons of contemporaneous history.*

Napoleon said on this occasion, "In theory, Lafayette is perhaps right; but what is theory? a mere dream when applied to the masses of mankind. He thinks he is still in the United States, as if the French were Americans. He has no conception of what is required for this country. The Catholic religion has still its root here; I have need of the pope. He will do all I desire." From that period all communication between the general and the First Consul ceased. Napoleon tried repeatedly afterward to regain him to his government, but in vain.†

‡ Thib., 287. Norv., ii., 193.

* Bour., v., 17. Thib., 34. Bign., ii., 233.

† Thib., 250, 253, 265. Bour., v., 17.

* Bign., ii., 235, 236.

† Bour., v., 61, 62.

Important changes in the Constitution followed this alteration in the character of the executive authority; they were preceded by memorable discussions on the principles of government in the Council of State.*

On the views taken by Napoleon the new Constitution was framed, which was proclaimed on the 4th of August. The chief changes were, that the Tribunate was reduced from one hundred to

fifty members; a diminution of importance, which was regarded at the time, as it

* Napoleon did not attempt to disguise his contempt for the real Revolutionists who now frowned on the sceptre of the consulate. "How contemptible are these men!" said he; "all your virtuous Republicans are at my service, if I will condescend to put gilt lace on their coats."—BOURRIENNE, v., 10, 11. "All the powers of the state," said Napoleon, "are in the air; they have nothing to rest upon. We must establish relations between them and the people, a particular in which the Constitution was essentially defective. The lists of those eligible to particular offices have by no means answered the desired end. If they were for life, they would establish the most fearful aristocracy that ever existed; if temporary, they would keep the nation in a continual ferment for an imaginary advantage. What flatters and captivates the people in Democratic institutions is the real and practical exercise of their powers; but in the existing system, the people, who discover only 5000 persons eligible to the higher offices of state, cannot flatter themselves that they possess such a share in the elections as to have any influence on the administration. To ensure the stability of government, the people must have a larger share in the elections, and feel themselves really represented.

"The electoral colleges attach the people to the government, and *vice versa*. They are a link, and a most important one, between the authorities and the nation. In that link it is indispensable to combine the class of proprietors with the most distinguished of those who have not that advantage; the former, because property must be the basis of every rational system of representation; the latter, because the career of ambition must not be closed to obscure or indigent genius.

"We are told to look at the English Constitution for a model: I am of opinion that it is inapplicable to this country, situated as it now is, and my reasons for that opinion are these: England embraces in the bosom of society a body of nobles, who hold the greatest part of the property of the nation, and are illustrated by ancient descent. In France that body is totally wanting; it cannot be created; if you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it could only be brought about by a concentration in their hands of the whole property of the nation, which is impossible; if of the ancient noblesse, a counter-revolution would immediately ensue. Besides this, the character of the two people is different; the Englishman is brutal, the Frenchman is vain, polite, inconsiderate. Look at the elections; you will see the English swilling for forty days at the expense of the nobles; never would the French peasantry disgrace themselves by similar excesses. Their passion is for equality. For these reasons I am clearly of opinion that the English Constitution is inapplicable to France.

"The Constitution may be aptly compared to a vessel: if you abandon it to the winds with all its sails set, no one can tell where it may be drifted. Where are now the men of the Revolution? The moment they were expelled from office, they sunk into oblivion. This will happen in all cases if precautions are not taken to prevent it; it was with that design that I instituted the Legion of Honour; among all people, in every republic that ever existed, classes are to be found. At present, nothing has a lasting reputation but military achievement; civil services are less striking, more open to differences of opinion. Hereditary succession to the First Consul is absurd; not in itself, for it is the best guarantee for the stability of the state, but because it is incompatible with the present state of France. It long existed in the ancient monarchy, but with institutions which rendered it feasible, which exist no longer, and cannot be restored. Hereditary succession is founded on the idea of civil right; it presupposes property; it is intended to ensure its transmission from the dead to the living. But how is it possible to reconcile hereditary succession in the chief magistrate with the principle of the sovereignty of the people? When the crown was hereditary, the chief situations in the kingdom were hereditary also; the fiction on which it was founded was but a branch of the general law. At present there is no longer any of that."*

* Thib., 295, 299.

really was, as a prelude merely to its total extinction, and which so completely deprived that remnant of freedom of consideration as to render it from thenceforward no obstacle whatever to the despotic tendency of the government. The Legislative Body was reduced to 258 members and divided into five divisions, each of which were annually renewed; the electors also retained their functions for life. The senate was invested with the power to dissolve the Legislative Body and the Tribunate, declare particular departments *hors de la Constitution*, and modify the fundamental institutions of the Republic. The First Consul received the right to nominate his successor and pardon offences. In return for so many concessions to the executive, a shadow of privilege was conferred on the electors; the electoral colleges were allowed each to present two citizens for the functions of the municipality department and nation. In all but name, the consulship was already a despotic monarchy.* So evident did this soon become, that even the panegyrists of Napoleon have not scrupled to assert that, the consular and imperial institutions were "fraudulent constitutions, systematically intended, by servile hands, to introduce despotic power." Subsequent experience has warranted the belief that, how arbitrary soever, they were the only institutions under which France could enjoy any degree of tranquillity, and that, if they were calculated to extinguish freedom, it was because the sins of the Revolution had rendered her people neither worthy of receiving, nor capable of enjoying that first of blessings.

A few days after the Constitution was published, the First Consul presided at Aug. 8, 1802. the senate, and received the con- Its acceptance gratulations of the constituted au- by the senate. thorities, the public bodies, and the foreign ambassadors, on his appointment for life. This was remarkable as the first occasion on which he had displayed the pomp and magnificence of regal power. The soldiers formed a double line from the Tuileries to the Luxembourg; the First Consul was seated in a magnificent chariot, drawn by eight horses; the two other consuls followed in carriages drawn by six. A splendid *cortège* of generals, ambassadors, and public functionaries followed, whose gorgeous appearance captivated the Parisian multitude, more passionately devoted than any in Europe to spectacles of that description. Enthusiastic applause from the inconstant populace rent the heavens: they did not manifest greater rapture when the Constituent Assembly began the work of demolishing the monarchy than they now did when the First Consul restored it.†

The aspect of Paris at this period was sufficient to have captivated a nation Aspect of Paris and its society at this period. gifted with a less volatile imagination than the French, the more especially coming, as it did, after the sad and melancholy scenes of the Revolution. The taste for luxury and pleasure had spread rapidly in a capital where they had all the charms of novelty, while the people, captivated with the return of enjoyments to which they had long been strangers, drank deep and thankfully of the intoxicating draught. The vast influx of

* Norv., ii., 193. Bour. v., 56. Bign., ii., 242, 246. Thib., 289, 297.

† Thib., 305, 306.

strangers, especially English and Russians, filled the streets with brilliant equipages, while the gay and party-coloured liveries dazzled the inhabitants, from the contrast they afforded to the sombre appearance of the Jacobins' costume. The whole population of Paris flocked to the Place Carrousel, where their eyes were daily dazzled by splendid reviews, attended by a concourse of strangers, which recalled the prosperous days of Louis XIV.; while the higher classes of citizens were not less captivated by the numerous and brilliant levées and drawing-rooms, where the court of the First Consul already rivalled the most sumptuous displays of European royalty.* M. de Markoff, who had succeeded Kalitscheff as ambassador from Russia, Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, and the Marquis Lucchesini, the representative of Prussia, were in an especial manner distinguished by the magnificence of their retinues and the eminent persons whom they presented to the First Consul. Among the illustrious Englishmen who hastened to Paris to satiate their curiosity by the sight of the remains and the men of the Revolution was Mr. Fox, whom Napoleon received in the most distinguished manner, and for whom he ever after professed the highest regard; but the praises of an enemy are always suspicious, and the memory of that able man would have been more honoured if the determined foe of England had bestowed on him some portion of that venomous hatred which he so often expressed towards Pitt or Wellington, and all the British leaders who had advanced the real interests and glory of their country.†

Nor was the French metropolis less illustrated by the spoils which were collected there from the vanquished states in every part of Europe. Already the Venus de Medicis, torn from her sanctuary in the tribune of Florence, diffused over the marble halls of the Louvre her air of matchless grace; the Pallas of Velletri attested the successful researches of the French engineers in the Roman States; while the St. Jerome of Parma, the transfiguration of Rome, and the last communion of the Vatican, exhibited to wondering crowds the softness of Correggio's colouring, the grandeur of Raphael's design, and the magic of Domenichino's finishing. Dazzled by the brilliant spectacle, the Parisians came to regard these matchless productions not as the patrimony of the human race, but their

own peculiar and unalienable property,* and thus prepared for themselves that bitter mortification which afterward ensued on the restoration of these precious remains to their rightful owners.

In foreign states, the re-establishment of a regular government in France, and its settlement under the firm and able guidance of Napoleon, diffused as great contentment as among its own inhabitants. In London, Vienna, and Berlin, the consulship for life gave unalloyed satisfaction. All enlightened persons in these capitals perceived that the restoration of the feudal régime and the property of the emigrants had already become impossible, and that the fury of the Revolution, under which they had already suffered so severely, was never so likely to be stilled as under the resolute and fortunate soldier who had already done so much to restrain its excesses. The Queen of Naples, a woman endowed with masculine spirit and great penetration, expressed the general feeling at Vienna, where she then was, in these words: "If I had possessed a vote in France, I would have given it to Napoleon; and written after my signature, I name him consul for life, as being the man most fitted to govern the country. He is worthy of the throne, since he knows how to fill it."‡

Public opinion, after this change, ran so strongly in favour of the centralization of influence and hereditary succession, that if the First Consul had not repressed the general transports, he would have received at once the unlimited gift of absolute power. The agents of government pursued with unrelenting severity the last remains of Democratic fervour. It was generally suggested that authority should be concentrated in the same hands, from the consulship for life to the appointment of mayor to the lowest village in France; and that the citizens should as rapidly as possible be estranged from any exercise of powers which they were evidently incapable of using to advantage. Innumerable projects were set on foot for reducing the number of the communes, the prefectures, and the tribunals; the old parliaments were held up as models of the administration of justice; the old intendants of provinces as a perfect system of local administration. So powerful was the reaction against the ideas and the changes of the Revolution!§

* The court of Napoleon, at this period, was happily characterized by the Princess Dolgoroucki, who then resided in Paris. "The Tuileries," said she, "is not, properly speaking, a court; and yet it is as little a camp: the consulship is a new institution. The First Consul has neither a *chapeau bras* under his arm, nor do you hear the clank of a sabre at his side."—LAS CASAS, iii., 241.

† Bour., v., 55. D'Abrantes, vi., 136, 140.

‡ To the honour of Mr. Fox it must be mentioned, that during his intercourse with the First Consul he never failed to impress upon him the absurdity and falsehood of those ideas in regard to the privacy of Mr. Pitt to any designs against his life, or any desire for his destruction, which were then so prevalent in the Tuileries. Alone and unaided, in the midst of the officers and generals of Napoleon, Mr. Fox undertook the defence of his illustrious opponent, and pleaded his cause with a warmth and generosity which excited the admiration even of the most venomous enemies of the English administration.—See DUCHESSE D'ABRANTES, vi., 136, 143.

He said frequently, in his bad French, "Premier Consul, etez cela de votre tête."—See LAS CASAS, iv., 172.

* Bour., v., 55. D'Abr., vi., 259.

† Bign., ii., 250.

‡ Thib., iii., 312.

§ So strong was the desire generally felt at this time for perpetuating the dynasty in the descendants of Napoleon, that the persons around his throne went the length of proposing to Josephine that she should palm off a stranger or bastard child upon the nation. "You are going to the waters of Plombieris," said Lucien to her. "You must have a son, if not of him, of some one else." And when she expressed her indignation at the proposal; "Well," says he, "if you will not or cannot comply, Bonaparte must have a child by some other woman, and you must adopt it; for a family is indispensable to him, and it is for your interest that he should have one; you can be at no loss to understand why." "Lucien," replied she, "you are mad. Do you suppose France would ever submit to be governed by a bastard?" Shortly after she recounted this extraordinary scene to one of the counsellors of state. "You may depend upon it," said she, "they have not abandoned their idea of hereditary succession, and that will be brought about some day, one way or other. They wish that Bonaparte should have a child of some other woman, and that I should adopt it; but

Shortly after Napoleon was appointed to the suppression of the ministry of police; the most important of these was the suppression of the ministry of police, and the transference of Fouché to a comparatively insignificant situation in the Conservative Senate. This austere but able statesman, notwithstanding his share in the massacres of the Loire and the fusillades of Lyons, had now become one of the most important supporters of the consular throne. His great value consisted in his perfect knowledge of the revolutionary characters, and the clear guidance which he afforded to the First Consul on all the delicate points where it was necessary to consult the inclinations, or yield to the prejudices of the immense body of men who had risen to importance on the ruins of the ancient proprietors. He formed the same link between the government and the revolutionary interest which Talleyrand did between them and the ancient régime. The honours and fortune to which he had risen had in no respect changed the simplicity of his former habits; but with the possession of power he had acquired a taste for its sweets, and became little scrupulous as to the means by which it was to be exercised. Ambition had become his ruling passion; he loved office and the wealth which it brought with it, not for the enjoyments which it might purchase, but the importance which it conferred. Such was his dissimulation, that he never suffered his real views to escape either from his lips or his countenance; and by the extraordinary hypocrisy of which he was master, inspired parties the most at variance with a sense of his importance, and a desire to propitiate his goodwill.* The Republicans beheld in the ancient Jacobin who had voted for the death of Louis, and presided over the executions of Nevers and Lyons, the representative of their party in the state; the ancient noblesse lavished on him their praises, and acknowledged with gratitude the favours he had conferred on many of the most illustrious of their body. Josephine made him her confidant in all her complaints against the brothers of her husband, and received large sums of money from his coffers to reveal the secrets she had elicited from the First Consul, while he himself yielded to a fascination which seemed to extend alike over the greatest men and most powerful bodies in the state.†

I told them I would never lend myself to such an infamous proposal. They are so blinded as to believe that the nation would permit a bastard to succeed. They are already beginning to hint at a divorce and a large pension to me. Bonaparte, even, is carried away by their ideas. The other day, when I expressed my fears in regard to the Princess Hortense, on account of the infamous reports which are in circulation about her infant being his son, he answered, 'These reports are only accredited by the public from the anxiety of the nation that I should have a child.' He is more weak and changeable than is generally imagined. It is owing to that circumstance that Lucien has got such an extraordinary dominion over him."‡ Napoleon at St. Helena alluded to this proposal, though, with his usual disregard of truth, he made it come from Josephine herself; an assertion which his secretary most properly denies, and which is completely disproved by the event. If Josephine had been willing to adopt an illegitimate son of Napoleon, and pass it off as her own offspring, she would have lived and died Empress of France.†

* His ruling maxim was, that the chief use of words was to conceal the thoughts.

† Bour., v., 32, 33. Thib., 325, 326.

* Thib., 309, 310.

† Bour., v., 21, 49.

Napoleon, however, at length perceived that the immense influence which Fouché enjoyed as head of the police might one day become formidable even to the government. He had the highest opinion of the importance of that branch of the administration, but he began to conceive disquietudes as to its concentration in the hands of so able an individual. It was impossible to disguise the fact that his members had conspired in favour of the consulate against the Directory, and the powerful machinery which was then put in motion to support Napoleon, might with equal facility be directed to his overthrow. Influenced by these considerations, the First Consul lent a willing ear to the party at the Tuileries who were adverse to Fouché, at the head of which was Talleyrand, who openly opposed and cordially hated his powerful rival. Yet such was the ascendancy of the minister of police, even over the powerful mind of Napoleon, that he long hesitated before he took the decisive step; and, after it had been resolved, on, felt the necessity of veiling it under a professed measure to increase the popularity of government. He represented to Fouché, therefore, that the office of minister of police was one which might now be dispensed with, and that the government would derive additional popularity from the suppression of so obnoxious a branch of the administration. Fouché saw through the device; but, according to his usual policy, yielded to a power which he could not brave, and expressed no dissent to the First Consul, though he was far from supposing the storm was so soon to break on his head. The *arrêt* for his dismissal was signed when he was on a visit to Joseph Bonaparte at Morfontaine. Fouché was named a senator, and loaded with praises by the government which deemed him too powerful to be retained in his former situation; and, at the same time, the ministry of police was suppressed, and united to that of justice, in the person of Regnier.*†

Soon after, an important change took place in the constitution of the senate. It had been originally provided that those elevated functionaries should, after their appointment, be incapable of holding any other situation; but it was subsequently enacted that the senators might hold the offices of consuls, ministers, inspectors of public instruction, be employed in all extraordinary missions, and receive the decoration of the Legion of Honour. Subsequently a munificent provision was made for the senate, and every member, on his nomination, received an appointment for life. Pensions by

* Bour., v., 36, 37. Thib., 325, 329.

† The letter of the First Consul to the senate, announcing the suppression of the ministry of police, was conceived in these terms: "Appointed minister of police in the most difficult times, the Senator Fouché has fully answered by his talents, his activity, and his attachment to the government, all that the circumstances demanded of him. Placed now in the bosom of the senate, he is called to equally important duties; and if ever a recurrence of the same circumstances should require a restoration of the office of minister of police, it is on him that the eyes of government would first be fixed to discharge its functions." These consolatory words opened to Fouché a ray of hope in the midst of his disgrace; all his efforts were from that moment directed to bring about his restoration to office; and at length, as will appear in the sequel, he attained his object.—See BOURBONNE, v., 37; and THIBAUDEAU, 326.

And dis-
grace of
Fouché.

Sept. 12.

Aug. 15, 1802.
Changes in the
constitution of
the senate.

Jan. 14, 1803. the executive, nominated by the First Consul, surrounded by every species of seduction, this branch of the government, in reality, served thereafter no other purpose but to throw a thin veil over the omnipotence of the executive. Napoleon was careful, however, to keep up its name, and bring forward all his despotic measures under the sanction of its authority, as the Roman emperors retained the venerable letters S. P. Q. R. on their ensigns, and the preamble "ex auctoritate senatus" to the most arbitrary acts of their administration.*†

An event occurred at this period, which tended, in a remarkable manner, to illustrate the dignity with which the exiled family of the Bourbons bore the continued rigours of fortune. When Napoleon was pursuing his projects for the establishment of a hereditary dynasty in his family in France, he caused a communication to be made to the Count de Lille, afterward Louis XVIII., then residing under the protection of the Prussian king at Königsberg, offering, in the event of his renouncing in his favour his right to the throne of France, to provide for him a principality, with an ample revenue, in Italy. But Louis answered in these dignified terms, worthy of the family from which he sprung: "I do not confound M. Bonaparte with those who have preceded him. I esteem his valour, his military talents; I am gratified by many acts of his administration, for the happiness of my people must ever be dear to my heart. But he deceives himself if he imagines that he will prevail upon me to surrender my rights. So far from it, he would establish them himself, if they could admit of doubt, by the step which he has taken at this moment. I know not the intentions of God to my family or myself, but I know the obligations which he has imposed upon me. As a Christian, I will discharge the duties which religion prescribes to my last breath; son of St. Louis, I will make myself be respected even in fetters; successor of Francis I., I wish ever to be able to say with him, 'All is lost except our honour.'"[†]

It was at the same period that Napoleon commenced the great undertaking which has so deservedly covered his memory with glory, and survived all the other achievements of his genius, the formation of a Civil Code, and the concentration of the heterogeneous laws of the monarchy and Republic into one consistent whole. In contemplating this great work, it is difficult whether to admire most the wisdom with which he called to his assistance the ablest and most ex-

perienced lawyers of the old régime, the readiness with which he apprehended the difficult and intricate questions which were brought under discussion, or the prudence with which he steered between the vehement passions and contending interests which arose in legislating for an empire composed of the remains of monarchical and Republican institutions. It is no longer the conqueror of Rivoli or Austerlitz whom we recognise; it is Solon legislating for a distracted people; it is Justinian digesting the treasures of ancient jurisprudence, that arises to our view; and the transient glories even of the imperial reign fade before the durable monument which his varied genius has erected in the permanent code of half of Europe.

It is observed by Lord Bacon, that when "laws have been heaped upon laws" Reflections on in such a state of confusion as to the difficulty render it necessary to revise them, of this subject. and collect their spirit into a new and intelligible system, those who accomplish such an heroic task have a good right to be named among the benefactors of mankind." Never was the justice of this observation more completely demonstrated than by the result of the labours of the First Consul in the formation of the Code Napoleon. The complication of the old laws of France, the conflicting authority of the civil law, the parliaments of the provinces, and the local customs, had formed a chaos of confusion which had suggested to many statesmen before the Revolution the necessity of some attempt to reduce them to a uniform system. By an astonishing effort of mental vigour, Pothier had contrived to extract out of this heterogeneous mass the elements of general jurisprudence, and followed out the principles of the Roman law with a power of generalization and clearness of expression to which there is nothing comparable in the whole annals of legal achievement. But his lucid works had not the weight of general law; they could not be referred to as paramount on every question; they contained principles to be followed from their equity, not rules to be obeyed from their authority. The difficulty of the task was immensely increased by the Revolution; by the total change in the most important branches of jurisprudence, personal liberty, the rights of marriage, the descent of property, and the privileges of citizenship which it occasioned, and the large inroads which revolutionary legislation had made on the broken and disjointed statutes of the monarchy.

To reform a system of law without destroying it is one of the most difficult tasks in political improvement, and requiring, perhaps more than any other change, a combination of practical knowledge with the desire of social amelioration. To retain statutes as they are, without ever modifying them according to the progress of society, is to make them fall behind the great innovator Time, and often become pernicious in their operation; to new model them, in conformity with the wishes of a heated generation, is almost certainly to incur unforeseen and irremediable evils. Nothing is more easy than to point out defects in established laws, because their inconvenience is felt, and the people generally lend a ready ear to those

* Thib., 335.

† Another *arrêt*, at the same period, regulated the costume of the persons employed in the legal profession. The robes of the judges were ordered to be red, and those of the bar black. During the Revolution, all the distinguishing marks had been abolished. The black robe which Molière had so exquisitely ridiculed had given way to the costume of the *sans-culottes*. At the same time, the old habiliments at the *Messe Rouge* were re-established, and the service was celebrated by the Archbishop of Paris. Everything breathed a return to the ancient régime. Cambacérès was the great promoter of these changes, well aware of the importance of whatever strikes the eye on the inconsiderate multitude.

—THIBAUDEAU, 338.

‡ Bour., v., 147. Bign., iii., 283, 287.

who vituperate existing institutions ; nothing is more difficult than to propose safe or expedient remedies, because hardly any foresight is adequate to estimate the ultimate effects which any considerable legal changes produce. They are, in general, calculated to remedy some known and experienced evil, and in so far as they effect that object, they are salutary in their operation ; but they too often go beyond that limit, and, in the pursuit of speculative good, induce unforeseen inconveniences much greater than those they remove. The last state of a nation, which has gone through the ordeal of legal innovation, is in general worse than the first.

The only way in which it is possible to avoid these dangers is to remedy experienced evils, and extend experienced benefits only, without advancing into the tempting but dangerous regions of speculative improvement. It is the clearest proof that the Code of Napoleon was formed on these wise principles, that it has not only survived the Empire which gave it birth, but continues, under new dynasties and different forms of government, to regulate the decisions of many nations who were leagued to bring about the overthrow of its author. Napoleon has said " that his fame in the eyes of posterity would rest even more on the code which bore his name than all the victories which he won," and its permanent establishment as the basis of the jurisprudence of half of Europe has already proved the truth of the prophecy.

Deviating altogether from the rash and presumptuous innovations of the Constituent Assembly, which took council of its own enthusiasm only, Napoleon commenced his legislative reforms by calling to his councils the most distinguished lawyers of the monarchy. Tronchet, Roederer, Portalis, Thibaudeau, Cambacérès, Le Brun, were his chief coadjutors in this Herculean task ;* but, although he required of these eminent legal characters the benefit of their extensive experience, he joined in the discussions himself, and struck out new and important views on the most abstract questions of civil right with a facility which astonished the counsellors, who had been accustomed to consider only his military exploits. To the judgment of none did the First Consul so readily defer as that of Tronchet ; notwithstanding his advanced age and monarchical prepossessions, he deemed no one so worthy as the illustrious defender of Louis XVI. to take the lead in framing the code for the Empire. " Tronchet," said he, " was the soul of the commission, Napoleon its mouthpiece. The former was gifted with a mind singularly profound and just, but he soared above those around him, spoke indifferently, and was seldom able to defend his opinions." The whole council, in consequence, was in general adverse to his propositions when they were first brought

forward ; but Napoleon, with the readiness and sagacity which he possessed in so remarkable a degree, saw at a glance where the point lay, and with no other materials than those which Tronchet had furnished, and hardly any previous acquaintance with the subject, brought forward such clear and lucid arguments as seldom failed to convince the whole assembly. He presided at almost all the meetings of the commission for the formation of the civil code, and took such a vivid interest in the debates, that he frequently remained at them six or eight hours a day. Free discussion in that assembly gave him the highest gratification ; he provoked it, sustained it, and shared in it. He spoke without preparation, without embarrassment, without pretensions ; in the style rather of free and animated conversation than premeditated or laboured discussion. He never appeared inferior to any members of the council, often equal to the ablest of them in the readiness with which he caught the point at issue, and the logical force with which he supported his opinions, and not unfrequently superior to any in the originality and vigour of his expressions. The varied powers and prodigious capacity of Napoleon's mind nowhere appeared in such brilliant colours as on those occasions, and would hardly appear credible if authentic evidence on the subject did not exist in the *procès verbaux* of those memorable discussions.*†

The limits of a work of this description render it impossible to enter into a survey of the many important subjects brought under review in the formation of the Code Napoleon. Two only can be noticed, as those on which the interests of society chiefly depend, the laws of succession, and those regarding the dissolution of marriage.

How clearly soever Napoleon saw and expressed the dangers of the minute subdivision of landed estates, and consequent destruction of a territorial noblesse, arising from the establishment of an equal division of property, whether in land or money, among the heirs of a deceased person, he found this system too firmly established to venture to shake it. It was identified in the eyes of all the active and energetic part of the nation with the first triumphs of the Revolution ; it had been carried by Mirabeau in the Constituent Assembly, with the general concurrence of the people, and had since become the foundation of so many private interests and individual prospects, that it was universally regarded as the great charter of the public liberties, and any infringement on it the first step towards a restoration of feudal oppression. Great as was the power, apparently unbounded the influence, of Napoleon, it would have been instantly shattered by any attempt to break in upon this fundamental institution. Wisely abstaining, therefore, from change,

* Their respective merits were thus stated by Napoleon : " Tronchet is a man of the most enlightened views, and a singularly clear head for his advanced years. Portalis would be the most eloquent orator if he knew when to stop. Thibaudeau is not adapted for that sort of discussion ; he is too cold. He requires, like Lucien, the animation and fire of the tribune. Cambacérès is the advocate-general ; he pleads sometimes on one side, sometimes on another. The most difficult part of the duty is the reduction of their ideas into the *procès verbal* ; but we have the best of *rédauteurs* in Le Brun."—THIBAudeau, 415

* *Thib.*, 412. *Bour.*, v., 122, 123. *Las Casas*, iii., 241, 242.

† Bertrand de Molleville, formerly minister of marine to Louis XVI., and a man of no ordinary capacity, said, in reference to these discussions, " Napoleon was certainly an extraordinary man ; we were very far, indeed, from appreciating him on the other side of the water. From the moment that I looked into the discussions on the civil code, I conceived the most profound admiration for his capacity. It is utterly inconceivable where he acquired so much information on these subjects."—*LAS CASAS*, iii., 249, 250.

where he could not introduce improvement, he contented himself with consolidating the existing laws on the subject, and establishing in the Code Napoleon a general system of succession, fundamentally at variance with that in all the other states of Europe, and of which the ultimate consequences are destined to be more important than any of the other changes brought about by the Revolution.

By this statute, which may be termed the revolutionary law of succession, the right of primogeniture and the distinction between landed and movable property were taken away, and inheritance of every sort divided in equal portions among those in an equal degree of consanguinity to a deceased person.* This inde-

* By the decree of April 19, 1803, the law of succession was established in the following manner:

Sketch of the French revolutionary system of succession.

1. The law pays no regard either to the nature of property, or the quarter from which it comes, in regulating succession.

2. Every succession which devolves to ascendants or collaterals is divided into two equal parts; the one for the relations by the father's side, the other for those of the mother.

3. The proximity of relations is determined by the number of generations by which they are separated from the deceased; in the line direct by the number of descents; in the collateral, by the number which separates each from the common ancestor, up and down again. Thus two brothers are related in the second degree; the uncle and nephew in the third; cousins-germain in the fourth.

4. In all cases where representation is admitted, the representatives enter as a body into the place, and enjoy the rights of the person represented. The right obtains *ad infinitum* in the direct line of descendants, but not in that of ascendants. In the collateral line, it is admitted in favour of the children of a brother or sister deceased, whether they are called to the succession concurrently with their uncles or aunts, or not. In all cases where representation is admitted, the succession is divided *per stirpes*; and if the same branch has left several descendants, the subdivision in the same manner takes place *per stirpes*, and the members of each subdivision divide what devolves to them *per capita*.—*Code Civil*, § 731-745.

- II. Children or their descendants succeed to their father or mother, grandfather, grandmother, or other ascendants, without distinction of sex or primogeniture, and whether of the same or different marriages. They succeed *per capita* when they are all related in the first degree; *per stirpes* when they are called in whole or in part by representation. If the defunct leaves no issue or descendants, his succession divides according to the following rules:

- III. 1. In default of descendants, the brothers and sisters are called to the succession, to the exclusion of collaterals or their descendants. They succeed either *per capita* or *per stirpes*, in the same way as descendants.

2. If the father and mother of a deceased person survive him, his brothers and sisters, or their descendants, are only called to half of the succession; if the one or the other, only to three fourths.

3. The division of this half or three fourths is made on the same principles as that of descendants, if the collaterals are of the same marriage; if of different, the succession is divided equally between the paternal and maternal lines.—*Code Civil*, § 750, 755.

- IV. In default of collaterals or their issue, ascendants succeed according to the following rules:

1. The succession divides into two equal parts, of which the one half ascends to the father's side, the other to the mother's.

2. The ascendant, the nearest in degree, receives the half belonging to his line, to the exclusion of the more remote.

3. Ascendants in the same degree take *per capita*, there being no representation in the ascending line.

4. If the father and mother of a deceased person, who dies without issue, survive him, and he leaves brothers and sisters, or their descendants, the succession is divided into two parts, one to the ascendants, one to the collaterals. But if the father and mother have predeceased him, their share accrues to that of the collaterals.—*Code Civil*, § 746, 749.

- V. 1. Voluntary gifts, whether by deeds *inter vivos* or by testament, cannot exceed the half of the deceased's effects if he leaves one child; the third, if two; the fourth, if three or more.

2. Under the description of children in this article are included descendants in whatever degree estimating these, however, *per stirpes*, not *per capita*.

feasible right of children to their parents' succession was declared to be a half, if one child was left; two thirds, if two; three fourths, if three or more: all entails or limitations of any sort were abolished. The effects of such a system, co-operating with the immense subdivision of landed estates which took place from the sale of the forfeited properties during the Revolution, have been incalculable. It is estimated by the Duke de Gaeta, long minister of finance to Napoleon, that in 1815 there were 13,059,000 individuals in France belonging to the families of agricultural proprietors, and 710,500 belonging to the families of proprietors not engaged in agriculture, all living on the revenue of profit derived from their proper ties.* As may be supposed, where so extreme a subdivision of property has taken place, the situation of the greater part of these little proprietors is indigent in the extreme. Prodigious effects of this law in subdividing land in France.

It appears, from the authority of the same author, that there were in 1815 no less than 10,400,000 persons taxed in France, and that of this immense number only 17,000 paid direct taxes to the amount of 1000 francs, or £40 a year each,† while no less than 8,000,000 were taxed at a sum below twenty-one francs, or sixteen shillings. Direct taxes to the amount of sixteen shillings correspond to an income of five times the amount, or £4 a year; to the amount of £40 a year, to one at the same rate of £200. Thus the incomes of only 17,000 proprietors in France exceeded £200 a year, while there were nearly 8,000,000 who were worth in property only £4 per annum.‡

3. Voluntary gifts, either by deeds *inter vivos* or testamentary deeds, cannot exceed the half of the effects of the deceased if he leaves no descendants, but ascendants in both the paternal and maternal line, or three fourths if one of these only.—*Code Civil*, § 913, 915.

- VI. Natural children have a right of succession to their parents alone, if they have been legally recognised, but not otherwise.

1. If the father or mother have left legitimate issue, the natural child has a right to a third of what he would have had right to if he had been legitimate.

2. It extends to a half if the deceased left no descendants, but ascendants, or brothers or sisters.

3. It extends to three fourths when he leaves neither descendants nor ascendants, nor brothers nor sisters; to the whole when he leaves neither.—*Code Civil*, § 756, 758.

* Gaeta, ii., 335.

† Taxed at	Number of persons taxed.	Produce of tax.	
		Francs.	Francs.
1000 francs, or . . . 40L.	17,745	31,649,468	or 1,130,000
500 to 1000, or from 20 to 40L.	40,773	27,633,016	or 1,140,000
101 to 500, or from 4 to 20.	459,337	90,411,706	or 3,500,000
51 to 100, or from 2 to 4.	694,643	41,181,488	or 1,650,000
31 to 50, or from 25s. to 2L.	689,637	27,326,518	or 1,300,000
21 to 30, or from 16s. to 25s.	704,571	17,632,083	or 750,000
Below 21 frs., or below 16s. 10d.	7,887,110	47,178,649	or 1,900,000
	10,414,721	282,935,928	11,140,000

When it is recollected that the contribution *foncière* in France is fully 20 *per cent.* upon all estates without exception, this table gives the clearest proof of the changes in property brought about by the Revolution. It results from it, that in 1815 there were only 17,000 proprietors in the whole country who were worth £200 a year and upward: a fact incredible, if not stated on such indisputable authority, and speaking volumes on the disastrous effects of that convulsion.

‡ Due de Gaeta, ii., 327. Peuchet, 246, 247.

§ From the report to the minister of the finances, published in 1817 by the commissioners on the cadastre, it appears that at that period there were 10,063,000 separate properties assessed to the land-tax in France. This number has since that time been constantly increasing, as might be expected under the revolutionary order of succession. The numbers were,

1816. 10,063,751

* Gaeta, ii., 337.

† Peuchet, 286, 287. *Ant.*, ii.

Singular attachment of the modern French to this law, which precludes all real liberty.

It is a singular fact, pointing apparently to an important law in the moral world, that when men yield to the seductions of passion, and engage in the career of iniquity, they are led by an almost irresistible impulse to covet the very changes which are to lead to their own destruction, and cling with invincible tenacity to the institutions which are calculated to defeat the very objects on account of which all these crimes have been committed. The confiscation of property in France was the great and crying sin of the Revolution, because it extended the consequences of present violence to future ages, and injured the latest generations on account of the political differences of the present time; and it is precisely that circumstance which has rendered hopeless all the efforts for freedom made by the French people. By interesting so great a number of persons in the work of spoliation, and extending so far the jealousy at the nobles, by whom the confiscated properties might be resumed, it has led to the permanent settlement of the law of succession on the footing of equal division and perfect equality. Opinion there as elsewhere, founded on interest, has followed in the same direction. No doctrine is so generally prevalent in France as that this vast change is the leading benefit conferred upon the country by the Revolution, and yet nothing can be so evident to an impartial spectator as that it is precisely the circumstance which has ever since rendered nugatory all attempts to establish public freedom there, because it has totally destroyed the features and the elements of European civilization, and left only Indian ryots engaged in hopeless contest with a metropolis wielding the influence of a central government, and the terrors of military power. The universality of the illusion under which the French labour on this subject is owing to the wide extent of the instinct which leads the Revolutionary party to shun everything that seems to favour an approach even to the restoration of the dispossessed proprietors; and in their terror of this remote and chimerical evil, they have adopted measures which, by preventing the growth of any hereditary class between the throne and the peasant, have rendered the establishment of constitutional freedom utterly impracticable, and doomed the first of European monarchies to the slavery and decrepitude of Oriental despotism. By such mysterious means does human iniquity, even in this world, work out its merited punishment, and so indissoluble is the chain which unites guilty excess with ultimate retribution.

1826 10,296,693
1833 10,814,799

Allowing that there are several separate properties often accumulated in the same individuals, this implies, in the estimation of the French writers, at least 3,000,000 separate proprietors. The total clear produce of the agriculture of France is estimated by Dupin at 4,500,000,000 francs, or £180,000,000 sterling. Supposing that the half of that sum, or £90,000,000 sterling, is the annual clear profit of cultivation, after defraying its charges, it follows that the average income of the eight millions of French proprietors, including all the great estates, is about £11 a year! Nothing more is requisite to explain the experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in that country. It exhibits Asiatic, not European civilization.—See SARRAN'S *Contre Révolution de 1830*, ii., 273, 274. *Deux Ans. de Règne de Louis Philippe*, 271, and DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, i., 7.

The principle of admitting divorce in many cases was too firmly established in the customs and habits of France to admit of its being shaken. Important deliberations, however, took place on the subject of the causes which should permit it. The First Consul, who entertained very singular ideas on the subject of marriage and the proper destiny of women,* warmly supported the looser side; and it was at length agreed, 1. That the husband might in every case sue out a divorce on the account of the adultery of his wife. 2. That she might divorce her husband for adultery in those cases only where he brought his concubine into their common habitation. 3. Divorce was permitted for severe and grave injuries inflicted by the one spouse on the other; for the condemnation of either to an infamous punishment. 4. The mutual consent of the spouses steadily adhered to, and expressed in a way prescribed by law, is also a sufficient cause of divorce.† The only limitations in the last case were, that it could not take place until two, nor after twenty years of married life had elapsed, or after the wife had attained the age of forty-five; that the parents or other ascendants of the spouses should concur, and that the husband should be above twenty-five, and the wife above twenty-one years of age.‡ It may easily be conceived what a wide door such a facility in dissolving marriage opened for the introduction of dissolute manners and irregular connexions; and in its ultimate effects upon society this change is destined to be not less important, or subversive of public freedom, than the destruction of the landed aristocracy by the revolutionary law of succession.§ In such a state of society, the facility of divorce and dissolution of manners act and react upon each other. Napoleon admitted this himself. "The foundlings," says he, "have multiplied tenfold since the Revolution."|| But it is not in so corrupted a source that we are to look for the fountains either of public freedom or durable prosperity.

The effects of these great measures carried into execution by Napoleon are thus justly and emphatically summed up in his own words: "In the course of the four years of the con-

Great effects of these salutary changes of Napoleon.

* When the article in the code, "The husband owes protection to his wife, she obedience to him," was read out, Napoleon observed, "The angel said so to Adam and Eve: the word *obedience* is in an especial manner of value in Paris, where women consider themselves at liberty to do whatever they please; I do not say it will produce a beneficial effect on all, but on some it may. Women in general are occupied only with amusements and the toilet. If I could be secure of never growing old, I would never wish a wife. Should we not add, that a woman should not be permitted to see any one who is displeasing to her husband? Women have constantly the words in their mouths, 'What, would you pretend to hinder me from seeing any one whom I choose?'"—THIBAUDEAU, 436.

In these expressions it is easy to discern that Napoleon's thoughts were running on Josephine, whose extravagance in dress and passion for amusement knew no bounds. But, independent of this, he had little romance or gallantry in his disposition, and repeatedly expressed his opinion that the Oriental system of shutting up women was preferable to the European, which permitted them to mingle in society. † Code Civil, 229, 233. ‡ Ibid., 275, 278.

§ From the returns lately made, it appears that, in the year 1824, out of 28,812 births, only 18,591 were legitimate, 2378 being of children born in concubinage, and 7843 children brought to the founding hospitals.—DUPIN, *Force Com. de France*, 99, 100. || Las Cas., v., 41

sulship, the First Consul had succeeded in uniting all the parties who divided France; the list of emigrants was infinitely reduced; all who chose to return had received their pardon; all their unalienated property had been restored, excepting the woods, of which, nevertheless, they were permitted to enjoy the life-rent; none remained exiled but a few persons attached to the Bourbon princes, or such as were so deeply implicated in resistance to the Revolution as to be unwilling to avail themselves of the amnesty. Thousands of emigrants had returned under no other condition but that of taking the oath of fidelity to the Constitution. The First Consul had thus the most delightful consolation which a man can have, that of having reorganized above thirty thousand families, and restored to their country the descendants of the men who had illustrated France during so many ages. The altars were raised from the dust; the exiled or transported priests were restored to their dioceses and parishes, and paid by the Republic. The concordat had rallied the clergy round the consular throne; the spirit of the western provinces was essentially changed; immense public works gave bread to all the persons thrown out of employment during the preceding convulsions; canals everywhere were formed to improve the internal navigation; a new city had arisen in the centre of La Vendée; eight great roads traversed that secluded province, and large sums had been distributed to the Vendéans to restore their houses and churches, destroyed by orders of the Committee of Public Safety.*

The difficulty with which the restoration of order in a country recently emerging from the fury of a revolution was attended, cannot be better stated than by the same masterly hand. "We are told that all the First Consul had to look to was to do justice: but to whom? To the proprietors whom the Revolution had violently despoiled of their properties, for this only, that they had been faithful to their legitimate sovereign, and the principle of honour which they had inherited from their ancestors? Or to the new proprietors, who had adventured their money on the faith of laws flowing from an illegitimate authority? Justice! but to whom? To the soldiers mutilated in the fields of Germany, La Vendée, and Quiberon, who were arrayed under the white standard or the English leopards in the firm belief that they were serving the cause of their king against a usurping tyranny; or to the million of citizens who, forming round the frontiers a wall of brass, had so often saved their country from the inveterate hostility of its enemies, and bore to so transcendent a height the glory of the French eagle? Justice! but for whom? For that clergy, the model and the example of every Christian virtue, stripped of its birthright, the reward of fifteen hundred years of beneficence; or the recent acquirers, who had converted the convents into workshops, the churches into warehouses, and turned to profane uses all that had been deemed most holy for ages?†"

Amid these great undertakings, the internal prosperity of France was daily increasing. The budget for the year 1803 presented a considerable in-

crease over that of 1802.* Various public works, calculated to encourage industry, were everywhere set on foot during that year; chambers of commerce established in all the principal cities of the Republic; a grand exhibition of all the different branches of industry formed at the Louvre, which has ever since continued with signal success; the Hôtel des Invalides received a new and more extended organization, adapted to the immense demands upon its beneficence which the wounds and casualties of the war had occasioned;† a portion of the veterans settled in national domains as a reward for their services during the war;‡ a new establishment was formed at Fontainebleau for the education of youths of the higher class for the military profession;§ and the great school of St. Cyr, near Paris, opened gratuitously to the children of those who had died in the service of their country;|| an academy was set on foot at Compiègne for five hundred youths, where they were instructed in all the branches of manufactures and the mechanical arts;¶ the Institute received a new organization, in which the class of moral and political science was totally suppressed—a change highly symptomatic of the resolution of the First Consul to put an end to those visionary speculations from which so many calamities had ensued to France;** while the general councils of the departments were authorized, in cases where it seemed expedient, to increase the slender incomes of the bishops and archbishops, a power which received a liberal interpretation under the Empire, and rapidly led to the cordial support of the clergy, throughout all France, to the consular government.††

Nor was it only in measures of legislation that the indefatigable activity and April 8, 1803. beneficent intentions of the First Consul were manifested. Then Vast improvements of Paris. were projected or commenced those great public improvements which deservedly rendered the name of Napoleon so dear to the French, and still excite the admiration even of the passing traveller in every part of the kingdom. That extensive inland navigation was set on foot which, under the name of the Canal at St. Quentin, was destined to unite the Scheldt and the Oise; other canals were begun, intended to unite the waters of the Saone to the Yonne, the Saone to the Rhine, the Meuse to the Rhine and the Scheldt, the Rance to the Villaine, and thereby open an internal communication between the channel and the ocean; the canals of Arles and Aigues Mortes were opened, and an inexhaustible supply of fresh water was procured for the capital by the Canal of Ourcq. This great step led to farther improvements. Paris had long suffered under the want of that necessary element, and the means of cleaning

* The budget for that year stood thus, being an increase of 17,000,000 francs, or £700,000, over the preceding year:			
Direct taxes	305,105,000 francs, or	£12,300,000	
Registers	200,106,000 — or	8,100,000	
Customs	36,924,000 — or	1,400,000	
Postoffice	11,205,000 — or	450,000	
Lottery	15,326,000 — or	620,000	
Salt tax	2,300,000 — or	92,000	
	570,966,000	or	£22,942,000

—See BIGNON, iii. 246, and GAETA, i. 303.

† July 8, 1802. ‡ June 15, 1803. § Jan. 28, 1803.

|| Oct. 8, 1803. ¶ April, 1803. ** Jan., 1803.

†† Big., ii., 252, 258.

* Nap. in Month., ii., 225.

† Ibid.

or irrigating the streets were miserably deficient; but, under the auspices of Napoleon, this great want was soon supplied. Numerous fountains arose in every part of the city, alike refreshing to the eye and salutary to the health of the inhabitants; the beautiful cascade of the Chateau d'Eau cooled the atmosphere on the Boulevards du Temple, while the waterworks and lofty *jets d'eau* in the gardens of the Tuileries attracted additional crowds to the shady alleys and marbled parterres of that splendid spot. Immense works, undertaken to improve

and enlarge the harbours of Boulogne, Havre, Cherbourg, Rochelle, Marseilles, Antwerp, and Ostend, sufficiently demonstrated that Napoleon had not abandoned the hope of wresting the sceptre of the seas from Great Britain; while the order to erect, in the centre of the Place Vendôme, a pillar in imitation of the Column of Trajan, to be surmounted by the statue of Charlemagne, already revealed the secret design of his imperial successor to reconstruct the Empire of the West.*

CHAPTER XXXVI.

NAPOLEON'S ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL THRONE.

JANUARY.—MAY, 1804.

ARGUMENT.

Favourable Prospects of Napoleon's Government in the Beginning of 1804.—Discontent, however, of the Republican part of the Army.—Pichegru in London.—Royalist Movements in France.—Project of Fouché for getting up a Conspiracy composed of Royalists and Republicans.—The Royalist Leaders are landed on the French Coast.—Artful Measures of Fouché to draw them on.—He reveals the Plot to Napoleon, and is, in consequence, restored to Power.—Arrest of Moreau.—Consternation which it excites in Paris.—Seizure of Pichegru, and of Georges Cadoudal.—History and Character of the Duke d'Enghien.—Generous Conduct of his Father on receiving a Proposal to assassinate Napoleon.—His Arrest is unjustly resolved on by Napoleon and the Council of State.—Occupations of the Prince at that Time.—He is seized and conducted to Strasbourg.—Fruitless Intercession of Josephine.—He had been vainly warned of his Danger.—Is removed to Paris, and sent to Vincennes, where he is delivered over to a Military Commission by Napoleon's Orders.—Gross Iniquity committed towards him.—He is convicted upon his Declaration only, without any Evidence.—His noble Demeanour before the Judges.—Sentence and Execution.—His Innocence is completely established after his Death.—Napoleon's Vindication of himself on this Subject at St. Helena.—Remarkable Retribution which reached all the Actors in this Murder.—Consternation which it excited in Paris, and in the Foreign Ambassadors there.—Courageous Conduct of M. Chateaubriand.—Opinion which Napoleon entertained of him.—Death of Pichegru.—Surgeon's Report on his Body.—Reflections on the probable Privy of the First Consul to his Death.—Napoleon's Defence of himself on this Subject at St. Helena.—Intense Interest excited at Paris.—Letter of Moreau to Napoleon.—Stoical Indifference of Georges.—Condemnation of the Prisoners.—Public Feeling on the Subject.—Clemency of the First Consul after the Convictions were obtained.—His Lenity to Moreau.—Death of Captain Wright in Prison at Paris.—Napoleon resolves to assume the Imperial Crown.—This explains his murdering the Duke d'Enghien.—First branching of the Project to the Senate.—The Tribunal is put forward to make the Proposal in Public.—Speech of the Mover on the Occasion.—Honourable Resistance of Carnot.—Universal Adulation with which Napoleon was surrounded.—His Answer to the Address of the Senate.—Key which it affords to his whole Conduct on the Throne.—He is declared Emperor of the French.—General Concurrence of the Nation.—Rank conferred on his Family.—Absolute Power vested in the Emperor.—Creation of the Marshals of the Empire.—Rapid Progress of Court Etiquette.—Dignified Protest of Louis XVIII.—Reflections on these Events.—Difference between the English and French Revolutions, which was all owing to the Violence and Injustice of the French Convulsion.—Vast Concentration of Influence at this Period in the Hands of Government.—Total Destruction of the Liberty of the Press.—Inference in Political Science to which this leads.

It were well for the memory of Napoleon if the historian could stop here; and, after having recounted the matchless glories of his military exploits, conclude with the admirable wisdom of his civil administration, and the felicity with which, amid so many difficulties, he recon-

structed the disjointed members of society after the Revolution. But history is not formed of panegyric; and, after discharging the pleasing duty of recording the great and blameless achievements which signalized the consulate, there remains the painful task of narrating the foul transactions, the dark and bloody deeds which ushered in the Empire.

Everything seemed to smile upon Napoleon.

In the civil administration, all were reconciled to the consulate for life, or submitted in silence to an authority which they could not resist. The army, dazzled by his brilliant exploits, rallied round his standard, and sought only to give expression to its admiration for the illustrious chief who had raised to such an unprecedented height the glory of the Republican eagles. The people, worn out with the sufferings and anxieties of the Revolution, joyfully submitted to a government which had given them that first of blessings, security and protection; and, forgetting the dreams of enthusiasm and the fumes of Democracy, returned to their separate pursuits, and sought in the enjoyments of private life a compensation for the experienced vanity of their political anticipations.†

But among the generals and higher officers of the army the same unanimity by no means prevailed. Bernadotte, the Republican brother-in-law to Joseph Bonaparte, was constantly in opposition to the First Consul. Early attached to Republican principles, he viewed with undisguised jealousy the evident approaches which the chief magistrate was making to arbitrary power; and in consequence of his influence, a number of officers in his staff and in the garrison of Rennes voted against the consulate for life. Moreau, however, was the head of the malecontent party. On every occasion he made it a point to oppose, to the increasing splendour of military dress and uniformity of court etiquette, the simplicity and uniformity of Republican costume. The conqueror of Austria traversed, amid crowds of brilliant uniforms, the Place Carrousel, or the saloons of the Tuileries, in the plain dress of a citizen, without any sort

* Bign., ii., 252, 264.

† Thib., 321.

of decoration. He declined, on various pretences, repeated invitations to the Tuileries, and at length was no longer asked to appear. He often manifested to the First Consul, when they met in public, a degree of coldness which must have estranged persons even less jealous of each other's reputation than the heroes of Marengo and Hohenlinden. Nothing could induce him to attend the ceremony performed in Notre Dame on occasion of the concordat; and at a dinner of military men at his house on the same day, he openly expressed the greatest contempt for the whole proceeding. Female jealousy added to the many causes of discord which already existed between these rival chiefs: Madame Hulot, his mother-in-law, and Madame Moreau, his wife, were influenced with the most violent jealousy at the elevation of Josephine, and unceasingly urged Moreau to step forward, and openly claim that place in society and the state to which his dignity and services so well entitled him. So far did this spirit of rivalry proceed, that Madame Moreau could not be prevented from breaking out into unseemly expressions when, on one occasion of a visit, she was detained a few minutes waiting in the antechambers of Josephine; and on one occasion she was only prevented by force from taking the precedence, at a public assembly, of the wife of the First Consul.*

While Moreau was thus insensibly and unavoidably becoming the leader of the discontented Republicans in Paris, circumstances were preparing for another distinguished general of the Revolution the chief direction of the Royalist party. Escaped from the deserts of Sinamari, Pichegru had found an asylum in London, where he entered into close correspondence with the French emigrants who endeavoured in that capital to uphold the sinking cause of the monarchy. His great abilities and acknowledged reputation procured for him the confidence of the British government, and he was occasionally consulted by them, especially in 1799, as to the probability of a Royalist movement declaring itself in the south of France.†

On the renewal of the war, various attempts were made by the Royalist emigrants in London to effect an insurrection in favour of the exiled family in different parts of France.‡ The object of these attempts was the restoration of the Bourbons, and to effect the expulsion of the First Consul from the throne; but it formed no part of the plan of any design, at least in which Louis XVIII. or any of the royal family were participants, to imbrue their hands in his blood, or do aught to him that he had not repeatedly done to every state with which he was in hostility. The celebrated Chouan chief, Georges, was the soul of the conspiracy. He had resisted all the offers of the First Consul, who was anxious to engage him in his service; and in a secret interview, the elevation and disinterestedness of his character excited the admiration of that

keen observer of human character.* Since that time he had resided chiefly in London, and was deeply implicated, along with Pichegru, in a conspiracy which had for its object to rouse the Royalist party in France, and overturn the government of the First Consul.†

On the existence of these opposite elements of conspiracy, emanating from the extremes of the Republican and Royalist parties, Fouché founded the project of uniting them in a conspiracy which might at once prove ruinous to both, and restore him to that consideration in the eyes of the First Consul which it had been his unceasing object to regain since his dismissal from office. The words of the senatus consultum were constantly present to his mind, that "if difficult circumstances should again arise, there was no one to whom the ministry of police might so fitly be intrusted;" and if he could only engage the two greatest generals in the Republic, next to the First Consul, in a conspiracy against his government, there seemed to be no doubt that he would attain the object of his ambition. With this view, in the end of 1803, he began to instigate some of their mutual friends to effect a reconciliation between these illustrious characters. The Abbé David was the first person employed in this service; but, having been arrested and sent to the Temple, his place was supplied by General Lajolais, a relation of Generals Klingin and Wurmser, who came to London, arranged with Pichegru the period of his departure for Paris, and returned soon after to the French capital to prepare matters for his reception there.‡

Meanwhile Georges, Polignac, Lajolais, and the other conspirators had been landed on the coast of Normandy, and had cautiously and secretly advanced to Paris, not with the view of engaging in any plot at that time, but to obtain accurate information as to the real state of the Royalist party in the capital. All their measures were known to the police, by means of secret information communicated by Lajolais and other traitors in the party: the points of their descent, the places where they were to sleep every night, were regularly detailed to Fouché. Everything was made easy by the agents of the police. They were allowed to come to the capital, and remain there for a considerable time unmolested. Several meetings took place between Georges, Pichegru, Lajolais, and the other leaders of the party,

Project of Fouché for getting up a conspiracy of Republicans and Royalists.

The Royalist leaders are landed on the French coast, Jan. 16, 1804.

* "You cannot be permitted," said Napoleon to him in 1800, "to remain in the Morbihan; but I offer you the rank of lieutenant-general in my armies." "You do me injustice," replied Georges; "I have taken an oath of fidelity to the house of Bourbon, which I will never violate." The First Consul then offered him a pension of 100,000 francs if he would abandon the cause of the king and remain quiet; but he was proof also against this temptation. He learned soon after that an order for his arrest had been given, and set off the same day for Boulogne, from whence, with M. Hyde Neuville, he reached England in safety.* Napoleon, alluding to this interview, observed, "Georges evinced that elevation of character which belongs to a great mind; but he was so enthusiastic in favour of his own party that we could come to no understanding. His mind was cast in the true mould; in my hands he would have done great things. I know how to appreciate his firmness of character; I would have given it a good direction."†

† Bour., v., 273, 273. Norv., ii., 273.

* Beauch., iv., 512.

† Bour., vi., 158, 159.

* Thib., 321, 323. Bour., v., 232. Las Cas., vii., 247.

† Big., iii., 318. Norv., ii., 272.

‡ "I must do Louis XVIII.," said Napoleon, "the justice to say, that I never discovered his participation in any plot against my life, although it was permanent elsewhere; his operations were confined to systematic plans and ideal changes."—LAS CASAS, ii., 368.

and Moreau had a conference with Pichegru on the Boulevard of Madeleine, and another in his own house.* The principles of Moreau, however, were those of the Revolution, and therefore it was impossible that he could agree with the Royalists upon ulterior measures, and the only purpose of the conferences was to put the Chouan chiefs in possession of the views of this illustrious leader of the Republican party. The agents of Fouché had given the Royalists to understand that Moreau would readily enter into their views; but in this they soon found that they had been completely deceived; and, accordingly, it was proved at the trial that Moreau declared to Pichegru that he knew of no conspiracy whatever; and that Polignac was heard to say to one of the party, "All is going wrong; we do not understand each other; Moreau does not keep his word; we have been deceived." Discouraged by these appearances, the conspirators were about to leave Paris, and Georges was on the point of setting out for La Vendée.†

But matters had now arrived at that point when Fouché deemed it expedient to divulge the information he had acquired, and reap the fruit of his intrigues. He had previously written to Napoleon that "the air was

Fouché reveals the plot to Napoleon, and is restored to power.

taken to Napoleon that "the air was

* The accurate intelligence which the secret police of Feb. 17, 1804. Fouché had of all the proceedings of the Royalist leaders, and the art with which they led them into the snare prepared for them, is completely proved by the proclamation published by the government on the day of their arrest. "In the year 1803," said Regnier, the head of the police, "a criminal reconciliation took place between Pichegru and Moreau, two men between whom honour should have placed an eternal barrier. The police seized at Calais one of their agents at the moment when he was preparing to return for the second time to England. In his possession were found all the documents which proved the reality of an accommodation inexplicable on any other principle but the connexion which crime occasions. Meanwhile the plot advanced. Lajolais, the friend and confidant of Pichegru, passed over secretly from Paris to London, and from London to Paris, communicating to Moreau the sentiments of Pichegru, and to Pichegru those of Moreau. The brigands of Georges were all this time preparing, underhand, at Paris, the execution of their joint projects. A place was fixed on between Dieppe and Trepot, at a distance from observation, where the brigands of England, brought thither in English ships of war, disembarked without being perceived, and there they met with persons corrupted to receive them; men paid to guide them during the night, from one station to another, as far as Paris. There they found rooms ready hired for them by trusty guardians; they lodged in different quarters at Chaillot, in the Rue de Bac, in the Faubourg St. Marceau, in the Marais. Georges and eight brigands first disembarked; then Coster St. Victor and ten others; and in the first days of this month a third party arrived, consisting of Pichegru, Lajolais, and others; the conspirators met at the farm of La Potterie; Georges and Pichegru arrived at Paris. They lodged in the same house, surrounded by thirty brigands, whom Georges commanded. They met with General Moreau; the day, the hour, the place where the first conference was held, were known: a second was fixed on, but not realized: a third and a fourth took place in the house of Moreau himself. The traces of Georges and Moreau have been followed from house to house; those who aided in their debarkation; those who, under cloud of night, conducted them from post to post; those who gave them an asylum at Paris; their confidants, their accomplices, Lajolais, the chief go-between, and General Moreau, have been arrested."—Bour., v., 293-295.

† Bour., v., 283, 287. Norv., ii., 274, 275.
 ‡ This is established by the testimony of Napoleon himself: "Real (the head of the police) told me," said Napoleon, "that when Moreau and Pichegru were together, they could not come to an understanding, as Georges would undertake nothing but for the interest of the Bourbons. He had, therefore, a plan, but Moreau had none; he wished to overturn my power, but had no person in view to put in my place. It was no wonder, therefore, they could not come to terms of agreement."—Bour., vi., 160.

full of poniards," and prepared him, by various mysterious communications, to expect some important intelligence. Regnier, who was intrusted with the duties, though not the situation, of minister of police, was totally ignorant of what was going forward, and confidently maintained that Pichegru had dined a few days before in the neighbourhood of London, when Fouché arrived with evidence that he had been for some time in Paris. Napoleon, upon this, devolved the farther conduct of the affair upon the ex-minister, whose superior information was now clearly manifested, and the immediate charge of the matter was intrusted to Real, one of his creatures, with orders to take his instructions from Fouché alone. At length, matters being ripe for the *dénouement*, the whole suspected persons, to the number of forty-five, with the exception of Moreau, Georges, and Pichegru, who had not yet been discovered, were arrested at once in Paris, and thrown into prison. Among them were two young men of noble family and generous dispositions, destined to a melancholy celebrity in future times—Counts Armand and Jules Polignac.*

Moreau was the first of the three who was seized. Charles d'Hozter, one of Feb. 15, 1804. the prisoners, had attempted to Arrest of Moreau.

Arrest of Moreau. dying declarations, wherein he had implicated that general, were made use of as a ground to order his arrest, although the subsequent report by Regnier admitted that the police had been throughout privy to all his meetings with the conspirators. Returning from his country estate to Paris, he was arrested and conveyed to the Temple; and on the morning of the 17th, all Paris was astonished by the following order of the day, addressed to the garrison of the capital: "Fifty brigands have penetrated into the capital; Georges and General Pichegru were at their head. Their coming was occasioned by a man who is yet numbered among our defenders, by General Moreau, who was yesterday consigned to the hands of the national justice. Their design was, after having assassinated the First Consul, to have delivered over France to the horrors of a civil war, and all the terrible convulsions of a counter-revolution."†

No words can convey an adequate idea of the consternation which prevailed in Consternation Paris on this intelligence being pro- which it excites in Paris. mulgated. Moreau was looked up to by a numerous and powerful party, especially in the army, as one of the greatest men in the Revolution; his name was illustrated by the most glorious exploits; the simplicity and modesty of his private life had long endeared him to all classes, and especially the numerous body who were enamoured of Republican manners. To find so illustrious a name coupled with brigands, to hear the known supporter of Republican principles accused of a design to bring about a counter-revolution, was so violent a revulsion, so inconceivable a change, as to excite in the highest degree the suspicions and passions of the people. The Revolutionists regarded Moreau as the leader of their party, and the only consistent supporter of their principles: the soldiers looked back with pride to his mili-

* Norv., ii., 276. Bour., v., 274, 275, 287.

† Norv., ii., 276.

tary achievements, and burned with indignation at the incredible imputations cast upon his honour; the ancient and ill-extinguished jealousy of the armies of Italy and the Rhine broke forth again with redoubled fury; the latter openly murmured at his arrest, and declared that the First Consul was about to sacrifice the greatest general of the Republic to his ambitious designs; he had then good cause to congratulate himself that Richépanse and twenty-five thousand of the conquerors of Hohenlinden had met with an untimely end on the shores of St. Domingo.*†

Napoleon, however, was not intimidated. Feb. 28, 1804. The arrest of Moreau was soon followed up by that of Pichegru, And of Pichegru. who was seized in his bed a fortnight after. It was not without difficulty that this renowned leader was made prisoner; his ready presence of mind, undaunted spirit, and prodigious personal strength, made it no easy matter to secure him, even under circumstances the most favourable to the assailants. He was at length betrayed by an old friend, in whose house he had sought refuge. This infamous wretch, who was named Le Blanc, had the baseness to reveal his place of retreat for 100,000 crowns. "His treachery," says Napoleon, "was literally a disgrace to humanity."‡ Guided by this traitor, and fully informed as to the means of resistance which he always had at his command, a party of police, strongly armed, entered his bedroom at night, by means of false keys furnished by their perfidious assistant. They found the general asleep, with a lamp burning on a table near the bed, and loaded pistols by his side. Advancing on tiptoe, they overturned the table so as to extinguish the light, and sprung upon their victim before he was aware of their approach. Suddenly awaking, he exerted his strength with undaunted resolution, and struggled long and violently with the assailants. He was at length, however, overpowered by numbers, bound hand and foot, and conducted, naked as he was, to the Temple.§||

The arrest of Pichegru was immediately followed by a decree of the senate, Feb. 26, 1804. which suspended for two years trial by jury in all the departments of the Republic "for the crimes of treason, attempts on the person of the First Consul, or the exterior or interior security of the Republic." For this purpose the tribunals were organized in a different manner, agreeably to the direction of the law of 23d Florial, 1802. All the persons accused in Paris were sent for trial to the tribunal of the department of the Seine.¶

Georges, however, was still at liberty, al-

though a rigid blockade prevented March 9, 1804. his leaving Paris; but he did not And of Georges Cadouhal. long escape the vigilance of the police. On the 9th of March, he was arrested as he was crossing the place of the Odéon, at seven in the evening, in a cabriolet. He never went abroad without being armed, and his arrest in that public manner cost the life of one man, whom he shot dead as he stopped his horse, and he desperately wounded another who advanced to seize him in the carriage. He was instantly conducted to the Temple, and treated with such rigour that, when Louis Bonaparte went to see him the next day in prison, he found him lying on his mattress, with his hands strongly manacled, and bound across his breast; a spectacle which excited the indignation of that humane prince, as well as that of General Lauriston, who was present on the occasion.*† Moreau, however, was treated in a very different manner; he met with the most respectful attention, and was surrounded by military men, who would not have permitted any insult to be offered to so illustrious a character.

On the day after the arrest of Georges, a meeting of the Council of State was History and character of the Duke d'Enghien. held, in which Napoleon took a step from which his memory will never recover. He decided the fate of the DUKE D'ENGHIEN. This young prince, son to the Duke de Bourbon, and a lineal descendant of the great Condé, was born, apparently to the highest destinies, at Chantilly, on August 2 1772. He accompanied his father, while yet a boy, in his flight from Paris on July 16, 1789, and had ever since remained in exile, attached to the noble but unfortunate corps which, under the Prince of Condé, continued, through adverse equally as prosperous fortune, faithful to the cause of the monarchy. A noble countenance, a commanding air, and dignified expression, bespoke, even to a passing observer, his illustrious descent, while the affability of his manners and generosity of his character justly endeared him to his numerous companions in adversity. On all occasions in which they were called into action, these shining qualities displayed themselves. Ever the foremost in advance, he was the last to retreat, and by his skill and bravery eminently contributed to the brilliant success gained by the emigrant corps at Berthiem in an early period of the war. On that occasion a number of Re- Sept. 2, 1793. publican prisoners fell into the hands of the Royalists; the soldiers loudly demanded that some reprisals should be made for the sanguinary laws of the Convention, which had doomed so many of their comrades to the

* *Norv.*, ii., 277. *Nap.*, vii., 243.

† "The crisis," says Napoleon, "was of the most violent kind; public opinion was in a state of fermentation; the sincerity of government, the reality of the conspiracy, was incessantly called in question. All the violent passions were awakened; the rumours of change were incessant; the storm was tremendous."—*LAS CASAS*, vii., 243, and iii., 361. ‡ *LAS CASAS*, iii., 362.

§ *LAS CASAS*, iii., 363. *Bour.*, vi., 10, 11.

|| "Pichegru's seizure was owing to his generosity in declining to receive another asylum, where he would have been perfectly safe. An old aid-de-camp of his, M. Lagrenie, who had retired from the service some years before, and a man of undoubted honour, besought him to accept an asylum in his house; but he positively refused to endanger, by accepting the offer, a man who had given so striking a proof of attachment to his person."—*Bour.*, vi., 11, 12.

¶ *Big.*, iii., 327, 328.

* *Bour.*, vi., 37, 45.

† When examined before the judges of police, Georges openly avowed his intention to overturn the First Consul. "What was your motive for coming to Paris? To attack the First Consul. What were your means of attack? By force. Where did you expect to find the means of applying force? In all France. There is, then, a conspiracy extending over all France, under the direction of you and your accomplices? No; but there was a reunion of force at Paris. What were the projects of yourself and your associates? To place a Bourbon in the room of the First Consul. What Bourbon did you mean to place on the throne? Louis Xavier Stanislas formerly, whom we now designate Louis XVIII. What weapons were you to use? Weapons similar to those of his escort and guard."—See *CAPEFIGUE*, *Hist. de la Restauration*, ii., 159, and *NORVINS*, ii., 279.

scaffold; but the young prince replied, "The blood of our companions, shed in the most just of causes, demands a nobler vengeance.* Let them live; they are Frenchmen, they are unfortunate; I put them under the safeguard of your honour and humanity."†

It was on the fate of a prince, thus richly endowed with every noble virtue, that the Council of State, under the presidency of Napoleon, sat at Paris on the 10th of March, 1804. It appeared from the depositions of two of the prisoners who had been apprehended, that a mysterious person was present at some of the meetings of the Royalist chiefs, who was treated by Georges with the utmost respect, and in whose presence none of the persons assembled sat down.‡ Suspicion turned on some prince of the blood as the only person to whom these marks of respect were likely to be shown, and no one was thought to answer the description so completely as the Duke d'Enghien, who at that period was at Ettenheim, a chateau situated on the right bank of the Rhine, in the territories of the Duke of Baden, and four leagues from Strasbourg. A confidential officer was despatched to Strasbourg to make inquiry; he ascertained that the duke was frequently at the theatre of Strasbourg, lived a very retired life, was sometimes absent for ten or twelve days together, and appeared passionately fond of hunting, in which the greater part of his time was employed.§ On this slender basis did this iniquitous Council of State, under the immediate directions of Napoleon, hold it established that the Duke d'Enghien was the mysterious stranger alluded to in the depositions of Georges' associates, upon which Napoleon himself dictated and signed an order for his arrest in a neutral territory, with such minute directions for the seiz-

ure of the prince and his conveyance to Strasbourg, that it was evident his destruction was already resolved on. Cambacérés, the second consul, who had voted in the convention for the death of Louis, made the strongest remonstrances against this proposed measure, especially its accomplishment by means of a violation of the neutral territory of Baden; but Napoleon cut him short by the observation,* "You have become singularly chary of the blood of the Bourbons."†

The truth was, that the unfortunate prince was at Ettenheim, on account of a ^{Occupation of} passion with which he was inspired ^{the prince at} for the Princess de Rohan, an emi- ^{that time.} grant lady of distinction in that neighbourhood, and it was to visit her that he was absent for the periods which, in the suspicious mind of the First Consul, could have been for no other purpose but to concert measures with Georges in the French metropolis. His mode of life is thus described by Savary, who afterward was so deeply implicated in his execution: "Several emigrants had arrived in the environs, and were entertained by the prince. He was passionately fond of the chase, had a *liaison de cœur* with a French lady who shared his exile, and was frequently absent for several days together. This may easily be conceived when it is recollected what a passion for the chase is, and what the attractions of the mountains of the Black Forest."‡ In truth, he had never been at Paris at all, nor engaged in any conspiracy whatever against either the government or life of the First Consul; and the mysterious stranger who was supposed to be him in the conferences with Georges afterward turned out to be Pichegru.§

The designs of the First Consul were too faithfully carried into effect. The ^{He is seized} execution of the order was intrust- ^{and conducted} ed to General Oranor, who, fol- ^{to Strasbourg.} lowing punctually the directions he had received, set out from New Brisach with three hundred gens-d'armes, and arrested the prince in his bed, at night, on the 15th of March. He was immediately conducted to Strasbourg, with all his papers and all the persons in the house, and intelligence despatched to Paris, by the telegraph, of his arrest. When it was known at the Tuileries that he had been seized, Josephine, who never failed to exert her influence in behalf of misfortune, implored the First Consul to show mercy. She threw her- ^{Vain inter-} self on her knees, and earnestly beg- ^{cession of} ged his life; but he said, with a stern ^{Josephine:} air, "Mind your own matters; these are not the affairs of women; let me alone." His violence on this occasion exceeded anything that had been witnessed since his return from Egypt. He was so prepossessed with the idea that the Bourbon princes were, one and all, leagued in a conspiracy against his life, that he was incapable of exercising the natural powers of his mind in considering the evidence on the subject. "I am resolved," said he, "to put an end

* Bour., v., 305, 306. Rovigo, ii., 37.

† Napoleon enjoined the officer intrusted with the mission to take 200 dragoons, and send 300 more, with four pieces of light cannon, to Kehl, and 100 men, with two pieces of cannon, from New Brisach.—See Rovigo, ii., 266.—*Pièces Just.*, No. 1.

‡ Rov., ii., 35.

§ Bour., v., 307. Rov., ii., 59.

* Réfutat. de M. le Duc de Rovigo, 134.

† The Prince of Condé, father to the Duke d'Enghien, had acted in an equally generous manner when a proposal was made to him by a person who offered to assassinate the First Consul. In a letter to the Count d'Artois, he gives the following account of the transaction: "Yesterday a man arrived here (in London) on foot, as he said, from Paris to Calais. His manner was gentle, and tone of voice sweet, notwithstanding the errand on which he came. Understanding that you were not here, he came to me at eleven o'clock in the morning, and proposed, with the greatest simplicity, to get quit of the usurper in the most expeditious manner. I did not give him time to conclude the details of his project, but instantly rejected them with the horror they were fitted to inspire, assuring him, at the same time, that if you were here you would do the same; that we should ever be the enemies of the man who had usurped the power and throne of our king, as long as he excluded him from it; that we had combated him with open arms, and would do so again, if an occasion should present itself; but that we would never carry on hostility by such means, which were suited only to the Jacobins; and that, if they betook themselves to crimes, certainly we should not follow their example. I then sent for the Baron de Roll, who confirmed all that I had said of your determination in that respect."—*Réfutation de M. le Duc de Rovigo*, 49.—*Pièces Just.*, No. 1.

‡ The description they gave was as follows: "Every ten or twelve days their master received a visit from a person with whose name they were unacquainted, but who was evidently a man of high importance. He appeared to be about thirty-six years of age; his hair was light, his height and size of ordinary dimensions, his dress elegant; he was always received with great respect, and when he entered the apartment all present rose and remained standing, without the exception even of MM. Polignac and Riviere. He was frequently with Georges, and on these occasions they were always alone."—*Rovigo's Memoir*, 11.

§ Rovigo, Mem., ii., 34.

to these conspiracies; if the emigrants will conspire, I will cause them to be shot. I am told there are some of them concealed in the hôtel of M. de Cobentzell" (the Austrian ambassador); "I do not believe it; if it were so, I would shoot Cobentzell along with them. The Bourbons must be taught that they are not to sport with life with impunity: such matters are not child's play."^{*}

M. Talleyrand, aware of the imminent danger which the duke ran if he continued to remain in his residence at Ettenheim, had vainly warned him of his danger. He secretly sent him warning to remove, through the lady to whom he was attached at that place, and similar intelligence was at the same time transmitted by the King of Sweden, by means of his minister at Carlsruhe; and it augments our regret at the issue of this melancholy tale, that he was only prevented from availing himself of the intelligence, and escaping the danger, by the tardiness of the Austrian authorities in procuring him passports. Upon receiving the warning he resolved to join his grandfather, but, in doing so, it was necessary that he should pass through part of the Austrian territories. Sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Vienna, wrote for this purpose to the Austrian government to demand a passport for the duke, and it was their tardiness in answering that occasioned the delay which permitted his arrest by Napoleon, and cost him his life.[†]

Orders arrived at Strasbourg from Paris on the 18th of March to have the Duke d'Enghien forthwith forwarded to the capital. The carriage which conveyed him arrived at the barriers of Paris on the 20th, at eleven o'clock forenoon. He was there stopped, and detained for above five hours, until orders were received from the First Consul. No council was summoned; Napoleon took upon himself alone the disposal of his fate. At four in the evening orders arrived to have him conducted, by the exterior barriers, to VINCENNES, an ancient castellated fortress of great strength, a mile and a half beyond the Faubourg St. Antoine, which had been long used as a state prison, and it was dark before he arrived there. Everything was prepared for his reception; not only his chamber was ready, but his grave was dug.[‡]

No sooner was Napoleon informed of the arrival of the Duke d'Enghien at the barriers, than he wrote out and signed an order for his immediate delivery to a military commission, to be tried for bearing arms against the Republic, for having been in the pay of England, and engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic.[§] The or-

Where he is delivered over to a military commission by Napoleon's orders.

* Bour., v., 316, 341.

† Bour., v., 304, 305. Rev., ii., 300.

‡ Bour., v., 328, 330.

§ The order was as follows:

"Paris, 29 Ventose, Ann. vii. (20th March, 1804).

"The Government of the Republic decrees as follows:

"Art. I. The late Duke d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the Republic, of having been and still being in the pay of England, of being engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic, shall be delivered over to a military commission, composed of seven members, named by the governor of Paris, who shall assemble at Vincennes.

"Art. II. The grand judge, minister of war, and general

der was directed to Murat, the governor of Paris, who forthwith sent for General Hullin, and six of the senior colonels of regiments in Paris, to form a military commission. They immediately proceeded to Vincennes, where they found Savary, with a strong body of *gendarmerie d'élite*, in possession of the castle and all the avenues leading to its approach. The subsequent proceedings cannot be better given than in the words of M. Harel, the governor of the castle.*

"In the evening of the 20th of March, when the prince was arrived at the barrier, they sent to inquire of me whether I could lodge a prisoner in the castle. I answered that I could not, as no rooms were in repair but my own chamber and the council hall. They desired me then to prepare a room for a prisoner, who would arrive in the evening, and to dig a grave in the court. I said that would not be easy, as the court was paved. They replied, I must then find another place, and we fixed on the ditch, where, in effect, it was prepared.

"The prince arrived at seven in the evening; he was dying of cold and hunger, but his air was by no means melancholy. As his room was not yet ready, I received him into my own, and sent out to get food in the village. The prince sat down to table, and invited me to partake his refreshments. He put many questions about Vincennes, and told me he had been brought up in the environs of the castle, and conversed with much kindness and affability. He repeatedly asked, what do they want with me? what are they going to do with me? but these questions made no alteration upon his tranquillity, and indicated no disquietude. My wife, who was unwell, was in bed in an alcove in the same room, concealed by her tapestry; her emotion was extreme, for she was foster-sister to the prince, had enjoyed a pension from his family before the Revolution, and she at once recognised him by his voice."[†]

The duke went to bed shortly after; but, before he had time to fall asleep, the officers arrived, and conducted him into the council-chamber. General Hullin and six other officers were there assembled; Savary arrived soon after the interrogatories began, and took his station in front of the fire, immediately behind the president's chair. The accused was charged with "having borne arms against the Republic, with having offered his services to the English government, the enemies of the French people, with having received and accredited the agents of the English government, and furnished them with the means of obtaining intelligence, and conspired with them against the exterior and interior security of the

Gross iniquity committed towards him.

governor of Paris, are charged with the execution of the present decree.

"The First Consul (Signed) BONAPARTE."

"By the First Consul (Signed) HUGHES MARET."

"A true copy.

"The General-in-Chief, Governor of Paris, (Signed) MURAT."

—See *Mémoire de M. Dupin sur les actes de la Commission Militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien*, 38—*Pièces Just.*, No. 2.

In Murat's order, following on this decree, the commission was directed to "assemble immediately at the chateau of Vincennes, to take cognizance, without separating, of the accused, on the charges set forth in the decree of the government."[‡]—*Ibid.*, 93.

* Bour., v., 328, 329. Rev., ii., 39.

† Bour., v., 330, 331. *Biog. des Contemporains*, Art. D'Enghien.

state; with having put himself at the head of an assemblage of emigrants and others in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France, in the territory of Baden; carried on communications in Strasbourg calculated to disturb the peace of the adjoining departments, and favour the views of England, and being engaged in the conspiracy set on foot at Paris against the life of the First Consul, and about, in case of its success, to enter France.* The law in such a case required that a counsel should be allowed to the accused; but none was permitted to the prince, and he was obliged, at midnight, to enter unaided upon his defence.†

No evidence whatever was brought forward

He is convicted upon his declaration only, without any evidence. against the accused; no witnesses were examined; the documentary evidence consisted only of one single writing, namely, the act of accusation.‡ The whole case against

him rested upon the answers he gave to the interrogatories put by the commission, and they were clear, consistent, and unequivocal, openly avowing the truth, but containing not one single admission which could be tortured into evidence of his culpability.§ "There were," says

* Jugement sur le Duc d'Enghien. Mém. par Dupin, 49.

† Dupin, 12, 13.

‡ "On n'avait," says Savary, "qu'un seul document pour toute pièce de charge et de décharge; c'était l'arrêté des consuls du 20 March. La minute du jugement rédigé à Vincennes le porta textuellement, 'Lecture faite des pièces tant a charge qu'à décharge au nombre d'une.'"—Rovigo, ii., 251.

§ The material parts of the declaration were as follow:

Being asked if he had taken up arms against France, he answered, "That he had served through the whole war; that he had never been in England, but had received a pension from that power, and had no other means of subsistence; that he had resided for two years and a half at Ettenheim in the Brisgaw, by permission from the sovereigns of that country; that he had applied for permission to reside at Fribourg, also in the Brisgaw, and remained only at Ettenheim for the pleasures of the chase; that he had corresponded with his grandfather in London, and also with his father, whom he had never seen since 1795; that he had been commander of the advance guard since 1796, and acted with the advanced guard before that time; that he had never seen General Pichegru, and had no connexion whatever with him; that he knew he desired to see him, but he congratulated himself upon his not having seen him, if it be true that he had intended to make use of the vile means ascribed to him; that he had no connexion with General Dumourier, and never saw him; and that, since the peace, he had occasionally corresponded with some of his comrades in the interior of the Republic on their own affairs and his, but no correspondence had taken place of the kind alluded to in the interrogatory."¹

The iniquities committed on the trial of the Duke d'Enghien were so numerous as to render it one of the most atrocious proceedings recorded in history. 1. The neutral territory of the Grand-duke of Baden was violated by an armed force, without a shadow of reason, to arrest an individual engaged in no overt acts of hostility, upon the mere suspicion of being engaged in correspondence with the conspirators in France. 2. The arrest was illegal, on the footing of having borne arms against the Republic; for the decrees of the convention and Directory on that subject, inhuman as they were, applied only to emigrants taken in France, or in an enemy's or conquered country, and Baden was neither the one nor the other, but a friendly state. 3. The laws against the emigrants did not apply to the Bourbons, who were a class apart, and were forever banished from the French territory; and even such as they were, they had been universally mitigated in practice since the accession of the First Consul. 4. The military commission was incompetent to try plots undertaken against the Republic, their cognizance being confined to the ordinary tribunals. 5. The whole proceedings at Vincennes were illegal, as having been carried on, contrary to law, in the night; as no defender or counsel was assigned to the accused; as no witnesses or documents were adduced against him; as his declarations admitted nothing criminal, and if they had, they would not per se have warranted a conviction; as the con-

Savary, the warmest apologist of Napoleon, "neither documents, nor proofs, nor witnesses against the prince, and in his declaration he emphatically denied the accusation brought against him. His connexions with England, in the rank in which he was born, his correspondence with his grandfather, the Prince of Condé, could not be considered as evidence of any conspiracy. And even if it had been otherwise, what judge is so ignorant as not to know that the admissions of an accused person are never sufficient to condemn him, if unsupported by other testimony!"² "I must confess," says General Hullin, "the prince presented himself before us with a noble assurance; he indignantly repelled the aspersion of having been directly or indirectly engaged in any conspiracy against the life of the First Consul, but admitted having borne arms against France, saying, with a courage and resolution which forbid us, even for his own sake, to make him vary on that point, 'that he had maintained the rights of his family, and that a Condé could never re-enter France but with his arms in his hands. My birth, my opinions, render me forever the enemy of your government.'"†

At the conclusion of his declaration, the prince added, "Before signing the present *procès verbal*, I earnestly request to be permitted to have a private audience of the First Consul. ^{His noble demeanour before the judges.}

My name, my rank, my habits of thought, and the horror of my situation, induce me to hope that he will accede to that demand." A member of the commission proposed that this request should be forwarded to Napoleon; but Savary, who was behind the president, represented that such a demand was inopportune.‡ The request, however, made such an impression, that when the sentence was about to be made out, the president took up the pen, and was beginning to write a letter, expressing the wish of the prince to have an interview with him, but Savary whispered to him, "What are you about?" "I am writing," said he, "to the First Consul, to express the wish of the council and of the accused." "Your affair is finished," replied Savary, taking the pen out of his hand; "that is my business."⁴ "In truth," says Savary, "General Hullin had received the most severe instructions. Even the case of the accused demanding an interview with the First Consul had been provided for, and he had been prohibited from forwarding such a communication to the government."

Without a vestige of evidence against the prince, did this iniquitous military tribunal, acting under the orders of a still more iniquitous government, find him guilty of all the charges, and order him to be immediately executed. After the interrogatory had ceased, and while the commission were deliberating with closed doors, he returned to his chamber and fell asleep. "He was so well aware of his approaching fate," says Harel, "that when they conducted him by torch

viction did not specify of what he was found guilty, and left a blank for the laws under which the sentence was pronounced, all directly in the face of statutory enactments.—See an able memoir by Dupin, i., 20, *Discussion des actes de la Commission Militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien.*

* Rov., ii., 252.

† Hullin, 7, 8.

‡ Hullin, 13.

§ Hullin, 13, 14.

|| Rov., ii., 250

* See the declarations in Savary, ii., 275. Pieces Just., No. iv.

light down the broken and winding staircase which led to the fosse where the execution was to take place, he asked where they were taking him, and pressing my arm, said, 'Are they going to leave me to perish in a dungeon, or throw me into an *oubliette*?' When he arrived at the foot of the stair, and, entering into the fatal ditch, saw, through the gray mist of the morning, a file of men drawn up, he uttered an expression of joy at being permitted to die the death of a soldier, and only requested that a confessor might be sent for: but this last request was denied him. He then cut off a lock of his hair, which he delivered, with his watch and ring, to the officer who attended him, to be forwarded to the Princess de Rohan and his parents; and, turning to the soldiers, exclaimed, "I die for my king and for France!" calmly gave the word of command, and fell pierced by seven balls. His remains were immediately thrown, dressed as they were, into the grave which had been prepared the evening before at the foot of the rampart.*†

No other authority than that of Napoleon himself is required to stamp the character of this transaction. Immediately after the execution was over, Savary hastened to the First Consul to inform him of what had been done. He received the account with much emotion. "There is something here," said he, "which surpasses my comprehension. Here is a crime, and one which leads to nothing."‡ The prince's

innocence was soon completely unconfessed. Hardly were his unconfined remains cold in their grave, when the witnesses who had spoken of the mysterious personage who met with Georges, and was supposed to be the Duke d'Enghien, upon being confronted with Pichegru, at once recognised him as the person to whom they had alluded. "The First Consul," says Savary, "upon receiving this information, mused long, and gave vent, by an exclamation of grief, to his regret at having consented to the seizure of that unhappy man. Notwithstanding his obvious interest to have the affair cleared up, he enjoined absolute silence regarding it, either because he considered such conduct most conducive to his interest, or because he was unwilling to confess the error into which he had fallen."§

* Mém. sur le Duc d'Enghien, ii., 171, 172. Rov., Vindication, 40. Bour., v., 332, 333.

† The spot where the murder was committed is marked by a little cross in the bottom of the fosse of Vincennes, on the side of the forest, about twenty yards from the drawbridge leading into the inner building. The author visited it in August, 1833, when the cannon on the ramparts were loaded with grapeshot, and the whole walls of the fortress were covered with workmen armed to the teeth, converting the Gothic edifice into a stronghold destined to bridle the licentious population of Paris, and establish the Oriental despotism of Louis Philippe. The monument of feudal power, the scene of despotic cruelty, the instrument of revolutionary punishment, arose at once to the view. "Les hommes agitent," says Bossuet, "mais Dieu les mène."

‡ Rov., ii., 45.

§ The murder of the Duke d'Enghien was so atrocious a proceeding, that almost every one concerned in it has made an effort to throw the blame off his own shoulders, and implicate more deeply the other actors in the bloody tragedy. Savary, General Hullin, and Napoleon himself, have all endeavoured to vindicate themselves, at the expense of their associates in the crime; but the only inference which can justly be drawn from a comparison of their observations is, that they were all guilty, and the First Consul most of all. In commenting on this subject, which fre-

A memorable retribution awaited all the actors in this bloody tragedy. Murat, seized eleven years afterward on the Neapolitan territory, when attempting to excite the people to a revolt, was delivered over to a military commission, tried under a law which he himself had made, and shot. General Hullin, after having spent, as he himself said, "twenty years in unavailing regrets, bowed down by misfortune, blind and unhappy," wished for the grave to relieve him from his sufferings;* Savary lived to witness calamities to himself and his country sufficient, in his own words, to draw from his eyes tears of blood;† and Napoleon, vanquished in war, precipitated from his throne, stripped of his possessions, was left an exile amid the melancholy main, to reflect on the eternal laws of justice which he had violated, and the boundless gifts of fortune which he had misapplied. Whether Providence interferes in the affairs of mankind by any other method than general laws, and the indignation which deeds of violence excite in the human heart, must remain forever a mystery; but in many cases, the connexion between national, equally as individual crime, and its appropriate punishment, is so evident as to be obvious even on the surface of history. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien lighted again the flames of Continental war, and induced that terrible strife which ultimately brought the Tartars of the Desert to the walls of Paris. From it may be dated the commencement of that train of events which precipitated Napoleon from the throne of Charlemagne to the rock of St. Helena.

When the melancholy event was known in Paris on the morning of the 21st, a universal stupor and consternation prevailed. Few were to be found who approved of the deed; distrust, terror, anxiety, were depicted in every

Constitutionally, he at times ascribed the catastrophe to a deplorable excess of zeal in the persons by whom he was surrounded;* at others, to an unfortunate prepossession, taken up at an unguarded moment, when he was worked up to madness by the reports he received of conspiracies and plots in every direction around him;† but in his testament he reverted to the more manly course of admitting the deed, taking upon himself its whole responsibility, and endeavouring to justify it on reasons of state necessity. "I arrested the Duke d'Enghien," said he, in that solemn instrument, "because that measure was necessary to the security, the interest, and the honour of the French people, when the Count d'Artois maintained, on his own admission, sixty assassins. In similar circumstances I would do the same."‡ As if any reasons of honour, interest, or security can ever call for or justify the death of an innocent man without either inquiry, evidence, or trial.

It is but justice to Napoleon, however, to add, that he said at St. Helena, "Most certainly, if I had been informed in time of certain features in the opinions and character of the prince, and especially if I had seen a letter which he wrote to me, but which was never delivered, God knows for what reason, till after he was no more, most certainly I would have pardoned him."§ Savary asserts that Napoleon said to Real, after hearing the circumstances of the prince's death, "Unhappy T—, what have you made me do?"|| and Napoleon said to O'Meara at St. Helena, that "Talleyrand had kept the duke's letter, written to him from Strasbourg, and only delivered it two days after his death;"¶ but Bourrienne asserts that the whole story of such a letter having been written and kept back is an entire fabrication. — See BOURRIENNE, v., 312.

* Hullin's Memoirs, i.

† Savary, iv., 382.

‡ Las Cas., vii., 257.

§ Ibid., vii., 253, 257.

¶ Test. de Nap., sec. 6.

|| Las Cas., vii., 258.

|| Savary, Vindication, 60.

¶ O'Meara, i., 321, 346.

Remarkable retribution which reached all the actors in the murder.

countenance. It was openly stigmatized by a great proportion of the people as a bloody and needless assassination; among none was the general grief more poignant than the warmest partisans of Napoleon; the bright morning of the consulate seemed overcast, and the empire to be ushered in by deeds of Oriental cruelty. Crowds issued daily through the barrier De Trône, to visit in the fosse of Vincennes the spot where the victim had suffered; a favourite spaiel, which had followed the prince to the place of execution, faithful in death, was to be seen constantly lying on the grave. The interest excited by its appearance was so strong, that, by an order of the police, the dog was removed, and all access to the place prohibited.*

The consternation which prevailed among the members of the diplomatic body was still greater. Couriers were instantly despatched to St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and London; and the ambassadors of all the powers at Paris met to concert measures on the subject. "All Paris," says M. Darlberg, the plenipotentiary of Baden, "is in consternation; Europe will shudder at the deed. We are approaching a terrible crisis; the ambition of Bonaparte knows no bounds; nothing is sacred in his eyes; he will sacrifice everything to his passions. M. Cobentzell, Lucchesini, and Oubril are concerting measures on the part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia."† M. Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs, gave a ball on the night of the day on which the prince was executed; but its aspect was mournful, and several members of the diplomatic body sent their apology. The cabinet of Prussia presented an energetic note, complaining of the violation of the territory of Baden, while that of Russia ordered a court mourning for his death, which was worn by all the ambassadors of that power at foreign courts, and addressed a vigorous remonstrance to the French government. The higher classes at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, were vehement in their condemnation of the sanguinary proceeding; the indignation of the English people, the vehemence of the English press, knew no bounds; and already were to be seen, both in the diplomatic relations of the European powers‡ and the feelings awakened in their subjects, the seeds of the coalition which brought the Continent in arms to the fields of Austerlitz and Eylau.

That indignation which the monarchies of Europe did not as yet venture openly to express, a single courageous individual, but one whose weight was equal to a nation in arms, did not hesitate immediately to manifest. The illustrious author of the "*Génie de Christianisme*," M. CHATEAUBRIAND, had been recently appointed ambassador of France at the Republic of the Valais, and he was presented to the First Consul on the morning of the 21st, to take leave preparatory to his departure. He observed at the time a striking alteration on the visage of the First Consul, and a sombre expression in his countenance; his matchless powers of dissimulation

could not conceal what was passing in his mind; but Chateaubriand knew of nothing at the time to which it could have been owing. Hardly had he left the Tuileries when intelligence, arrived of the death of the Duke d'Enghien: he instantly sent in his resignation of the appointment. This intrepid conduct excited a vehement burst of anger in the breast of the First Consul; and the friends of Chateaubriand were in the greatest alarm every morning for a considerable time, expecting to hear of his arrest during the night; but the Princess Eliza, who was inspired with the highest admiration for that great author, at length succeeded in averting a tempest which, in its outset, might have proved fatal to one of the brightest ornaments of modern literature. From that period, however, may be dated the commencement of that enmity between that great author and the First Consul, which continued uninterrupted till the Restoration.*

Napoleon was strongly irritated by any opposition to his wishes or resistance to his will, and, accordingly, he never forgave Chateaubriand the public reproof administered on this memorable occasion; but his feelings had no influence on his judgment, and no man could better appreciate dignified or heroic conduct in an adversary. Although, therefore, the author of the "*Genius of Christianity*" never afterward received encouragement from the First Consul, he occupied a high place in his estimation, and this continued in exile, even after the essential injury done by that author to his cause by the celebrated pamphlet on the "*Constitutional Monarchy*," published at the Restoration. "Chateaubriand," said he, "has received from nature the sacred fire; his works attest it; his style is not that of Racine, it is that of a prophet. There is no one but himself in the world who could have said with impunity in the Chamber of Peers, that the greatcoat and hat of Napoleon, placed on the end of a stick on the coast of Brest, would make Europe run to arms from one end to another."†

This tragic event was soon followed by another still more mysterious. Early on the morning of the 6th of April, General Pichegru was found strangled in prison. Since his apprehension he had undergone ten separate examinations, in the course of which he had been repeatedly confronted with Georges, Lajolais, and all the witnesses who were examined against them. On all occasions, however, he evinced an unconquerable firmness and resolution. No one was injured by his answers; and nothing whatever had been elicited from him calculated to effect the great object of implicating Moreau in the conspiracy. Such was the effect produced by his courageous demeanour, that Real said openly, before several persons, on coming from one of his examinations, "What a man that Pichegru is!" In all his declarations he was careful to abstain from anything which might involve any other person, and exhibited a grandeur of character and generous resolution in his fetters, which excited the admiration even of his enemies. He positively refused, however, to sign

* *Rev.*, ii., 45. *Bour.*, v., 339. *Big.*, iv., 343.

† M. Darlberg's letter, March 22, 1804. *Paris. Rev.*, ii., 290.

‡ *Big.*, iii., 345. *Ann. Reg.*, 1804. *State Papers*, 642. *Bour.*, vi., 4, 5. *Rev.*, ii., 244.

* *Bour.*, v., 348, 349. *Big.*, iii., 344.

† *Nap. in Mont.*, iv., 248. *Bour.*, v., 349, 350.

any of his judicial declarations, alleging as a reason that he was too well acquainted with the arts of the police, who, having once got his signature, would, by a chemical process, efface all the writing which stood above it, and insert another statement, containing everything which they wished him to admit. He loudly announced his intention of speaking out boldly on his trial, and in particular declared that he was resolved "to unfold the odious means by which he and his companions had been entrapped into the conspiracy by the police. That they had at length become fully sensible of the Machiavelian devices which had been practised upon them, from the facility given to their landing and coming to Paris, and the utter nullity of all the reports they had received of the general disposition in their favour. That, having had their eyes at length opened, they were only solicitous to get out of Paris, and were making preparations for that purpose when they were arrested by the police." This intention to speak out at the trial was in an especial manner declared on the day of his last examination, taken before Real, and next morning at eight o'clock he was found strangled in his cell.*

The surgeons who were called to examine Surgeons' the body of the deceased signed a report on port, in which they stated that "the his death. body was found with a black silk handkerchief hard twisted round the neck by means of a small stick about five inches long, which was kept tight on the left cheek, on which it rested by one end, which prevented it from unwinding, and produced the strangulation which had terminated in death." The *gendarmes* in attendance declared that they heard no noise, except a considerable coughing on the part of the general, which lasted till one, when it ceased, and that the sound resembled that of a person who had difficulty of respiration.† This is all the light which positive evidence throws on this mysterious transaction; but it were well for the memory of Napoleon if moral presumptions of greater strength than any such testimony did not incline to the darker side.‡

"When you would discover," says Machiavel, "who is the author of a crime, consider who had an interest to commit it." Judging by this standard, moral presumption weighs heavily against the First Consul. He was on the eve of the greatest step in his life; the imperial sceptre was within his grasp, and the public authorities had already been instructed to petition him to assume the crown of Charlemagne. At the same time, the crisis was of the most violent kind. The Royalist party were in the highest state of excitement, in consequence of the execution of the Duke d'Enghien; the

Republicans, in sullen indignation, awaited the trial of Moreau. In these critical circumstances it was impossible to over-estimate the effect which might have been produced on such inflammable materials by the bold declarations of Pichegru at his trial, openly denouncing the intrigues and treachery of the police, and tearing aside the veil which concealed the dark transactions by which Fouché had precipitated the leaders of the opposite parties into measures so eminently calculated to aid the ascent of Napoleon to the throne. The First Consul, it is true, had no cause either to be apprehensive of Pichegru, or to doubt his conviction at the trial; but his ministers had every reason to fear the effect which might be produced by the revelations made by so energetic and intrepid a character, and the strongest grounds for believing that he would utterly negative all attempts to implicate his great rival, Moreau, in the conspiracy. In these circumstances, private assassination became the obvious expedient, and within the gloomy walls of the Temple numerous wretches were to be found, trained to crime, and profoundly versed in all the means of perpetrating it in the way least likely to incur detection. There can be no reasonable doubt, therefore, that Pichegru was murdered, but there is no evidence to connect Napoleon with the act; and the probability is, that it was perpetrated by Fouché and the police, to prevent the exposure of the infamous means used by them to implicate both Moreau and the Royalists in the trammels of a conspiracy, which they had so much reason to apprehend from the illustrious captive's known character and declared resolution.

This view is strongly confirmed when it is recollected, on the other hand, that Pichegru himself had no conceivable motive for committing suicide. Death to so old a soldier and determined a character could have few terrors; and the experience of the Revolution has proved that its prospect hardly ever led to self-destruction. He had uniformly and energetically declared his resolution to speak fully out at the trial, and nothing had occurred to shake that determination, for his own condemnation he must, from the first, have regarded as certain. Voluntary strangulation, in the way in which Pichegru perished, if not an impossible, is at least a highly difficult act; the religious impressions which he had preserved from his youth upward rendered it highly improbable; and the secrecy which government maintained in regard to his declarations necessarily led to the conclusion that they contained matter which it was deemed advisable to bury in the tomb. So universal was the impression produced by these circumstances, that M. Real, on the morning of his death, said, "Though nothing can be more apparent than that this was a suicide, yet it will always be said that, despairing of conviction, we strangled him in prison;"* a *cri de conscience*, coming from such a character, at so early a period, which is not the least remarkable circumstance in this mysterious case. Bourrienne, Napoleon's private secretary, declares it as his firm conviction that he was murdered;† and Savary, while he denies this himself, tells us that a belief of his assassination was so general, that a high functionary, a

* Bour., v., 23, 31. Big., iii., 411.

† Bour., vi., 31, 32. Rov., ii., 55. Ann. Reg., 1804, 638. State Papers.

‡ It is not the least interesting circumstance in this melancholy story, that Pichegru had been the school companion of Napoleon at the military academy of Brienne. They had been bred up in the same house, and it was he who taught Napoleon the four first rules of arithmetic. Though considerably older than the First Consul, they had received their commissions as lieutenants of artillery at the same time. Now the one was about to ascend the throne of France, while the other was strangled in a dungeon.—See BOURRIENNE, vi., 13, 15.

* Rov., ii., 56.

† Bour., vi., 25, 35.

friend of his own, spoke of it some years afterward as a matter concerning which no doubt could be entertained, and mentioned the *gendarmes* as the persons by whom the bloody deed had been carried into execution.*† The populace of Paris, struck by the mysterious circumstances of his death, ascribed it to the Mamelukes who had accompanied Napoleon from Egypt, and had been trained to such deeds in the recesses of Eastern seraglios †

At length, after long and tedious preparatory examinations, Moreau, Georges, the two Polignacs, La Riviere, and all the accused, were brought to trial. Before leaving the Temple, Georges harangued the other prisoners in the court, and earnestly recommended prudence and moderation, and that they should abstain from criminating each other. The solemnity of the occasion, and the recollection that it was from the same walls that Louis XVI. had been taken to the scaffold, had subdued to a sadder and milder mood his naturally daring and vehement character. "If, in the trials which await us," said he, "your firmness should ever forsake you, look on me; recollect that I am with you; remember that my fate will be the same as your own. Yes! we cannot be separated in death, and it is that which should console us. Continue, then, mild and considerate towards each other; redouble your mutual regards; let your common fate draw tighter the bonds of your affection. Regard not the past. We are placed in our present position by the will of God; in the hour of death, let us pray that our country, rescued from the yoke which oppresses it, may one day be blessed under the rule of the Bourbons. Never forget that it was from the prison which we are about to quit that Louis XVI. went forth to the scaffold. Let his sublime example be your model and your guide."‡

Early on the 28th of May, the doors of the

Palace of Justice were thrown open, and the trial began. An immense crowd instantly rushed in, and occupied every avenue to the hall; the doors were besieged by thousands, urgent to obtain admittance. The public anxiety rose to the highest pitch. Persons of the chief rank and greatest consideration in Paris were there; the remnants of the old nobility, the leaders of the modern Republic, flocked to a scene where the fate of characters so interesting to both was to be determined. The prisoners, to the number of forty-five, were put to the bar together. Public indignation murmured aloud at seeing the conqueror of Hohenlinden seated amid persons, many of whom were regarded as the hired bravoës of England. In the course of the trial, which lasted twelve days, a letter from Moreau to the First Consul, written from the prison of the Temple, was read, in which he stated his case with so much simplicity and candour, that it produced the most powerful effect on the audience.* The result of the trial was, that Moreau's innocence was completely established, or, rather, the prosecutor totally failed to prove any criminal connexion on his part with the conspirators; not one witness could fix either a guilty act or important circumstance upon him. He admitted having seen Pichegru on several occasions, but positively denied that he had ever been in presence of Georges; and, though two witnesses were adduced who swore to that fact, their testimony was unworthy of credit, being that of accused persons under trial for the same crime † Throughout the whole

* Moreau there said, "In the campaign of 1797 we took the papers of the Austrian staff; among them were several which seemed to implicate Pichegru in a correspondence with the French princes; this discovery gave us both great pain, but we resolved to bury it in oblivion, as Pichegru, being no longer at the head of the army, was not in a situation to do injury to the Republic. The events of the 18th Fructidor succeeded; disquietude became universal; and two officers who were acquainted with that correspondence represented to me the necessity of making it public. I was then a public functionary, and could no longer preserve silence. During the two last campaigns in Germany, and since the peace, he has occasionally made remote and circuitous overtures to me as to the possibility of entering into a correspondence with the French princes, but I considered them so ridiculous that I never made any answer."

† As to the present conspiracy, I can equally assure you that I have not had the smallest share in it. I repeat it, general, whatever proposition may have been made to me, I rejected it in opinion, and regarded it as the most absurd of projects. When it was represented to me that the occasion of a descent into England would be favourable to a change of government, I answered, that the senate was the authority to which all Frenchmen would look in cases of difficulty, and that I should be the first to range myself under its authority. Such overtures made to me, a private individual, wishing to keep up no connexions, neither in the army, nine tenths of which have served under my orders, nor in the state, imposed upon me no duty but that of refusal; the infamy of becoming an informer was repugnant to my character; ever judged with severity, such a person becomes odious, and deserving of eternal reprobation when he turns against those from whom he has received obligations, or with whom he has maintained terms of friendship. Such, general, have been my connexions with Pichegru; they will surely convince you that rash and ill-founded conclusions have been drawn from a conduct on my part perhaps imprudent, but far from being criminal." These words bear the stamp of truth, and they embrace the whole of what was proved against Moreau. Not one of the 119 witnesses examined at the trial said more against him.—*Bour-RETREVE*, vi., 118, 120.

‡ Lajolais and Picot were the persons who spoke to it, and Lajolais was the secret agent of Fouché throughout the whole transaction, and both were fellow-prisoners at the bar with Moreau.*

* Rovigo, ii., 63.

* *Rov.*, ii., 56.

† In discoursing on this subject at St. Helena, Napoleon observed "that he would be ashamed to defend himself against such a charge; its absurdity was so manifest on its very face."

What could I gain by it? A man of my character does not act without sufficient motives. Have I ever been known to shed blood by mere caprice? Whatever efforts may have been made to blacken my memory, those who know me are aware that my nature is foreign to crime; there is not in my whole career a single act of which I could not speak before any tribunal on earth. I do not say without embarrassment, but with advantage. In truth, Pichegru saw that his situation was desperate; his daring mind could not endure the infamy of punishment; he despaired of my clemency, or despised it, and put himself to death. Had I been inclined to commit a crime, it was not Pichegru, but Moreau, that I would have struck."* Had Napoleon's veracity been equal to his ability as a chronicler of the events of his time, this passage would have been deserving of the highest consideration; but the slightest acquaintance with his writings and actions must be sufficient to convince every impartial person that he had no regard whatever to truth in anything that he said or wrote, and fired off words as he would do shot in a battle, to produce a present effect, without the slightest idea that they ever would be sifted by subsequent ages, or ultimately recoil upon himself. He forgets that it was to secure the conviction of Moreau, and out of the damning evidence that he could give in regard to him, that the private assassination of Pichegru became expedient, and that the more he elevates the character of the Republican general who was brought to trial, the more he magnifies the probability of the destruction of the Royalist chief whose testimony might have led to his acquittal.

‡ *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, 165.

§ *Bour.*, vi., 47.

* *Las Caz.*, vii., 244.

trial his demeanour was dignified, mild, and unassuming. On one occasion only his indignant spirit broke forth, when the president accused him of a desire to make himself dictator: "Me dictator!" exclaimed he, "and with the partisans of the Bourbons! Who, then, would be my supporters? I could find none but in the French soldiers, of whom I have commanded nine tenths, and saved above fifty thousand. They have arrested all my aids-de-camp, all the officers of my acquaintance, but not a shadow of suspicion could be found against any one, and they have all been set at liberty. Can there be such folly as to suppose that I proposed to make myself dictator by means of the partisans of the old French princes, who have combated for the Royalist cause since 1792? Do you really believe that these men, in twenty-four hours, should have been so suddenly changed as to make me dictator? You speak of my fortune, of my income; I began with nothing, and might now have been worth 50,000,000 francs; I possess only a house and a small property attached to it; my allowances amount to 40,000 francs, and let that be compared with my services."*

As the case went on, and the impossibility of convicting Moreau of the capital charge preferred against him became apparent, the disquietude of the First Consul was extreme. He sent in private for the judges, and questioned them minutely as to the probable result of the process; and, as it had become impossible to convict him of any share in the conspiracy, it was agreed that he should be found guilty of the minor charge of remotely aiding them. Some of the judges proposed that he should be entirely acquitted, but the President Hemart informed them that such a result would only have the effect of impelling the government into measures of still greater severity, and therefore this compromise was unanimously agreed to. Napoleon strongly urged a capital sentence, in the idea, probably, of overwhelming his rival by a pardon; but the judges returned the noble answer, "And if we do so, who will pardon us?" In truth, the temper of the public mind was such, that any capital sentence on so illustrious a person would probably have produced a violent commotion, and it was extremely doubtful whether the soldiers of the army of the Rhine would not have risen at once to his rescue. So intense was the interest excited by his situation, that when Lecourbe, one of the bravest and most distinguished of his lieutenants, entered the court with the infant child of Moreau in his arms, all the military present spontaneously rose and presented arms; and if Moreau had given the word, the court would that moment have been overturned, and the prisoners liberated. Whenever he rose to address the judges, the *gendarmes* by whom he was guarded rose also, and remained uncovered till he sat down. In fact, the public mind was so agitated, that the influence of Moreau in fetters almost equalled that of the First Consul on the throne.†

The demeanour of Georges throughout the whole trial was stoical and indifferent; he re-

jected the humane proposals made to him by Napoleon to save his life, if he would abandon his attempts to re-instate the Bourbons, saying "that his comrades had followed him into France, and he would follow them to death." Armand and Jules Polignac excited the warmest interest by the generous contest which ensued between them as to which had been really implicated in the conspiracy, each trying to take the whole blame upon himself, and to exculpate the other.* When the debates were closed and the judges retired to deliberate, the public anxiety rose to the highest pitch; they remained four-and-twenty hours in consultation, and all the while the court and all its avenues were thronged with anxious multitudes. The most breathless suspense prevailed when the judges returned to the court, and Hemart, seating himself in the president's chair, read out the sentence, which condemned Georges Cadouhal, Bouvet de Lozier, Russilon, M. de Riviere, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, Picot, Costor San Victor, and others, to the number of sixteen, to death; and Moreau, Jules de Polignac, Leridant, Roland, and a young girl named Issay, to two years' imprisonment.†

Though the preservation of Moreau's life, which had been placed in such imminent hazard, was universally considered as a subject of congratulation, yet the condemnation of so great a number of persons, many of whom belonged to the highest society in Paris, to death together, spread a general consternation through the capital. During four years of a steady and lenient administration, the people had not only lost their indifference, but acquired a horror at the shedding of blood; and a catastrophe of this sort, which recalled the sanguinary scenes of the Convention, diffused universal distress. To this feeling soon succeeded a sense of the gross injustice done to Moreau, found guilty upon the unsupported declarations of two conspirators who were condemned along with himself; and with so strong a sense of the iniquity of the conviction in the breast of the judges, that they were obliged to sentence him to a punishment, ridiculous and inadequate if he were guilty, oppressive if innocent.‡

Napoleon, however, was not really cruel; he was, on the contrary, in general, averse to measures of severity, and only callous to all the suffering they occasioned when they seemed necessary either for the projects of his ambition or the principles of his state poli-

* Armand de Polignac first declared publicly that he alone was accessory to the conspiracy, and that his brother was entirely innocent, and earnestly implored that the stroke of justice might fall on him alone. On the following day, his brother Jules rose and said, "I was too much moved yesterday at what my brother said to be able to attend to what I was to advance in my own defence; but to-day, when I am more cool, I implore you not to give credit to what his generosity has prompted to suggest in my behalf. If one of us must perish, I am the guilty person. Restore him to his weeping wife; I have none to lament me; I can brave death. Too young to have enjoyed life, how can I regret it?" "No!" exclaimed Armand, "you have life before you; I alone am the guilty person; I alone ought to perish."—Bour., vi., 138, 139.

† Bour., vi., 138, 140. Big., iii., 421. Rev., ii., 62, 63.

‡ Rev., ii., 63, 64. Bour., vi., 140, 141.

* Bour., vi., 115, 123, 124. Rev., ii.

† Bour., vi., 124, 126. Big., iii., 420.

cy. His object in all these measures was to attain the throne, and for this purpose the death of the Duke d'Enghien, which struck terror into the Royalists, and the condemnation of Moreau, which paralyzed the Republicans, seemed indispensable. Having attained these steps, he yielded not less to his own inclinations than the dictates of sound policy in pardoning many of the persons convicted. Murat, immediately after the sentence was pronounced, repaired to Napoleon, and earnestly entreated him to signalize his accession to the imperial throne by pardoning all the accused; but he could not obtain from him so splendid an act of mercy. Josephine, never wanting at the call of humanity, exerted her powerful influence in favour of several of the persons under sentence; many other persons at the court followed her example, and others were pardoned, in particular Lajolais, in consideration of the services they had rendered to the police during the conspiracy. In these different ways, Bouvet de Lozier, Riviere, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, and Armand Gaillard, and three others, experienced the mercy of the First Consul. The remainder were executed on the 25th of June, on the Place de Grève: they all underwent their fate with heroic fortitude, protesting with their last breath their fidelity to their king and country; and Georges, in particular, insisted upon dying first, in order that his companions, who knew that he had been offered his pardon by the First Consul, might see that he had not deserted them in the extreme hour.*

Napoleon asserted to Bourrienne, shortly after the trial was over, that he had been greatly annoyed by the result of the process, chiefly because it prevented him from utterly extinguishing Moreau as the head of a party in the state; that assuredly he never would have suffered him to perish on the scaffold; but that his name, withered by a capital conviction, would no longer have been formidable, and that he had been led to direct a prosecution from his council assuring him that there could be no doubt of a conviction. He added, that if he had foreseen the result, he would have privately urged Moreau to travel, and even have given him a foreign embassy to colour his departure.† After the sentence was pronounced, he acted with indulgence to his fallen rival. On the very day on which he requested permission to retire to America, Napoleon granted it; he purchased his estate of Gros Bois, near Paris, which he conferred upon Berthier, and paid the expenses of his journey to Barcelona, preparatory to embarking for the United States, out of the public treasury. His ardent mind had been singularly captivated by the stern resolution of Georges; after his sentence was pronounced, he sent Real to the Temple, and offered, if he would attach himself to his service, to give him a regiment, and even make him one of his aids-de-camp; but the heroic Vendean remained faithful to his principles even in that extremity, and preferred dying with his comrades to all the allurements of the imperial throne.‡

One other deed of darkness belongs to the same period in the government of Napoleon. Captain Wright, from whose vessel Pichegru had been <sup>Death of Cap-
tain Wright in
prison, at Par-</sup> disembarked, was afterward shipwrecked on the coast of Morbihan, and brought, with all his crew, to Paris, where they were examined as witnesses on the trial of Georges. This intrepid man, who had formerly been a lieutenant on board Sir Sydney Smith's ship when he stopped the Eastern career of Napoleon at Acre, positively declined to give any evidence, saying, with the spirit which became a British officer, "Gentlemen, I am an officer in the British service; I care not what treatment you have in reserve for me; I am not bound to account to you for the orders I have received, and I decline your jurisdiction." He added, after his deposition, taken in prison, was read over in court, that "they had not annexed to that declaration the threat held out to him, that he should be shot if he did not reveal the secrets of his country."* Some time after this, but the precise date is not known, as it was not revealed by the French government for long afterward, Captain Wright was found in his cell in the Temple with his throat cut from ear to ear. By whom this was done remains, and probably will ever remain, a mystery. The French authorities gave out that he had committed suicide in prison; but the character of that officer, and the letters he had written shortly before his death, in which he positively declared he had no intention of laying violent hands on himself, rendered that event extremely improbable. The previous threats which he publicly declared on the trial they had made to him, and the strong desire which the French government had to implicate the English cabinet in a conspiracy against the life of the First Consul, in order to weaken the force of public indignation in Europe at the death of the Duke d'Enghien, render it more than probable that he was cut off in order to extinguish the evidence which he could give as to the disgraceful methods resorted to by the police to extort declarations from their prisoners; or possibly, as was asserted in England at the time, to destroy the traces of torture on his person.†

It was in the midst of these bloody events that Napoleon assumed the IMPERIAL CROWN, and the shadow of the expiring Republic was transformed into the reality of Byzantine servi-

Napoleon resolves to assume the imperial crown.

spirators whom I regret; that is Georges. His mind is of the right stamp; in my hands he would have done great things. I appreciate all the firmness of his character, and I would have given it a right direction. I made Real inform him that, if he would attach himself to me, I would not only pardon him, but give him a regiment. What do I say? I would have made him one of my aids-de-camp. Such a step would have excited a great clamour; but I should not have cared for it. Georges refused everything. He is a bar of iron. What can I now do? He must undergo his fate, for such a man is too dangerous in a party; it is a necessity of my situation."‡ This is a sufficient proof that Napoleon was aware that assassination formed no part of the design of the conspirators against him, or assuredly he would never have taken the chief of such a band into his service.

* Bourr., v., 135, 136. Rev., ii., 60. Scott, v., 126, 128.
† Scott, v., 127, 129. Ann. Reg., 1805. Sir Robert Wilson's Egypt, 72. O'Meara, i., 275.

‡ Bourr., vi., 150.

* Bourr., vi., 142, 144. Rev., ii., 66.

† Bourr., vi., 156, 157. Rev., ii., 66.

‡ Bourr., vi., 159. Ann. Reg., 1804, 1805. Rev., ii., 65, 66.

§ "There is one man," said Napoleon, "among the con-

tude. Eighteen months before he had declared in the Council of State "that the principle of hereditary succession was absurd, irreconcilable with the sovereignty of the people, and impossible in France;"* and four years before that, he had announced to the Italian States "that his victories were the commencement of the era of representative governments;" and already he was prepared to adopt a measure which should establish that absurd and impracticable system in that very country, and overturn, within all the states that were subjected to his influence, those very representative institutions. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* was the principle of his policy. He never looked back to the past, or attempted to reconcile former professions with present actions; success, not duty, was the ruling principle of his conduct; he deemed nothing done while anything remained to do.

It was neither from a thirst for blood nor a jealousy of the Bourbons that he put the Duke d'Enghien to death. Expedience, supposed political expedience, was the motive. "When about to make himself emperor," says Madame de Staël, "he deemed it necessary, on the one hand, to dissipate the apprehensions of the Revolutionary party as to the return of the Bourbons; and to prove, on the other, to the Royalists, that when they attached themselves to him, they finally broke with the ancient dynasty. It was to accomplish that double object that he committed the murder of a prince of the blood—the Duke d'Enghien. He passed the Rubicon of crime, and from that moment misfortune was written on his destiny."† Interposing boldly, like the Committee of Public Safety on occasion of the fall of Danton, between the Royalists and Republicans, he struck redoubtable blows to both; proving to the former, by the sacrifice of their brightest ornament, that all prospect of reconciliation with them was at an end; and to the other, by the trial of their favourite leader, that all hopes of reviving in the people the dreams of Democratic enthusiasm were extinguished; while to the great body of revolutionary proprietors, the millions who had profited by the preceding convulsions, and were desirous only to preserve what they had gained, he held out the guarantee of an hereditary throne, and a dynasty competent to restrain all the popular excesses, of which the recollection was so deeply engraven in the public mind.‡

The season chosen for the first broaching of these ideas, which had been long floating in prospect in the thoughts of all reflecting persons, was shortly after the death of the Duke d'Enghien, and when a vague disquietude pervaded the public mind as to the result of the conspiracies and trials which excited so extraordinary an interest. In a secret conference with several of the leading members of the senate, held six days after that event, Napoleon represented to them the precarious state of the Republic, dependant as it was on the life of a single individual, daily exposed to the daggers of assassins; passed in review the different projects which might be adopted to give it more stability, a republic, the restoration of the ancient dynasty,

or the creation of a new one; and discussed them all as a disinterested spectator, totally unconnected with any plans which might be ultimately adopted. The obsequious senators, divining his secret intentions, warmly combated the transference of power to any other hands, and conjured him to provide as soon as possible for the public weal, by making supreme power hereditary in a race of sovereigns, commencing with himself. Feigning a reluctant consent, he at length said, "Well, if you are really convinced that my nomination as emperor is necessary to the welfare of France, take at least every possible precaution against my tyranny; yes, I repeat it, against my tyranny; for who knows how far, in such a situation, I may be tempted to abuse the authority with which I may be invested?"*

The project thus set on foot was the subject of secret negotiations for above a month between the senate and the government. It was agreed that the first public announcement of it should come from the Tribune, as the only branch of the Legislature in which the shadow even of popular representation prevailed. So completely had the strength of that once formidable body been prostrated, and its character changed by the alterations made on its constitution when the consulate for life was proclaimed, that it proved the ready instrument of these ambitious projects. Everything was arranged with facility for acting the great drama in presence of the people. The moment was chosen; the dispositions were made; the speeches, addresses, and congratulations agreed on; the parts assigned to the principal actors, before the curtain drew up, or the people were admitted to the spectacle. At length, on the 25th of April, the representation began in the hall of the Tribune.†

M. Curée and Simeon were the most distinguished orators on the side of the government in that branch of the Legislature. "Revolutions," said they, "are the diseases of the body politic; everything which has been overturned was not in reality deserving of censure. There are certain bases of public prosperity at the foundation of every social edifice. Seasons of discord may displace them for a time, but ere long their own weight restores them to their natural situation; and if a skilful hand superintends the reconstruction of the building during that period of returning stability, they may regain a form which shall endure for centuries. It is in vain that we are reminded of the long possession of the ancient dynasty. Principles and facts alike oppose their restoration. The people, the sole fountain and depository of power, may displace a family by virtue of the same authority by which they seated them on the throne. Europe has sanctioned the change by recognising our new government. The reigning family in England have no other title to the throne but the will of the people. 'When Pepin was crowned, it was only,' says Montesquieu, 'a ceremony the more, and a phantom the less. He acquired nothing by it but the ornaments of royalty; nothing was changed in the nation. When the success-

The Tribune is put forward to make the proposal in public, April 25, 1804.

First broaching of the project to the senate.

March 27, 1804.

* Thib., 454. † Rév. Franç., ii., 328. ‡ Bign., iii., 377.

* De Staël, Rév. Franç., ii., 329, 330. Thib., 455. Bour vi., 52. † Bign., iii., 379, 380. Bour., vi., 52. Thib., 455

ors of Charlemagne lost supreme authority, Hughes Capet already held the keys of the kingdom: the crown was placed on his head because he alone was able to defend it."

"An eternal barrier separates us from the re-
Speech of the turn of the factions which would
movers on the tear our entrails, and that royal fam-
occasion. ily which we proscribed in 1792 be-

cause it had violated our rights. It is by placing the crown on the head of the First Consul alone that the French people can preserve their dignity, their independence, and their territory. Thus only will the army be assured of a brilliant establishment, faithful chiefs, intrepid officers, and the glorious standards which have so often led it to victory: it will neither have to fear unworthy humiliations, disgraceful disbanding, nor horrid civil wars, where the bones of the defenders of their country are exposed to the winds. Let us hasten, then, to demand hereditary succession to the supreme magistrature; 'for in voting this to a chief,' as Pliny said to Trajan, 'we prevent the return of a master.' But, at the same time, let us give a worthy name to so great a power; let us adorn the first magistrate in the world by a dignified epithet; let us choose that which shall at once convey the idea of the first civil functions, recall glorious recollections, and in nowise infringe on the sovereignty of the people. I see, for the chief of the national power, no name so worthy as that of **EMPEROR**. If it means victorious consul, who is so worthy to bear it? What people, what armies were ever more deserving of such a title in their chief? I demand, therefore, that we lay before the senate the wish of the nation, that Napoleon Bonaparte, at present First Consul, be declared emperor, and in that quality remain charged with the government of the French Republic; that the imperial dignity be declared hereditary in his family; and that such of our institutions as are only sketched out be definitely arranged."* No sooner was the harangue delivered than a crowd of orators rushed forward to inscribe their names on the tribune to follow in the same course. The senate of Augustus was never more obsequious.

Notwithstanding the headlong course which public opinion was following towards despotic power, and the obvious necessity for it to stay the discord from which such boundless suffering had ensued, there were some determined men who stood forward to resist the change, undeterred by the frowns of power, unseduced by the cheers of the multitude, uninstructed by the lessons of experience. Carnot

Honourable resistance of in the Tribune, and Berlier in the Carnot. Council of State, were the foremost of this dauntless band. There is something in the spectacle of moral courage, of individual firmness withstanding public transports, of conscious integrity despising regal seductions, which must command respect, even when advocating a course which is impracticable or inexpedient. "In what a position," said they, "will this proposition place all those who have advocated the principles of the Revolution! When hereditary succession to the throne is established, there will no longer remain a shadow to the Republic of all for which it has sacrificed so many millions of lives. I cannot believe that

the people of France are disposed so soon to abandon all that has been so dearly acquired. Was liberty, then, only exhibited to man to increase his regrets for a blessing which he never can enjoy? Is it to be forever presented to his eyes as the forbidden fruit to which he dares not reach out his hand? Has nature, which has inspired us with so pressing a desire for this great acquisition, doomed us in its search to continual disappointment? No! I can never be brought to regard a blessing so generally preferred to all others, without which all others are nothing, as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, and that the system which it goes to establish is easier of institution, and more stable in duration, than either arbitrary power or an unrestrained oligarchy." Every one respected the courage and motives of these upright men, but the fallacy of their arguments was not the less apparent, the public tendency to despotism not the less irresistible.* In the Council of State the hereditary succession was carried by a majority of 20 to 7; and in the Tribune by a still larger majority, Carnot alone voting in the minority.

The theatrical representation thus got up in the Tribune, and the exchange of
Universal adulation with which Napoleon was surrounded. addresses, consultations, public and private, which followed, soon produced the desired effect. In Na-

poleon's words, it was now evident that the pear was ripe. Addresses flowed in from all quarters, from the army, the municipalities, the cities, the chambers of commerce, all imploring the First Consul to ascend the imperial throne, and vying with each other in the strains of servile adulation. Their general strain was, "Greatest of men, complete your work; render it as immortal as your glory; you have extricated us from the chaos of the past; you have overwhelmed us with the blessings of the present; nothing remains but to guarantee for us the future." To the address of the senate, imploring him to assume the purple, Napoleon replied, "We have been constantly guided by the prin-
His answer to the senate. ciple that sovereignty resides in

the people; and that therefore everything, without exception, should be rendered conducive to their interest, happiness, and glory. It is to attain this end that the supreme magistracy, the Senate, the Council, the Legislative Body, the Electoral Body, and all the branches of administration, have been instituted. The people of France can add nothing to the happiness and glory which surround me; but I feel that my most sacred, as my most pleasing duty, is to assure to its children the advantages secured by that revolution which cost so much, and, above all, by the death of so many millions of brave men who died in defence of our rights. It is my most earnest desire that we may be able to say, on the 14th of July in this year, 'Fifteen years ago, by a spontaneous movement, we ran to arms, we gained liberty, equality, and glory.'

Now these first of blessings, secured May 4, 1804. beyond the possibility of chance, are beyond the reach of danger; they are preserved for you and your children. Institutions, conceived and commenced in the midst of the tempests of war, both without and within, are about

* Bour., vi., 55, 56. Bign., iii., 381, 382.

* Bour., vi., 61, 62. Bign., iii., 382, 383. Thib., 460

to be secured, while the state resounds with the designs and conspiracies of our mortal enemies, by the adoption of all that the experience of ages has demonstrated to be necessary to guarantee the rights which the nation has deemed essential to its dignity, its liberty, and its happiness.*

In this answer is to be found the key to the whole policy of the First Consul on the throne, and the secret of the astonishing facility with which he established, on the ruins of revolutionary passions, the most despotic throne of Europe. Aware that the great body of mankind are incapable of judging on public affairs, but perfectly adequate to a perception of their private interests, he invariably observed the principles there set forth, of carefully protecting all the revolutionary interests, and constantly addressing the people in the language of revolutionary equality. By steadily adhering to these rules, he succeeded in at once calming their interested fears and flattering their impassioned feelings; by constantly holding out that the people were the source of all power, he blinded them to the fact that they had ceased to be the possessors of any; and by religiously respecting all the interests created by the Revolution, he rendered the nation indifferent to the abandonment of all the principles on which it was founded.

All things being at length matured, the senate, by a decree on the 18th of May, declared Napoleon EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH, but referred to the people the ratification of their device, which declared the throne hereditary in his family, and that of his brothers Joseph and Lucien. The obsequious body hastened to St. Cloud with the decree, when the emperor received them with great magnificence. "Whatever," said he, "can contribute to the good of the country, is essentially connected with my happiness. I submit the law concerning the succession to the throne to the sanction of the people. I hope France will never repent of the honours with which she has environed myself and my family. Come what may, my spirit will be no longer with my posterity from the moment that they shall cease to merit the love and the confidence of the great nation."†

The appeal to the people soon proved that the First Consul, in assuming the imperial dignity, had only acted in accordance with the wishes of the immense majority of the nation. Registers were opened in every commune of France, and the result showed that there were 3,572,329 votes in the affirmative,‡ and only 2569 in the negative. History has recorded no example of so unanimous an approbation of the foundation of a dynasty; no instance of a nation so joyfully taking refuge in the stillness of despotism.

Various changes, necessarily flowing from this great step, immediately followed. On the day after his accession, the senate published a *senatus consultum*, by which the imperial dignity was established in the Bonaparte family, and rank and precedence of his relations, as well as the other dignitaries of the Empire, regulated. Various im-

portant alterations in the Constitution were made by this decree, if Constitution it could be called, which had only the shadow of representative institutions with the reality of military despotism; but they will more appropriately come to be considered in the chapter relating to the internal government of the Empire. The whole real powers of government were, by the new *senatus consultum*, vested in the Senate and the Council of State; in other words, in the emperor. The Legislative Body continued its mute inglorious functions. The Tribunate, divided into several sections, and obliged to discuss in these separate divisions the projects of laws transmitted to it by the Legislative Body,* lost the little consideration which still belonged to it, and paved the way for its total suppression, which soon after ensued. In everything but name, the government of France was thenceforward an absolute despotism.

Napoleon's first step on coming to the throne was to create the marshals of the Empire, and it was ordered that they should be addressed as M. le Maréchal. Those first named were eighteen in number, well known in the annals of military glory; Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Massena, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davoust, Bessières, Kellerman, Lefebvre, Perignon, and Serurier. He already projected the creation in their favour of those new patents of nobility, which were destined to recall the most glorious events of the Empire, and form a phalanx of Paladins to defend the imperial throne.†

On the same day Napoleon fixed the titles and precedence of all the members of his family. He directed that his brothers and sisters should receive the title of imperial highness; that the great dignitaries of the Empire should adopt that of most serene highness; and that the address of "my lord" should be revived in favour of these elevated personages. Thenceforth the progress of court etiquette and Oriental forms was as rapid at the Tuileries as in the seraglio of the Byzantine Empire. "Whoever," says Madame de Staël, "could suggest an additional piece of etiquette from the olden time, propose an additional reverence, a new mode of knocking at the door of an antechamber, a more ceremonious method of presenting a petition or folding a letter, was received as if he had been a benefactor of the human race. The code of imperial etiquette is the most remarkable authentic record of human baseness that has been recorded by history."‡§

* Art. 96, *Senatus Cons.*, May 19, 1804. Bign., iii., 363 Bour., vi., 76, 77. † Bour., vi., 78. Bign., iii., 401.

‡ Rév. Franç., ii., 334, 335. Bour., vi., 77, 78.

§ No sooner did he receive intelligence of the assumption of the imperial crown by Napoleon, than Louis XVIII., on the shores of the Baltic, hastened to protest against an act so subversive of the rights of his family.

"In taking the title of emperor," said the exiled prince, "Bonaparte has put the seal to his usurpation. That new act of a revolution, in which everything has been fundamentally null, cannot, doubtless, impair my rights; but, being accountable for my conduct to other sovereigns, whose rights are not the less injured than my own, and whose thrones are shaken by the principles which the senate of Paris has dared to put forth; accountable to France, to my family, to my own honour, I should consider myself guilty of betraying the common cause if I preserved silence on this occasion. I declare, then, after renewing

* Bour., vi., 65, 70. † Bign., iii., 387. ‡ Ib., iii., 388.

Such was the termination of the political changes of the French Revolution, such the consequences of the first great experiment tried in modern Europe of regenerating society by destroying all its institutions. Born of the enthusiasm and philanthropy of the higher and educated classes, adopted by the fervour and madness of the people, coerced by the severity of Democratic tyranny, fanned by the gales of foreign conquest, disgraced by the cupidity of domestic administration; having exhausted every art of seduction, and worn out every means of delusion, it sunk at length into the stillness of absolute power. But it was not the slumber of freedom, to awaken fresh and vigorous in after-days; it was the deep sleep of despotism; the repose of a nation worn out by suffering; the lethargy of a people who in the preceding convulsions had destroyed all the elements of durable freedom.

In this respect there is a remarkable difference between the state of the public mind and the disposition of the people in England during the usurpation of Cromwell, and in France under the empire of Napoleon. Both were military despotisms, originating in the fervour of former times; but the philosophic observer might discern under the one symptoms of an unconquered spirit, destined to restore the public freedom when the tyranny of the moment was overpast; in the other, the well-known features of Asiatic servility, the grave, in every age, of independent institutions. The English nobility kept aloof from the court of the Protector; he strove in vain to assemble a House of Peers; the landed proprietors remained in sullen silence on their estates; such was the refractory spirit of the Commons, that every Parliament was dissolved within a few weeks after it assembled; and when one of his creatures suggested that the crown should be offered to the victorious soldier, the proposal was rejected by a great majority of the very Parliament which he had moulded in the way most likely to be subservient to his will. But the case was very different in France. There the nation rushed voluntarily and headlong into the arms of despotism; the First Consul experienced scarcely any resistance in his strides to absolute power either from the nobility, the Commons, or the people; all classes vied with each other in their servility to the reigning authority; the old families eagerly sought admittance into his antechambers, the new greedily coveted the spoils of the Empire, the cities addressed him in strains of Eastern adulation, the peasants almost unanimously seated him on the throne. Rapid as his advances to absolute power were, they could hardly keep pace with the desire of the nation to receive the chains of a master; and with truth might he apply to all his subjects what Tiberius said of the Roman senate, "Oh! homines ad servitutem parati."

We should widely err if we supposed that

my protest against all the illegal acts committed since the commencement of the Revolution, that, far from recognising the new title conferred on Bonaparte by a body which has itself no legal existence, I protest against that title and all the subsequent acts to which it may give rise." This protest was so little regarded by the French government, that it was published on the 1st of July in the *Moniteur*.—See BIGNON, iii., 389, 391.

this extraordinary difference was owing either to any inherent servility in the French character, or any deficiency in the spirit of freedom among the inhabitants of that country when the contest commenced.

Which were all owing to the violence and injustice of the French convulsions.

There never was a nation more thoroughly and unanimously imbued with the passion, both for liberty and equality, than the French were during the early years of the Revolution; and in the prosecution of that object they incurred hardships and underwent sufferings greater, perhaps, than any other people ever endured in a similar time. It was the magnitude of the changes produced by the Revolution, the prostration of all the higher classes which it induced, which produced this effect. When France emerged from the Revolution, almost all the old families were destroyed; commerce and manufactures were ruined, and the only mode of earning a subsistence which remained to the classes above the cultivators of the soil, was by entering into the service, and receiving the pay of government. Necessity, as much as inclination, drove all into servility to the reigning authority; if they did not pay court to persons in power, they had no alternative but to starve. Neckar, in his last and ablest work, had already clearly perceived this important truth. "If by a revolution in the social system or in public opinion," says he, "you have lost the elements of great proprietors, you must consider yourselves as having lost the elements requisite for the formation of a tempered monarchy, and turn, with whatever pain, to a different constitution of society. I do not believe that Bonaparte himself, with all his talent, his genius, and his power, could succeed in establishing in France a constitutional hereditary monarchy. There is a mode of founding an hereditary monarchy, however, widely different from all the principles of freedom; the same which introduced the despotism of Rome; the force of the army, the Prætorian Guards, the soldiers of the East and the West. May God preserve France from such a destiny." What a testimony to the final result of the Revolution, from the man who, by the duplication of the *Tiers Etat*, had so great a share in creating it!*

Madame de Staël has well explained the prodigious and unprecedented accumulation of power and influence which was concentrated in the hands of the First Consul when reconstructing the disjointed members of society after the preceding convulsions. "Every mode of earning a subsistence had disappeared during ten years of previous suffering. No person could consider himself secure of his livelihood; men of all classes, ruined or enriched, banished or rewarded, equally found themselves at the mercy of the supreme power. Thousands of Frenchmen were on the list of emigrants; millions were the possessors of national domains; thousands were proscribed as priests or nobles; tens of thousands feared to be so for their revolutionary misdeeds. Napoleon, who fully appreciated the immense authority which such a state of dependance gave him, took care to keep it up. To such a one he restored his property,

Vast concentration of influence at this period in the hands of the government.

* Neckar, *Dernières Vues*, 235, 240.

from another he withheld it; by one edict he gave back the unalienated woods to the old proprietors, by another he suspended the gift. "There was hardly a Frenchman in the whole kingdom who had not something to solicit from the government, and that something was the means of existence. The favour of government thus led, not to an increase of vain or frivolous pleasures, but to a restoration of your country, a termination of exile, the bread of life. That unheard-of state of dependance proved fatal to the spirit of freedom in the nation. An unprecedented combination of circumstances put at the disposition of a single man the laws passed during the Reign of Terror, and the military force created by revolutionary enthusiasm. All the local authorities, all the provincial establishments were suppressed or annulled; there remained only in France a single centre of movement, and that was Paris; and all the men in the provinces who were driven to solicit public employment were compelled to come to the capital to find their livelihood. Thence has proceeded that rage for employment or situations under government which has ever since devoured and degraded France."*

Another element which powerfully contributed to the same effect was the complete concentration of all the influence of the press in the hands of government, in consequence of the changes and calamities of former times. "The whole journals of France were subjected," says the same author, "to the most rigorous censure; the periodical press repeated, day after day, the same observations, without any one being permitted to contradict them. Under such circumstances, the press, instead of being, as is so often said, the safeguard of liberty, becomes the most terrible arm in the hand of power. In the same way, as regular troops are more formidable than militia to the independence of the people, so do hired writers deprave and mislead public opinion much more than could possibly take place when men communicated only by words, and formed their opinions on facts which fell under their observation.

When the appetite for news can be satisfied only by continued falsehood; when the reputation of every one depends on calumnies, universally diffused, without the possibility of their refutation; when the opinions to be advanced on every circumstance, every work, every individual, are submitted to the observations of journalists, as a file of soldiers to the commands of their officers, the art of printing becomes what was formerly said of cannon, 'the last logic of kings.'"

These profound observations suggest an important conclusion in political science, which is, that the press can be regarded as the bulwark of liberty only as long as, independent of it, the elements of freedom exist in the different classes of society; and that, if these elements are destroyed, and the balance in the state subverted, either by an undue preponderance of popular or regal power, it instantly changes its functions, and instead of the arm of independence, becomes the instrument of oppression. It immensely augments the power of the weapons with which the different classes of society combat each other; but the direction which this great engine receives, and the objects to which it may be directed, are as various as the changing dispositions and fleeting passions of mankind. In a constitutional monarchy, where a due balance is preserved between the different classes of society, the cause of freedom is strengthened by its influence; but in another state of things it may be perverted to very different purposes, and become, as in Republican America, the organ of Democratic, or in Imperial France, the instrument of sovereign oppression. The only security, therefore, for durable freedom, is to be found in the preservation of the rights and liberties of all classes of the people; in the due ascendancy of wealth and education, as well as the energy and independence of popular industry; and the gates to Oriental servitude may be opened as wide by the vehemence of Democratic injustice, as the advances of regal ambition or the force of military power.

Inference in political science to which this leads.

* De Staël, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 259, 261, 372, 373.

* De Staël, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 263, 264.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

PEACE OF AMIENS.

FROM THE CONCLUSION OF HOSTILITIES TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.

OCTOBER, 1801—MAY, 1803.

ARGUMENT.

Universal Joy in the British Islands at the Conclusion of the War.—Napoleon meditates an Expedition to St. Domingo.—Disastrous Effects of the Revolt in that Island to the French Navy.—Description of St. Domingo.—Its Statistical Details.—Origin of the Revolution in that Island.—Rash Measures of the French Constituent Assembly.—Freedom is conferred on all Persons of Colour.—The Insurrection breaks out.—Its Progress and Horrors.—The Constituent Assembly endeavour without Success to retrace their Steps.—French Delegates in vain strive to settle the Differences.—The Insurrection becomes universal.—The Girondists resolve upon unlimited Concession.—The Arrival of their Commissioners augments the Discord.—Storming and Massacre of Cape Town.—The universal Freedom of the Blacks is proclaimed.—The English obtain a footing on the Island.—Furious Civil Wars which ensued between the Negroes and Mulattoes.—Napoleon confirms Toussaint in his Command.—Vigorous Measures of the Negro Chief in the Administration.—His Agricultural Policy, and is appointed President for Life of the Island.—Napoleon instantly resolves to subdue it.—Increasing Prosperity of the Inhabitants under Toussaint's Administration.—Preparations of Napoleon for its Subjugation.—Immense Naval and Military Forces assembled.—British Government make no Opposition.—Expedition sails, and arrives off St. Domingo.—First Irresolution, but final Firmness of Toussaint.—The French land, and Cape Town is burned by the Blacks; but the French generally prevail in the Field.—Description of the Mountainous Interior to which the Negroes retire.—Fruitless Endeavour to induce Toussaint to submit.—General and successful Attack on his Position.—Desperate Defence of a Fort in the Mountains.—The War assumes a Guerilla Character.—Negotiations for the Termination of Hostilities.—Dignified Conduct of Toussaint.—General Pacification.—Treacherous Views of Napoleon.—Perfidious Arrest of Toussaint by the French Authorities.—Dreadful Atrocities on both Sides in Guadaloupe.—Perfidious Conduct of the French towards that Island.—General Revolt in St. Domingo in Consequence.—Death of Le Clerc, and Ruin of the French Army.—Continued Successes of the Negroes.—The Rupture of the Peace of Amiens completely destroys the French Army.—Reflections on this Expedition, and on the Measure which it affords of the Capacity of the Negroes.—Degraded State of St. Domingo ever since that Time.—Ambitious Designs of Napoleon in Europe.—Holland is again revolutionized, and the Cisalpine Republic again remodelled.—Entry of Napoleon into Lyons.—Senatus Consultum there settling the Cisalpine Government.—Nature of the New Constitution.—Annexation of Piedmont to France.—Construction of the Roads over Mont Cenis and the Simplon.—Parma and Placentia are occupied by the French, with Elba.—Progress of the Negotiations for the German Indemnities.—Cordial Union of France and Prussia in this Matter.—In return for which, Prussia guarantees the French Acquisitions in Italy.—Policy of Austria in this Negotiation, and of Russia.—Secret Views of the latter Power.—Courageous Act of Austria in occupying Passau.—Angry Correspondence in consequence between France and Austria.—Conference at Ratisbon.—The Principle of Secularization is admitted.—Compensations respectively received.—Proportion in which the several Powers gained Acquisitions.—Disastrous moral Effect of this Spoliation of the Ecclesiastical Princes.—Projects of Napoleon against Switzerland.—Advantages of the Federal System in that Country.—Its adaptation to the Varieties of their Physical Condition.—Different Characters of the Races which composed its Inhabitants.—Discontent which the Central Democratic Government produced.—Violent internal Dissensions of the Swiss Cantons.—Arguments adduced by the Partisans of France.—Answers made by the Partisans of the old Institutions.—Revolution effected by the Aid of the French Troops, but it does not answer the Views of Napoleon.—The new Government is again deposed, and a fresh Constitution framed by Napoleon.—French Troops are withdrawn, and the Independence of the Valais proclaimed, upon which the Government at Berne is overturned.—The Mountaineers prepare for War.

—Heroic Proclamation of the Forest Cantons.—Hostilities commence.—Great early Success of the Mountaineers.—Diet assembled at Schwytz.—Total Subversion of the Central Government.—Forcible Interference of the First Consul.—The Swiss in vain invoke the Aid of Austria.—Ney overruns the Country with twenty thousand Men.—England remonstrates in vain.—Dignified Address of the Deputies of the Zurich Cantons on resigning the Government.—The Swiss, in Despair, submit.—Aloys Reding and the Leaders of the Confederates are arrested.—Speech of the First Consul to the Swiss Deputies at Paris.—Discontent which his Principles excite on both Sides.—His final Act of Mediation for the Settlement of Helvetia.—Equitable Measures for the Government of the Country.—Admirable Principles of Napoleon's Measures in this Respect.—Extreme Dissatisfaction excited by this Event over Europe.—Honourable Opinions of Mr. Fox on the Subject, and on the Treatment of Holland.—Tranquillity and Happiness of England during this Period.—Rapid Improvement of the Finances and Trade of the Country, and of British Shipping.—Financial Details.—Comparison of the Income and Expenditure in 1802 and 1803.—Causes of Irritation which gradually arose between England and France.—Complaints of the First Consul at the English Newspapers.—M. Otto's Note on this Subject.—Indignation at this Proceeding even in France itself.—Answer made to M. Otto by the British Government.—Trial of Peltier for a Libel on the First Consul.—War of the public Journals on both Sides.—Expedition of Sebastiani to Egypt.—English resolve to retain Malta as a Security.—Violent Explosion of Napoleon in Conversation with Lord Whitworth.—Hostile Preparations on both Sides.—Second violent Ebullition of Napoleon on Lord Whitworth.—Diplomatic and Military Preparations of France.—Note in Reply from Lord Hawkesbury.—Ultimatum of both Parties.—War is at length declared.—Arrest of all the British Travellers in France.—General Indignation which it excites, even in that Country.—Debates on the War in Parliament.—Arguments in Favour of it by the Ministry, and on the other Side by the Opposition.—Reflections on the altered Tone of the Opposition.—England was obviously resolved on War, but it was unavoidable on Napoleon's acknowledged Intentions.—His Designs for the naval Subjugation of this Country.—Incessant Conquest was indispensable to his Existence on the Throne.—Greatest Stretches of Power by France under his reign were always made during Peace; and he was uniformly most rigorous to those who had submitted the most and been most faithful in their Alliance with France.—He meditated, therefore, in the end, a resistless attack on Great Britain after a long Peace.

UNBOUNDED was the joy, unlimited the hopes, conceived in Europe upon the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. Ten years of ceaseless effusion of blood had tamed the fiercest spirits and hushed the strongest passions; the finances of all the parties in the strife had become grievously embarrassed; and the people of every country, yielding to the joyful illusion, fondly imagined that the years of discord had terminated, and a long season of peace and prosperity was to obliterate the traces of human suffering. They did not reflect on the unstable basis on which this temporary respite was rested; they did not consider that it was not from the causes of hostility having ceased, but the means of carrying it on having been exhausted, that a truce had been obtained; that the elements of a yet greater conflagration lay smouldering in the ashes of that which was past; that discordant passions had been silenced, not extinguished; irreconcilable interests severed, not adjusted. Little

Universal joy in the British islands at the termination of the war.

anticipating the dreadful calamities which yet awaited them, the population of Paris forgot, in the glitter of reviews and the splendour of military pageantry, all the calamities of the Revolution; the inhabitants of Vienna enjoyed without woe the respite from anxiety and exertion which the suspension of hostilities afforded them; and the youth of Britain hastened in crowds to the French metropolis, to gratify their curiosity by the sight of the scenes which had so long been the theatre of such tragic events, and the heroes who had gained immortality in such glorious achievements.

But not one instant's respite did the First Consul allow to his own active and indelible mind. Deeming nothing done while aught remained to do, he had no sooner arrived at the highest point of military glory, than he turned his attention to the restoration of naval power, and eagerly availed himself of the opportunity which the suspension of maritime hostilities afforded to revive that decayed but indispensable part of public strength. Wholly deeming the recovery of the French colonies the only means that could be relied on for the permanent support of his marine forces, he projected, on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, an expedition for the recovery of St. Domingo, the once great and splendid possession of France in the Gulf of Mexico, long nursed by the care and attention of the monarchy, at once lost by the reckless innovations of the Constituent Assembly.

It would seem as if the laws of Providence, in nations not less than individuals, have provided for the certain ultimate punishment of inordinate passions, in the consequences flowing from their own indulgence. Long before the war commenced, or the fleets of France had felt the weight of British strength; before one shot had been fired on the ocean, or one harbour blockaded by a hostile squadron, the basis on which the French maritime power rested had been destroyed. Not the conquest of the Nile or the conflagration of Toulon; not the catastrophe of Camperdown or the thunderbolt of Trafalgar, ruined the navy of France. Severe as these blows were, they were not irreparable; while her colonies remained, the means of repairing them existed. It was the rashness of ignorant legislation which inflicted the fatal wound, the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm which produced consequences that could never be repaired.

St. Domingo, the greatest, with the exception of Cuba, and beyond all question, before the Revolution, the most flourishing of the West India islands, is about a hundred marine leagues, or three hundred English miles in length, and its mean breadth is about thirty leagues, or ninety miles. It contains three thousand square leagues, of which two thirds were, in 1789, in the hands of the Spaniards, and one third in those of the French. Although the French portion was the smallest, yet it was incomparably the most productive, both from the nature of the soil, and the cultivation bestowed on the surface. The Spanish consisted, for the most part, of sterile mountains, clothed with forests or rising into naked cliffs, in the centre of the island; whereas the French lay in the plains and valleys at their feet, and had the advantage both of the numerous streams which in that humid climate descended from their wooded sides, and the frequent bays

and gulfs which the ocean had formed in its deeply indented shore.*

The French possession of their portion of the island commenced in 1664, and notwithstanding the frequent interruption of their colonial trade during the wars with England, its prosperity increased in a most extraordinary degree, and in a ratio far beyond that of any other of the West India islands. As usual in all the colonies of that part of the world, the inhabitants consisted of whites, mulattoes, and negro slaves; the former were about 40,000, the latter 60,000, but the slave population exceeded 500,000. Such a disproportion was in itself a most perilous element in social prosperity; but it was much increased by the habits and prejudices of the European race, who were exposed to so many dangers. A large portion of the property of the island was in the hands of an inconsiderable number of great and old families, whose fortunes were immense, prejudices strong, and luxury extreme; while a far more numerous but less opulent body, under the name of *Petits Blancs*, were gradually rising into importance, and, like the *Tiers Etat* in the mother-country, felt far more jealousy of the great proprietors than apprehensions of the consequences of political innovation. Not a few also of the great proprietors were overwhelmed with debt, the natural consequence of long-continued extravagance; and experience soon proved that, not less in the New than the Old World, it was in that class that the most ardent and dangerous partisans of revolutionary change were to be found.

The produce of the island, and the commerce which it maintained with the mother-country before the commencement of the troubles, was immense. The French part alone raised a greater quantity of colonial produce than the whole British islands taken together. Its exports amounted to the enormous value of 168,000,000 francs, or £6,720,000; and the gross produce, including the Spanish portion, amounted to 460,000,000 francs, or £18,400,000, while its imports, in manufactures of the parent state, were no less than 250,000,000, or £10,000,000 sterling. More than half of this immense produce was re-exported from France to other states, and the commerce thence arising was the chief support of its maritime power. Sixteen hundred vessels and twenty-seven thousand sailors were employed in conducting all the branches of this vast colonial traffic: with so magnificent a possession, France had no occasion to envy the dependancies of all other states put together.† It was this splendid and unequalled colonial possession which the French nation threw away and destroyed at the commencement of the Revolution, with a recklessness and improvidence of which the previous history of the world had afforded no example.

Hardly had the cry of liberty and equality been raised in France, when it responded from the warmly and vehemently from the Revolution in shores of St. Domingo. Independence of that island, the identity of the natural passion for liberty, which must ever exist among those who are subjected

* Dum., viii., 487, 488.

† Dum., viii., 460, 464.

‡ Dum., viii., 112, 113. Jom., xiv., 445. Hugu., ii., 407.

§ The produce of the whole British West India islands exported in 1788, £8,448,839; the British manufactures they consumed in £3,088,286; the shipping employed in their trade 949,079 tons; the seamen, 13,691 in the outward, 14,900 in the homeward voyage. The total gross agricultural produce of the islands is about £39,000,000.—See *Parl. Return*, 4th June, 1833; and *Porter's Parl. Tables*, i., 54.

to the restraints of servitude, the slave population of this colony were rapidly assailed by revolutionary agents and emissaries, and the workshops and fields of the planters overrun by heated missionaries, who poured into an ignorant and ardent multitude the newborn ideas of European freedom. The planters were far from appreciating the danger with which they were menaced; on the contrary, a large proportion of the smaller class took part, as usual in revolutionary convulsions, with the popular party, and aided in the propagation of principles destined soon to exterminate themselves with slaughter and conflagration. All united in regarding the crisis of the mother-country as a favourable opportunity for asserting their independence, and emancipating themselves from those restraints which the jealousy of her policy had imposed on their commerce.*

By a decree on March 8, 1790, the Constituent Assembly had empowered each colony belonging to the Republic to make known its wishes on the subject of a Constitution, and that these wishes should be expressed by colonial assemblies, freely elected and recognised by their citizens. This privilege excited the most ruinous divisions among the inhabitants of European descent, already sufficiently menaced by the ideas fermenting in the negro population. The whites claimed the exclusive right of voting for the election of the members of this important assembly, while the mulattoes strenuously asserted their title to an equal share in the representation; and the blacks, intoxicated with the novel doctrines so keenly discussed by all classes of society, secretly formed the project of ridding themselves of both. This decree of the National Assembly was brought out to the island by Lieutenant-colonel Ogé, a mulatto officer in the service of France, who openly proclaimed the opinion of the parent Legislature, that the half-caste and free negroes were entitled to their full share in the election of the representatives. The jealousy of the planters was immediately excited. They refused to acknowledge the decree of the assembly, constituted themselves into a separate Legislature,† and having seized Ogé in the Spanish territory, put him to death by the torture of the wheel, under circumstances of atrocious cruelty.

This unpardonable proceeding, as is usually the case with such acts of barbarity, aggravated instead of stifling the prevailing discontents, and the heats of the colony soon became so vehement that the Constituent Assembly felt the necessity of taking some steps to allay the ferment. The moderate and violent parties in that body took different sides, and all Europe looked on with anxiety upon a debate so novel in its kind, and fraught with such momentous consequences to a large portion of the human race. Barnave Malouet, Alesander Lameth, and Clermont Tonnerre strongly argued that men long accustomed to servitude could not receive the perilous gift of liberty with safety either to themselves or others but by slow degrees, and that the effect of suddenly admitting that bright light upon a benighted population would be to throw them into inevitable and fatal convulsions. But Mirabeau, the master-spirit of the assembly, and the only one of its leaders who combined popular princi-

ples with a just appreciation of the danger of pushing them to excess, was no more, and the declamations of Brissot and the Girondists prevailed over these statesman-like ideas. By a decree on the 15th of May, 1791, the privileges of equality were conferred indiscriminately on all persons of colour born of a free father and mother.*

Far from appreciating the hourly-increasing dangers of their situation, and endeavouring to form with the new citizens an organized body to check the farther progress of levelling principles, the planters openly endeavoured to resist this rash decree. Civil war was preparing in this once peaceful and beautiful colony; arms were collecting; the soldiers, caressed and seduced by both parties, were wavering between their old feelings of regal allegiance and the modern influence of intoxicating principles, when a new and terrible enemy arose, who speedily extinguished in blood the discord of his oppressors. On the night of the 22d of August, the negro revolt, long and secretly organized, at once broke forth, and wrapped the whole northern part of the colony in flames. Jean Francois, a slave of vast penetration, firm character, and violent passions, not unmingled with generosity, was the leader of the conspiracy; his lieutenants were Biasson and Toussaint. The former, of gigantic stature, Herculean strength, and indomitable ferocity, was well fitted to assert that superiority which such qualities seldom fail to command in savage times; the latter, gifted with rare intelligence, profound dissimulation, boundless ambition, and heroic firmness, was fitted to become at once the Numa and the Romulus of the sable Republic in the southern hemisphere.†

This vast conspiracy, productive in the end of calamities unparalleled even in the long catalogue of European atrocity, had for its objects the total extirpation of the whites, and the establishment of an independent black government over the whole island. So inviolable was the secrecy, so general the dissimulation of the slaves, that this awful catastrophe was noways apprehended by the European proprietors; and a conspiracy, which embraced nearly the whole negro population of the island, was revealed only by the obscure hints of a few faithful domestics, who, without betraying their comrades, warned their masters of their danger. The explosion was sudden and terrible. In a moment, the beautiful plains in the north of the island were covered with fires—the labour of a century was devoured in a night; while the negroes, like unchained tigers, precipitated themselves on their masters, seized their arms, massacred them without pity, or threw them into the flames. From all quarters the terrified planters fled to Cape Town, already menaced by ten thousand discontented slaves in its own bosom, while fifteen thousand insurgents surrounded the city, threatening instant destruction to the trembling fugitives within its walls.‡

The cruelties exercised on the unhappy captives on both sides, in this disastrous contest, exceeded anything recorded in history. The negroes marched with spiked infants on their spears instead of colours; they sawed asunder the male prison-

* Dum., viii., 123, 125.

† Ibid., viii., 125, 127. Bign., ii., 395.

‡ Ibid., viii., 127, 129.

* Dum., viii., 112, 119.

† Ibid., viii., 120, 123.

ers, and violated the females on the dead bodies of their husbands. Nor were the whites slow in taking vengeance for these atrocities. In several sallies from Cape Town, the discipline and courage of the Europeans prevailed. Numerous prisoners were made, who were instantly put to death, and the indiscriminate rage of the victors extended to the old men, women, and children of the insurgent race, who had taken no part in the revolt.*

While these disasters were overwhelming the northern part of the island, the southern was a prey to the fierce and increasing discord of the planters and people of colour. At length the opposite parties came into open collision. The mulattoes, aided by a body of negroes, blockaded Port au Prince; while the whites of that town and its vicinity, supported by the National Guard and troops of the line, assembled their forces to raise the siege. The black army was commanded by a chief named Hyacinthe, who displayed in the action an uncommon degree of skill and intrepidity. The shock was terrible; but at length the planters were overthrown, and their broken remains forced back to the town. In other quarters similar actions took place, with various success, but the same result; the whites were finally forced into the cities, and the plains irrevocably overrun by the insurgent forces.†

Overwhelmed with consternation at these disastrous events, the Constituent Assembly endeavoured, when it was too late, to retrace their steps. Barnave, who had so ably resisted the precipitate emancipation of the mulatto race, and clearly predicted the consequences to which it would lead, prevailed upon them, in those brief days of returning moderation which signalized the close of their career, to pass a decree, which declared, in substance, that the external relations and commerce of the colonies should alone be subject to the direct legislation of the National Assembly in the parent state, and that the Colonial Assemblies should have the exclusive right of legislating, with the approbation of the king, for the internal condition and rights of the different classes of inhabitants. But it was too late. This wise principle, which, if embraced earlier in the discussion, might have averted all the disasters, only added fuel to the flames which were consuming the unhappy colony. The planters, irritated by injury and hardened by misfortune, positively refused to make any dispositions for the gradual extinction of slavery;‡ and insisted upon the immediate and unqualified submission of the whole insurgents, mulatto and negro; while the slaves, emboldened by unlooked-for success, openly asserted their determination to come to no accommodation but on terms of absolute freedom.

Three delegates of the convention, with a reinforcement of three thousand men, were despatched in November, 1791, to endeavour to re-establish the affairs of the colony, and reconcile its discordant inhabitants; but they soon found that the passions excited on both sides were so vehement as to be incapable of adjustment. They arrived at Cape Town, where they found the remnant of the white population blockaded by the negro forces. They

were received by the members of the Colonial Legislature covered with black, and those of the municipality arrayed in red crape; while instruments of punishment, gibbets and scaffolds erected in the market-place, too surely told the bloody scenes which the island had recently witnessed. Their first step was to proclaim a general amnesty, which was received with apparent thankfulness in the insurgent camps, and cold distrust by the Colonial Legislature. Toussaint repaired to the town, where he professed the desire of the negroes to return to their duty, if their rights, as proclaimed by the mother-country, were recognised; but his language was not that of rebels negotiating an amnesty for their offences, but an independent power actuated by a desire to stop the effusion of blood. As such, it excited the indignation of the planters, who insisted on the unqualified submission of the slaves, and the punishment of the authors of the revolt: demands which so enraged the negroes,* that it was with difficulty Toussaint could prevent them from giving it vent by the indiscriminate massacre of all the prisoners in their hands.

The Constituent Assembly had flattered itself that its last decree, which put the The insurrection becomes universal. fate of the mulatto and negro population into the hands of the Colonial Legislature, would have had the effect of inducing the latter to concede emancipation to the half-caste race, and of conciliating the former, through gratitude for so great a benefit conferred on them by their former masters; but, in forming that hope, they proved their ignorance of the effect of concessions dictated by alarm, of which their own institutions were soon to afford so memorable an example. The Colonial Legislature, aware, from dear-bought experience, that the prospect of such acquisitions in that moment of excitement would only inflame, with tenfold fury, all who had a drop of negro blood in their veins, resolutely refused to make any concessions even to the mulatto population. The commissioners of the National Assembly openly took part with that unhappy body of men, thus deprived of the benefit conferred on them by the mother-country; in consequence of which the war, which had subsided during the progress of the negotiation, broke out again with redoubled fury, and the mulattoes everywhere joined their skill and intelligence to the numbers and ferocity of the negroes. A large body of whites were massacred in the church of Ouanaminthe by the Africans, whom the mulattoes had the cruelty to introduce; and Cape Town itself was nearly surprised by Biasson and Toussaint, at the head of a chosen body of their followers. The contest had no longer a semblance of equality. The insurrection broke out on every side, extended into every quarter; fire and sword devoured the remains of this once splendid colony; the wretched planters all took shelter in Cape Town; and the slaves, deprived of the means of subsistence by their own excesses, dispersed through the woods, reverting to the chase or plunder for a precarious existence.†

Meanwhile the Legislative Assembly, which had succeeded the Constituent, a The Girondists resolve upon unlimited concession. step farther advanced in revolutionary violence, were preparing ulterior measures of the most frantic character. Irritated at the Colonial Legislature for not having followed up their intentions, and

* Dum., viii., 120, 130. Rep. à l'Assemblée Const., 23, 27.

† Dum., viii., 130, 138.

‡ Ibid., viii., 138, 142.

* Dum., viii., 142, 145.

* Ibid., viii., 145, 151.

instigated by the populace, whom the efforts of Brissot and the Society at Paris *des Amis des Noirs* had roused to a perfect phrensy on the subject, they revoked the decree of the 24th of September preceding, which had conferred such ample powers on the colonial legislatures, dissolved the assembly at Cape Town, and despatched three new commissioners, Arthaux, Santhonax, and Polverel, with unlimited powers to settle the affairs of the colony. In vain Barnave and the remnant of the Constitutional party in the assembly strove to moderate these extravagant proceedings: the violence of the Jacobins bore down all opposition. "Don't talk to us of danger," said Brissot; "let the colonies perish rather than one principle be abandoned.*"

The proceedings of the new commissioners May, 1793. speedily brought matters to a crisis. They arrived first at Port au Prince, and, in conformity with the secret instructions of the government, which were to dislodge the whites from that stronghold, they sent off to France the soldiers of the regiment of Artois, established a Jacobin Club, transported to France or America thirty of the leading planters, and issued a proclamation, in which they exhorted the colonists "to lay aside at last the prejudices of colour." Having thus laid the revolutionary train at Port au Prince, they embarked for Cape

Town, where they arrived in the middle of June. Matters had by this time

reached such a height there as indicated the immediate approach of a crisis. The intelligence of the execution of the king, and proclamation of a republic, had roused

to the very highest pitch the Democratic passions of all the inferior classes. The planters, with too good reason, apprehended that the convention which had succeeded the Legislative Assembly would soon outstrip them in violence, and put the finishing stroke to their manifold calamities, by at once proclaiming the liberty of the slaves, and so destroying the remnant of property which they still possessed. But their destruction was nearer at hand than they supposed. On the 20th of June, a quarrel

accidentally arose between a French naval captain and a mulatto officer in the service of the colonial government; the commissioners ordered them both into their presence, without regard to the distinction of colour, and this excited the highest indignation in the officers of the marine, who landed with their crews to take vengeance for the indignity done to one of their members. The colonists loudly applauded their conduct, and invoked their aid as the saviours of St. Domingo: the exiles brought from Port au Prince fomented the discord as the only means of effecting their liberation: a civil war speedily ensued in the blockaded capital, and for two days blood flowed in torrents in these insane contests between the sailors of the fleet and the mulatto population.†

The negro chiefs, secretly informed of all these disorders, resolved to profit by this opportunity of finally destroying the whites thus afforded to them. Three thousand insurgents penetrated through the works, stripped of their defenders during the general tumult, and, making straight for the prisons, delivered a large body of slaves who were

there in chains. Instantly the liberated captives spread themselves over the town, set it on fire in every quarter, and massacred the unhappy whites when seeking to escape from the conflagration. A scene of matchless horror ensued: twenty thousand negroes broke into the city, and, with the torch in one hand and the sword in the other, spread slaughter and devastation around. Hardly had the strife of the Europeans with each other subsided, when they found themselves overwhelmed by the vengeance which had been accumulating for centuries in the African breast. Neither age nor sex were spared; the young were cut down in striving to defend their houses, the aged in the churches where they had fled to implore protection; virgins were immolated on the altar; weeping infants hurled into the fires. Amid the shrieks of the sufferers and the shouts of the victors, the finest city in the West Indies was reduced to ashes: its splendid churches, its stately palaces, were wrapped in flames; thirty thousand human beings perished in the massacre, and the wretched fugitives who had escaped from this scene of horror on board the ships were guided in their passage over the deep by the prodigious light which arose from their burning habitations. They almost all took refuge in the United States, where they were received with the most generous hospitality;* but the frigate *La Fine* foundered on the passage, and five hundred of the survivors from the flames perished in the waves.

Thus fell the queen of the Antilles: the most stately monument of European opulence that had yet arisen in the New World. Nothing deterred, however, by this unparalleled calamity, the commissioners of the Republic pursued their frantic career, and, amid the smoking ruins of the capital, published a decree which proclaimed the freedom of all the blacks who should enrol themselves under the standards of the Republic; a measure which was equivalent to the instant abolition of slavery over the whole island. Farther resistance was now hopeless; the Republican authorities became the most ardent persecutors of the planters; pursued alike by Jacobin phrensy and African vengeance, they fled in despair. Polverel proclaimed the liberty of the blacks in the West, and Montbrun gave free vent to his hatred of the colonists, by compelling them to leave Port au Prince, which had not yet fallen into the hands of the negroes. Everywhere the triumph of the slaves was complete, and the authority of the planters forever destroyed.‡

But, although the liberation of the negroes was effected, the independence of the island was not yet established. The English regarded with the utmost jealousy this violent explosion in their vicinity, and the leaders of the insurgents soon perceived that they could maintain their freedom only by an alliance with the French government. Toussaint, influenced by these views, passed into the service of France with the rank of colonel, and the blacks began to be organized into regiments under the standards of the Republic.

The English, before long, appeared as actors on this theatre of devastation. They were naturally apprehensive of the utmost danger to their West Indian possessions from the establish-

* Dum., viii., 151, 152. Toul., iv., 172.

† Ibid., viii., 152, 159.

* Toul., iv., 257, 260. Dum., viii., 157, 160.

‡ Dum., viii., 160, 164. Ibid., viii., 164, 166.

The universal freedom of the blacks is proclaimed, June 3, 1793.

The English obtain a footing on the island. ment of so great a revolutionary outpost in the centre of the Gulf of Mexico, and entertained a hope that, by allying themselves with the remnant of the planters, they might not only extinguish that frightful volcano, but possibly wrest the island, with all its commerce, from the French Republic. A British squadron appeared off Port au Prince early in 1794, and took possession of that town in the June following. They afterward obtained the Mole of St. Nicholas, the principal harbour of the island, and the negro chief Hyacinthe passed into their service with 12,000 blacks. Encouraged by this great re-enforcement, they commenced a systematic warfare for the reduction of the island; but Toussaint, at the head of the French forces and the great majority of the negroes, still maintained the standard of independence: the blacks soon deserted the British standard, the deadly climate mowed down the European troops, they were gradually pressed backward to the seacoast, and at length the Mole of St. Nicholas, their principal stronghold, capitulated to the victorious negro chief.*

No sooner were they delivered from external enemies, than the parties in the island broke out into furious hostility with each other. The mulattoes beheld with undisguised apprehension the preponderance which the negroes had acquired in the late contests, and arrayed themselves, under General Rigaud, and Hedouville, the commissioner of the French government, to resist Toussaint, who was at the head of the African population. A frightful civil war ensued, which was long carried on with various success; but at length the mulattoes were overcome, and Rigaud forced to take refuge in the walls of Cayes, the sole fortress in the island which still acknowledged his authority. Toussaint, who still professed himself a lieutenant of the French Republic, now undisputed master of the field, immediately turned his forces against the Spanish part of the colony, which had been ceded to France by the treaty of Bâle. He marched at the same time against Port au Prince and Cape Town; his progress was one continued triumph; the Spanish territory received him without resistance, and in December, 1800, his authority was obeyed from one end of the territory to the other.†

Matters were in this situation when Napoleon, who had now succeeded to the helm of government, began to turn his attention to the affairs of this long neglected and now ruined colony. Entirely directed by military ideas, he immediately conceived the design of regaining the French dominion over the island by means of Toussaint, who had now concentrated in his own hands all its forces, and for this purpose lent a willing ear to the representations of Colonel Vincent, whom the negro chief had sent to Paris to lay the state of its affairs before the First Consul. Influenced by these views, he sent back Colonel Vincent with a decree confirming Toussaint in his command as general-in-chief, establishing the Constitution there which in France followed the 18th Brumaire, and a proclamation, in which he called on the "brave blacks to remember that France alone had recognised their freedom."

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This proclamation cut off all hopes from Rigaud and the remnant of the mulatto population, who immediately, in despair, embarked from Cayes, and dispersed themselves over the West India islands, abandoning forever their country to the insurgent population for whom they had made so many sacrifices: the usual fate of those in the middling ranks who stir up the passions of the lowest.*

Toussaint, now undisputed governor of the whole island, adopted the most vigorous measures to put an end to the public discord. While he himself published a general amnesty, and paraded in triumph through the island, attended by all the pomp of European splendour, he committed to his ferocious lieutenant, Dessalines, the task of extinguishing the remains of the hostile party. That chief executed the duty with scrupulous exactness; the method of destroying provinces by means of noyades, imported from France by the revolutionary agents, was practised with fatal success, and African vengeance availed itself of the means of destruction which revolutionary cruelty had invented. While Toussaint was received with discharges of cannon and every demonstration of public joy in the principal cities of the island, ten thousand unhappy captives perished by the orders of the ferocious Dessalines, and the remains of the ardent race of mulattoes, whose ambition had first disturbed the peace of the island, perished by the hands of the servile crowd whom they had themselves elevated into irresistible power.†

Delivered by this bloody execution from almost all his enemies, Toussaint applied himself, with his wonted vigour, to restore the cultivation of the island, which, amid the public calamities, had been almost totally abandoned. Imitating the feudal policy, he distributed the unoccupied buildings and lands among his military followers, and their authority having compelled the common men to work, the level parts of the country soon assumed a comparatively flourishing appearance. At the same time, an assembly of the leading chiefs of the country was convoked at Cape Town, who drew up a Constitution for the inhabitants, and conferred on Toussaint unlimited authority, under the title of president and governor for life, with the right of nominating his successor. Colonel Vincent was immediately despatched to Paris with the new Constitution, and a letter from Toussaint to the First Consul, beginning with the words, "The first of blacks to the first of whites."‡

This unexpected intelligence was a severe blow to the First Consul. He at once perceived that Toussaint had no intention of remaining his lieutenant; that the feeling of independence had taken root; and that, unless a blow was immediately struck, the colony was forever lost to the French Empire. Colonel Vincent arrived with this despatch on the 14th of October, 1801, just thirteen days after the signature of the preliminaries of peace with England, and when the now pacified ocean afforded him the means of at once reasserting the French dominion over the island. He immediately resolved to subdue the

His agricultural policy; and is appointed president for life of the island.

July 1, 1801.

Napoleon instantly resolves to subdue the island.

* *Jom.*, xiv., 435, 440. *Bign.*, ii., 398, 399.

† *Bign.*, ii., 399, 400.

‡ *Jom.*, xiv., 444, 445. *Bign.*, ii., 401, 402. *Dum.*, viii., 176, 177.

* *Dum.*, viii., 167, 171. *Bign.*, ii., 396, 397.

† *Jom.*, xiv., 430, 434.

colony by force of arms, and restore to France those inestimable maritime advantages which its possession had so long secured to the monarchy. The idea of regaining a commerce which, with the addition of the Spanish part of the island, might be expected to amount to sixteen millions sterling, employ two thousand ships, and thirty thousand seamen, was irresistible to a sovereign who felt his deficiency in these particulars to be the only impediment to universal dominion.*

Meanwhile, under the stern and severe government of the African chief, the fields of St. Domingo began to regain part of their once smiling aspect. The military discipline which, during the long previous wars, he had been enabled to diffuse among his followers, afforded him the means of establishing that forced cultivation, without which experience has never found the negro race capable of pursuing the labour of civilized life. The mulattoes, compelled to engage in the most degrading occupations, bitterly lamented the insupportable black yoke they had imposed upon themselves; the negroes, forced to re-enter their fields and workshops, found that their dreams of liberty had vanished into air, and they had only made, for the worse, an exchange of masters. Their comfortable dwellings, their neat gardens, their substantial fare, had disappeared, and there remained only the bitterness of servitude, without either its protection or its compensations. But, amid the most acute individual suffering, the rigid government of Toussaint succeeded in restoring, in part, the cultivation of the colony. The negroes were detained, by the terrors of military execution, in the most complete subordination. The chiefs to whom the lands were allotted submitted to the rule of a master whom they at once feared and admired. Commerce with the adjoining islands and the United States began to revive from its ashes; and out of the surplus produce and customs of the island, the government obtained the means of maintaining a respectable military establishment. Eighteen thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred mounted gens d'armes preserved order in the colony. Toussaint, amid other great projects, had conceived the design of purchasing slaves from the adjoining states. His authority was absolute and universal; and the convulsions of St. Domingo added another to the numerous proofs furnished by history, that revolutionary movements, under whatever circumstances commenced, can terminate only in establishing the unlimited despotism of a single individual.†

But it was no part of the designs of the First Consul to allow this magnificent colony of Napoleon only to slip out of the grasp of France, or its reviving commerce nourish only the navy of Britain. Hardly was the ink of his signature to the preliminaries of a maritime peace dry, when he turned all his attention to the conquest of the island. Independently of the maritime and political advantages to be derived from such a measure, he entertained the most sanguine hopes of the acces-

sion of influence which he would obtain from the disposal of the immense possessions, belonging chiefly to the emigrant noblesse, which would be recovered in the southern hemisphere. Having taken his resolution, he proceeded, with his wonted vigour and ability, in preparing the means of its execution. An extraordinary degree of activity immediately was manifested in the dockyards of Brest, L'Orient, Rochefort, Toulon, Havre, Flushing, and Cadiz. Land-forces began to diverge towards these different points of embarkation, and the destination of the armament was announced in the following proclamation issued by government: "At St. Domingo, systematic acts have disturbed the political horizon. Under *equivocal appearances*, the government has wished to see only the ignorance which confounds names and things, which usurps when it seeks to obey; but a fleet and an army, which are preparing in the harbours of Europe, will soon dissipate these clouds, and St. Domingo will be reduced, in whole, to the government of the Republic." In the proclamation addressed to the blacks, it was announced by the same authority, "Whatever may be your origin or your colour, you are Frenchmen, and all alike free and equal before God and the Republic. At St. Domingo and Guadeloupe slavery no longer exists—all are free—all shall remain free. At Martinique different principles must be observed."*

The forces collected in the different harbours of the Republic for this purpose were the greatest that Europe had ever yet sent forth to the New World. Thirty-five ships of the line, twenty-one frigates, and above eighty smaller vessels, having on board twenty-one thousand land-troops, were soon assembled. They resembled rather the preparations for the subjugation of a rival power than the forces destined for the reduction of a distant colonial settlement. The fleet was commanded by Villaret Joyeuse; the army by Le Clerc, the brother-in-law of Napoleon, and husband of the Princess Pauline, whose exquisite figure has since been immortalized by the chisel of Canova. The land-forces were almost all composed of the conquerors of Hohenlinden. The First Consul gladly availed himself of this opportunity to rid himself of a large portion of the veterans most adverse to his authority. The most distinguished generals of Moreau's army, Richepanse, Rochambeau, Lapoype, and their redoubtable comrades, were employed in the same destination. In the selection of the general-in-chief, the First Consul was not less influenced by private considerations. He was desirous of giving the means of enriching themselves to two relations, whose passion for dress and extravagant habits had already occasioned repeated and disagreeable pecuniary demands to the public treasury.†

The British government naturally conceived no small disquietude at the preparation of so great an armament, at the very time when the signature of the preliminaries rendered it difficult to imagine what could be its destination. They demanded, accordingly, explanations on the subject, and the cabinet of the Tuileries at once unfolded the object of the expedition. Not deeming themselves entitled to interfere between

* Bign., ii., 402. Jom., xiv., 445. † Dum., viii., 177, 178.

† The American war of independence is no exception. It was not a revolutionary movement, but a regular war between one distant power and another; and, but for the boundless issue of the back settlements, it is more than doubtful whether even there the same results would not have taken place.

* Dum., viii., 193, 194. Bign., ii., 408, 409.

† Duchess d'Angoulême, vi., 98, 99. Norw., ii., 194. Bign., ii., 411.

France and her colonies, and, perhaps, not secretly disinclined to the subjugation of so formidable a neighbour as an independent negro state in the close vicinity of her slave colonies, Great Britain abstained from any farther opposition, and merely took the precautionary measures of assembling a powerful fleet of observation in Bantry Bay,* and greatly strengthening the naval force in the West Indies.

The fleets from Brest, L'Orient, and Rochefort all set sail on the 14th of December, 1801. The land-forces they had on board, under the immediate command of Le Clerc, amounted only to 10,000, but they were followed by re-enforcements from Cadiz, Brest, Havre, and Holland, which swelled the troops ultimately to 35,000 men. The first division of this formidable force appeared off the island in the beginning of February. So completely was the government of St. Domingo at fault as to the object of the expedition, that, had it not been for fifteen days which were lost in the Bay of Biscay in assembling the different divisions of the fleet, Toussaint would have been surprised without any preparations whatever for his defence. No sooner, however, did he receive intelligence from an American vessel of the appearance of the fleet in the southern latitudes, than he instantly took his line, despatched messengers in all directions to assemble his forces, and announced his heroic resolution in these memorable words: "A dutiful son, without doubt, owes submission and obedience to his mother; but if that parent should become so unnatural as to aim at the destruction of its own offspring, nothing remains but to intrust vengeance to the hands of God. If I must die, I will die as a brave soldier and a man of honour. I fear no one."<†

But events quickly succeeded each other, which warned the negro chief of the desperate nature of the contest to which he was committed. He had recently before concluded a convention for mutual assistance with General Nugent, the governor of Jamaica, and, with reason, placed great reliance on the efficacious support of the English naval power to protect his dominions from the threatened invasion, when the intelligence of the peace of Amiens, followed by accounts of the arrival of the French fleet in the neighbourhood of the island, at once dissipated these expectations. He hastened to Cape Samana, to obtain, with his own eyes, a view of the formidable armament of which report had so magnified the terrors; and was struck with astonishment at the sight, covering, as it did, the ocean with its sails, and so much beyond anything yet seen in these latitudes. For a moment he hesitated on the part he should adopt. "We must die," said he; "France in a body has come to St. Domingo. We have been deceived; they are determined to take vengeance and enslave the blacks." Recovering, however, soon after, his wonted resolution, he mournfully cast his eyes over the interminable fleet, whose sails, as far as the eye could reach, covered the ocean, and despatched couriers in all directions to rouse the most determined resistance. His forces, however, even with all the advantages of climate and local knowledge, were scarce equal to the mag-

nanimous resolution. They hardly exceeded twenty thousand men, dispersed over the whole island; and, whatever their courage may have been, they could not be expected to stand the shock of the troops with whom the Austrian monarchy had contended in vain.*

Le Clerc gave orders to commence the disembarkation at Cape Town on the 1st of February, where Christophe The French land, and Cape Town is burned by the blacks. commanded, but difficulties arose in consequence of the impossibility of finding a pilot who would guide the vessels into the harbour. At length the admiral seized upon the harbour-admiral, a mulatto named Sangos; put a rope about his neck, and threatened him with instant death if he did not show the way, and a bribe of 50,000 francs (£2000) if he would; but nothing could induce him to betray his country. The precious time thus gained was turned to a good account by Christophe. He rapidly organized everything for burning what yet remained of the town, which had been in part rebuilt since the sack ten years before; removed all the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, and all the stores which could be of service to the enemy, and only waited the signal of disembarkation to apply the torch in every direction. On the 4th the division of Hardy effected

a landing on the one side of the capitol, and Rochambeau on the other, under the cover of a brisk cannonade from the fleet; on the same night the town was set on fire and burned with the utmost fury; out of eight hundred houses scarcely sixty were standing on the following morning, and the first struggles of African independence were signalized by an act of devotion, of which European patriotism has exhibited few examples. The generous sacrifice was not made in vain; both stores and provisions, which might have furnished invaluable supplies to the army, were destroyed, and out of the ruins of the city arose those pestilential vapours, which afterward proved more fatal to the troops than all the forces which Toussaint could assemble for their destruction.†

This sinister commencement, so ominous of the desperate nature of the resistance. But the French were generally pre-not, however, immediately followed in the field. ed by the disasters which were apprehended. European skill and discipline soon asserted their wonted superiority over the military efforts of the other quarters of the globe; and how could the blacks, but recently emancipated from the lash of slavery, be expected to withstand, in regular combat, the conquerors of Hohenlinden? General Kerviseau, without difficulty, made himself master of the Spanish part of the island, which had unwillingly submitted to the negro govern-

* Dum., viii., 206, 207. Jom., xv., 42, 43, 48. Le Clerc, i., 19, 35.

† Dum., viii., 208, 218. Jom., xv., 46, 47, 48. Norv., ii., 207.

‡ The parallel conflagrations of Numantium, Cape Town, and Moscow, prove that, whatever may be their deficiency in industry or the habits of persevering exertion, the negro race is as capable as the European of the sacrifices required by patriotic spirit. When we recollect that it was in a comparatively rude state of society that all these heroic deeds were done, and that the history of civilization has afforded no similar examples, we are led to the conclusion that the progress of refinement, by extending the influence of artificial wants, and strengthening the bonds by which men are bound to their individual possessions, gradually weakens the chords of public feelings, and that a foundation is thus laid for the decay of empires in the very consequences of their extension and greatness.

* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 335. Ann. Reg., 1801, 99. Dum., viii., 202, 203.

† Jom., xv., 41, 42. Dum., viii., 205, 206. Le Clerc, i., 117, 132.

ment. Boudet and Latouche landed at Port au Prince in the harbour, in the face of the enemy, and pursued them so rapidly into the town as to save it from the conflagration with which it was menaced by the savage Dessalines, while the whole southern part of the island submitted at once to the authority of the invaders, and was thus saved from impending destruction. The important harbour of the Mole of St. Nicholas was occupied without opposition; but Dessalines, who had failed in accomplishing that object at Port au Prince, did not abandon Saint Marc till he had reduced it to ashes. On all sides the plains and seacoast fell into the hands of the Europeans, and the black forces were driven back into the impracticable and wooded mountain ridges in the central parts of the island.*

But this apparent triumph was the result, chiefly, of the profound and resolute system of defence adopted by the black government, which consisted in destroying the cities on the coast, ruining the cultivated plains which might afford supplies to the enemy, and retiring into the woody fastnesses in the interior, called, in the emphatic language of the country, "the Grand Chaos," where the system of bush-fighting might render unavailing the discipline and experience of the European soldiers. There is nothing in the temperate zone comparable to the difficulty and intricacy of these primeval forests, where enormous trees shoot up to the height of two hundred feet from the ground, and their stems are enveloped in an impenetrable thicket of creepers and underwood, which flourish under the rays of a vertical sun. No roads, few paths traverse this savage district; almost the only mode of penetrating through it is by following the beds of the torrents, which in that humid climate frequently furrow the sides of the mountains, where a column of regular soldiers is exposed to a murderous fire from the unseen bands stationed in the overhanging woods. It was Toussaint's design to maintain himself in these impenetrable fastnesses, sending forth merely light parties to harass the flanks and rear of the enemy, until the pestilential season of autumn arrived, and the heavy rains had generated those noxious vapours which in that deadly climate so rapidly prove fatal to European constitutions. He had only twelve thousand regular troops remaining, but they were aided by the desultory efforts of the negroes in the plain, who were ever ready, like the peasants of La Vendée, to answer his summons, though apparently engaged only in agricultural pursuits; and with such auxiliaries, and the prospect of approaching pestilence, his resources were by no means to be despised, even by the best-appointed European army. All the blacks were animated with the most enthusiastic spirit, for the intentions of the invader were no longer doubtful, and the tenour of the last instructions to Le Clerc had transpired, which were to re-establish slavery throughout the whole island.†

Penetrated with the difficulty of the novel species of warfare on which he was about to enter, Le Clerc tried to prevail on the negro chief, by conciliatory measures and the force of his paternal affections, to lay down his arms. For

this purpose he sent to him his two sons, whom he had brought with him from Paris, along with their crafty preceptor, M. Coisson, and a letter from the First Consul, in which he acknowledged his great services to France, and offered him the command of the colony if he would submit to the laws of the Republic. With no small difficulty the children made their way to the habitation of Toussaint at Ennery, thirty leagues from Cape Town, in the mountains. Their mother wept for joy on beholding her long-lost offspring; and the chief himself, who was absent on their arrival, fell on their necks on his return, and for a moment was shaken in his resolution to maintain the independence of his country by the flood of parental affection. He soon, however, recovered the wonted firmness of his character. In vain his sons embraced his knees, and implored him to accede to the proposition of the First Consul; in vain his wife and family added their tears. He saw through the artifice of his enemies, and clearly perceived that his submission would be the signal for the re-establishment of slavery throughout the colony. In the generous contention, patriotic duty prevailed over parental love. He sent back his sons to Le Clerc with an evasive letter proposing an armistice; the French general granted him four days to determine, and again restored them to their father. Toussaint, upon this, retained his sons, and returned no answer to Le Clerc, who forthwith declared him a rebel, and prepared to carry on the war to the last extremity.*

A few days afterward the Toulon squadron arrived, bringing a re-enforcement of six thousand men; and the French general, finding himself at the head of fifteen thousand effective men, prepared for a concentric attack from all quarters on the wooded fastnesses still in the hands of the negro chief. It took place on the 17th with the greatest success. Toussaint himself, intrenched with 2500 of his best troops, supported by 2000 armed negroes, in a strong position at the ravine of Couleuvre, at the entrance of the thickets, was attacked and defeated by Rochambeau, with the loss of 700 men. His lieutenant, Maurepas, who had gained an important success at Gros Morne, was by this advantage placed between two fires, and forced to surrender; and soon after entered, with all his followers, into the service of the Republic. Dessalines, defeated by Boudet in the neighbourhood of St. Marc, with his own hands set fire to his dwelling. All his officers followed his example, and the retreat of the blacks towards the mountains in the south was preceded by the massacre of twelve hundred whites, and clouds of smoke, which announced the destruction of all the plantations in that part of the island.†

Nothing daunted by these calamities, Dessalines had no sooner reached a place of security in the hills, than he meditated an expedition against Port au Prince, from which the French troops had been in a great measure withdrawn; but it was defeated by the skill and valour of Latouche Triaille, and he was compelled to fall back to the mountains. The beaten remains of the blacks now assembled at the fort of Crête à Pierrot, an inconsiderable stronghold erected by

* Jom., xv., 50, 53. Novr., ii., 207, 209. Bign., ii., 415, 416. Dum., viii., 220, 230.

† Novr., ii., 207. Jom., xv., 53, 55. Dum., viii., 230, 232. Le Clerc, i., 171, 180.

* Dum., viii., 232, 235. Jom., xv., 55, 59. Novr., ii., 209, 210. Franklin's Hayti, 143.

† Jom., xv., 60, 62; Dum., viii., 236, 245. Novr., ii., 211, 212.

the English at the confluence of two streams, in a position deemed inaccessible. Here, however, they were assaulted by two brigades of the French army, under Debelle; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the blacks with grape and musketry, that the attempt to carry it by a

coup de main failed, and the assailants March 3. were repulsed with the loss of seven hundred of their bravest troops. Le Clerc, upon this, concentrated all his disposable forces for the attack of this important point. The divisions both of Hardy and Rochambeau were brought up to support that of Debelle, and an escalade was again tried with the victorious troops of Rochambeau, who were a second time repulsed with severe loss. Le Clerc now despaired of reducing it but by regular approaches; and heavy artillery having, with infinite difficulty, been at length planted against it, the defences of the fort were battered in breach, and everything disposed for an assault. Conceiving themselves

March 23. unable to resist the attack of so considerable a body, the negroes, during the night, fell furiously upon the blockading forces, cut their way through, and got clear off, highly elated at having arrested the whole French army above three weeks, and inflicted on them a loss of fifteen hundred men, in the attack of a fort so ~~in~~considerable that fifteen pieces of cannon only were found mounted on the ramparts.*

Meanwhile Toussaint was again rallying his broken divisions in the rear of the besieging force, and had spread terror in every direction through the conquered territory. His lieutenant, Christophe, carried his nocturnal incursions as far as Cape Town, and kept in constant alarm the feeble garrison which was left amid its ruins. The division of Hardy, in consequence, fell back to their assistance, and, re-enforced by two thousand five hundred fresh troops, which had just disembarked from the Dutch fleet, its brave commander issued forth, and took the field against Christophe; but the blacks, taught by experience, nowhere appeared in large bodies, and kept up such a murderous guerilla warfare upon the invaders, that, without making any sensible progress, they sustained a very serious diminution. Christophe at length retired to his old and formidable positions of Dondon and La Grande Rivière, at the entrance of the woody defiles. He was there attacked by Hardy, but the French were defeated, with heavy loss.†

Both parties were now exhausted with this deadly strife. The negroes, driven from the rich and cultivated part of the island into the sterile and intricate woody fastnesses, saw no resources for successfully prolonging the contest. Their means of subsistence must soon be expected to fail in these savage thickets; they had beheld with astonishment the agility and courage with which the French soldiers pursued them into their most inaccessible retreats, and began to despair of successfully maintaining the contest with an enemy who was continually receiving re-enforcements from apparently interminable squadrons. On the other hand, Le Clerc was not less desirous to come to an accommodation. Although, in a campaign of six weeks, he had, by great exertions, surmounted incredible diffi-

culties, yet it could not be dissembled that these advantages had been gained by enormous sacrifices; the re-enforcements received from France were far from compensating the losses which had been sustained; the soldiers, worn out with fatigue, and disgusted with an inglorious warfare, passionately longed for repose; their Republican principles revolted at shedding their blood so profusely for the re-establishment of slavery; the military chest was exhausted, and the unhealthy season was fast approaching, which would mow down the troops yet faster than the deadly aim of the negroes. These feelings at length led to an accommodation. The French general secretly entered into a separate negotiation with the leaders of the enemy; Christophe and Dessalines followed the example of Maurepas, and went over with their forces to the French service, where they received their former rank and appointments; and the heroic Toussaint was left, with a few thousand devoted followers, to make head not only against the European invaders, but the faithless Africans who had ranged themselves on their side. Borne down by necessity, the negro chief was at length forced to submit; dignified, but, in doing so, he maintained the dignity of his character, and, instead of accepting the rank and emoluments which had seduced the fidelity of his followers, returned to his mountain farm of Emnery, and resumed, like Cincinnatus, the occupations of rural life.*

This pacification was complete, and everything promised a successful issue to this hazardous expedition. The negro chiefs rivalled each other in deeds testifying the reality of their submission. Christophe, Dessalines, Maurepas, zealously performed all the duties imposed on them by the French general. Thirty thousand muskets were surrendered in the department of the north alone, and stored up in the magazines of Cape Town. The French even found themselves compelled to restrain the ferocious zeal of their new allies, who put to death, without mercy, all the negroes who evaded the general disarmament. Everywhere the blacks returned to their usual occupations. The workshops, the fields, were filled with labourers; foreign ships began to frequent the harbours, and commerce to give an air of returning prosperity to the scene of desolation. The regulations chalked out by Toussaint were, for the most part, adopted; the officers he had selected confirmed in their respective commands; and the foundations of a judicious system of colonial administration laid, by an assembly convoked at Cape Town. As the public treasury was exhausted, General Le Clerc pledged his private credit for these beneficent undertakings:† a generous confidence, which was returned by the French government by a base disavowal, which involved his family in total ruin.‡

* Bign., ii., 423, 424. Dum., viii., 254, 257. Jom., xv., 72, 75.

† Norv., ii., 218. Dum., viii., 257, 261. Jom., xv., 73, 75.

‡ The regulations of Toussaint had converted personal into rural servitude. The negroes were compelled to work in common by their overseers and officers, and received in return a fourth of the produce, which fourth was divided among them according to the skill and strength of each individual. The inspectors exercised a summary jurisdiction over the labourers. All delinquencies were brought before them by the proprietors, and they forthwith investigated and punished the offence with rigid severity. Free labour was unknown, and continues so, generally speaking, to this day. It was the reality of slavery without its name. These regulations were so judicious, among a people invincibly

* Dum., viii., 244, 249. Jom., xv., 64, 70. Norv., ii., 212.

† Dum., viii., 249, 255. Jom., xv., 70, 72. Norv., ii., 214.

The secret instructions of the First Consul directed the commander-in-chief to engage all the negro chiefs to accept situations in the French service, and to send them over to receive employment, according to their rank, in the French continental armies.* It was not very likely that the soldiers of Marengo and Hohenlinden would have submitted to be commanded by negro officers, or that the place of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Richepanse could have been supplied by the sable generals of division from Toussaint's army. Napoleon's real design was to deprive the blacks of their efficient leaders, and so pave the way for the re-establishment of slavery and the ancient proprietors. This was soon made manifest by what occurred at Guadeloupe. The proclamation of the First Consul had announced to the blacks the same treatment in St. Domingo and Guadeloupe; and the re-establishment of servitude in the latter island revealed to the African race the fate which awaited them under the French government.†

During the two months which followed the pacification, Toussaint lived in profound retirement in his country residence at Ennery. Meanwhile, however, the yellow fever broke out at Cape Town, and the hospitals were speedily crowded with French soldiers, several hundred of whom died every day. The sight of this catastrophe excited the hopes of the negroes, and some insurrectionary movements manifested themselves among them in the mountains, not far from Toussaint's dwelling. Le Clerc immediately called upon Toussaint to disarm these assemblages, and he formed a detachment for that purpose; but the French, being suspicious of its destination, surrounded and disarmed it; and July 5, 1802, soon after, the general-in-chief, conceiving apprehensions of the fidelity of the negro leader, had him arrested and brought to Cape Town. The grounds on which this perfidious act was justified were so flimsy as to be incapable of deceiving any one; but it can hardly be made a subject of reproach against Le Clerc, for his instructions were positive, in one way or another to transport to France all the

averse to voluntary exertion, that they were immediately adopted by the French general.—See DUMAS, viii., 263, 269.

* Nap. in Month.

† Dum., viii., 262, 263. Nov., ii., 219. Jom., xv., 75, 76.

‡ The ground set forth by the French government was, that in one of his letters which they intercepted, addressed to one of his old aids-de-camp, he had congratulated him "that at length Providence had come to their succour." Ja Providence was the name of the great hospital at Cape Town; and from this ambiguous expression the French authorities concluded that he viewed with satisfaction the progress of the malady which was consuming them: a supposition probably not far from the truth, but which could never justify the arrest of the sable hero, while living quietly on his estate, on the faith of a treaty solemnly concluded with the French government. The mode of Toussaint's arrest added to the atrocity of the deed. Instead of sending a detachment to Ennery to seize him, he was called to Gonaives by General Brumy. The unsuspecting African fell into the snare, trusted to French honour, and was betrayed. He was forthwith sent to France, and confined in the castle of Joux, in the Jura, where he died soon after, whether by natural or violent means is unknown. This castle is situated on a rocky eminence, in a defile of those romantic mountains, on the road from Besançon to Lausanne. Among the numerous spots illustrated by these memorable wars, not the least interesting is the scene of the imprisonment and death of the greatest of African heroes; and it were well for the memory of Napoleon if it could be cleared of the obloquy arising from the sudden death, about the same time, of so many eminent men in the state prisons of France.—See NORVINS, ii., 21; JOMINI, ex., 77; DUMAS, viii., 272.

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leaders of the blacks. Its infamy rests on the government of Napoleon, on whom the subsequent fate of this great man has affixed a lasting stain, which the consequent destruction of the expedition has inadequately expiated.*

While these events were in progress in St. Domingo, changes which ultimately were productive of the most important consequences took place in Guadeloupe. This island had revolted and fallen under the dominion of the blacks by a process extremely analogous to, though less bloody than, that which had obtained in its larger neighbour. The mulattoes, under a renowned leader named Pélage, had risen in insurrection in October, 1801, against the European governor, and speedily made themselves masters of the island; but hardly had they got possession of the reins of power, when they found themselves threatened by a formidable conspiracy of the slaves, and narrowly escaped being butchered a few days after in the seats of their newly-acquired power. The island May 5, 1802.

was in a state of anarchy, divided between rival authorities, when Admiral Bouvet arrived with the division of Richepanse, 3500 strong, which had mainly contributed to the great victory of Hohenlinden. Pélage, whose terrors were fully awakened by the fervour of the insurgent slave population, immediately ranged himself under his command, and manifested, in the short campaign which followed, the most distinguished bravery: but the slaves resisted, and Basseterre, the capital, was only taken after a bloody conflict. Though driven to the mountains, however, the negroes maintained a desperate conflict: an inconsiderable fort in the woods held out long, and was only reduced by a regular siege; Ignatius, a determined chief, was at length destroyed at Petit Bourg after a frightful slaughter; and another leader, named Delgrasse, blew himself up, with three hundred of his followers, rather than surrender to the enemy. These bloody catastrophes, however, extinguished the revolt in the island; but they were followed by measures of unpardonable and ruinous severity. Twelve hundred prisoners August 5, 1802.

were drowned in cold blood by Lacrosse, who took the command of the island; and soon after, by a proclamation issued in the name of the First Consul, slavery and the whole ancient régime was solemnly re-established. A few days afterward, Richepanse was cut off by the yellow fever: a lamentable fate for so distinguished a European officer, to perish by an inglorious death in the midst of colonial atrocity.†

The intelligence of these alarming events produced the utmost agitation in St. Domingo. The re-establishment of slavery in Guadeloupe, to which liberty had been promised equally as to St. Domingo in the proclamation of the First Consul,‡ naturally excited the utmost apprehensions in the blacks as to the fate which was reserved for themselves, in the event of the French authority being firmly re-established in the larger island. A stifled insurrection soon broke out, which speedily spread over the whole

* Dum., viii., 270, 271. Jom., xv., 77, 78.

† Dum., viii., 288, 301. Jom., xv., 80, 85.

‡ "At St. Domingo and Guadeloupe slavery no longer exists: all are free, and shall remain so. At Martinique, different principles must prevail: slavery continues there, and must continue."—Proclam., Nov., 1801.—DUMAS, viii., 283.

Perfidious conduct of the French towards that island.

colony; although Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines vied with each other in acts of severity against the insurgents. Dessalines even went so far as to arrest Charles Belais, Toussaint's nephew, who was conducted to the Cape, and sentenced to death by a military commission composed of mulatto officers. But the enthusiasm soon became universal, as the mask of profound dissimulation which they had so long worn fell from the faces of the negro chiefs. On the night of the 14th of October, Clervaux, Christophe, and Paul L'Ouverture, joined the insurgents in the north, and their example was shortly afterward followed by Dessalines with all the forces in the west.*

The situation of the French army was now critical in the extreme. By the losses of the campaign their troops had been reduced to thirteen thousand men, and of these five thousand were in the hospitals, so that there remained only eight thousand capable of bearing arms; a force totally inadequate to maintain the whole country against an exasperated black population of several hundred thousand souls. Le Clerc therefore directed a concentration of all the disposable troops at Cape Town and Port au Prince; but in doing this, they were severely pressed by the insurgents, who increased immensely when their retreat had become manifest; and in the midst of this hazardous operation he was seized with the yellow fever, which had already proved fatal to Hardy, Debelle, and his best officers. The violence of the malady, and the anxiety consequent on so responsible a situation, triumphed over the natural strength of his constitution, and he died on the 2d of November, leaving the remains of the army in the deepest state of dejection.†

Rochambeau succeeded to the command; but though by no means destitute of military successes of tary talents, he hastened the approaching dissolution of the French authority in the island by the violence and injustice of his civil administration. Instead of cultivating the mulatto population, who had rendered such important services to his predecessor, he forever alienated the affections of this numerous body by the arrest and execution of Bardet, one of the half-caste chiefs who had rendered the most efficient aid to the French. Such was the exasperation occasioned by this atrocious proceeding, that it instantly threw the mulattoes into the arms of the negroes, and the flames of insurrection shortly spread through the southern and eastern parts of the island, where that mixed race chiefly prevailed. Encouraged by these successes, Christophe and Dessalines made a nocturnal attack on Cape Town in the middle of February; they surprised Fort Belair, and put the garrison to the sword; and their assault on the body of the place was only defeated by an uncommon exertion of vigour and courage on the part of the French general. Exasperated at these disasters, Rochambeau renewed his severities on the mulatto race; two of their chiefs, Prosper and Brachas, were seized and drowned; and this so enraged their countrymen, that they all left the colours of France, to which they had hitherto rendered essential service, and joined the negro standards. Informed of these disasters, Rochambeau embarked in person for Port

au Prince, with twelve hundred fresh troops recently arrived from France: but no sooner had he advanced into the open country around that town, than his troops fell into an ambuscade, and were driven back with great loss into its walls.*

Matters were in this disastrous state when the finishing blow was put to the affairs of the colony by the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and renewal of hostilities between France and Great Britain. The insurgents, supplied with arms and ammunition by the English cruisers, speedily became irresistible; all the fortified ports in the south and west fell into their hands. Lavalette, at Port au Prince, capitulated to Dessalines, and was fortunate enough to reach the Havana with the greater part of his troops. Rochambeau, blockaded in Cape Town by the blacks on the land side and the English at sea, was obliged, after a gallant resistance, to surrender at discretion, and was conducted to Jamaica; while the Viscount de Noailles, who last maintained the French standard on the island, escaped under false colours, dexterously eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers, and surprised one of their corvettes, but was wrecked on the coast of Cuba, as if it had been ordained that no part of that ill-fated expedition should escape destruction.†

This terminated this melancholy expedition, in which one of the finest armies that France ever sent forth perished, the victims of fatigue, disease, and the perfidy of its government. The loss sustained was immense: out of thirty-five thousand land-troops embarked, scarce seven thousand ever regained the shores of France; the history of Europe can hardly afford a parallel instance of so complete a destruction of so vast an armament. Nevertheless, the First Consul is not chargeable with any want of skill or foresight in the conduct of the expedition, or any Machiavelian design to get quit of the soldiers of a rival chief, in its original conception. The object of regaining possession of so great a colony was well worth the incurring even of considerable risk; the forces employed apparently adequate to the end; the period of the year selected the best adapted for the conduct of warlike operations. In ability of design and wisdom of execution, Napoleon never was deficient: it was the insensibility to any moral government of mankind, springing out of the irreligious habits of a revolution, that occasioned all his misfortunes. St. Domingo, in fact, was conquered when it was lost by his deceit and perfidy; by the iniquitous seizure of Toussaint when relying on the faith of a solemn treaty, and the re-establishment of slavery in Guadeloupe in violation of the promises of the French government, contained in a proclamation signed by the First Consul.‡

* Dum., viii., 303, 315. Jom., xv., 92, 95. Bign., ii., 433, 435.
† Jom., xv., 98, 99. Norv., ii., 230, 231. Dum., viii., 336, 339. ‡ Bign., ii., 445.
§ Napoleon admitted, subsequently, that he was wrong in his conduct to St. Domingo. "I have to reproach myself," said he, "for that expedition in the time of the consulate. It was a great fault to try to subject it by force. I should have been contented with the intermediate government of Toussaint. Peace was not then sufficiently established with England: the territorial wealth to which I looked in trying to subject it, would have only enriched our enemies. It was undertaken against my opinion, in conformity to the wishes of the Council of State, who were carried away by the cries of the colonists."—LAS CASAS, ii., 179.

* Dum., viii., 273, 277. Jom., xv., 85, 87. Norv., ii., 223, 224. † Dum., viii., 277, 279. Jom., xv., 87, 92.

Since the expulsion of the French from the island, St. Domingo has been nominally independent; but slavery has been far indeed from being abolished, and the condition of the people anything but ameliorated by the change. Nominally free, the blacks have remained really enslaved. Compelled to labour, by the terrors of military discipline, for a small part of the produce of the soil, they have retained the severity, without the advantages of servitude; the industrious habits, the flourishing aspect of the island, have disappeared; the surplus wealth, the agricultural opulence of the fields, have ceased; from being the greatest exporting island in the West Indies, it has ceased to raise any sugar;* and the inhabitants, reduced to half their former amount, and bitterly galled by their Republican task-masters, have relapsed into the idleness and inactivity of savage life.†

* Mackenzie's *St. Domingo*, i., *passim*.

† The revolution of St. Domingo has demonstrated that the negroes can occasionally exert all the vigour and heroism which distinguish the European character; but there is, as yet, no reason to suppose that they are capable of the continued efforts, the sustained and persevering toil, requisite to erect the fabric of civilized freedom. An observation of Gibbon seems decisive on this subject. "The inaction of the negroes does not seem to be the effect either of their virtue or of their pusillanimity. They indulge, like the rest of mankind, their passions and appetites, and the adjacent tribes are engaged in frequent acts of hostility. But this rude ignorance has never invented any effectual weapons of defence or destruction; they appear incapable of forming any extensive plans of government or conquest, and the obvious inferiority of their mental faculties has been discovered and abused by the nations of the temperate zone. Sixty thousand blacks are annually embarked from the coast of Guinea, but they embark in chains, never to return to their native country; and this constant emigration, which, in the space of two centuries, might have furnished armies to overrun the globe, accuses the guilt of Europe and the weakness of Africa."* If the negroes are not inferior, either in vigour, courage, or intelligence, to the European, how has it happened that, for six thousand years, they have remained in the savage state? What has prevented mighty empires arising on the banks of the Niger, the Quarra, or the Congo, in the same way as on those of the Euphrates, the Ganges, and the Nile? Heat of climate, intricacy of forests, extent of desert, will not solve the difficulty, for they exist to as great an extent in the plains of Mesopotamia or Hindostan as in Central Africa. It is in vain to say the Europeans have retained the Africans in that degraded condition, by their violence, injustice, and the slave-trade. How has it happened that the inhabitants of that vast and fruitful region have not risen to the government of the globe, and inflicted on the savages of Europe the evils now set forth as the cause of their depression? Did not all nations start alike in the career of infant improvement? and was not Egypt, the cradle of civilization, nearer to Central Africa than the shores of Britain? In the earliest representations of nations in existence, the paintings on the walls of the Tombs of the Kings of Egypt, the distinct races of the Asiatics, the Jews, the Hotentots, and the Europeans are clearly marked; but the blue-eyed and white-haired sons of Japhet are represented in crowskins, with the hair turned outward, in the pristine state of pastoral life, while the Hotentots are already clothed in the garb of civilized existence. What since has given so mighty an impulse to European civilization, and retained in a stationary or declining state the immediate neighbours of Egyptian and Carthaginian greatness? It is impossible to arrive at any other conclusion but that, in the qualities requisite to create and perpetuate civilization, the African is decidedly inferior to the European race; and if any doubt could exist on this subject, it would be removed by the subsequent history and present state of the Haytian Republic.—See Mackenzie's *St. Domingo*, vol. ii., 260, 321.

The following table contains the comparative wealth, produce, and trade of St. Domingo, before 1789, and in 1832, after forty years of nominal freedom.

ST. DOMINGO.		
	1789.	1832.
Population.....	600,000	280,000
Sugar exported.....	672,000,000 lbs.	None.

* Gibbon, c. xxv., vol. iv., 311.

But it was not only in the southern hemisphere that the vast designs of the First Consul were manifested. Europe also was the theatre of his ambition; and the preliminaries of Amiens were hardly signed, when his conduct gave unequivocal proof that he was resolved to be fettered by no treaties, and that to those who did not choose to submit to his authority, no alternative remained but the sword.

By the 11th article of the treaty of Luneville, it had been provided that "the contracting parties shall mutually guarantee the independence of the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics, and the right to the people who inhabit them to adopt whatever form of government they think fit." The allies, of course, understood by this clause real independence; in other words, a liberation of these republics from the influence of France; but it soon appeared that Napoleon affixed a very different meaning to it, and that what he intended was the establishment of constitutions in them all which should absolutely subject them to his power.

Holland was the first of the affiliated republics which underwent the change consequent on the establishment of the consular power in France. For this purpose, the French ambassador, Schimmelpennick, repaired to the Hague, to prepare a revolution which should assimilate the government of the Batavian to that of the French Republic. So devoted was the Directory at the Hague to his will, that they voluntarily became the instrument of their own destruction. On the 17th of September, the French ambassador sent the Constitution, ready made, to the Legislative Body, with the intimation that they had nothing to do but affix to it the seal of their approbation, as it had already received the sanction of the people. In fact, on the same day it was published to the nation, and the Directory took for granted that it would be approved. The Dutch Legislature, however, were not prepared for this degradation, and the last act of their existence did honour to their memory: they decreed the suppression of the illegal acts of the Directory. Forthwith a *coup d'état* was put in force; the Directory, by a violent act, dissolved the chambers; their doors were closed by French bayonets, the guards absolved from their oaths, and all the persons in the employment of the government dismissed. Shortly after, the new Constitution was published by the Directory, alike without the knowledge or concurrence of the people—but it was a nearer approximation to the habits and wishes of the respectable classes than the Democratic institutions which had preceded it—a Legislative Body, composed of five-and-thirty members, in a slight degree recalled the recollection of the old States-General. The division of provinces was the same as in the United States; but the Council of State, of twelve members, with a president changing every three months, was possessed of much more absolute power than ever belonged to the stadtholder, while the frequent change of the president prevented any one from acquiring such a preponderance as might render him formidable

Holland is again revolutionized.

Sept. 18, 1801.

Coffee.....	86,789,000 lbs.	32,000,000 lbs.
Ships employed in trade.....	1680	1
Sailors.....	27,000	167
Exports to France.....	£6,720,000	None.
Imports from ditto...	9,890,000	None.

—*Ibid.* i., 321, and DUMAS, viii., 112.

to the authority of the First Consul. The form of submitting the Constitution to the people was gone through; out of 416,419 citizens having a right to vote, 52,219 rejected it. The immense majority who declined to vote was assumed to be favourable to the change, and the new government was solemnly proclaimed. The conduct of the Dutch on this occasion affords a striking proof of the impossibility of eradicating, by external violence, the institutions which have grown with the growth and strengthened with the strength of a free people. In vain they were subdued by the armies of France, and Democratic institutions forced upon them, with the loud applause of the indigent rabble in power. The great mass of the inhabitants, and almost the whole proprietors, withdrew altogether from public situations, and took no share whatever in the changes which were imposed upon their country. In the seclusion of private life, they retained the habits, the affections, and the religious observances of their forefathers; their children were nursed in these patriotic feelings, untainted by the revolutionary passions which agitated the surrounding states; and when the power of Napoleon was overthrown, the ancient government was re-established with as much facility and as universal satisfaction as the English Constitution on the restoration of Charles II.*

Having thus established a government in Holland entirely subservient to his will, and in harmony with the recent institutions in France, the next care of the First Consul was to remodel the Cisalpine Republic in such a way as to render it, too, analogous to the parent state, and equally submissive to his authority. For this purpose, early in November, 1801, the French authorities began to prepare the inhabitants of the infant Republic for the speedy fixing of their destinies, and the formation of a new Constitution better adapted to their more matured state of existence; and on the 14th of the same month, a proclamation of the Extraordinary Commission of government announced the formation of an assembly of 450 deputies at Lyons, in the end of December, to deliberate on the approaching Constitution. The place assigned for their meeting sufficiently indicated the influence intended to be exercised over their deliberations; and it was openly avowed in the proclamation, which "invited the First Consul to suspend the immense labours of his magistracy, to share with the members of the assembly the important duties which awaited them." To render the members more docile to his will, and prepare the scenes in the drama which was to be performed before the audience of Europe, two of the ablest statesmen of France, M. Talleyrand and M. Chaptal, preceded the First Consul at Lyons, and arranged everything before his arrival in a way perfectly conformable to his will.†

The convocation was opened on the 31st of December, at Lyons, with extraordinary pomp. The unwonted concourse of strangers, both from France and Italy; the extraordinary number of the most illustrious characters of both countries who were assembled, gave that city the air of the capital of Southern Europe; the splendour of the processions with which the proceedings were opened, excited the utmost enthusiasm

among the inhabitants. On the 11th of January the First Consul made his triumphal entry into the city, escorted by a brilliant troop of one hundred and fifty young men of the first consideration, and was everywhere received with the most enthusiastic acclamations. Fêtes, spectacles, and theatrical representations succeeded each other without interruption, and universal transports attended the opening of a council fraught with the fate of the Italian peninsula. The few deputies attached to Republican principles soon perceived that their visions of Democracy were vanishing into air; but, unable to stem the torrent, they were constrained to devour their vexation in secret, and join in the external acts of homage to the First Consul. But, amid the fumes of incense and the voice of adulation, Napoleon never, for one instant, lost sight of the important object of establishing his authority in Italy; and the report of the committee to whom the formation of a Constitution had been referred, soon unfolded the extent of his views. They reported that reasons of policy and state necessity forbade the evacuation of the Cisalpine territory by the French troops; that the infant Republic "had need of a support which should cause it to be respected by the powers who have not yet recognised its existence; that it absolutely required a man who, by the ascendant of his name and power, might give it the rank and consideration which it could no otherwise attain; and, therefore, that General Bonaparte should be invited to honour the Cisalpine Republic by continuing to govern it, and by blending with the direction of the government in France the charge of its affairs, as long as he might deem necessary for uniting all the parts of its territory under the same political institutions, and causing it to be recognised by all the powers of Europe." Napoleon accepted without hesitation the duty thus imposed upon him. He replied, "The choice which I have hitherto made of persons to fill your principal offices has been independent of every feeling of party or local interests; but as to the office of president of the Republic, I can discover no one among you who has sufficient claims on the public gratitude, or is sufficiently emancipated from party feelings to deserve that trust. I yield, therefore, to your wishes, and I shall preserve, as long as circumstances shall require it, the lead in your affairs." Loud applauses followed every part of this well-conceived pageant; and, at the conclusion of the address, the whole assembly rose and demanded that the name of "Cisalpine" should be changed into that of "Italian Republic;" an important alteration, which revealed the secret design, already formed by the ruler of France, of converting the whole peninsula into one state, in close alliance with the great nation.*

The new Constitution of the Italian Republic, "prepared in the cabinet of the First Consul, and to which the representatives of that state were not permitted to offer any opposition," was founded upon different principles from any yet promulgated in Europe. Three electoral colleges were formed; one composed of proprietors, one of persons of the learned professions, one of the commercial

Entry of Napoleon into Lyons. Senatus consultum there settling the Cisalpine government.

Jan. 25, 1802.

* Dum., viii., 39, 42. Norv., ii., 174, 175.

† Bot., iii., 416. Bign., ii., 152, 153. Norv., ii., 175, 176.

* Ann. Reg., 1802, 78. Bot., iii., 416, 417. Norv., ii., 176, 177. Bign., ii., 154, 157.

interest, whose numbers were invariably to remain the same. The Legislative Body consisted of seventy-five persons, elected by these colleges; while the vice-president, secretary of state, and all the members of the executive, were appointed by the First Consul. This Constitution, so different from the Democratic institutions which had preceded it, in some respects merits the eulogy of the Italian historian, as being "the best which Napoleon had ever conceived;"* and unquestionably, in the restriction of the elective franchise to the most respectable members of these different classes, an important step was made towards that establishment of political power, on the basis of property and intelligence, which is the only foundation on which that admirable part of a limited government can be securely rested. Melzi, a great proprietor in Lombardy, was appointed vice-president of the Republic, with every demonstration of regard from the First Consul: a judicious choice, well deserved by the character and patriotism of that illustrious nobleman; and in that appointment, not less than the general character of the Constitution, the Democratic party perceived a death-blow to all the hopes they had formed.†

The success of this measure for the thorough subjection of the Italian Republic to his will, led, shortly after, to another still more audacious, and which, at any other period, would have instantly lighted in Europe the flames of a general war.

On the 11th of September, Piedmont

Sept. 11, 1802. was, by a formal decree, annexed to the French Republic, the First Consul alleging that the absence of any stipulation in his favour in the treaties of Luneville and Amiens was equivalent

to a permission for him to absorb it in the growing dominion of France. The principle was thus openly acted upon, that the Republic was at liberty to incorporate with its dominions any lesser state, whose integrity was not expressly guarantied by the greater powers. By this bold measure, all the north of Italy, from the summit of the Maritime Alps to the shores of the Mincio, was directly subjected to French influence; and Austria beheld at Milan a second French capital, almost within sight of the frontier of its Italian possessions. Thus Sardinia, which was the first of the European states which had submitted to the power of Napoleon, which, after a fortnight's struggle, opened its gates to the youthful conqueror, and had since, through every change of fortune, remained faithful to his cause, was rewarded for its early submission and long fidelity by being the first to be destroyed; and the keys of Italy were placed, without opposition, in the hands of the French Republic.

Formidable as these acquisitions to France were, they were rendered doubly so from the measures taken at the same time by the enterprising spirit and vast conceptions of the First Consul to secure these important transalpine acquisitions to his dominions. Louis XIV. had said, after the family compact was concluded, "There are no longer any Pyrenees;" but with greater reason Napoleon might say, after the roads over the Simplon and Mont Cenis were formed, "There are no longer any Alps." The Valais, an integral part of Switzerland, but of great importance in a military point of view, as

commanding the direct route from France to Italy, both by the Great St. Bernard and the Simplon, was erected into a separate Republic, entirely under French influence, under the denomination of the "Republic of the Valais." The object of detaching this inconsiderable state from the Helvetic Confederacy was soon apparent. French engineers began to work on the northern side of the Simplon; Italian, to surmount the difficulties of the long ravine on the south; and soon that magnificent road was formed which leads from the rugged banks of the Rhone to the smiling shores of the Lago Maggiore, and has revealed to the eyes of an admiring world the stupendous grandeur of the defile of Gondo. Similar works were undertaken at the same time up the valley of the Isere and over Mont Cenis, as well as from the Rhone over Mont Genevre to Turin. The Alps, traversed by three splendid roads, ceased to present any obstacle to an invading army;* and works, greater than the Roman emperors achieved in three centuries of their dominion in Italy, were completed by Napoleon in the three first years of his consular government.

The command of Savoy, Piedmont, the Pays de Vaud, and the Valais, gave France a ready entrance through these new roads into Italy; but not content with this, the First Consul rapidly extended his dominions through the centre of the peninsula. A new Constitution was given to the Ligurian Republic, which brought Genoa more immediately under French influence. The secret treaty of March 12, 1801, with Spain, by which Parma and Placentia were ceded to the Italian Republic, was made public, and the French troops took possession of that state, as well as the island of Elba, on the shores of Tuscany, while the King of Etruria, at Florence, a creature of his creation, preserved entire the ascendancy of the First Consul in the centre of Italy. Thus not only was the authority of Napoleon obeyed, but almost his dominion extended from the North Sea to the Roman States; while the pope and the King of Naples, trembling for their remaining possessions, had no alternative but entire submission to the irresistible power in the north of the peninsula.†

These rapid and unparalleled encroachments would, notwithstanding the bad success of their former efforts, have led to a fresh coalition of the Continental powers against France, if they had not been intent at that moment upon the important subject of indemnities to be provided for the German princes, and divided by the fatal apple of discord which French diplomacy had thus contrived to throw between the rival powers of Prussia and Austria.

When the conquests of France were extended to the Rhine, and all the territories on the left bank were permanently annexed to the Republic, not only a host of small German princes were dispossessed of their estates, but several of the greater powers lost valuable appendages of their dominions, situated on the same side of the river. To soften the effects of this deprivation, it was provided by the treaty of Luneville that indemnities should be obtained by the sovereigns who had suffered on the occasion, and for this purpose a congress be opened in some conve-

* Bot., iii., 416.

† Dum., viii., 56, 57. Bign., ii., 157, 158. Norv., ii., 177, 178.

‡ Dum., ix., 80, 81. Jom., xv.

* Dum., ix., 81. Ann. Reg., 1802, 90.

† Ann. Reg., 1802, 88, 89. Dum., ix., 81, 82.

nient part of the German Empire: But how were the sufferers to be indemnified, when the whole territories on the right bank were already appropriated by lay or ecclesiastical princes, and no one could receive an indemnity without some party being spoliated to give him admission? To solve the difficulty, it was agreed by the greater powers to *secularize*, as it was called, a large proportion of the ecclesiastical sovereignties of the Empire; in other words, to confiscate a considerable part of the Church property, and out of the spoils thus acquired, provide equivalents for the conquests gained by the French Republic. Thus the dangerous precedent was established of indemnifying the stronger power at the expense of the weaker, a species of iniquity of which France and Austria had set the first example, in their atrocious convention for the partition of the Venitian territories, and which, by showing the German princes that they could place no reliance on the support of the great powers in a moment of danger, gave an irredeemable wound to the constitution of the Empire.

As it was early foreseen that the partition of these indemnities would form a most important subject of discussion, and that, by dexterous negotiation on that subject, more might be gained than by a successful campaign, the great powers soon began to strengthen themselves by secret alliances. Preparatory to the approaching contention, and before entering that great field of diplomacy, France and Russia inserted, with this

view, in the secret treaty, 8th of October, 1801, already mentioned between the two powers, a stipulation, by which it was provided that the two cabinets "should pursue a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to the adoption of their plans in the partition of the indemnities, which have for an invariable object the maintenance of a just equilibrium between the houses of Prussia and Austria.*" Shortly

before, a treaty had been concluded Aug. 24, 1801. between France and Bavaria, by which the First Consul guaranteed all the possessions of the latter, and engaged to support his claim for indemnities with all the influence in

his power: Prussia might already of France and calculate with certainty upon the Prussia in this support of France, not only from matter.

general principles of policy and common jealousy of the emperor, but from the express stipulations in the treaty of Bâle in 1795, and the secret convention of 1796, in virtue of which she had maintained an ambiguous neutrality, of essential service to the Republic in the subsequent desperate struggles with the imperial forces. The Prussian cabinet accordingly received the warmest assurances of support from the First Consul in the approaching negotiations, and the idea of a triple alliance between the cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg was even talked of and seriously entertained at all these capitals, inasmuch that the French envoy, General Hedouville, and the Prussian at Paris, the Marquis Lucchesini, received orders from their respective courts to make every exertion to bring about this object. At length,

May 23, 1802. on the 23d of May, 1802, a treaty was concluded at Paris between France and Prussia, without the privity of the Russian ambassador, which settled the amount of the Prussian indemnity and that of the Prince of Orange;

and such was the address of the First Consul and his ambassador at St. Petersburg, that the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander to its provisions was obtained without difficulty, notwithstanding the slight thus offered to his influence. By this convention it was stipulated that Prussia should obtain the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildesheim, L'Eschefeld, the town and territory of Erfurth, the city of Munster, with the greater part of its territory, and other cities and abbeacies, to the amount of more than four times what she had lost on the left bank of the Rhine. In return for these large acquisitions at the expense of neutral states, Prussia "guaranteed to the French Republic the arrangements made in Italy, viz., the existence of the kingdom of Etruria, that of the Italian Republic, and the annexation of the 27th military division (Piedmont) to the French territory." By a treaty signed on the 4th of June, 1802, between France and Austria, it was

stipulated that these two powers should act together in regulating the matter of the indemnities; and the Emperor Alexander, when he ratified the treaty, provided for a compensation to the King of Sardinia for his Continental possessions, and to the Duke of Holstein Oldenburg for his losses under the new arrangement. Thus was Prussia rewarded for her impolitic desertion of the European alliance and seven years of discreditable neutrality by the acquisition of extensive territorial possessions adjoining her own dominions; and thus did Napoleon, who had first bribed Austria to wink at his Italian conquests by the confiscation of the whole Continental possessions of Venice, now reward the defection of Prussia by the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the Empire. The parties to this general system of spoliation, linked as they were together, seemed to be beyond the reach of punishment; but Providence was preparing for them all, in consequence of their iniquity, the means of ultimate retribution: for Austria the disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz; for Prussia the catastrophe of Jena and treaty of Tilsit; for Napoleon the retreat from Moscow and rock of St. Helena.*

The views of Austria in this negotiation were widely different. Intent upon gain, Policy of Austria in this negotiation.

desirous even of extending her frontier from the Inn to the Iser at the expense of Bavaria, in exchange for her possessions in Swabia, she was yet opposed to the system of secularization, and desirous that the compensations should break up as little as possible the old and venerable constitution of the Germanic Empire. This policy, which duty, equally with interest, prescribed to the head of that great confederation, was directly opposite to that which France and Prussia pursued. The former of these powers was anxious to augment her own strength by the acquisition of as many of the ecclesiastical possessions as possible, and increase her influence by the enrichment, at the expense of the Church, of the princes who were included in the line of neutrality protected by her power; the latter looked only to breaking up the German confederation, and creating a circle of little sovereigns round the frontiers of the Republic dependant on its support for the maintenance of its recent acquisitions. Russia took under its especial protection, after the share of

And of Russia.

* Bign., ii., 89.

† Bign., ii., 304, 325. Jom., xv., 23, 27. Dum., vii., 10, 23.

Prussia was secured by the treaty of May, 1802, the interests of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Baden, and France cordially united in their support; foreseeing already, in the extension of these powers through revolutionary influence, the formation of an outpost which might at all times open an entrance for its armies into the heart of Germany, and counterbalance all the influence of the emperor in its defence. Thus was Austria, the power best entitled, both from the dignity of the imperial crown and the magnitude of its possessions in the Empire, to a preponderating voice in the negotiation, thrown into the shade in the deliberations; and thus did Russia and Prussia unite with the First Consul in laying the foundation of that CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, from which, as a hostile outwork, he was afterward enabled to lead his armies to Jena, Friedland, and the Kremlin.*

It was not without ulterior views to her own advantage that Russia supported in this extraordinary manner the pretensions of France in the affairs of Germany. The French ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. Hedouville, received instructions from the First Consul to assure the emperor of his "sincere desire to obtain for Russia the entire and free navigation of the Black Sea;" while, at the same time, Colonel Caulaincourt was commissioned at Paris to communicate to Napoleon the desire of the Czar to favour the extension of French commerce in the Black Sea; M. Hedouville was also enjoined to open a negotiation for "the triumph of liberal principles in the navigation and commerce of neutral vessels." Thus Napoleon shook for a moment the firm purpose of the Emperor Alexander, by artfully presenting to his youthful imagination the objects of ambition long cherished by his predecessors Catharine and Paul—afterward, in part, attained by his successor Nicholas.†

Convinced at length, from the intelligence communicated by his ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Paris, and Berlin, of the perfect accord between these powers, the Emperor of Austria deemed it high time to take some step which should vindicate his authority as the head of the Empire, and show the coalesced powers that they would not succeed in maintaining all their proposed acquisitions but by force of arms. By an

imperial decree, he directed that the deputation of the interested powers should meet at Ratisbon on the 3d of August. This deputation consisted of four electors, viz., Mayence, Saxony, Bohemia, and Brandenburg, and four members of the college of princes, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, the Grand-master of the Teutonic Order, and Hesse Cassel. It was universally known that a decided majority of this assembly was in the interests of France; and in effect, so little did the coalesced powers attempt to disguise their designs, that the parties whom they supported had taken possession of the provinces allotted to them in the secret treaties before the congress at Ratisbon assembled. The King of Prussia, on July 3d, took possession of the territories assigned to him, in conformity with a proclamation issued on the 6th of June; and the Elector of Bavaria, following the example, seized on the territories he was to receive on the 17th of July,

and was proceeding to occupy Passau, when the emperor, who regarded that important city with reason as one of the bulwarks of his hereditary states, anticipated him by marching the Austrian forces into it, as well as into the archbishopric and city of Saltzbourg.*

This courageous act, which seemed at first sight to set at defiance the whole power of Russia, Prussia, and France, was in reality levelled at the First Consul, who had, by secret instructions not communicated to the other powers, enjoined this extravagant prejudication of the deliberations of the congress. Desirous, however, if possible, to avoid coming to an open rupture with France, the emperor instructed his ambassador at Paris to soften as much as possible the hostile act, by representing that the town in dispute was only taken possession of in a provisional manner till its destiny was finally determined by the congress. An angry interchange of notes ensued between the French and imperial ambassadors, during which the First Consul deemed the opportunity favourable to draw still closer his relations with the Prussian cabinet. In consequence, a treaty was concluded on the 5th of September between France, Prussia, and Bavaria, by which it was stipulated that if "within sixty days the emperor should not evacuate the town of Passau and its dependancies, the French and Prussian governments should unite their forces to compel him to do so, as well as to maintain the ancient possessions of Bavaria on the right bank of the Inn." To this convention the cabinet of St. Petersburg acceded, stipulating only, as the condition of its concurrence, an adequate compensation to the Grand-duke of Tuscany.†

Meanwhile the conferences at Ratisbon were opened, and the fruit of the secret negotiations which had so long been depending became manifest. Immediately after it met, the ministers of France and Russia laid on the table a joint plan for the partition of the indemnities, and insisted that the matters submitted to their deliberations should be finally adjusted within the space of sixty days. This haughty interference on the part of stranger powers was in the highest degree grating to the feelings of the Austrian cabinet, but, with the usual prudence of their administration, they resolved to dissemble their resentment. Having recourse again to negotiation, they assailed the cabinet of the Tuileries by the same artifices with which the First Consul had succeeded so well at St. Petersburg and Berlin, and offered, on condition of obtaining some advantages in Germany, to recognise his recent strides in Italy. This proposal had the desired effect. Two conventions were concluded at Paris in the end of December, between Austria and France, which settled the affairs both of Italy and Germany. By the first, the compensations in which the imperial family was interested were fixed. The Brisgaw and Ortenaw were conferred upon the Duke of Modena, in lieu of the states he had lost in Italy, and the emperor received in exchange the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, which were severed from the Church for that purpose, while Passau

Angry correspondence in consequence between France and Austria.

Sept. 5, 1802.

August 18. Conferences at Ratisbon.

The principle of secularization is admitted.

Dec. 26, 1802.

* Dum., vii., 23, 40. Bign., ii., 325, 332. Jom., xv., 26, 29. † Bign., ii., 320, 321.

* Dum., vii., 42, 45. Jom., xv., 28, 29. Bign., ii., 333, 335. † Bign., ii., 335, 338. Dum., viii., 44, 51.

was ceded to Bavaria, and, in exchange, the bishopric of Aichstedt conferred upon Austria. By the second, the emperor recognised the King of Etruria, and all the changes which had taken place in Italy since the treaty of Luneville.*

The shares of the greater powers being settled, the claims of the minor states were easily disposed of, and the indemnities finally adjusted by a recess of the 25th of February, 1803. By this arrangement, the most important which had taken place since the treaty of Westphalia, the old Germanic constitution was entirely overturned, and a new division made, which forever destroyed the fundamental principles of the Empire. It was easy to perceive, on comparing the compensations dealt out to the different states, the influence which had preponderated in the deliberations, and the gross injustice with which those states who had inclined, in the preceding contests, to the interests of France, were enriched at the expense of those who had stood by the imperial fortunes. The Grand-duke of Tuscany received hardly a fourth, the Duke of Modena little more than a third, of what they had respectively lost; while Prussia acquired four times, and Bavaria nearly twice, the amount of their ceded provinces on the left bank of the Rhine.†

But it was not merely by the augmentation

* Bign., ii., 343, 345. Jom., xv., 31, 32.

† Dum., vii., 48, 49. Jom., xv., 32, 33. Bign., ii., 344, 349.

‡ By this treaty, the equivalents settled upon the principal powers, out of the ecclesiastical spoils of the Empire, were thus adjusted :

I. Prussia, by the treaty of Bâle, had ceded to the Republic her provinces on the left of the Rhine, including the duchy of Guelders, the principality of Moccurs, and part of the duchy of Cleves, containing in all

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost.....	137,000	1,400,000 florins
Gained.....	526,000	3,800,000
So gained.....	389,000	2,400,000

Her acquisitions, which made up this great addition, consisted of the free towns of Malhausen, Nordhausen, and Goslar. The bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and part of Munster, and many other abbeys and church lands.

II. Bavaria had lost, beyond the Rhine, the duchy of Deux Ponts, that of Juliers, and the palatinate of the Rhine. She received instead the important free towns of Ulm, Memmingen, Nordlingen, the bishoprics of Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg, and Passau, and a vast many rich abbeys and monasteries. Her losses and gains stood thus :

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost.....	580,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained.....	854,500	6,607,000
Gained.....	274,500	2,801,000.

III. Wirtemberg, for its possessions in Alsace and Franche Comte, obtained nine imperial cities and eight abbays.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost.....	14,000	240,000 florins.
Gained.....	120,000	612,000
Gained.....	106,000	372,000

While such were the portions allotted to the states under the protection of France or Russia, who were to be rewarded for preceding neutrality, and form the basis of a counterpoise to the power of Austria, the indemnities allotted to the connexions of that power were of the most meager description. For example, the Grand-duke of Tuscany had lost in Italy the beautiful duchy of Tuscany, and he received the archbishopric of Saltzburg, the bishopric of Aichstedt, part of that of Passau, and the valley of Beretsgaden.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
He lost.....	1,150,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained.....	286,000	2,150,000
Lost.....	864,000	1,650,000

—See BIGNON, ii., 349, 351 ; and JOMINI, xv., 32, 37.

of some and diminution of other states, and the formation of a body of sovereigns in the Empire dependant on France for the maintenance of their acquisitions, that this partition of the indemnities was fatal to the best interests of Europe. Moral effects, far more disastrous, resulted from this great act of diplomatic spoliation. In all ages, indeed, the maxim *va victis* has been the rule of war, and injury or subjugation formed the lot of the conquered. But in all such cases, not even excepting the recent and flagrant partition of Poland, it was on the belligerent states only that these consequences fell, and the adjoining nations were exempt from the effects of the tempest which had overthrown their less-fortunate neighbour. It was reserved for an age in which the principles of justice, freedom, and civil right were loudly invoked on both sides, to behold the adoption of a different principle, and see belligerent states indemnify themselves for their losses in war, at the expense, not of the vanquished, but of neutral and weaker powers which had taken no part in the contest. This monstrous injustice, of which Napoleon gave the first example in the cession of Venice, precipitated into hostile measures by his intrigues, to Austria, was immediately adopted and acted upon by all the great powers; and at the congress of Ratisbon their frontiers were surrounded, and strength augmented by the spoils of almost all the ecclesiastical princes, and a great number of the free cities of the Empire. This, too, was done, not by conquerors with arms in their hands, not in the heat of victory or triumph of conquest, but by calculating diplomatists; in the bosom of peace, without any inquiry into the interest or wishes of the transferred people, and guided only by an arithmetical estimate in cold blood of the comparative acquisitions by each power in revenue, subjects, and territory. All ideas of public right, of a system of international law, or the support of the weaker against the greater powers, were overturned by this deliberate act of spoliation. Woful experience diffused a universal conviction of the lamentable truth, that the lesser states had never so much cause for alarm as when the greater were coming to an accommodation. Neutrality, it was seen, was the most perilous course which could be adopted, because it interested no one in the preservation of the weaker states; and all Europe prepared to follow the banners of one or other of the rival chiefs, who, it was foreseen, must soon contend for the empire of the world in the centre of Germany. It is the glory of England that she alone has never acceded to this system of international spoliation, but, on the contrary, resisted it, on every occasion, to the utmost of her power: that her acquisitions and losses have been all at the expense of her enemies or herself: that no friendly or neutral power has had cause to rue the day that she signed her treaties; and that, so far from gaining at the expense of lesser states, she has repeatedly made sacrifices of enormous magnitude, to soften the consequences of their adverse fortune: a memorable instance of the effects of real freedom and a constitutional government in subduing the desire of gain, and elevating the standard of public virtue, and of the difference of its effects from all that the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm or the ambition of despotic power are capable of producing!

Disastrous moral effects of this general spoliation of the ecclesiastical princes.

While the Continental powers were intent on the acquisition of ill-gotten gains in the centre of Germany, Napoleon had leisure to pursue his projects of ambition in the mountains of Switzerland. His conduct towards the inhabitants of that country led to important consequences, as it first unfolded, even to his warmest admirers, the insatiable spirit of aggrandizement by which he was actuated, and was one of the immediate causes of the renewal of the war.

When Republican institutions are established in a country of considerable extent and varied productions, it is by the *federal system*—in other words, a congregation of independent states, having each the power of internal legislation—that the national integrity can alone, for any length of time, be preserved. The reason is, that separate interests are there brought to bear directly on the conduct of public affairs; and if those interests are adverse, which must frequently be the case, the despotism of the stronger over the weaker power speedily becomes insupportable. A monarch equally removed from both, and equally dependant upon either for his support, may dispense equal justice between the contending interests of separate provinces or classes of society; but it is in vain to expect anything like equity in the judgment formed by one of these provinces or classes upon the rival pretensions of the other. To do so is to expect that men will judge equally and impartially in their own cause—a pitch of perfection to which human nature never has and never will arrive. The Autocrat of Russia or the emperors of Rome may deal out impartial justice in determining on the rival and conflicting interests of the different provinces of their vast dominions, but it is quite extravagant to look for a just decision by one of these provinces or its representatives upon the other. Power, superiority of votes or influence, will ever form the basis of their decision; the majority, as Tocqueville tells us it now is in America, will become despotic; and that power will never be yielded up but to the sword. The unchangeable division in Great Britain between the manufacturing and agricultural classes on the subject of the corn-laws, and the threatened dissolution of the American confederacy by the collision of the Southern and Northern provinces on the subject of the tariff on English goods, are so many instances of the operation of the simple principle that no man can judge impartially in his own cause, and which, when applied to nations, forbids the extension of Democratic institutions for any great length of time beyond the limits of a single city or particular class of society.*

Interest, accordingly, universally leads the holders of considerable property, in all countries where Democratic institutions prevail, to support the system of federal union in preference to that of a central and universally-diffused authority; because they find that it is in small states where the interests of the inhabitants are nearly the

same, and in such states only that their influence can be felt, or their wants receive due consideration. On the other hand, the Democratic party in such communities are generally at first desirous of the concentration of power in a central government, and the concurrence of all the representatives in its formation; these being the circumstances in which the influence of the leaders of the multitude is most effectually exercised, and the ascendancy of towns, where their partisans are chiefly to be found, most thoroughly established.

Though not extensive in point of superficial surface, Switzerland embraced such an extraordinary variety of climate, soil, and occupation, as rendered the rule of a single central Democratic government in an especial manner vexatious. The habits and interests of the vine-growers in the Pays de Vaud are as much at variance with those of the shepherds of Glarus, as those of the intellectual city of Geneva or the aristocratic society of Berne are with the manufacturers of Soleure, or the chestnut-fed inhabitants of the Italian bailiwicks. Nor were the habits and ideas of the people less at variance than the physical features of the districts in which they dwelt. Their lineage, their language, their religion, their affinities were different. Perched on the summit of the Alps, they partook of the varied character of the races of mankind who met at their feet and ran up the valleys to their highest summits. The inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud, speaking the French tongue, shared in the feelings and excitement which the Revolution had produced to the north of the Jura. Those who dwelt on the Ticino and the Misocco betrayed, in their harmonious language, enthusiastic feelings, and indolent habits, the influence of Italian descent; while the brave Switzers to the north of the St. Gothard evinced, in their independent spirit, rough manners, cleanly habits, and persevering character, the distinguishing features which in every age have distinguished the nations of German or Gothic descent. To establish one uniform Democratic government for a country so situated, is as great an absurdity as it would be to propose the same political institutions for the English, trained to habits of order by centuries of freedom; the French, impetuous by nature, and unrestrained by custom; and the Russians, but recently emerged, under the rule of despotism, from savage life.

The natural and unavoidable consequence of the establishment of a central Democratical government in a country composed of such various and discordant materials, was the entire subjugation of the rural districts by the inhabitants of the great towns. The peasants of Unterwalden, the shepherds of Glarus, in vain attempted a contest with the citizens of Berne, Lausanne, or Zurich, speaking a different language, trained to habits of business, and closely congregated round the seat of government. In the unequal struggle they were speedily cast down, and thus the unity of the Republic was but another expression to them for the practical loss of all their political franchises. The circumstances, too, under which this Constitution had been forced upon them—the cruel devastation of their country, by which it had been preceded—the odious foreign yoke which it had

* Sparta, Athens, Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence are instances of the government of a subject-territory by the citizens of a single town: Holland, of the ascendancy of one commercial class in society: Great Britain, from 1688 to 1832, of a government substantially vested in the representatives of the great properties and interests or the state. It is not difficult to foresee what must be the result of the subsequent transference of political power from the proprietors to the multitude in an empire composed of such widely-separated and discordant materials.

brought upon their necks—the unheard-of contributions and spoliation by which it had been followed—had produced indelible feelings of aversion among the mountaineers—a race of men resolute in their ideas, tenacious of their habits, and more jealous of their independence than any other people in Europe. Hence the singular fact, that the most ardent opponents of the new central government were to be found among the partisans of the most opposite former constitutions; and that, besides the oligarchy of Berne and Zurich, where political power was confined to a limited number of families, were to be found the peasants of the Forest Cantons, who exercised indiscriminately, under the canopy of Heaven, all the functions of government.*

After the forcible proclamation of the new Constitution imposed by the Directory upon Switzerland in 1798, the country remained for four years the theatre of interminable contests and intrigues. The success of the allies in 1799 having brought their forces into their mountains, and the Archduke Charles having, by proclamation, invited the people to re-establish their ancient form of government, an insurrection broke out simultaneously in every part of the country; but the allies being unable to render them any assistance, or advance any distance into their territory, it was speedily suppressed, without difficulty, by the armed force organized in the towns in the French interest. Overwhelmed with astonishment at the immense bodies of men who contended for the empire of Europe amid their mountains, sensible of their own insignificance amid such prodigious masses, and equally pillaged

Violent internal dissensions of the Swiss cantons.

by friend and foe, the Swiss took hardly any farther share in the contest, and resigned themselves, in hopeless despair, to a yoke which, in the circumstances of the world, appeared inevitable. But the passions, restrained from breaking out into open hostilities with foreign powers, burned only the more fiercely in the internal dissensions which tore every part of the Republic. So furious did the spirit of party become, and so vehement the reproaches addressed by the adverse factions to each other, that the historian would be at a loss to recognise the features of the Swiss character, were it not in the lenity of them all, when victorious, to their fallen adversaries—a moderation so remarkable, and so analogous to what took place in Holland during all the convulsions subsequent to the Revolution, and in England throughout the Great Rebellion, that it encourages the pleasing hope that such tempering of savage inclination is either the blessed result of long-established freedom and religious habits, or is an inherent quality in the nations of Gothic descent.†

Without pursuing the complicated thread of Helvetic revolution during the four disastrous years that followed the French invasion, it will be more serviceable to give a summary of the arguments urged respectively by the partisans of the new Constitution and the ancient govern-

ment. On the part of the French supporters it was urged "that nothing could be so extravagant as to hear the federal party invoke the popular welfare, when they were in reality advancing the interests only of oligarchy and fanaticism. How dare they make use of the sacred name of freedom, when, under the name of a popular government, two or three families have been for above a century in possession of all the offices of administration? It is in vain that they impose so far upon the public credulity as to style the central government a thousand times more burdensome than the ancient régime, when the slightest observation must be sufficient to show that the burdens which have pressed so severely upon all classes have been owing solely to the evils inseparable from foreign warfare. And are the expenses of a few additional regiments, and of a central administration, composed of most of eighty or a hundred individuals, to be put in comparison with at least twenty separate governments, embracing, with their subordinate agents, several thousand persons? Disguise it as you will, it is not the feelings of patriotism or the public interest which occasion all the outcry, but selfish consideration and private advantage. Thinking, like Cæsar, that it is better to be the first at Præneste than the second at Rome, these popular despots would rather reign unmolested in their little valleys than be blended in the general administration of Switzerland, where they would speedily be reduced to their proper level, and where their voices, drowned in the minority, would cease to give them the consideration to which they aspire, under the mask of disinterested patriotism.*"

It was impossible to deny that there was some truth in these insinuations; but the opposite party, at the head of which, Aloys Reding, chief of the canton of Schwytz—a chief of an energetic and noble character—did not fail to retort upon their adversaries arguments of an opposite kind, to which the recent calamities gave additional weight. They urged, "that if the misfortunes of Switzerland, since it had been exposed to revolutionary agitation, would not convince the partisans of a central government of their errors, neither would they be convinced though one rose from the dead. Since the disastrous period when the French troops entered Switzerland, and proclaimed that form of administration amid the blood of thousands and by the light of burning villages, what had been witnessed in their once happy and united territory but rancour, hatred, and dissension? It is idle to ascribe that continued exasperation to the clamour of interested individuals; it has extended infinitely beyond the persons dispossessed by the recent changes, and embraces, in fact, the whole population, with the exception of that limited class in the towns to whom the central system has given the entire government of the country. Every one knows that Helvetia has paid more in taxes and contributions since the French invaded it, than in a century before; and, in fact, it could hardly have been credited that such vast sums existed in the country as the Republican agents have contrived to extract from its industrious inhabitants. It is in vain to allege that these calamities have been the result of war. The worst of them have arrived, not in war, but in peace; and have been, not contributions levied by soldiers, with arms in

* Jom., xiv., 409, 410. Dum., viii., 35, 36. Bign., ii., 368.

† Jom., xiv., 410, 411. Bign., ii., 361. Dum., viii., 35, 37.

‡ The usual course with the victorious party was to banish their fallen antagonists to Bale or Lausanne; and, after a few months, even this severity was relaxed, and the proscribed families returned to their homes and usual avocations. What a contrast to the proscriptions of the convention, and transportations of the Directory, in the capital styling itself the centre of European civilization!—See BIGNON, ii., 361.

* Jom., xiv., 411, 412.

their hands, but exactions made by the cupidity of revolutionary agents, armed with the powers of the central government. It is utterly impracticable that such a system of administration can answer in a country so peculiarly situated as our cantons are; the universal reprobation in which it is held is a sufficient proof of its total failure. In fact, the interested motives, so liberally insinuated on the other side, truly govern those who, for the sake of a constitution in which they have contrived to obtain lucrative situations, oppose themselves to the unanimous wish of their fellow-citizens.*

Matters were brought to a crisis by a solemn recognition of the central authority by the assembly, which met at Berne on the 1st of August, 1801. The representatives of the lesser cantons and of the aristocratic party protested against that resolution, and also against the power of redeeming tithes inserted in the new Constitution. Deeming opposition fruitless in an assembly ruled by a revolutionary majority, the deputies of nine cantons separated from the remainder of the body, and, finding that their absence only rendered the opposite party more precipitate in their measures, they had recourse to a *coup d'état* to accomplish their subversion. On

Oct. 28, 1801. Revolution effected by the aid of the French troops.

the night of the 28th of October, a part of the Legislative Body met, and gave full power to Dolder and Savary, two leading members of the ancient executive council, to accomplish the revolution. They immediately had recourse to the French troops, who had secret orders from the First Consul to support the movement; the posts of government were all forced, the Legislative Assembly was dissolved, and a provisional government, with Reding at its head, proclaimed.†

The object of Napoleon in supporting this counter-revolution at Berne was to establish a government in that country more in harmony with the monarchical institutions now in the course of reconstruction at Paris, than the Democratic assembly convened during the first fervour of the Helvetic Revolution; but he soon experienced some difficulty in steering between the opposite extremes into which the country was divided. Reding, the head of the provisional government, repaired to Paris, where the First Consul immediately impressed upon him the necessity of proceeding upon the principle of fusing together the different parties, on which he himself had proceeded in the formation of the consular government; and therefore required, as the condition of his farther support, the admission of six of the most moderate of the opposite

Nov. 29, 1801. party into the government. Reding was coldly received at the Tuileries. His energetic and ardent character was little suited to the First Consul, who had no intention of reinstating the aristocratic party, who necessarily inclined to Austria, on that defenceless part of the French territory. He returned, therefore, to Berne, disappointed in his hopes, and applied without success to Austria and Prussia to obtain that support which he despaired of receiving from the French government.‡

On his return, Reding found the new govern-

ment destitute both of power and consideration, and discord breaking out more fiercely than ever between the adverse factions. The senate appointed by the revolution of the 28th of October promulgated a new Constitution, Feb. 17, 1802. professed to be based on the principles laid down by the First Consul; but it neither satisfied either of the parties in Switzerland, nor accorded with the views on which his administration was founded. Deeming the time now arrived, therefore, when his interference was loudly called for, Napoleon instigated Dolder and the six persons admitted into the government at his suggestion, to accomplish another revolution. They took advantage of the moment when Reding and the deputies of the Forest Cantons had returned, with patriarchal simplicity, to their valleys to celebrate the festival of Easter, and effected the object

April 17, 1802. The new government is again deposed.

17th of February was abolished, and an assembly of forty notables, specified in a list furnished by the French ambassador, appointed to meet at Berne on the 28th of April, to put a final stop to the dissensions of the country. The new Constitution, framed by Napoleon

May 19. And a new Constitution framed by Napoleon.

was proclaimed at Berne on the 19th of May. It consisted of an executive, composed of a landamman and two lieutenants, appointed for nine years; a senate of fifty-six members, who proposed all changes in the laws, and a national diet which sanctioned them. The sense of the citizens was forthwith taken upon this Constitution. It appeared that out of 330,000 persons entitled to vote, 92,000 rejected it, 72,000 supported it, and 170,000 abstained from voting. A majority of votes, therefore, were for rejection; but the government, proceeding on the principle that those who withdrew were favourable to the change, proclaimed its adoption by a large majority. The lesser cantons loudly announced their determination of seceding from the confederacy if it was forced upon them: but the aristocratic cantons, influenced by the promise that, if agreed to, the French troops would be withdrawn, at length agreed to its adoption.*

Deeming the result of the last revolution sufficiently favourable to his views, Napoleon thought it no longer advisable to continue the French troops in Switzerland, where they had remained, in defiance of the treaty of Luneville, for two years, to the evident dissatisfaction both of England and Austria. On the 20th of July, accordingly, the retreat of the Republicans was proclaimed by the First Consul, and, at the same time, the erection of the Valais into a separate republic announced. This measure, contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the inhabitants, and evidently in connexion with the formation of the great military road over the Simplon, announced but too clearly to the Swiss the state of dependence under which they were to be placed to France by the new government they had obtained, and contributed not a little to the explosion which immediately followed the removal of the French forces.†

The government at Berne, aware of the slight

* Jom., xiv., 424, 425. Dum., viii., 19, 20. Bign., ii., 371, 372. † Jom., xv., 109. Dum., ix., 20, 21.

* Jom., xiv., 412, 414. Dum., ix., 16.

† Dum., viii., 37, 39. Bign., ii., 368, 369. Jom., xiv., 418, 419.

‡ Dum., ix., 19, 20. Bign., ii., 370, 371. Jom., xiv., 420, 421.

Upon which the government at Berne is overturned. were to be withdrawn, and loudly remonstrated against the adoption of a measure so fatal to their interests; but the First Consul, tired of the incessant changes of rulers in the Swiss States, and desirous of a pretext for interfering with decisive effect in a country so important to his military operations, persevered in his resolution, and the evacuation in good earnest commenced. The government, despairing of any support from the national troops, eagerly solicited the aid of the Helvetic brigades, which was granted them by the First Consul; but before they had time to arrive, the insurrection had broken out in the small cantons, and the Constitution approached its dissolution. In a letter addressed to the French ambassador, on the 13th of July, 1802.

they openly announced their resolution to withdraw from the Helvetic Confederacy, and renew the ancient league of the Waldstätten, under which they had in early times maintained their independence.* In this important and touching manifesto the shepherds of the Alps asserted, by unanswerable arguments, their right to that freedom

The mountaineers prepare for war. Aug. 17, 1802.

in the choice of their government for which the French had so long and justly contended, and which had been expressly guaranteed to them by the treaty of Luneville. But the administration at Berne answered them by a proclamation, in which they announced their resolution to maintain by force the unity of the Republic. Upon this the Forest Cantons convoked a diet

Aug. 17, 1802. at Schwytz, which abolished all privileges, and re-established the ancient Democratic Constitution, in which they were immediately joined by the neighbouring cantons of Zug, Glarus, Appenzel, and the Rheinthal. "The treaty of Luneville," said they, "allows us the free choice of our institutions: we are at liberty, therefore, to overturn those which have been forced upon us." The opposite parties now openly prepared for war; magazines were formed, arms collected on both sides; and while the mountaineers on the Lake of Lucerne were rousing themselves, under

their former magistrates, for the assertion of their ancient Democratic rights, the peasants of the Oberland were secretly conspiring with the patricians of Berne for the re-establishment of the former aristocratic privileges of that oligarchy: a union at which the French writers are never weary of expressing their astonishment, not perceiving that it was formed on true conservative principles, and for the re-establishment of a government in both situations recommended by experience, and suited to the interests and habits of the people.

Hostilities were commenced in the Forest Cantons by an attack on the advanced guard of the troops of the Helvetic Republic, near the foot of Mount Pilatus, who were repulsed in an attempt to penetrate from the north into the Canton of Underwalden.

August 28. Hostilities commence. Great early success of the mountaineers.

Zurich soon after revolted against the constituted authorities, and the indignation of the inhabitants was strongly excited by an ineffectual bombardment which General Andermatt, at the head of the forces of the Republic, kept up, with the view of terrifying the inhabitants into submission. But the flame now broke out on all sides: the peasants of the Oberland and Argovia assembled under their old leaders, Watteville and D'Erlach, and the approach of their united forces towards Berne compelled the government to summon Andermatt from the siege of Zurich to defend its own ramparts. Dolder, who, by making himself useful to all parties, had contrived to place himself at the helm of the government, now lost all hope; and, seeing no means of making head against the storm, concluded a convention, by which he was allowed to retire with his troops unmolested to the Pays de Vaud. Thither he proceeded accordingly, followed by the French ambassador, who fabricated a story of a bullet having fallen in the court of his hotel, to give his government a pretence for immediate hostilities with the insurgents. The confederates immediately published a proclamation, in which they declared, "after four years of incessant calamity, we have at length attained the object of our desires. Guided by duty, and called by fortune, we have at length re-entered into the city of Berne, our common mother, which your courage and fidelity has placed in our hands. We are penetrated with gratitude and admiration, when we behold the generous and sublime burst of patriotism which has led you to brave so many dangers to recover your laws and your government. The supreme authorities have resolved to remain on terms of friendship with those who, during the preceding days of calamity, have deviated from their duty: it tenders them the hand of reconciliation. It expects not less confidently from its own and now victorious supporters, that they will forget their former injuries, and not stain the triumph of their country by acts of individual vengeance."*

Meanwhile Reding convoked a General Diet to be held at Schwytz, and announced to the assembled cantons "the necessity of renouncing forever all political privileges, and conceding to the people subjected to their government, as to lawful brothers, the same liberties and privileges which are enjoyed by the inhabitants of towns." A resolution wise and just in itself, and which sufficiently indicated the intention not to

* "We have in vain endeavoured," said they, "for four successive years, to extricate ourselves from the Forest a constitution which, from its origin, and still more from the violence with which it was established, could not fail to be insupportable. It is in vain that we have constantly hoped that the Helvetic government, instructed by the calamitous events of the last four years, would at length find that our separation from the Republic was that which was most wise and suitable for both parties; and that the wish which we have so often and so strongly expressed for our ancient liberty, would have induced them to abandon the hope that these three cantons would ever voluntarily accept any other constitution than that which has always been considered as the only one suited to these states, and for that reason so highly prized by ourselves and our ancestors. Our reunion with Helvetia, which has been stained with so much blood, is perhaps the most cruel example of constraint that history can offer.

"In the conviction, therefore, that for a forced and unfortunate marriage divorce is the only reasonable remedy, and that Helvetia and ourselves cannot recover repose and contentment except by the dissolution of this forced tie, we are firmly resolved to labour at that separation with all possible activity; and we think it best to address that authority which for four years past has united us, in spite of ourselves, to the Helvetic Republic. As to anything farther, we only wish to preserve uninterrupted harmony and good understanding with all our neighbours. In listening to our just demands, the Helvetic Republic will find the only means of preserving with us the relation of brotherhood and kindly neighbours."—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1802, p. 227.

* Dum., ix., 24, 30. *Jom.*, xv., 110, 125. *Bign.*, ii., 373, 375.

re-establish those vexatious distinctions in political power by which the Swiss Confederacy had been so long deformed. The Diet assembled at Schwytz, met on the 27th of September, and immediately adopted the resolution to raise an armed force of twenty thousand men. At the same time, the truce agreed upon with Dolder having expired, hostilities were renewed on the side of the Pays de Vaud, and Fribourg, after a sharp cannonade, fell into the hands of the confederates. The approaching dissolution of the central government was now apparent: the national guards of the Pays de Vaud, who had taken up arms in its defence, were driven back in disorder from Morat to Moudon; Payenne opened its gates; and the discomfited authorities could hardly assemble 2000 men at Lausanne for their defence. Already the Swiss troops, in great force, were approaching, and the fugitive government was preparing to retire into the neighbouring territory of France, when a new actor appeared on the stage, and the wishes of Switzerland were crushed for a long course of years by the armed interference of the First Consul.*

On the 4th of October, General Rapp, aid-de-camp to Napoleon, arrived at Lausanne with the same with the following proclamation by the French government: "Inhabitants of Helvetia! Swiss blood has flowed from the hands of the Swiss. For two years you have exhibited the most deplorable spectacle. Contending factions have alternately possessed themselves of power. They have signalized their ephemeral authority by a system of partiality which accused at once their weakness and incapacity. You have disputed for three years without coming to an understanding. If you are abandoned to yourselves, you will massacre each other for three years longer without interruption. Your history proves that you can never settle your intestine divisions but by the interposition of France. It is true, I had intended not to intermeddle in your affairs. I had seen all your different administrations seek my advice without following it, and not unfrequently abuse my name to the purposes of their interests and their passions; but I can no longer remain an unconcerned spectator of the misfortunes which are devouring you. I revoke my resolution. I will become the mediator in your differences; but my mediation shall be efficacious, and such as suits the dignity of the great nation which I represent. Five days after the publication of the present proclamation the senate shall assemble at Berne. The government established at that place since the capitulation is dissolved. All authorities, wherever constituted by it, are at an end. The troops who have been in arms for six months shall alone be retained. All the others are hereby disbanded, and required to lay down their arms."†

This haughty proclamation was a severe blow to the confederate chiefs at the moment when they were about to triumph; for nearly the whole country had now ranged themselves under their banners, and, with the exception of the Pays de Vaud, Switzerland had unanimously overturned the constitution forced upon them by France. The dignity of their conduct was equal to its wisdom under this cruel reverse. Disdaining to submit to the yoke of the

conqueror, and yet sensible of their inability to contend with so formidable a state without the aid of more efficient allies, they invoked the support of Austria and the other powers to assert for them the independence stipulated by the treaty of Luneville; and finding the imperial cabinet deaf to their entreaties, still refused to separate, protested against the violence by which they were menaced, and declared that "they yielded only to force." They despatched a confidential agent to Paris, who addressed himself to the ambassadors of all the other states, imploring their assistance. "Scarcely," said he to the English government, "did Switzerland find herself independent, than she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes. Almost the whole of the country, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, threw off the yoke. The aristocratic cantons renounced their exclusive privileges. The new cantons were left at liberty to form their own constitutions. Who could have imagined that Bonaparte, in defiance of the treaty of Luneville, would have issued such a decree as has just appeared? Is an independent nation to be thus treated? Should he persist in this determination, and the other powers not interfere, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, though without hope of resistance, exhausted as we are by the colossus who is about to overwhelm us, or to base ourselves in the eyes of the whole universe. Will the government of England, ever so generous, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide whether we are still to be ranked among free people? We have only men left us. The Revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means. We are without arms, ammunition stores, or money to purchase them." But, though all the Continental powers warmly participated in these feelings, none ventured to give expression to them. England alone interfered, and, by an energetic note, protested against this subjugation of a neutral power, in direct violation of the treaty of Luneville, and despatched a confidential agent to the borders of Helvetia to ascertain the real state of the country; but, finding it impossible to rouse the Continental powers to any interference in its behalf, they justly deemed it inexpedient to proceed farther at that moment in support of so remote and inland a state.* All was soon accomplished. Ney entered Switzerland with twenty thousand men, and occupied, without resistance, Soleure, Zurich, and Berne; and the scene of violence commenced by the imposition of a contribution of 600,000 francs on the cities which had fallen under the power of the invaders.†

The subjugation of Switzerland being resolved on, the tyrannical process was, however, carried into effect with as much clemency and moderation as the circumstances would admit. Ney, to whom the painful task of completing the conquest of these gallant mountaineers was committed, executed his duty with humanity and discretion. He sent a peremptory order to the Diet to dissolve and disband its forces, and supported the mandate by the advance of masses, evidently overwhelming, to St. Gall, Glarus, and Schwytz,

* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1282.

* Jom., xv., 125, 129. Dum., ix., 30, 38. † Dum., x., 38, 39.

† Jom., xv., 130, 135. Dum., ix., 34, 40. Bign., ii., 377, 378.

Yielding to necessity, they ordered their troops to disband, and closed their sittings by a touching appeal to posterity, in which they protested against the violence by which they had been oppressed, and bequeathed to happier times the duty of restoring the liberties of their country.* At the same time they notified to Ney, "that the Diet of Schwytz, yielding to force, had come to the resolution of separating, inserting, however, in the name of all Switzerland, the same reservation for the future which it had already made known in its public proclamation."[†]

Aloys Reding, after the disbanding of the troops, disdained either to fly or make submission, but remained at Schwytz, ready to undertake, in his own person, all the responsibility consequent on his patriotic devotion. He was soon after arrested, along with his brother, the Landamman of Baden, and some other leaders of the confederates, and sent, under a strong guard, to Zurich, from whence, in a short time, he was transferred to the castle of Chillon, on the Lake of Geneva, a fortress rendered more interesting in the eyes of freedom by his captivity, than by the sufferings of the feudal prisoner over whose fate modern genius has thrown an imperishable lustre.‡

Resistance being thus rendered hopeless in Switzerland, a Diet of fifty-six deputies of the cantons was appointed to meet at Paris, in the December following, to deliberate on the formation of a constitution, and receive the law from the First Consul. His conduct and language on this occasion were distinguished by his usual penetration and ability, and a most unusual degree of lenity and forbearance; and if anything could have reconciled the Swiss to the loss of their independence, it must have been the wisdom and equity on which his mediation was founded.

"The situation of your country," said he to the assembled deputies, "is critical; moderation, prudence, and the sacrifice of passion are necessary to save it. I have undertaken, in the face of Europe, the engagement to render my mediation efficacious. I will faithfully discharge all the duties which that sacred function imposes on me; but that which might be difficult without your concurrence, becomes easy by your influence and assistance. Switzerland does not resemble any other country; its geographical and topographical situation, the difference of religion, and extreme variety of manners which prevail in its various parts, render it an exception to all other states. Nature has made your country federative; to at-

tempt to conquer it is not the part of wisdom. Circumstances, the spirit of past ages, have established among you sovereign and subject people. New circumstances, and the spirit of a different age, have introduced equality of right between all the parts of your territory. Many of your states have been governed for centuries by the most absolute Democracy; others have fallen under the dominion of particular families, and subjects have grown into sovereigns. The influence of public opinion in Italy, Savoy, France, and Alsace, which surround you, have powerfully contributed to the formation of these institutions. The disposition of these countries is now changed, and yours must undergo a similar modification. The renunciation of all exclusive privileges is at once the wish and the interest of your people.

"What your interests require is, 1. Equality of rights among the whole eighteen cantons. 2. A sincere and voluntary renunciation of all exclusive privileges on the part of the patrician families. 3. A federative organization, where every canton finds itself arranged according to its language, its religion, its manners, its interest and opinion. The central government remains to be provided for, but it is of much less consequence than the cantonal organization. It is impossible to establish uniformity, either in finances, army, or civil administration, among you. You have never maintained regular armies, nor had established accredited agents at the courts of the different governments. Situated on the summit of the mountains which separate France, Italy, and Germany, you participate in the disposition of all these different countries. Strict neutrality, a prosperous commerce, and family administration, can alone secure your interests, or be suited to your wishes. Every organization that could be established among you hostile to the wishes or interests of France, would injure you in the most essential particulars.

"After having addressed you as becomes one of your own citizens, I must now use the language befitting the chief magistrate of two of your most powerful neighbours; and I must at once declare that neither France nor the Italian Republic will ever suffer a system to be established among you calculated to promote the interest of their enemies. The repose and tranquillity of forty millions of men, your immediate neighbours, without whom you can neither exist as a state nor subsist as individuals, are also of no small weight in the balance of public justice. Let nothing, as concerns them, be hostile among you; let everything, on the contrary, be conducive to their interests, and let it continue, as in times past, your first interest, your first policy, your first inclination, your first duty, to permit nothing, to leave nothing on your territory which, directly or indirectly, can prejudice the interests, the honour, or the cause of the French people. It is indispensable, not merely that there should exist no sort of disquietude for that portion of our territory which is open and which you cover, but that we should farther feel the assurance that, if your neutrality were ever to be violated, your interest, not less than your inclination, would lead you to range yourselves under the banner of France rather than in opposition to it."*

Abstracting from the determination, here openly announced, of subjecting Switzerland to the influence, and even government of France,

* This memorable address, worthy of the country of Tell, was conceived in the following terms: "The Digitized address of the deputies of the cantons have come to the resolution of surrendering the powers with which they were invested into the hands of their constituents, inasmuch as the force of foreign armies opposes an irresistible bar to the accomplishment of their duties. But while they recognise the necessity of submission, the deputies conjure their constituents not for one moment to believe that it can impair their right to choose their own form of government; a right which they inherit from the virtues and courage of their ancestors, and is expressly guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville. With this view, while they yield to force, they are resolved to do nothing which may impair that precious bequest to future generations, or sanction in any degree that which other inhabitants of Switzerland, accepting such an alleviation, may have the appearance of approving."—See JOMINI, xv., 133, and DUMAS, ix., 57.

† Jom., xv., 137. Dum., ix., 56. Ney's Mem., ii., 247, ‡ Dum., ix., 58, 59.

* Thib., 356, 359.

Discontent which his principles excite on both sides. which, however alarming to all the neighbouring powers, as chief magistrate of that country, the First Consul was naturally led to desire, there can be no doubt that the principles which he here set forth were those which the most profound wisdom would have suggested to terminate the dissensions of which it had so long been the prey. They gave, accordingly, almost as great umbrage to the vehement Republican as the ultra-conservative party; the former deploring the re-establishment of a federal union and the separate constitution of different cantons; the latter the formation of a central government, under the influence, and subject to the control, of France. Both parties conducted the debate with much warmth, and the greatest abilities of France and Switzerland were employed in the conference, which took place in the Council of State at Paris, in presence of the First Consul.* At length the discussion was terminated by the act of mediation pronounced by Napoleon on the 19th of February, 1803, which, for the remainder of his reign, settled the condition of the Helvetic Confederacy.

By this act Switzerland was divided into nineteen cantons; the lesser ones were revived, and their limits re-established as formerly. The Oberland of Helvetia was restored to Berne; but the states of Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, St. Gall, and the Tessino, which formerly had been subjected to the other cantons, were elevated to the rank of constituent members of the confederacy. Six of the principal cantons, namely, Fribourg, Berne, Soleure, Zurich, and Lucerne, were styled directing cantons, and the Diet sat, year about, at their chief towns; and for that year the chief magistrate of that canton was landamman of Switzerland. The federal contingent was fixed at 15,203 men and 490,507 francs (£20,000). All exclusive privileges were abolished, so that the citizen of any one canton was a denizen of any part of the confederacy. All alliances of one canton with another, or with a foreign state, were interdicted. Each canton sent a deputy to the Diet; but Berne, Zurich, Vaud, Argovia, St. Gall, and the Grisons, sent two. The functions of this Supreme Council were declared to be, 1. To proclaim war or peace, and conclude foreign alliances, which required the consent of three fourths of the Diet. 2. To fix regulations for foreign commerce, capitulations in foreign services, and the recruiting of soldiers. 3. To levy the contingent, and appoint commanders of the armed force, and the foreign ambassadors. 4. To adopt measures of external utility and settle disputes between one canton and another. The act concluded in these terms: "The present act, the result of long conferences with enlightened persons, appears to us the best that could be devised for the constitution and happiness of the Swiss. As soon as it is carried into execution the French troops shall withdraw. We recognise Helvetia, as organized by this act, as an independent power, and guaranty the Federal Constitution, and that of each canton in particular, against the enemies of the tranquillity of the state."[†]

The subsequent dispositions of the First Consul were all dictated by a desire to render the foreign yoke then imposed upon the Swiss as

light as possible, and win the affections of a people whose situation rendered their neutrality of more value to France than their alliance. Satisfied with the erection of the Valais into a separate republic, which gave him the entire command of the Simplon Road, Napoleon allowed the Swiss to retain their neutrality, rejected all idea of an alliance offensive and defensive, and modified the existing stipulated contingent of 25,000 men into a levy of sixteen regiments, who were taken into the pay of the French Republic. These lenient conditions gave universal satisfaction in Switzerland. The deputies of the cantons met at Fribourg in the beginning of July, under the auspices of Louis d'Affry, designated by Napoleon as the first landamman of the confederacy, while the presence of Aloys Reding, as deputy for Schwytz, gave testimony to the commencement of the system of fusion which it was so much his object to establish in all the countries subjected to his dominion, and proved that if the Swiss were not reconciled to the foreign yoke, at least they had abandoned all hope of farther resisting it.[‡]

The dignified conduct of the Swiss patriots in the last extremity of their independence, and the necessity to which they reduced the First Consul of openly employing force to subdue them, was in the highest degree contrary to his wishes, and proved more prejudicial to his interests in Europe than any other event which had occurred under his government. He had hoped that all necessity for a visible conquest would be prevented by one of the factions

Equitable measures for the government of the country.

Extreme dissatisfaction excited by this event over Europe.

* Jom., xv., 240, 241. Dum., ix., 73, 75.

† The sagacity with which the First Consul discriminated the most important features in the condition of the Swiss cantons may be appreciated by the following extracts from the speech he delivered on the formation of the internal constitution of the confederacy.

Admirable principle of Napoleon's measure in this respect.

"The re-establishment of the ancient order of things in the Democratic cantons is the best course which can be adopted; both for you and me. They are the states whose peculiar form of government render them so interesting in the eyes of all Europe; but for this pure Democracy you would exhibit nothing which is not to be found elsewhere. Beware of extinguishing so remarkable a distinction. I know well that this Democratic system of administration has many inconveniences; but it is established, it has subsisted for centuries, it springs from the circumstances, situation, and primitive habits of the people, from the genius of the place, and cannot with safety be abandoned. When usage and systematic opinion find themselves in opposition, the latter must give way. You must never take away from a Democratic society the practical exercise of its privileges. To give such exercise a direction consistent with the tranquillity of the state is the part of true political wisdom. In ancient Rome the votes were counted by classes, and they threw into the last classes the whole body of indigent citizens, while the first contained only a few hundred of the most opulent individuals; but the populace were content, and, amused with the solicitation of their votes, did not perceive the immense difference in their relative value, and that, all put together, they did not equal the influence of a few of the great patrician families.

"Since the Revolution, you have never ceased to seek your safety independent of France. Your position, your history, in fine, common sense forbid it. The interests of defence bind Switzerland to France; those of attack render it of value in the eyes of other powers. The first is permanent and constant; the second depends on fortune and political combination, and can only be transient in its operation. Switzerland can never defend its plains but with the aid of France. France is open to attack on the Swiss frontier; Austria is not, for she is covered by the bulwark of the Tyrol. I would have gone to war on account of Switzerland; I would have sacrificed a hundred thousand men, rather than allow it to remain in the hands of the party who were at the head of the last insurrection, so great is the influence of its geographical position upon France."—THIBAUDEAU, 363, 367.

* Dum., ix., 65, 72. Jom., xv., 138, 140.

† Jom., xv., 139, 141. Dum., ix., 70, 73. App., 253, 279. Pièces Just.

openly invoking his assistance, and that thus Switzerland would be subjugated, as other countries had been, by dividing without appearing to do violence to the people. The unanimous expression of public detestation which attended the proclamation of the French Constitution, and the instant overthrow of the government which followed the removal of the French troops, entirely frustrated this insidious design, and compelled Napoleon to throw off the mask, and, in direct violation of the treaty of Luneville, openly accomplish the subjugation of the country. This violent proceeding was not less painful to the feelings of the people than it was alarming to the governments of all the neighbouring states. To see the great central fortress of Switzerland, commanding all the passes from France into Italy, placed in the hands of so ambitious a ruler, at the very time when he was rapidly extending his dominions over the whole peninsula, excited the strongest jealousy in all the European cabinets, while the subjugation of the country of William Tell, and the overthrow of Swiss independence by Republican bayonets, awakened deep feelings of commiseration among all to whom the name of liberty was dear, and did more to dispel the general fascination which had attended the government of the First Consul than any circumstance which had occurred since his elevation to power. At the same time, the indignation of the Dutch was strongly excited by the continued residence of the French troops in their territory, and the heavy load which the finding clothing and paying so large a body of men imposed on their almost ruined finances, in direct opposition to the treaty signed and promises held out on occasion of the late change in their government; and the conviction became as general as it was painful, that the ambition of France was insatiable, and that the establishment of revolutionary governments in the adjoining states only led to a prolongation of the onerous yoke of the Great Parent Republic.*

While the Continent of Europe was agitated by these important events, and pre-saged, in the rapid strides of the First Consul towards universal dominion, the approaching renewal

Tranquillity and happiness of England during this period.

* Sir R. Liston's Despatch, Dec. 29, 1802. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1285.

† As a specimen of the effect which these events produced on the liberal party in Europe, it is sufficient to refer to the speeches of the leaders of the opposition in the British Parliament. "The French government," said

Mr. Fox, "was bound by treaty, as well as by every principle of justice, to withdraw their troops from Switzerland, and to leave that country to itself, even with the miserable government which they had established in it, and to respect its independence. During their dominion in that country, they had formed a government so utterly odious to the people, that the moment their troops were withdrawn, the inhabitants, by an insurrection founded on the truest principles of justice, rose and overturned it. The French government interfered to restore it, and, bad as the system was, the manner of their interfering to restore it was, if possible, still worse. This violent act of injustice no man can contemplate with more indignation than myself."

"The conduct of France with respect to Holland affords a still more intolerable instance of injustice. Were I master of the use of colours, and could paint with skill, I would take the darkest to delineate the conduct of France towards that republic. It certainly has been worse treated by her than any other country whatever. Holland has not only suffered all the unavoidable evils of war, but when peace came, to turn that country, in defiance of a positive treaty with France, into a dépôt for French troops, for the mere purpose of putting the Dutch to the expense of maintaining them, was an act no less despicable for its meanness than hateful for its atrocity."—*Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1446, 1450.

of the war, England was tasting, with unalloyed satisfaction, the blessings and the tranquillity of peace. She had given the most unequivocal proof of the sincerity of her confidence in the honour of France in permitting the vast armament of Le Clerc to proceed unmolested to the West Indies; and had beheld, with pain, indeed, but without opposition, the successive new-modelling of the Batavian, Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Valaisan republics, under the authority of the First Consul, and the annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia to his dominions or those of his subject states. On occasion only of the overthrow of Helvetic independence her ministers presented an energetic note to the French government, complaining of that breach of the European liberties; but finding their remonstrances not supported by the other powers, they prudently desisted from any more efficacious interference in their behalf.* Secure in her insular position and maritime strength, she beheld with uneasiness the successive additions to the power of France, and deemed herself not called upon to interfere actively in Continental affairs till the powers more immediately interested were prepared to second her efforts by efficacious aid.

During this brief period of national repose, the industry and finances of the country prospered in a most extraordinary degree; and Great Britain, literally reaped, at the same time, the excitement of war with the commerce and tranquillity of peace. As her statesmen did not deem it safe to make any considerable reduction in the national establishments while the power of France was so formidable, the lassitude arising from a diminished government expenditure was hardly experienced: an extensive paper currency maintained the prices and activity of war, while the opening of the Continental ports brought into her harbours the extended commerce of peace, and rendered her commercial cities the emporium of the civilized world. Her exports and imports rapidly increased: the cessation of the income-tax conferred comparative affluence on the middling classes: agriculture, sustained by continued high prices, shared in the general prosperity: the sinking fund, relieved in some degree from the counteracting influence of annual loans, attracted universal attention; while the revenue, under the influence of so many favourable circumstances, steadily

Rapid improvement of the finances and trade of the country.

* "His majesty has received with deep regret the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, published by authority in the *Moniteur* of October 1. His majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers."

"The cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as any other power, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has, in the present instance, been expressly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the treaty of Luneville, by the French government, conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement. His majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and with whatever regret he may have perused the late proclamation of the French government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights."—Lord HAWKESBURY's *Note to M. OTTO*, Oct. 10, 1802.—*Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1281.

augmented, and the national exigencies were easily provided for without any addition to the burdens of the people. So wide spread was the enthusiasm occasioned by this bright gleam of prosperity, that even sagacious practical men were carried away by the delusion; and the only apprehension expressed by the moneyed classes was, that the sinking fund would extinguish the debt too rapidly, and capital, left without any secure investment, be exposed to the risk and uncertainty of foreign adventure.*

Under the influence of such favourable circumstances, the permanent revenue of Great Britain steadily increased, while the public expenditure was rapidly diminished. In the year 1802, indeed, the effect of the great war expenses, which the unsettled state of the negotiation prior to the signing of the definitive treaty made it impossible to reduce, rendered a considerable national expenditure necessary; but in the succeeding year the full benefit of pacific reduction was experienced. In the former year the current annual expenditure was, independent of the interest of the debt, £29,693,000, and the receipt £36,368,000: in the latter, the receipt had risen to £30,609,000, and the expenditure, without the interest of debt, fallen to £28,298,000.† The financial operations of both years were on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, from the extent of the floating debt which was funded, and loans contracted to meet the winding up of the war, which produced a receipt and expenditure in each of nearly eighty millions from the public treasury: but, excepting these extraneous sums, the aspect of the national resources was in the highest degree satisfactory. The sinking fund was rapidly and steadily absorbing the debt, and afforded the prospect of extinguishing the whole national encumbrances, great as they were, at no distant period.‡

* It was stated by the chancellor of the Exchequer, in his place in Parliament, that the real value of British produce and manufactures exported in the year 1802 was little short of £50,000,000, being an increase of £8,000,000 above the year preceding; and the shipping entering the port of London in the years 1801 and 1802 were as follows:

	British.			Foreign.		
	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
1801..1762	418,631	23,096	3385	452,667	20,388	
1802..2459	574,700	33,743	1549	217,117	10,555	

Thus indicating that the return of peace had reduced to a half the foreign shipping in the port of London, and added a half to the British.—*Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1127.

† Porter's *Parl. Tables*, i., p. 1.

‡ The ways and means and expenditure for these two years stood as follows:

Expenditure. 1802.		
Ordinary.....	£29,693,000	
Int. of debt, funded and unfunded,.....	19,855,588	
Exchequer Bills.....	23,892,815	
Sinking Fund.....	6,114,033	
	£79,555,436	

The interest of the debt, funded and unfunded, was £19,855,588; the produce of the sinking fund £6,114,033.*

Ways and Means.		
Ordinary income.....	£36,368,149	
Loan.....	27,550,449	
Exchequer Bills.....	17,094,653	
	£81,013,251	

The unfunded debt funded this year amounted to the sum of £23,892,815, which explains the difference between the supply and expenditure.

Expenditure. 1803.		
Current.....	£28,298,366	
Interest of funded and unfunded debt.....	20,699,864	
Sinking Fund.....	6,494,694	
Paid Exchequer Bills.....	17,194,198	
	£72,687,122	

* Porter's *Parl. Tables*, i. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi., 446, and *Ann. Reg.*, 1802, 458. *App. to Chron.*

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But these flattering prospects were of short duration. Independent of the increasing jealousy with which the British government beheld the Continental encroachments of Napoleon, and which rapidly communicated itself to all classes of the English people, several causes of irritation grew up between the rival governments, which first weakened, and at last destroyed their good understanding. The detail of these causes is fraught with the highest historical interest. The fate of the world has depended on the results to which they led.

The first of these subjects of irritation was the asperity with which the government and acts of the First Consul were canvassed in the English newspapers. Not only did several French journals, published in London, in particular that of Peltier and the "Courrier Français de Londres," comment with great severity on his proceedings, but almost all the English journals, following the bent of the public mind, descanted, in the most unmeasured terms, on his continual encroachments in Continental Europe. To Napoleon, who was accustomed only to the voice of adulation, and heard nothing in the enslaved journals of his own country but gracefully-turned flattery, these diatribes were in the highest degree painful, and not the less so, probably, because the charges which they contained in regard to his foreign aggressions were more easily silenced by authority than answered by argument. He therefore caused his minister at the court of London to remonstrate warmly against these articles,* and concluded by soliciting, "1. That

Causes of irritation which gradually got up with France.

Complaints of the First Consul at the English newspapers.

Ways and Means.

Revenue.....	£38,609,392
Loan.....	11,960,523
Exchequer Bills.....	20,481,130
	£71,051,045

The rapid growth and steady application of the sinking fund was the subject of deserved congratulations to the country, both by the chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr Pitt. They calculated that it would extinguish the whole existing debt in forty-five years; and the celerity of its increase, compared with that of the interest of the debt, might be judged by the fact, that when it was first instituted, in 1764, its produce annually was one tenth of the interest; whereas in 1803 it had risen to a third of the then existing debt. It will hereafter appear that, when it was broken up in 1813, it was producing more than half the interest of the debt; and that if it had been let alone, it would have extinguished the whole debt existing at the conclusion of the war before the year 1840.—See *Porter's Parl. Tables*, i., 1, and *Parl. Deb.*, xxxvi., 1127, 1130.

* "The greatest of all injuries," said M. Otto, "is that which tends to debase a foreign government, to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most decided of all protections is that which places under the safeguard of the laws men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquility of Europe, but even to dissolve the first bonds of society. This is not a question concerning some paragraphs which, through the inadvertence of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print, but a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the chief of the French Republic, but all its constituted authorities—against the whole nation—represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. These observations are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered in England only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace. It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings, evidently published with a view to circulation in France, but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to induce the evil-disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the conclusion of the concordats, that these implacable enemies of France continue to exercise hostilities and provoke the just indignation of the French government and people. Not a doubt can exist of these writings having been composed

M. Otto's note on this subject.

the English government should adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and writings printed in England are filled. 2. That the individuals specified in the undersigned list should be sent out of Jersey. 3. That Georges and his adherents should be transported to Canada. 4. That, in order to deprive the evil-disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two governments, it should be recommended to the princes of the House of Bourbon, at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw. 5. That such of the emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient government of France, be required to quit the territory of the British Empire.*

Of these extravagant demands, which proved Indignation that Napoleon understood as little excited at this the action of a free government as he even in France did the relative situation of France itself, and England treating on a footing

of perfect equality, it is sufficient to observe, that it has excited the indignation even of the French historians who are most friendly to his cause. "It was nearly the same thing," says his eloquent apologist, Norvins, "to propose to Great Britain the sacrifice of its Constitution, as to insist upon its abandoning the two pillars of its freedom, the liberty of the press, and the privilege of habeas corpus. Such a demand was in the highest degree imprudent on the part of the First Consul, as it necessarily rendered him odious to the English people. Such language might have been used to the Cisalpine or Ligurian Republics, the creations of his hands; but it was wholly unsuitable to an independent power like England; and although that language was but the expression of disunion which already existed between the two governments, yet it was extremely imprudent to make it known in a diplomatic communication to the whole of Europe."†

The British government replied to this extraordinary requisition in dignified but courteous language.‡ They answered specifically each of

and circulated by Georges and the former bishops of France."—*Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1270.

* M. Otto's note, Aug. 17, 1802. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1270. Norv., ii., 234, 236.

† Norv., ii., 237, 238.

‡ "It cannot be denied," they observed, "that some im-

Answer made to proper and indecent paragraphs against the M. Otto by the government of France have appeared, both in the English newspapers and the French journals published in London; but they have

not been published under the authority of the British government, nor are they anyways responsible for their contents. His majesty neither can nor will, in consequence of any representation or menace from a foreign power, make any concession which may be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the Constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject; the Constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description; but there exist judicatures wholly independent of the executive, capable of taking cognizance of such publications as the law deems criminal; and they may investigate and punish not only libels against the government and magistracy of this kingdom, but those reflecting on the individuals in whose hands the administration of foreign governments is placed. The British government is perfectly willing to afford to the French government all the means of punishing the authors of any writings which they may deem defamatory which they themselves possess; but they never can consent to new model their laws, or to change their Constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign power. If the French government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels, they may punish the venders or distributors of such writings as they deem defamatory in their own country, or increase, by additional penal regulations, the risk of their circulation within their own bounds

the charges advanced by the French government, and concluded with observing, "His majesty is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace which is consistent with the honour and independence of the country, and the security of its laws and Constitution. But the French government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation, and the character of its government, if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power will ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded."*

No farther diplomatic correspondence took place on this subject; but soon after, Trial of Pel- tier for a libel on the part of the First Consul, a prosecution was instituted by the attorney-general against Peltier, for one of the most vehement of his articles against the French government. This prosecution, which, in the excited state of the public mind on the subject of France, awakened the most intense interest, gave occasion to a splendid display of eloquence on the part of the accused from Sir James Mackintosh, who then first gave public proof of those great abilities which his *Vindicia Gallica* and lectures on constitutional law had long made known to a more limited circle. Peltier was found guilty: but the subsequent breaking out of war between the two countries prevented his being brought up to receive judgment.†

The war of journals continued with redoubled vehemence on both sides of the Chan- War of the nel, as events succeeded calculated to public jour- call forth mutual complaints; and nals on both several articles in the *Moniteur*, of the sides. The most hostile character, bore evident marks of the First Consul's composition. The French incessantly urged the execution of "the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens;" loudly complained that the British government had not evacuated Alexandria, Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope, as stipulated in that instrument; and declared that the French people would ever remain in the attitude of Minerva, with a helmet on her head and a spear in her hand. The English answered that the strides made by France

"With respect to the removal of the persons considered obnoxious to the French government from the British dominions, his majesty has no desire that the princes of the house of Bourbon should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed or can be induced to quit it; but he feels it to be inconsistent with his honour and with his sense of justice to withdraw from them the right of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly, and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two governments. The emigrants in Jersey, most of whom are there chiefly in consequence of the cheapness of provisions, had removed, or were removing, previous to M. Otto's note: if any of them can be shown, by reasonable evidence, to have distributed papers on the coast of France with the view of disturbing the government and of inducing the people to resist the new Church Establishment, his majesty will deem himself justified in taking measures to compel them to leave the country. Measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for removing Georges and his adherents from his majesty's European dominions. There are few, if any of the French emigrants who continue to wear the decorations of the ancient government: it might be more prudent if they all abstained from doing so; but the French government cannot expect that his majesty will commit so harsh an act as to send them out of the country on that account."—Lord Hawkesbury's Note, 17th of August, 1802, *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1274, 1276

* Lord Hawkesbury's Note, Aug. 17, 1802. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1277.
† *Ann. Reg.*, 1803, p. 240.

over Continental Europe since the general pacification, and their menacing conduct towards the British possessions, were inconsistent with any intention of preserving peace, and rendered it indispensable that the securities held by them for their own independence should not be abandoned. This recriminatory warfare was continued with equal zeal and ability on the opposite sides of the Channel; loud and fierce defiance were uttered by both parties; and it soon became manifest, from the temper of the people, not less than the relations of their governments, that the contest could be determined only by the sword.*

In truth, it was not merely from the continental acquisitions of France, great as they had been since the peace, that the British government conceived apprehensions of the impossibility of long maintaining friendly terms with that power. Other circumstances nearer home indicated a determination in the First Consul to resume the contest at no distant period, and render the places evacuated by the treaty of Amiens the outposts from which hostilities were to be directed against their vital interests. The continued stay of a large French force in Holland, in defiance of express treaty; the gradual accumulation of troops on the shores of the Channel and on the frontiers of Hanover, indicated anything rather than a pacific disposition, and menaced England in the quarters where she was most easily assailable. At the same time, the mission of Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt and Syria, in October, 1802, for purposes evidently of a warlike character, and the minute and elaborate military report which he laid before the First Consul on his return, proved that, so far from having abandoned the idea of conquest on the banks of the Nile, he was prepared to resume it on the first convenient opportunity.† Influenced by these circumstances, and the evident demonstration of an insatiable ambition which the conduct of France to Italy and Switzerland afforded, the English government sent orders to delay the evacuation of Malta, Alexandria, and the Cape of Good Hope, which they had not only resolved on, but in part commenced, and openly declared their resolu-

tion to retain these important stations till some satisfactory explanation was obtained of the French movement.*

This resolution of the cabinet of St. James's immediately gave rise to an angry diplomatic correspondence between the two governments; but, instead of quoting these official documents, it is more important to give the substance of the famous interview which the First Consul had with Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador at Paris, on the 21st of February, 1803, which is so descriptive of the character of that extraordinary man as to be one of the most valuable documents of history. "He placed," says that nobleman, in his account of the interview transmitted the day following to his own government, "in the very first rank our not evacuating Egypt and Malta, as we were bound by the treaty to have done. In this," said he, "no consideration on earth shall make me acquiesce. Of the two, I would rather see you in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine than Malta. The abuse thrown out against me in the English public prints is vexatious, but not of so much consequence, not so mischievous as what appears in the French papers published in London. My irritation against England is daily increasing, because every wind which blows from England brings nothing but enmity and hatred against me. If I had felt the smallest inclination to take Egypt by force, I might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country, in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. Instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it only furnishes me with a pretence for invading it. I shall not do so, however I may wish to possess it as a colony, because I do not think it worth the chance of a war, in which I might possibly be considered as the aggressor, and by which I should lose more than I should gain, since, sooner or later, Egypt must belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish Empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.

"What have I to gain by going to war? A descent upon your coasts is the only means of offence I possess; and that I am determined to attempt, and put myself at its head. But can you suppose that, after having gained the height on which I stand, I would risk my life and reputation in so hazardous an undertaking, unless

to refer to the testimony of the French historians. "England," says General Matthieu Dumas, "notwithstanding its regret at seeing the key of the Levant and the East Indies slip from its grasp, was making preparations for receiving in the fortresses of Malta the Neapolitan troops, who, by the treaty of Amiens, were to form its garrison for a year. Such, indeed, was their sincerity, that the foreign troops were actually disembarked and well received. From the 15th to the 20th of September, at the periods fixed by the treaty, orders were in like manner transmitted for the evacuation of Alexandria by the British troops, and the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch forces." General Dundas and Sir Roger Curtis had received positive orders for the surrender of the Cape, with all its dependencies, to the Dutch forces. The best understanding prevailed between the troops of the two nations. The 1st of January, 1803, was fixed for the final evacuation; and the British troops had actually commenced their embarkation, and were half on board, when, on the evening of the 31st of December, a vessel arrived which had left Plymouth on the 31st of October, with orders to stop the cession of the colony. The British had only fifty-nine men at that time in the town; the Dutch garrison was fifteen hundred strong, and the British troops were eight miles distant when this unexpected intelligence arrived.—DUMAS, ix., 91, 120, 121.

* See the documents in *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1257, 1297.

* *Dum.*, ix., 98, 106. *Norr.*, ii., 238, 241. *Ann. Reg.*, 1803, 246.

† It appears from Colonel Sebastiani's report that he embarked on the 16th of September at Toulon, and, after visiting Tripoli, arrived at Alexandria on the 16th of October. "I communicated," says he, "to the English commander there the order of the ministers of foreign affairs to demand a speedy evacuation and the execution of the treaty of Amiens. General Stuart told me that the evacuation of the place would be shortly effected; and when I insisted for a more specific answer, he declared that he had no orders from his court to quit Alexandria, and that he believed he should winter there." He minutely examined the fortifications of Alexandria, and all the neighbouring forts; afterwards visited Cairo, under an escort of five hundred men; traversed Upper Egypt, as far as the Cataracts, and returned by St. Jean d'Acre and the Ionian Islands to France, with specific information as to the military and political state of the countries he had visited, and their respective dispositions towards France and England. The First Consul thought it so little necessary to disguise his designs, that he published the report, which is very long and elaborate, in the *Moniteur*; and it was particularly observable that Sebastiani assured all the Christians, from whom he received deputations in Egypt and Syria, "of the friendship and protection of the First Consul." The report concluded with a detailed statement of all the British troops in Egypt, and the respective forces of the Turks and native chiefs.—See the whole Report in *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvii., 1350, 1359.

‡ British Declaration. *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1332, 1333.

§ As decisive evidence that in the autumn of 1802, and anterior to the manifestation of the First Consul's ambitious designs in Europe, the British government was sincere in its intention to execute the treaty of Amiens, it is sufficient

compelled to it by absolute necessity? I know that the probability is that I myself and the greatest part of the expedition will go to the bottom. There are a hundred chances to one against me, but I am determined to make the attempt; and such is the disposition of the troops, that army after army will be found ready to engage in the enterprise.

"France, with an army of 480,000 men, to which amount it is to be immediately completed, and ready for the most desperate enterprise, and England, with a fleet which has rendered her the mistress of the seas, and which I shall not be able to rival for ten years, might, by a good understanding, govern the world, and by their strife overturn it. If I had not felt the enmity of the British government on every occasion since the peace of Amiens, there is nothing I would not have done to prove my desire to conciliate. Participation in indemnities, as well as influence on the Continent; treaties of commerce; in short, anything that would have testified confidence. Nothing, however, has been able to overcome the hostility of the British government; and thence we are now come to the point, Shall we have peace or war? To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled, the abuse in the public prints suppressed, or kept within due bounds, and the protection openly given to my bitterest enemies. If you desire war, it is only necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. I have not chastised the Algerines, from my unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers; but I hope that the time will come when England, Russia, and France will feel that it is for their interest to destroy such a nest of robbers, and force them to live by cultivating their lands rather than plunder.

"Peace or war depends on Malta. It is in vain to talk of Piedmont and Switzerland. They are mere trifles, and must have been foreseen when the treaty was going forward. You have no right to speak of them at this time of day. I do not pretend to say this mission of Colonel Sebastiani was merely commercial. It was rendered necessary, in a military point of view, by your infraction of the treaty of Amiens."

This energetic and highly characteristic conversation was not of a nature calculated to diminish the alarm of the British government, or allay the hourly increasing irritation in the two countries. The result was, that the English cabinet openly gave orders for the assembling of Mar. 8, 1803. forces; and on the 8th of March, a Hostile preparations on message from the king to both houses of Parliament announced that, both sides: "as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, his majesty has judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his majesty refers are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet, as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his majesty and the French government, this communication has been deemed necessary." This message was received with the most animated feelings of patriotism by both

houses of Parliament. Mr. Fox, whose eloquence had so often been exerted in palliating the conduct of France, concurred in the address in answer, which passed both houses

without a single dissenting voice; and everything announced a degree of unanimity in the farther prosecution of the war unknown in its earlier stages. A few days afterward the militia was called out. Ten thousand additional men were voted for the navy, and preparations were made in the principal March 10. harbours of the kingdom for the most vigorous hostilities. These measures were immediately met by corresponding menaces on the part of France, and everything breathed hostility and defiance in the two countries.* Lord Nelson was intrusted with the command of the Mediterranean fleet. Lord Keith set out for Plymouth. Sir Sydney Smith received orders to put to sea with a squadron of observation. A hot press took place in the Thames. Sixteen ships of the line were instantly put in commission, the public ardour rose to the highest pitch, and England resumed her arms with a degree of enthusiasm exceeding even that with which she had laid them aside.†

These hostile preparations speedily led to a second and still more violent ebullition on the part of the First Consul. Mar. 14. Second and violent In a public court at the Tuileries, ebullition of Napoleon on held a few days after the king's message had been communicated to him, Lord Whitworth. he publicly addressed Lord Whitworth in the following terms: "So you are determined to go to war. We have already fought for fifteen years. I suppose you want to fight for fifteen years more. The English wish for war; but if they are the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it into the scabbard. They have no respect for treaties. Henceforth they must be shrouded in black crape. Wherefore these armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in the harbours of France; but if you arm I shall arm also. If you insist upon fighting, I shall fight also. You may destroy France, but never intimidate it. If you would live on terms of good understanding with us, you must respect treaties. Wo to those who violate them; they will answer for the consequences to all Europe." This violent harangue, rendered still more emphatic by the impassioned gestures with which it was accompanied, induced the English ambassador to suppose that the

* M. Talleyrand, in answer to the message of the English king, drew up the following note, which was delivered to the British ambassador:

1. If his Britannic majesty, in his message, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it is destined for America, and was on the point of sailing; but in consequence of that message its orders are countermanded.

2. If we do not receive satisfactory explanations respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, when that country is named in the king's message.

3. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that they should form an encampment on the borders of Hanover, and that additional bodies of troops should join them.

4. It is natural that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

5. It is likewise in the nature of things that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.

6. It is also the natural consequence of all this that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.—See *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1309.

† *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1170, 1180. *Dum.*, ix., 138, 144. *Ann. Reg.*, 1803.

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1297, 1299.

First Consul would so far forget his dignity as to strike him; and he was deliberating with himself as to what he should do in the event of such an insult being offered to the nation which he represented, when Napoleon retired, and delivered the assembled ambassadors of Europe from the pain they experienced at witnessing so extraordinary a scene.*

This vehement exposure of hostile disposition produced an extraordinary sensation both in England and Europe. In the former, by the indignation it excited, and the ardent desire to revenge the slight thus publicly put upon the national honour in the person of its ambassador; in the latter, by the clear evidence which it afforded of the impossibility of amicable terms being any longer preserved between the rival powers. Couriers, despatched the same night to every court in Europe, immediately made known generally the conflict that was approaching; and diplomacy was soon as active in endeavouring to contract alliances as military energy in forwarding warlike preparations. General Duroc was forthwith despatched by the First Consul to Berlin, and Colonel Colbert to St. Petersburg, to endeavour to rouse the Northern Powers to re-assert the principles of the armed neutrality, and join in the league against Great Britain; but these potentates had already concerted measures, on occasion of the meeting they had at Memel in the preceding year to settle the matter of German indemnities, and refused to interfere in the contest. At the same time, he put the army on the war footing; ordered the immediate levy of a hundred and twenty thousand men; re-enforced the troops both in Holland and Italy; declared Flushing and Antwerp in a state of siege; commenced the formation of the great arsenals which were afterward constructed in the Scheldt; hastened his naval preparations with the most incredible activity; and already directed those numerous corps to the shores of the Channel, which, under the name of the Army of England, were so seriously to menace the independence of Great Britain. The flame spread to every heart; patriotic feeling was roused to the highest pitch in France as well as in England; and never was war commenced with more cordial approbation on the part of the people of both countries.†

To these intemperate sallies on the part of the First Consul the British government contented itself with replying, through the medium of the minister for foreign affairs, "His majesty has the most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens should be executed in as complete a manner as possible; but it is impossible for him to consider that treaty as founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that, if that state of possession or engagement was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or

compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; and that, if ever there was a case in which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his majesty, but specially agreed to in a note by the French government, namely, that his majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the acquisition of territory made by France upon the Continent. The subsequent acquisitions made by France in various quarters, particularly in Italy, have extended the power and increased the territory of France; and therefore England would have been justified, consistently with the spirit of the treaty, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His majesty, however, would have been willing to have overlooked these acquisitions, for the sake of not disturbing the general peace of Europe, and would have acted up to the very letter of the article regarding the evacuation of Malta, when his attention was arrested by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani on Egypt, which discloses views utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the treaty of Amiens.*

Notwithstanding the hostile nature of these declarations, the negotiation was kept open for two months longer, ^{Ultimatum of both parties.} and had very nearly terminated by the English being permitted to retain Malta, on an indemnity being provided for France on the Continent. The British government proposed that Malta should be retained by England, and the knights indemnified; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops; Elba confirmed to France; the Italian and Ligurian republics recognised by England, with the kingdom of Etruria, upon a satisfactory indemnity being provided to the King of Sardinia. To this the French cabinet would not agree; and it was next proposed by the English ministers that "Great Britain should possess Malta for ten years; that the island of Lampedusa should be ceded in perpetuity to that power; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops, and the new Italian states recognised by England, on provisions in favour of Sardinia and Switzerland being contained in the treaty."† If these terms were not acceded to in seven days, the British ambassador was enjoined to demand his passports. Napoleon would only consent, on the other hand, that Malta should be placed in the power of Russia, Prussia, or Austria, upon their agreeing to it and becoming parties to the treaty of Amiens; but this the British cabinet declined, alleging that Russia, the only power deemed independent of France, had positively refused to be a party to any such arrangement.‡ As a last resource, and finding the British ambassador

* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1311, 1312.

† April 23, 1803. Lord Hawkesbury's Despatch.

‡ When this was first proposed to the Emperor Alexander, he answered that it would be ineffectual, as so considerable an island could not be the real object of content between the parties; but he afterward signified his readiness to accept the treaty, though it was then too late, as war was declared. The communication from the Russian ambassador, signifying the emperor's readiness to act as mediator, was dated 24th of May, and was not communicated to the English government till all diplomatic relations with France had ceased, by the declaration of war on the 16th of May preceding.—See BIGNON, iii., 73, 107, 108.

* Lord Whitworth's Despatch, Mar. 14, 1803. Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1210. Nov., ii., 249. Dum., ix., 163, 164.

† Dum., ix., 146. Nov., ii., 250.

resolute, Talleyrand suggested an arrangement by which Malta should be ceded in perpetuity to Great Britain, in return for a proper equivalent to France; but Lord Whitworth had no authority to enter into such an arrangement, which was one of exchange, instead of being indemnity and security; and Talleyrand positively refused to explain himself farther on the subject, or specify what equivalent France required. Lord

Whitworth, in consequence, demanded War is at length declared. 12th; letters of marque were issued by the British government on the 16th; General Andreossi, the French ambassador, embarked at Dover on the 18th of May; and the flames of a war were again lighted up, destined ere long to involve the whole world in conflagration.*

This declaration of war was immediately followed by an act as unnecessary as it was barbarous, and which contributed more, perhaps, than any other circumstance to produce that strong feeling of animosity against Napoleon which pervaded all classes of the English during the remainder of the contest. Two French vessels had been captured, under the English letters of marque, in the Bay of Audierne; and the First Consul made it a pretence for ordering the arrest of all the English then travelling in France between the ages of eighteen and sixty years. Under this savage decree, unprecedented Decree, May 22, 1803.

above ten thousand innocent individuals, who had repaired to France in pursuit of business, science, or amusement, on the faith of the law of nations, which never extended hostilities to persons in such circumstances, were at once thrown into prison, from whence great numbers of them were never liberated till the invasion of the allies in 1814. This severity was the more unpardonable, as the minister of foreign affairs had, a few days before, given the English at Paris assurances that they should be permitted to leave the kingdom without molestation; and numbers had, in consequence, declined to avail themselves of the means of evasion when in their power. No other authority than that of Napoleon himself is required to characterize this transaction. "Upon reading," says he, "the ironical and insolent answer made by the English government to my complaints, I despatched, in the middle of the night, an order to arrest over all France, and in all the territories occupied by our armies, the whole English, of whatever description, and retain them as hostages for our vessels, so unjustly seized. The greater part of these English were wealthy or noble persons, who were travelling for their amusement. The more novel the act was, the more flagrant its injustice, the more it answered my purpose. The clamour it raised was universal, and all the English addressed themselves to me; I referred them to their own government, telling them their fate depended on it alone."† In committing this unpardonable act, Napoleon hoped to bring under his power such a number of Englishmen of distinction as should compel the British government to yield to his terms; but he mistook the character of the people with whom he had to deal, and contributed only to the formation of that

inveterate spirit of hostility which mainly occasioned his overthrow.**

The renewal of the war was soon after the subject of important and animated Debates on the war in Parliament; but in the tone which pervaded the speeches of the opposition, it was manifested how materially the light in which the war was viewed by the Whig party had changed in the course of the contest, and how much the constant aggressions of Napoleon had alienated the minds of those who had hitherto shown themselves the staunchest enemies of the conduct of government in resisting the progress of the Revolution.

It was argued by Mr. Pitt, Mr. Canning, and Lord Hawkesbury, "that the first Arguments in great point on which the negotiation favour of it by turned was, whether there was such the ministers.

* Ann. Reg., 1803, p. 289. Dum., ix., 178. Bign., iii., 127, 128.

† Of the feelings with which this unjustifiable proceeding on the part of the First Consul was received, even by those of his generals who were most attached to his person and government, cited even in no better proof can be required than is furnished in the Duchess d'Angoulême's Memoirs, to whose husband's lot, as governor of Paris, it fell to carry the painful decree into execution in that city. He was sent for by the First Consul in the middle of the night, who put letters into his hands explaining the cruel measure which was in contemplation. His eyes flashed fire, his whole figure was trembling with agitation. "Junot," said he, "you must, before an hour elapses, take measures so that all the English, without one single exception, should be arrested. The Temple, the Force, the Abbé will hold them—they must be seized;" and with these words he struck the table violently with his fist. "This measure," said Napoleon, "must be executed at seven in the evening: I am resolved that in the obscure theatre, or lowest restaurateur in Paris, not an Englishman shall this night be seen." "My general," replied Junot, who, though at first stunned, soon recovered from his stupor, "you know not only my attachment to your person, but my absolute devotion to everything which concerns you. It is that devotion which induces me to hesitate at obeying your orders before imploring you to take a few hours to reflect on the measure which you have now commanded." Napoleon frowned: "Again," said he, "are we to have the scene of the other day over again? Even Duroc, with his quiet air, will soon come here to preach to me. By God, gentlemen, I will show you that I can make myself obeyed. Lannes has already experienced that; he will not find much to amuse himself with while eating oranges at Lisbon. Do not trust too far, Junot, to my friendship; from the moment that I conceive doubts as to yours, mine is gone." "My general," replied Junot, still undaunted, "it is not at the moment that I am giving you the strongest proof of my devotion that you should thus address me. Demand my blood, demand my life, I will surrender them without hesitation; but to ask a thing which must cover us with—" "Go on," cried Napoleon; "what is likely to happen to me, because I fling back on a faithless government the insults which it offered to me?" "It is not my part," said Junot, "to decide on the conduct which you should pursue. I am sure that when you come to yourself, and are no longer fascinated by those around you who impel you to violent measures, you will be of my opinion." "Of whom do you speak?" Junot made no answer; he knew what he would say, but his noble heart disdained to descend to the accusation of others.*

The pretence put forth by the French writers, that this unparalleled measure was justified by the capture of two French vessels in the Bay of Audierne before war was formally declared, is totally groundless. These vessels were seized on the 20th of May, eight days after the English ambassador had left Paris, and two after the French had sailed from Dover, that is, after hostilities had been openly announced between the two countries, and four after the issuing of letters of marque by the British government. To set up this, the first capture of the war, as an excuse for the severe and cruel measure adopted towards the private travellers, a class of men who universally have been allowed, in modern Europe, to retire unmolested upon hostilities breaking out, was a pretext as flimsy as the measure itself was unjustifiable and impolitic; and it was, in an especial manner, unseemly in a power which made such loud complaints of the enforcing of the ordinary rules of war in maritime affairs by the English cruisers.

* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1339, 1349. Lord Whitworth's Despatch, May 12, 1803. Bign., iii., 65, 75. Norv., ii., 250, 253. Dum., ix., 160, 177. † Nap. in Las Cas., vii., 32, 33.

* D'Abr., vi., 398, 403.

clear evidence of an intention, on the part of France, to resume its designs against Egypt as justified us in retaining Malta for our security? Now, on this point, the proof furnished by the conduct of the First Consul was decisive. The mission of Sebastiani to the Levant, which he himself admitted to Lord Whitworth was of a military character; the emphatic declaration which he made to that nobleman, that, sooner or later, Egypt must belong to France; and the information of the same intention, through the minister of foreign affairs, evidently proved that he had only suspended his designs against that country, and was resolved to renew them on the first favourable opportunity. This was a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of the treaty of Amiens, which expressly provided for the integrity of the Turkish Empire; and the time when he set out (Sept. 16) was important, as it entirely destroyed the pretence that he was sent to refute the statements in Sir Robert Wilson's work, which it is notorious was not published at that time. It is in vain to oppose to the inference clearly deduced from these circumstances the improbability that, if such had really been the designs of the French government, they would have so openly avowed them; for that has been uniformly the system of all the rulers of that state since the Revolution, and seems to be now a fixed principle of their policy, instead of carefully concealing any project likely to shock the feelings of mankind till the moment of its execution, to announce it publicly for a long period before, in order that the minds of men may be familiarized to its contemplation, and have come to regard it with indifference.

"If, then, the design against Egypt is apparent, can there be the smallest doubt that we are entitled, from the moment it is discovered, to take such measures of prevention and security as are sufficient to guard against the danger to which we are thus exposed? And if this be admitted, the justice of our retaining Malta, the outwork both of Egypt and India, is apparent. All military authorities are agreed upon the vast importance of that island; and among them we must place, in the very first rank, the First Consul himself, who has not only declared that he would rather see us in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine, but has evinced the sincerity of that declaration by preferring all the hazards of a war, which he was obviously anxious to avoid, to its relinquishment. England's interest in Malta is apparent, because it is a step on the road to India: whence the extraordinary anxiety of France for its acquisition, if not as a stage on the same journey for themselves? Consider, then, what would be our feelings, if, after all the warnings given us, we were now to surrender Malta out of our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to follow in six or twelve months afterward?

"The conduct of France on the Continent of Europe has been equally inconsistent with the maintenance of pacific relations. What shall we say to her arrogant interference in the matter of German indemnities, and arrangement of the share of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes, without the concurrence either of the emperor or the states interested in the maintenance of the equilibrium of the Empire? What of the unprovoked and tyrannical attack on Switzerland? What of the continued stay of French troops in Holland, in direct violation both of the treaty of Amiens and the subsequent conventions with the

Batavian Republic? The annexation of Piedmont, the severing of the Valais from Switzerland, the acquisition of Parma and Placentia, the new government imposed on the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics, the erection of the kingdom of Etruria, are so many steps towards supreme dominion over Italy, which may be already said to be in the hands of the French government. And are we, with such instances of disregard of treaties and insatiable ambition before our eyes, to permit him to make the same unresisted strides towards maritime which he has already made towards Continental supremacy?

"Add to this a still more glaring attack on our national independence, the clandestine sending of agents in the train of the French ambassador, with instructions to take soundings in our ports, and obtain information as to the military situation of all the provinces of the kingdom; and when the government of England applied to the French ambassador to have them removed, the First Consul manifested an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refusal, authorized emissaries, under the name of commercial agents, to prepare, in the midst of peace, the most effectual means for our annoyance and destruction in time of war. He has, at the same time, summoned us, in the most arrogant manner, to restrain the liberty of the press with reference to his government; in other words, to make an exception in favour of France of that general right to free discussion which is the birthright of Englishmen, and daily exercised against their own government and all the world besides. What are these acts but to require us to surrender at once our liberties and the means of national defence? And, not content with this, he requires us to banish the Bourbon princes, and transport the French emigrants to Canada; addressing thus the King of England as if he were the president of one of his newly-created republics, and requiring him to submit to the last indignity of the conquered, the necessity of betraying the unfortunate.

"We have tried the system of connexion with Europe for a century, and that of leaving the Continent to shift for itself for eighteen months, and we see what has been the result. Compare the rank and station to which we raised ourselves by our former policy, with that to which we have been fast descending by the prevalence of the latter. Weigh the insults which we have borne, the aggressions to which we have been exposed during this short period, against all the causes and provocations of war scattered over the face of the preceding century, and see if the former do not preponderate. We have found, then, and this, if nothing else, the experiment of the peace of Amiens has clearly proved, that a country, circumstanced as this is, cannot safely abjure a dignified policy, and abdicate its rank among nations; that with such a country, to be lowly is not to be sheltered, to be unpresuming is not necessarily to be safe. We may now see, by dear-bought experience, that our safety is necessarily linked with that of Continental Europe, and that a recurrence to our ancient and established policy is not only the most honourable, but the most prudent course which can be pursued.

"In these circumstances, nothing remains but to be prepared, collectively and individually, to meet, with courage and resignation, whatever difficulties it may be the will of Providence we

should encounter; to make such vigorous naval and military preparations as may not only be adequate to repel any attempt at invasion, but diffuse the most complete sense of security throughout the whole nation, and enter at once upon such a resolute and prospective system of finance, as may enable the people to contemplate, without apprehension, the maintenance of the war for as long a period as it has already lasted, and prevent its expenses, in the end, from being unnecessarily, perhaps intolerably, augmented.*

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Fox and Mr. Wilberforce, "that, how-
ever manifest it might be that the
opposition. First Consul cast a longing eye to Egypt, and coveted Malta as a stepping-stone to that country, still the question of peace or war did not depend on that circumstance. Was it not evident that from the very first he had fixed his affections on that fortress? and nothing has recently occurred to strengthen the conviction of every thinking man on that subject. But still seeing that, knowing that, we made peace, and stipulated for the surrender of Malta to a neutral power; and this was all that the security of our Eastern possessions required. This is what, by the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim; this is what we should have remained contented with. Malta, indeed, is a valuable possession; but the most valuable of all possessions is good faith. By claiming the sovereignty of Malta, instead of its independence, you take a ground which is barely tenable, and give your inveterate enemy an opportunity of misstating your real views, both to France and Europe, and charging this country with those projects of rapacity and monopoly by which it has been his incessant object to represent its councils as actuated.

"The language of Bonaparte, in the latter stages of the negotiation, affords reason to believe that he would have acquiesced in the independence of Malta, if not our retention of it for ten years; and this affords a reply to the argument that the surrender of Malta, on a declaration of war, was the only alternative left us. No; there was another alternative, the independence of Malta—that independence which, under the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim, and which would have secured Egypt and our Eastern possessions. Why were we so dilatory in availing ourselves of the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Russia? Whence the extraordinary haste, at the very close, to break off the negotiation, when it had taken a turn favourable beyond our most sanguine hopes—when the First Consul apparently was willing, rather than risk a war, to have ceded it to us in perpetuity, upon obtaining an equivalent, and the appearances of coercion being avoided?

"Undoubtedly you may interfere to prevent the aggrandizement of any Continental state upon the general principles of policy, which include prudence, and upon the first principle which governs nations as well as individuals, the principle of self-defence. Nay, you are authorized by the rank you hold, and I trust will ever hold in the scale of nations, to interfere and prevent injustice and oppression by a greater to a smaller power. But has the conduct of France since the peace been such as to call for the application of this principle? The system of German indemnities, indeed, was robbery, spoliation of the

weaker by the stronger power; but France has had no greater share in the general iniquity than other powers against whom we have made no complaint. To say that the emperor was injured by the arrangements made, is nothing to the purpose. Undoubtedly he was; but what else could be expected after the disasters of the war? Piedmont, at the time of the treaty of Amiens, was substantially a province of France; it was the twenty-seventh military division, and belonged to that power as effectually as Gibraltar to us. Whether it is expedient that it should belong to France, instead of being restored to the King of Sardinia, is a different question, which should have been settled, if it was meant to have been seriously agitated, at the treaty of Amiens. The violent interference with Switzerland no one can contemplate with more indignation than myself; but it was an act not particularly directed against this country, and which, how culpable soever, we were not called on to resist, if the powers more immediately interested looked on with indifference. The disgraceful treatment of Holland, in defiance alike of treaty and former services, is, indeed, one of the most atrocious acts on record; but we have allowed the proper season for complaining to go past, and by acquiescing in their injustice at the time, have precluded ourselves from making it the subject of re-creation afterward. The mutual abuse of the press is not to be classed with these serious subjects of complaint. Great and permanent as was the evil thereby occasioned, from the irritation which it perpetuated in the minds of the people of both countries, still it is not a fit subject for war; and both nations might properly be addressed in the advice which Homer put into the mouth of the Goddess of Wisdom, 'Put up your swords, and then abuse each other as long as you please.'

"The demand to send away the French refugees, however, can never be too strongly reprobated. To deny to any man, whatever be his condition or rank, the rights of hospitality for political principles, would be cowardly, cruel, and unworthy of the British character. The demand that we should send out of the country persons obnoxious to the government of France is made upon the most false and dangerous principles. The acquiescence of two such nations as England and France in such a system of international law would exterminate every asylum, not only to crime, but misfortune, on the face of the globe. To yield to such demands would be the height of baseness. No man has, politically speaking, less respect for the House of Bourbon nor a greater desire for peace than I have; but yet for that family, or the very worst prince it contains, if among them there should be a bad one, I should be willing to draw my sword and go to war rather than comply with a demand to withdraw a hospitality to which he had trusted. I say this with respect to persons against whom no crime is alleged; with respect to those who are accused, whether justly or unjustly, of a crime, I think some inquiry should be made into the grounds of the accusation, and the result, whatever it is, be publicly made known. This is a duty we owe, not only to France, but ourselves, for the hostility of a great and generous nation gives no countenance to crimes even against its worst enemies.

"As to the commercial commissioners, as it is apparent that they were in truth military men, and in effect no better than spies, it was a shame-

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi., 1387, 1396, 1430.

ful attempt to impose upon us for a most mischievous purpose; and therefore there was but one course to have pursued, namely, to have sent them immediately out of the country, and instantly applied to France for explanation and satisfaction for having sent them here under such colours and for such objects. But without doing either the one or the other, the question is, Was it a ground for going to war?

"Is Malta essential to Egypt? Is Egypt essential to India? Both propositions are more than doubtful. Great stress is laid upon the possession of the banks of the Nile as indispensable to our Eastern possessions; but is there any rational foundation for this opinion? Is it not rather the result of an overweening interest in that country, from the glorious triumphs to our arms of which it has recently been the theatre? feelings natural and praiseworthy if kept within due bounds, but not fit to be made the ground for determination in so momentous a question as that of peace and war. And let us beware lest, while crying out against the aggrandizement of France in Europe, we do not give them too good cause to recriminate upon us for our conduct in Asia,* and consider well whether, since the treaty of Amiens, we have not added more to our territories in the Mysore than France has done in the whole Continent put together."

The house divided, when 398 supported the address, approving of the war, and 67 voted against it. In the House of Lords the majority was still greater; 142 voting for the amendment and 10 against it.†

The altered tone of the opposition upon the war was very remarkable, and eminently characteristic of the change tone of the opposition. which, in the estimation even of its warmest opponents, the contest had undergone. There were no longer the fierce recriminations, the vehement condemnation of government, the loud accusations of leaguings with sovereigns in a crusade against the liberties of mankind, with which the chapel of St. Stephen had so long resounded when the subject was brought forward. France now had little of popular sympathy in any other country. She had lost the support of the Democratic party throughout Europe, and stood forth merely as a threatening and conquering military power. This change, though at the time little attended to, as all alterations which are gradual in their progress, was of the utmost moment, and deprived the contest, in its future stages, of the principal dangers with which it had at first been fraught. It was no longer a war of opinion on either side of the Channel. Democratic ambition did not now hail, in the triumphs of the French, the means of individual elevation. Aristocratic passion ceased to hope for this overthrow as paving the way to a restoration of the ancient order of things. The contest had changed its character; from being social it had become national. Not the maintenance of the Constitution, the coercion of the disaffected, the overthrow of the Jacobins was the object for which we fought; the preservation of the national independence, the vindication of the national honour was felt to be at stake. The painful schism which had so long divided the country was at an end. National success was looked upon with triumph and exultation by an immense majority of the people, with the exception of a few party leaders, who to the last re-

garded it with aversion. The war called forth the sympathies of almost all classes of citizens. The young, who had entered into life under its excitement, were unanimous in its support; and a contest which had commenced under more divided feelings than any recorded in the history of England, terminated with a degree of unanimity unprecedented in its long and glorious career.

Upon coolly reviewing the circumstances under which the contest was renewed, England was it is impossible to deny that the British government manifested a feverish anxiety to come to a rupture, and that, so far as the transactions between the two countries are concerned, they were the aggressors. The great stress laid on Sebastiani's mission to Egypt; the evasion of Russian mediation; the peremptory refusal to abandon Malta, even to a neutral power; the repeated demands by the English ambassador for his passports; the resolution at last not to treat, even on the footing of Malta being abandoned to England, are so many indications of a determined spirit of hostility, and a resolution, on one pretence or another, to put an end to amicable relations between the two countries.

On the other hand, the same impartiality requires it to be stated that the conduct of France to other states, and the language which the First Consul had begun to hold towards Great Britain herself, indicated a settled resolution of disregarding the stipulations of treaties, and the commencement of a system of intimidation inconsistent with the existence of any independent power. The stretches made by France over Europe during a period of profound peace, in defiance alike of express agreement and the regard due by the common law of nations to the independence of weaker powers, were such as to render any long-continued pacification out of the question. Pointing as the First Consul evidently did towards universal dominion, actuated as he plainly was by the principle that everything was allowable which was conducive to the interests or the grandeur of France, it was in vain to expect that he would long continue at peace with this country, the only obstacle that stood in his way in the prosecution of these intoxicating objects. If he had not hitherto engaged in open acts of hostility against us, it was only because he was not prepared for them, because peace was requisite to restore his marine and put his naval resources on a more respectable footing; but his language already showed his secret designs, and in his anxiety for supreme authority he spoke as if he had already acquired it. In these circumstances, it is of little consequence what was the ostensible cause of the rupture; the real ground of it was a well-founded distrust of the pacific intentions of the First Consul, or his ability to remain at peace even if he had been so inclined; a conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that he was preparing, at some future period, a desperate attack upon our independence, and that all which he now acquired would ere long be turned with consummate talent against it.

He himself has told us what he meant to have done, and unfolded the matured designs he had formed for our subjugation. It was no part of his plan to have gone to war in 1803, or exposed his infant navy to the risk of being swept from the ocean or blockaded in its harbours, before his sailors had acquired the experience requisite for

* Parl. Hist., xxvii., 1405, 1438, 1466.

† Parl. Hist., xxvii., 1491, 1514.

success in naval warfare. He intended to have remained at peace with England for six or eight years; to have built annually twenty or twenty-five ships of the line; immensely enlarged his ports and fortifications in Holland, the Scheldt, and the Channel; extended, in the interim, his dominion over all the lesser states in the Continent, and not unfurled the flag of defiance till he had from eighty to a hundred ships of the line at Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, manned by experienced seamen, to cover the embarkation of the invading army at Boulogne.* The immense docks which he excavated out of the granite of Cherbourg and the slime of the Scheldt, the vast arsenal of Antwerp, the capacious basin of Boulogne, were all preparations for the great design which he had in contemplation, and which no moderation or pacific disposition on the part of Great Britain, short of absolute submission, could possibly have averted. "When by these means," said he, "England came to wrestle hand to hand with France, and the advantage which she derived from her insular situation was at an end, she must necessarily have fallen. The nation which depends on a population of seventeen millions must in the end sink before one which commands the resources of forty."[†]

In forming a judgment on the propriety of the course adopted by England on this occasion, there are two considerations not generally attended to, which require to be kept steadily in view, arising as they do out of the whole conduct of the French government throughout the Revolutionary war.

The first is, that all the great stretches of pow-

* "I was resolved," said Napoleon, "to renew at Cherbourg the designs for the bourn the wonders of Egypt. I had already subjugation ready raised in the sea my pyramid. I of this country. I would also have had my Lake Mareotis. My great object was, to concentrate at Cherbourg all our maritime forces, and in time they would have been immense, in order to be able to deal out a grand stroke at the enemy. I was establishing my ground so as to bring the two nations, as it were, body to body. The ultimate issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium."

"The emperor had resolved upon a strictly defensive plan till the affairs of the Continent were finally settled, and his naval resources had accumulated to such a degree as to enable him to strike a decisive stroke. He ordered canals in Brittany, by the aid of which, in spite of the enemy, he could maintain an internal communication between Bordeaux, Rochefort, Nantes, Holland, Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest. He proposed to have at Flushing, or its neighbourhood, docks, which were to be capable of receiving the whole fleet of Antwerp, fully armed, from whence it could put to sea in twenty-four hours. He projected, near Boulogne, a dike similar to that at Cherbourg; and between Cherbourg and Brest, a roadstead like that of Pilsde Bois. Sailors were to be formed by exercising young conscripts in the roads, and performing gun-practice and other operations in the harbours. He intended to construct twenty or twenty-five ships of the line every year. At the end of six years he would have had 200 ships of the line, at the end of ten as many as 300. The affairs of the Continent being finished, he would have entered heart and soul into that project; he would have assembled the greater part of his forces on the coast from Corunna to the mouth of the Elbe, having the bulk on the shores of the Channel. All the resources of the two nations would thus have been called forth, and then he would either, he conceived, have subjected England by his moral ascendancy, or crushed it by his physical force. The English, alarmed, would have assembled for the defence of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Thames. Our three corps off Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp would have fallen on their central masses, while our wings turned them in Scotland and Ireland. Everything then would have depended on a decisive affair, and this was what Napoleon called his battle of Actium. 'We must have conquered,' said he repeatedly, 'when the two nations were opposed to each other, body to body, for we were forty millions and they only fifteen.'"—See LAS CASAS, *op.*, 8. 15.

[†] Nap. in Las Cas., v., 8, 14.

er during the whole contest were made by France in a period of peace; and that, great as were her military conquests, they were yet inferior to the strides which she made, in defiance of treaty, in the middle of the forced pacifications which followed her triumphs. During the peace of Campo Formio she conquered Switzerland, revolutionized Rome, and subjugated Naples. By the treaty of Luneville she was bound to allow the Helvetian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics to choose their own constitutions; but hardly was the ink of his signature dry when she established a government in these independent states, all entirely composed of her creatures, and incorporated Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia with her dominions. The peace of Presburg and Tilsit was immediately followed by the overthrow of her own allies, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, and the seating of brothers of Napoleon on the thrones of the first two of these kingdoms. The peace of Vienna, in 1809, was but a prelude to the incorporation of the Roman States, Holland, and Hamburg with the French dominions; and the treaty of Vienna, in 1805, was the immediate forerunner of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the conquest of Naples for his brother Joseph; in other words, the organization of half of Germany and the whole of Italy under the direction of the emperor.

Nor did the military strength of France, under the able direction of Napoleon, grow in a less formidable manner during every cessation of hostilities. Like blood in a plethoric patient, it accumulated fearfully during each interval of bleeding, and resistance to the malady became the more difficult the longer it was delayed. Down to 1800, Austria had maintained a protracted and doubtful contest with the Republic; but during the peace which followed, the military resources of France were so immensely increased that in the next war which ensued, in 1805, she was struck to the earth in a single campaign. The long repose of Germany which succeeded the treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was marked by such an extraordinary growth of the military strength of France as enabled it at the same time, in 1812, to maintain three hundred thousand men in Spain, and precipitate five hundred thousand on the Russian dominions. Continued hostility, however, in the end weakened this colossal power: the military resources of France rapidly declined during the fierce campaigns of 1812 and 1813; and at length the conqueror of Europe saw himself reduced, in the plains of Champagne, to the command of fifty thousand men. This effect of peace to France, so different from what is generally observed in conquering states, was the result of the complete overthrow of all pacific habits and pursuits during the Revolution; the rise of a generation, educated in no other principles but the burning desire for individual and national elevation, and the organization of these immense warlike resources by a man of unexampled civil and military talent. Napoleon felt this strongly. He had no alternative but continued advance or abandonment of the throne. "My conquests," said he, "were in no respect the result of ambition or the mania of dominion; they originated in a great design, or, rather, in necessity."^{*}

The second is, that Napoleon uniformly treat-

* Las. Cas., ii., 273.

Greatest stretches of power by France during his reign were always made in time of peace.

ed with the greatest severity the powers which had been most friendly and submissive to his will; and that acquiescence in his demands, and support of his interests, so far from being a ground to expect lenient, was the surest passport to vindictive measures; while he reserved all his favours for the rivals from whom he had experienced only the most determined hostility. Reversing the Roman maxim, his principle was,

"Parcere superbis, et debellare subjectos."

The object of this policy was, that he might strengthen himself by the forces of the weaker before he hazarded an encounter with the greater powers. Its steady prosecution was an important element in his unexampled success; its ultimate consequences the principal cause of his rapid decline.

Holland was the first power which submitted to the Republican arms. The inhabitants of its great towns hailed the soldiers of Pichegru as deliverers. Its government was rapidly revolutionized, and throughout the whole war stood faithfully by the fortunes of France; and it received in return a treatment so oppressive as to call forth the passionate censure of Mr. Fox in the British Parliament,* and induce a brother of Napoleon to abdicate the throne of that country, that he might not be implicated in such oppressive proceedings. Piedmont next submitted to the rising fortunes of Napoleon. After a campaign of fifteen days it opened its gates to the conqueror, and placed in his hands the keys of Italy; and in a few years after the King of Sardinia was stripped of all his Continental dominions, and the territories he had so early surrendered to France were annexed to the engrossing Republic. Spain was among the first of the allied powers which made a separate treaty with France; and for thirteen years afterward its treasures, its fleets, and its armies were at the disposal of Napoleon; and he rewarded it by the dethronement of its king and a six years' war fraught with unexampled horrors. Portugal at the first summons drew off from the alliance with England, and admitted the French eagles within the walls of Lisbon; and it received in return an announcement in the *Moniteur* that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. The pope submitted without a struggle to all the rapacious demands of the French government: the treasures, the monuments of art, one third of the dominions of the Church were successively yielded up: the Head of the Faithful condescended to travel to Fontainebleau to crown the Modern Charlemagne; and he was rewarded by a total confiscation of his dominions, and imprisonment for the remainder of his life. Venice maintained a neutrality of the utmost moment to France during the desperate struggle with Austria in 1796, when ten thousand even of Italian troops would have cast the balance against the rising fortunes of Napoleon; and he, in return for such inestimable services, instigated a revolt in its continental dominions, which afforded him a pretence for destroying its independence, and handing over its burning Democrats to the hated dominion of Austria. A majority of the Swiss fraternized with the Republicans, and called in the French forces in 1798; and in 1802 Switzerland

was deprived of its liberties, its government, and its independence. Prussia, by a selfish and unhappy policy, early withdrew from the alliance against France, and for ten years afterward maintained a neutrality which enabled that enterprising power to break down the bulwark of central Europe, the Austrian monarchy; and on the very first rupture he treated it with a degree of severity almost unparalleled in the annals of European conquest.

While such was the conduct of Napoleon to the states which had earliest submitted and most faithfully adhered to his fortunes, his lenity towards the powers which had boldly resisted and steadily defied his ambition was not less remarkable. Austria, after a desperate warfare of five years, received as the price of its pacification the Venetian territories, more than an equivalent for all it had lost in the Low Countries; and on occasion of every subsequent rupture, obtained terms so favourable as to excite the astonishment even of its own inhabitants; until at length a princess of the House of Hapsburg was elevated to the Revolutionary throne, and the continued hostility of twenty years rewarded by a large share of the conqueror's favour. Russia had twice engaged in fierce hostility against France; but the resentment of Napoleon did not make him forget his policy. He made the most flattering advances to Paul in 1800, and after the next struggle the treaty of Tilsit actually gave an accession of territory to that formidable rival. With England, his most inveterate and persevering enemy, he was ever ready to treat on terms of comparative equality. He surrendered valuable colonies of his allies at the peace of Amiens, and was inclined, in the last extremity, to have abandoned Malta rather than provoke a war with so dreaded a naval power when his own maritime preparations were only in their infancy. The inference to be drawn from these circumstances is, not that Napoleon towards the greater powers was actuated by a spirit of moderation, the reverse of what he evinced towards the lesser, for such a conclusion is at variance with the whole tenour of his life; but that his ambition in every instance was subordinate to his judgment, and that he studiously offered favourable terms to the states with whom he anticipated a doubtful encounter, till his preparations had rendered him master of their destinies. His long-continued favour to Prussia was but a prelude to the conquest of Jena and partition of Tilsit: his indulgence to Russia only a veil for his designs till the assembled forces of half of Europe were ready in 1812 to inundate its frontiers: his proffered amity to Great Britain, the lure which was to deceive the vigilance of its government till the Channel was studded with hostile fleets, and a coalition of all the maritime states had prepared a Leipsic of the deep for the naval power of England. Such being the evident design of the First Consul, as it has now been developed by time, and admitted by himself, there can be but one opinion among all impartial persons as to the absolute necessity of resuming hostilities, if not in 1803, at least at no distant period, and preventing that formidable increase of his resources during the interval of peace, which with him was ever but the prelude to a more formidable future attack, and might have deprived Great Britain of all the security which she enjoyed from her insular situation and long-established maritime superiority.

He meditated, in the end, a resistless attack on England.

* *Ante*, ii., p. 264.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES TO THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR.

MAY, 1803—DECEMBER, 1804.

ARGUMENT.

Great Preparations on both Sides for the Renewal of the War.

—Conquest of Hanover by the French.—A Convention is entered into by the Hanoverian Generals.—Violation of Neutral Rights by the French Generals.—They extend themselves through Southern Italy.—Declarations against English Commerce.—Immense Preparations in the Channel for the Invasion of Britain.—Works and Flotilla at Boulogne.—Description of the small Craft assembled.—Napoleon visits Antwerp, and orders immense Works there.—His Designs for the Invasion, and Measures to enforce Discipline in the Army on the Coast.—Humiliating Treaties agreed to by Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal.—Louisiana sold by France to America.—Vast Forces collected on the Channel by the Money thus gained.—Military Force and Finances of France.—Preparations of England to repel the Danger.—Number and Warlike Spirit of the Volunteers.—Naval Preparations.—Finances and New Taxes of the Year.—Proposal to fortify London.—Argument in favour of it by Mr. Pitt.—Napoleon's Opinion on the Subject.—Fresh Rebellion in Ireland.—Murder of the Lord Chief Justice in Dublin.—Execution of the Ringleaders.—Naval Events of the Year.—Defeat of Linois by the China Fleet.—Supplies and Finances for the Year 1804.—General Despondency which ensued in Britain, which is increased by the alarming Illness of the King.—All Eyes are in Consequence turned to Mr. Pitt.—Coalition against the Ministry, which falls, and Mr. Pitt becomes Prime Minister.—Vigorous Measures of Lord Melville for the Restoration of the Navy, and his admirable Civil Regulations for that Service.—Situation of Austria.—Statistical Details regarding that Monarchy.—Its Government and State Policy, and Jealousy of Prussia and Reliance on England.—Leading Statesmen at Vienna at this Period.—Rapid Growth of Prussia in Wealth and Numbers.—Court and Manners of Berlin.—Its State Policy and Diplomacy.—Foreign Policy.—Russia.—Its rapid Growth and steady System.—Statistics of the Empire and State of the Army.—Character and Manners of the Emperor Alexander.—His Differences with France, which lead to a Recall of the Russian Ambassador from Paris.—Napoleon gains over Prussia by hinting at its obtaining Hanover.—Immense Sensation excited by the Death of the Duke d'Enghien.—The French Government endeavours to effect a Set-off, by falsifying Mr. Drake's proceedings at Stuttgart.—Opinions of the Diplomatic Body at Paris on the Subject.—Warlike Note presented by D'Oubril, on the Part of Russia, to Napoleon.—Talleyrand's Answer.—Farther Memorial of Russia.—Pacific System of Austria.—Its Conduct at the Death of the Duke d'Enghien.—Recognises Napoleon's Imperial Title.—Temporizing Policy of Prussia.—Accession of Hardenberg to Power produces no external Change.—They remonstrate against the Seizure of Sir George Rumbold.—Hostile Dispositions of Sweden, which are taken Advantage of by Great Britain.—Extension of the French Power in Italy.—Internal Measures of Napoleon.—Splendid Fête at Boulogne.—His Vexation at the Defeat of his Flotilla in the midst of it.—General Rejoicings over France on this Occasion.—Disgraceful Adulation with which he was surrounded.—Vast Designs of the Emperor at Mayence for the Confederation of the Rhine.—His Coronation at Paris.—Ceremony at Notre Dame.—Result of the Appeal to the People on the Subject.—Distribution of Eagles to the Army.—Protest of Louis XVIII. against his Assumption of the Imperial Crown.—Splendour of the Imperial Court.—Napoleon refuses any Accession of Territory to the Holy See.—Origin of the Differences between England and Spain.—Secret Measures of Hostility by the latter Power.—Catastrophe which precipitated Hostilities, and at once brings on a War.—Spanish Manifesto.—Reply by England.—Argument against the Conduct of Government in Parliament.—Defence of it by Mr. Pitt, who is supported by Parliament.—Reflections on the Subject, and Particulars in which England appears to have been wrong.

THE recommencement of the war was followed by hostile preparations of unparalleled magnitude on both sides of the Channel. Never did the ancient rivalry of France and England break

forth with more vehemence, and never was the animosity of their respective governments more warmly supported by the patriotism and passions of the people. The French, accustomed to a long career of conquest, and considering themselves, on land at least, as invincible, burned with anxiety to join in mortal combat with their ancient and inveterate enemies; and anticipated, in the conquest of England, the removal of the last obstacle which stood between them and universal dominion. The English hurled back with indignation the defiance they had received, warmly resented the assertion of the First Consul that Great Britain could not contend single-handed with France, and invited the descendants of the conquerors of Hastings to measure their strength with those in whose veins the blood of the victors of Cressy and Azincour was yet fresh. Ancient glories, hereditary rivalry, were mingled with the recollection of recent wrongs and newly-won triumphs. The Republicans derided the military preparations of those who had fled before their arms in Holland and Flanders—anticipating in the conflagration of Portsmouth a glorious revenge for the fires of Toulon—and pointed to the career of William the Conqueror as that which was to be speedily followed by the First Consul. The English reverted to the glories of the Plantagenet reigns, and fired at the recital of ancient achievement; and referred with exultation to the sands of Egypt, as affording an earnest of the victories they were yet to obtain over the veteran arms of France. Both parties entered, heart and soul, into the contest; both anticipated a desperate and decisive struggle, but little did either foresee the disasters which were to be encountered or the triumphs that were to be won.

The first military operation of the French ruler was attended with rapid and easy success. Ten days after the hostile message of the King of England to the House of Commons, the French army on the frontiers of Hanover received orders to put itself in motion, and accomplish the reduction of that electorate. The force intrusted to Mortier on this occasion was twenty thousand men; and the Hanoverian troops, whose valour was well known, amounted to nearly sixteen thousand; but the preponderating multitudes with which it was well known the First Consul could follow up, if necessary, this advanced guard, rendered all attempts at resistance hopeless. Some measures of defence were, however, adopted; and the Duke of Cambridge, in an energetic proclamation, enjoined the immediate assemblage of the *levy en masse*, but the rapid advance of the French troops rendered all these efforts abortive. Count Walmoden made a gallant resistance at Borstell, on the shores of the Weser; but as there was no time for succours to arrive from England, and it was desirable not to involve that inconsiderable state in the horrors of a protracted and hopeless

Great preparations on both sides for the renewal of the war.

Conquest of Hanover by the French, May 26, 1803.

June 2, 1803.

struggle, a convention was wisely entered into two days afterward, at Suhlingen, by which it was stipulated that the Hanoverian army should retire with the honours of war, taking with them their field-artillery behind the Elbe, and not bear arms against France till exchanged during the remainder of the contest. The public stores in the arsenals, amounting to nearly 400 pieces of cannon and 30,000 muskets, fell into the hands of the French; but what they valued more were nineteen colours and sixteen standards, the trophies of the army of Prince Ferdinand during the Seven Years' War.*

The British government, upon being informed of these transactions, refused to ratify the capitulation, and loudly complained of the invasion of the German Confederation by this irruption, in defiance alike of the privileges of the Elector of Hanover as a Prince of the Empire, and the neutrality of his German states, which had been observed throughout all the late war, and was expressly provided for in the treaty of Luneville. The consequence was, that Walmoden was summoned by Mortier to resume hostilities or lay down his arms. The brave Germans declared they would rather perish than submit to such a degradation, and on the 27th hostilities recommenced along the whole line; but the contest was too obviously unequal to permit either party to come to extremities. The French abated somewhat from the rigour of their first terms. The Hanoverian army was dissolved; the soldiers disbanded and sent home for a year; the officers retained their side arms; those of the common men were given up to the civil authorities. The troops thus let loose afterward proved of essential service to the common cause. They were almost all received into the English service, and, under the name of the King's German Legion, were to be seen in every subsequent field of fame from Vimeira to Waterloo.†

In the course of this incursion the French armies set at naught the neutrality, not only of Hanover, but of all the lesser states in its vicinity. Mortier traversed without hesitation all the principalities, not merely which lay in his way on the road to Hanover, but many beyond that limit. Hamburg and Bremen were occupied, and the mouth of the Elbe and Weser closed against British merchandise. This uncalled-for aggression is not only of importance, as demonstrating the determination of the First Consul to admit of no neutrality in the contest which was commenced, but as unfolding the first germe of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which he mainly trusted afterward in his hostilities against Great Britain. Unaccustomed, however, as the European powers hitherto were to such instances of lordly usurpation, this violation of neutral rights excited a very great sensation. In the North especially the advance of the French standards to the Elbe, and the permanent occupation of the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen by the troops of that nation, awakened a most extraordinary jealousy. Russia openly expressed her discontent, and Austria and Prussia made representations on the subject to the cabinet of the Tuileries; while Denmark, more courageous, actually assembled an army of thirty thousand men in Holstein, to prevent the violation of the Danish

territory. But the emperor was too much depressed by his long-continued disasters—Prussia too deeply implicated in her infatuated alliance with France to resent openly this violation of the German Confederation—and Russia too far removed to take any active steps, when the powers more immediately interested did not feel themselves called on to come forward. Thus the jealousies of the North evaporated in a mere interchange of angry notes and diplomatic remonstrances; the troops of Denmark alone appeared in the field to assert the cause of European independence; too weak to contend with the Republican legions, they were compelled to retire into their cantonments, after being treated with insulting irony in the French journals;* and the North of Germany permanently fell under the dominion of France, from which it was only delivered, ten years after, by the disasters of the Russian campaign.†

Simultaneous with the conquest of Hanover by the French was the march of an army into the South of Italy, and occupation of the port of Tarentum by the Republican forces. St. Cyr received the command of the troops destined to this service, which were fourteen thousand strong; and on the 14th of May he addressed a proclamation to the soldiers, which was soon after followed by the invasion of the kingdom of Naples. They advanced forthwith to Tarentum, which, with its extensive fortifications and noble roadstead, again formed the outwork of France against the Eastern possessions of Great Britain. At the same time Tuscany was invaded, Leghorn was declared in a state of siege, and all the English merchandise found in that great seaport confiscated; the First Consul thus evincing that he was resolved to admit of no neutrality in a lesser state in the great contest which was approaching, and that, by a continued violation of the usages of war at least, he was resolved to compel a change in the code of naval hostility. As usual, all these troops were to be maintained and paid by the countries where they were quartered. The formal protest by the ephemeral King of Etruria against the military occupation of his dominions was hardly even noticed by the First Consul. In vain it was represented to him that the commerce and revenue of Tuscany were ruined by the measures of severity adopted towards the English merchandise; these considerations were as nothing, in his estimation, compared to the grand design which he had in contemplation of overturning the power of Great Britain. At the same time the island of Elba, intrusted to General Rucca, was put in the best state of defence; Corsica fortified at every accessible point, and ten thousand men laboured on the fortifications of Alexandria, the key, in Napoleon's estimation, to the whole peninsula. "I consider that fortress," said he, "as the possession of the whole of Italy: the rest is a matter of arms, that of political combination."‡

By an *arrêté* on the 23d of June, the First Consul formally commenced that virulent strife which he so long maintained against the English commerce. It declared "that no co-

Declarations against English commerce, June 23, 1803.

* Bign., iii., 129, 133. Ann. Reg., 1803, p. 326. Dum., ix., 204, 205.

† Dum., ix., 217, 220. Ann. Reg., 1803, 326.

* "The military mania," said the *Moniteur*, "is a strange passion to seize little princes."—BIGNON, iii., 139.

† Ann. Reg., 1803, 326, 327. Bign., iii., 138, 139. Dum., ix., 207, 208.

‡ Dum., x., 16, 27. Bign., iii., 140, 143. Bot., iv., 125, 139

lonial produce, and no merchandise coming directly from England, should be received into the ports of France; and that every such produce or merchandise should be confiscated.* Neutral vessels arriving in France were subjected to new and vexatious regulations, for the purpose of discovering from whence they had come;† and any vessel coming from, or which "had touched at a harbour of Great Britain," was declared liable to seizure.

But all these combinations, extensive as they were, sunk into insignificance compared to the gigantic preparations made on the shores of the Channel for the invasion of Great Britain.

Everything here conspired to rouse the First Consul to unheard-of exertion. By accumulating the principal part of his troops on the shores of the Channel, he fixed the attention and excited the alarm of Great Britain, furnished a brilliant object of expectation to his own subjects, and obtained a pretext for maintaining an immense army on foot, without exciting the jealousy of the other European powers; while, if they conceived the design of attacking France, he had always at hand a vast force ready organized capable of crushing them. Impelled by these different motives, he made the most extraordinary efforts to hasten the preparations for a descent on Great Britain. The official journals publicly announced his intention of putting himself at the head of the expedition, and called on all the departments to second the attempt. The public spirit of France, and the hereditary rivalry with which its inhabitants were animated against England, produced the most strenuous efforts to aid the government. A circular from the war office to the different towns and departments called on them to furnish voluntary aids to the great undertaking. "Every vessel," said the war minister, "shall bear the name of the town or district which has contributed the funds for its formation: the government will accept with gratitude everything, from a ship of the line to the smallest praam. If, by a movement as rapid as it is general, every department, every great town covers its dockyards with vessels, soon will the French army proceed to dictate laws to Great Britain, and establish the repose of Europe, the liberty and prosperity of commerce, on the only basis which can ensure their duration." Everywhere the people answered the appeal with acclamations, and soon every workshop on the coast was in activity from the Texel to Bayonne. Forts and batteries, constructed on every headland and accessible point of the shore, both secured the territory of the Republic from insult, and afforded protection to the small craft proceeding from the places of their construction to the general points of rendezvous: the departments vied with each other in patriotic gifts and offerings; that of the Upper Rhine contributed 300,000 francs (£12,000) for the construction of a vessel to bear its name; that of the Côte d'Or threw off at their own expense a hundred pieces of cannon to arm the flotilla; and Bourdeaux, albeit the first to suffer by the resumption of hostilities, manifested, in an energetic address, their cordial concurrence in the war. Such was the public spirit, even of those parts of the country which had been most convulsed during the Revolution, that Napoleon ventured upon the noble design of forming a

Vendéan legion, "all composed," to use his own words, "officers and soldiers, of those who have carried on war against us;" and its ranks were speedily filled by the remains of that unconquerable band.*

The object to be gained by all these preparations was to assemble, at a single point, a flotilla capable of transporting an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with its field and siege equipage, ammunition, stores, and horses; and at the same time to provide so formidable a covering naval force as might ensure its safe disembarkation, notwithstanding any resistance that could be opposed by the enemy. Such a project, the most gigantic to be attempted at sea of which history makes mention, required the assembling of very great means and no small share of fortune for its success; but it was within the range of possibility, and the combinations made for its accomplishment were among the most striking monuments of the extensive views and penetrating genius of the First Consul.

The harbour of Boulogne was taken as the central point for the assembling of the Works and vessels destined for the conveyance flotilla at Boulogne. Its capacious basin, enlarged and deepened by the labour of the soldiers, was protected by an enormous tower, constructed on a coral reef, amid incredible difficulties, from the action of the waves, and armed with heavy cannon capable of carrying to the distance of 2000 toises, while similar excavations extended the neighbouring ports of Etaples, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse. Every harbour, from Brest to the Texel, was rapidly filled with gunboats of different dimensions; the dockyards, the shipwrights, were universally put into activity; and as fast as the vessels were finished, they were sent round, under protection of the numerous batteries with which the coast abounded, to Cherbourg, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. The number and intrepidity of the British cruisers in the Channel rendered this a service both of difficulty and danger; but the First Consul was indefatigable, and by communicating his own incredible activity to all the persons in subordinate situations, at length made great progress in the assembling of naval forces within sight of the shores of Britain. No sooner were the English cruisers blown off their stations by contrary winds, than the telegraph announced the favourable opportunity to the different harbours; numerous vessels were speedily seen rounding the headlands and cautiously cruising along the shore, while the artillerymen, with lighted matches in their hands, stood at the frequent batteries with which it bristled, to open upon any ships of the enemy which might come within range in attempting to impede their passage. The small draught of water which the gunboats required enabled the greater part of them to escape untouched, and concentrate in the roads of Boulogne; but a considerable number were intercepted and destroyed by the British cruisers, and innumerable deeds of daring courage were performed, in too many of which valuable blood was shed in the attainment of a comparatively trifling object.†

* Bign., iii., 144. Norv., ii., 264. Dum., x., 33, 37.

† Dum., x., 38, 48. Bign., iii., 144, 145. Norv., ii., 261, 262.

‡ In this partisan warfare, Captain Owen, in the *Immortalité*, and Sir Sydney Smith, in the *Antelope*, particularly distinguished themselves.—See JAMES'S *Naval Hist.*, iii., 294, 346.

* Dum., x., 51, 52. Bign., iii., 142, 143.

The small craft assembled was of four different kinds, according to the weight of the small craft and species of the troops which assembled. They were intended to convey. The praams, or largest sort, carried each six four-and-twenty pounders, and were intended rather to protect the smaller vessels which conveyed the troops than to be employed in the transport themselves. The next class bore four twenty-four pounders and one howitzer; they were calculated to receive each from 150 to 200 men, and made flat-bottomed, in order to land them as near as possible to the shore. The third were armed each with two twenty-four pounders, and were capable of conveying eighty men each; while the smallest had a four-pounder at the poop and a bomb at the stern, and bore from forty to fifty men each. The artillery were intended to be embarked in the larger vessels, the cavalry in those of a medium size, the infantry in the smallest; and such was the discipline and organization of the troops destined for the expedition, that each man knew the vessel on board of which he was to embark; and experience proved that a hundred thousand men could find their places in less than half an hour.*

Upward of thirteen hundred vessels of this description were, in the course of the year 1803, collected at Boulogne and the adjoining harbours; but immense as these preparations were, it was not on them alone that the First Consul relied for the execution of his project. Innumerable transports were at the same time assembled, which, without being armed, were destined for the reception of the stores and ammunition of the army; and Napoleon himself proceeded to the coast, to hasten by his presence the preparations which were going forward, and judge with his own eyes of the measures which should be adopted. He visited all the material points in the maritime districts, inspected at Flushing the new docks and fortifications which had been commenced, and rapidly discerned in Antwerp the central point where the chief arsenal for the naval subjugation of England should be established. An *arrêt* of the 21st of July 1803. July directed that a dock should be there constructed, capable of containing twenty-five ships of the line and a proportional number of frigates and smaller vessels; and those immense works were immediately commenced which in a few years rendered this the greatest naval station on the Continent.† Not content

with the realities of that marvellous period, the minds of men, as usual in times of highly-wrought excitement, were inflamed by fictitious prodigies; and the announcement that, in excavating the harbour of Boulogne, a hatchet of the Roman legions and a medal of the Norman princes had been discovered, conveyed to the vivid imaginations of the French soldiers the happy omen that they were about to tread in the footsteps of Julius Cæsar and William the Conqueror.*

But these naval forces, great as they were, constituted but a part of those which were destined to be employed in the invasion of Great Britain. The whole fleets of France and Holland, and soon after Spain, were engaged in the mighty enterprise. The design of Napoleon, which he himself has pronounced to have been of the most profoundly conceived and nicely calculated which he ever formed, was to have assembled the fleet destined to compose the covering naval force at Martinique, by a junction of all the squadrons in the harbours of Spain and the Mediterranean in the West Indies; to have brought this combined fleet rapidly back to the Channel while the British blockading squadron were traversing the Atlantic in search of their enemies, raised the blockade of Rochefort and Brest, and entered the Channel with the whole armament, amounting to seventy sail of the line. It was under cover of this irresistible force that Napoleon calculated upon crossing over to England, at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with whom he thought he would reach London in five days, and where he intended instantly to proclaim parliamentary reform, the downfall of the oligarchy, and all the objects which the English Republicans had at heart. Numerous as were the chances against the successful issue of so vast a design, it will appear in the sequel how near it was succeeding, how little the English were aware of the danger which really threatened them, and with what signal ingratitude they treated the gallant officer whose important combat defeated the most profound combination that the genius of Napoleon ever formed for their destruction.†

But towards the success of this attempt a very great military as well as naval force was necessary, and the attention of the First Consul was early turned to the means of restoring the strength of that arm which the expedition of St. Domingo and detachments into Italy and Hanover had very much diminished. The sol-

pals reasons which induced me not to agree to peace at Châtillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded. France, without the frontiers of the Rhine and Antwerp, is nothing.* All the difficulties attendant on the situation were nothing in the eyes of Napoleon: in his impatience to make the English feel the dangers of the Scheldt, which they had themselves often signalized as so formidable, he was indefatigable; and in less than eight years Antwerp had become a maritime arsenal of first-rate importance, and contained a considerable fleet.† When Napoleon made these energetic remarks at St. Helena, he was far from anticipating that, in twelve years, a British squadron was to aid a French army to wrest this magnificent fortress from the ally of England, and restore it to the son-in-law of France and the sway of the tricolour flag!

* Bign., iii., 147, 149. Norv., ii., 263, 264. Dum., x., 77, 78.

† Nap. in Month., ii., 227. Jom., Vie de Nap., ii., 20, 21. Las Cas., ii., 277, 280.

* Las Cas., vii., 43, 44, 56, 57.

* Dum., x., 40, 45. Bign., iii., 145, 147.

† The opinion of Napoleon was repeatedly and strongly expressed as to the great importance of Antwerp as a naval station to France. "He often declared," says Las Casas, "that all he had done for Antwerp, great as it was, was nothing compared to what he intended to have done. By sea, he meant to have made it the point from whence a mortal stroke was to be launched against the enemy; by land, to have rendered it a certain place of refuge in case of disaster, a pivot of the national safety; he intended to have rendered it capable of receiving an army in case of defeat, and sustaining a whole year of open trenches. Already all the world admired the splendid works erected at Antwerp in so short a time—its numerous dockyards, magazines, and basins, 'but all that,' said the emperor, 'was nothing: it was only the commercial town; the military town was to be on the opposite bank of the Scheldt, where the ground was already purchased for its construction. There three-deckers were to have reposed, with all their guns on board, during the winter months; vast sheds were to have been constructed to shelter their huge bulk from the weather in peace; everything was determined on on the most gigantic scale. Antwerp was to me a province in itself. It is one of the great causes of my exile to St. Helena; for the cession of that fortress was one of the princi-

His design for the invasion.

And measures to enforce discipline in the army on the coast.

diers, long habituated to the excitement and plunder of war, had become weary of the monotony of a garrison or pacific life; discipline was sensibly relaxed, and desertion, especially among the old soldiers, had increased to an alarming extent. The most energetic measures were immediately taken to arrest this evil; new regulations introduced to ensure a rigid enforcement of the conscription, and the height requisite for the service lowered to five feet two inches: a decisive proof that the vast expenditure of human life in the preceding wars had already begun to exhaust the robust and vigorous part of the population. Such was the rigour with which the conscription laws were now enforced, that escape became hopeless; and the price of a substitute, which rose to the enormous sum of £500, rendered it totally impossible for the middling classes to avoid personal service. Napoleon was indefatigable on the subject. "Keep your eyes," said he to the minister of war, "incessantly fixed on the recruiting; let not a day pass without your attending to it; it is the greatest affair in the state." From necessity, then, not less than inclination, the military life became the sole object of ambition; and the proportion of the number drawn to that of the youth who were liable to serve each year was so great, that, for the remainder of his reign, it practically amounted to almost a total absorption of half, sometimes the whole, of the young men, as they rose to manhood, into the ranks of war.*†

Nor was Napoleon less solicitous, by means of foreign negotiations, to increase the disposable force which he could bring to bear against the common enemy. Ney, who had commanded in Switzerland, concluded a capitulation, by which sixteen thousand troops of that government were put at the disposal of France, and soon after placed in reserve of the army of England at Compeigne, while a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded between the two states, which stipulated that the Helvetic Confederacy should, in addition, if necessary, furnish eight thousand auxiliary troops to France; General Pino led an Italian division across the Alps, to form part of the same armament; while Angereau assembled a corps in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, to enforce the mandates of the consular government, if the courts of Madrid and Lisbon refused to conclude treaties on the footing of the orders sent out from the Tuileries. But there was no need for the precaution; terror and French influence were already paramount at both those capitals, and the seal was put to the disgrace of the Peninsula by the treaties concluded with Spain

Oct. 19, 1803. Portugal on the 19th of October, and with Portugal on the 25th of December. By the first of these conventions, an annual payment of six millions of francs (£240,000 a month, or £2,880,000 a year) was stipulated in favour of France, to be either remitted to Paris or employed in repairing the French ships of war in the Spanish harbours; several officers, holding

important situations in the Spanish army, were to be dismissed for alleged offences against the French government; many stipulations in favour of the export of French manufactures, and their transit into Portugal, were agreed to; and the Spanish government engaged to procure the payment of at least a million of francs (£40,000) a month by the Portuguese to the French government, as long as the maritime war lasted. By the second, Portugal purchased an exemption from actual hostilities by an annual payment of 16,000,000 francs (£640,000) to Napoleon. The conclusion of these treaties was a virtual declaration of war by both Spain and Portugal against Great Britain, since it placed the pecuniary resources of both countries at the disposal of France during the continuance of the contest. Bitterly did the people of the Peninsula subsequently lament their degradation, and nobly did they then wipe off the stain on their honour.*

No sooner, also, did the maritime war appear inevitable, than Napoleon concluded an arrangement with the United States of America, by which, in consideration of eighty millions of francs (£3,200,000), he ceded to them his whole rights, acquired by the convention with Spain, to Louisiana; anticipating thus, for a valuable consideration, the probable fate of a naval contest, and extricating from the hands of the British a valuable colonial possession, which would assuredly soon have become their prey.†

By these different means, Napoleon was enabled to put on foot a very large army for the invasion of Great Britain. An order addressed to the minister at war, on the 14th of June, 1803, fixed the organization of the army, which was divided into six corps, each of which was to occupy a separate camp and be under a different commander. Ney, Soult, Davoust, and Victor, were to be found among the names of the generals. It extended along the whole coast, from the Texel to the Pyrenees. The first camp was in Holland, the second at Ghent, the third at St. Omer, the fourth at Compeigne, the fifth at St. Malo, the sixth at Bayonne. The whole troops assembled at these different points were intended to exceed 150,000 men, and their command was intrusted to the most distinguished generals of the army. Though all included under the name of the army of England, their wide dissemination renders it probable that the First Consul had other objects in view besides the subjugation of Great Britain in their disposition; but the Continental powers shut their eyes to the danger which awaited them from the concentration of such powerful forces, and secretly rejoiced that the vast army from which they had all suffered so much was quietly cantoned at a distance from them on the shores of the ocean, intent on a distant and hazardous enterprise.‡

Great as these preparations were, they were not beyond the resources at the disposal of the First Consul. The arms and finances of France alone, without counting the subsidiary forces of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian states subject to its command, amounted to the enormous aggregate of above 420,000 men, independent of the national

Louisiana sold to America, April 30, 1803.

Vast force collected on the coast by the money thus gained.

Military force of France.

* Dum., x., 60, 72.

† It was calculated that 208,233 young men in the French Empire annually attained the age of 20, the period when liability to serve commenced. Thus the first conscription of 1798, which required 200,000 men who had that year attained that age, absorbed nearly the whole persons liable, and the drawing of lots became a vain formality. The conscription in 1803 was 120,000, and it was never less, generally much greater, during the remainder of the war.—DUMAS, x., 65.

* Norv., ii., 265, 266. Bign., iii., 200, 201, and 233

† Bign., iii., 169, 170.

‡ Jom., ii., 22. Dum., x., 89, 91.

and coast guards, which were above 200,000.* The finances of the country were in an equally flourishing condition. The revenue exceeded that of 1802, and amounted to 570,968,000 francs, or £23,000,000 sterling;† while the immense subsidies paid by Spain and Portugal as the price of their pretended neutrality—by the Italian Republic in return for the alliance of France—and the maintenance by Hanover, Holland, Naples, and Tuscany, of all the troops cantoned in their respective territories, largely contributed to the increase of the resources of the Republic.‡

But nothing was the government or people of England daunted by the formidable preparations which were directed against them. Relying on the patriotism and spirit of the people, the administration made the most vigorous efforts for the national defence, in which they were nobly seconded both by Parliament and the people. Independent of the militia, eighty thousand strong, which were called out on the 25th of March, and the regular army of 130,000 already voted, the House of Commons, on June 28th, agreed to the very unusual step of raising 50,000 men additional by drafting, in the proportion of 34,000 for England, 10,000 for Ireland, and 6000 for Scotland; which it was calculated would raise the regular troops in Great Britain to 112,000 men, besides a large surplus force for offensive operations. In addition to this, a bill was brought in shortly afterward, to enable the king to call on the levy *en masse* to repel the invasion of the enemy, and empowering the lord-lieutenants of the several counties to enrol all the men in the kingdom, between seventeen and fifty-five years of age, in different classes, who were to be divided into regiments according to their several ages and professions. But all persons were to be exempt from this conscription who were members of any volunteer corps approved of by his majesty; and, such was the general zeal and enthusiasm, that in a few weeks three hundred thousand men were enrolled, armed, and disciplined in the different parts of the kingdom, and the compulsory conscription fell to the ground. This immense force, which embraced all classes and professions of men, not only was of incalculable importance, by providing a powerful reserve of trained men to strengthen the ranks and supply the vacancies of the regular army, but contributed in a remarkable manner to produce a patriotic ardour and feeling of unanimity among the people, and lay the foundation of that military spirit which enabled Great Britain at length to appear as prin-

cipal in the contest, and beat down the power of France, even on that element where hitherto she had obtained such unexampled success.*

The spectacle now presented by the British Islands was unparalleled in their previous history, and marked decisively the arrival of a new era in the war, that in which popular sympathy was enlisted against the Revolution, and the military usurpations of France had roused a unanimous resolution to resist its aggression. In the multitudes who now thronged to the standards of their country were to be seen men of all ranks and descriptions, from the prince of the blood to the labourer of the soil. The merchant left his counting-house, the lawyer his briefs; the farmer paused in the labours of husbandry, the artisan in the toils of his handicraft; the nobleman hurried from the scene of dissipation or amusement, the country gentleman was to be seen at the head of his tenantry. Everywhere were to be seen uniforms, squadrons, battalions; the clang of artillery was heard in the streets, the trampling of cavalry resounded in the fields. Instead of the peasant reposing at sunset in front of his cottage, he was to be seen hurrying, with his musket on his shoulder, to his rallying-point; instead of the nobleman wasting his youth in the ignoble pleasures of the metropolis, he was to be found inhaling a nobler spirit amid the ranks of his rural dependants. In the general tumult even the voice of faction was stilled; the heart-burnings and divisions on the origin of the war were forgotten; the Whigs stood beside the Tories in the ranks of the volunteers; from being a war of opinion, the contest had become one of nations, and, excepting in a few inveterate leaders of party in the Legislature, one feeling seemed to pervade the whole British Empire.† Mr. Sheridan, with that independent and patriotic spirit which ever distinguished him, at the close of the session made an eloquent speech on moving the thanks of Parliament to the volunteers and yeomanry for the zeal and alacrity with which they had come forward in defence of their country; and thunders of applause shook the house when he declared it to be the unalterable resolution, not less of the Legislature than the government, that “no proposal for peace should be entertained while a single French soldier had footing on British ground.”‡

Nor was it at land only that preparations to resist the enemy on the most gigantic scale were made: the navy also, the peculiar arm of British strength, received the early and vigilant attention of government. Fifty thousand seamen, including twelve thousand marines, had been in the first instance voted for the service of the year; but ten thousand additional were granted when it became probable that war would ensue, and forty thousand more when it actually broke out. Great activity was exerted in fitting out adequate fleets for all the important naval stations the moment that hostilities were resumed, although the dilapidated state of the navy, in consequence of previous ill-judged economy, rendered it a matter of ex-

* The army consisted of,

Infantry.....	341,000
Artillery.....	26,000
Cavalry.....	46,350
Invalids.....	14,500
	427,910

See Report of the Minister at War, June, 1803. DUMAS, ix., 117.

† The Budget for 1803 stood thus:

	Francs.	
Direct contributions.....	305,105,000	or £12,200,000
Registers, stamps, &c.....	200,106,000	or 8,420,000
Customs.....	36,924,000	or 1,500,000
Postoffice.....	11,200,000	or 600,000
Salt-tax.....	2,300,000	or 92,000
Lottery.....	15,326,000	or 950,000
	570,968,000	or £23,062,000

—See DUKE DE GAETA, i., 364.

The annual subsidy paid by the Italian Republic was 25,000,000 francs, or £1,000,000 sterling.—DUMAS, xi., 134.

‡ BIGN., iii., 245, 246.

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* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1604, 1627, 1630.

† The king reviewed in Hyde Park, in October, sixty bat talions of volunteers, amounting to 27,000 men, besides 1500 cavalry, all equipped at their own expense, and in a remarkable state of efficiency. The total volunteers of the metropolis were 46,000.

‡ Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1694, 1697. Dum., x., 136.

treble difficulty. Seventy-five ships of the line, and two hundred and seventy frigates and smaller vessels, were put in commission. The harbours of France and Holland were closely blockaded; Lord Nelson rode triumphant in the Mediterranean; and, excepting when their small craft were stealing round the headlands to the general rendezvous at Boulogne, the flag of France, at least in large fleets, disappeared from the ocean.*

No small efforts in finance were required to meet these extensive armaments by sea and land; but the resources of the country enabled government to defray them without difficulty. A property-tax of 5 per cent., which it was calculated would produce £4,500,000 yearly; additional customs to the amount of £2,000,000 a year; additional excise, chiefly on malt spirits and wine, which were estimated at £6,000,000; and a loan of £12,000,000, were sufficient to enable government to meet the heavy expenses attendant on the renewal of the war, even on the extended scale on which it was now undertaken. These burdens, especially the income and malt taxes, were severe, but they were universally felt to be necessary; and such was the general enthusiasm, that the imposition of war taxes in a single year to the amount of twelve millions and a half did not excite a single dissident voice in Parliament, or produce any dissatisfaction in the country.†

A long and interesting debate took place in Mr. Pitt's Parliament upon the question whether London should be fortified. Colonel Crawford urged strongly the great danger of the capital and the principal depot for our military and naval stores being wholly undefended; and maintained that, as matters then stood, the loss of a single battle might draw

after it the surrender of the metropolis and chief arsenals of the kingdom, the effect of which, both in a political and military point of view, would be incalculable. Mr. Pitt added the great weight of his authority on the same side, and strongly enforced the propriety, not only of strengthening the metropolis, or at least the arsenals in its vicinity, but fortifying the principal headlands of the coast, in order to render landing by the enemy more difficult. "It is in vain to say," said he, "you should not fortify London because our ancestors did not fortify it, unless you can show that they were in the same situation that we are. We might as well be told that, because our ancestors fought with arrows and lances, we ought to use them now, and consider shields and corslets as affording a secure defence against musketry and artillery. If the fortification of the capital can add to the security of the country, I think it ought to be done. If, by the erection of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between the safety and destruction of the capital. It will not, I admit, make a difference between the conquest and independence of the country, for that will not depend upon one nor upon ten battles; but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives, with misery, havoc, and desolation spread over the country on the one hand, or the confounding the efforts and chastising the insolence of the enemy on the other."‡ These arguments were little attended to at the time, and the proposed measure was not adopted; but there can be no doubt that they were well founded, and that England might have had bitter cause to regret their neglect, if Napoleon, with a hundred thousand men, had landed on the coast of Sussex. For this opinion we have now abundant grounds, in the result of the invasions of Austria, Russia, and France, at a subsequent period, when possessed of much greater military resources than were then at the command of the British government, and the best of all authority in the recorded opinion of Napoleon himself. Central fortifications near or around the metropolis are of incalculable importance, in order to gain time for the distant strength of the kingdom to assemble when it is suddenly assailed; if they had existed on Montmartre and Belleville, the invasion of the allies in 1814, instead of terminating in the submission of France, would probably have led to a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine; and he is a bold man who on such a subject ventures to dissent from the concurring opinion of Mr. Pitt and Napoleon.†

* James, vol. iii., Table No. 12. Ann. Reg., 1803, 621. App. to Chronicle.

† Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1595.

‡ The new taxes imposed were,

1. Customs.

Twenty per cent. additional on sugar, &c., imported	£1,300,000
Duty of one per cent. on exports	460,000
One penny a lb. on cotton wool	250,000
Tonnage additional	150,000

2. Excise.

Fifteen per cent. on the lower, and 45 per cent. on higher teas	£1,300,000
Additional duty of ten pounds a pipe on wine	500,000
Twenty per cent. on spirits	1,500,000
Two shillings additional on malt	2,700,000

3. Property.

Five per cent. on income and property	6,000,000
	4,500,000

In all

The income and expenditure of the year stood as follows:

EXPENDITURE.

Navy	£10,211,378
Army	8,935,753
Militia, &c.	2,689,976
Ordnance	1,128,913
Miscellaneous	5,440,441
Grant to National Debt	200,000
Exchequer Bills	10,150,456
	£38,956,917
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded	20,699,864
Sinking fund	£59,656,783
	6,494,000
	£66,150,783

INCOME.

Total income from taxes	£38,609,392
Loan	12,000,000
Raised by Exchequer bills	20,481,000
	£71,090,392

—See Ann. Reg., 1803, 631, et seq.; Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1595; and PORTER'S Parl. Tables, i., 1.

* Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1659, 1662.

† "Napoleon says he frequently turned in his mind the propriety of fortifying Paris and Lyons; and Napoleon's opinion on this in an especial manner occurred to him on the subject. On occasion of his return from the campaign of Austerlitz. Fear of exciting alarm among the inhabitants, and the events which succeeded each other with such astonishing rapidity, prevented him from carrying his designs into execution. He thought that a great capital is the country of the flower of the nation; that it is the centre of opinion, the general depot; and that it is the greatest of all contradictions to leave a point of such importance without the means of immediate defence. At the season of great national disasters, empires frequently stand in need of soldiers, but men are never wanting for internal defence, if a place be provided where their energies can be brought into action. Fifty thousand national guards, with three thousand gunners, will defend a fortified capital against an army of 300,000 men. The same fifty thousand men in the open field, if they are not experienced soldiers commanded by skilled officers, will be thrown into confusion by the charge of a few thousand horse. Paris, ten times in its former history, owed its safety to its walls; if in 1814 it

This year was again distinguished by one of those unhappy attempts at rebellion which have so frequently of late years disgraced the history and blasted the prospects of Ireland. Though the country was disturbed by the usual amount of predial violence and outrage, no insurrection of a political nature was apprehended, when suddenly, on the 14th of July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, unequivocal symptoms of a fermentation of a more general character were observed in the population of Dublin. It was soon discovered that a conspiracy was on foot, the object of which was to force the castle and harbour stores of the capital, dissolve the connexion with England, and establish a republic in close alliance with France; but the means at the disposal of the conspirators were as deficient as the objects they had in view were visionary and extravagant. Eighty or a hundred persons, under the guidance of Emmett, a brother of the chief who was engaged in the former insurrection, a young man of an ardent and enthusiastic temperament, proposed, on the 23d of July, to assemble in open rebellion the peasantry from the adjoining countries, who were for that purpose to flock into the metropolis, under pretence of seeking for work in hay-making, on the eve of the festival of St. James; and with that motley array they were to march against a garrison consisting of above four thousand men. In effect, on the day appointed the country labourers did assemble in vast numbers in St. James's-street as soon as it was dark, and Emmett put himself at their head; but he soon discovered that the insurgents were rather disposed to gratify their appetite for assassination and murder, than engage in any systematic operations for the subversion of the government. In vain he and a few other leaders, animated with sincere though deluded patriotic feeling, endeavoured to infuse some order into their ranks, and lead them against the castle and other important points of the city: instead of doing so, they murdered Lord Kilwarden, the venerable lord-chief justice of Ireland, and Colonel Browne, a most worthy and meritorious officer, whom they met in the streets; and, equally incapable of resolute as humane conduct, were shortly after dispersed by two volleys from a subaltern and fifty men, who unexpectedly came on the rear of their savage and disorderly columns.*

The fate of the lord-chief-justice was peculiarly deplorable. He arrived at the entrance of Thomas-street in his carriage, accompanied by his daughter and nephew, when the chariot was stopped, the chief-justice and his nephew dragged out and murdered by repeated stabs from the ruffians, who struggled with each other

had possessed a citadel capable of holding out only for eight days, the destinies of the world would have been changed. If in 1805 Vienna had been fortified, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the war; if in 1806 Berlin had been fortified, the army beaten at Jena might have rallied there till the Russian army advanced to its relief; if in 1808 Madrid had been fortified, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, and Somosierra, could never have ventured to march upon that capital, leaving the English army in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, in its rear.[†] Let not the English imagine that their present naval superiority renders these observations inapplicable to their capital: it was after the victory of Austerlitz that the necessity of fortifying Paris occurred to the victor in that memorable fight. Who will guaranty the navy of England in all future times against a maritime crusade, and a rout of Leipsic at the mouth of the Thames?—See NAPOLEON in MONTHOLON, ii., 278, 280.

* Ann. Reg., 1803, 300, 312.

for the gratification of striking them with their pikes, while the young lady, whom they had the humanity to spare, fled in a state bordering on distraction through the streets, and arrived at the castle in such agitation as to be hardly capable of recounting the tragic event which she had witnessed. A by-stander, shocked at the savage ferocity of the murderers, exclaimed that the assassins should be executed next day; but the words recalled his recollection to the upright dying magistrate, and he raised his head for the last time to exclaim, "Murder must be punished; but let no man suffer for my death, but on a fair trial, and by the laws of his country," and immediately expired. Memorable words to be uttered at such a moment by such a man, and eminently descriptive of that love of impartial justice which constitutes at once the first duty of a judge and the noblest epitaph on his sepulchre.*

Emmett and Russell, the two leaders of the insurrection, were soon after seized, Execution brought to trial, and executed. The of the ring-former made no sort of defence, but, leaders.

when called upon to receive sentence, stood up and avowed the treason with which he was charged, glorying in his patriotic intentions, and declaring himself a martyr to the independence and liberties of his country. At his execution he evinced uncommon intrepidity and composure, received the communion of the Church of England, and died the victim of sincere but deluded patriotism. The remaining conspirators were pardoned, upon making a full disclosure of their projects and preparations, by the judicious lenity of government, and a bill was shortly after brought in for the better suppression of insurrection, and the temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland, which passed both houses without any opposition.†

A frantic and unsuccessful attempt at the assassination of the king was made, in the same year, by Colonel Despard, a revolutionist of the most dangerous character, who was tried, condemned, and executed.

Notwithstanding the magnitude of the preparations on both sides, the naval operations of the first year of the war were inconsiderable. The French fleets were not yet in such a state of forwardness as to be able to leave their harbours in large masses, and the closeness of the British blockade prevented any considerable number of detached vessels from escaping. As usual, the effects of the English maritime superiority speedily appeared in the successive capture of the enemy's colonies. St. Lucia and Tobago fell into their hands in July, and Demerara, July 17. Berbice, and Essequibo in September. Sept. 12 The planters in these sugar islands willingly yielded to the British forces, anticipating from them protection from their own slaves, whom the events in St. Domingo and Gaudaloupe had given them so much reason to dread, and a share in that lucrative commerce which, under the British flag, they could carry on with every part of the world, and which the almost total cessation of production in the French islands had thrown almost exclusively into their hands. Some angry disputes broke out in this year between the British government and the lo-

Naval events of the year.

* Ann. Reg., 1803, 311, 312.

† Parl. Hist., xxxvi., 1671, 1675.

cal Legislature in Jamaica, in consequence of the refusal of the latter to contribute the requisite supplies to the support of the large military garrison of the island;* but they gradually gave way in the following years, in consequence of the advantageous market for their produce which the war afforded them, and the approach of real danger from the combined fleets of France and Spain.

The first gleam of success came from the Defeat of Li- Eastern Ocean, and, what was re- moins by the markable, from the merchant-ships China fleet. of England. Immediately after war was declared, Admiral Linois, with one sail of the line and three frigates, escaped from the Roads of Pondicherry, in consequence of the British admiral on that station being ignorant of the commencement of hostilities; and since that time he had cruised about in the Indian Archipelago, capturing detached ships, and doing considerable damage to British commerce. Imboldened by this success, he lay in wait for the homeward bound China fleet, which he expected would prove an easy prey. On the 14th of February he descried the fleet leisurely approaching, in no expectation of encountering an enemy, and anticipated little opposition; but Commodore Dance, who commanded the British vessels, by a bold and gallant manœuvre defeated his efforts, and, to his infinite honour, saved the Feb. 15th, valuable property under his command 1804. from destruction. Dismissing the heavily-laden and weaker vessels to the rear, he made the signal for the stronger and better equipped to bear down in succession upon the enemy; and so intimidated was the French admiral by this gallant bearing and vigorous fire, that after a few broadsides he took to flight, and was pursued for above two hours by his commercial victors! This gallant action, which confounded the enemy and saved British property to the amount of a million and a half sterling, excited the greatest satisfaction throughout the nation.† Rewards were distributed with an unsparing hand by the East India Company to the various commanders and their brave crews, and the commodore received the honour of knighthood from his majesty's hands.

Various attacks were made in the course of the summer on the Boulogne flotilla and the squadrons of small craft proceeding to that destination; but, although the utmost gallantry was uniformly displayed by the officers and men engaged, the success obtained was in general very trifling, and bore no proportion to the loss sustained by the assailants. The only conquest worthy of record made by the British, either at sea or land, during the year 1804, was that of Surinam in the West Indies, which, in the beginning of May, yielded, to the great joy of the inhabitants, to a military and naval force under the command of Sir Charles Green and Commodore, afterward Sir Samuel Hood; on which occasion, also, a frigate and brig fell into the hands of the victors.‡

The supplies voted by Parliament for the service and vice of the year 1804 were much finances for greater than for the preceding year, 1804. and the military and naval force kept on foot far more considerable.§ The expendi-

ture swelled, independent of the charges of the debt, to no less than £53,000,000, of which £42,000,000 was for the current expenditure, and £11,000,000 for retiring of Exchequer bills. The land-troops of the year amounted, including 22,000 in India, to above 300,000 men, exclusive of 340,000 volunteers: an enormous force, capable, if properly directed, not only of repelling any attempt at invasion, but interposing with decisive effect in any strife which might take place between France and the great military powers of the Continent.*† The naval forces, also, were very considerably augmented, there being no less than 100,000 men, including 22,000 marines, voted for the service of the year, and 83 ships of the line and 390 frigates, and smaller vessels in commission.

But the magnitude of their forces, compared with the inconsiderable amount of the services rendered by them to the country, ere long revealed the secret which ensued weakness of the administration. It in Britain. was in vain to disguise from the country that the public expenditure could not long continue at the enormous height which it had now reached, and that, unless some advantages commensurate to the sacrifices made were gained, the nation must in the end sink under the weight of its fruitless exertions. To the animation, excitement, and hope which generally prevailed at the commencement of the war, had succeeded the listlessness, exhaustion, and discontent which invariably, after a certain interval, follow highly-wrought and disappointed feeling. The trifling nature of the success which had been gained, notwithstanding such costly efforts, during the first year of the contest, produced a very general conviction that

<i>Expenditure.</i>	
Navy.....	£12,350,574
Army.....	12,993,000
Militia, &c.....	6,159,000
Ordnance.....	3,737,000
Miscellaneous.....	4,217,000
Extra do.....	2,500,000
Exchequer Bills.....	11,000,000
Civil List.....	591,000
Additional do.....	60,000
	£53,607,574
Interest of Debt, funded and unfunded...	20,726,772
Sinking Fund.....	6,436,000
	£81,772,346

<i>Ways and Means.</i>	
War Taxes.....	£15,440,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund.....	5,000,000
Malt Duty additional.....	750,000
Duty on Pensions, &c.....	2,000,000
Lottery.....	250,000
Surplus of 1803.....	1,370,000
Loan, England.....	10,000,000
Do. Ireland.....	4,500,000
Exchequer Bills.....	14,000,000
Annuities Loan.....	1,150,000
Permanent Revenue, minus surplus of }	25,365,000
Consolidated Fund.....	£79,825,000

—See *Parl. Deb.*, ii., 351, 355, and *App.*, 35, and *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, 584. *App. to Chron.*

* *James*, iii., *App.*, Table 13. *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, 577. *App. to Chron.* *Parl. Deb.*, ii., 351, 355.

† This force was distributed as follows:

In the British Isles.....	129,039
Colonies.....	36,630
India.....	22,897
Recruiting.....	533
Militia in Great Britain.....	109,947
Regulars and Militia.....	301,046
Volunteers in Great Britain.....	347,000
Total in Great Britain.....	648,046
Irish Volunteers.....	70,000
Grand Total.....	718,046

—See *Parl. Deb.*, i., 1678, and *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, 19.

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, p. 2. *Bign.*, iii., 158.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, 141, and *Chron.*, 409. *Dum.*, xi., 64, 66, 69.

‡ *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, 138, 139.

§ The receipt and expenditure of the year 1804 stood as follows:

ministers, whatever their individual respectability or talents might be, were unequal as a body to the task of steering the vessel of the state through the shoals and quicksands with which it was surrounded; and, in particular, did not possess that weight and eminence in the estimation of foreign states, which was necessary to enable Great Britain to take up her appropriate station as the leader of the general confederacy, which it was now evident was alone capable of reducing the Continental power of France. This feeling was strongly increased by the complaints which generally broke out as to the reduced and inefficient state of the navy under the management of Earl St. Vincent; and it soon became painfully evident, from a comparison of the vessels in commission at the close of the former and commencement of the present war, that this important arm of the public defence had declined to a very great degree during the interval of peace; and that, under the delusion of a wretched, and in the end most costly economy, the stores on which the public salvation depended had been sold and dissipated to an extent in the highest degree alarming. The consequence was, that when war broke out the navy was in an unprecedented state of dilapidation; and from the absence of convoys for our merchant fleets, and the neglect to appraise Admiral Rainier and the fleets in the East of the breaking out of hostilities by an overland despatch, many severe losses, which might have been avoided, were sustained by the commercial interests.*†

The public despondency, already strongly excited by these untoward events, was increased by the alarming illness of the king. The alarming intelligence which spread abroad as to the health of the king. On the 14th of February, it was publicly announced by a bulletin at St. James's Palace that his majesty was indisposed, and a succession of similar notices soon left no doubt in the public mind that the disease was that mental malady which had plunged the nation fifteen years before in such general consternation. On this occasion the panic was still greater, from the alarming posture of public affairs, and the general distrust which prevailed as to the stability and capacity of the administration. But after an interval of a few weeks it was announced that the most distressing symptoms had abated. On the 29th of February the chancellor of the Exchequer declared in Parliament "that there was no necessary suspension of the royal functions." On the 14th of March the lord-chancellor stated in the House of Lords that "he had since conversed

with his majesty, and that his mental state warranted the Lords Commissioners in expressing the royal assent to several bills which had passed through Parliament;" and on the 9th and 18th of May the king drove, to the infinite joy of the inhabitants, through the principal streets of the metropolis, though it was several months afterwards before he was restored to his domestic circle, or able to go through the whole functions of royalty.*

But during this interval of doubt and alarm the minds of the great majority of All eyes are men throughout the nation became turned to Mr. convinced of the necessity of placing Pitt.

the helm of the state under firmer guidance, and all eyes were naturally turned to that illustrious statesman who had retired only to make way for a pacific administration, and could now, in strict accordance with his uniform principles, resume the direction of the second war with revolutionary France. As usual in such cases, the gradual approximation of parties in the House of Commons indicated the conversion of the public mind, and it soon became evident that the administration was approaching its dissolution. On the 15th of March matters came to a crisis. Mr. Pitt made a long and elaborate speech, in the course of which he commented with great severity on the maladministration of the royal navy under the present government, and concluded with moving for returns of all the ships in commission in 1793, 1801, and 1803. He was cordially supported by Mr. Fox and Mr. Coalition

Sheridan, and it became evident that against the a coalition had taken place between ministry. the Whig and Tory branches of the opposition. The motion was lost by a majority of 70, there being 130 for it and 200 against it. But, from the character and weight of the men who had voted, it was evident that the ministry were rapidly sinking, and that they only retained office till their successors could be appointed, which the unhappy condition of the king rendered a doubtful period.† In effect, their majority went on continually declining; and on the 25th of April, in a question on the army of reserve, it was only 37. It was now openly stated by ministers that they only held office during the continuance of a delicate state of public affairs, and the opposition, seeing their object gained, suspended all farther attacks till the king's health was restored; and on the 12th of May, the day after he had appeared in public, it was formally announced in the House of Lords that ministers had resigned, and their successors had been appointed.‡

It was at first expected that a coalition was to be formed as the basis of the new Mr. Pitt becomes Prime administration; but it was soon discovered, both that there was an irreconcilable difference between the opinions of the leaders of the different parties on the chief subjects of policy, and also that there were scruples in the royal breast against the admission of Mr. Fox, which rendered his accession to the cabinet nearly impracticable. The new ministry, therefore, was formed exclusively of Tories, and a majority of it was composed of members of the late cabinet. The material changes were, that Mr. Pitt was First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in room of Mr. Addington; Lord Melville First Lord of the Ad-

* Ann. Reg., 1804, 129, 131.

† Mr. Addington boasted during the peace that, if war broke out, fifty ships of the line could be equipped in a month; but when this declaration came to be put to the test, it was discovered that the royal arsenals were almost emptied, and everything sold requisite for the naval defence of the country. Even the men-of-war on the stocks at the close of the contest had been left imperfect, and the hands employed upon them dismissed. In the general penury which prevailed, neither vessels could be procured for the king's squadrons, nor convoys provided for the merchant-service. When the Royal Message was delivered to Parliament, on the 8th March, 1803, there was hardly a ship of war either ready or in a state of forwardness, and the greatest aversion to the public service pervaded every department of the navy. The consequence was, that, notwithstanding the utmost efforts to repair the ruinous economy and dilapidations of the two preceding years, the ships in commission on the 5th of January, 1804, were only 356, of which 75 were of the line, whereas in the commencement of 1801 the number was 472, of which 100 were of the line. — See Ann. Reg., 1804, 130, 131, and JAMES's *Naval Hist.*, iii., Tables No. 9 and 13.

* Ann. Reg., 1804, 27, 29. † Parl. Deb., i., 866, 937.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1804, 80, 84. Parl. Deb., i., 319, 409.

miralty, in room of Earl St. Vincent; and Lord Harrowby Foreign Secretary, in lieu of Lord Hawkesbury.* Lord Grenville, the able and faithful supporter of Mr. Pitt during the former war, declined to take office, assigning as a reason that it was formed on too narrow a basis, at a time when the public dangers called for a co-alition of all the leading men in the state, to give vigour and unanimity to the national councils; an opinion in which he was joined by a great proportion of the men of moderate principles throughout the country. Although Mr. Pitt probably judged rightly in constructing his cabinet entirely of men of his own principles, as experience has proved that no individual talent, how great soever,† can withstand the loss of character consequent on an abandonment of principle, and therefore that coalition administrations have seldom any long existence.

The vigour and decision of Mr. Pitt's councils speedily appeared in the confederacy which he formed of the Continental States, on the greatest scale, to stem the progress of French ambition. Nor was the ability and energy of Lord Melville less conspicuous in the rapid restoration of the navy from a state of unexampled decrepitude and decay to a degree of exaltation and lustre unprecedented even in its long and glorious annals. Everything was to be done; for such was the mutilated and shattered state of the fleet, and to such an extent had the spirit of parsimonious reform been carried, that when stores and timber were offered at comparatively moderate terms, they were refused by the late admiralty, and suffered to be sold to the agents of the country, rather than deviate from their pernicious economy, even in the purchase of those articles which were in daily consumption. The consequence was, that Lord Melville was compelled to accept the offers of timber, stores, and masts, at whatever price the contractors chose to demand; and the savings of one naval administration entailed a quadruple expenditure upon that which succeeded it. But, by strenuous exertions and at an enormous cost, the defects were at length made up; the deficiencies were supplied by the purchase of East India vessels, and by contracting for the repairs of others; and the old practice of building prospectively for the service of future years, which had been abandoned in the fervour of ill-judged economy, was again resumed with the very best effects to the public service. The results of the admirable vigour and efficiency which the new First Lord of the Admiralty introduced into every branch of the civil department of the navy were soon conspicuous. Instead of 356 vessels, including 75 of the line, which alone were in commission in the beginning of 1804, there were 473, including 83 of the line, ready for sea in the beginning of 1805; eighty vessels of war, including twenty-six of the

line, were, in a few months, far advanced on the stocks; and the navy was already afloat which was destined to carry the thunder of the British arms to the shoals of Trafalgar.*

Nor was the conduct of Lord Melville less beneficial in the civil regulations introduced for the increase of the comfort and health of the sailors. Many admirable practical improvements were established; many experienced evils removed; the wives of absent seamen allowed to draw a certain proportion of their wages during their absence at the nearest harbour to their places of residence; many abuses in the food, clothing, and pay of the men corrected; and the foundation laid of that excellent system of management which is ultimately, it is to be hoped, destined to wipe the stain of impressment, with all its concomitant evils, from the British Constitution. The merits of the new admiralty on these subjects, however, were neither generally known to, nor appreciated by, the country. In hostile projects they were for the first year of their administration by no means fortunate. From unacquaintance with nautical subjects, they lent too credulous ears to the designs of visionary projectors: repeated unsuccessful attacks on the French flotilla tarnished the reputation of the navy, and the total failure of an attempt to blow it up by means of infernal machines called catamarans, exposed it to the ridicule of all Europe.†

Before detailing the political combinations by which Mr. Pitt again resuscitated the torpid spirit of the coalition, and brought Russia and Austria, and eventually Prussia, into the great contest of European independence, a slight survey of the political situation and resources of these great military monarchies, henceforth principals in the strife, is indispensable.

Before the commencement of the Revolutionary war, the revenues of Austria, which in 1770 amounted to 90,000,000 of florins (£8,000,000), had risen by the acquisitions made in Poland and elsewhere to 106,000,000, or £9,800,000. During the war its revenue was increased by the imposition of several new taxes; and it sustained no diminution by the peace of Campo Formio, the Venetian States proving more than a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries. At the peace of Luneville, the income of government amounted to 115,000,000 florins, or £10,000,000 sterling, a sum equal to at least twenty-five millions sterling in Great Britain; and with this revenue, which was the clear receipt of the treasury, independent of the expense of collection and several provincial charges, they were able to maintain an army of 300,000 men, including 50,000 magnificent cavalry. Like most of the other European states, Austria had been compelled, during the difficulties of former years, to have recourse to a paper currency; and the Bank of Vienna, established by Maria Theresa in 1762, was the organ by which this was effected. It was not, however, a paper circulation, convertible at pleasure into gold, but a system of assignats, possessing a forced legal currency; and government, in 1797, passed a regulation prohibiting any person from demanding exchange in coin for more than twen-

Situation of Austria. Statistical details regarding that monarchy.

* The new cabinet stood thus:

Mr. Pitt, Premier.
Duke of Portland, President of the Council.
Lord Eldon, Lord-Chancellor.
Earl of Westmoreland, Privy Seal.
Earl of Chatham, Master-general of the Ordnance.
Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control.
Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.
Lord Harrowby, Foreign Affairs.
Earl of Camden, War and the Colonies.
Lord Mulgrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

† Lord Grenville's Letter to Mr. Pitt, Ann. Reg., 1804, 123, 125.

* James, iii., App., No. 12, 13. Ann. Reg., 1804, 137.

† Ann. Reg., 1804, 141, 143. Dum., xi., 26, 51.

ty-five florins, or two pounds sterling. During the course of the war silver and gold almost entirely disappeared from circulation, and paper billets for two and three shillings were in general circulation. A considerable portion of the smaller currency was in brass, which was issued at double its intrinsic value; and besides this, there were obligations of various sorts of the government to foreign provinces, bankers, and states. The debt, in all, was 200,000,000 florins (£10,000,000) in 1789; but at the conclusion of the war, in 1801, it amounted to triple that sum. The treasury had been reduced to the necessity of paying the interest in paper currency, and even compelling forced loans from its own subjects.*

The policy of Austria, like that of all other countries which are governed by a landed aristocracy, is steady, consistent, and ambitious. It never loses sight of its objects: yields when it cannot resist, but prepares in silence the means of future elevation. In no other monarchy is the personal cost of the court so inconsiderable; a great expenditure is neither required to uphold the influence of the crown nor overshadow the lustre of the nobility. The disposal of all the situations in the army and civil administration, which are at least as numerous, renders the influence of government irresistible, and enables the archdukes and imperial family, without injury to their authority, to live rather with the simplicity of private citizens than the extravagance of princes of the blood in other countries. In no part of Europe is the practical administration of government more gentle and paternal than in the hereditary states; but in the recently-acquired provinces the weight of authority is more severely felt, and many subjects of local complaint have long existed in the Italian and Hungarian dominions. The population of the Empire, at the peace of Luneville in 1801, was 27,600,000; and they have given ample proof, in the glorious efforts of subsequent times, both of the courageous and patriotic spirit by which they are animated, and the heroic sacrifices of which they are capable.†

Jealousy of Prussia was, during the years which followed the treaty of Luneville, the leading principle of the Austrian cabinet; a feeling which originated in the aggression and conquests of the great Frederic, and had been much increased by the impolitic, and ungenerous advantage which the court of Berlin took of the distresses and dangers of the Austrian monarchy, to extend, by an alliance with France, their possessions and influence in the North of Germany. Europe had too much cause to lament this unhappy division, the result of a selfish and shortsighted policy on the part of the Prussian government, which, in their rivalry of the emperor, made them shut their eyes to the enormous danger of French ambition till incalculable calamities had been inflicted on both monarchies, and they were brought to the verge of destruction by the overthrow at Jena. Though compelled frequently to withdraw from the alliance with England, they never ceased to look to it as the main pillar of the confederacy for the independence of Europe, and reverted to the cabinet of London on every occa-

sion when they took up arms, in the perfect confidence that they would not apply for aid in vain. The natural inclination of the imperial cabinet was to lean for Continental support on the Russian power; and although this tendency was considerably weakened by the part which the cabinet of St. Petersburg took with Prussia in arranging the matter of German indemnities, yet this temporary estrangement soon disappeared upon the arrival of more pressing dangers, and they were to be seen contending side by side, with heroic constancy, on the field of Austerlitz.*

The leading persons in the administration of Vienna at this period were the Count Cobentzell, vice-chancellor of state, and Count Colloredo, a cabinet minister, and intimate friend of the emperor. The Archduke Charles, whose great military abilities had procured for him a European reputation, was at the head of the war department, but the powers of government were really in the hands of Cobentzell and Colloredo, and an unworthy jealousy prevailed of the hero who had more than once proved the saviour of Germany. A young man, afterward celebrated in the most important transactions of Europe, M. DE METTERNICH, had already made himself distinguished by his eminent talents in political affairs, but he had not yet risen to any of the great offices. The general policy of the Austrian cabinet at this period was reserve and caution; the Empire had bled profusely from the wounds of former wars, and required years of repose to regain its strength and recruit its finances; but the principles which governed its secret resolutions were unchangeable, and it was well known to all the statesmen of Europe that, in any coalition which might be formed to restrain the ambition of France, Austria, if success appeared feasible, would bear a prominent part.†

Immense was the difference, at this period, between the system of government of Austria and Prussia. Though the latter monarchy, in reality, only dated from the reign of Frederic the Great, yet during the short period which had since elapsed it had made unexampled progress. The treasure, indeed, amassed by that great warrior and able prince had been wholly dissipated during the succeeding reign, but both under his sway and that of his successor Frederic William, the monarchy had made important advances in territory, wealth, and population. By withdrawing from the alliance against France in 1794, the cabinet of Berlin had succeeded in appropriating to itself a large portion of the spoils of Poland, while the open preference to French interests which they evinced for the ten years which followed the treaty of Bâle was rewarded by a considerable share of the indemnities; in other words, of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the Empire: and a most important increase of influence, by the place assigned to Prussia as the protector of the neutral leagues beyond a fixed line in the North of Germany. During this long period of pacification the industry and population of the country had rapidly increased; a large portion of the commerce of Germany had fallen into its hands, and the whirl and expenditure of war, so desolating to

* Raymond and Roth, Stat. de l'Autrich., ii., 274, 285. Bign., ii., 270, 273.

† Bign., ii., 270, 274.

* Bign., ii., 275, 276.

† Bign., ii., 263, 267. Dum., xi., 23, 27.

other states, was felt only as increasing the demand for agricultural produce, or augmenting the profits of neutral navigation.*

At the death of the Great Frederic in 1786, the population of the monarchy was 7,000,000 of souls, and its revenue 31,000,000 thalers, or about £4,500,000 sterling. By the shares obtained of Poland, on occasion of its successive dismemberments, and the acquisition of Anspach, Bayreuth, and other districts, its population was raised to 9,000,000; and although the treasure of 70,000,000 thalers (£10,000,000), left by the great Frederic, had disappeared, and been converted into a debt of 28,000,000 thalers, or £4,100,000, yet this was compensated by the increase of the revenue, which had risen to 36,000,000 thalers, or £5,000,000. Various establishments had been set on foot at Berlin, eminently calculated to promote the interests both of commerce and agriculture. In particular, a bank and society of commerce were established in that capital, and institutions formed in the provinces to lend money to the landed proprietors on reasonable terms. By the aid of these establishments, and the effect of long-continued peace and prosperity, the finances of the state were in the most flourishing condition in 1804: all the branches of the public service provided for by the current revenue, and even a considerable progress made in the reduction of the debt. The large share of the German indemnities obtained through French and Russian influence by this aspiring power, made a considerable addition to the public resources: the acquisition of 526,000 souls raised the population to 9,500,000 souls, and the increase of 2,375,000 thalers yearly revenue swelled the income of the public treasury to 38,375,000 thalers, or £6,000,000 sterling; a sum equivalent, from the value of money, to at least ten millions sterling in Great Britain. This revenue, as in Austria, was the net receipt of the exchequer, and independent, not merely of the expenses of collection, but of various local charges in the different provinces. The regular army was nearly 200,000 strong, brave, and highly disciplined, but not to be compared to the French, either in the experience and skill of the officers, or in the moral energy which had been developed by the events of the Revolution.†

The Prussian capital was one of the most agreeable and least expensive in Europe. No rigid etiquette, no impassable line of demarcation separated the court from the people; the royal family lived on terms of friendly equality, not only with the nobility, but the leading inhabitants of Berlin. An easy demeanour, a total absence of aristocratic pride, an entire absence of extravagance or parade, distinguished all the parties given at court, at which the king and queen mingled on terms of perfect equality with their subjects. Many ladies of rank, both at Paris and London, spent larger sums annually on their dress than the Queen of Prussia: none equalled her in dignity and grace of manner, and the elevated sentiments with which she was inspired. Admiration of her beauty and attachment to her person formed one of the strongest feelings of the Prussian monarchy; and nothing contributed more to produce that profound irritation at France, which in the latter years of the war pervaded all classes

of its inhabitants, than the harshness and injustice with which Napoleon, to whom chivalrous feelings were unknown, treated, in the days of her misfortune, that captivating and high-spirited princess.*

A spirit of economy, order, and wisdom pervaded all the internal arrangements of the state. The cabinet, led at that period by Haugwitz, but in which the great abilities of Hardenberg and Stein soon obtained an ascendancy, was one of the ablest in Europe. Its diplomatists, inferior to none in information, penetration, and address, had long given to Prussia a degree of influence at foreign courts beyond what could have been expected from the resources and weight of the monarchy. The army, drawn from the robust rural population, and supported by the admirable system of limited service, was in effect a military school, in which the whole inhabitants were trained to the use of arms, and could be rendered available in periods of danger to the public defence. In no other of the great powers of Europe were the expenses of government so moderate, or the state capable, in proportion to its numbers, of bringing so great a number of men into the field; and though no restraint recognised in theory existed upon the authority of the sovereign, the wisdom and justice of the administration in every department left few just causes of complaint to the people.†

The established principles of the Prussian cabinet, under the direction of Haugwitz, ever since the peace of Bâle in 1795, had been to keep aloof from the dangers of war, and take advantage, as far as possible, of the distresses of their neighbours to augment the territory and resources of the monarchy. From a mistaken idea of present interest, not less than the influence of former rivalry with Austria, they inclined to the alliance with France, and derived great temporary benefits from the union, both in the accessions of territory which they received out of the ecclesiastical estates of the Empire, and the increase of importance which they acquired as the head of the defensive league of the north of Germany. Little did they imagine, however, in what a terrible catastrophe that policy was to terminate, or anticipate, as the reward of their long friendship, a severity of treatment to which Austria and England were strangers, even after years of inveterate and perilous hostility. The interview at Memel in 1802, and the open support given by Russia to the Prussian claims in the matter of the indemnities, had already laid the foundation of an intimate personal friendship between Frederic William and the Emperor Alexander; but it was as yet rather an alliance of policy than affection, and had not acquired the warmth which it afterward received at the tomb of the Great Frederic, and on the field of Leipsic.‡

Russia, under the benignant rule of Alexander, was daily advancing in wealth, power, and prosperity. That illustrious prince, whose disposition was naturally inclined to exalted feeling, had been bred in the exercise of benevolent affections by his tutor, Colonel La Harpe, a Swiss by birth and a philanthropist by character, under whose instructions he had learned to appreciate the glorious career which lay before him,

* Hard., v., and vi., 379, 247, 249. Bign., ii., 291, 292.

† Bign., ii., 293, 297.

* Bign., ii., 297, 299.

† Hard., vi., 407, 411. Bign., ii., 299, 301.

‡ Binn., ii., 300, 301. Hard., vi., 401, 407.

in the improvement, instruction, and elevation of his people. From the very commencement of his reign his acts had breathed this benevolent spirit: the punishment of the knout, the use of torture had been abolished; valuable rights given to several classes of citizens; improvements introduced into the civil and criminal code; slavery banished from the royal domains; and the first germe of representative institutions introduced, by permitting to the senate, conservators of the laws, the right of remonstrance against their introduction. But these wise and philanthropic improvements, which daily made the Czar more the object of adoration to his subjects, only rendered Russia more formidable to the powers of Western Europe; the policy of the cabinet of St. Petersburg was unchanged and unchangeable: domineering ascendancy over Turkey and Persia, predominant influence in the European monarchies, formed the continued object of its ambition, and in the contests and divisions of other powers too many opportunities occurred of carrying their designs into execution. For above a century past Russia has continually advanced, and never once receded; victorious or vanquished, its opponents are ever glad to purchase a respite from its hostility by the cession of territory; unlike the ephemeral empires of Alexander or Napoleon, its frontiers have slowly and steadily enlarged. Civilization marches in the rear of conquest, and consolidates the acquisitions which power has made; its population, doubling every sixty years, is daily rendering it more formidable to the adjoining states; and its limits, to all human appearance, are not destined to recede till it has subjected all Central Asia to its rule, and established the Cross in undisturbed sovereignty on the dome of St. Sophia and the minarets of Jerusalem.*

At the conclusion of the reign of Peter the Great, in 1725, the population of the Empire was about twenty millions, June 18, 1834. and its revenue 13,000,000 silver rubles, or £3,200,000 sterling: in 1787 its numbers had swelled to 28,000,000, and its revenue risen to 40,000,000 rubles, or £9,000,000: in 1804 its inhabitants were no less than 36,000,000, and its revenue about 50,000,000 silver rubles, or £12,000,000: a sum equivalent to at least double that sum in France, and triple its amount, at that period, in Great Britain.† The greater part of the revenue was derived from the capitation-tax, a species of impost common to all nations in a certain stage of civilization, where slavery is general, and the wealth of each proprietor is nearly in proportion to the number of agricultural labourers on his estate. It amounted to five rubles for each freeman and two for each serf, and was paid by every subject of the Empire, whether free or enslaved. Customs and excise, especially on spirituous liquors—the object of universal desire in cold climates—produced a large sum: the duties on the latter articles alone brought in annually 30,000,000 paper rubles, or £3,000,000, into the public treasury. But notwithstanding this considerable revenue, and the high value of money in that compara-

tively infant state, the expenses of government, which necessarily embraced a considerable naval as well as military establishment, were so great, that they were barely equal to the protection of its vast territory; and experience has demonstrated that, without large foreign subsidies, Russia is unable to bring any great force into the central parts of Europe. The army, raised by conscription, at the rate of ^{And state of the army.} so many in each hundred of the male population, amounted nominally to above 300,000 men; but, from the vast extent of territory which they had to defend, it was a matter of great difficulty to assemble any considerable force at one point, especially at a distance from the frontiers of the Empire; and in the wars of 1805 and 1807, Russia never could bring above 70,000 men into any one field of battle. In no state of Europe is the difference so great between the amount of an army as it appears on paper and the actual force which it can bring into the field; and a commander in general can assemble round his standard little more than half of what the gazettes announce as being at his disposal. Drawn, however, from the agricultural population, its soldiers were extremely formidable, both from the native strength and the enduring courage which they possessed. The slightest physical defect was sufficient to cause the proffered serf to be rejected; and though they embraced the military life with reluctance, and left their homes amid loud lamentations, they soon attached themselves to their colours, and undertook with undaunted resolution any service, how perilous soever, on which they might be sent. The commissariat was wretched; the hospital service still miserably defective; but the artillery, though cumbrous, was numerous and admirably served, and the quality of the troops almost unrivalled. Accustomed to hardships from their infancy, they bivouacked without tents in the snow in the coldest weather, and subsisted without murmuring on a fare so scanty that the English soldiers would have thought themselves starved on it. Fed, clothed, and lodged by government, the pay of the infantry only amounted to half a guinea, that of the Cossacks eight and sixpence, a year; but such was the patriotic ardour and national enthusiasm of the people, that even on this inconsiderable pittance they were animated with the highest spirit, and hardly ever were known to desert to the enemy. The meanest soldier was impressed with the belief that Russia was ultimately to conquer the world, and that the commands of the Czar in the prosecution of that great work must invariably be obeyed. When Benningsen retired towards Königsberg, in the campaign of 1807, and sought to elude the enemy by forced marches during the long nights of a Polish winter, the Russian murmur at retreat was so imposingly audacious, although ninety thousand men thundered in close pursuit, that the general was compelled to soothe their dissatisfaction by announcing that he was marching towards a chosen field of battle. The disorder consequent on six days of continued famine and suffering instantly ceased, and joyous acclamations rent the sky when they received the command to halt, and the lines were formed, with parade precision, amid the icy lakes and drifted snow of Preussisch Eylau.*†

* Tooke's Russia, ii., 124, 147. Bign., ii., 278, 280

† The revenue actually paid was 120,000,000 rubles; but, from the great emission of paper money bearing a legal currency subsequent to 1787, the value of the ruble had fallen to half of what it was in its original silver standard, and it was worth no more than half a crown English money.—BIGNON, ii., 282.

* Wilson's Polish Campaign, i., 31. Bign., ii., 282, 285.

† "Comrades, go not forward into the trenches; you will be lost!" cried a retiring party to an advancing detachment, "the enemy are already in possession." "Prince Potemkin

Enthusiastically beloved by his subjects, Alexander had, immediately on his accession to the throne, abolished the custom of alighting from the carriage when the royal equipages were met, which had excited so much discontent under his tyrannical predecessor; but the respect of his subjects induced them to continue the practice, and, to avoid such a mark of Oriental servitude, he was in the habit of driving about, without guards, in a private chariot. Married early in life to the beautiful Princess Elizabeth of Baden, he soon became an indifferent husband, but constantly kept up the external appearances of decorum, and remained throughout an attached friend to that princess. More tender cords united him to the Countess Narishkin, a Polish lady of extraordinary fascination, gifted with all the grace and powers of conversation for which the women of rank in that country are, beyond any other in Europe, distinguished; and to her influence his marked regard for the Polish nation through life is, in a great degree, to be ascribed. Immediately upon his accession to the throne, he was compelled to select his ministers from the party which placed him there; and Pahlen, Pain, and Woronzow were his first advisers. But, though attached from the outset to England, to whose influence he owed his elevation, he was sincere in his admiration for the First Consul, and, still directed by the angry feelings of 1799, entered warmly into the French project of elevating Prussia, at the expense of Austria, in the division of the German indemnities. A species of prophetic sympathy united him to Frederic William, who had ascended the throne about the same age, and only shortly before himself; and this was soon ripened into a sincere attachment, from their interview at Memel in the summer of 1803, and contributed not a little to determine the subsequent course of events on the great theatre of Europe.*

Notwithstanding, however, the high admiration which Alexander felt for Napoleon, and the open support which he had given to his policy in the matter of the German indemnities, events soon occurred which produced first a coldness, and at length a rupture between them. The first of these arose out of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulated that Malta should be placed under the guarantee of the great powers, and especially Russia, Austria, and Prussia. No sooner was the war renewed, than England made the most strenuous exertions to induce the Czar to accept the office of mediator between the contending powers in regard to this matter; and Napoleon could not refuse to accede to the proposal. After a long negotiation, however, it came to nothing. While Talleyrand was prodigal of protestations in regard to the sincere desire of the First Consul to submit to the decision of so magnanimous and just a potentate, he took care to make no concessions whatever calculated to restore the peace of Europe. The Russian monarch, by his rescript of May 24, insisted that, as a basis of the arrangement, the neutrality of the north of Germany and the Neapolitan territory should, in the event of war, be maintained inviolate, in terms of the

secret articles of the treaty of the 11th of October, 1801;* but hardly was this basis laid down, when Hanover was invaded by the army of Mortier, and Naples, as far as Tarentum, overrun by that of St. Cyr.

The consequences of this double rupture eventually were the revival of the coalition. Russia and France, indeed, easily came to an understanding on the subject of Switzerland, the Czar agreeing to leave the First Consul undisturbed in his usurpation over the Helvetic Confederacy, provided he would not interfere in his arrangements concerning the Ionian isles; but on other and more vital points it was soon discovered that their pretensions were irreconcilable. Napoleon proposed that Malta should be garrisoned by Russian troops for as many years as should be deemed necessary; Lampedosa be ceded to Britain; Switzerland and Holland evacuated by the French troops; and the acquisitions of France in Italy recognised by England. The British government, on the other hand, offered to submit all their differences with France to the decision of Alexander, and insisted that the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Germany should be a part of the arrangement; but to this he positively refused to accede. This matter was soon warmly taken up by the Russian cabinet, especially after the occupation of Cuxhaven by the French troops, and the closing of the Elbe and the Weser to British vessels—measures utterly subversive of the neutrality of Germany, and in which the Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law to the emperor, whose territories were next threatened by Gallic invasion, was in an especial manner interested. The continued occupation of Tarentum by the French troops also irritated the Russian cabinet, as well as the failure to provide an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for his Continental dominions, as stipulated in the same treaties; and to such a height did the mutual exasperation arrive, that, before the end of 1803, M. Markoff, the Russian ambassador, was received with so much indignity, in a public audience, by the First Consul, that he was recalled, and M. D'Oubril, the chargé d'affaires, alone left at the French capital.†

Prussia at first warmly seconded Russia in its remonstrances against the occupation of the north of Germany, and especially the levying of heavy requisitions on Hamburg and the Elector of Hesse Cassel by the French troops. But Napoleon threw out a lure to the cabinet of Berlin, which speedily caused its efforts in that direction to slacken. He directed his diplomatic agents at that capital to drop hints that possibly the electorate of Hanover might, in the event of Prussia withdrawing her opposition to France, be incorporated with her monarchy; and though the Prussian ministers did not venture to close at once with so scandalous an aggression, yet, actuated partly by the desire of securing so glittering a prize, partly by a wish to be freed from the disagreeable vicinity of the French troops, they proposed to Napoleon that his troops should evacuate Hanover, which should be occupied till a general peace by those of the Prussian monarchy. Napoleon declined to accede to such an arrangement, but offered, on condition of an alli-

Which lead to a recall of the Russian ambassador from Paris.

June 18, 1803.

Napoleon gains over Prussia by hinting at its getting Hanover.

July 30, 1803.

must look to that, for he gave us the order; come on, Russians!" was the reply; and the whole marched forward, and perished, the victims of their heroic sense of duty.—SIR ROBERT WILSON'S *Polish War*, p. 2.

* Bign., ii., 285, 290.

* Bign., iii., 108, 111. Dum., x., 5 and 6.

† Bign., iii., 205, 225. Dum., x., 6.

ance, offensive and defensive, being entered into with France, to cede in perpetuity Hanover to that power. Prussia had the virtue or the prudence to resist this insidious offer, and reverted to the proposal that the French troops should retire from the north of Germany, and the First Consul should respect the neutrality of the Empire; and that, in consideration of this, Prussia should engage that, during the continuance of the war, France should neither be attacked by Germany, nor across Germany. This proposition, however, by no means suited the great designs which Napoleon had already formed of forcing all the neutral powers into a general confederacy against England, and, in consequence, the negotiation fell to the ground, leaving only in the Prussian cabinet, unhappily for itself, a secret desire for the possession of the Hanoverian states, which long prevented them from joining in the general league against French usurpation.*†

Matters were in this state when the arrest and execution of the Duke d'Enghien excited a unanimous feeling of horror through Europe, and universally overwhelmed the French partisans by the indignation which it produced in every virtuous mind. The impulse given by this deed, not less impolitic than criminal, to the fermenting elements of a coalition against France, was very great. The court of St. Petersburg went into deep mourning on the occasion, and sent orders to all its diplomatic ministers at foreign courts to do the same; that of Stockholm followed the example; and M. d'Oubril, on the part of his imperial majesty, presented an energetic remonstrance on the occasion, both to the Diet at Ratisbon and the cabinet of the Tuileries. This produced a vigorous reply from the First Consul, written in his usual powerful manner, but with so little circumspection, that it was evidently calculated to widen instead of closing the breach already existing between the two powers. "The complaint of Russia on this matter," said he, "leads one to ask whether, when England meditated the assassination of Paul, and it was known that the proposed assassins were within a league of the frontier, the Russian government could have had any hesitation in seizing them. A war, conducive, as any struggle between France and Russia ever must be, to no other interests but those of England, will never be voluntarily undertaken by the First Consul; but commence it who will, he would prefer it to a state of things derogatory in the slightest degree to the equality subsisting between the great powers. He claims no superiority over them, but he will submit to no degradation. He interferes with none of the measures of the Russian cabinet, and he requires a corresponding forbearance on their part." Sim-

ilar explosions took place between the diplomatic agents of the two powers at the Diet of Ratisbon; and resolved to have the lead in provoking a rupture, if it should arise, Napoleon sent instructions to his ambassador, General Hedouville, to quit St. Petersburg in forty-eight hours, and leave only a chargé d'affaires there. "Know," said he, "as your final instructions, that the First Consul has no desire for war, but he fears no human being."*

As a sort of counterpoise to the powerful feeling excited against them by the tragic fate of the Duke d'Enghien, the French government, shortly after that catastrophe, published, by means of Regnier, the head of the police, the particulars of some steps taken towards effecting a counter-revolution in France by the British government, in which Mr. Drake, their accredited envoy at the court of Bavaria, and Mr. Spencer Smith, the chargé d'affaires at the electoral court of Wirtemberg, were the chief agents. They made a very great handle of that transaction, and endeavoured, by a forced and unnatural construction of the expressions employed by these gentlemen in their instructions to the leaders of the malecontent party in France, to make it appear that their object was not merely a counter-revolution, but the assassination of the First Consul; but a simple quotation of the expressions used, as given in their own report, is sufficient to demonstrate that this was not the case, and that nothing was aimed at but the subversion of the existing government: a project in which it was never supposed diplomatic characters were forbidden to enter towards powers in hostility with their country, and in which almost all the ambassadors of France, throughout the Revolutionary war, were actively engaged.† It clearly appeared, however, that though well qualified to meet the French forces in the field, England was no match for their police agents in a transaction of this description; for the publications of Regnier revealed the mortifying fact, that the whole correspondence, both of Drake and Spencer Smith, had been regularly transmit-

* State Papers, 644. Ann. Reg., 1804. Bign., iii., 439, 441.

† Mr. Drake's instructions to his agents are thus given in the official report by the French police: "Art. 2. The principal object in view being the overthrow of the present government, one of the chief means of accomplishing this is by obtaining knowledge of the plans of the enemy. For this purpose, it is of the utmost consequence to begin by establishing a correspondence with the different bureaux for obtaining information as to the plans going forward, both for the exterior and the interior. 7. To gain over those employed in the powder-mills, so as to be able to blow them up as occasion may require. 8. It is necessary to gain over a certain number of printers and engravers that may be relied on, to print and execute everything that the confederacy may stand in need of. 9. It is much to be wished that a perfect knowledge may be gained of the situation of the different parties in France, and particularly at Paris. 13. It is well understood that every means must be taken to disorganize the armies both in and out of the Republic." The report adds, that in his intercepted correspondence Mr. Drake says, "If you see any means of extricating any of Georges' associates, do not fail to make use of them;" and again, "I earnestly request you to print and distribute a short address to the army. The main object is to gain partisans among the military; for I am thoroughly persuaded that it is through the army alone that we can reasonably hope to gain the object so much desired." In a subsequent report mention is made of a project for getting possession of the fortresses of Huningen and Strasbourg; but nowhere is there the slightest allusion to the commission of assassination, or any illegal or disgraceful acts.—See Report by REGNIER, the 24th of March and the 11th of April, 1804; State Papers, Ann. Reg., 1804, 620, 625.

* Bign., iii., 230, 233.

† The working of this feeling may be discerned in the secret instructions sent to the Marquis Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, on the 17th of December, 1803. He was directed, if possible, to conclude a convention, containing a secret article, in these terms: "Without entering into any formal stipulation as to the fate of the electorate of Hanover, which the events of the maritime war and the negotiations for a general peace will determine, the First Consul, considering that the geographical position of Prussia renders these arrangements of more importance to her than any other power, engages to keep chiefly in view the interests of his Prussian majesty in all the discussions which the destination of that country may give rise to." Napoleon, however, declined to accede to any such half measures.—See BIGNON, iii., 232, 233.

ted, as fast as it took place, to the police of Paris; and that their principal correspondent in that city, M. Mehu de la Touche, was himself an agent of the police, employed to tempt the British envoys into this perilous enterprise.* But, that neither the British government nor their diplomatic agents ever entertained any projects of assassination against the First Consul, or any other means of annoyance but those of open hostility, is admitted by the person in the world who had the best opportunity of information on this subject, the private secretary of Napoleon himself;† and it is difficult to see how the First Consul could object to diplomatic characters in other countries engaging in attempts to overturn revolutionary governments in hostility with their own, when his own brother Joseph, during his embassy at Rome, was, with his knowledge and authority, actively engaged in the conspiracy which overturned the papal government in 1797; and the French ambassador at Venice, in 1796, took so active a part in the Democratic conspiracy which led to the destruction, by his means, of that ancient republic.‡

The publication of the details of this abortive attempt at a counter-revolution in France, which were officially communicated to the whole foreign ambassadors at Paris, led to answers from all the members of that body, which are curious, as evincing the different degrees of subjection in which the European potentates were then kept by the French ruler. The answer of the Russian ambassador was evasive, amounting to nothing but a declaration in favour of the rights of nations; that of the Austrian equally ambiguous; but those of Prussia and all the lesser powers were, more or less, an echo of the sentiments of the French government on the occasion, and clearly indicated the paramount ascendancy exercised over their minds by the ruler

* Report by Regnier, April 14, 1804. State Papers, 624, 625. Ann. Reg., 1804.

† "I can affirm," says Bourrienne, "with perfect confidence, that the British government have constantly rejected with indignation, not indeed the projects submitted to them for overturning the consular or imperial government, but all designs of assassination or personal violence against the person of the First Consul and the emperor. Positive proof of this will be found in the subsequent part of these memoirs."—Bour., v., 12. Again, the same author adds, "All the correspondence, which scandalized every honest man, on this subject, was the work of the perfidious suggestions of the secret agents of police, of whom Mehu de la Touche was the chief, who acted in the perilous but lucrative line of double espionage. I can affirm as a positive fact, that during the six years that I spent at Hamburg, I was in a situation to know everything; and I can with confidence affirm, that neither in my public character nor private relations have I ever discovered the smallest evidence to warrant the assertion that the English government was ever engaged in any plots of a dishonourable character."—Bour., vi., 207.

‡ Hard., Memoirs, v., 186, 192.

§ "Should the pope die," said Napoleon to his brother Joseph, when ambassador at Rome in 1797, "you must exert yourself to the utmost to prevent another being appointed, and to bring about a revolution."—*Confidential Despatch of NAPOLEON to JOSEPH*, dated Passeriano, the 29th of September, 1797. "What you have to do," said Talleyrand, in his confidential despatch of the 10th of October following, "is to take care that the reign of the popes shall cease; and to encourage the disposition of the people for liberty, you must proclaim at Rome a representative government, and deliver Europe from the papal supremacy; taking care, at the same time, to secure for us Ancona, with a suitable extent of maritime territory."—See HARDENBERG'S *Memoirs*, v., 186, 192. These were the instructions of Napoleon and the French government to an ambassador at the court of a friendly power, for the purpose of revolutionizing that very power; whereas the acts complained of on the part of the English diplomatic agents were all directed against France, with whom their sovereign was in a state of declared hostility.

of its military force.* Lord Hawkesbury, as the official organ of the British government, also published a manifesto on the subject, which was followed by an answer from Talleyrand on the part of the French cabinet; but the interest of these manifestoes was soon obliterated in the whirl of more important events, arising out of the ceaseless advance of French ambition.†

* State Papers. Ann. Reg., 1804, 630, 638.

† Lord Hawkesbury observed, in the British note, "That his majesty's government should disregard the feelings of such of the inhabitants of France April 30, 1804. as are justly discontented with the existing government of that country; that he should refuse to listen to their designs for delivering that country from the degrading yoke of bondage under which it groans, or to give them aid and assistance, so far as those designs are fair and justifiable, would be to refuse fulfilling those duties which every wise and just government owes to itself and to the world in general, under circumstances similar to the present. Belligerent powers have an acknowledged right to avail themselves of all discontents that may exist in countries with which they may be at war. The exercise of that right, even if in any degree doubtful, would be fully sanctioned in the present law, not only by the present state of the French nation, but by the conduct of the government of that country, which, since the commencement of the present war, has constantly kept up communications with the disaffected in the territories of his majesty, and has assembled at the present moment on the coast of France a corps of Irish rebels, destined to second them in their designs against that part of the United Kingdom. In the application of these principles, his majesty has commanded me to declare, besides, that his government have never authorized a single act which could not stand the test of the strictest principles of justice, and of usages recognised and practised in all ages. If any minister, accredited at a foreign court, has kept up correspondence with persons resident in France, with a view to obtain information as to the designs of the French government, or for any other legitimate purpose, he has done nothing more than what ministers, under similar circumstances, have always been considered as having a right to do, and much less than the ministers and commercial agents of France have towards the disaffected in his majesty's territories."

To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, "In every country, and in every age, the ministry of diplomatic agents has been held in veneration among men; Sept. 5, 1804. ministers of peace, organs of conciliation, their presence is an augury of wisdom, justice, and happiness. England, on the contrary, wishes that its diplomatic agents should be the promoters of plots, the agents of troubles, the correspondents of vile spies and profligate emissaries: it charges them to foment seditions, to provoke and reward assassination, and pretends to cover these infamous proceedings with the respect and inviolability that belongs to the ministers of kings and the pacificators of nations. 'Diplomatic agents,' says Lord Hawkesbury, 'are not permitted to conspire in the country where they reside against the laws of that country, but they are subject to no such restriction in regard to the states for which they are not accredited.' Admirable restriction! Europe will be covered with conspiracies, but the defenders of public right will have no cause of complaint: some distance will always intervene between the chief conspirator and his accomplices; Lord Hawkesbury's ministers will pay the crimes which they instigate, but they will have sufficient deference to appearances to avoid being at once their instigators and witnesses. Such maxims are the height of hypocrisy and audacity: never did government make so barefaced a sport of the opinion of cabinets and the conscience of nations. The emperor is resolved to put a stop to proceedings so fatal to humanity; and you are therefore invited to communicate to your government, that the French government will not recognise the English diplomacy in Europe, until the English cabinet shall cease to charge its ministers with warlike commissions, and restrain them to their proper functions." It is curious to recollect that this tirade, which proceeds entirely upon the false assumption that the British envoys were implicated in plots for assassination, emanated from Napoleon and Talleyrand, who directed Joseph Bonaparte, in 1797, to revolutionize Rome, the very state at which he was the ambassador of the French Republic.—See *State Papers*, Ann. Reg., 1804, 602, and DUMAS, x., 279, 280. A similar attempt was made by the Prince of Peace to charge Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, with having let fall in conversation some expressions favourable to the assassination of Napoleon; but this immediately drew forth a positive and indignant denial from that gentleman, and, from the degraded character of the Spanish favourite, obtained no credit in Europe.—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1805, 124, 125.

This attempt on the part of the French government to turn aside a portion of the odium which attached to them throughout Europe in consequence of the violation of the territory of Baden and murder of the Duke d'Enghien, was attended with very little success. The Russian cabinet, now fully awakened to a sense of the imminent danger arising from the evident resolution of the First Consul to extend his power over the whole Continent, and feeling the personal slights put upon the Emperor Alexander in the correspondence of Napoleon, were resolute in demanding satisfaction; and on the

Warlike note presented by D'Oubril on the part of Russia to Napoleon. July 21, 1804.

21st of July a most important note was presented by M. d'Oubril, which at once announced the basis of a new coalition against France. In this able document it was stated that no government could behold with indifference the dreadful blow given to the independence and security of nations by the recent arrest and execution of the Duke d'Enghien; that Russia, by the peace of Teschen, engaged to guaranty and mediate the German Empire, and in that character was not only entitled, but bound to interfere in that matter; that, desirous to extinguish the flames of war, she had since proposed to act as mediator between France and England, but was not accepted; that since the renewal of the war the French government had evinced a determination to disregard all the rights of neutral powers, by marching its troops to the coasts of the Adriatic, and levying contribution on, and taking military possession of, the Hanse Towns, though these states had no connexion whatever with the depending contest; that Portugal and Spain had been compelled to purchase their neutrality by enormous pecuniary sacrifices; that Switzerland, Holland, and great part of Italy were mere French provinces: one part of the German Empire was occupied by the French troops, and in another arrests were committed by French detachments, in open violation of the law of nations; that Russia had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France, but neither could she remain a passive spectator of the successive trampling under foot of all the weaker states of Europe by its armies; nor could she overlook the insult offered to his imperial majesty in alluding to the death of his father, and advancing a totally groundless charge, in relation to that matter, against Great Britain, whom France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it. The note concluded by declaring that M. d'Oubril had been ordered to state that he could not prolong his stay in Paris unless the following points were adjusted: "I. That, conformably to the fourth and fifth articles of the secret convention of the 11th of October, 1801, the French troops should be ordered to evacuate the kingdom of Naples; and, having done so, its government should engage to respect the neutrality of that power during the remainder of the war. II. That, in pursuance of the second article of the same treaty, the French government should agree in future to act in close concert with his imperial majesty for the settlement of the affairs of the Italian peninsula. III. That he should engage, in conformity with the sixth article of the same convention, and of the promises so often repeated to Russia, to provide without delay an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for the losses he has sustained. IV. That, in virtue of the obligation implied in a common mediation and guarantee, the French govern-

ment should engage to evacuate the north of Germany, and undertake to respect strictly in future the neutrality of the Germanic Confederacy."^{*}

How just and conformable to the letter as well as the spirit of preceding treaties these demands may have been, it was hardly to be expected that the First Consul would accede to them, or permit France openly to recede before Russia; and it is therefore probable that, in making this demand in such peremptory terms, the Russian cabinet had it in view to establish a basis on which, at some future period, they might found the resumption of hostilities. M. Talleyrand answered the note on the 29th of the same month, and declared; "Whenever the court of Russia shall fulfil the articles of its treaty with France, the latter will be ready to execute them with the same fidelity. If the cabinet of St. Petersburg is of opinion that it has claims on that of Paris, in consequence of the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the secret convention of 1801, France also claims the execution of the third article of the same treaty, which provides that the two contracting parties shall not suffer their respective subjects to maintain any correspondence, direct or indirect, with the enemies of the two states: a wise provision, which has been totally neglected by the imperial ambassador, M. Markoff, the true author of the disunion and coldness between the two powers, and who, during his residence at Paris, has even gone so far as to lend the asylum to which he was entitled to the hired agents of England. Was the mourning assumed by the Russian court for a man whom the French tribunals had condemned for having conspired against the safety of the First Consul, conformable to the letter or spirit of this article? The French government demands the execution of the ninth article of the secret convention, in which the two contracting parties mutually guaranty the independence of the Republic of the Seven Isles, and that no foreign troops shall remain: a stipulation evidently violated by Russia, since she has continued to retain her troops there, re-enforced them in an ostentatious manner, and changed the government of the country without any concert. Finally, France claims the execution of the eleventh article of the same treaty, which evidently requires that, instead of evincing a spirit so unduly partial to England, and rendering itself, perhaps, the first auxiliary of its ambition, Russia should unite with France to consolidate a general peace, and re-establish a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, to secure the liberty of the seas."[†]

The same views were more fully unfolded in a subsequent memorial presented by Farther me- M. d'Oubril to the French cabinet on morial of August 28th. The Russian minis- Russia. ter there loudly complained that the King of Sardinia, stripped of all his Continental dominions by the union of Piedmont to France, still remains without the indemnity so often promised by France; that the King of Sardinia and the north of Germany are still oppressed by the burdensome presence of the French troops; that the whole of Italy has been changed by the innovation of the French government, without any concert with his imperial majesty; and replied to the charge of the cabinet of the Tuileries, founded on the ninth article of the secret convention,

^{*} State Papers. Ann. Reg., 1804, 648.

[†] State Papers. Ann. Reg., 1804, 649, 650

"That if the Russian troops have a second time occupied the Ionian Islands, it is with the consent of the Ottoman Porte, at the request of the inhabitants, and in virtue of a previous concert with France. The emperor only awaits the intelligence of his chargé d'affaires' departure from Paris to intimate to the French mission to quit his capital. He beholds with regret the necessity under which he is laid of suspending his relations with a government which refuses to perform its engagement; but he will remain in that suspensive position which it lies on the French government to convert, if it pleases, into one of open hostility." This note remained without any answer; and on the day following, M. d'Oubril received his passports, with the intimation, however, that it was expected he would not cross the frontier till he received intelligence that the French chargé d'affaires had left the Russian territories, and he remained, accordingly, at Mayence. War was not yet openly proclaimed between the two empires, but it could hardly be said that peace existed; and its open declaration was evidently postponed only for a convenient opportunity.* And when the accession of Napoleon to the imperial throne was notified to the court of St. Petersburg, the emperor refused to recognise his new title, even after it had been acceded to by the sovereign whose dignity it appeared more immediately to affect, the Emperor of Austria.

The warlike intentions of Russia during this year were not confined to diplomatic manifestations. Independent of several lesser squadrons which were cruising in the Baltic, a fleet of nine ships of the line and several frigates passed the Sound, and sailed round by the Straits of Gibraltar towards the Adriatic Sea; while several expeditions from Sebastopol proceeded through the Dardanelles in the same direction, and disembarked 7000 men in the Ionian Islands. The army was everywhere put on the most efficient footing, vacancies filled up, new levies ordered, and everything done which could enable Russia to interpose with a weight proportioned to its strength in the great conflict which was approaching in Western Europe.†

While the political horizon was thus overshadowed by clouds in the northern hemisphere, Austria continued faithful to her system of maintaining a strict neutrality, and repairing in silence the breaches in her army and finances which had been produced by the disasters of preceding years. An event occurred, however, in the course of the year, which proved that the spirit of the imperial cabinet was far from being extinguished, and that Austria might still be calculated upon to bear a prominent part in any coalition which might be formed for the independence of Europe. The Elector of Bavaria had become entangled in some very unpleasant disputes with the nobles of the equestrian order, as they were called; that is, the nobles who held directly of the Empire, and were subject to no other jurisdiction, wherever their territories might be locally situated, which had fallen to him on the partition of the indemnities. The elector, considering them as to all intents and purposes his subjects, had summoned them to meet him at Bamberg, to settle the point in dispute between them; but they had refused, and applied to the emperor,

who supported their pretensions to independence from his government. Upon this the elector appealed to the First Consul; but, however well inclined he might have been in general to support any sovereign who resisted the jurisdiction and weakened the authority of the emperor, he had no desire to see Austria added to the number of his enemies in the present threatening aspect of affairs in the north of Europe. The elector therefore received, to his no small astonishment, a notification that he must not oppose the rights of the emperor in this particular, and also give satisfaction to Austria for the seizure of the Oberhausen, a district situated on the frontiers, near the Inn, the year before, and long the subject of contention between the two powers. By a solemn decree of the Aulic Council, the nobles of the equestrian order throughout the Empire were confirmed in all the privileges which belonged to them before the division of the indemnities, and the execution of this decree by force of arms was committed to the Archduke of Austria and the Electors of Saxony and Baden: a result which contributed in no small degree to restore the influence of the emperor throughout Germany, and revive the ancient respect for the majesty of his undefined authority which preceding events had so much impaired.*

Careful, however, not to hazard the advantage thus gained by any premature or unsupported measure of hostility towards France, the cabinet of Vienna abstained from expressing any open indignation at the violation of the territory of the Empire at Ettenheim, and gave an answer rather favourable than otherwise to the circular transmitted to the diplomatic body at Paris, relative to the affair of Drake and Spencer Smith. Nay, they at once ordered the French emigrants to quit their territories, when the First Consul represented that their residence there gave umbrage to the government of France. Notwithstanding these pacific steps, however, the armaments in the interior went on without intermission; magazines were formed in Styria, Carinthia, at Venice, and in the Tyrol: the army was gradually increasing in strength and reviving in spirit, and an attentive observer could discern, amid a constant interchange of pacific assurances, appearances not a little indicative of an approaching rupture.†

Matters were in this state between the cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries, when the elevation of Napoleon to the imperial dignity opened up apparently a fresh subject of discord between the two powers. But, instead of testifying any repugnance at this step, the Austrian cabinet had the address to make it a ground for adopting a measure which had been long in their contemplation, but for which a favourable opportunity had not yet arrived, viz., the assumption of the title of Emperors of Austria by the House of Lorraine, and rendering it hereditary in their family. After a long correspondence between the two cabinets, this matter was adjusted to their mutual satisfaction, and on the 11th of August, immediately after the emperor, in a full council, had recognised the title of the Emperor Napoleon, he assumed for himself and his successors in the Austrian dominions the title of

* State Papers. Ann. Reg., 1804, 951, 953. Bign., iii., 452, 454. Dum., xi., 53.

† Dum., xi., 55.

* Ann. Reg., 1804, 190, 191. Bign., iv., 1, 9.

† Bign., iv., 12, 13, 19.

"Emperor of Austria." The motive for this step was declared to be "the preservation of that degree of equality which should subsist between the great powers and the just rank of the House and State of Austria among the nations of Europe." The step was justified on "the precedent formerly afforded by the assumption of the imperial crown by the Czars of Russia, and more recently by the ruling sovereign of France;" and though it at first excited considerable jealousy among the lesser princes of Germany, yet they soon all recognised the new and hereditary title of the emperor; and it was ere long acquiesced in by all the potentates of Europe, those under the influence of Napoleon, not less than those who were opposed to him: by the first, because it afforded some countenance to the recent assumption of the imperial dignity by the French ruler; by the last, because it promised to consolidate in the Austrian dominions some counterpoise to his power.*

Aware that the cabinet of Vienna would endeavour, on the first favourable opportunity, to regain some of its lost possessions, and that its friendly dispositions could not with certainty be calculated upon for any length of time, Napoleon was urgent in his endeavours, during the whole of this year, to draw closer the cords which united France to Prussia. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien had awakened at Berlin, as elsewhere, the most profound feelings of indignation; and in the consternation with which it overwhelmed the friends of France might be seen, says the panegyrist of Napoleon, the clearest evidence that, "more than even a crime, that act was a fault."† But, though the Anti-Gallican party was greatly strengthened, it was not placed in possession of power by that event. The policy of the cabinet still continued to be guided by French influence, and, accordingly, the King of Prussia was among the first of the greater powers which formally recognised the French emperor. When the menaces of Russia gave reason to apprehend an immediate rupture in the north, it became of the utmost moment for Napoleon to secure, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of Prussia, in order that a barrier might be opposed to the march of the Moscovite troops across the north of Germany; and on condition that the French troops in the electorate of Hanover should not be augmented, and that the burden of the war should not be laid upon the neutral states of that part of the Empire, Prussia agreed to maintain a strict neutrality, and not to permit the march of Russian or any other foreign troops across her territories. In return for these concessions, which, though not so extensive as he desired, were yet of great moment to the French emperor, Napoleon openly proclaimed, both in his diplomatic relations and in the official columns of the *Moniteur*, his inclination to augment the strength of Prussia,‡ and his intention not to let any pretensions of France upon Hanover stand in the way of the territorial aggrandizement of that power.

A change which occurred at this period in the Prussian ministry was looked to by the diplomatists of Europe as likely to lead to a material alteration in its foreign policy; but it was not attended at first with the effects

which were anticipated. Count Haugwitz, who for ten years had been the chief director of its diplomatic relations, and whose leaning towards the French alliance had been conspicuous throughout the whole of his administration, retired to his estates in Silesia; and the chief direction of affairs fell upon BARON HARDENBERG, a statesman of great ability, who was known to be decidedly hostile to the Revolutionary principle, the devastating effects of which he had had ample opportunities of appreciating in the course of his diplomatic career, and whose inclination towards the English and Russian alliance, already warmly espoused by the queen, was expected to produce important effects on the fate of Northern Europe. The new minister, however, proceeded at first in the footsteps of his predecessor; the negotiation for the occupation of Hanover, if not by Prussian, at least by Saxon or Hessian troops, instead of French, was resumed, though without success, as Napoleon showed an invincible repugnance to quitting his hold of that important part of the German territory; but the jealousy of Prussia was allayed by a renewed promise that the French troops in that electorate should not exceed thirty thousand men; on condition of which the king engaged that they should not be disquieted from the side of his dominions.*

An event, however, soon occurred, which put the independence of Prussia to the test, and afforded the measure of the extent to which its cabinet was disposed to sacrifice its pretensions to the rank of an independent power to the ascendancy of the French alliance. Sir George Rumboldt, the English minister at Hamburg, was seized at his country villa within the territory of that free city, on the night of the 25th of October, in virtue of an order for arrest, signed by the French minister of police at Paris, and forwarded without delay to that capital, where he was lodged in the Temple, and all his papers submitted to the inspection of the French government. This violent proceeding was not only a flagrant violation of the law of nations, in the person of the accredited minister of England, in the circle of Lower Saxony, but a grave fault of policy, as it directly brought the Emperor of France into collision with the King of Prussia, the protector of that circle of the Empire, and endangered all the amicable relations which with so much care had been nursed up for ten years between the two powers. It produced a very great sensation at Berlin. The party hostile to the French alliance represented it as a grievous slight upon the honour of Prussia, and such as, if unredressed, would forever blast its influence in the north of Germany; and the opinion became universal that the ambition of Napoleon knew no bounds, and that he was resolved to treat the independent states of Europe in the same manner as the provinces of his own Empire. The conduct, both of the king and the cabinet at this crisis, was worthy of the successors of the Great Frederic. The Prussian ambassador at Paris received instructions to make the most energetic remonstrances on the subject to the cabinet of the Tuileries, and the king wrote in person a confidential letter to the emperor, expressing how deeply he had been hurt by the event. These representations had the desired effect: nothing was discov-

They remonstrate against the seizure of Sir Geo. Rumboldt. Oct. 25, 1804.

* State Papers, 695. *Ann. Reg.*, 1804. *Bign.*, iv., 22, 29.

† *Bign.*, iv., 32.

‡ *Bign.*, iv., 30, 41. *Ann. Reg.*, 1804, 194, 195.

* *Bign.*, iv., 41, 43.

ered in Sir George's papers tending to implicate either him or the British government in anything which could answer the purposes of Napoleon, and after a few days' confinement he was sent to Cherbourg, and delivered over, with a flag of truce, to the English cruisers, leaving to France the disgrace only of having violated the law of nations and the independence of Germany without any object, and receded before the remonstrances of a comparatively inferior power.*

The first decided symptom of hostility towards France came from Sweden, a country removed by its situation from the immediate dangers of French invasion, and under the government of a prince of an ardent and chivalrous character, whose animosity to the Revolutionary system had been long and powerfully marked. As Duke of Pomerania, that sovereign had a voice in the Diet of the Empire at Ratisbon, and his notes presented to that assembly on the subject of the Duke d'Enghien had breathed an uncommon degree of spirit and independence.† This conduct, which was not more than might have been expected in an intrepid sovereign who was married to a princess of the House of Baden, the potentate immediately insulted on that occasion, drew forth the pointed animadversions of the French emperor; and in a series of articles inserted in the official part of the *Moniteur*, the King of Sweden was assailed in a manner which could hardly be tolerated by any independent power.‡ In one, in particular, a distinction was drawn between the Swedish nation, with whom the writer professed a desire to remain on a friendly title, and its sovereign, a rash and headstrong young man, misled by extravagant ideas. "Your merchant vessels," it added, "shall ever be well received in the ports of France; your squadrons, whenever they stand in need of them, shall be victualled in her harbours. She will see on their mast-heads only the pavilions of the Gustavuses who have reigned before you." When language such as this prevails between sovereigns, the transition is easy to a state of actual hostility. On the 7th of September, 7, 1804.

On the 7th of September, a note presented by the Swedish ambassador, addressed *Monsieur* Napoleon Bonaparte, announced the termination of all confidential communication between the two governments, and at the same time the importation of French journals and pamphlets into Sweden was prohibited. Mr. Pitt was too vigilant an observer not to perceive, in this state of mutual irritation, the foundation of a convention favourable to the interests of Great Britain; and on the 3d of December a treaty was concluded at London between England and Sweden, by which it was stipulated that a *dépôt* should be established at Stralsund in Pomerania, or in the adjoining island of Rugen, for the formation of the legion which it was intended to form of Hanoverian troops, in the pay of Great Britain; and that an entrepôt should be established in that town for the disposal of British colonial produce and manufactures. In return for these concessions, and in order to enable the Swedish government to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence, a subsidy of £80,000 was promised by England. If these provisions did not amount to any act of open hostility

against France, they at least demonstrated that Sweden was not disposed to enter into the projects of the Emperor Napoleon for the exclusion of British commerce from the Continent of Europe: a disposition which amounted, in his estimation, to a declaration of war against the French Empire.

At the time that Sweden was thus giving the first example of a decided resistance to France, the Ottoman Empire also adopted a peremptory tone on the same subject. Retaining still a lively recollection of the evils they had sustained in consequence of the unprovoked attack of Napoleon on Egypt, they refused to recognise him as emperor; and Marshal Brune, the French ambassador at Constantinople, after six months of vain attempts at negotiation, was compelled to quit that capital, which fell entirely into the views of the Russian party.†

While the Northern and Eastern powers were thus giving signs of approaching hostility to France, Napoleon was Extension of French power in Italy, Oct. 20, 1804. unceasingly extending his grasp over the Italian peninsula. By a treaty with the Ligurian Republic, of October 20, the whole resources of Genoa were placed at the disposal of France, and that magnificent harbour became a great French naval station in the Mediterranean. The emperor engaged to procure admission on favourable terms for the Ligurian manufactures into the states of Piedmont and Parma, and to cause its pavilion to be respected by the Barbary powers; in return for which he obtained six thousand sailors, and the free use of the arsenals, fleets, and harbours of the Republic. Napoleon immediately took measures for the construction of ten ships of the line at Genoa. "This," says the French historian, "was, in effect, an appropriation of Genoa to France; the Act of Incorporation which soon after followed of this Republic with the French Empire was but a public proclamation of what then took place."‡

While negotiations of such moment were taking place in the diplomatic body throughout Europe, and everything conspired to indicate an approaching rupture of the most terrible kind, Napoleon was actively engaged in Internal measures of Napoleon, July 14, 1814. measures calculated to rouse the spirit and heighten the enthusiasm of his own subjects. On the 14th of July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, the inauguration of the Legion of Honour took place with all imaginable pomp in the splendid Church of the Invalides at Paris, built by Louis XIV.; and on the same day, the crosses of honour of that body were distributed by the generals in all the camps and garrisons of the Empire. The profound policy of Napoleon was here singularly conspicuous, in selecting the anniversary of the first victory of the Revolution for the establishment of an institution calculated to revive the distinctions which it was its chief object to abolish, and blending in the public mind the recollection of Republican triumph with the edifice and the associations which were most likely to recall the splendour of the monarchy.

At the same time that this apparent homage to Republican principles was paid at Paris, a measure of all others the most destructive to real freedom was carried into effect July 15.

Which is taken advantage of by Great Britain. Dec. 3, 1804.

* Ann. Reg., 1804, 183, 184. Bign., iv., 43, 46.

† State Papers, 697. Ann. Reg., 1804.

‡ *Moniteur*, Aug. 14, 1804.

* Bign., iv., 57, 59. Ann. Reg., 1804, 195.

† *Dum.*, xi., 56, 57.

‡ Bign., iv., 117, 119.

in the restoration of the ministry of police, with the crafty Fouché again at its head.

Shortly after the conclusion of this important ceremony in the capital, the emperor repaired to the headquarters of the grand army at Boulogne, Aug. 16, 1804.

anniversary of the fête of his tutelary saint, a spectacle of the grandest and most imposing kind took place. Marshal Soult received orders to assemble the whole troops in the camps at Boulogne and Montreuil, nearly eighty thousand strong, on the slopes of a vast natural amphitheatre, situated on the western face of the hill on which the Tower of Cæsar is placed, lying immediately to the eastward of the harbour of the former of these towns. In the centre of

this amphitheatre a throne was placed, elevated on a platform of turf, at the summit of a flight of steps. The immense body of soldiers were arranged in the form of the rays of a circle, emanating from the throne: the cavalry and artillery, stationed on the outer extremity, formed the exterior band of that magnificent array; beyond them, a countless multitude of spectators covered the slope to the very summit of the hill. The bands of all the regiments of the army, placed on the right and left of the throne, were ready to rend the air with the sounds of military music. At noon precisely, the emperor ascended the throne amid a general salute from all the batteries, and a flourish of trumpets unheard since the days of the Romans: immediately before him was the buckler of Francis I., while the crosses and ribands which were to be distributed were contained in the helmet of the Chevalier Bayard. His brothers, ministers, and chief functionaries, the marshals of the Empire, counsellors of state and senators, the staff of the army, its whole generals and field officers, composed the splendid suite by which he was surrounded. Amid their dazzling uniforms the standards of the regiments were to be seen; some new, and waving with yet unsullied colours in the sun; many more torn by shot, stained with blood, and black with smoke, the objects of almost superstitious reverence to the warlike multitude by which they were surrounded. The emperor took the oath first himself, and no sooner had the members of the Legion of Honour rejoined "We swear it," than, raising his voice aloud, he said, "And you, soldiers, swear to defend, at the hazard of your life, the honour of the French name, your country, and your emperor." Innumerable voices responded to the appeal, and immediately the distribution of the decorations commenced, and the ceremony was concluded by a general review of the vast army, who all defiled in the finest order before the throne, where they had just witnessed so imposing a spectacle.*

The chief of such a host might be excused for deeming himself the sovereign of the earth; but an event was approaching, destined to teach the French emperor, like his great predecessor Canute the Dane, that there were bounds to his power, and that his commands were limited to the element on which his army stood. It was part of the pageant that a naval display should take place at the same time, and the eyes of Napoleon and the minister of marine, M. Decrès, were anxiously turned,

towards the close of the ceremony, to the headlands round which it was expected the vanguard of the flotilla would appear. In effect, they did make their appearance at four o'clock; but at the same moment a violent tempest arose, the wind blew with terrific violence, and several of the vessels, in the hands of their inexperienced mariners, were stranded on the beach. This untoward incident, though, practically speaking, of little importance, was yet in the highest degree mortifying to Napoleon, arriving as it did on such an occasion, in presence, not only of his own troops, but the English cruisers, and characteristic as it was of the impassable limits which the laws of nature had placed to his power. He retired chagrined and out of humour for the rest of the day; all the magnificence of his military display could not console him for the rude manner in which he had been reminded, at the highest point of its splendour, of his weakness on the other element, which required to be subdued before his dreams of universal dominion could be realized.*

The fête of Napoleon was celebrated in the other harbours of France by the completion of works of more durable utility, but everywhere with the same enthusiastic feeling. At Cherbourg it was signalized by discharges of artillery from the battery placed on the great sea-dike intended to break the fury of the waves which roll into that harbour—a work begun by the unfortunate Louis XVI., and now completed by his illustrious successor. At Antwerp the rejoicings were equally sincere: several smaller vessels were launched on the occasion, and already its basins in a great state of forwardness, three ships of the line and a frigate almost completed, and immense preparations in the arsenals and dockyards, attested the impulse which the genius of the emperor, in a single year, had given to the naval resources of France. Two days after the fête the English cruisers stood into the harbour of Boulogne, and a heavy cannonade took place between them and the front line of the French flotilla. Napoleon, on board a gunboat with Admiral Bruix, was a spectator of the combat; and after an exchange of long shots for two hours, the English ships stood off, not having succeeded in inflicting any serious damage on the enemy—a circumstance which afforded the French, little accustomed to indecisive combats at sea, an opportunity for boundless exultation, and the happiest augury of success in the great maritime contest which was approaching.†

* D'Abr., vii., 185, 187. Norv., ii., 338.

† Dum., xi., 44, 47. Bign., iv., 124, 125.

‡ No man knew better than Napoleon how to win the affections and excite the gratitude of his soldiers; and it was to his wonderful powers in this respect, almost as much as to his political and military capacity, that his long-continued success was owing. To increase this effect, and add to the naturally retentive powers of his memory in this respect, he inquired privately from the officers who were the veterans of Egypt or Italy in their regiments; and when he passed them in review, stopped the men designated to him, and said, "Ah! you are a veteran: how is your old father? I have seen you at Aboukir or the Pyramids: you have not a cross; here is one for you," and threw the cord round the astonished soldier's neck. It may easily be conceived what must have been the effect of such a demeanour, impressing as it did the soldiers with the belief that they were all known to the emperor if they had distinguished themselves, and that any one might look, under such auspices, to becoming a marshal of the Empire.

It was not only in his own soldiers, however, that this great man appreciated heroic or generous conduct. No one sat a higher value upon it in his enemies. When at Bou-

* Dum., xi., 40, 42. D'Abr., vii., 176, 178. Norv., ii., 336, 338.

From Boulogne the emperor traversed the coast of the Channel as far as Ostend, everywhere reviewing the troops, inspecting the harbours, stimulating the preparations, and communicating to all classes the energy of his own ardent and indefatigable mind. From thence he proceeded to Aix la Chapelle, endeavouring by all means to revive the recollection of the Empire of Charlemagne—an era of which, with Eastern servility, he was incessantly reminded in the adulatory addresses which flowed in from the mayors and constituted authorities in all the districts through which he passed. "God," said the prefect of Arras, "created Bonaparte, and rested from his labours"—an excess of flattery which shortly drew forth from the Faubourg St. Germain the witty addition, that he had better have reposed a little sooner;* and is valuable as an historical record, demonstrating how rapidly revolutionary violence leads to Eastern despotism, for in no part of France was Democratic cruelty more vehement ten years before than in that very town of Arras, the scene of the unparalleled atrocities of Le Bon, and the place where the guillotine had become so familiar an object, that it was employed by the little children to decapitate cats, birds, and mice which had fallen into their hands.†

More important changes were destined to result from the next station at which the emperor rested, Mayence, where he received at the same time the congratulatory addresses of all the eastern provinces of France, and of all the lesser German potentates on the right bank of the Rhine, whom he was already preparing to mould into the frontier bulwark of his power. It was here that he first brought to maturity the design which he had already formed of a CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, under the protection of France, and which would practically amount to an extension of its power into the heart of Germany.‡ Napoleon remained during the autumnal months at this great frontier fortress; and while to the public eye he seemed engaged only in matters of parade and magnificence, receiving the congratulations of the adjoining states on his accession to the imperial throne, he was in reality incessantly occupied with those vast designs which in the succeeding year led to such memorable results both at land and sea. It was there that he first conceived the plan of that great combination to elude the British fleets, and concentrate an overwhelm-

ing force in the Channel, which so nearly proved successful in the following year, and placed the English monarchy in greater jeopardy than it had stood since the battle of Hastings;* and it was there, too, that he matured the details of that astonishing march of his land-forces from the shores of the Channel to the heart of Germany, which was so soon destined to lead to the triumphs of Ulm and Austerlitz. Nor were objects of internal utility and pacific improvement neglected during these warlike designs. Numerous decrees for the encouragement of industry, as well as the encouragement of science and the protection of the frontier, are dated from the places visited during this journey. One from the camp at Boulogne established Sept. 11. nine prizes of 10,000 francs (£400), and thirteen of 5000 each, for useful inventions in agriculture and manufactures—proceeding on the noble desire expressed in the preamble, that "not only should France maintain the superiority she had acquired in science and the arts, but that the age which was commencing should advance beyond that which was drawing to a close." one from Mayence, on the 21st of September, Sept. 21. organized the institution of twelve colleges in the principal towns of the Empire for the study of law; one from Dunkirk Aug. 25. gave a new and more effective organization to the body of engineers for roads and bridges through the state; while another July 16. put upon a new and much improved footing the important establishment of the Polytechnic School.†

Immediately after his return to Paris, Napoleon commenced preparations for the important solemnity of the coronation. Although the spirit of the age was still essentially irreligious, and the forcing through the concordat with the pope had exposed his government to a ruder shock than the abrogation of all the political privileges acquired by the people during the Revolution,‡ still Napoleon was well aware that, with a large proportion at least of the rural population, the consecration of his authority by the ceremony of coronation was an essential particular, and that to all, of whatever latitude of opinion, it was of great political importance to prove that his influence was so unbounded as to compel the head of the Church himself to officiate on the occasion. The papal benediction appeared to be the link which would unite the Revolutionary to the legitimate régime, and cause the faithful to forget, in the sacred authority with which he was now invested, the violence and bloodshed which had paved his way to the throne.§ Napoleon, for

His coronation at Paris.

logue, two English sailors were brought before him who had escaped from the depot at Verdun, and attempted to cross the Channel in a frail bark a few feet long, just capable of floating them, which they had constructed of wood which they found on the sea-beach. The daring nature of the attempt attracted the admiration of the emperor, who said to them, "Is it really true that you have endeavoured to cross the sea in that bark?" "Ah! sire," they replied, "if you doubt it, give us leave and you will see us set out instantly." "I indeed wish it," replied he: "you are bold, enterprising men, but I will not let you expose your life. You are free. Farther, I will cause you to be conducted on board an English ship: you shall return to London, and tell the English what esteem I have for the brave, even among my enemies." He dismissed them with several pieces of gold each. This incident took such a hold of his imagination, that he recounted it to his companions in exile at St. Helena.—See BOURRIENNE, vi., 201, 202.

* Norv., ii., 347. Bour., vi., 194, 195, 205.

† See vol. i., 258, and D'Abr., vii., 213, 214. Bour., vi., 221, 222.

‡ Marquis Lucchessini's Confed. Rhenana, i., 74. Bign., iv., 127, 128. Norv., ii., 344.

* Letter of Sept. 29, 1804. Dum., xi., 205. Pièces Just.

† Bign., iv., 130, 139. Norv., ii., 340, 341.

‡ "At that period (in 1804) there prevailed," says the French historian, "in the Republic a complete indifference on religious subjects; and the apathy of the nation in that respect was such that it would not leave to any legislator the power of choosing for it any species of Christian worship. This state of things is well worthy of consideration; and it existed in the great majority of the nation to such a degree, that the organization of the Catholic worship by the concordat appeared to the people a more daring innovation than the overthrow of the national representation on the 19th Brumaire. Religion had no hold at that period of the affections, I had almost said none of the necessities of the people: the spirit of the age since the days of Louis XV. had been entirely philosophical."—NORVINS, ii., 326-7.

§ "I will allow the generals of the Republic," said Napoleon, "to exclaim as long as they please against the mass: I know what I am about; I am working for poster-

these reasons, had long resolved, not only that he should be crowned according to the forms of the French monarchy, but that the ceremony should be performed by the head of Christendom; and for this purpose a negotiation had for some months been in dependence with the Holy See. There was no precedent, indeed, of such an honour being conferred on any crowned head excepting the emperors of Germany, the successors of the Cæsars, since the days when Stephen III. consecrated the usurpation of Pepin, and poured the holy oil on the head of the founder of a new dynasty and his son Charlemagne; but this only rendered him the more desirous to secure for himself an honour of which there had been no example for ten centuries, and his achievements certainly would not suffer by a comparison with those of the illustrious founders of the Carolingian dynasty. Early in June, accordingly, a negotiation had been opened with the Vatican for the coronation of the emperor by the pope in person; and although considerable difficulties were at first started by the cardinals in order to enhance the merit of compliance, and, if possible, obtain some concessions to the Church from so great an act of condescension on the part of its head, yet such was the ascendancy of French influence and the terror of Napoleon's arms, that at length the consent of the consistory was obtained; and in reply to a letter of Napoleon, dated from Mayence on the 15th Sept. 15, 1804.

September, the pope agreed to officiate at the consecration, and announced the speedy commencement of his journey to France. On the day following a concordat was concluded for the Italian Republic on terms precisely similar to those already agreed on with the French government.*

The ceremony was fixed for the 2d of December, in the Cathedral Church of Notre Dame at Paris. The pope arrived on the 25th of November at Fontainebleau, where the emperor went to congratulate him on his approach. They met at a cross in the forest on the road to Lyons, about a mile to the southward of the palace, which is still shown to travellers. Napoleon was on horseback, but they both alighted at the same time, and immediately remounted the pope's carriage, the emperor entering first, and placing his holiness on his right hand. They drove together to Fontainebleau, from whence Pius VII. proceeded alone to Paris.† He was everywhere received with extraordinary demonstrations of respect, and lodged at the Tuileries, in magnificent rooms, in the pavilion of Flora, where, by a delicate attention, he found his sleeping apartment furnished exactly like that which he had recently left on the Monte Cavallo. His arrival at Paris created an extraordinary sensation;

ity." Though indifferent as to religion himself, he saw clearly that in the end it rules the great body of mankind, and that the irreligious fanaticism of the age was probably destined to be as short-lived as its Democratic fervour.—See BOURRIENNE, vi., 223.

* Bign., iv., 103, 113. Bot., iv., 136, 142. Dum., xi., 75.

† It is a remarkable coincidence, that Fontainebleau, where Napoleon, in the pride of apparently boundless power, met the pope coming to his coronation, was also the witness, ten years after, of his abdication and fall. But the life of the emperor is full of such extraordinary and apparently mysterious combinations. Immediately after his accession to the consulship, he was intent on a negotiation to obtain for France the island of ELBA, the scene of his first exile; and not a month before his coronation, he dictated orders to Villeneuve for the conquest of ST. HELENA, the destined theatre of his sufferings and death.—See BOURRIENNE, vi., 233.

among the small remnant of the faithful, of joy at beholding the head of the Church within a city so recently defiled by the orgies of infidelity; among the more numerous body of the irreligious or indifferent, of curiosity and astonishment at the extraordinary changes which had so rapidly converted the Cathedral where, ten years before, the Goddess of Reason was enthroned amid crowds of revolutionary admirers into the scene where the august ceremony of coronation was to be performed by the head of the Church on the founder of a new race of sovereigns. How skeptical or indifferent soever the great bulk of the people may have been, they were universally impressed with feelings of respect for the venerable pontiff who displayed, in the trying circumstances in which he was placed, so large a portion of Christian charity and forbearance; and on some occasions on which the brutality of Democratic prejudice strove to expose him to insult, his demeanour was so mild and benevolent as to excite the unanimous admiration of all who witnessed it.*

On the day before the coronation, the Senate and Tribunate presented, with great Result of the pomp, the result of the appeal made to the French people on the subject people on the of the hereditary succession of his subject. family. Sixty thousand registers had been opened. Out of 3,574,898 votes, only 2569 were in the negative. Such was the result, after sixteen years' experience, of the Democratic fervour of 1789! In reply to a laboured harangue from François de Neufchâteau, the orator of the Legislature on this occasion, Napoleon said, "I ascend the throne where I have been placed by the unanimous voice of the people, the senate, and the army, with a heart penetrated with the splendid destinies of a people whom, in the midst of camps, I first saluted with the title of the Great. From my youth upward my thoughts have been entirely occupied with their glory; and I now feel no pleasure nor pain but in the happiness or misfortune of my people. *My descendants will long sit on this throne.* In the camps they will be the first soldiers of the army, sacrificing their lives for the defence of their country. As its first magistrates, they will never forget that contempt for the laws and the overthrow of the social edifice are never occasioned but by the weakness and vacillation of princes. You, senators, whose councils and aid have never been wanting in the most difficult circumstances, will transmit your spirit to your successors. Remain ever as you now are, the firmest bulwarks and the chief counsellors of the throne, so necessary to the happiness of this vast empire."‡

The ceremony of coronation took place on the day following, with the utmost possible magnificence, in the Cathedral of Notre Dame. The day was intensely cold, but clear and bright, the procession long and gorgeous, and the whole luxury and magnificence of the Empire displayed under its venerable walls. Carriages glittering with gold and purple trap-

* Bour., vi., 225, 227. Bign., iv., 141, 143. D'Abr., vii., 216.

† When visiting the imperial printing-office, one of the workmen was ill bred enough to keep on his hat in the presence of his holiness. A murmur of disapprobation arose among the crowd, which the pope observing, stepped forward and said, with the most benevolent aspect, "Uncover yourself, young man, that I may give you my benediction; no one was ever the worse of the blessing of an old man." The spectators were profoundly affected by this incident.—Bourrienne, vi., 227. ‡ Bour., vi., 233.

ping; horses proudly caparisoned; liveries, resplendent with colour, dazzled the multitude in the streets through which the cortège passed, as much as a sea of ostrich feathers; rich embroidered court dresses; and a procession of stars, ribands, and uniforms, added to the imposing aspect of the scene within the Cathedral. The bewildered Republicans who witnessed the ceremony beheld with pain the pages in attendance on the empress's carriage, and the swords used as part of full dress, as under the ancient régime. The multitude, though dazzled by the spectacle, was far from testifying the enthusiasm which was evinced in the fêtes of the Revolution. After taking the oath prescribed by the senatus consultum of the 18th of May, 1804,* and receiving the papal benediction, the emperor, with his own hands, took the crown and placed it on his head; after which he himself, with perfect grace, crowned the empress, who knelt before him. The general aspect of this interesting moment may be still seen in the admirable picture of David, whose good fortune it has been to be the means of transmitting to posterity so many of the memorable scenes of this heart-stirring epoch.†

On the day following, a military spectacle of Distribution a still more animating kind took place of eagles to in the Champs de Mars. Napoleon the army. had there laid aside his imperial robes. He appeared in the uniform of a colonel of the guard, to distribute to the colonels of all the regiments in Paris, and deputations from all those absent, the EAGLES which were thenceforward to form the standards of the army. In the midst of the plain, in front of the Ecole Militaire, a throne was placed, on which the emperor and empress were seated. The spot selected was nearly the same with that where, fifteen years before, the unfortunate Louis XVI. had sat beside the president of the National Assembly. At a signal given, the troops closed their ranks, and grouped in dense masses round the throne; then the emperor, rising from his seat, said, in a loud voice, "Soldiers! there are your standards.

* The oath was in these words: "I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic; to respect, and cause to be respected, the laws of the concordat and the liberty of worship; to respect, and cause to be respected, equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the sale of the national domains; to impose no tax but by legal authority; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour; and to govern, with no other views but to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."—BIGNON, iv., 144.

† D'Abr., vii., 249, 259. Bour., vi., 235, 236. Bign., iv., 145, 146.

‡ The Duchess of Abrantes, who, as wife of the governor of Paris, was very near the emperor on this occasion, mentions, that immediately after crowning the empress he cast a look of almost intolerable intelligence on her. He thought, doubtless, of her mother, Madame Permon, and the Rue des Filles de St. Thomas, where she had refused his hand ten years before, in the humbler state of his fortunes. What must have been the duchess's feelings on the fate which might have been her mother's at that moment?—D'ABRANTES, vii., 261, 263.

When Napoleon was paying his court to Josephine, shortly before their marriage, neither of them having a carriage, they walked together to the notary Raguideau, to whom the latter communicated her design of marrying the young general. "You are a great fool," replied the cautious formalist; "and you will live to repent it. You are about to marry a man who has nothing but his cloak and his sword." Napoleon, who was waiting in the antechamber unknown to Josephine, overheard these words, but never mentioned them to her till the morning of the coronation, when he sent for Raguideau. The astonished old man was brought into the presence of the emperor, who immediately said to him, with a good-humoured smile, "What say you now, Raguideau; have I nothing but my cloak and my sword?"—BOURRIENNE, vi., 237, 238.

These eagles will serve as your rallying-point. They will ever be seen where your emperor shall deem them necessary for the defence of his throne and of his people.*

While Napoleon was thus conferring upon his newly-acquired power the sanction of papal benediction, Louis XVIII., from the shores of the Baltic, protested, in the face of God and man, against this fresh invasion of his claims, in terms worthy of the illustrious house whose fortunes he bore. "On the shores of the Baltic, in the sight and under the protection of Heaven, strengthened by the presence of my brother, of the Duke d'Angoulême, and the concurrence of the other princes of the blood; calling to witness the royal victims, and those whom honour, fidelity, patriotism, and duty have subjected to the Revolutionary Dec. 2, 1804. axe, or the thirst and jealousy of tyrants; invoking the manes of the young hero whom impious hands have torn from his country and future glory; offering to our people, as a pledge of reconciliation, the virtues of the angel whom Providence has snatched from fetters and death to offer an example of every Christian virtue, we swear, that never will we abandon the heritage of our fathers, or break the sacred bond which unites our destinies to yours; and we invoke, as witness to our oath, the God of St. Louis, the Judge of the rulers of men.†" Who could have foreseen, at the date of this coronation and this protest, that the bones of Louis XVIII. would repose in the royal vaults of St. Denis, while those of Napoleon were to rest under a solitary willow on the rock of St. Helena!

The coronation of the emperor was followed by a series of rejoicings, assemblies, Splendour of and fêtes, which lasted for upward of the imperial two months. The vast expenditure, court. both of the court and the numerous civil and military functionaries of government; the great concourse of strangers, and unwonted splendour of the dresses and decorations, caused an unusual degree of activity among the shopkeepers and manufacturers of Paris, and contributed not a little to reconcile that important and Democratic body to the imperial régime which had now succeeded the terrors of the Revolution. Without possessing the whole elegance or finished manners of the old régime, the imperial court was remarkable for the lustre and beauty of its assemblies, over which the grace and affability of Josephine threw their principal charm. But not one moment did Napoleon withdraw from state affairs for such amusements. Through the midst of the whole he laboured eight or ten hours a day with his ministers, and was already deeply engaged in those great designs which led to such decisive results in the succeeding years.‡

The pope had been led to expect, in return for his condescension in travelling to Paris to crown the emperor, some important benefits for the Holy See, and the cabinet of the Vatican looked forward to the restoration of the three legations annexed to the Italian Republic by the treaty of Tolentino. But, however much Napoleon might appreciate the importance of obtaining the papal benediction to his throne, he was not the man to relinquish any of the substantial

* Dum., xi., 77, 78. Bour., vi., 238, 239. † Bign., iv., 150. ‡ Bign., iv., 153. D'Abr., vii., 240, 260.

Protest of Louis XVIII. against his assumption of the imperial crown.

Napoleon refuses any accession of territory to the Holy See.

advantages of power and territory on that account, and he was little disposed to imitate the magnificent liberality of his predecessor Charlemagne to the Catholic Church. He accordingly replied to the petition of the pope for the three legations, "France has dearly purchased the power which she enjoys. We cannot sever anything from an empire which has been the fruit of ten years of bloody combats. Still less can we diminish the territory of a neighbouring potentate, which, in confiding to us the powers of government, has imposed upon us the duty of protection, and never conferred upon us the power of alienating any part of its territory."*

The close of the year was marked by a melancholy event, on which the British historian must dwell with pain, and which led to lighting up the flames of war between England and Spain.

The treaty of San Ildefonso in 1796 has been already mentioned, by which Spain became bound to furnish France with an auxiliary force;† and also the subsequent convention of 19th October, 1803, by which this auxiliary force was commuted into a subsidy to the amount of £2,880,000 yearly by the Spanish to the French government.‡ The hostile character of this treaty, and great amount of this subsidy, had long been a matter of jealousy to the British government, furnishing, as it evidently did, the means of war to France; and being, as it was, as directly applied to the fitting out of the armaments destined for the invasion of England, as if the gun-boats, instead of being constructed with this treasure at Boulogne, had been fitted out at Cadiz or Corunna. As it was known, however, that the Spanish cabinet, in yielding to this tribute, was, in truth, constrained by necessity, the English government, from whom its amount was studiously concealed, was not at first disposed to make it the subject of complaint; and it was intimated, soon after the convention was agreed to, that England would not consider a small and temporary advance of money as any ground for the commencement of hostilities. In

the close of the year, however, when Dec. 13, 1803. rumours as to the magnitude of the payment had got abroad, the English ambassador stated, in a formal note to the Spanish government, that if it amounted to anything like such a sum as three millions, Great Britain would consider it as a war-subsidy, and as in itself equivalent to a hostile aggression against herself.§ In reply, the Spanish cabinet insisted

that the amount of the subsidy was perfectly consistent with the neutrality which their court professed towards England, and not greater than would have been required to fit out the contingent provided for in the former treaty. Thus the matter rested for six weeks, when Feb. 18, 1804. the English ambassador presented a fresh and energetic remonstrance, upon the ground of the evident partiality and preference shown to French vessels over British, especially in the sale of prizes, and complaining of hostile preparations and armaments in the Spanish harbours.* The Spanish government, in reply, strongly professed their desire to give perfect satisfaction to the English cabinet on every subject excepting the subsidy, as to which they would not draw back from existing engagements; upon which the British ambassador stated that his government wished for an indefinite suspension of hostilities on the ground of the subsidy, provided no other causes of complaint were given, but that, if such took place, they would forthwith commence war without any farther declaration of an intention to do so.†

Matters were in this state of jealous watching and suspended hostility, when, in the end of September, intelligence was received by the British government that several small detachments of French troops, amounting in all to 1500 men, had proceeded from Bayonne to Ferrol, where a French naval force of four ships of the line was already lying, and that the Spanish government had transmitted orders for the arming, without loss of time, three ships of the line, two frigates, and several smaller vessels at that port; that similar instructions had been sent to Carthage and Cadiz; that three first-rate line-of-battle ships had been directed to proceed from Cadiz to Ferrol; and that orders had been given to the packets to arm as in time of war.‡ This was accompanied by the alarming addition, that within a month eleven ships of the line would in this way be ready for sea at the latter harbour; that numbers of soldiers were daily arriving there from France; that the ships, though said to be bound for America, were victualled for three months only; that they merely waited the arrival of the treasure on board the

Secret measures of hostility by the latter power, Sept. 29, 1804.

the best adapted to the wants and situation of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the interests of the British subjects, and the most dangerous to the British dominions; in fine, more than equivalent for every other species of aggression. Imperious necessity compels him now to declare these sentiments, and to add that the passage of French troops through the territories of Spain would be considered as a violation of her neutrality, and that his majesty would feel himself compelled to take the most decisive measures in consequence of that event." The Spanish minister replied, "Although the Spanish cabinet is penetrated with the truth that the idea of aiding France is compatible with that of neutrality towards Great Britain, yet he has thought that he could better combine these two objects by a method which, without being disagreeable to France, strips her neutrality towards Great Britain of that hostile exterior which military succours necessarily present."—*Parl. Deb.*, iii., 74, 91.

* On the 18th of February, 1804, Mr. Frere stated, in his note to the Spanish minister at Madrid, "I am ordered to declare to you that the system of forbearance on the part of England depends entirely on the cessation of every naval armament within the ports of this kingdom, and that I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence here if, unfortunately, this condition should be rejected. It is also indispensable that the sale of prizes brought into the ports of this kingdom should cease, otherwise I am to consider all negotiations as at an end, and I am to think only of returning to my superiors."—*Parl. Deb.*, iii., 89, 91.

† Ann. Reg., 1805, 124, 125. *Parl. Deb.*, iii., 62, 92.

‡ Lord Cochrane's Despatch, Sept. 3, 1804. *Parl. Deb.*, iii., 95 and 242.

* Du Pradt, *Quatre Concordats*, 173. Bign., iv., 113, 114.

† This force was mutually stipulated at fifteen ships of the line and 24,000 men; and this aid is to be furnished on the simple demand of the requiring party, without any inquiry into the policy or justice of the hostilities in which they are to be engaged; and by Art. ii. of the same treaty, the contracting parties are to assist each other with their whole forces, in case the stipulated succours should not be sufficient.

‡ *Ante*, i., 441, and ii., 280.

§ Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, stated in this note, "With respect to the subsidy, his majesty is perfectly sensible of the difficulties of the situation in which Spain is placed, as well by reason of her ancient ties with France as on account of the character and habitual conduct of that power and of its chief. These considerations have induced him to act with forbearance to a certain degree, and have inclined him to overlook such pecuniary sacrifices as should not be of sufficient magnitude to force attention from their political effects. But it is expressly enjoined to me to declare to your excellency that pecuniary advances, such as are stipulated in the recent convention with France, cannot be considered by the British government but as a war-subsidy: a succour the most efficacious,

frigates from America to throw off the mask; and that there did not appear a doubt of the hostile intentions of Spain.* In consequence of this intelligence, which was transmitted at the same time to Mr. Frere at Madrid, warm remonstrances Sept. 27, 1804. ces were presented to the Spanish Mr. Frere's government; and it was intimated note. by the British ambassador, "that the total cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain having been the principal condition required by England, and agreed to by Spain, as the price of the forbearance of Great Britain, the present violation of this condition can be considered in no other light but as a hostile aggression on the part of Spain, and a defiance given to England. These preparations become still more menacing from a squadron of the enemy being in the port where they are carrying on. In no case can England be indifferent to the armament which is preparing; and I entreat you to consider the disastrous consequences which will ensue if the misery which presses so heavily on this country be completed by plunging it unnecessarily into a ruinous war." To this note

Oct. 3, 1804. the Prince of Peace replied, on the D. P. Ceval- part of the Spanish government, lo's answer. "The King of Spain has never thought of being wanting to the agreement entered into with the British government. The cessation of all naval armaments against Great Britain shall be observed as heretofore; and whatever information to the contrary may have been received is wholly unfounded, and derogatory to the honour of the Spanish nation."[†]

Everything indicated that hostilities could not be averted many weeks, when they Catastrophe which precipitated hostilities. were unhappily precipitated by the measures of the British cabinet. No sooner was Admiral Cochrane's despatch, announcing the serious naval preparations at Cadiz, Carthage, and Ferrol, received by the English government, than they transmitted orders to that officer to prevent the sailing of either the French or Spanish fleets from the harbour of Ferrol, and to intimidate this intention to the French and Spanish admirals; and at the same time they sent instructions to Lord Nelson on the Mediterranean, Admiral Cochrane on the Ferrol, and Lord Cornwallis on the Brest station, to despatch two frigates each to cruise off Cadiz, in order to intercept the homeward-bound treasure frigates of Spain; and at the same time they directed these admirals to stop any Spanish vessels laden with naval or military stores, and keep them till the pleasure of the British government was known, but without committing any farther act of hostility either on such vessels or the treasure frigates. These orders were too punctually executed. On the 5th of October a squadron of four British frigates off Cadiz, under the command of Captain Moore, in the Indefatigable, fell in with the four Spanish frigates having the treasure on board, and the British officer immediately informed the Spanish commander that he had orders to detain his vessels, and earnestly entreated that this might be done without effusion of blood. The Spaniard, of course, declined to submit in this way to an equal force, and the consequence was, that an engagement took place, and in less than ten minutes

one of the Spanish ships blew up with a terrific explosion. The three others were captured, with the valuable treasure, amounting to above £2,000,000 sterling, on board; but England had to lament a loss, on the part of Spain, of a hundred killed and wounded, besides two hundred and forty lost in the frigate which exploded, before any formal announcement of hostilities.*

It is needless to proceed farther with the details of this painful negotiation. The cap- Which at ture of the frigates produced the result once brings on a war. which might have been anticipated, in an immediate declaration of war by Spain against Great Britain, on the 12th of December. Various attempts at explanation and apology were made by the English government, but Spain was too completely in the arms of France to expect she should forego such an opportunity of joining in the war; nor, indeed, after such an act of violence, could it be expected that any independent state would abstain from hostilities.^{††}

* Captain Moore's Despatch. Ann. Reg., 1804, 557, and 144.

† Parl. Deb., iii., 99, 115.

‡ The Spanish manifesto on this occasion stated, "It was very difficult for Spain and Holland, who had Spanish manifesto. treated jointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations are reciprocally connected, to avoid finally taking part in the grievances and offences offered to their ally. In these circumstances his majesty, proceeding on the principle of a wise policy, preferred pecuniary subsidies to the contingent of troops and ships, with which he was bound to assist France by the treaty of alliance in 1796; and expressed, by his minister at the court of London, his decided and firm resolution to remain neutral during the war. But the English government, animated with a spirit of hostility against Spain, not only listened to the reclamations of individuals addressed to it, but exacted, as the precise condition on which they would consider Spain, as neutral, the cessation of every armament in her ports, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes brought into them. Though these conditions were urged in the most haughty manner, they were complied with, and religiously observed by the Spanish nation; when the English government manifested its secret and perverse aims by the abominable capture of four Spanish frigates, navigating in a state of profound peace, at the very moment when the English vessels were enjoying the full rights of hospitality in the harbours of Spain. Barbarous orders, at the same time, were given to detain and carry into its harbours as many Spanish ships as its fleets could meet with, to burn or destroy every Spanish ship below a hundred tons, and carry every one of larger dimensions into Malta."—*State Papers*, 700, 701. Ann. Reg., 1804.

To this it was replied in the British declaration of war, "The stipulations of military and naval succours to a great extent by the treaty of 1796, Reply by England. followed by an obligation to put at the disposal of France, if required, the whole resources of the Spanish monarchy, gave to Great Britain an incontestable right to declare that, unless she decidedly renounced that treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform its conditions, she could not be considered as a neutral power; that the monthly sum which Spain was bound to pay by the present convention far exceeded the bounds of forbearance, as it might prove a greater injury than any other hostility; that, in consequence, it had been intimated to the Spanish government that England's abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that, if either any French troops entered Spain, or authentic accounts were received of any naval armaments preparing in the harbours of Spain for the assistance of France, the British ambassador had instructions forthwith to leave Madrid; that the constant report of naval armaments in the ports of Spain had induced the British cabinet to give the Spanish government explicit warning on the 18th of February, 1804, that all farther forbearance on the part of England must depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain; that, notwithstanding the strongest assurances of the Spanish government that this should be the case, information was received from the British admirals that considerable bodies of French troops had arrived at Ferrol from France, and that orders had been given for fitting out four ships of the line and two frigates in that very harbour, in which four French line-of-battle ships were already assembled, so as to threaten to outmatch the British blockading force; that these circumstances compelled the British government explicitly to declare, by its ambassador at Madrid, that the continuance

* Admiral Cochrane's Despatches, Sept. 5 and 11, 1804. Parl. Deb., iii., 242, 243, and Sir R. Calder's Despatch. Ibid., 213.

† Parl. Deb., iii., 95, 98.

‡ Orders, Sept. 18, 19, and 25, 1804. Parl. Deb., iii., 118, 121.

This unhappy catastrophe produced a great and painful division of opinion among the people of Great Britain. While the ministerial party lamented the necessity under which government lay of adopting the steps which had led to so deplorable an effusion of human blood, they yet vindicated the measure as justifiable in itself, and unavoidable in the circumstances in which they were placed; but a large and conscientious body of their usual supporters beheld with pain what they deemed an unwarrantable invasion of the rights of nations, and loudly condemned an act derogatory to the honour of the British name. The debates in Parliament on this subject condensed, as usual, everything that was or could be urged on the opposite sides, clothed in all the force of language of which the great orators who then led the different parties were masters. On the one hand, it was urged by Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville, "that there appeared nothing but inattention, negligence, and mystery on the part of the British government on this occasion. The Spanish government had been most eager to cultivate a good understanding with this country, and had made repeated applications for this purpose to the British cabinet; but the criminal negligence or supineness of ministers had at length forced them into the arms of France, and compelled them to permit the march of fifteen hundred French troops to Ferrol. Spain no doubt had, in 1796, entered into a treaty of alliance with France, which might well have been made the ground of hostility, but it was not done so; and when afterward she commuted the military succours there stipulated into a fixed annual payment, to this, too, there was no serious objection stated. They told the Spanish government, indeed, that the continuance of a suspension of hostilities would mainly depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the harbours of Spain; but was this condition violated? Ships, indeed, were fitting out at Ferrol; but when remonstrated with on the subject, the Spanish government at once declared that their sole object was to transport troops to the coast of Biscay, where a rebellion had broken out; and at the same time the governor of Ferrol stated that, to remove all uneasiness, the men should be put ashore, and sent round by land, however inconvenient. Not satisfied with these explana-

of peace required a complete and unreserved disclosure of the Spanish relations and engagements with France, which had hitherto been withheld; and that, at the same time, it became necessary to issue orders to prevent the sailing of the French or Spanish squadrons from Ferrol, and to intercept and detain the treasure ships till its destination was divulged, and to send back any Spanish ship of war to the harbour from which she sailed, but on no account to detain any homeward-bound ships of war not having treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever."—See *Parl. Deb.*, iii., 126, 130.

The statement of the Spanish manifesto as to the orders given to Lord Nelson to destroy all vessels under 100 tons and send the others to Malta, is an exaggerated and mistaken allusion to these last instructions. No such orders were given by the British government. On the contrary, the instructions were "not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic majesty sailing from a port of Spain; but you are to require the commander of such ship to return directly to the port from whence he came, and only, in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain him and send him to Gibraltar or England. You are not to detain any homeward-bound ship of war, unless she shall have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever." They are also directed "to detain any Spanish ships or vessels laden with naval or military stores."—See *Orders*, 25th September, and 25th November, 1804. *Parl. Deb.*, iii., 119, 121.

tions, not waiting to see if they were well founded, we proceeded at once to the violence of assailing their ships on the high seas. It is in vain to assimilate this to an embargo on an enemy's ships. Was there no difference between delaying merchants' ships, which might be delivered back, and assailing them on the high seas? Take a merchant's property, it might be restored to him; imprison seamen, they might be discharged; but burn, sink, and blow up ship and crew, and who can restore the innocent blood which has been spilt? The French branded us with the name of a mercantile people, and said that we were ever thirsting after gold. They would therefore impute this violence to our eagerness for dollars. Better that all the dollars and ten times their quantity were paid, so as it could wash away the stain which had been brought on our arms.

"In considering this question, we must carefully distinguish between the causes of a rupture which might have been set forth, and those which were actually made the ground of hostilities. The treaty of St. Ildefonso was clearly an offensive treaty, and its existence was as clearly a ground on which war might have been declared. It was even more offensive than the family compact. But the grand objection to the conduct of ministers was, that they did not instantly take a decided line on the resumption of hostilities with France. They should then have required Spain to renounce the offensive articles of that treaty, or used every effort to cultivate a good understanding with that power, while yet her disposition was amicable. They did neither. The subsequent commutation of the warlike succours into a money payment may possibly have been considered as an additional hostile act by ministers, but unquestionably they did nothing to evince this feeling to the court of Spain. Mr. Frere remained, and was directed to remain, at Madrid long after the commutation was known. Spain, in truth, was acting under the dread of French conquest, and therefore it was cruel to inquire rigidly into her conduct. The armament at Ferrol was quite inconsiderable, and had been admitted by Mr. Frere himself to be destined for the conveyance of troops to Biscay. The orders for sailing had been countermanded, and the vessels ordered on the 16th of September to be laid up in ordinary; so that all ground of complaint had been removed before the English orders to stop the treasure frigates had been given. Even the refusal to communicate the terms of the commutation treaty was no justification of the violence which had been committed, because that refusal was subsequent to the order which produced the capture."*

On the other hand, it was answered by Mr. Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury: "The Defence of the terms of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, government by which France and Spain mutu- Mr. Pitt. ally guaranty each other's territories, and engage to furnish reciprocally a force of fifteen ships of the line and 24,000 men, to be given upon the mere demand of the requiring party, and the additional obligation upon each, in case of need, to assist the other with their whole forces, lie at the foundation of this question, because they constituted the ground of the whole proceedings which the British government found themselves compelled to adopt. In whatever light this treaty be viewed, it could not be con-

* *Parl. Deb.*, iii., 354, 362, 448, 453

sidered, on the part of Spain, but as a reluctant tribute to the overbearing dictates of its ambitious and tyrannic ally; and although conditions so plainly hostile would have justified the demand of an explicit and immediate renunciation from Spain, on pain of a declaration of war in case of refusal, yet a feeling of pity towards a gallant and high-spirited, though unfortunate nation, long dictated a delicate and temporizing policy. But, at the same time, the interests of this country imperatively required that a pledge should be given that this treaty should not be acted upon; and in reply to the representations of the English ambassador to that effect, the Prince of Peace evinced, in August last, a disposition, if possible, to elude the demands of France. The requisitions of the First Consul, however, were urgent, and nothing short of a subsidy of £250,000 a month, or £3,000,000 a year, would be accepted; although the Spaniards were so sensible of the enormity of complying with such a demand, that they strongly urged that even a subsidy of £700,000 yearly would expose them on just grounds to a declaration of war from Great Britain. The particulars of this treaty Spain, down to the very last moment, refused to communicate; and, when urged on this subject, they answered, 'You have no reason of complaint, because you do not know what we pay.' From what we have learned, however, of the commutation which was finally agreed to, it is evident that, so far from being an alleviation, it was the greatest aggravation of the original treaty. At the very highest, the rated equivalent for fifteen ships of the line would be a million yearly: so that, as the Spanish government has agreed to pay three millions annually, there remains £2,000,000 for the commutation of the land-forces, being at the rate of £85 a man; whereas the equivalent for service of this kind usually given, and that agreed to in the treaty between this country and Holland in 1788, was £9 for each man: a fact which clearly demonstrates that the commutation is nearly ten times as injurious to Great Britain as the original treaty would have been.

"The forbearance of ministers, under such aggravated circumstances of provocation, was not founded upon blindness to the danger which the hostility of Spain, under French direction, might hereafter produce, but upon motives of policy, adopting due preparations against that event. Their forbearance was expressly said to be conditional, and to depend as a *sine qua non* on a total abstinence from naval preparations in all the harbours of Spain, and the prohibition of the sale of prizes in Spanish ports. When it is recollected that the total revenue of Spain does not exceed eight millions, and that they had consented to give three millions, or not much less than a half of this sum, annually to France, these conditions cannot be deemed exorbitant. It is in vain to say that this enormous subsidy was subsequently acquiesced in. In all his notes to the Spanish government on this subject, Mr. Frere accurately distinguishes between temporary connivance and permanent acquiescence, and reserved the right of making the subsidy the ground of hostility at some future period, even by itself; and much more, if any additional ground for complaint were given.

"Such was the state of affairs, when information was received from Admiral Cochrane that the condition on which alone the neutrality of Spain, under existing circumstances, had been

connived at, had been violated by the Spanish government. That government were called upon to act upon that information, cannot be denied. The existence of formidable preparations in the ports of Ferrol, at the very time when a French squadron was lying blockaded there, and French troops were pouring in through the Spanish territory, and the packets were armed as in time of war, were such indications of approaching hostility as would have rendered the British government to the last degree culpable if they had not instantly adopted measures of precaution. What would have been said, if, through their negligence in doing so, the Ferrol, in conjunction with the Cadiz and Carthagea squadron, had struck a blow at our interests, or co-operated with the French in any part of the great naval designs which they have in contemplation? The excuse that they were wanted to convey troops to quell an insurrection in Biscay is a pretence so flimsy as to be seen through the moment it is stated. If such was really the object, why not transport the troops in small craft, or in ships of war armed *en flute*? and why, for such a domestic transaction, range her line-of-battle ships alongside of the French and Dutch in the harbour of Ferrol? Why arm the packets, if land operations in Biscay alone were in contemplation? The only question, in truth, is, not whether we have done too much, but whether we have done enough. It was clearly stated by us, long before hostilities commenced, that if the conditions of neutrality were violated by Spain, we would consider it as a declaration of war: they were so violated, and we acted upon them as such. We would, in such circumstances, have been clearly justified in preventing the junction of the French, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, and intercepting the treasures destined for the coffers, not of Spain, but of France; but we adopted the milder expedient of stopping and detaining them only; and if they have subsequently been rendered good prize, it is entirely owing to the conduct of Spain herself, in refusing to communicate any particulars in regard to the commutation convention, and following that up by a declaration of war against this country."

Upon a division, the conduct of ministers in this affair was approved of by a Who is supported by Parliament, Feb. 12, 1805.
majority of 207 in the Lower House: there being 313 in their favour, and 106 on the other side. In the House of Lords a similar decision was given by a majority of 78: the number being 114 to 36.†

Thirty years have now elapsed since this question, so vital to the national honour and public character of England, was thus fiercely debated in Parliament and the nation: almost all the actors on the stage are dead, or have retired into the privacy of domestic life, and the rapid succession of other events has drawn public interest into a different direction, and enabled us now to look back upon it with the calm feelings of retrospective justice. Impartiality compels the admission that the conduct of England in this transaction cannot be reviewed without feelings of regret. Substantially, the proceedings of the English cabinet were justifiable, and warranted by the circumstances in which they were placed; but formally, they were reprehensible, and form enters into the essence of justice in the transactions of nations. It

* Parl. Deb., iii., 366, 386.

† Ib., iii., 354, 468.

is true, the treaty of St. Ildefonso was a just ground for declaring war: the commutation treaty was a still juster; and even the armaments at Ferrol, if not explained, might have warranted the withdrawing of the ambassador at Madrid, and commencement of hostilities. Spain was in the most delicate of all situations in relation to Great Britain, after agreeing to the enormous war subsidy stipulated by that treaty; and this the French historians cannot dispute, since they represent the accepting of a subsidy of £80,000 a year from England, by the convention of the 3d of December of that very year,* as an overt act of hostility on the part of Sweden against France. She was bound, therefore, in return for the forbearance which overlooked such excessive provocation, to have been studiously careful not to give offence in any other particular, and could not have complained if the crossing of the Bidassoa by one French company, or the arming of one frigate at Ferrol, had been followed by an immediate declaration of war on the part of Great Britain. But admitting all this, conceding

And particular in which England appears to have been wrong.

that ample ground for declaring war existed, the question remains, Could the existence of these grounds warrant the commencement of hostilities without such a declaration, while the

British ambassador was still at Madrid, and negotiations for the explaining or removal of the

grounds of complaint were still in dependence? That is the material question, and it is a question on which no defence can be maintained for the conduct of England. True, the declaration of war would, in such circumstances, have been a piece of form merely; true, it would not have averted one shot from the treasure frigates, and, on the contrary, led to their immediate capture instead of conditional detention; but it was a step which the usages of war imperatively required, and the want of which distinguishes legitimate hostility from unauthorized piracy. A line apparently as unsubstantial frequently separates the duellist from the assassin, or the legitimate acquirer of property from the highway robber; and they have much to answer for who, in the transactions of nations which acknowledge no superior, depart from one formality which usage has sanctioned, or one security against spoliation which a sense of justice has introduced. It is with painful feelings, therefore, that the British historian must recount the circumstances of this melancholy transaction; but it is a subject of congratulation that this injustice was committed to a nation which was afterward overwhelmed by such a load of obligation, that, like the Protestant martyr at the stake, England held her right hand in the flames till her offence was expiated by suffering, and that if Spain was the scene of the darkest blot on her character which the annals of the Revolutionary war can exhibit, it was the theatre, also, of the most generous devotion, and the brightest glories which her history has to record.

* Bign., iv., 68.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR TO THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805.

ARGUMENT.

Necessity to which Napoleon was exposed of constant War.

—To disguise it, he proposes Peace to Great Britain.

—Answer of the British Government.—Great Influence of

the French Press in his Favour.—Speech of Napoleon to the Senate.—Commencement of indirect Taxation

in France, and flattering State of the Finances.—Public Announcement of the Alliance with Russia in the

King of England's opening Speech to Parliament.—Important Negotiations with the Russian Ambassador in

London.—Memorable State Paper, of the 11th of January, 1805, the Basis of the whole Anti-revolutionary Alliance.

—Continued Jealousy of Austria on the Part of Prussia.—Supplies for 1805.—Financial Details of Great Britain for

1805.—Other Parliamentary Measures.—Charges against Lord Melville.—His Impeachment and Acquittal.—Com-

mencement of the Debates on the Catholic Question.—Argument of Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville for the Repeal

of the Catholic Disabilities.—Answer of Lords Hawkesbury, Sidmouth, and Eldon, for their Continuance.—The

Bill is rejected by a large Majority.—Reflections on this Subject.—Total Failure of Catholic Emancipation to paci-

fy the Country.—Causes of this apparent Anomaly.—The immense Confiscation of Land in former Times.—

The Vesting of the forfeited Estates in Absentees.—Total Unfitness of the Irish at Present for a Free Constitu-

tion, and peculiar Character and Dangers of the Catholic Religion.—Measures of Napoleon at this Period.—

Change of Government in Holland, and Assumption of the Iron Crown of Lombardy by the French Emperor.—

His Journey into Italy.—Splendid Pageant on the Field of Marengo.—He enters Milan.—Is crowned with the

Iron Crown of Charlemagne.—Adulatory Addresses from Naples and Genoa.—Napoleon's Reply to the latter Body.

—Incorporation of Genoa with France.—His secret Designs in that Step.—Popularity of Napoleon's Govern-

ment in Italy, and great Works which it undertook.—His Progress through the Italian Cities.—Magnificent Fête at

Genoa.—Extinction of Lucca, and Incorporation of Parma and Placentia with France.—Increasing Jealousy of Aus-

tria, and Change of its Ministry.—Treaty, Offensive and Defensive, between Russia and England.—Objects of the

Alliance.—They disclaim all Intention to control the French in the Choice of their Government.—At length the

Accession of Austria is obtained to the Alliance.—Sweden also is included.—Prussia in vain endeavours to

Mediate.—Manifesto of France in the *Moniteur*.—Prussia persists in her Neutrality, from the Hope of getting Han-

over, and agrees explicitly to accept of that Electorate.—Napoleon repairs to Boulogne to superintend the Eng-

lish Expedition.—Immense Force collected on the Coasts of the Channel for that Object.—Its admirable Organiza-

tion and Equipment.—Nature of the Camps in which the Soldiers were lodged.—Ample Powers vested in the Mar-

shals of Corps and Generals of Division, and vigilant Watching to which they were subjected.—Vast Extent of

his Correspondence with his Generals.—Organization of the Flotilla.—His secret Project for effecting the Passage.

—Autograph Note which he has himself left on the Subject.—Various Actions with the British Cruisers off Bou-

logne.—Operations of the combined Fleets of France and Spain to second the Enterprise.—Measures of Defence by

the British Government.—The Toulon and Rochefort Squadrons put to Sea.—Alarm they excite in Great Brit-

ain.—The combined Fleet steer for the West Indies.—Uncertainty of Nelson.—He at length follows to that

Quarter.—Searches in vain for the Enemy there.—Simultaneous Anxiety of Napoleon as to Nelson's Destination.

—Combined Fleet had returned to Europe.—Its secret Orders.—Entire Success hitherto of Napoleon's Design.

—But Nelson penetrates it, and warns the British Government of its Danger.—Energetic Measures of the Ad-

miralty when they receive his Despatches.—The combined Fleet is outstripped by the British Brig which

brought them.—Extraordinary Penetration of Collingwood as to the Enemy's Design.—Sir R. Calder's Action

with the combined Fleet.—The two Fleets separate without decisive Success.—Vast Importance of this Action.

—Napoleon's Conduct on receiving the Intelligence.—It totally defeats his well-laid Projects.—Cruel Injustice to

which Sir R. Calder was meanwhile subjected.—Nelson returns to England.—Napoleon orders the combined Fleet

again to put to Sea.—But it makes Cadiz instead of Brest.

—Ganteaume in vain leaves Brest to meet them.—Napoleon's Designs are in consequence entirely ruined.—He

sets off for Paris, September 1.—Extraordinary Dexterity to which the Troops had arrived in embarking.—Austria

had been making hostile Preparations.—Angry Note of Talleyrand to the Cabinet of Vienna.—Their Reply.—Both

Parties warmly assail the Court of Munich.—It finally joins France.—The Austrians cross the Inn.—Forces on

both Sides.—The Army of England marches from Boulogne for the Rhine.—His Address to the Senate.—En-

tire Dislocation of the Armament at Boulogne.—The combined Fleet is ordered, nevertheless, to sail from Cadiz.—

Restoration of the Gregorian Calendar.—Increase of the British blockading Force before Cadiz.—Enthusiastic Re-

ception of Nelson by the Fleet.—His Stratagem to induce the Enemy to leave the Harbour.—They accordingly set

sail.—Disposition on both Sides.—Magnificent Aspect of the Fleets as they approached each other.—Order in which

the English Fleet bore down upon the Enemy.—Battle of Trafalgar.—Heroic Conduct of Collingwood.—Nelson next

breaks the Line.—Details of the Action in other Quarters.—Last Moments and Death of Nelson.—Vast Magnitude

of this Victory.—Violent Tempest, and Disasters to the Prizes after it terminated.—Interchange of courteous

Deeds with the Spaniards at Cadiz.—Mingled Joy and Grief in England on the Occasion.—Honours granted to

the Family of Nelson.—Character of that Naval Hero.—Victory of Sir R. Strachan.—Reflections on the decisive

Nature of these Successes.—On the Manœuvre of breaking the Line, and on the Introduction of Steam into

Naval Warfare.—What if Napoleon had succeeded in effecting a Landing.—His Designs, if he had succeeded in

that Object.—Democratic Changes which he would instantly have proclaimed.—Their probable Result.

"The world," said Napoleon, "believe me the enemy of peace; but I must fulfil my destiny. I am forced to combat and conquer in order to preserve. You must accomplish something new every three months in order to captivate the French people. With them whoever ceases to advance is lost."* Continued progress, fresh successions of victories, unbounded glory, were the conditions on which he held the throne. He knew well that the moment these failed his authority would begin to decline. With him constant wars and evident advances towards universal dominion, therefore, were not the result merely of individual ambition, or dictated by an insatiable desire to extend the boundaries of France; they were the necessary consequence of the circumstances in which he was placed, and the temper of the times in which he lived. They arose, inevitably, from a military conqueror arriving at the supreme direction of a nation when heated by the pursuit of revolutionary ambition. As this system, however, required a continual sacrifice of the rights and interests of other nations, in order to feed the vanity and gratify the passions of one, it involved in itself, like every other irregular indulgence, whether in nations or individuals, the principles of its own destruction. He fell at last, not because he opposed, but because he yielded to the evil spirit of his times; because, instead of checking, he fanned the flame of revolutionary ambition, converted by his genius into that of military conquest; and continually advanced before a devouring fire, which precipitated him at last

Necessity to which Napoleon was exposed of constant war.

* Dum., xi., 81. De Staël, Dix Ans d'Exil, 15.

upon the snows of Russia and the rout of Waterloo.

But, although well aware that it was on such perilous conditions, and such alone, ^{But to disguise it, he proposes} that he held the throne, no man ^{peace to Great Britain.} knew better than Napoleon the importance of concealing their existence from the eyes of mankind, and representing himself as compelled on every occasion to take up arms in order to defend the dignity or independence of the Empire. It was his general policy, accordingly, when he perceived that unceasing encroachments during peace had roused a general spirit of resistance to his ambition, and that a general war was inevitable, to make proposals of accommodation to the most inveterate of his enemies, in order to gain the credit of moderate intentions, and throw upon them the odium of actually commencing hostilities. In pursuance of this system, he was no sooner convinced, from the turn which his diplomatic relations with Russia and Sweden had taken, that a third coalition was approaching, than he made pacific overtures to the English government. His letter on this subject, addressed, according to custom, to the King of England in person, was of the following tenour: "Sir, my brother, Jan. 2, 1805.

Called to the throne by Providence and the suffrages of the Senate, the people, and the army, my first feeling was the desire for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity: they may continue their strife for ages, but will their governments, in so doing, fulfil the most sacred of the duties which they owe to their people? And how will they answer to their conscience for so much blood innocently shed, and without the prospect of any good whatever to their subjects? I am not ashamed to make the first advances. I have sufficiently proved, I flatter myself, to the world that I fear none of the chances of war. It presents nothing which I have occasion to fear. Peace is the wish of my heart, but war has never been adverse to my glory. I conjure your majesty, therefore, not to refuse yourself the satisfaction of giving peace to the world. Never was an occasion more favourable for calming the passions and giving ear only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. If that opportunity be lost, what limit can be assigned to a war which all my efforts have been unable to terminate? Your majesty has gained more during the last ten years than the whole extent of Europe in riches and territory: your subjects are in the very highest state of prosperity: what can you expect from a war? To form a coalition of the Continental powers? Be assured the Continent will remain at peace. A coalition will only increase the strength and preponderance of the French Empire. To renew our intestine divisions? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances? Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To wrest from France her colonies? They are to her only a secondary consideration, and your majesty has already enough and to spare of those possessions. Upon reflection you must, I am persuaded, yourself arrive at the conclusion that the war is maintained without an object; and what a melancholy prospect for two great nations to combat merely for the sake of fighting! The world is surely large enough for our two nations to live in it; and reason has still sufficient power to find the means of reconciliation, if the inclination only is not wanting. I have now at least discharged a duty

dear to my heart. May your majesty trust to the sincerity of the sentiments which I have now expressed, and the reality of my desire to give the most convincing proofs of it."*

The forms of a representative government would not permit the King of England to answer this communication in person; but Lord Mulgrave, the minister for foreign affairs, on the 14th of January, addressed the following answer to M. Talleyrand: "His Britannic majesty has received the letter addressed to him by the chief of the French government. There is nothing which his majesty has more at heart than to seize the first opportunity of restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, provided it is founded upon a basis not incompatible with the permanent interests and security of his dominions. His majesty is persuaded that that object cannot be attained but by arrangements which may at the same time provide for the future peace and security of Europe, and prevent a renewal of the dangers and misfortunes by which it is now overwhelmed. In conformity with these sentiments, his majesty feels that he cannot give a more specific answer to the overture which he has received until he has had time to communicate with the Continental powers, to whom he is united in the most confidential manner, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of sentiments with which he is animated, and of the lively interest which he takes in the security and independence of Europe."[†]

This reply, which in a manner disclosed the existence of a coalition against France, or at least of negotiations tending to such an end, completely answered the purpose of Napoleon. ^{Great influence of French press in his favour.} It both revealed to the subjects of his Empire the necessity of extensive armaments, and gave them an opportunity of comparing what they deemed the pacific intentions and moderation of the emperor with the projects of ambition which were formed by the coalesced sovereigns. The press, which in his hands, as in the hands of every despotic power, whether military or popular, had become the most terrible and slavish instrument in benighting mankind, resounded with declamations on the forbearance and wisdom of the youthful conqueror. The real causes of the war, the occupation of Italy, the invasion of Germany, the subjugation of Switzerland, were forgotten; and public opinion, formed on the only arguments the people were permitted to hear, prepared unanimously to support the ruler of France, in the firm belief that, in so doing, they were not following out any projects of offensive ambition, but preparing only for the maintenance of domestic independence.[‡]

This general delusion was increased by the eloquent and seducing expressions in which Napoleon addressed himself to the Legislative Body at the opening of the session in the close of the year 1804: "Princes, magistrates, soldiers, citizens," said he, "we have all but one object in our several departments, the interest of our country. Weakness in the executive is the greatest of all misfortunes to the people. Soldier or First Consul, I have but one thought:

* Dum., xi., 63, 64.

† Dum., xi., 86. Ann. Reg., 1805. State Papers, 237.

‡ De Staël, ii., 282. Sur la Rév. Franç.

§ Dum., xi., 69.

Dec. 25, 1804.
Speech of Napoleon to the Senate.

emperor, I have no other object, the prosperity of France. *I do not wish to increase its territory, but I am resolved to maintain its integrity.* I have no desire to augment the influence which we possess in Europe, but I will not permit what we enjoy to decline. *No state shall be incorporated with our Empire;* but I will not sacrifice my rights, or the ties which unite us, to other states.¹⁷ Such were the expressions by which he blinded the eyes of his subjects at the very time that he was taking measures, as the event will show, for the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic with France, and the progressive extension of its dominion over the Ecclesiastical States and the whole Italian Peninsula. No man ever knew as well as Napoleon how, by the artful use of alluring expressions, to blind his people to the reality of the projects which he had in view; and none ever calculated so successfully upon the slight recollection and exclusive attention to present objects which have ever characterized that volatile people.*

This session of the Legislative Body was distinguished by an important step in French finance, highly characteristic of the increased wisdom and milder administration by which that great department was now governed. This was the commencement of the system of *indirect* taxation, and the consequent diminution of that enormous load of direct burdens which, amid all the declamations of the Revolutionists, had been laid during the preceding convulsions upon the French people.

It has been already mentioned† that the territorial burdens of France during the progress of the Revolution had become enormous; the land-tax amounting to a full fifth of the whole profit derived from cultivation by the nation, and the inequality in the distribution of this burden being so excessive, that in many places the landowners paid thirty, forty, and fifty, and even eighty per cent. on their incomes.‡ The enormity of the evil at length attracted the attention of the emperor, and his sagacious mind at once perceived the superiority of taxes on consumption, which, confounded with the price of the articles on which they were laid, were hardly

felt as a grievance, over an enormous direct payment from the proprietors to the government, which fell with excessive and intolerable severity upon a particular class of society. Under his auspices, accordingly, a system of indirect taxes was organized under the name of *Droits Reunis*, which soon came to form an important branch of the public revenue. In the very first year, though their amount was very inconsiderable, they enabled the government to diminish the territorial imposts by 10,200,000 francs, or £408,000. The revenue, as laid before the Chambers, though not a faithful picture, exhibited a progressive increase in all its branches, and enabled the emperor, without any loans, with the assistance only of the great contributions levied on Spain, Portugal, Italy, and other allied states, to meet the vast and increasing expenses of the year.§|| On the 31st of December, a flattering exposition of the situation of the Empire was laid before the Chambers by M. Cham-

pagny, the minister of the interior, and the intention announced of effecting constitutional changes in the Italian and Bavarian Republics, similar to that recently completed in the French Empire. The splendid picture which these representations drew of the internal prosperity of France gave rise to the eulogium on Napoleon, which acquired a deserved celebrity at the time. "The first place was vacant: the most worthy was called to fill it: he has only dethroned anarchy."¹⁸

Events of still more importance were announced to the British Parliament in the speech from the throne; and the negotiations which then took place were of the greater importance, that they formed the basis on which, at the conclusion of the war, the arrangements at the Congress of Vienna were mainly formed. From the grounds then taken, Great Britain, through all the subsequent vicissitudes of fortune, never for one moment swerved. In the speech from the throne, the King of England observed, "I have received pacific overtures from the chief of the French government, and have in consequence expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may be consistent with the permanent interest and safety of my dominions; but these objects are closely connected with the general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation without previous communication with those powers on the Continent with whom I am engaged in confidential intercourse and connexion with a view to that important object, and especially to the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe."¹⁹

It was not without foundation that Mr. Pitt thus publicly announced the formation of political connexions which evidently pointed to a third coalition. His ardent mind had long perceived, in the coldness which had taken place between France and Russia, and the almost open rupture with Sweden, the elements from which to frame a powerful confederacy against that formidable Empire; and considerable progress, through his indefatigable efforts, had been made not only in arranging the basis of such a confederacy, but obtaining the co-operation of the power whose aid was indispensable to its success, the cabinet of Vienna. Assured, at length, of the friendly disposition of the Austrian government, notwithstanding the caution and reserve which, from their exposed situation, they were compelled to adopt, Mr. Pitt, four days after the meeting of Parliament, presented a confidential com-

Public announcement of the alliance with Russia in the King of England's opening speech to Parliament. Jan. 15, 1804.

Important negotiations with the Russian ambassador at London. Jan. 19, 1805.

France.		
Direct Taxes.....	313,749,000, or	£12,500,000
Registers	198,584,000, or	7,800,000
Customs.....	41,485,000, or	1,700,000
Excise, first year.....	3,895,000, or	138,000
Postoffice	10,471,000, or	442,000
Lottery.....	16,658,000, or	640,000
Salt Tax.....	3,220,000, or	122,000

588,062,000, or £23,342,000

—DUC DE GAETA, i., 304.

* State Papers, 1804. Ann. Reg., 284. Bign., iv., 68.

† Parl. Deb., iii., 3.

* Bign., iv., 163, 164. ii.

† Ante, i., 483.

‡ Duc de Gaeta, i., 196, 197.

§ Duc de Gaeta, i., 215. Bign., iv., 158, 159.

|| The income of France during the year 1804 was eighteen millions higher than in 1803, and was as follows:

munication to the Russian ambassador in London, in which the basis of the principles of the coalition was distinctly laid down. It was proposed, 1. To reduce France to its former limits, such as they were before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the countries rescued from France, such arrangements as, while they provide in the best possible manner for the happiness and rights of their inhabitants, may at the same time form a powerful barrier against it in future, and for this purpose to incorporate the Low Countries with Prussia. 3. To unite the kingdom of Etruria to Tuscany, restore Lombardy to Austria, and annex Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont. 4. To take measures for establishing a system of public right throughout Europe. "The first of these objects," continues the note, "is certainly the one which the views of his majesty and of the emperor (of Russia) would wish to be established, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the wishes which they have formed for the security and independence of Europe." The co-operation of Austria was alluded to in the same document; for it goes on to state, "His majesty perceives with pleasure, from the secret and confidential communications which your excellency has transmitted, that the views of the court of Vienna are perfectly in accordance with this principle, and that the extension which that court desires can not only be admitted with safety, but even extended with advantage to the common cause."* But it is worthy of especial notice that, even in this secret and confidential note, there is not a hint of either reducing the ancient limits of France or imposing a government on it contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants: an instance of moderation in nations, suffering at the moment so severely under the ambition of that country, which is in the highest degree remarkable, and rendered the confederacy worthy of the glorious success which ultimately attended its exertions. The note, indeed, is the noblest monument of the prophetic wisdom, as well as impartial justice, with which Mr. Pitt conducted the war against the Revolution. It is truly wonderful to see that great statesman thus early tracing the outline of the general policy of the great coalition which, ten years afterward, effected the deliverance of Europe; and it is a memorable instance of national perseverance as well as moderation, to behold the same objects unceasingly pursued by his successors, during ten years of the most violent oscillations of fortune, and no severer terms at length imposed upon the vanquished than had been agreed to by their conquerors in the outset of the strife, and at the highest point of their enemy's elevation.†

About the same time a treaty was concluded between Russia and Sweden, for the avowed purpose of "maintaining the Jan. 14, 1805.

secure the aid and co-operation of the other powers of the Continent, in proportions corresponding to their ability to take part in the great and important enterprise on which the future safety of Europe is entirely dependant.

"With this design, the first point is to fix as precisely as possible the objects which are to be kept in view by the coalesced powers.

"It appears from the explanation which has been given of the intentions of the emperor, with which those of the king are entirely conformable, that these objects may be divided into three heads: 1. To rescue from French domination the countries which that power has conquered since the commencement of the Revolution, and to reduce it to the limits by which it was bounded before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the territories so taken from France, such arrangements as may at once provide for their own tranquillity and happiness, and establish a barrier against the future projects of aggrandizement of that power. 3. To establish, on the restoration of peace, a system of mutual convention and guarantee for the security of the different powers, and establish in Europe a general system of public rights.

"The first and second of these objects are announced in the most general terms; but neither the one nor the other can be considered in detail without considering the nature and extent of the means at their disposal for carrying them into execution. The first is certainly that which the wishes of the emperor and king would wish to see established in its fullest extent, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the views which they have formed for the deliverance of Europe. If it were possible to unite to Great Britain and Russia the two other great powers of the Continent, there seems no doubt that such an assemblage of forces would be at their disposal as would enable them to accomplish all that they desire. But if, as there is too much reason to fear, it shall be found impossible to make Prussia enter into the views of the confederacy, it may be doubted whether it will be possible to carry on in all parts of Europe the operations necessary to secure the first object in its full extent.

"The second object involves within itself more than one object of the highest importance. The views and sentiments of his majesty and the Emperor of Russia in striving to bring about this concert, are pure and disinterested. Their chief object in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France, is to re-establish, as much as possible, their ancient rights, and to secure the well-being of their inhabitants: but, in pursuing that object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which, indeed, that well-being is mainly dependant.

"It follows from this principle that, if any of these countries are capable of re-establishing their independence, and placed in a situation where they are capable of defending it, such an arrangement would be entirely conformable to the spirit of the proposed system. But among the countries at present subjected to the dominion of France, there are others to whom such a system is wholly inapplicable, either from their ancient relations having been so completely destroyed that they cannot be re-established, or because they are so situated that their independence could only be nominal, and equally incompatible with their own security, or that of Europe in general. Happily, the greater number stand in the first predicament. If the arms of the allies should be crowned with such success as to despoil France of all the conquests she has made since the Revolution, it would certainly be their first object to re-establish the United Provinces and Switzerland, and the territories of the King of Sardinia and Naples, as well as the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany; but those of Genoa, of the Italian Republic, including the three Legations, as well as Parma and Placentia, the Austrian Low Countries, and the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, belong to the second denomination. As to the Italian provinces which have been mentioned, experience has demonstrated that they have neither disposition nor resources to resist the aggressions of France; the King of Spain has too largely participated in the system, of which so large a portion of Europe has been the victims, to render it necessary to take into consideration the ancient rights of his family; and the last measures of Genoa, and of some of the other Italian States, give them no title to appeal either to the justice or generosity of the allies. It is evident, besides, that these little sovereignties have no means of maintaining their independence, and that their separate existence can serve only to weaken and paralyze the force which, as much as possible, should be concentrated in the hands of the principal powers of Italy.

"It is needless to dwell particularly on the situation of the Low Countries. The events which have taken place forbid the possibility of their being restored to the House of

* Schoel, Rec. de Pièces Officielles, vii., 59. Bign., iv., 192, 193.

† This state paper, the most remarkable in the whole memorable state Revolutionary war, as containing the principles which were constantly maintained and finally brought to a successful issue by Great Britain, deserves to be quoted at greater length than is possible in the abridged narrative of the text:

"From the Report of Prince Czartouriski, and the confidential communications received from the cabinet of St. Petersburg, his majesty perceives with the highest satisfaction that the sentiments of the emperor, in regard to the deliverance and security of Europe, and its future independence, agree entirely with his own. The king, in consequence, is desirous of entering into the fullest and most unreserved explanations on every point which relates to that great object, and to form the closest union with the emperor, in order that, by their united efforts, they may

Memorable state paper, Jan. 11, 1805, the basis of the whole anti-revolutionary alliance.

balance of power in Europe, and providing for the independence of Germany." Immediately afterwards, a Russian corps disembarked in Pomerania, to act in conjunction with the Swedish forces. This treaty proved a source

of jealousy and disquietude to the Prussian cabinet; and the diplomatic relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg soon assumed a spirit of hostility, which augured little good to the confederacy which England was striving to bring about between the great powers of Europe. Count Wintzingerode was, in consequence, despatched to Berlin by the Emperor Alexander, to endeavour to induce the Prussian cabinet to enter into the designs of England and Russia; but, notwithstanding the leaning of Baron Hardenberg, its chief minister, and the influence of the queen, the old jealousy of Austria still prevailed, and Prussia persisted in that evident partiality to the

Austria: it follows, therefore, that some new arrangements must be made in regard to that country; and it is evident that it can never exist as an independent power. The same considerations apply to the states on the left bank of the Rhine: they have been detached from the Empire, and their owners received indemnities in the interior of Germany. It appears, therefore, no way repugnant to the most sacred principles of justice and public morality to make, in regard to these countries, such dispositions as the general interests of Europe require; and it is evident that, after all the blood which has been shed, there exist no other means of re-establishing the peace of Europe on a durable foundation. It is fortunate that such an arrangement, essential in itself to the object which is proposed, may be made to contribute in the most powerful manner to bring about the means by which it may be effected.

"It is certainly a matter of the highest importance, if not of absolute necessity, to secure the efficacious and vigorous co-operation of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to hope that either of these powers will embark in the common cause, unless they have the prospect of an advantage to indemnify them for their exertions. For these reasons, his majesty is clearly of opinion that nothing could so much contribute to the general security, as by giving Austria additional strength to resist the designs of France on the side of Italy, and putting Prussia in a similar situation in the Low Countries. In Italy, reasons of policy require that the strength of the King of Sardinia should be increased, and that Austria should be placed in a situation to furnish him with prompt assistance in case of attack. With this view, it is indispensable that the territories now forming the Republic of Italy should be given to other sovereigns. In making the distribution, a proper augmentation must be given to the King of Sardinia; and his possessions, as well as those of the grand-duchy of Tuscany, which it is proposed to revive, be brought in contact with those of Austria; and for those the Ligurian Republic, to all appearance, must be united to Piedmont.

"Such territorial arrangements would go far to secure the future repose of Europe, by forming a more powerful barrier against the ambition of France than has yet existed; but to render that security complete, it appears necessary that there should be concluded, at the period of a general pacification, a general treaty, by which the European powers should mutually guaranty each other's possessions: such a treaty would lay the foundation in Europe of a system of public right, and would contribute as much as possible to repress future enterprises directed against the general tranquillity; and, above all, to render abortive every project of aggrandizement, similar to those which have produced all the disasters of Europe since the calamitous era of the French Revolution."^{*}

In all these varied projects there is not a syllable either about territorial acquisition to Great Britain, or the infliction upon France of any part of that system of spoliation which she had so liberally applied to other states. The whole project breathes only a spirit of justice, philanthropy, and moderation; it contemplates restitution, and restitution only where that was practicable; and where it was not, such new arrangements as the interests of the people in the territories to be disposed of and the general safety of Europe required. The world has since had abundant reason to experience the prophetic wisdom of these arrangements, in all cases where they were subsequently carried into execution, and to lament the deviation made from them, particularly in the final destruction of Poland and Belgium.

^{*} Schoell, vii., 69. Jom., Vie de Nap., i., 471, 478.

French alliance which was destined to be rewarded by the catastrophe of Jena and partition of Tilsit.*

The supplies voted in the British Parliament for the service of the year amounted to no less than £44,559,521 for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, exclusive of £4,534,000, as separate charges for England, besides £28,032,000 as permanent expenses, making a total of £77,125,521 yearly expenditure. The ways and means, including a loan of £20,000,000, amounted to £43,992,000 for England, and £3,500,000 for Ireland, besides a permanent revenue for both countries of £32,381,000; in all, £79,873,000.† The new taxes imposed to meet the interest of the loan amounted to £1,560,000, consisting chiefly of additions to the salt duty, to the postage of letters, to the legacy duty, and to horses employed in husbandry, or in agricultural operations.‡

The disturbed state of Ireland again rendered the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act indispensable, which accordingly passed both houses by a very large majority. Indeed, the continued anarchy of that beautiful island now began to spread among the thoughtful and observant in Great Britain a conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that its people either had not received from nature the character, or had not reached by industry the stage of civilization requisite for the safe enjoyment of a free constitution; and that the passions consequent on the exercise of its powers would permanently distract its inhabitants and desolate its surface. In this session of Parliament, also, the report of the select committee

* Bign., iv., 194, 196, 197.

† INCOME, GREAT BRITAIN.

Extraordinary.	
Malt and personal estate duties.....	£2,750,000
War taxes.....	8,300,000
New war do.....	1,150,000
Property tax.....	6,300,000
Surplus consolidated fund.....	4,000,000
Lottery.....	300,000
Surplus, 1804.....	1,192,000
Loan, England.....	20,000,000
	£43,992,000
Permanent.	
Customs.....	£8,357,000
Excise.....	20,604,000
Stamps.....	3,354,000
Land and assessed taxes.....	5,309,000
Postoffice.....	924,000
Pensions and salaries.....	49,000
Do.....	61,000
Smaller taxes.....	32,000
	38,690,000
Deduct war customs and excise.....	8,300,000
	30,390,000
Total extraordinary and permanent income	£74,382,000

EXPENDITURE, GREAT BRITAIN.

Extraordinary Charges.	
Navy.....	£15,035,000
Army.....	18,616,000
Ordnance.....	4,846,000
Miscellanies.....	6,450,000
	44,947,000
Permanent Charges.	
Interest of debt.....	£19,193,000
Sinking fund.....	6,835,000
Civil list, &c.....	1,337,000
Other payments.....	727,000
	28,092,000
Total extraordinary and permanent charges exclusive of Ireland.....	*£73,039,000

‡ Parl. Deb., iii., 551, 546, and v., 23.

* Parl. Deb., iii., 546, 550. V. App., 230. Ann. Reg., 1805, 592. App. to Chron.

upon the tenth and eleventh naval reports was printed, in regard to the treasuryship of the navy under the management of Lord Melville: proceedings upon which the spirit of party immediately fastened with more than usual acrimony, and which were subsequently made the means of effecting the overthrow of the statesman who had elevated the British navy from a state of unexampled dilapidation to the highest point of its triumph and glory.*

The grounds of this charge against Lord Melville, which is a matter of more importance in the domestic history of Britain than in the general transactions of Europe, were, 1st, that he had applied the public money to other uses than those of the navy departments under his control, in violation of an express act of Parliament; and, 2d, that he had connived at a system, on the part of the treasurer of the navy, of appropriating, for a time at least, the public money under his charge to his own uses; in consequence of which, if the public had sustained no actual loss, they had at least run a considerable risk, and been deprived of the profits arising from such temporary use, which should all have been carried to the public credit. They were brought forward, in a speech of distinguished ability and vehemence, by Mr. Whitbread, a mercantile gentleman of great eminence in London, a perfect master of business and a powerful debater, who for long afterward assumed a prominent place in the ranks of the opposition in the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt, without denying the facts detailed in the report, called the attention of the house to the real import of what was established in evidence, viz., that no loss had been sustained by the public, every shilling drawn out by the treasurer of the navy having been replaced in the hands of the bankers; and that it did not appear that Lord Melville had been aware of the private purposes of profit to which that gentleman had applied the money, and most certainly had not derived one farthing of patrimonial advantage from that irregularity.† After an animated debate, Mr. Whitbread's resolutions were carried by the casting vote of the speaker, the numbers being 216 on each side.‡

This was too important a blow against the administration of Mr. Pitt not to be followed up with the utmost vigour by the Whig party. It led to various subsequent proceedings, and so vehement did the opinion of the public become in consequence of the incessant efforts made to keep it in a state of agitation, that on the 6th of May 6. Mr. Pitt announced in Parliament that Lord Melville's name had been erased from the list of privy counsellors, and the thanks of the House of Commons were voted to the commissioners who had prepared the report, "for the zeal, ability, and fortitude with which they had discharged the arduous duties intrusted to them." The noble lord had resigned his situation as First Lord of Admiralty two days after the resolutions of the House of Commons were passed. These proceedings led to the impeachment of Lord Melville, in the following year, in the House of Peers, but he was acquitted by a large majority on all the charges, after a trial of great length and perfect impartiality.

* Suttie's Reports. Parl. Deb., v., 1, 210. App., iii., 589.
† "I never," said Mr. Whitbread, "charged Lord Melville with participating in the plunder of the public, because that had not appeared."—*Parl. Deb.*, iv., 611.
‡ *Parl. Deb.*, iv., 255, 326. *Ann. Reg.*, 1805, 67, 72.

ty; and in the interim the nation, from whose services he had been removed, was saved from imminent danger and possible destruction by the memorable victory, to which his efforts as First Lord of the Admiralty had so mainly contributed, at Trafalgar.*

This session of Parliament was distinguished also by the commencement of those memorable debates on the removal of the existing disabilities from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, which continued, with little intermission, to agitate the Legislature for five-and-twenty years. It was argued with the utmost ability in both houses of Parliament; and to a subsequent generation, which has witnessed the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill, and is familiar with its effects, it is a matter both of interest and instruction to behold the light in which it was then considered, and the arguments adduced for and against the measure by the greatest men of the age.

On the one hand, it was argued by Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Grattan, "That, in considering the claims of the Roman Catholics to exemption from the disabilities under which they laboured, it is material to recollect that they do not form a small or inconsiderable sect, but compose three fourths of the population of Ireland, and embrace, according to some, three, according to others, five millions of its inhabitants. It would, indeed, be a happy thing if we were all united in religious as well as in political and constitutional opinions, but that, unfortunately, cannot now be hoped for; and the question is, What is to be done under existing circumstances? That Parliament has long, too long, acted upon the distinction of religious faith, is indeed certain; but, in justice to the memory of King William, it must be observed, that the system of exclusion did not commence with his measures, but arose in a subsequent reign, when the opinion unfortunately became prevalent that the Roman Catholics were the irreconcilable enemies of the Protestant establishment of Ireland and the Protestant government of England; and upon that assumption, without any proof, the next step was to exclude them from all share in the Constitution. Not content with this, means were devised, by penalties, proscriptions, and disabilities, to drive the whole Catholic peasantry from the island, or reduce them to the state of a poor, ignorant, and illiterate population.

"Such was the state in which the Roman Catholics of Ireland were at the accession of his present majesty; and under his government the measures pursued have, indeed, been a contrast to the dark and bigoted system of his predecessors. Under his auspicious rule a system of gradual amelioration has been introduced, by measures which were the more effectual because they were gradual, which have by degrees reversed the whole former system. You have given them full toleration and the benefits of education; taken away those odious measures which produced the disunions of families; restored the industry of the country, by granting to the people a participation in the soil, and allowed them a full share of its benefits, except the exercise of the elective franchise. By these means the people rapidly advanced in wealth, agriculture, com-

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 86, 88, 127. *Parl. Deb.*, iv., 602, 606.

mercy, and general civilization: the magnanimity of Great Britain acknowledged the right of an independent government, and at length, in 1792, they were admitted to a full participation of all the privileges of British subjects, excepting those for which the present petition prays. Here, therefore, was a system of gradual relaxation introduced, and here for a time a stand was made; not because reasons existed which rendered it doubtful whether any farther concessions should ever be made, but because there were many considerations which made it appear desirable that the last relaxations should not be made in the Irish Parliament. That Parliament had not arisen, like the British, from the wants and necessities of many centuries, but it was constituted at once, with the precise object of making the Legislature a Protestant one, to the exclusion of three fourths of the population. In these circumstances, it was more than doubtful whether the sudden admission of Catholics into that Legislature, founded, as it would have been, on a constituency embracing a great majority of persons of that persuasion, might not have endangered the Protestant interests of Ireland, and possibly its connexion with this country. But that obstacle is now removed: the Irish members no longer form a separate assembly, but are merged in the general Parliament of the empire; and the same prudential considerations which forbade the admission of Catholics into the Irish Parliament, where they would have formed a dangerous majority, recommend their entrance into the British, where they can never exceed a small minority.

"It cannot be denied that the Catholics of Ireland conceived great hopes that, by the operation of the union, they would be relieved of their disabilities. No authorized assurance was ever given, no promise was made to them that such a measure would result from that step; but still, by the arguments of those who supported it, and the course of reasoning both within doors and without doors, hopes were given that the subject of Catholic Emancipation would be more favourably considered than it had hitherto been; and those who promoted the measure undoubtedly gave the Catholics to understand that their claims would meet with the most impartial consideration from the United Parliament. It is this pledge which you are now called upon to redeem: you are required, not to concede Catholic Emancipation, but to go into a committee to consider whether their demands can with safety be granted.

"Every government unquestionably has the power to impose restrictions and disabilities upon a particular and suspected class of its subjects, but it must ever be a question of expedience whether such power should be exercised or not. What valid objections can be now urged against the removal of religious disabilities? We are not now to go back into the nineteenth century to a disquisition on the justice as well as expedience of the great principles of toleration. They are universally admitted: it lies upon the opponents of emancipation to make out their exception from the general rule. We are told that it is impossible for a Roman Catholic to be a loyal subject, and great pains have been taken to inculcate this doctrine. If true, this principle would lead to this result, that you must undo all that you have done, recall every concession you have made, and begin a crusade to drive the Catholics out of Ireland. But does

history warrant the assertion that they bear this extraordinary character? Have not Protestants and Catholics been equally mingled in the ranks of the disaffected? And have not many bright examples of the loyalty and fidelity of the popish priesthood and peasantry occurred, especially during the critical period of the American war? Lamentable as were the disorders of Ireland at the close of the last century, yet it is now evident that they arose from causes foreign to their religion: from the heart-burnings consequent on the unhappy system of middlemen, and the false relation of landlord and tenant, or the contagion of revolutionary principles from a neighbouring state; and the tranquil condition of three fourths of the Catholic population for years past may surely now plead as strongly in their favour as their former discontents can militate against them.

"The period has now arrived when one of two things must be done with respect to Ireland. Either you must go back and restore the degrading and exclusive system of Queen Anne, or you must go on and conciliate the Catholics by admitting them to a full participation in the blessings of the British Constitution. No middle course is practicable. They have already received too much to be coerced by force; too little to be won by affection. They have got everything excepting the right to seats in Parliament and eligibility to the higher offices in the army, the navy, and the law. It is in vain to say that such exclusion is not an injury. To many it is a most substantial disadvantage, because it deprives them of the just reward for their talents and exertions: to all it is a galling bar, a badge of servitude; and he knows little of human nature who is not aware that such vexatious restraints, though accompanied with little real hardship, are frequently productive of more violent heart-burnings than serious patrimonial injuries. If they came into this house, do you really believe they would attempt to overturn the hierarchy of the country? What could five or six, or even fifty or sixty Catholics do to accomplish such an object in the midst of a Protestant Legislature tenfold more numerous? Similar arguments were urged against the admission of Presbyterian members, but have they ever been found in hostility against the English establishment, and has not, on the contrary, the removal of religious disabilities been the grand cause of the pacification and loyalty of the once distracted and rebellious inhabitants of Scotland?" Mr. Pitt supported the claims of the Catholics generally, but lamented that they had been brought forward at that particular moment under circumstances which left little if any hope of the question being satisfactorily adjusted.*

On the other hand, it was strenuously argued by Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord-chancellor Eldon: "Independent of the obvious reasons against this measure at the particular time at which it is now pressed upon the country, there are other objections applicable to every time and to any circumstances under which this subject can be brought forward. In considering this question, it is indispensable to distinguish between toleration and the concession of political power. The first should ever be granted in its fullest extent; the second should be withheld when the granting

Answers of
Lords Hawkes-
bury, Sid-
mouth, and
Eldon.

* Parl. Deb., iv., 651, 653, 670, 694, 1014, 1020.

of it may endanger the other institutions of society. The Catholics have proved themselves, by their conduct in Canada and elsewhere, to be as loyal subjects in some places as the British Empire can boast; but their present claims do not relate to their condition as subjects, but their title to political power. No law, it is true, can be considered as perpetual, and some power must every where exist capable of abrogating the laws of the state, according as circumstances may render necessary; but there are some landmarks between the governors and the governed, *non tangenda non movenda*, except on the clearest expedience or the most overbearing necessity. The principles of the Revolution, as established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, have always been considered as of this description. That great and glorious change was not brought about by speculative opinion or the passion for visionary improvement; it was the result of necessity and experienced evils; and the great statesmen by whom it was effected had the courage to put to themselves the question, whether the inconvenience of having a king of a different religion from that established in the country, or the evil of breaking in upon the legal order of succession to the crown, were the greater; and they decided in favour of the latter. Now is it not a necessary consequence of this limitation of the crown to persons of the Protestant faith that the immediate advisers, officers, and counsellors of the crown should be of the same persuasion? What would be more preposterous than, in a government where the law is above the crown, and has altered its channel of descent, to allow the ministers, the chancellor, the judges of the land, to be of the religion the most hostile to the establishment?

"What would be the practical effect of a removal of the restrictions and limitations which our ancestors have adopted for the security of the Constitution? There are many classes of dissenters who differ from the Church of England as widely on doctrinal points, and more widely on ecclesiastical government, than the Roman Catholics; but the vital point is that they do not appeal to a foreign power for instruction or direction. It is this which constitutes the grand distinction between the Roman Catholics and all other descriptions of Christians; and it is this which it is, in a peculiar manner, of importance to consider in judging of their claims to political power. It is not their profession of a different faith which renders them dangerous; it is the submission to a foreign authority—the constitution of an *imperium in imperio*, only the more dangerous that it is founded on a spiritual basis, which all conscientious persons will ever prefer to any temporal authority. In the Catholic religion, above all others, the jurisdiction and authority of the priesthood interfere in a great part of the civil and domestic concerns of life. If religion and the state are distinct and at variance, and the Catholic is compelled to decide between them, he must decide for his religion and against the state. The question is not whether Catholics may be loyal subjects—whether they should enjoy toleration, or obtain civil rights or civil liberty—for all that they already have—but whether they are to obtain political power of every description, when they refuse, and on the principles of their religion ever must refuse, to acknowledge the complete authority of the state.

"The practical effect of the extension of the
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elective franchise to the Catholics of Ireland has been to produce in most of its counties something very nearly approaching to universal suffrage. It is the opinion of those best acquainted with the internal state of Ireland, that, if the doors of Parliament are once thrown open to the Catholics, the influence of the priests will infallibly be exerted in favour of the Catholic candidates, and as certainly against the Protestants; and thus the influence of property would be operating on one side, and that of religion on the other. Such a state of things would not only create much internal confusion and disorder, but it must operate most injuriously with respect to the lower orders of the people, who must unavoidably, and on many occasions, become the victims of these contending interests.

"The present condition of the Continent renders it, in an especial manner, inexpedient to make the proposed concessions at this time. Whoever contemplates the present extension of the power of France, must be convinced that the Roman See is substantially under the power of Napoleon. The pope has been compelled to travel to Paris, a thing unheard of for ten centuries, to place a Revolutionary crown on the head of that fortunate usurper; and he looks, doubtless, for some considerable return to so extraordinary a mark of condescension. Can there be any doubt, therefore, of the complete dependence in which he is placed to the French government? and would it not be the height of madness in us, knowing his inveterate hostility to this country, to weaken our means of resistance by the admission to political power of those who are necessarily subject to a power over which he has such a control?

"Mr. Emmett and all the leaders of the Irish insurgents have declared, in their examinations before the Secret Committee of the Irish Lords, 'that the mass of the people do not care a feather for Catholic emancipation; neither did they care for Parliamentary reform, till it was explained to them as leading to other objects which they did look to, particularly the abolition of tithes.' It is evident, therefore, from their authority, as well as from the reason of the thing itself, that the great body of the Catholics would not consider what you are now called upon to grant as any desirable boon or material concession. We are ready to give them every reasonable liberty or franchise, but not to surrender the state into their hands. The expectation that concession, as such, will lead to peace, is, unfortunately, contradicted by the whole history of Ireland, where it has been invariably found that yielding leads to disturbance and anarchy; and the public peace has been preserved only by a severe code, which, how painful soever, was, in time past at least, indispensable. The severity of that code we deprecate as much as any of the advocates of the Catholics; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that under it Ireland enjoyed absolute tranquillity for nearly a century; and that, since its relaxation, it has been disgraced by two rebellions, and constantly been, more or less, the theatre of disturbance. Let us, therefore, seeing the results of the preceding parts of the experiment have been so doubtful, avoid rash innovations and shun additional changes. The future destiny of our country is not in our own hands: kingdoms may rise and fall, flourish or decay; but let us not be ourselves the instruments of that blow which may occasion our destruction, and recollect that it is only by a steady adherence

to that system which we have received from our forefathers that we can hope to exist with safety, or to fall, if fall we must, with honour.*

The motion to go into a committee on the Roman Catholic petition was negatived by a great majority in both houses: in the Peers by 178 to 49; in the Commons by 336 to 124.†

In forming an opinion on this subject, interesting from the principles which it embraces, and still more from the consequences to which they lead, it is impossible to deny that it is involved in extraordinary difficulty. Not theory, but experience, is the antagonist with which liberal principles have here to contend. How convincing soever the argument in favour of the complete removal of religious disabilities may be, and how pleasing soever the prospect of constructing a society in which opinion is as free as the air we breathe, and actual delinquency alone can impose disability, it is impossible to deny that the experiment, when put into practice, has, hitherto at least, signally failed. Catholic emancipation has at length been carried; but it has produced none of the benefits which its advocates anticipated, and realized many of the evils which its opponents predicted. When it is recollected that it was argued that concession to the Irish Catholics would only lead to additional demands; that the whole influence of the priests would be thrown on the popular side, and the peace of the country be perpetually disturbed by the conflict between numbers and property, it is impossible now to dispute the justice of the objections stated to the change; and melancholy experience has taught us that Lord Hawkesbury's words were prophetic. Ireland never has been so distracted as since Catholic emancipation was granted: the total suspension of the Constitution has, in consequence, been forced as a measure of absolute necessity upon government; and, without stilling the waves of discontent in the Emerald Isle, that long-debated change has fixed the fire-brand of discord in the British Empire. Consequences so disastrous, so different from what they anticipated, have filled with astonishment the friends of toleration: many have come to doubt whether its doctrines are in reality so well founded as abstract argument would lead us to suppose; others have settled into the belief that, however well founded in themselves, they were inapplicable to the circumstances of an old empire, essentially founded upon an opposite set of principles; and that, in the attempt to draw a tainted beam out of the edifice, the whole structure has fallen into ruins.

* *Parl. Deb.*, iv., 674, 691, 695, 700, 783, 803.

† *Parl. Deb.*, iv., 843, 1059.

‡ The following table exhibits the steady and rapid increase of crime in Ireland since the Catholic Relief Bill was passed:

	Committed.	Convicted.
1828, Catholic disabilities in force	14,693	9,269
1829, Relief Bill passed in March	15,271	9,449
1830,	15,794	9,902
1831, Reform agitation	16,192	9,605
1832, Ditto	16,036	9,759
1833, Tithe agitation begun	17,819	11,444
1834, Coercion Act in force	21,381	14,523

Thus the committals in Ireland had increased a half in six years after the disabilities were removed from the Catholics. When it is recollected that not a third part of the atrocious crimes in that country are ever made the subject either of committal or trial, it may safely be concluded, from this instructive table, that during that period crime has more than doubled over its whole extent.—See *Parl. Papers*, June 14, 1835.

In truth, however, the total failure of Catholic emancipation affords no grounds for doubting, in the general case, the great principles of religious toleration; it only shows that other and deeper sources of evil were operating in Ireland, to which that measure, though founded in the abstract on just principles, could furnish no sufficient antidote; and that Great Britain is experiencing, in the endless difficulties consequent on the possession of that island, the same law of moral retribution of which France, ever since the Revolution, has furnished so memorable an example. When rightly considered, the state of that country is pregnant with political instruction: it shows that nations who commit injustice cannot escape punishment; and in its present wretchedness may be discerned additional grounds for that love of real freedom, and detestation of revolutionary ambition, which constitute the great moral of the present times.

I. The first circumstance which has left an incurable wound in Ireland, and through it, in the whole British Empire, is the enormous and unpardonable extent to which the confiscation of landed property had been carried in former times. Without referring to historical details, it is sufficient to observe that at least three fourths of the soil of Ireland has, at different times, changed hands in this violent manner, and that the great majority of the persons on whom the forfeited estates have been bestowed were English soldiers of fortune, noble proprietors, or companies resident in Great Britain. The consequences of this spoliation have been to the last degree disastrous. As the forfeiture of property is the most cruel of all acts of injustice, because it extends to distant generations the punishment of one, so it is the one of all others which most certainly leads to its own punishment. Invariably it leaves the seeds of undying animosity between the descendants of the oppressors and oppressed; between the owners of the soil and the peasantry who till their lands. Landed confiscation has been to Ireland what a similar deed of injustice was to France, a festering sore which has never been healed. In both countries restitution has become impossible, from the multitude of new interests which have been created: therefore by both countries retribution must be endured.

II. The ghastly wound thus opened in Ireland by the barbarity of feudal injustice might, however, in the course of ages have been healed, as the evils of Norman confiscation were in Great Britain, were it not for another circumstance, of peculiar and lamentable malignity, which has continually kept it open. This is the unhappy bestowing of the estates upon persons resident in this country, and the consequent introduction of the system of middlemen and absentee proprietors into the neighbouring island. These evils necessarily flowed from the first great act of injustice; for it was not to be supposed that English noblemen would leave their baronial palaces to dwell in the comparatively barbarous realm of Ireland; and they soon found that, without middlemen interposed between them and the cultivators of the soil, they could not realize anything whatever out of their possessions. Thence necessarily followed, in close and rapid succession, the interposition of a number of tenants, many holding their estates for a

long tract of years, between the landlords and the peasantry; the continual impoverishment of the rural cultivators, by the necessity of maintaining, out of the produce of their labour, such a multitude of superiors; and the ruinous right of the landlord to distraint the effects of the sub-tenant for the arrears of rent due by his principal: a privilege which, in its application to a country so situated, rendered the growth of agricultural capital impossible, and chained the people to habits of indigent existence and unlimited increase of population. The Irish landlords have long clung with blind tenacity to this blasting privilege, inconsistent with any degree of prosperity in their country, as the only means of realizing any rents out of their tenantry; a parallel case to the strong attachment of the holders of national domains in France to the Revolutionary law of succession, the certain destroyer of anything like general freedom in their country; and another example of that law of nature which induces men, who have profited by the fruits of injustice, to adhere with infatuated obstinacy to the very institutions which are calculated to bring about its punishment.

III. The unhappy vicinity to Great Britain, and the supposed necessity of having a similar form of government and national representation for the two countries, has contributed still farther to perpetuate the disorders of Ireland, and distract its indigent peasantry by the passions and the ambition which centuries of freedom and an extensive distribution of property alone enable its more advanced neighbour to bear with safety. Experience has now placed

And total unfitness of the Irish at present for a free constitution.

it beyond a doubt that Ireland is not capable of bearing the excitement, or disregarding the passions consequent on a popular constitution.

The state of civilization to which she has arrived is not adequate to such a trial: the passions consequent on the unhappy wounds in her bosom are too strong to endure them without convulsions.* Could the wishes of philanthropy be granted, what Ireland should receive for half a century is a wise and humane, but despotic government, which, while encouraging every branch of industry, alleviating every source of suffering, aiding every opening to employment,

* The atrocious crimes over Ireland in the last months of 1832, three years after Catholic emancipation had passed, were at the rate of six thousand a year. In the year immediately following the passing of the Coercion Act they were, over the whole country, reduced three fifths; and in the county of Kilkenny, and a few other baronies where its extraordinary powers were put in force, they had been reduced from 1561 to 330 a year.—See *Parl. Report*, May 8, 1833, and May 14, 1834. "The disturbances of Ireland," said the Marquis Wellesley, while viceroy of that country in 1834, "have in every instance been excited and inflamed by the agitation of the combined projects for the abolition of tithes and the destruction of the union with Great Britain. I cannot employ words of sufficient strength to express my solicitude that his majesty's government should fix the deepest attention on the intimate connexion, marked by the strongest characters in all these transactions, between the system of agitation and its inevitable consequence, the system of combination leading to violence and outrage: they are inseparably cause and effect; nor can I, after the most attentive consideration of the dreadful scenes passed under my view, by any effort of my understanding separate one from the other in that unbroken chain of indissoluble connexion." So strongly are the Irish themselves convinced of their inability to bear the excitement of a free constitution, at least in periods of agitation, that Mr. Littleton, the Irish secretary under Lord Grey's administration, stated in Parliament that he had never met with a single person of any shade of political opinion in Ireland, and he had mingled with all, who did not cordially approve of the Coercion Act of 1833, and earnestly wish for its renewal.—*Mirror of Parliament*, the 19th of July, 1834.

should, at the same time, close every avenue to Democratic ambition, and extinguish every hope of Revolutionary elevation. It is thus, and thus only, that the apparently incurable disorders of her social condition could be removed; that habits of industry could become general; artificial wants and a higher standard of comfort reduce to due subjection the principle of population; and a foundation be laid, in the growth of an opulent middling class in society, for the safe and pacific exercise of those powers which, when prematurely conceded, destroy in a short time the only durable foundation of real freedom.

IV. It was long ago observed by the great champion of religious freedom, Mr. Locke, that the principles of toleration are not to be applied to those who hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics, or who attribute to themselves any peculiar privilege or power in civil concerns, or acknowledge any foreign or alien ecclesiastical authority.* The distinction which he draws between toleration to those who merely differ from government in religious belief, and those who acknowledge a foreign spiritual authority, and are animated by an undying desire to regain the lost possessions or ascendancy of the Catholic Church, is in the highest degree important, and throws a precious ray of light upon the darkness with which the calamities consequent on Catholic emancipation have shrouded not only the prospects of the British Empire, but the great principles of religious toleration itself. These calamities are not chargeable upon the doctrines of religious freedom abstractly considered; they are the fatal results of the combination of religious difference in the case of the

* Locke's words, which are very remarkable, are as follows: "Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative, covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly that men are not obliged to keep their promise, that princes may be dethroned by those who differ from them in religion, or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves; for these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and the hand of the magistrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth. But, nevertheless, we find those who teach the same things in other words. For what else do they mean who teach that no faith is to be kept with heretics? Their meaning is, forsooth, that the privilege of breaking faith belongs to themselves, for they declare all that are not of their communion heretics. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox—that is, in plain terms, to themselves—any peculiar power or privilege above other mortals in the concerns of religion, or who, under pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government, and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects, and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrates so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?"

"Again, that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrates which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince; for by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be enlisted, as it were, for soldiers against his own government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience, when both are subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only influence to persuade the members of his own church to whatever he lists, but can enjoin it on them on the pain of eternal fire."—*First Letter on Toleration*, Works, vi., 46, 47.

Catholics, with the poisonous intermixture of ecclesiastic ambition, civil rancour, and political passion. The Catholics are dangerous, not merely because they profess different religious tenets, but because they belong to an ecclesiastical power which formerly numbered the British Islands among the brightest jewels of its mitre, and will never cease to labour to extirpate the faith which despoiled it of that ancient part of its heritage. Temporal passion, political ambition, revenge for injury, are here mixed up, in overwhelming proportions, with the abstract question of religious freedom. Unlimited toleration the Irish papists are clearly entitled to, and have long possessed; but to concede to them political power was the same error as it would have been in the Carthaginians to have permitted on their shores an armed and fortified settlement of Romans; or for England to have allowed an intrenched camp of the soldiers of Napoleon to be constructed on the coast of Kent. Nor is the comparatively inconsiderable number at first of such an organized band of aliens any reason for despising its ultimate dangers, for such a body, by taking advantage of the divisions of the ruling power, and attaching itself to the malecontents in its bosom, can almost always, in the end, attain a supremacy over both the contending factions. A few hundred English merchants appeared as suppliant settlers on the banks of the Ganges; but no sooner did they gain the privilege, professedly for defence, of constructing forts and batteries, than they went on from one acquisition to another, till they had subjected a hundred millions of Hindoos to their dominion.

While the British Parliament was occupied with these momentous discussions, Napoleon at the British people, little conscious of the imminent danger which threatened them from the power of Napoleon, were eager in the pursuit of the abuses opened up in the tenth report of the naval commissioners, that great conqueror was busied with the twofold object of consolidating in all the affiliated republics his newly-acquired authority, and directing the vast naval and military preparations destined for the invasion of this country. With the double view of attaining the first of these objects, and disguising the real designs by which he hoped to effect the last, he introduced a change into the government of all the states dependant upon France, placed on his head the Iron Crown of Lombardy, and surrendered himself, in appearance, to the magnificent fêtes by which the impassioned people of Italy celebrated the supposed era of their regeneration; but during the whole time his eyes were fixed on the shores of the Channel, and the minutest movements of the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, which were all to co-operate in the expedition, as well as of the vast army destined for his immediate command, were regulated by his indefatigable activity, while to appearance engaged only in the pomp and magnificence of an imperial progress.*

Holland was the first of the dependant republics which underwent the change consequent upon the assumption of the crown by Napoleon. The continuance of the Republican régime in that country was altogether at variance with the institutions which he proposed to establish in all the states

subjected to his control; but as it appeared too violent a transition to make so old a commonwealth pass at once from Democracy to monarchy, an intermediate preparatory state was imposed upon it by the emperor. The whole powers of the Constitution were by this change vested in a single magistrate, who, to conciliate the patrician party, was styled the Grand Pensionary. This new Constitution, forged at Paris, the grand manufactory of institutions of that description, was prepared by the French government, with the aid of M. Schemmelpennick, the Dutch ambassador at that capital, a respectable man, who rapidly entered into the views of the emperor, and was rewarded by the office of Grand Pensionary himself. The Dutch, incapable of resistance, yielded to this, as they had done to all the preceding changes. The Democrats were indignant at beholding a single governor concentrate in his hands all the powers of government; but the Orange party were secretly gratified at seeing so effectual a curb imposed on their revolutionary antagonists, and augured better things of this Constitution than any which had before been forced upon their country. The new Constitution, accepted on the 22d of March by the Legislative Body, soon received the sanction of the great majority of the inhabitants.*

More important changes soon after ensued in the Italian States. The original design of Napoleon was to have erected the Italian Republic into a separate kingdom, and placed his brother Joseph on the throne; and this choice was highly agreeable to the Cisalpines; but that upright prince declared he would not accept it, unless the emperor would give the new kingdom that without which it could not exist, a tract of seacoast, and a harbour in the Mediterranean, and relieve it from the burdensome tribute of 25,000,000 francs (£1,000,000) yearly paid to the French government. These conditions by no means answered the views of Napoleon, and therefore he changed his design, and resolved to place the crown of Lombardy on his own head, and send his son-in-law, Eugene Beauharnois, to Milan, to govern the kingdom in quality of viceroy.†

This design was first opened to Count Melzi and a deputation of the Italian Republic, who attended at Paris on occasion of the coronation of Napoleon as Emperor of France. Their consent was without difficulty obtained; and it having been arranged that the proposal should appear to come from the Italians themselves, Count Melzi, in a studied harangue, delivered in presence of the French Senate, called upon Napoleon to establish a monarchical form of government and hereditary succession, as the only means of averting the evils with which their infant institutions were threatened. He then read aloud the fundamental articles of the Act of Settlement, by which Napoleon, emperor of France, was declared King of Italy, with the right of succession to his sons, natural or adopted, and male heirs. On the following day the emperor appeared in great pomp in the Senate, and conferred on his sister Eliza the principality of Piombino. The act of settlement of the Italian crown was then read; the members of the deputation took the oath of fidelity to their new sovereign, and he declared, "That

March 22.
April 30.

And assumption of the iron crown of Lombardy by the French emperor.

March 18, 1805.

* *Norv.*, ii., 365, 367. *Dum.*, xi., 140, 141.

* *Bign.*, iv., 199, 200.

† *Dum.*, xi., 133, 134. *Bign.*, 199, 202.

he accepted, and would defend, the iron crown; and that, even during his lifetime, he would consent to separate the two crowns, and place one of his natural or adopted sons upon the throne as soon as the British, French, and Russian troops have evacuated respectively Malta, Naples, and the Ionian Islands." This great change was proclaimed with due solemnity at Milan on the

31st of March, when Eugene Beauharnois, who had already assumed the command of the army, acted as viceroy, and received the homage of the principal authorities.

On the same day the new Constitution of the kingdom was promulgated by an imperial and royal decree. The former and singular establishment of three colleges of electors, consisting of proprietors, men of letters, and men of business, was kept up in the new kingdom; but in every other respect its institutions were an exact copy of those established in the French Empire.*†

The better to conceal the great designs which he was at this time bringing to maturity for the concentration of his land and sea forces in the invasion of Great Britain, Napoleon resolved to proceed to Italy, and dazzle the world by the splendour of the ceremonies attendant on his assumption of the iron crown of Charlemagne. For this purpose

he set out for Turin, by the route of Fontainebleau and Lyons, corresponding daily with the minister of marine, and retiring from the magnificence of entertainments and the reception of adulatory addresses to direct the minutest details of the great armament which he was collecting in every harbour, from Texel to Cadiz, and from Brest to Venice, for this grand expedition. Nothing gives so strong an impression of the vast ability and indefatigable activity of his mind as the study of the numerous minute and lucid orders which he addressed during every day of this journey to the minister of marine, and the admirable sagacity with which almost all the conceivable chances of those numerous squadrons were calculated and provided for by his all-seeing intellect.‡ But while these were the objects of his secret meditation, very different were the occupations in which, to external appearance, he was engaged. At Lyons he inspected the rising manufactures of that city, upon which the five pacific years of his government had already diffused an

extraordinary degree of prosperity. In crossing Mount Cenis, he surveyed the great works in progress for the formation of the magnificent road which now traverses that mountain. At Turin he relinquished the royal palace to the pope, who had reached that place on his return to Rome, and lodged in the Castle of Stupinigi, a country residence of the kings of Sardinia, which had been splendidly fitted up for his reception. He there received accounts of the successful passage of the Straits of Gibraltar by the Toulon squadron, and its junction with the Spanish fleet of Admiral Gravina at Cadiz, of which the details will immediately be given. Overjoyed at this intelligence, he moved on with alacrity to Asti and Alexandria, and at the latter place seemed wholly engrossed with the immense fortifications in progress round its walls, destined to render it one of the greatest fortresses in the world. A splendid pageant had for some time been in preparation at the field of Marengo. Thirty-four bat-

talions and seven squadrons were assembled on that memorable plain, to imitate the manœuvres of the battle which had given it immortality; while the emperor and empress, seated on a lofty throne which overlooked the whole field, were to behold, in mimic war, the terrible scenes of which it had once been the theatre. The day was bright and clear; the soldiers, who from daybreak had been on the ground, impatiently awaited the arrival of the hero; and shouts of acclamation rent the sky when he appeared with the empress, in a magnificent chariot drawn by eight horses, surrounded with all the pomp of the empire, and ascended the throne, before which the manœuvres were to be performed. Many of the veterans who had been engaged in the action were present, among whom the soldiers, in an especial manner, distinguished Marshal Lannes, who had borne so large a portion of the brunt of the Imperialists in that terrible strife. After the feigned battle was over, the soldiers defiled before the emperor, upon the most distinguished of whom he conferred, amid the loud acclamations of their comrades, the crosses and decorations of the Legion of Honour. The splendid equipments of the men, the proud bearing of the horses, the glitter of gold and steel which shone forth resplendent in the rays of the declining sun, and the interesting associations connected with the spot, produced an indelible impression on the minds of the spectators, and contributed not a little to fan the military spirit among the indolent youth of Italy, whom Napoleon was so desirous to rouse to more manly feelings prior to the great contest with Austria, which he foresaw was approaching.*

On the day following the emperor continued his journey, passed the Po at Mezzona Costa amid the shouts of a prodigious concourse of people, and proceeded to Pavia, where he received the adulatory addresses with which the learned men of Italy lauded the dispenser of its wealth and influence. His triumphal entry into Milan took place on the 8th; and, amid the fêtes and rejoicings which preceded his coronation, the designs were formed for the greater part of those splendid public edifices which now adorn that beautiful city, and consoled its inhabitants for all the sacrifices they were obliged to make during the remainder

* Bot., iv., 154, 156. Dum., xi., 137, 138.

† Napoleon, on this occasion, made the following speech in the Senate: "Powerful and great is the French Empire, but greater still is our moderation. We have in a manner conquered Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany; but in the midst of such unparalleled success we have listened only to the counsels of moderation. Of so many conquered provinces we have retained only that one which was necessary to maintain France in the rank among nations which she has always enjoyed. The partition of Poland, the provinces torn from Turkey, the conquest of India, and of almost all the European colonies, have, in a manner, turned the balance against us. To form a counterpoise to such acquisitions we must retain something, but we must keep only what is useful and necessary. Great would have been the addition to the wealth and resources of our territory if we had united to them the Italian Republic; but we gave it independence at Lyons; and now we proceed a step farther, and solemnly recognise its ultimate separation from the crown of France, deferring only the execution of that project till it can be done without danger to Italian independence."—Botta, iv., 157.

‡ This correspondence is to be found entire in General Matthieu Dumas's work, having been put into his hands by the Duchess Decres, widow of the minister of marine, to whom it was addressed.—See DUMAS, xi., 195, 286. *Pieces Just.* It leaves no doubt whatever as to the reality of Napoleon's designs for the invasion of this country, and the extraordinary combination of chances which alone prevented it from being carried into effect.

* Bot., iv., 157, 161. Dum., xi. 141, 147. Bigu., iv., 217, 218.

Splendid pageant in the field of Marengo. May 5.

His journey into Italy.

April 2.

May 8, 1805. He enters Milan.

of the war to the ambition of their sovereign. Then were projected the gorgeous additions to the Cathedral, which now shoots up its hundreds of marble pinnacles and thousands of white statues pure as the driven snow, in glittering splendour, into the clear blue of heaven; the chaste design of the arch of the Simplicon; the noble sweep of the amphitheatre; and the other works which, unhappily for the arts, were in part left incomplete at the fall of Napoleon. A fortnight was devoted to the reception of congratulatory addresses from the foreign and Italian potentates; among whom were, in an especial manner, noticed those from the King of Naples and the King of Prussia, two powers, particularly the latter, whose neutrality was of essential importance in the great contest which was approaching. The better to testify his good understanding with Prussia, the emperor, at the reviews of the troops, wore the decorations of the black and red eagle, sent to him on the occasion by Frederic William.*

After reposing a thousand years in the treasury of Monza, the iron crown of Charlemagne was brought forth to encircle the brows of Napoleon. On the 26th of May the ceremony of the coronation was conducted, with the utmost magnificence, in the Cathedral of Milan. The dresses, the decorations, the ornaments, were even more sumptuous on this occasion than on the preceding one, how splendid soever, at Paris. First came forth, from a side entrance, the Empress Josephine, dressed in gorgeous habiliments, and dazzling with the lustre of diamonds. She was received with loud acclamations; but the lofty aisles shook with thunders of applause when, a few minutes after, the emperor appeared, arrayed in his imperial robes, bearing on his head the imperial diadem, and in his hands the crown of Charlemagne and the sceptre of justice. The Cardinal Caprara officiated instead of the pope on the occasion; Napoleon placed the iron crown on his own head, pronouncing at the same time the historical words, *Dio me la diede: guai a chi la tocca*.† He afterward, as at Paris, himself crowned Josephine, who knelt at the high altar at his feet. The magnificence of the dresses, the matchless beauty of the women, the inimitable strains of the music, and the admirable decorations of the Cathedral, in all of which the refined taste of the Italians shone forth in the most conspicuous manner, combined to form a scene surpassing even the far-famed coronation in the preceding year at Notre Dame. Te Deum was afterward sung, according to the ancient custom of the kings of Lombardy, in the Ambrosian Church. Fireworks, fêtes, and illuminations closed the day; and nothing was omitted which could captivate the ardent imaginations of the Italians, or flatter the pleasing illusion that the days of national independence had at length arrived, and the reign of Tramontane authority ceased forever.‡

Among the numerous congratulatory addresses presented on this occasion to the emperor, not the least remarkable was that from the King of Naples, couched in the warmest terms of flattery and adulation. At that very time, however, he had intercepted a secret correspondence

of Queen Caroline with the imperial cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, which left no doubt of the understanding of that court with the enemies of France, and he in consequence, in his answer to the address, gave way to one of those sallies of passion to which he was occasionally subject, and which, to so contemptible an enemy, and for the deeds of a high-spirited queen, was in a peculiar manner unworthy of his character. A more important deputation was soon after received from the Senate of Genoa; and the terms in which the doge addressed the emperor left no doubt as to the important alterations in the political situation of that republic which were soon to take place. "In regenerating the people of this country," said that chief magistrate, "your majesty has contracted the obligation to render it happy; but this cannot be done unless it is governed by your majesty's wisdom and valour. The changes which have taken place around us have rendered our insulated situation a source of perpetual disquietude, and imperiously call for a union with that France which you have covered with imperishable renown. Such is the wish which we are charged to lay at your majesty's feet. The reasons on which it is founded prove sufficiently that it is not the result of any external suggestion, but the inevitable consequence of our actual situation."*

Napoleon replied in words memorable, as containing the death-warrant of one of Napoleon's re- the oldest and most distinguished re- ply to the lat- publies of modern Europe. "Cir- ter body. cumstances have frequently compelled me within the last ten years to interfere in your internal situation. I have constantly endeavoured to introduce peace, and contribute to the spread of those liberal principles which alone could restore to your government that splendour with which it formerly was surrounded; but I am now convinced of your inability to accomplish by yourselves anything worthy of your ancient renown. Everything has changed. The new maritime code which the English have adopted, and compelled the greatest part of Europe to recognise; the right which they have assumed of blockading places not in a state of siege, which, in effect, is nothing else than a right to annihilate at their pleasure the commerce of every other people; the continual ravages of your coasts by the corsairs of Barbary—all conspire to render your insulated existence to the last degree precarious. Return, therefore, to your own country. I shall shortly follow you there, and put the seal to the union which my people and you have contracted. The barriers which separate you from the remainder of the Continent shall, for the common good, be removed, and things restored to their natural situation."† The secret motive of Napoleon is here conspicuous. The annexation of Genoa to France was a part of his general maritime system, and suggested by his inveterate hostility to this country.

A few days afterward a decree appeared, formally incorporating the Ligurian Republic with the French Empire, and dividing its territory into three departments: those of Genoa, Montenotte, and the Apennines. Two days afterward the ancient standard of the Republic was taken down in all the forts and vessels, and the tricolour hoisted in its stead. Thus was the

* Bign., iv., 219, 220. Bot., iv., 160, 165. Personal observation.

† "God has given it me: beware of touching it."

‡ Bot., iv., 165, 167. Dum., xi., 149, 151. Bign., iv., 220.

* Dum., xi., 151, 153. Bign., iv., 221, 222.

† Dum., xi., 154, 155. Bign., iv., 230.

June 9, 1805
Incorporation
of Genoa with
France.

French territory, for the first time, fairly extended beyond the Alps, a large surface of seacoast added to its dominion, its frontiers advanced far into the Apennines, and brought to adjoin the Tuscan States; while one of the oldest republics in Europe, which for fourteen hundred years had maintained a separate existence, often illustrated by great and heroic actions, sunk unheeded into the arms of death.*†

Before quitting the capital of Milan, Napoleon presided at the opening of its Legislative Assembly, and laid the foundation of those great improvements in its social institutions which have survived the transitory empire of its author. The annual expenses of the kingdom were fixed at 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000; the military establishment cost 30,000,000, the civil only six; and a very considerable portion of the public revenue was allotted to the departments, to be laid out in canals, bridges, and other works of public ornament or utility. The Code Napoleon was introduced, which still continues, from its experienced utility, notwithstanding the change of government, to regulate the decisions of its courts of law: the order of the Iron Crown instituted, and the authority and powers of the viceroy, Eugene Beauharnois, defined by an express statute. Napoleon, after having received as king the oath of allegiance of his son-in-law as viceroy, pronounced a discourse, which terminated with these words, sufficiently expressive of the military direction which he was so desirous of giving to the ambition of Italy: "I have given fresh proofs of my desire to accomplish, by every means in my power, the happiness of

the Italian people. I trust that, in their turn, they will endeavour to occupy the place which they have already obtained in my mind; and they will never do so till they are persuaded that force in arms is the chief bulwark of nations. It is at length time that the brilliant youth, who now waste the best years of their lives in the indolence of great cities, should cease to fear the fatigues and the dangers of war.*"

Notwithstanding the heavy burdens with which they were oppressed under the government of Napoleon, and the unexampled calamities with which it closed, the Italians were highly satisfied with his administration, and still look back with fond regret to the *Regno d'Italia* as the brightest period of their modern existence. Part of this, no doubt, is to be ascribed to the expenditure and animation consequent on the vice-regal court at Milan, and the natural gratification which the people experienced at the elevated position which, as subjects of Napoleon, they occupied in the theatre of Europe. But still more was owing to the wisdom and moderation of Eugene's internal administration, and the admirable principles of government which he received from the sagacity and experience of Napoleon. In the management of the kingdom of Italy, he followed the maxims which deservedly gave, and so long preserved to the Romans, the empire of the world. Unlike the conquered states of the other European monarchies, the inhabitants of Lombardy felt the foreign yoke only in the quickened circulation of wealth, the increased vent for industry, the widened field for exertion. Honours, dignities, emoluments, all was reserved for Italians: hardly a magistrate or civil functionary was of foreign birth. Everywhere great and useful undertakings were set on foot; splendid edifices ornamented the towns; useful canals irrigated the fields: if the burdens of the people were heavy, they had at least the gratification of perceiving that a large portion of them were reserved for domestic objects, and that they received back, in the rewards of industry, a part of what they had rendered to the service of the state. In the satisfaction arising from this judicious system of government, they forgot that the heavy tribute of a million yearly was remitted to Paris, and that the higher situations in the army were exclusively occupied by Frenchmen: a system under which the soldiers of Italy came to perform glorious actions before the close of the war, and which seems to be the only method by which a temporary revival, even of the military spirit, can be communicated to nations enervated by the long enjoyment of peace, and the establishment for centuries of the refinements of civilization.†

Still keeping his eyes fixed on the shores of the Channel, and corresponding daily with his minister of marine for the regulation of all the squadrons destined to co-operate in the English expedition, Napoleon visited the other towns of the north of Italy; Verona, Mantua, Parma, successively felt the animating influence of his presence, and in each he left some lasting mark of the grandeur of his conceptions, and the minute attention which he paid to the wants and interests of his subjects. At Bologna he received a deputation

Popularity of Napoleon's government in Italy, and great works which he undertook.

* Dum., xi., 155, 156.

† Napoleon's secret motive for this act of rapacity, like most of the actions of his life, was the insatiable desire which he was animated of subverting the power of Great Britain. This distinctly appeared from his letter to the arch-chancellor of that republic, on the advantages to be derived from this acquisition. "I had no other reason for uniting Genoa to the Empire but to obtain command of its naval resources; and yet the three frigates which its port contains are not yet armed. Genoa will never be truly French till it furnishes six thousand sailors to my fleets. It is neither money nor soldiers which I wish to extract from it. Sailors, old sailors, are the contribution which I require. You must establish a naval conscription there. It is in vain to talk of governing a people without occasioning frequent discontent. Do you not know that in matters of state justice means force as well as virtue? Do you think I am so sunk in decrepitude as to entertain any fears of the murmurs of the people of Genoa? The only answer I expect or desire to this despatch is, *sailors, ever sailors*. You are sufficiently acquainted with my resolution to know that this desire is not likely to be ever diminished. Think of nothing in your administration, dream of nothing, but sailors. Say whatever you please in my name; I will consent to it all, provided only that the urgent necessity of furnishing sailors is expressed with sufficient force."

—BIGN., v., 78.

So tenacious was Napoleon on this subject, and so provident was that great conqueror of the future at this period of his government, that he wrote shortly after to the same minister when on the eve of setting out for the Rhine: "To secure victories, we must think only of defeats. Never lose sight of the chance of my army in Italy being compelled to fall back on Alexandria, nay, on Genoa. Let the artillery, the arsenal, the magazines, be there in a condition to stand a siege." Again, from Strasbourg, on the 1st of October: "Never lose sight of the provisioning of Genoa. I must have there at least 300,000 quintals of wheat. My war projects are vast; but in the midst of them all never lose sight of Genoa. Even if besieged, still remain at your post there. Take such measures that in no event can you run short of corn. Say boldly, on all occasions, that Genoa is indissolubly united to France. Repeat that the man who, on their mountains, dissipated the hosts of Austria and Sardinia with thirty thousand men, is not now likely to yield to the menaces of coalition when he has three hundred thousand in the centre of Germany." —BIGN., v., 79, 80.

Sept. 16, 1805, from St. Cloud.

Oct. 1, from Strasbourg.

* Dum., xi., 157, 159. Bign., iv., 223, 224.
† Bign., iv., 226. Dum., xi., 147, 149.

from the Republic of Lucca, complaining of the vexatious dominion of the oligarchy, under whose influence they had fallen; and to whom he promised a government in the person of his sister Eliza, which should be completely in harmony with the institutions of the other states in Northern Italy: veiling thus, as he always did, his projects for the advancement and elevation of his family under an air of regard for the public welfare; and affecting the greatest deference for the public choice, when he was in effect depriving the people of all influence either in the election of their government or the administration of affairs. At length, on the 30th of June, he made a triumphal entry into Genoa, and celebrated the union of that city with France by fêtes and rejoicings of the most unparalleled magnificence. At the gates of the city he was received by the magistrates with the keys. "Genoa, named the superb from its situation," said they, "is now still more so from its destination: it has thrown itself into the arms of a hero; jealous in many ages of its liberties, it is now still more so of its glory; and therefore it places its keys in the hands of one above all others capable of maintaining and increasing it." In the principal church of the city he received the oaths of allegiance of the leading inhabitants, amid the thunder of artillery from the overhanging forts, batteries, and vessels in the harbour, and then commenced the fêtes, which in splendour and variety exceeded anything seen in Italy in modern times. All that Eastern imagination had fancied, all that poetic genius has ascribed to fairy power, was realized on that memorable occasion. The singular and romantic situation of the city, its blue sea and cloudless skies; its streets of marble and gorgeous domes; its embattled shores and overhanging forts; its proud palaces, surmounting one another in gay theatric pride, and lovely bay, glittering with the sails of innumerable barks, were peculiarly fitted to give animation and lustre to the spectacles. Splendid, above all, were the fireworks and illuminations at night: spreading from the Lantern on the west to the extremity of the Mole on the east, seeming to ascend to heaven in the mountains above, and to descend to the deep in the reflection of the water beneath. Never, in the proudest days of its greatness, amid the triumphs of Doria or the glories of La Meloria, did Genoa present so magnificent a spectacle as in these the last of its long existence. It was amid the roar of artillery and the blaze of illumination that this venerable Republic descended into an unhonoured tomb. Such is modern Italian patriotism!*

The same period witnessed the extinction of the Republic of Lucca; the promises of Napoleon were accomplished: it was bestowed, as a separate appanage, along with Piombino, on his sister, the Princess Eliza. Thus was fulfilled the saying of Napoleon nine years before, that the days were passed in which republics could be swallowed up by monarchies! Finally, he put the last hand to the organization, at this time, of Italy, by a decree, after his return to Paris, incorporating the states of Parma and Placentia with the French Empire, under the title of the twenty-eighth military division. His ascendancy in Italy was

now complete: Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia were incorporated with the Empire: he reigned at Milan by the title of king, and in Lucca and Tuscany by the ephemeral governments of the Princess Eliza and the King of Etruria.*

These prodigious strides towards universal dominion did not escape the notice of the other powers of Europe. The resolution of Russia and England was already fixed; but the temporizing policy of the cabinet of Vienna, desirous to gain time, and prepare for those redoubtable blows which they well knew, in the event of hostilities, would be in the first instance directed against themselves, rendered it necessary during the first part of the year to delay the rupture. The rapid advances of Napoleon in Italy, however, at length roused the indignation of the Austrian nobility. M. Winzingerode, the Russian ambassador, daily found the cabinet more inclined to adopt his views as to the necessity of a general and combined effort to arrest the common danger; and at length the force of general opinion became so great, that it produced a change in the cabinet, and total alteration in the external policy of government. The illustrious president of the council, M. Cobenzell, who had long been at the head of the pacific party, resigned, and was succeeded by Count Bail-[†] June, 1805. let Latour; and Prince Schwarzenbourg received the situation of vice-president of the Aulic Council. This change was decisive: the war party were now predominant; and it was only a question of time and expedience when hostilities should be commenced.

Russia and England, more removed from the danger, and therefore more independent in their resolutions, had proceeded considerably farther in the formation of a coalition. On the 11th of April a treaty was signed at St. Petersburg, which regulated the terms and the objects of the contracting parties, and the forces they were respectively to employ in carrying these into execution. The preamble set forth, "As the state of suffering in which Europe is placed demands speedy remedy, their majesties have mutually agreed to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for fresh encroachments on the part of the French government. They have agreed, in consequence, to employ the most speedy and efficacious means to form a general league of the states of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the present concert." The forces to be employed, independent of those furnished by England, were fixed at 500,000 men; and the objects of the league are declared to be, "1. The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the north of Germany. 2. The establishment of the independence of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland. 3. The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will admit. 4. The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, including the island of Elba, by the French forces. 5. The establishment of an order of things in Europe which may effectually guaranty the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations.

Extinction of Lucca, and incorporation of Parma and Placentia with France.

Increasing jealousy of Austria, and change in its ministry.

Treaty, offensive and defensive, between Russia and England, April 11, 1805.

* Bot., iv., 172, 176.

* Bot., iv., 176. Bign., iv., 236, 237.

† Dum., xi., 160, 164.

strife which was approaching, and apprehensive of being cast down from the position which she occupied in the shock of such enormous powers, Prussia made the most energetic efforts to avert the collision, and for this purpose the cabinet of Berlin despatched M. Zastrow, aid-de-camp to the king, to St. Petersburg. Under the mediation of Prussia, a negotiation between the courts of Russia and France took place, which for three months averted the commencement of hostilities, but led to no other result. Neither party was sincere in the desire for an accommodation; and if either had, the pretensions of the opposite powers were too much at variance to render a pacification possible. France was resolutely determined to abandon none of its acquisitions on the Continent, alleging as a reason that they were necessary to form a counterpoise to the vast increase of territory gained by Russia in the East, by Austria in Italy, and by England in India; and the Emperor Alexander replied, with reason, that recent events had too clearly demonstrated that the acquisitions of France were out of all proportion to those of the other powers: a fact of which the necessity of a general coalition to form a barrier against its ambition afforded the clearest evidence.*†

Notwithstanding all the efforts of England and Russia, however, it was found impossible to overcome the leaning of Prussia towards the French interest. The real secret of this partiality was not any insensibility to the dangers to be apprehended to the independence of Germany from the power of France in the cabinet of Berlin, or its able director, Baron Hardenberg, but the effect of the glittering prize which her ministers had long coveted in the Electorate of Hanover. The Prussian government could never divest itself of the idea that, by preserving a dubious neutrality, and reserving her interposition for the decisive moment, she might without danger add that important acquisition to her dominions. In effect, Napoleon, well aware

of this secret bias, withdrew, in the close of July, 12,000 men from the Hanoverian states; and the Prussian ministers then dropped hints as to "the revival of the king's wishes as to Hanover," and at length openly broached the project of taking provisional possession of that electorate, "as the union of the Continental dominions of his Britannic majesty to Prussia is of such consequence to that monarchy, that it can never relinquish the prospect of gaining such an acquisition, provided it can be done without compromising the character of his majesty." There was the real obstacle. The King of Prussia, notwithstanding all the immediate advantages of the acquisition, was stung with the secret reproaches of conscience at the idea of thus appropriating the possessions of a friendly power at the very moment when it was making such efforts, without the idea of selfish recompense, for the deliverance of Europe. The struggles of conscience, however, became daily weaker. The king at length put the question to his ministers, "Can I, without violating the rules of morality, without being held up in history as a prince destitute of faith, depart, for the acquisition of Hanover, from the character which I have hitherto maintained?" The woman that deliberates is lost. It was easy to see in what such contests between duty and interest would terminate. Before the middle of August, the Prussian cabinet intimated to the French minister at Berlin their willingness to conclude a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French government, on the footing of the annexation of Hanover to their dominions; and Duroc was forthwith sent from Paris by Napoleon to conclude its terms, and arrived there on the 1st of September. Subsequent unforeseen events prevented the treaty being signed, and saved Prussia from this last act of cupidity and infatuation; but, in the mean while, the precious moments were lost. The French forces were enabled to pour in irresistible multitudes, through the Prussian dominions, upon the devoted host at Ulm; and the battle of Austerlitz overthrew the independence of Germany, and exposed Prussia, unaided, to the mortal strokes of the French emperor. By such combinations of selfishness and folly was Napoleon aided in his project of elevating France to supreme authority in Europe, and for such wretched objects was that sincere alliance of all its powers long abandoned, which would at any time have opposed an effectual barrier to his progress!††

* Bign., iv., 258, 269. Dum., xii., 92, 95.

† The real points in dispute between France and Russia will be better understood from the following extract from the *Moniteur* at this period, than the reserved and formal style of diplomatic notes. "What have France and Russia to embroil each other? Perfectly independent of each other, they are impotent to inflict evil, but all-powerful to communicate benefits. If the Emperor of France exercises a great influence in Italy, the Czar exercises a still greater over Turkey and Persia. If the cabinet of Russia pretends to have a right to affix limits to the power of France, without doubt it is equally disposed to allow the Emperor of the French to prescribe the bounds which it is not to pass. Russia has partitioned Poland; it is but fair that France should have Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. It has seized upon Crimea, the Caucasus, and the northern provinces of Persia; can it deny that the right of self-preservation gives France a title to demand an equivalent in Europe? Do you wish a general congress in Europe? Let every power begin by restoring the conquests which it has made during the last fifty years. Let them re-establish Poland, restore Venice to its Senate, Trinidad to Spain, Ceylon to Holland, the Crimea to the Porte, the Caucasus and Georgia to Persia, the kingdom of Mysore to the sons of Tippoo Saib, and the Mahratta States to their lawful owners, and then the other powers may have some title to insist that France shall retire within her ancient limits. It is the fashion to speak of the ambition of France. Had she chosen to preserve her conquests, the half of Austria, the Venetian States, the states of Holland and Switzerland, and the kingdom of Naples, would have been in her possession. The limits of France are in reality the Adige and the Rhine. Has it passed either of these limits? Had it fixed on the Solza and the Drave, it would not have exceeded the bounds of its conquests." It is not difficult to trace the hand of Napoleon in these able remarks.—*Moniteur*, 18th July, 1805, and DUMAS, xii., 96, 97.

* Bign., iv., 268, 273.

† The Prussian ministers having demanded a frank statement of the intentions of Napoleon in the East, and agreed explicit of such an alliance, the following note was presented by the French minister to that electorate. Baron Hardenberg: "The peace of the Continent will be the fruit of the alliance between France and Prussia. It will be enough for this purpose for Prussia to say that she makes common cause with France in any war which may have for its object to change the present state of Italy. What danger can Prussia fear, when the emperor engages to support it with 80,000 men against the Russians; when it will have for auxiliaries Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, Baden, the emperor engaging to obtain for the king the possession of Hanover, while his allies will only be called on to guarantee the present state of Italy? The emperor offers Hanover absolutely and without any condition; and the king may judge from that whether or not he is disposed to be generous towards his German allies." The Prussian minister replied: "It is with the most lively gratitude that the king has received the proposition made by the intervention of the French minister. He experiences the greatest satisfaction at the proposal made to exchange the electorate of Hanover for a guarantee of the present state of Italy, in or-

Threatening as was the present state of the Continent, Napoleon was not one whit diverted by it from his projected descent upon Great Britain. On the contrary, it only furnished an additional reason for pushing the preparations for that great undertaking with additional vigour; being well aware that, if England was destroyed, the Continental coalition would soon fall to pieces, and that a blow struck on the banks of the Thames would more effectually attain this object than one either in the basin of the Danube or the shores of the Visula. For this purpose, shortly after Aug. 3, 1804, his return from Italy, he repaired to the camp at Boulogne, there to inspect in person the vast military force arrayed on the shores of the Channel, and to direct the distant movements of the fleets by which he hoped to obtain, for a time at least, the mastery of the seas, and the means of safely disembarking it within a few days' march of London.*

The army which Napoleon had now assembled for this great enterprise was one of the most formidable, in point of numerical strength, and beyond all question the most perfect in point of military organization, which had ever been brought together since the days of the Roman legions. It amounted to 114,000 combatants, 432 pieces of cannon, and 14,654 horses, assembled in the camps at St. Omer, Bruges, Montreuil, and Boulogne, besides 12,000 at the Texel and Helvoetsluys, and 10,000 on board the combined fleet, and the like force at Brest, ready to embark on the squadron of Admiral Gantheaume; in all, 155,000 men, in the highest state of discipline and equipment. The stores of ammunition, warlike implements, and provisions collected, were on an unparalleled scale of magnitude, and amply evinced the reality of the design which the emperor had in view. Each cannon had two hundred rounds of ammunition; the cartridges were 14,000,000; the flints, 1,200,000; the biscuits, 2,000,000; the saddles, 10,000; and 5000 sheep were ready to accompany the army in its embarkation. Provisions for the immense multitude for three months had been collected; the hospital arrangements were perfect; and 2293 vessels, capable of transporting 160,000 men and 9000 horses, of which 1339 were armed with above three thousand pieces of cannon, independent of the artillery which accompanied the army, awaited, in the harbours of Boulogne, Etaples, Ambleuse, Ostend, and Calais, the signal to put to sea.†

der to avert a war on the Continent and lead towards peace with England. His majesty is desirous to see the independence of Switzerland established, as well as that of Holland and the part of Italy not allowed by Prussia to France. If on these subjects his imperial majesty will explain himself in a positive manner, the king will enter with pleasure into the details necessary for a definitive arrangement."—See BIGNON, iv., 271, 272.

* BIGNON, iv., 277.

† DUMAS, xii., 33, 37, and Tables opposite p. 304. JOM., ii., 66, 68.

‡ The composition of this vast armament around Boulogne was as follows: it is one of the most curious monuments of the age of Napoleon:

Infantry.....	76,798
Cavalry.....	11,640
Cannoniers.....	3,780
Wagoners.....	3,780
Non-combatants.....	17,476
Total.....	113,474
Gunboats.....	1,339
Transport vessels.....	954

During its long encampment on the shores of the Channel, this great army had been organized in a different manner from any that had yet existed in modern Europe. It is a curious circumstance, that the genius of Napoleon, aided by all the experience of the Revolutionary wars, reverted at last to a system extremely similar to that of the Roman legions; and to the vigour and efficiency of this organization, which has never since been departed from, the subsequent extraordinary successes of the French armies may in some degree be ascribed. At the commencement of the Revolution the divisions of the army, generally fifteen or eighteen thousand strong, were hurried, under the first officer that could be found, into the field; but it was soon found that there were few generals capable of skilfully directing the movements of such considerable masses of troops; while, on the other hand, if the divisions were too small, there was a want of that unity and decision of movement which was requisite to ensure success. Selecting a medium between these two extremes, Napoleon adopted a double division. His army was divided, in the first instance, into corps composed of from twenty to thirty thousand men each, the direction of which was intrusted to a marshal of the Empire. Each of these corps had, in proportion to its force, a suitable allotment of field and heavy artillery, its reserve, and two or three regiments of light cavalry; but the heavy cavalry and medium horse, or dragoons, were united into one corps, and placed under the command of one general. The organization of the Imperial Guard was precisely the same, with this difference only, that it was considered as the reserve of the whole army, and as such more immediately under the command of the emperor himself. Each corps was formed into four or five divisions, varying from five to seven thousand men, each commanded by generals of division, who received their orders from the general of the corps. The troops in these divisions always remained under the same officers; the divisions themselves belonged to the same corps; no incorporation or transposition, excepting in cases of absolute necessity arising from extraordinary casualties in war, disturbed the order established in the camps. In this way the generals came to know their officers, the officers their soldiers; the capacity, disposition, and qualities of each were understood. An *esprit de corps* was formed, not only among the members of the same regiment, but those of the same division and corps; and the general of division took as much pride in the precision with which the regiments under his orders performed their combined operations, or the marshal in the perfection of the arrangements of the corps under his direction, as the captain of dragoons did in the steadiness with which his men kept their line

Which would carry.....	161,215 men
and horses.....	9,059
Guns mounted on armed vessels.....	3,500
Horses.....	7,394
Fusils (spare).....	32,837
Cartridges.....	13,000,000
Flints.....	1,268,400
Biscuits (rations).....	1,434,800
Bottles brandy.....	236,230
Tools.....	30,375
Saddles.....	10,560
Field-pieces.....	432
Rounds of ammunition.....	86,400
Loads of hay.....	70,370
Do. oats.....	70,370
Sheep.....	4,924

—See DUMAS, xii.; Tables, 1, 2, 3, fronting p. 304.

in a charge, or the sergeant in the cleanliness of the appointments of the little subdivision intrusted to his care.*†

Satisfied with their lot in this great encampment, the soldiers were singularly tractable and obedient. Constantly occupied and amused by the spectacle of sea-fights, or frequent reviews and mock-battles, they neither murmured at the exactions of a rigid discipline, nor experienced the usual monotony and languor of a pacific life in camps. The good effects of distributing the corps into divisions were here soon rendered conspicuous. The general commanding each division became not only personally acquainted with all his officers, but had an opportunity of correcting anything defective in the discipline of the men; and the soldiers, from constant exercises and the habit of acting together in large masses, acquired a degree of precision in the performance of manœuvres on a great scale which never before had been equalled in the French armies, and embraced everything that was really useful or suitable to the French character in the discipline of the Great Frederick.

No man knew better than Napoleon, from his own experience, as well as the calamities which an obstinate adherence to the opposite system had inflicted upon his opponents, that the general-in-chief especially, if far removed from the theatre of operations, cannot with advantage prescribe the details of subordinate movements. In his campaigns, consequently, each marshal received general instructions as to the line of operations which he was to adopt, and the end to which his efforts were to be directed, but he was left entirely master of the means by which these objects were to be attained; and although Napoleon was frequently extremely minute in his directions to his lieutenants, yet he always left them a general discretion to adopt them or not, according to circumstances; and a commander, in his estimation, would have committed a serious fault if he had followed the letter of his instructions when a change of circumstances called for a deviation from them. The same system of confidence was established between the marshal and his generals of division, to all of whom a certain

discretionary power in the execution of orders was intrusted: a confidence for the most part well deserved by the ability and experience of those officers. In one respect only the changes of Napoleon at this period were of doubtful utility, and that was in virtually suppressing the *état-major*, or general staff, by enacting that the rank of colonels in it should be abolished: an ordinance which, by closing the avenue of promotion, at once banished all young men of ability from that department, and converted what had formerly been the chief school of military talent into a higher species of public couriers.*

But though Napoleon left to each officer, in his own sphere, those discretionary powers which he knew to be indispensable, it is not to be supposed that he was negligent of the manner in which their several duties were discharged, or that a vigilant superintendence was not kept up, under his direction, of all the departments in the army. On the contrary, he exercised an incessant and most active survey of every officer intrusted with any service of importance in the vast army subject to his orders: nothing escaped his vigilance; continual reports addressed to headquarters informed him how every branch of his service was conducted; and if anything was defective, an immediate reprimand from Berthier instantly informed the person in fault that the attention of the emperor had been attracted to his delinquencies. Continual and minute instructions, addressed to the generals, commissaries, and functionaries of every description connected with the army, gave to all the benefit of his luminous views and vast experience. With the extension of his forces, and the multiplication of their wants, his powers appeared to expand in an almost miraculous proportion; and the active superintendence of all, which seemed the utmost limit of human exertion, when only fifty thousand men required to be surveyed, was not sensibly diminished when five hundred thousand were assembled. Above all, the attention of the emperor was habitually turned to the means of providing for the subsistence of his troops: a branch of service which, from the prodigious extension of his forces, and the rapidity with which he moved them into countries where no magazines had been formed, required, in an extraordinary degree, all the efforts of his talent and reflection. To such a length was this superintendence of the emperor carried, that it was a common saying in the army, that every officer who had anything of importance to perform imagined that the imperial attention was exclusively directed to himself; while, in fact, it was divided among several hundreds, perhaps thousands, who stood in a similar predicament. By this unexampled vigilance, seconded by the great abilities of the officers and generals under his command, the army destined for the invasion of England acquired a degree of perfection, in point of discipline, organization, and military habits, unprecedented since the days of the Roman legions.†

* Dum., xii., 401, 411. Jom., ii., 58.

† The camps in which the soldiers were lodged, during their long sojourn on the shores of the Channel, were distinguished by the same admirable system of organization. They were laid out according to the usual form, in squares intersected by streets, and composed of barracks constructed on a uniform plan, according to the materials furnished by the country in which they were situated. At Ostend they were formed of light wood and straw; at Boulogne and Wimereux of sharp stakes, cut in the forest of Guénis, supported by mason-work. These field barracks were extremely healthy: the beds of the soldiers, raised two feet above the ground, were composed of straw, on which their camp blankets were laid; the utmost care was taken to preserve cleanliness in every part of the establishment. Constant employment was the true secret both of their good health and docile habits; neither officers nor soldiers were ever allowed to remain any time idle; when not employed in military evolutions, they were continually engaged either in raising or strengthening the field-works on the different points of the coast, or levelling down eminences, draining marshes, or filling up hollows to form agreeable esplanades in front of their habitations and where their exercises were performed. The different corps and divisions mixed with each other in these works of utility or recreation: they even went so far as to engage in undertakings of pure ornament; gardens were created, flowers were cultivated, and, in the midst of an immense military population, the aspect of nature was sensibly improved.—See DUMAS, xii., 25, 26.

‡ Dum. xii., 29, 32.

* Jom., ii., 58, 60. Dum., xii., 408, 412.

† Dum., xii., 411, 413.

‡ Ample evidence of the truth of these observations exists in the correspondence of the emperor, still preserved in the archives of Paris, or in the custody of his generals, and which, if published entire, would amount to many hundred volumes. From the valuable fragments of it published in the annexes to General Matthieu Dumas, and the works of General Gourgaud and Baron Fain on the campaigns of 1812

The organization of the flotilla was as extraordinary and perfect as that of the land-forces. It was divided into as many subdivisions as there were sections in the army; and all the stores, baggage, and artillery were already on board, so that nothing was wanting but the embarkation of the men. The French genius, able beyond that of any other people in Europe in the organization of large bodies, shone forth here in full lustre. Such was the perfection to which the arrangements had been carried, that not only every division of the army, but every regiment and company had a section of the flotilla allotted to it; and the point and vessel of embarkation was assigned to every man, horse, gun, and carriage in that prodigious array. Every man in the army, down to the lowest drummer, knew where he was to embark, on board what vessel, and where he was to station himself while on board; and, from constant practice, they had arrived at such a precision in that most difficult branch of their duty, that it was found by experiment that a corps of twenty-five thousand men, drawn up opposite the vessels allotted to them, could be completely embarked in the short space of ten minutes.*

The object of Napoleon, in this immense accumulation of gunboats and armed vessels, was not to force his way across the Channel by means of this novel species of naval force, but merely to provide transports for the conveyance of the troops, and withdraw the attention of the enemy, by their seeming adaptation for warlike operations, from the quarter from whence the force really intended to cover the descent was to be obtained. The problem to be solved was to transport one hundred and fifty thousand men in safety to the shores of Kent, and no man knew better than Napoleon that to engage in such an enterprise while the English were masters of the sea was a vain attempt. From the beginning, therefore, he resolved not to hazard the embarkation till, by a concentration of all his naval forces in the Channel, while the English fleets were decoyed to distant parts of the world, he had acquired, for the time at least, a decided command of the passage. The great object, however, was to disguise these ultimate designs, and prevent the English government from adopting the means by which they might have been frustrated; and for this end it was that the Boulogne flotilla was armed, and the prodigious expense incurred of constructing fifteen hundred warlike vessels, bearing several thousand pieces of cannon. Not one of these guns was meant to be fired; they were intended only as a veil; the real covering of the force was assembled at Martinique, and was to return suddenly to Europe, while the British squadrons were despatched to distant points to succour their menaced colonial possessions. The stratagem, thus ably

conceived, was completely successful; not one person in the British dominions, except the sagacious Admiral Collingwood, penetrated the real design; the French fleets returned in safety from the West Indies to the European latitudes, leaving Nelson three weeks' sail in the rear; and when the emperor was at Boulogne, in August, 1805, at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men, sixty ships of the line were assembled in the Bay of Biscay, where the united British squadrons did not amount to much more than half that force.**

In the prosecution of this profound design, it was of importance to accumulate as much as possible of the flotilla at Boulogne; and in the prosecution of this object many actions took place between the English cruisers and the vessels advancing round the coast, which answered the double purpose of habituating the sailors to naval warfare, and perpetuating the illusion that it was by means of the armed force of the flotilla that the descent was to be effected. Numerous actions, in consequence, took place with the English cruisers, whose vigour and boldness knew no bounds in their warfare against this ignoble species of opponents when coasting along under cover of the numerous batteries with which the coast was guarded; but, notwithstanding all their efforts, the success achieved, from the impossibility of getting sufficiently near the enemy, was more than counterbalanced by the severe loss of life sustained in those perilous services. The most important of these was a series of actions from the 17th to the 19th of July, when the Dutch flotilla, under the command of Admiral Verhuel, accomplished the passage from Dunkirk to Ambleteuse, near

* Jom., ii., 70. Nap. in Month., ii., 20, 21. Las Casas, ii., 277, 280.

† The following precious note, written by Napoleon at the time of his leaving the camp at Boulogne, in September, 1805, explains fully the particulars of this great project :

“What was my design in the creation of the flotilla at Boulogne ?

“I wished to assemble forty or fifty ships of the line in the harbour of Martinique, by operations combined in the harbours of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest; to bring them suddenly back to Boulogne; to find myself in this way, during fifteen days, the master of the sea; to have 150,000 men encamped on the coast, three or four thousand vessels in the flotilla, and to set sail the moment the signal was given of the arrival of the combined fleet. That project has failed. If Admiral Villeneuve, instead of entering into the harbour of Ferrol, had contented himself with joining the Spanish squadron, and instantly made sail for Brest and joined Admiral Gantheaume, my army would have embarked, and it was all over with England.

“To succeed in this object it was necessary to assemble 150,000 men at Boulogne, to have there four thousand transports and immense materiel, to embark all that, and, nevertheless, to prevent the enemy from divining my object. It appeared scarcely practicable to do so. If I have succeeded, it was by doing the converse of what might have been expected. If fifty ships of the line were to assemble to cover the descent upon England, nothing but transport vessels were required in the harbours of the Channel, and all that assemblage of gunboats, floating batteries, and armed vessels was totally useless. Had I assembled together three or four thousand armed transports, no doubt the enemy would have perceived that I awaited the arrival of my fleets to attempt the passage; but, by constructing prams and gunboats, I appeared to be opposing cannons to cannons; and the enemy was in this manner deceived. They conceived that I intended to attempt the *trajet* by main force, by means of my flotilla. They never penetrated my real design; and when, from the failure of the movements of my squadrons, my project was revealed, the utmost consternation pervaded the councils of London, and all men of sense in England confessed that England had never been so near its ruin.”—See the *original* in DUMAS, xii., 315, 316. and in *Napoleon in MONTHOLON*, iii., App., 384.

1813, and 1814, as well as the letters of Napoleon contained in Napier's Account of the Peninsular War, some idea may be formed of the prodigious mental activity of a man who, amid all the cares of empire, and all the distractions of almost incessant warfare, contrived, during the twenty years that he held the reins of power, to write or dictate probably more than the united works of Lope de Vega, Voltaire, and Sir Walter Scott. His secret and confidential correspondence with the Directory, published at Paris in 1819, from 1796 to 1798 only, a work of great interest and rarity, amounts to seven large closely-printed volumes; and his letters to his generals, during that time, must have been twice as voluminous.

* Ney's Mem., ii., 256, 260. Dum., xii., 35, 37.

Boulogne. They were annoyed almost the whole way by the English vessels under the command of Sir Sydney Smith and Captain Owen in the *Immortalité* frigate; but the weight of the attack was reserved for the rounding of Cape Gris Nez. The British ships approached within musket-shot, and poured in their broadsides with great effect upon the French vessels as they were weathering that dangerous point; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the batteries arranged on the cliffs by Marshal Davoust, that they were unable to prevent the flotilla from reaching the place of their destination with very little loss. The rapid and incessant cannonade both by the batteries on shore and the English cruisers, and the vivid interest excited among an immense crowd of spectators from the neighbouring camps by the passage of the flotilla through such a perilous defile, formed together a brilliant spectacle, which awakened the most animating feelings among the military and naval forces of France.*

While the emperor, on the heights of Boulogne, was actively engaged in re-
Aug. 1805. viewing the different corps of his army, and inspecting the immense preparations for the expedition, the different squadrons of his empire were rapidly bringing on the great crisis between the naval forces of the two countries.

Jan. 4, 1805. Early in the year, Napoleon took advantage of the open hostilities which had now ensued between England and Spain, to conclude at Paris a secret convention for the combined operation of the squadrons of both countries; and the important part there allotted to the fleets of Spain leaves no room for doubt that their co-operation had been foreseen and arranged with Napoleon long before the capture of the treasure frigates, and that that unhappy event only precipitated a junction of the Spanish forces already calculated on by Napoleon for the execution of his great design. By this convention, it was stipulated that the emperor should provide at the Texel an army of 30,000 men, and the transports and vessels of war necessary for their conveyance; at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, 120,000 men, with the necessary vessels of war and transports; at Brest, 21 ships of the line, with the frigates and smaller vessels, capable of embarking 30,000 men; at Rochefort, 6 ships of the line and 4 frigates, with 4000 men; at Toulon, 11 ships of the line and 8 frigates, having 9000 land-troops on board; and Spain, in return, bound herself to have 30 ships of the line and 5000 men ready, and provisioned for six months, in the harbours of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthage-
na: in all 38 French ships of the line and 30 Spanish, and 170,000 men, all to be employed in the invasion of England. But their destination was as yet kept secret, it being provided "that these armaments shall be maintained and destined to operations on which his majesty reserves the explanation for a month, or to the general charged with full powers to that effect." When it is recollected that the fleets of Spain composed nearly a half of the naval forces thus assembled by Napoleon for the great object of his life, and that without this addition his own would have been totally inadequate to the undertaking, no doubt whatever can remain that their co-operation had for years before been calculated on by his far-seeing policy; and this must increase the regret of every Englishman, that, by the unhappy neglect to declare war before hostilities were commenced, Great Britain was put formally in the wrong, when in substance she was so obviously in the right.*

Measures of defence by the British government.

The English government, after the breaking out of the Spanish war, lost no time in taking measures for the new enemy which had arisen. Sir John Orde, with five ships of the line, commenced the blockade of Cadiz; Carthage-
na also was watched, and a sufficient fleet was stationed off Ferrol. But still these squadrons, barely equal to the enemy's force in the harbours before which they were respectively stationed, were totally unequal to prevent its junction with any superior hostile squadron which might approach; and thus, if one squadron got to sea, it might with ease raise the blockade of all the harbours, and assemble the combined fleets for the projected operations in the Channel. This was what, in effect, soon happened.†

Napoleon, anxious for the execution of his designs, sent orders for the Rochefort and Toulon squadrons to put to sea. On the 11th of January the former of these fleets, under the command of Admiral Missiessy, set sail, and made straight for the West Indies, without meeting with any English vessels. The Toulon squadron put to sea about the same time, but, having met with rough weather, it returned to Toulon, considerably shattered, in four days after its departure.‡ The Rochefort fleet was more fortunate; it arrived at Martinique on the 5th of February, and, after having landed the troops and ammunition destined for that island, made sail for the British island of Dominica, where the admiral landed 4000 men, under cover of a tremendous fire from the line-of-battle ships. General Prevost, the governor, who had only 500 regular troops in the island, immediately made the best dispositions which the limited force at his command would admit to resist the enemy. He retired deliberately, disputing every inch of ground, to the fort of Prince Rupert, in the centre of the island; and the French commander, not having leisure for a regular siege, re-embarked and made sail for Guadaloupe, after destroying the little town of Roseau. He next proceeded to St. Kitts and Nevis, in both of which islands he levied contributions and burned some valuable merchantmen; after which he embarked, without attempting to make any impression on the military defences. The arrival of Admiral Cochrane with six sail of the line having rendered any farther stay in the West Indies dangerous, Admiral Missiessy returned to Europe, after throwing a thousand men into Santa Domingo, and compelling the blacks to raise the siege of that place, and regained Rochefort in safety in the beginning of April, to await another combination of the French and Spanish squadrons.§

Jan. 11. The Toulon and Rochefort squadrons put to sea.
Jan. 15.
Feb. 22, 1805.

The successful issue of this expedition excited the greatest alarm in Great Britain, from

* Dum., xi., 97, 98.

† Ann. Reg., 1805, 219, 221.

‡ "These gentlemen," said Nelson, when he heard of this unexpected return, after having gone to Malta in search of the enemy, "are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyons gale. We have buffeted them for twenty-one months, and not carried away a spar."—SOUTHBY'S *Life of Nelson*, ii., 214.

§ Ann. Reg., 1805, 219, 221. *Jom.*, ii., 71. Dum., xi., 110, 113, 123.

* Dum., xii., 42, 48. James, iii., 434, 440.

Alarm they excite in Great Britain. the evidence which it afforded of the facility with which, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the blockading squadrons, the enemy's fleets might leave and regain their harbours, and carry terror into her most distant colonial possessions. But it was far from answering the views of Napoleon, who had prescribed to Missiessy a much more extensive set of operations, viz., to throw succours into Martinique and Guadeloupe, take possession of St. Lucie and Dominica, regain Surinam and the other Dutch colonies, put the few remaining strongholds of St. Domingo in a respectable state of defence, and make himself master of St. Helena. The instructions for this expedition are dated by the emperor from Strasburg, September 29, 1804, shortly before his coronation. Strange combination in his destiny, to have contemplated the capture of the rock of St. Helena on the eve of his coronation, as he had the reduction of the Island of Elba at the period of his being created First Consul for life!*

More important results followed the next sortie of the enemy, which took place on the 30th of March from Toulon. On that day Admiral Villeneuve put to sea with eleven ships of the line and eight frigates, while Nelson, who purposely remained at a distance to entice the enemy from the protection of their batteries, was at anchor in the Gulf of Palma, and made straight for Carthage, with the intention of joining the Spanish squadron of six sail of the line in that harbour; but finding them not ready for sea, the French fleet passed the Straits of Gibraltar, raised the blockade of Cadiz, from whence Sir John Orde retired to unite with the Channel fleet off Brest, and formed a junction with the Spanish squadron in that harbour, and one French ship of the line which was lying there. Increased by this important accession to the amount of eighteen ships of the line and ten frigates, the combined fleet, having on board ten thousand veteran troops, set sail on the following day for the West Indies. About the

April 10. same time the Brest squadron, under Admiral Gantheaume, consisting of twenty-one ships of the line, put to sea, and remained three days off the Isle of Ushant before they retired to their harbour, on the approach of Admiral Cornwallis with the Channel fleet, which only amounted to eighteen.†

Meanwhile Nelson was in the most cruel state of anxiety. He was bearing up with certainty of position from the Gulf of Palma for his old Nelson. On the 4th of April, he met the Phœbe brig with the long-wished-for intelligence that Villeneuve had again put to sea, and when last seen was steering for the coast of Africa. Upon this he immediately set sail for Palermo, under the impression that they had gone to Egypt; but feeling assured by the 11th, from the information brought by his cruisers, that they had not taken that direction, he instantly turned and beat up, with the utmost difficulty, against strong westerly winds to Gibraltar; devoured all the while by the utmost anxiety lest, before he could reach them, the enemy might menace Ireland or Jamaica. In spite of every exertion, he could not reach the Straits till the 30th of April, and even then the wind was so adverse that he could not pass them, and

was compelled to anchor in Mazari Bay, on the Barbary coast, for five days.*†

At length, on the 5th of May, he received certain information that the combined He at length fleet had made for the West Indies, follows to the and amounted to eighteen sail of the West Indies. line and ten frigates. Nelson had only ten sail of the line and three frigates; his ships had been at sea for nearly two years; the crews were worn out with fatigue and watching; and anxiety had so preyed upon his naturally ardent mind that his health had seriously suffered, and his physician had declared an immediate return to England as indispensable to his recovery. In these circumstances this heroic officer did not an instant hesitate what course to adopt, but immediately made signal to hoist every rag of canvass for the West Indies. "Do you," said he to his captains, "take a Frenchman apiece, and leave all the Spaniards to me. When I haul down my colours I expect you to do the same, but not till then."‡§

The combined fleet had above thirty days the start of Nelson; but he calculated, by his superior activity and seamanship, upon gaining ten days upon them during the passage of the Atlantic. In fact, Villeneuve reached Martinique on the 14th of May, while Nelson arrived at Barbadoes on the 4th of June; but in the interim the allied squadrons had done nothing excepting the capture of the Diamond Rock, near Martinique, by a few ships detached for that purpose, which was reduced, after a most gallant resistance by the small British force by which it was occupied. Overjoyed at the discovery that the enemy were in those seas, and that all the great British settlements were still safe, Nelson, without allowing his sailors any rest, instantly made sail for Trinidad, thinking that the French fleet Searches in had gone to attempt the reduction of vain for the that colony; and so far was he mis- enemy there. led by false intelligence, that he cleared his fleet for action on the evening of the 7th of June 7. June, hoping to render the mouths of the Orinoco on the following day as famous in history as those of the Nile; but when morning broke not a vessel was to be seen, and it was evident that the British fleet had, by erroneous information, accidentally or designedly thrown in their way, been sent in an entirely wrong direction. Had it not been for this circumstance, and had Nelson acted upon his own judgment alone, he would have arrived at Port Royal just as the French were leaving it, and the battle would

* South, ii., 216, 217. Ann. Reg., 1805, 225.

† On this occasion Nelson wrote to Sir Alexander Ball, at Malta: "My good fortune, my dear Ball, seems flown away. I cannot get a fair wind, nor even a side-wind. Dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what to do when we leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain account of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill luck will go far to kill me; but, as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down, whatever I may feel."—SOUTHEY, ii., 217.

‡ South, ii., 219, 220.

§ The uncertainty as to the destination of Nelson's squadron filled Napoleon, whose mind, not less than that of his great opponent, was anxiously intent on the result of the great events as to Nelson's destination. now in progress, with the utmost disquietude. On the 9th of June, 1805, immediately before leaving Milan, he wrote to the Minister of Marine: "We cannot discover what has become of Nelson; it is possible that the English have sent him to Jamaica: but I am of opinion that he is still in the European seas. It is more than probable that he has returned to England to re-victual and place his crews in new vessels, for his fleet stands greatly in need of repairs, and his squadron must be in very bad condition." Even Napoleon's daring mind could not anticipate Nelson's heroic passage of the Atlantic, in these circumstances, in pursuit of a fleet nearly double his own.—DUMAS, xi., 169.

* Dum., xiii., 205. Pièces Just.

† South. Nelson, ii., 217, 218. Dum., xi., 124, 128.

have been fought on the same spot where Rodney defeated De Grasse five-and-twenty years before; but as it was, the opportunity was lost, and the greatest triumph of the British navy was reserved for the European seas.*

In truth, the combined fleet had sailed from Martinique on the 28th of May, and instantly made sail for the north, having been joined while there by Admiral Magon with two additional ships of the line, which raised their force to twenty line-of-battle ships. This re-enforcement also brought the last instructions of Napoleon, dated Pavia, 8th of May, 1805, which were, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, and join the five French ships of the line and ten Spanish which awaited them in that harbour; make sail from that to Rochefort, join the five ships of the line under Missessy at that place; and with the whole united squadrons, amounting to forty ships of the line, steer to Brest, where Gantheaume awaited them with twenty-one. With this great fleet, which would greatly overmatch any force the British government could muster in the Channel, was Villeneuve to proceed to Boulogne, and cover the passage of the flotilla. His instructions were to shun a battle, unless it was unavoidable, and if so, to bring it on as near as possible to Brest, in order that the fleet of Admiral Gantheaume might take a part in it. "The grand object of the whole operation," said Napoleon, "is to procure for us a superiority for a few days before Boulogne—masters of the Channel for a few days, one hundred and fifty thousand men will embark in the two thousand vessels which are there assembled, and the expedition is concluded." Every contingency was provided for: the chance of the fleets going round about was foreseen, and stores of provisions were provided both at Cherbourg and the Texel, in the event of the general rendezvous taking place in either of these harbours.†

Hitherto everything had not only fully answered, but even exceeded, Napoleon's expectations. The design he had so long had in contemplation had never been penetrated by the British government: on the contrary, Nelson was in the West Indies; he had been decoyed to the mouths of the Orinoco when the French admiral was returning to Europe with twenty sail of the line, eighteen days in advance of his indefatigable opponent, while the English squadrons which blockaded Ferrol and Rochefort were totally inadequate to prevent the junction of the combined fleet with the vessels of war in those harbours.

Villeneuve had sailed on the 28th of May 28. from Martinique, and on the 13th of June 13. Nelson, on arriving at Antigua for the first time, received such intelligence as left no doubt that the combined fleet had returned to Europe. Disdaining to believe, what the gratitude of the delivered colonists led them to allege, that the enemy had fled at the mere terror of his name before a fleet not half their amount, he

immediately suspected some ulterior combination, but without being able to penetrate what it was; and instantly despatched several fast-sailing vessels to Lisbon and Portsmouth in order to warn the British government of the probable return of the whole fleets

of the enemy to Europe. To this sagacious step, as will immediately appear, the safety of the British Empire is mainly to be ascribed. Nelson himself, without allowing his sailors a moment's rest, set sail the very same day for July 18. Europe, and on the 18th of July reached Gibraltar; having, from the time he left Tetuan Bay, twice crossed the Atlantic, and visited every one of the leeward islands, with a fleet which had been two years at sea, in seventy-eight days;* an instance of vigour and rapidity of naval movement unparalleled in the annals of the world.†

Great was the despondency in the British islands at the intelligence of a fleet of such strength having proceeded to the West Indies, where it was well known no English force at all capable of resisting it was to be found; and the Admiralty, in the midst of the general alarm, took the most energetic measures to avert the danger, by instantly ordering every man and ship that could be got in readiness to sea, and despatched Admiral Collingwood with a squadron of five ships of the line to cruise off Gibraltar, and act as circumstances might require. That sagacious officer, alone of all the British chiefs, penetrated the real design of Napoleon; and on the 21st of July, while yet the combined fleet had not been heard of on its return from the West Indies, wrote to Nelson that he was convinced they would raise the blockade of Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, and with the united force make for the British islands. His penetration was so remarkable, that his letter might almost pass for a transcript of the secret instructions of Napoleon, at the time in the possession of Villeneuve.§

Meanwhile, Villeneuve returned to Europe as rapidly as adverse winds would permit, and on the 23d of June he had reached the latitude of the Azores. Napoleon, who by this time had returned to St. Cloud from Italy, despatched orders to the fleet at Rochefort to put to sea and join Admiral Gantheaume off the Lizard Point; or, if he had not made his escape from Brest, to make for Ferrol and join the combined fleet there. He literally counted the days and hours till some intelligence should arrive of the great armament approaching from

Energetic measures of the Admiralty when they received his despatches.

The combined fleet is outstripped by the British brigs with the despatches.

* From April 30th to July 18th.

† Ann. Reg., 1805, 228, 229. South., ii., 224, 225. Dum., xii., 6, 7.

‡ On the day following Nelson landed at Gibraltar, being the first time he had quitted the Victory for two years.

§ South., ii., 224, 225. Collingwood, i., 145.

|| His words are: "July 21, 1805.—We approached, my dear lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen first. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object which they had in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the bay, and taking the Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant, perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined with twenty more. This appears a probable plan; for unless it be to bring their power full fleet and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to chance of loss, which I do not believe Bonaparte would do without the hope of an adequate reward. The French government never aims at little things while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force which proved the great impediment to their undertaking."—Collingwood's *Memoirs*, i., 145, 146. The history of Europe does not contain a more striking instance of political and warlike penetration.

* South., ii., 222, 223. Dum., xii., 1, 6.

† See the orders in Dum., xi., 247, 254. Pièces Just.

the West Indies, the signal for the completion of all his vast and profound combinations. But meanwhile, one of the brigs despatched by Nelson from Antigua on the 13th of June had outstripped the combined fleet, and by the rapidity of its passage fixed the destinies of the world. The Curieux brig, sent on this important errand,

July 9. arrived at London on the 9th of July, having made the passage from Antigua in twenty-five days; and instantly the Admiralty despatched orders to Admiral Stirling, who commanded the squadrons before Rochefort, to raise the blockade of that harbour, join Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and cruise with the united force off Cape Finisterre, with a view to intercept the allied squadrons on their homeward passage towards Brest. These orders reached July 15. Admiral Stirling on the 13th of July; on the 15th he effected his junction with the fleet before Ferrol, and Sir Robert Calder stood out to sea, with fifteen line-of-battle ships, to take his appointed station in search of the enemy.*

The event soon showed of what vital importance it was that the Curieux had arrived so rapidly in England, and that the Admiralty had so instantaneously acted on the information Sir Robert communicated by Lord Nelson. Hard- Calder's ac- ly had Sir Robert Calder reached the tion.

place assigned for his cruise, about sixty leagues to the westward of Cape Finisterre, when the combined fleet of France and July 22. Spain hove in sight, consisting of twenty line-of-battle ships, a fifty gunship, and seven frigates.† The weather was so hazy, that the two fleets had approached very closely before they were mutually aware of each other's vicinity; but as soon as the British admiral descried the

enemy he made the signal for action, and bore down on the hostile fleet in two columns. Some confusion, however, took place in consequence of the necessity under which the English squadron lay of tacking before they reached the enemy, which, combined with the foggy state of the weather, brought the two fleets into collision in rather a disorderly manner; and when they got into close action, several vessels in both fleets were exposed to the attack of two or three opponents. The superiority of the British, however, was soon apparent, notwithstanding the preponderance of force on the part of the enemy. Before the action had continued four hours, two of the Spanish line-of-battle ships, the St. Raphael and Férme, were so much damaged that they were compelled to strike their colours, while the Windsor Castle, in the English fleet, was also so much injured as to render it necessary to put her in tow of the Dragon. Darkness separated the combatants, and the British fleet, carrying with them their prizes, lay to for the night to repair their injuries, and prepare for a renewal of the action on the following day. The loss sustained by the British was very small, amounting only to 39 killed and 159 wounded; that of the French and Spaniards to 476;* and no ship except the Windsor Castle was seriously damaged on the English side. Neither fleet showed any decided inclination to renew the action on the following day: at noon the combined fleet approached to within a league and a half of the British, who were drawn up in order of battle, but Villeneuve made signal to haul to the wind on the same tack as the British; that is, to decline the engagement for the present, as soon

The two fleets separate with out decisive success.

as he saw that the English fleet stood firm; and night again separated the hostile squadrons. On the day after, Sir Robert Calder stood away with his prizes towards the north, justly discerning, in the danger arising from the probable junction of Villeneuve with the Rochefort and Ferrol squadrons, the first of which was known to have put to sea, a sufficient reason for falling back upon the support of the Channel fleet or that of Lord Nelson; and Villeneuve, finding the passage clear, stood towards Spain, and after leaving three sail of the line in bad order at Vigo, entered Ferrol on the 2d of August.†

Of the importance of this, perhaps the most momentous action ever fought by the navy of England, no farther proof is required than is furnished by the conduct of Napoleon, narrated by the unimpeachable authority of Count Daru, his private secretary, and the very eminent author of the History of Venice. On the day in which intelligence was received from the English papers of the arrival of Villeneuve at Ferrol, Daru was called by the emperor into his cabinet. The scene which followed must be given in his own words. "Daru found him transported with rage, walking up and down the room with hurried steps, and only breaking a stern silence by broken exclamations. 'What a navy—what sacrifices for nothing—what an admiral! All hope is gone, That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Ferrol! It is all over: he will be blockaded there—Daru, sit down and write.' The fact was, that on that morning

Vast importance of this action. Napoleon's conduct on receiving the intelligence. August 11, 1805.

* Dum., xii., 16, 19. Ann. Reg., 1805, 229. James, iv., 1, 2.

† Yet, strange to say, our naval historians seem insensible to the vital importance of this junction of the squadrons blockading Rochefort and Ferrol. Mr. James observes, "Thus was the blockade of two ports raised, in which, at the time, were about as many ships ready for sea as the fleet which the blockading squadrons were to go in search of. The policy of this measure does not seem very clear. If the squadron did not, like the Rochefort one, take advantage of this circumstance and sail out, it was only because it had received no orders."* Is it not evident that, unless this junction of the blockading squadrons had taken place, the combined fleet would have successively raised the blockade of both harbours, and stood on with five-and-thirty sail of the line for Brest?

Napoleon, whose penetrating eye nothing escaped, viewed in a very different light the concentration of the English blockading squadrons at this critical period. On the 27th of July, 1805, he wrote in these terms to the Minister of Marine: "The English squadron before Rochefort has disappeared on the 12th of July. It was only on the 9th of July that the brig Curieux arrived in England. The Admiralty could never have decided in twenty-four hours what movements to prescribe to its squadrons. Even if they had, it is not likely their orders could have reached the squadron before Rochefort in three days. I think the blockade must have been raised, therefore, by orders received before the arrival of the Curieux. On the 15th of July that squadron effected its junction with that before Ferrol; and on the 16th or 17th they set out in virtue of anterior orders. I should not be surprised if they had sent another squadron to strengthen that of Nelson, and to effect the destruction of the combined fleet, and that it is these fourteen vessels before Ferrol which form that squadron. They have taken with them frigates, brigs, and corvettes, assuredly either to keep a look-out or seek the combined fleet." It is interesting at the same moment to see the sagacity of Collingwood penetrating the long-hidden designs of the French emperor, Napoleon's foresight divining the happy junction of the fleets before Rochefort and Ferrol under Sir Robert Calder, and the rapid decision of the Admiralty, so much beyond what he conceived possible, which proved the salvation of England.—See DUMAS, xii., 19, 20.

* James, iv., 2.

* James, iv., 7, 9. Dum., xii., 51, 52.

† James, iv., 17. Vict. et Conq., xvi., 143. Dum., xii., 53.

the emperor had received intelligence of the arrival of Villeneuve in that Spanish harbour; he at once saw that the English expedition was blown up, the immense expenditure of the flotilla lost for a long time, perhaps forever! Then, in the transports of a fury which would have entirely overturned the judgment of any other man, he adopted one of the boldest resolutions, and traced the plans of one of the most admirable achievements that any conqueror ever conceived. Without a moment's hesitation, or even stopping to consider, he dictated at once the plan of the campaign of Austerlitz; the simultaneous departure of all the corps from Hanover and Holland to the south and the west of France, their order of march, duration, their lines of conveyance, and points of rendezvous; the surprises and hostile attacks which they might experience, the divers movements of the enemy, everything was foreseen: victory rendered secure on every supposition. Such was the justice and vast foresight of that plan, that over a base of departure two hundred leagues in extent, and lines of operations three hundred leagues in length, the stations assigned were reached according to this original plan, place by place, day by day, to Munich. Beyond that capital the periods only underwent a slight alteration, but the places pointed out were all reached, and the plan, as originally conceived, carried into complete execution.*

Nothing can portray the character of Napoleon and the importance of Sir Robert Calder's victory more strongly than this passage. He well knew how imminent affairs were in his rear; that Russia was advancing, Austria arming; and that, unless a stroke was speedily struck on the Thames, the weight of Europe must be felt on the Danube. It was to anticipate this danger, to dissolve the confederacy by a stroke at its heart, and conquer, not only England, but Russia and Austria on the British shores, that all his measures were calculated; and they were arranged so nicely, that there was barely time to carry the war into the enemy's vitals before he was assailed in his own. Finding this great project defeated by the result of Sir Robert Calder's action, he instantly took his line, adopted the secondary set of operations when he no longer could attempt the first, and prepared to carry the thunder of his arms to the banks of the Danube, when he was frustrated in his design of terminating the war in the British capital.

While such immense consequences were resulting from the action of the 22d of July, the gallant officer who, with a force so inferior, had achieved so decisive a success, was the victim of the most unmerited obloquy. The first intelligence of the defeat of the combined fleet by so inconsiderable an armament was received over all England with the utmost transports of joy; and the public expectation wound up to the very highest pitch by an expression in the admiral's despatches, which pointed to an intention of renewing the battle on the following day, and the statement everywhere made by the officer who brought the intelligence, that a renewal would certainly take place.† When,

therefore, it was discovered that the hostile fleets had not again met—that the British admiral had stood to the northward, rather avoiding than seeking an encounter—and that Villeneuve had reached Ferrol in safety, where he lay unblockaded with thirty ships of the line, these transports were suddenly cooled, and succeeded by a murmur of discontent, which was worked up to a perfect paroxysm of rage upon finding that, in consequence of these circumstances, Napoleon, in the official accounts published in the admiral's name on the occasion, claimed the victory for the French arms.* The consequence was, that, after having continued a short time longer in the command of the fleet, Sir Robert was compelled to retire and demand a court-martial, which, on the 26th of December, “severely reprimanded him for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement on the 23d and 24th of July,” though the sentence admitted that his conduct had not been owing either to cowardice or disaffection.‡ Thus, at the very time that a public outcry, excited by the vehemence of party ambition, was chasing from the helm of the Admiralty the statesman whose admirable arrangements had prepared for the British navy the triumph of Trafalgar, the fury of ignorant zeal affixed a stigma on the admiral whose gallant victory had defeated the greatest and best-arranged project ever conceived by Napoleon for our destruction, and finally rescued his country from the perils of Gallic invasion. Such, in its first and hasty fits, is public opinion! History would, indeed, be useless, if the justice of posterity did not often reverse its iniquitous decrees:§

published by the Admiralty. The passage published was in these words: “The enemy are now in sight to windward; and when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any farther opportunity that may offer to give you a farther account of these combined squadrons.” The suppressed paragraph was this: “At the same time, it will behoove me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe that they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port; therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron.” Had this paragraph been published after the former, it would have revealed the real situation of the British admiral, lying with fourteen ships of the line fit for action, in presence of a combined squadron of eighteen hourly expecting a junction with two others, one of fifteen, and the other of five line-of-battle ships. In these circumstances, no one can doubt that to retire towards the Channel fleet was the duty which the safety of England, with which he was charged, imperatively imposed on the British admiral. It is the most pleasing duty of the historian thus to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the memory of a gallant and meritorious officer; and it is the greatest consolation, next to the inward rewards of conscience, of suffering virtue, when borne down by the torrent of popular obloquy, to know that the time will come when his character will be reinstated in the eyes of posterity, and that deserved censure be cast upon the haste and severity of present opinion, which in the end seldom fails to attend deeds of injustice.

* The accounts published by Napoleon, in the name of Villeneuve, of the action, were entirely fabricated by the emperor himself. In his despatch to the minister of marine of 11th August, after noticing the accounts in the English newspapers, which claimed the victory, Napoleon said, “The arrival of Villeneuve at Corunna will overturn all their gasconades, and in the eyes of Europe will give us the victory; that is no small matter. Instantly write out a narrative of the action, and send it to M. Maret. Here is my idea of what it should be;” and then follows the fabricated account.—DUMAS, xii., 348; *Pièces Just.*

† James, iv., 18. Ann. Reg., 1805, 230, 231.

‡ Let us hear what the French writers say of this proceeding: “Admiral Calder,” says Dupin, “with an inferior force, meets the Franco-Spanish fleet; in the chase of it he brings on a partial engagement, and captures two ships. He is tried and reprimanded, because it is believed that, had he

* Dupin, *Force Navale de l'Angleterre*, i., 244. Dum., xii., 119, 120. Bign., iv., 296-7.

† The public discontent, which terminated so cruelly for Sir Robert Calder, was, in a great degree, owing to the unfortunate suppression of part of his despatches in the account

* James, iv., 17.

Meanwhile Nelson, having taken in water and other necessary supplies at Tetuan, stood for Ceuta on the 24th of July; and, having heard nothing of the combined fleet, proceeded to Cape St. Vincent, rather cruising in quest of intelligence than following any fixed course. He then traversed the Bay of Biscay, and approached the north of Ireland; and finding the enemy had not been heard of there, joined Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant on the 15th of August. No news had been obtained of the enemy; and on the same evening he received orders to proceed with the Victory and Superb to Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 17th, and at length heard of the action of the 22d of July and entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol. He was hailed with unbounded demonstrations of gratitude and joy in England, the public having followed with intense anxiety his indefatigable and almost fabulous adventures in search of the enemy, and deservedly awarded that consideration to heroic efforts in discharge of duty which is so often the reward only of splendid or dazzling achievements.*

Napoleon's hopes of accomplishing the objects of his ambition were somewhat revived upon finding that Nelson had not joined Sir Robert Calder's squadron, and that the fleet in Ferrol was still immensely superior to that of the enemy. Accordingly, he resumed his designs of invasion: on the 12th of August transmitted orders to Villeneuve, through the minister of marine, to sail without loss of time from Ferrol, and pursue his route towards Brest, where Gantheaume was prepared to join him at a moment's warning; and in two days afterward he wrote a second letter, in still more pressing terms, absolutely enjoining the immediate sailing of the combined fleet. Sir Robert Calder had at this time effected a junction with Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, so that the sea was open to his adventure. On the 17th of August, however, he was again detached, with twenty ships of the line, to cruise off Cape Finisterre. On the 11th, the combined fleet, amounting to twenty-nine sail of the line, having left several vessels behind them in a state not fit for service, stood out to sea, and at first took a northwesterly direction; but, having received accounts at sea from a Danish vessel that

renewed the action, he would have obtained a more decisive victory. What would they have done with Calder in England if he had commanded the superior fleet, and had lost two ships in avoiding an engagement which presented so favourable a chance to skill and valour?"—*DUPIN'S Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne*, ii., 17.

* South, ii., 225, 230. Ann. Reg., 1805, 230.

† "Despatch instantly," wrote Napoleon, on the 12th of August, to M. Decres, "a messenger to Ferrol. Make Villeneuve acquainted with the news received from London. Tell him I hope that he is continuing his mission, and that it would be too dishonourable for the imperial squadrons to permit a skirmish of a few hours and an engagement with fourteen vessels to render abortive such great projects; that the enemy's squadron has suffered much; and that, on his own admission, his losses have not been very serious." And on the 14th of August, "With thirty vessels, my admirals should learn not to fear four-and-twenty English; if they are not equal to such an encounter, we may at once renounce all hopes of a marine. I have more confidence in my naval forces; had I not, it would ruin their courage. If Villeneuve remains the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th, at Ferrol, I will not complain; but if he remains an hour longer with a favourable wind, and only twenty-four line-of-battle ships before him—I require a man of superior character. The little energy of my admirals throws away all the chances of fortune, and ruins all the prospects of the campaign."—*DUMAS*, xii., 59, 67.

a British fleet of twenty-five ships of the line (Sir Robert Calder) was approaching, Villeneuve tacked about and made sail for Cadiz, where he arrived on the 21st, the very day on which he was expected at Brest. Admiral Col-
ingwood, with four sail of the line, who
lay before that port, was obliged to retire on the approach of so overwhelming a force; but no sooner had they entered than he resumed his station, and with his little squadron gallantly maintained the blockade of a harbour where five-and-thirty hostile line-of-battle ships were now assembled.*

Not anticipating such a departure on the part of the combined fleet from the prescribed operations, Gantheaume, on the 21st of August, stood out of Brest harbour with one-and-twenty ships of the line, and drew up in order of battle in Bertheaume Roads. Admiral Cornwallis, whose squadron, after the large detachment under Calder, amounted only to fourteen, immediately moved in to attack them, and a distant cannonade ensued between the two fleets; but the French, who had no intention to engage in a general affair before the arrival of the combined fleet, did not venture out of the protection of their batteries, and the day passed off without any general action. In vain every eye was turned to the south, in the hopes of desecrating the long-wished-for re-enforcement; in vain Gantheaume counted the hours for the arrival of Villeneuve with thirty ships of the line, chasing before him Calder with twenty. In that decisive moment the star of England prevailed; the action of the 22d of July had saved his country, though it had proved fatal to its saviour; the combined fleet, weakened and discouraged, had sought refuge in Cadiz, not daring to encounter a second action; and the Brest squadron, after spending the day in anxious suspense, returned at night to their harbour.†

The intelligence of the arrival of the combined fleet at Cadiz put a final period to the designs of Napoleon against Great Britain, and all his energies were instantly turned to the prosecution of the war against Austria. His indignation appeared in an act of accusation which he drew up against Villeneuve, dictated by himself, in which the leading charges were, incapacity in the action of the 22d of July, and positive disobedience of orders, in afterward steering with the combined fleet for Cadiz, instead of pursuing the prescribed route for Brest.‡ But as it was of the utmost moment that his designs against the Imperialists on the Danube should as long as possible be disguised, preparations for embarkation were continued with redoubled activity down to the last moment, and at the very time when the emperor was directing the contemplated movements across France and Germany to the shores of the Danube. Between the 23d of August and the 1st of September the troops were daily exercised at embarking and disembarking in the Bay of Boulogne, and at length acquired the most extraordinary perfection in that difficult operation.§

* James, iv., 23, 27. Dum., xii., 63, 71.

† Dum., xii., 69, 70.

‡ Dum., xii., 84.
§ The following passage from Marshal Ney's Memoirs contains some curious details on this subject: "The instructions of the emperor were so luminous, minute, and precise, as to give the inferior commanders nothing to do but follow them out specifically. To ascertain the time

August 21.
Gantheaume
in vain leaves
Brest to meet
them.

Napoleon's designs are in consequence entirely ruined.

He sets off for
Paris, Sept. 1.

Extraordinary
dexterity to which
the troops had arrived
in embarking.

The cavalry and artillery were all stored in the appointed vessels; the emperor's household and baggage were embarked; and the soldiers, in the utmost impatience, awaited the signal to step on board, when suddenly, on the 1st of September, the emperor set out at two o'clock for Paris, and orders were issued to the whole of this mighty armament to defile by different routes towards the Rhine.*

The circumstances which induced this sudden change of resolution were not merely the destruction of all the projects for the naval campaign by the entry of Villeneuve into the harbour of Cadiz: matters had also come to a crisis on the Continent of Europe, and the time had now arrived when, as the coalition could not be dissolved on the shores of Britain, it required to be anticipated on the banks of the Danube.†

From the moment that Napoleon put on his head the iron crown of Charlemagne, in direct violation of the treaty of Luneville, which had provided for the independence of the Cisalpine Republic, and incorporated Genoa, Parma, and Placentia with his vast dominions, all hope of permanently preserving the peace of the Continent was at an end; and it was only a question of time and expedience when Austria should openly join her forces to those of the coalition. The assembly of all the armies of France on the shores of the Channel, the departure of the emperor for Boulogne, and the embarkation of a considerable part of his forces having impressed the Aulic Council with the belief that the military strength of the Empire would soon be involved in that perilous undertaking, the moment appeared eminently favourable for the Imperialists

Aug. 12, 1805. Chastelar, at the head of fifteen thousand men, entered the Tyrol, and began to organize the brave and hardy population of that province. Considerable bodies of workmen were employed in strengthening the fortifications on the Venitian frontier, and armaments already began to be formed on the Inn and the principal roads leading into Bavaria. These hostile preparations were immediately made the subject of angry contention between the cabinet of the Tuileries and that of Vienna; and in several articles in the *Moniteur*, evidently flowing from

required for the embarkation, Marshal Ney distributed the gunpowder, caissons, artillery, projectiles, and stores on board the transports provided for that purpose, and he divided that portion of the flotilla assigned to him into subdivisions: every battalion, every company received the boats destined for its use; every man, down to the lowest drummer, was apprized of the boat, and the place in the boat, where he was to set himself. At a signal given, infantry, cavalry, artillery were at once put under arms, and ranged opposite to the vessels on board which they were respectively to embark. A cannon was discharged, and all the field-officers dismounted and placed themselves at the head of their respective corps; a second gun was the signal to make ready to embark; a third, and the word of command, 'Colonels, forward!' was heard with indescribable anxiety along the whole line; a fourth, which was instantly followed by the word 'March!' Universal acclamations immediately broke forth; the soldiers, in perfect order, hastened on board, each to his appointed place; in *ten minutes* and a half twenty-five thousand men embarked. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds: they thought the long-wished-for moment had arrived; but at the next signal the order to disembark was given, and they were made aware that the whole was only a feint to try the rapidity with which the movement could be performed. The relanding was completed nearly as rapidly as the embarkation; in *thirteen minutes* from the time the soldiers were on board they were drawn up in battle array on shore.—*NEY*, ii., 260, 261.

* *Jom.*, ii., 101. *Dum.*, xii., 127. *Ney*, ii., 249, 265.

† *Bign.*, iv., 303.

the pen of Talleyrand, the question as to the balance of power in Europe, and the danger to be apprehended from the strength of France, was discussed with more openness than was possible in the studied ambiguity of diplomatic correspondence.*†

At length the mask was let fall on both sides. The concentration of the Austrian forces on the Adige and the Inn, and the general warlike activity which pervaded the imperial dominions, left

no doubt that a contest was approaching; while, on the other hand, the whole forces of Napoleon were, unknown to Austria, converging from the Elbe to the Pyrenees towards the Danube. In these circumstances it was of the highest importance to both sides to secure the co-operation of the lesser states of Germany, and especially of Bavaria, whose dominions lay directly between the hostile powers, and would, in all probability, be the first theatre of hostilities. The court of Munich, accordingly, was warmly urged, both by France and Austria, to side with them in the contest, and the elector, long uncertain, hesitated between the two parties, and even entered into diplomatic connexions with both—the common resource of weak states when threatened with destruction by the collision of powerful neighbours,

* *Bign.*, iv., 310, 319. *Dum.*, xii., 101, 111.

† The views of the opposite parties are well abridged in the following state papers which at this period passed between the two cabinets:

"Let us come at once," said Talleyrand, "to the bottom of the question. Austria wishes to take up arms in order to reduce the power of France. If such is her design, I ask you to consider, is it conformable to her real interests? Is she always to consider France as a rival, because she was so once; and is it not from a very different question that the liberties of Europe are now menaced? The time is perhaps not far removed when France and Austria united will be required to fight, not only for their own independence, but for the liberties of Europe and the principles of civilization itself. In every war that may ensue between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and France on the other, Austria, whatever name she may assume, will speedily be found to be a principal in the strife; and she is fortunate if, abandoned by an ally of whom she has experienced the inconstancy and caprice, she does not experience the rudest strokes of fortune.

"What does France demand of Austria? Neither efforts nor sacrifices. The emperor desires only the repose of the Continent. He is ever ready to make a maritime peace as soon as England will adhere to the treaty of Amiens. But as that is impossible, in the present temper of England, but by means of a maritime war, he desires to devote himself exclusively to it, and therefore he demands of Austria not to divert him from that great design, and to enter into no engagement which may disturb the harmony which now prevails between the two empires."

It was replied on the part of Austria, on the 3d of September, "That the cabinet of Vienna was both willing and anxious to put a period to the dangers which threatened Europe, by a sincere and anxious mediation; but that to do that with any prospect of success, it was indispensable that the faith of treaties should be religiously observed, and that he who violated them was the real aggressor. The treaty of Luneville anxiously stipulated the independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian Republics. Every state should respect the independence of those which adjoin it, no matter whether they are strong or weak; and it is the violation of this duty by the French government which imposes upon other states the necessity of coalescing to oppose a barrier to its invasion. Austria is arming, but not with a hostile intention, and solely with the design of maintaining the existing peace with France, as well as the equilibrium and repose of Europe. Even should war become inevitable, she solemnly declares that the courts of Austria and Russia have bound themselves to interfere in no respect in the internal affairs of France, to make no change on the established possessions or relations in Germany, and to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain has the same intentions, and is desirous to be regulated by the same moderate principles in re-establishing her pacific relations with the French Empire."†

* Note, Aug. 5, 1805, Talleyrand to Cobentel.

† Note by Austria, Sept. 3, 1805. *Dum.*, xii., 109, 110.

and hardly to be reproached as a fault when it is the result of necessity. On the one hand, it was represented by the French party that Austria was the old and hereditary enemy of Bavaria; that she had already solicited the cession of a portion of her territory, and there could be no doubt that she coveted her possessions as far as the Lech; and that the elector had therefore everything to hope from an alliance with Napoleon, and as much to fear from falling into the jaws of the emperor. On the other hand, it was strongly urged by the old aristocratic party that all these advantages were merely elusory; that the alliance with France was a connexion with a revolutionary state which threatened the subversion of all the institutions of society; and that, when menaced by such a catastrophe, the only prudent course was to adhere to the head of the Germanic body, whose interests, it might be relied on, would always be opposed to such innovations. It was sufficiently difficult to determine which course to adopt between such opposing considerations; but, in addition to them, the elector had other and more anxious causes for solicitude on this occasion. His eldest son was at Paris, in the power of Napoleon; the fate of the Duke d'Enghien was still recent; and his paternal fears were strongly excited by the perils which he might run if the French emperor were irritated by decided hostilities. Vacillating between such

He finally joins France. to the substance of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France on the 24th of Aug. 24. August, but delayed the signature of the treaty on various pretences, anxious to gain time in these critical circumstances, and it was not finally signed till the 23d of September, at Wurtzburg. Meanwhile, the Austrians, having some suspicion of such an understanding, summoned the elector in a peremptory manner, on the 6th of September, to unite his forces to their own. They were met by the most urgent entreaties to be allowed to remain neutral; and as this was refused, the elector, on the 8th, despatched a letter to the emperor, promising, if neutrality was impossible, to unite his forces to his own. In the night following, however, being overcome with terrors for his son, he secretly departed with his family to Wurtzburg, and the Bavarians retired into Franconia to join the French forces; and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Inn*.

The preparations of Napoleon were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the contest in which he was engaged, and the immense forces which the allies were preparing to deploy against him. Mr. Pitt had conducted the negotiations for the formation of a coalition with the most consummate ability: every difficulty had been removed, every jealousy softened; Austria and Russia stood forth prominent in the fight; and hopes were even entertained that, if disaster did not attend the first efforts of the coalition, Prussia might be induced to unite her forces to those of the other allies in support of the freedom of Europe. In Italy and Germany no less than 350,000 men were preparing to act against France, among whom were 116,000 Russians, advancing by forced marches through Poland towards the Bavarian plains. Their arrival, however, could not be calculated upon for at

least two months to come; and in the mean time the Austrian army, which had just crossed the Inn, eighty thousand strong, stood exposed to the first strokes of Napoleon. Thirty thousand Imperialists, under the Archduke John, were already assembled in the Tyrol, and the Archduke Charles, at the head of fifty-five thousand of the best troops of the Empire, was preparing to exert his great talents on the Italian plains. It could not be concealed that the forces of the coalition would ultimately become superior, and that France had much to dread from the prospect of having to combat with the single resources of the Empire against Europe in arms on the Rhine. Everything, therefore, depended on secrecy of combination and celerity of movement; and in both these qualities Napoleon was unrivalled.*†

To meet this immense force, and destroy part before the remainder could advance to its support, was the object of Napoleon, and in its prosecution he displayed even more than his wonted energy and ability. The army of England on the shores of the Channel, the forces in Holland, the troops in Hanover, were forthwith formed into seven corps, under the command of so many marshals of the Empire: their united numbers amounted to 190,000 men; a force amply sufficient to crush the Imperialists in Germany, if they could be brought simultaneously into action before the Russians advanced to their support. The army of Italy was 35,000, besides 15,000 in the Neapolitan territories; and the troops of Bavaria and the lesser German states, whose aid might be relied on, amounted to 24,000, so that France could open the campaign with 270,000 men.‡

But these forces, considerable as they were, formed but a part of the preparations of the emperor. On the 23d of September he repaired to the senate, and submitted two propositions to the Legislature, which were forthwith adopted. The first was a levy of 80,000 conscripts from the class who were to become liable to military service in 1806: a sufficient proof that France was already anticipating the military resources of the Empire; the second, the reorganization of the National Guard throughout its whole extent. But in thus reviving the Republican institution, the emperor was careful to organize it on a different footing from what it had been during the days of Democratic equality. "It is important," said he, "that the officers of the National Guard should be named by the emperor: every species of force ought to emanate from the supreme au-

The army of England marches from Boulogne to the Rhine.

Immense preparations of Napoleon.

* Dum., xii., 131, 138. Jom., ii., 97.

† The forces of the coalition were thus disposed when hostilities commenced by the passage of the Inn: In Bavaria and Upper Austria, under the Archduke Ferdinand 90,000

Reserve under Emperor Francis, forming at Vienna . . . 30,000
First Russian army crossing Poland 56,000
Second Russian army under Emperor Alexander . . . 60,000
Austrians in Tyrol 30,000
Austrians in Italy under Archduke Charles 55,000
Russians and Swedes in Pomerania 30,000

351,000

—DUMAS, xii., 138.

‡ Dum., xii., 136.

§ The French forces were thus disposed:
Grand army, divided into seven corps under Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, Augereau, with the cavalry under Murat, and guard under Mortier . . . 196,471
Army of Italy 34,674
— of Naples 15,000
Electoral troops 23,815
269,960

* Bigu., iv., 320, 323. Dum., xii., 210, 211.

—DUMAS, xii., 136.

thority; all our institutions should be in harmony, and a single uniform direction be given to whoever commands the force of the armed citizens." Subsequent decrees arranged the details of this reorganization: every man in good health was required to serve, from the age of twenty-one to sixty; ten companies formed a cohort, and several cohorts, according to the locality, a legion. Those only in the departments of the frontier, from Geneva to Calais, were called into active service, and arranged into four corps, commanded by General Rampon, Marshal Lefebvre, Marshal Kellerman, and General D'Abbeville. The emperor adjourned the

meeting of the senate by the following address, which sufficiently indicated the urgent aspect in which he viewed public affairs, and left him no alternative but to conquer or die.

His address to the senate.

"The eternal objects of the enemies of the Continent are at length accomplished; the war is renewed in the heart of Germany; Austria and Russia have united themselves to England. A few days ago I hoped that the peace of the Continent would not be disturbed: menaces and umbrages alike found me immovable, but the Austrian army has crossed the Inn; Munich is invaded; the Elector of Bavaria is chased from his capital; all my hopes have vanished. Senators, when, in conformity with your wishes, I placed the imperial crown on my head, I undertook to you and to all the citizens of France the obligation to maintain it pure and inviolate. Magistrates, soldiers, citizens, all equally desire to preserve our country from the influence of England, which, if it once prevailed, would lead only to the burning of our fleets, the filling up of our ports, the ruin of our industry. I have kept all the promises which I have made to the French people: they have made no engagement with me which they have not more than fulfilled. Frenchmen! your emperor will do his duty; the soldiers will do theirs; you will do yours."*

Previous to setting out from Boulogne, Napoleon issued several decrees for the disarmament of the flotilla, and the laying up what was kept in ordinary for future and distant operations.

The artillery was removed from the greater part of the armed vessels and all the transports; such part of it as could be accommodated in the harbour of Boulogne was kept there, the remainder dispersed through the harbours of the Channel. The English, too well satisfied at this dislocation of so formidable a force, made no attempt to hinder its dispersion, and soon of all that vast assemblage of vessels, hardly enough remained at Boulogne to transport thirty thousand men. A reserve of twenty thousand men alone remained on the heights above the harbour, under the command of General Brune, destined at once to keep up alarm on the coasts of Britain, and form a reserve in case of disasters befalling the grand army. Thus terminated this extraordinary armament, the greatest assemblage of military and naval forces ever made in modern times, contrived with the utmost skill, conducted with the most profound dissimulation, which entirely deceived the vigilance of the mighty nation against which it was directed, and failed at last rather from a casual combination of circumstances, and the intrepidity of an admiral whom England punished for his achievement, than any inade-

quacy in the means employed to attain the vast object which her enemy had in view.*

Determined, however, not to lose entirely the fruit of his naval armaments, Napoleon, before setting out for the grand army, issued directions for the fleet at Cadiz to put to sea and proceed to Toulon, in order to be ready to act as occasion might require on the shores of Italy. This instruction was accompanied by the appointment of Admiral Rosily to the command of the combined fleet, in lieu of Villeneuve, who was directed to surrender the command to him on his arrival: a measure which led to events of the greatest importance, by rendering the disgraced admiral desperate, and prompting him to make the ill-omened sortie which terminated in the disaster of Trafalgar. But, after bringing the fleet round to Toulon, the successor of Villeneuve was to break it down into several detached cruising expeditions, the chief of which was one to take possession of and cruise near St. Helena! Strange fatality, which appeared to attach him, on the eve of so many of the greatest events of his life, to the destined scene of his exile and death!†

An important change occurred at this period, highly characteristic of the decline of Revolutionary fervour, and a return to the ordinary ideas of civilized life. This was the restoration of the Gregorian Calendar, and abolition of the barbarous nomenclature of the Revolutionary era, which for twelve years had been in use in France: a change prescribed by the emperor in a decree shortly before setting out for Strasbourg.‡

Meanwhile the British government directed all their efforts to form a powerful fleet to blockade the combined squadrons in the harbour of Cadiz. Independently of the twenty ships of the line which had been detached from the Channel fleet by Admiral Cornwallis, and the four which Admiral Collingwood had under his command off the Isle of Leon, seven more were got together in Portsmouth and Plymouth, and Nelson, who had retired to his house at Merton to recruit his exhausted strength, again volunteered his services to resume the command, repaired to Portsmouth, and hoisted his flag on board the Victory, of ninety guns. Even during the few weeks of his retirement, his thoughts perpetually ran on the combined fleets, and he was constantly impressed with the idea that they were destined to receive their deathblow from his hand. In these generous sentiments he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, who, notwithstanding the ardour of her attachment, constantly urged him to sacrifice every private consideration at the call of public duty.§ He was

The combined fleet is ordered, nevertheless, to sail from Cadiz.

Restoration of the Gregorian Calendar. July 9, 1805.

Increase of the British blockading force before Cadiz.

Sept. 14.

* Dum., xii., 127, 129, 142, 143. Jom., ii., 87, 89.

† Dum., xii., 145, 149. ‡ Ibid., xii., 151.

§ When Captain Blackwood, on his way to London with despatches, called at Merton one morning early, Nelson, the moment he saw him, exclaimed; "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets! I think I shall yet have to beat them. Depend upon it, Blackwood," he repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing." At length his anxiety became so excessive that he resolved, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of his physicians, to volunteer his services to resume the command, which were, of course, gladly accepted by the Admiralty. In this resolution he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, with that feeling of generous ardour which has so often animated her sex in similar circumstances when influenced by romantic attachment. "Nelson," said she, "however we may

vividly impressed, however, with the presentiment that he would fall in the battle which was approaching, and before he left London called at the upholsterer's, where the coffin which Captain Hallowell had given him, made of the wreck of the *L'Orient*, was deposited, desiring that its history might be engraven on its lid, as it was highly probable he would want it on his return. On the night on which he left Merton, he wrote a few lines in his journal, highly descriptive of the elevated feeling and manly piety which formed the leading features of his character.*

With difficulty he tore himself, on the Sept. 14. beach at Portsmouth, on the following morning, from the crowd, who knelt and blessed him as he passed; and the last sounds which reached his ears from that loved land, which he was never again to see, were the enthusiastic cheers of his countrymen, who never ceased to strain their aching eyes on his vessel till it vanished from their sight.†

Nelson's reception in the fleet off Cadiz was as gratifying as his departure from England: the yards were all crowded with hardy veterans, anxious to get a sight of their favourite hero, and peals of acclamation shook the yards when he was seen on the quarter-deck of the *Victory* shaking hands with his old captains, who, in transports of joy, hastened on board to congratulate him on his arrival. No one from that moment entertained a doubt that the fate of the combined fleet was sealed if they should venture from their harbour. So great was the terror of his name that, notwithstanding the positive orders to sail for Toulon which he had received, Villeneuve hesitated to obey when he heard of his arrival; and in a council of war, it was resolved not to venture out unless they were at least one third superior to the enemy. Informed of this circumstance, Nelson carefully concealed his real strength from his opponents, stationed his fleet out of sight, about sixty miles to the westward of Cape St. Mary's, with a chain of repeating frigates to inform him of the motions of the enemy, while, at the same time, the blockade of the port was rigorously enforced, so as to render it probable that ere long they would be compelled to sail, from the impossibility of finding supplies in the vicinity of Cadiz for so great a multitude. Forty sail of the line were now assembled in that harbour, of which thirty-three were ready for sea; and as Napoleon, never contemplating the return of the combined fleet to Cadiz, had made no magazines of provisions in that quarter, though ample stores had been collected at Rochefort, Brest, and the harbours of the Channel, the want of provisions was soon severely felt. Still, however, the council of war which Villeneuve had summoned to his assistance had declined to undertake the responsibility

of an engagement, and Nelson, to overcome their irresolution, had recourse to a stratagem, which was crowned with the most complete success. Having received, on the 15th of October, information that he would soon be joined by six sail of the line from England, he ventured on the bold step of detaching Admiral Louis with a like force to Gibraltar for stores and water; thus maintaining the blockade with only twenty-two line-of-battle ships, in presence of thirty-three newly-equipped and ready for action. In these critical circumstances, Nelson was not without some feelings of anxiety lest the Carthage or Rochefort squadrons should join the enemy and increase their already formidable superiority; yet even then he had the generosity to allow Sir Robert Calder, who was obliged to go home to demand a court-martial, to proceed thither in his own ninety-gun ship, which could ill be spared at such a crisis. Fortunately, the promised re-enforcements arrived, and in Oct. 19. single vessels, so as not to attract the notice of the enemy; and Nelson, whose anxiety for the approaching combat had now risen to the very highest pitch, again found himself at the head of seven-and-twenty ships of the line.*

Deceived by this stratagem as to the real strength of the enemy; aware that Napoleon was desirous of concentrating his principal naval resources in the Mediterranean; and apprehensive that, if he any longer delayed his departure, Admiral Rosilly might assume the command, and deprive him of the fair opportunity which now presented itself of covering his former failures by the defeat of England's greatest hero, Villeneuve at length resolved upon putting to sea and risking a battle. Early on the 19th of October, accordingly, the inshore frigates made signal that the enemy were coming out of the harbour; and at two o'clock in the afternoon, that they were fairly at sea, steering for the southeast. Overjoyed at this intelligence, Nelson instantly gave the signal to chase in the same direction; and though they were not got sight of on the following day, yet so well were their motions watched by the frigates on the outlook, that the British admiral was made acquainted with every tack which they made, while he himself studiously kept out of view, lest, upon seeing the number of his vessels, they should return to Cadiz harbour. At length, at daybreak on the 21st, their whole fleet was descried, drawn up in a semicircle, in close order of battle, about twelve miles ahead; and Nelson, who had previously arranged the order of attack with his worthy second in command, Collingwood, and fully explained it to the officers of the fleet, made signal to bear down in two lines perpendicular upon the enemy. He had twenty-seven sail of the line and four frigates: they thirty-three line-of-battle ships and seven frigates, of which four were three-deckers; and four thousand marksmen were dispersed through the fleet, who unhappily took too effectual aim in the battle which followed.†

lament your absence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gain a quiet heart by it. You will gain a glorious victory, and then you may return here and be happy." He looked at her with tears in his eyes: "Brave Emma! good Emma! If there were more Emmas there would be more Nelsons."—SOUTHEY, ii., 232.

* "Friday night, Sept. 13, half past ten. I drove from dear, dear Merton, where I left all which I hold dear in this world, to go and serve my king and country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the expectations of my country! and if it is His good pleasure that I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to the throne of His mercy. If it is His good providence to cut short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission, relying that He will protect those so dear to me whom I leave behind. His will be done!"—SOUTHEY, ii., 235.

† South., ii., 234, 237.

* South., ii., 237, 242. Ann. Reg., 1805, 233, 234. Dum., xii., 174, 177.

† James, iv., 39. South., ii., 240, 246. Ann. Reg., 1805, 234, 235. Dum., xii., 175, 177.

‡ In communicating his plan of attack to Collingwood, Nelson, who was altogether destitute of professional jealousy, wrote, "I send you my plan of attack as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in; but it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your

Nelson's plan of attack was, to bear down upon the enemy in double columns, and thus break the line in two places at once. In this way he thought it was most likely that each ship should be brought speedily into close action with its antagonist, and the greatest chance of decisive success be obtained. Villeneuve's instructions, as the English lay to windward, were to lie in close order and await the attack. The fleet was divided into two lines, so arranged that, at the interstices of each two vessels in the front line, the broadside of one in the second presented itself: a combination as well imagined as can be figured, to meet the anticipated British manœuvre of breaking the line. The front line, commanded by Villeneuve himself and Admirals Alava and Dumanoir, consisted of twenty-one line-of-battle ships: twelve under Admirals Gravina and Magon formed the second. Collingwood, in the Royal Sovereign, led the first column of the British, followed closely by the Belleisle and Mars: Nelson himself, in the Victory, headed the second, immediately after whom came the Temeraire and the Neptune.* When the lines were completely formed, and the ships bearing rapidly down on the enemy, so that it was evident an engagement was inevitable, Nelson retired to his cabin and wrote the following prayer: "May the great God whom I worship grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory, and may no misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself individually, I commit my life to Him that made me, and may His blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To Him I resign myself and the just cause which is intrusted to me to defend."† Noble sentiments to be uttered by such a leader on such an occasion, and worthy to be engraven on the hearts of all who, like him, are called to the glorious duty of defending the cause of freedom and religion against the efforts of tyrannic power!

Never did the ocean exhibit a grander spectacle than was presented by the British fleet bearing down on the combined squadrons, at noon on the 21st of October, a few leagues to the north-west of CAPE TRAFALGAR. A long swell was setting into the Bay of Cadiz; our ships, crowding all their canvass, moved majestically before it, with light winds from the southwest. Right before them lay the mighty armament of France and Spain, the sun shining full on their close-set sails, and the vast three-deckers which it contained appearing of stupendous magnitude amid the lesser line-of-battle ships by which they were surrounded. The

British sailors, however, admired only the beauty and splendour of the spectacle, and, never doubting of success, observed to each other, "What a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead!" Nelson, when he appeared on the quarter-deck, wore his admiral's frockcoat, bearing on his left breast four stars, the insignia of the different orders with which he was invested; the officers on board lamented such a display, which it was evident would expose him to certain death from the enemy's marksmen; but they knew it was in vain to remonstrate, as his resolution was taken, and he had before been heard to say, "In honour I gained them, and in honour I will die with them." He was in good spirits, but calm and sedate; not in that exhilaration with which he had entered into battle at the Nile and Copenhagen; it was evident that he neither expected nor wished to survive the action. He asked Captain Blackwood what he should deem a victory. That officer answered he should consider it a glorious result if fourteen were taken; but Nelson replied, he should not be satisfied with less than twenty. He then made signal for the British fleet to prepare to anchor at the close of the day, and when it was given, asked the captain whether he did not think there was another wanting; and, after musing a while, he fixed what it should be, and the signal appeared at the mast-head of the Victory, the last he ever made, which will be remembered as long as the British name shall endure: "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY." It was received by a rapturous shout throughout the fleet, which already rung the knell of those of France and Spain, although their seamen were brave and experienced, and animated with the utmost enthusiasm for the combat which was approaching. "Now," said Nelson, "I can do no more; we must trust to the Great Disposer of all events and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty."*

Nelson led thirteen ships of the line in the Victory, Collingwood fourteen in the Royal Sovereign; but such was the superior sailing of the latter vessel, that she speedily distanced all her competitors, and was already near the enemy's line when the last vessels in the column were still six miles distant; and as Nelson steered two points more to the north than Collingwood, in order to cut off the enemy's retreat from Cadiz, the other column was first engaged.† Far ahead of all the rest of the fleet was the Royal Sovereign, which, with all sails set, steered right into the centre of the enemy's line, and was already enveloped in fire, when the nearest vessels, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, were still more than two miles in the rear. "See," said Nelson, "how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action!" while Collingwood, well knowing what would be passing in the breast of his commander and friend, at the same time observed, "What would Nelson give to be here!" When Villeneuve beheld the manner in which the hostile fleet was bearing down upon his line,

Order in which the English fleet bears down.

judgment for carrying them into execution. We can, my dear Coll, have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies and getting a glorious peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you, and no man will render your services more justice than your very old friend, Nelson and Bronte." Nelson said to his captains, "That, knowing his precise object to be that of a close and decisive action, would supply any deficiency of signals; and in case they could not be seen or understood, no captain can do wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." So impressed were these noble veterans with the grandeur of the plan of attack proposed to them, that many of them shed tears in his presence.—SOUTHBY, ii., 243, 244.

* Collingwood's Memoirs, i., 162. James, iv., 41, 49. South., ii., 246, 247. Dum., xiii., 183.

† South., ii., 247.

* James, iv., 45, 47. South., ii., 252, 253. Dum., xiii., 185, 186.

† Nelson, in bearing down, made signal when the ships entered into action to cut away their canvass, in order that no hands might be lost in furling the sails. The loss to the fleet in a few minutes was nearly £200,000; but to this admirable piece of foresight much of its early success was owing.

he remarked to those around him that all was lost. In passing the Santa Ana, the Royal Sovereign gave her a broadside and a half into her stern, tearing it down, and killing and wounding four hundred of her men;* then wheeling rapidly round, she lay beside her so close that the lower yards of the two vessels were locked together, and the muzzles of their guns literally touched each other. The Spanish admiral, Alava, seeing that it was the intention of Col- lingwood of the Royal Sovereign to engage him to leeward, had brought all his strength to the starboard side; and such was the weight of his metal that his first broadside made the Royal Sovereign heel two streaks out of the wa-

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Trafalgar.

ter. A furious combat now engaged between the two first-rates; but, such was the rapidity and precision of the Royal Sovereign's fire, that the discharges of the Spaniard rapidly became weaker and weaker; and it was expected by the English that she would be compelled to strike before another British ship had got into close action. This disgrace, however, was prevented by the St. Juste, Indomitable, Fougueux, and St. Leandro, which grouped round the Royal Sovereign when they saw their admiral's danger, and assailed her on all sides by such a vehement cross-fire that their balls frequently struck each other above the deck of the English vessel. Regardless of his danger, Collingwood continued for twenty minutes pouring his broadsides into his first-rate antagonist, and with such effect that she at length returned his fire only by a single gun, at long intervals from each other, though with a firmness worthy of the Spanish character; the admiral continued the contest, relying on the assistance of his friends, who now clustered round the English vessel so closely that she was entirely hid from the remainder of the fleet, and they watched with intense anxiety the opening of the smoke, which at length showed the British flag, waving unconquered in the midst of the numerous ensigns of France and Spain by which it was surrounded.†

Meanwhile Nelson, burning with anxiety, was crowding all sail to reach the scene of danger, and as he approached within a mile and a half's distance single shots were fired from different vessels in the enemy's line, some of which fell short, and others went over, until at length one went through the Victory's main-top-gallant-sail. A minute or two of awful silence ensued, during which the Victory continued to advance, when all at once the whole van of seven or eight ships opened a concentric fire upon her, of such severity as hardly ever before was directed at a single ship. At this awful moment the wind, which had long been slight, died away to a mere breath, so that the Victory advanced still more slowly, ploughing majestically through the waves, unable from her position to return a single shot. Presently a ball knocked away the wheel—every man at the poop was soon killed or wounded—the spars and rigging were falling on all sides—while the crew, with their lighted matches in their hands,

stood at their guns, long waiting, with the coolness which discipline alone can give, the signal to return the fire. At this moment Nelson's secretary, Mr. Scott, was killed by his side. "This is too warm work, Hardy," said he, "to last long," as he continued with his captain, amid the scene of destruction, his accustomed slow walk in the centre of the vessel. He at first steered for the bows of the Santissima Trinidad, which he imagined bore the French admiral, though his flag was not yet hoisted; but, as the Victory approached, the enemy closed up and presented so compact a front that it was impossible to find an entrance, and Nelson directed Captain Hardy to steer for the opening between the Temeraire and Bucentaur, and at one o'clock the Victory, as she passed slowly and deliberately through, poured her broadside, treble shot, into the Bucentaur, with such terrible effect, that above four hundred men were killed or wounded by the discharge. While listening with characteristic avidity to the deafening crash made by their shot in the French hull, the British crew were nearly suffocated by the clouds of black smoke which entered the Victory's portholes, and Nelson and Hardy had their clothes covered by the volumes of dust which issued from the crumbled woodworks of the Bucentaur's stern. In advancing, the Victory received a dreadful broadside from the French Neptune, but passed on to the Redoubtable, with which she grappled, and commenced a furious conflict, while, on the other side, she engaged the Bucentaur and Santissima Trinidad. Captain Harvey, in the Temeraire, fell on board the Redoubtable on the other side, so that these four ships formed as compact a tier as if they had been moored together, their heads all lying the same way. The lieutenants of the Victory upon this depressed their guns, and diminished the charge, lest the shot should pass through and injure the Temeraire;* and as every shot from the Victory set the Redoubtable on fire, the British sailors stood with buckets of water in their hands and extinguished the flames in the enemy's decks as they arose, lest they should involve both ships in destruction.

After the first discharge, the Redoubtable closed her lower deck ports, and fired from them no more, fearing that she would be boarded from the Victory. He is mortally wounded. Seeing this, and thinking they had struck, Nelson twice ordered the firing into her to cease, but her crew still kept up a murderous warfare from the decks and tops; and to this humanity he fell a victim. The sixty-eight pounders, indeed, on the Victory's fore-castle, each loaded with 500 musket balls, soon cleared the Redoubtable's gangways; but a destructive fire was kept up from her fore and main tops, and as Nelson was walking on the quarter-deck, he was pierced by a shot from one of the French marksmen, not more than fifteen yards distant. "They have done for me at last, Hardy," said he. "I hope not," said Hardy. "Yes," he replied, "my backbone is shot through." He was immediately carried below, but even then, such was his presence of mind, that he directed the tiller-rope, which had been shot away, to be replaced, and taking out his handkerchief, covered his face and stars, lest the crew should be discouraged by the sight. The cockpit was crowded with wounded and dying men; he insisted that the surgeon should

* Collingwood's guns on this occasion were all double-shotted, and by long previous practice he had brought his men to such perfection that they could fire three well-directed broadsides in three minutes and a half. On the morning of the battle he was in unusual spirits, conversing cheerfully with his officers. "Now, gentlemen," said he, "let us do something to-day which the world may talk of hereafter."—COLLINGWOOD, ii., 168, 169.

† James, iv., 49, 52. Collingwood, i., 172, 174. South, ii., 257. Dum., xiii., 201, 204.

* Ann. Reg., 1805, 235, 236. James, iv., 54, 59. South, ii., 259, 262. Dum., xiii., 204, 206, 208.

leave him, and attend to those to whom he might be useful, "For to me," said he, "you can do nothing." All that could be done was to fan him with paper, and give him lemonade to assuage his burning thirst. As the action continued, however, several ships of the enemy began to strike; and as the crew of the Victory cheered as each successive flag was lowered, at every hurra a gleam of joy illuminated the countenance of the dying hero.*

Meanwhile the battle continued with unabated fury in all directions. At a quarter past two the *Santa Ana* struck to the Royal Sovereign, after an uninterrupted combat of two hours' duration; but the loss on board of the English ship was also very severe, and she was reduced to nearly as unmanageable a state as her vanquished opponent. During the latter part of the action Collingwood took his men off the poop, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed; but he long after remained there, fearless of death himself. At length, descending to the quarter-deck, he visited the men, enjoining them not to fire a shot in waste; looking himself along the guns to see that they were properly pointed, commending particularly a negro gunner, who, while he stood beside him, fired ten times directly into the opposite porthole of the *Santa Ana*. Captain Harvey of the *Temeraire*, when engaged in close combat with the *Redoutable*, perceived the *Fongueux*, of 74 guns, preparing to board her on the other side. He allowed the enemy to come within a hundred yards, and then poured in a broadside with such tremendous effect that she fell a perfect wreck aboard of the English vessel, and was soon after carried, with little resistance, by boarding. The other British vessels, as they successively came into action, engaged in close combat the nearest ships of the enemy; and when the arrival of the remote parts of the columns had reduced the great odds against which the leading line-of-battle ships had at first to contend, the wonted superiority of the English soon became apparent. Before three o'clock ten ships of the line had struck. The fire on the poop of the Victory from the tops of the *Redoutable* was so tremendous, that for a time it was almost deserted, upon which the French made a vigorous attempt to board; but they were quickly repulsed by the crew of the English vessel rushing up from below and engaging them at the muzzles of the muskets; and shortly after, the *Temeraire* having wafted nearer, poured in her whole broadside upon her crowded decks with such effect that two hundred men were swept away by the discharge. By degrees, however, the marksmen in the tops of the *Redoutable* were picked off by the Victory's marines, and at length her whole masts and rigging fell across the *Temeraire*'s bows, which, forming a bridge of communication between the two combatants, she was boarded and taken possession of by the crew of the English vessel, which thus had the glory of capturing an antagonist on the right and left. Never had a ship been more gallantly defended: out of six hundred and forty-three men who composed her crew, only five-and-thirty reached the English shores.† Shortly after the *Bucentaur*,

which had never recovered the first broadside of the Victory, struck her colours, with Villeneuve on board, and the masts of the *Santissima Trinidad*, which had been exposed to a tremendous raking fire from the Victory, Neptune, Leviathan, and Conqueror, fell with a tremendous crash, and she was taken possession of when wholly disabled by a boat from the Prince.*

While victory was thus everywhere declaring for the British arms, Nelson was lying in the cockpit, in the utmost anxiety to hear the details of the battle. As Captain Hardy could not for above an hour leave the deck, he repeatedly exclaimed, "Will no one bring Hardy to me? He must be killed; he is surely dead." At length he came down: they shook hands in silence. Hardy in vain strove to suppress his feelings at that painful moment. "Well, Hardy," said Nelson, "how goes the day with us?" "Very well," replied Hardy; "ten ships have struck, but five of the van have tacked, and are coming down upon the Victory; but I have called two or three fresh ships round, and have no doubt we shall give them a drubbing." "I hope," said Nelson, "none of our ships have struck?" "There is no fear of that," replied Hardy. "I am a dead man," then said Nelson; "I am going fast; it will be all over with me soon." Hardy then went up to the deck, but returned in about fifty minutes, and taking Nelson by the hand, congratulated him, even in the arms of death, on his glorious victory; adding that fourteen or fifteen of the enemy were taken. "That's well," replied Nelson; "but I bargained for twenty;" and then, in a stronger voice, added, "Anchor, Hardy, anchor. Do you make the signal. Kiss me, Hardy," said he. Hardy knelt down and kissed his cheek. "Now I am satisfied," said Nelson; "thank God, I have done my duty." His articulation now became difficult; but he was repeatedly heard to say, "Thank God, I have done my duty," and expired at half past four without a groan, leaving a name unrivalled, even in the glorious annals of the English navy.†

The combined fleet now presented the most melancholy spectacle. In every direction were to be seen only floating wrecks of the wrecks or dismantled hulks. The proud armament, late so splendid, was riddled, shattered, and torn by shot. Guns of distress were heard on all sides, and in every quarter the British boats were to be seen hastening to the vessels which had surrendered, to extricate their crews from their perilous situation. Twenty ships of the line had struck, with Villeneuve, the commander-in-chief, and the Spanish admirals, Alava and Cisneros. One of them, the *Achille*, of 74 guns, had blown up after she surrendered; but nineteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the *Santissima Trinidad*, of 130 guns, and *Santa Ana*, of 112, were in the hands of the British, and lay in mingled confusion alongside of their redoubtable conquerors. In this extremity Admiral Gravina, with nine ships of the line, forming the van of the combined fleet, stood away for Cadiz; and Admiral

The two midshipmen kept firing, and he supplied them with cartridges. The old quartermaster pointed to the man who had fired the fatal shot, who wore a glazed hat and white frock. He received a ball in the mouth, and instantly expired.—SOUTHBY, ii., 269, 270.

* South., ii., 263, 264. Ann. Reg., 1805, 237. James, iv., 61, 63.

† The marksmen who had wounded Nelson did not escape. Shortly after he fell, the storm of balls was so severe, that an old quartermaster, who had seen him fire, and two midshipmen, alone were left on the Victory's poop.

* James, iv., 75, 89. South., ii., 270, 271. Ann. Reg., 1805, 236, 237. Dum., xiii., 268, 209. Vict. et Conq., xvi., 170, 175. Collingwood, i., 174.

† Beattie's Narrat., 46, 49. South., ii., 267, 270.

Dumanoir, with four French ships, took to flight, pouring his broadsides, as he passed, not only into the British ships, but the Spanish prizes which had struck their colours: a circumstance which, although probably unavoidable, from the confused way in which friend and foe were intermingled, contributed not a little to augment the irritation between the two nations which this terrible disaster could not fail to produce. The British ships were too much occupied in taking care of their numerous prizes to be able to give chase; and Dumanoir stood out to the northward and got clear off, only, however, to fall into the hands of another squadron, and ultimately reach a British harbour.*

It had been Nelson's dying instructions to Admiral Collingwood to bring the fleet to anchor; and it would have been well for that great and good man had this advice been followed, as he would have probably brought his nineteen noble prizes in safety to Spithead.† As it was, he deemed it an unnecessary precaution till nine at night, and the consequences proved eminently disastrous.‡ Early on the morning of the 22d a strong southerly wind arose, with squally weather, and a heavy swell set in from the Atlantic into the Bay of Cadiz. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the British, it was found impossible to keep the prizes in tow, or make the necessary repairs on their pierced and ruined sides, to enable them to ride out the gale; and the consequence was that most of them drifted their cables, and either foundered at sea or were wrecked on the coast. The crew of the *Algesiraz* rose upon the slender British guard which had her in possession, and escaped

Oct. 22. with them into Cádiz, where the authorities had the generosity to allow the English who had her in possession to return on their parole to the English fleet. Encouraged by this circumstance, Captain Kirgulen, the senior French officer in the harbour, put to sea with five sail of the line and five frigates, the only part of the combined fleet which was in a condition for service, in the hope of recapturing some of the dismantled hulls which were drifting about the coast. The British instantly formed a line of battle, covering such of the prizes as they still had in tow, and the French did not approach within gunshot; but their frigates succeeded in getting hold of the *Santa Ana* and *Neptune*, which drifted into their hands, and brought them into Cadiz. Many melancholy catastrophes happened during the storm. Among the rest, the *Indomitable* was wrecked on the coast, having on board, besides her own, the survivors of the *Bucentaur's* crew, and above 1000 persons perished. Many of the prizes foundered in the gale; others were sunk by the British. Four only reached Gibraltar in safety. But the British took Ad-

mirals Villeneuve, Alava, and Cisneros, besides 20,000 prisoners, including the land-forces on board; and the combined fleet was almost totally annihilated, while their own loss was only 1690 men killed and wounded. "Six-and-twenty ships of the line," says General Matthieu Dumas, "at Trafalgar or Cape Ortega,* were compelled to strike their colours." It may truly be said that there were left only a few remnants of the fleet which, two months before, had filled England with alarm.†

An interchange of courteous deeds took place between the British fleet and the Courteous in-Spaniards at Cadiz. The magni-tercourse with-tude of the disaster had extinguish- the Spaniards ed all feelings of irritation, and at Cadiz. brought the people into that state of sad exaltation which is nearly allied to generous emotion. Admiral Collingwood made an offer to send all the wounded Spaniards ashore: a proposal which excited the deepest gratitude in that high-spirited people, and was at the same time a seasonable relief to the British squadron, already sufficiently occupied with its own wounded and the numerous prizes in their hands. In return, the Marquis of Solana, governor of Cadiz, sent to offer the English the use of the hospitals for their wounded, pledging the Spanish honour that they should be carefully attended to. When the storm after the action drove some of the prizes upon the coast, they declared that the English who were thus thrown into their hands should not be considered as prisoners of war, and the Spanish soldiers gave up their own beds to their shipwrecked enemies. Already was to be seen the commencement of that heartfelt alliance which was so soon destined to take place between these generous enemies; and it was amid the tempests of Trafalgar that the feelings were produced which brought them to stand side by side at Vittoria and Toulouse.‡

No words can describe the mingled feelings of joy and grief, of exultation and Melancholy, which pervaded the British Empire upon the news being received of the battle of Trafalgar. The greatest naval victory recorded in the annals of the world had been gained by their arms. The dangers of invasion, the menaces of Napoleon, were at an end. Secure in their seagirt isle, they could now behold without alarm the marshalled forces of Europe arrayed in hostility against them. In a single moment, from the result of one engagement, they had passed from a state of anxious solicitude to one of independence and security. Inestimable as these blessings were, they yet seemed inadequately purchased by the life of the hero by whom they had

* The subsequent action with Sir R. Strachan.

† Dum., xiii., 230, 239. James, iv., 123, 137. Coll., i., 183, 184.

‡ In the midst of this scene of ruin, Admiral Collingwood did not neglect the duty which he owed to the Supreme Disposer of all events. On the day after the battle the following general order was issued to the fleet: "The Almighty God, whose arm is strength, having of his great mercy been pleased to crown the exertions of his majesty's fleet with success, in giving them a complete victory over their enemies on the 21st of this month, and that all praise and thanksgiving may be offered up to the throne of grace for the great benefit to our country and to mankind, I have thought proper that a day should be appointed for a general humiliation before God, and thanksgiving for his merciful goodness, imploring forgiveness of sins, a continuation of his divine mercy, and his constant aid to us in defence of our country, liberties, and laws, without which the utmost efforts of man are naught."—COLLINGWOOD, i., 179.

§ Collingwood, i., 185, 190. South., ii., 275, 276.

* James, iv., 99, 102. South., ii., 273, 274. Dum., xiii., 228, 229. Vict. et Cong., xvi., 188, 192.

† A practical proof of the benefit which might have been derived to the fleet and the prizes from attending to Nelson's dying instructions was afforded by the Defence. This vessel, with its prize the *San Ildefonso*, anchored, and rode out the gale in safety. The *Swiftsure* and *Bahama* prizes also anchored, and were saved.—JAMES, iv., 130.

‡ In justice to Collingwood, however, it must be stated that many high naval authorities are of opinion that, if he had anchored immediately after the battle, the consequences might have been fatal to many of the British squadron, not one of which was lost by pursuing the opposite course; and that, when the signal to anchor was given at nine at night, many vessels, including the *Victory* itself, were incapable of obeying.—COLLINGWOOD, i., 191, 192, note.

Violent tempest, and disasters to the forces after it terminated.

Mingled joy and grief in Britain on the occasion.

been gained. The feelings of grief were even more powerful than those of gratitude; and England, with the fleets of her antagonist sunk in the deep, seemed less secure than when, in presence of her yet unscathed enemies, she was protected by the hero whose flaming sword turned every way.

Need it be added that all the honours which a grateful country could bestow were heaped upon the memory of Lord Nelson. Nelson? His brother was made an earl, with a grant of £6000 a year: £10,000 was voted to each of his sisters, and £100,000 for the purchase of an estate. A public funeral was decreed, and a monument by the nation in the place of his interment, St. Paul's Cathedral. The principal cities of the empire vied with each other in erecting monuments and statues to his memory. Admiral Collingwood was made a baron, and received a pension of £2000 a year: a grant which first raised that noble officer from that state of comparative dependance which is so often the lot of upright integrity. The remains of Nelson were consigned to the grave, amid all the pomp of funeral obsequies, in St. Paul's, followed by a countless multitude of weeping spectators. The leaden coffin in which he was brought home was cut in pieces, and distributed as relics through the fleet; and when at his interment his flag was about to be lowered into the grave, the sailors who assisted at the ceremony with one accord rent it in pieces, that each might preserve a fragment as long as he lived. Unbounded was the public grief at his untimely end. "Yet," in the words of his eloquent biographer, "he cannot be said to have fallen prematurely whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr; the most awful, that of the martyred patriot; the most splendid, that of the hero in the hour of victory; and if the chariot and horses of fire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory.*"

Lord Nelson was the greatest naval officer of Character of this or any other nation whose that naval hero. achievements have been recorded in history. The energies of an ardent and impetuous mind were in him wholly absorbed in patriotic feeling. Duty to his God, his king, and country constituted the simple objects to which unrivalled powers and consummate genius were directed. Like all other great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make his officers thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his general plan of operations, but intrusted them with full discretionary powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the skillful combination which brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action. Simple in his desires, enthusiastic in his character, he was alike superior to the love of wealth, the bane of inferior, and envy of others, the frailty of ambitious minds. Devotion to his country was in him always blended with a constant sense of religious duty; and amid all the license of arms he was distinguished from the first by an early and a manly piety. In later years, when his achievements had marked him out as the great defender of Christianity, he considered himself an instrument in the hand of Provi-

dence to combat the infidel spirit of the Revolution, and commenced his despatch on the battle of the Nile by ascribing the whole to Almighty God. Too great to be fettered by rules, too original to condescend to imitation, he consulted his own inspiration only in all his mighty deeds, and in every instance left the stamp of native genius in the duties, whether elevated or humble, which he performed. His whole career, from his first entrance into the navy to the battle of Trafalgar, exhibited a pattern of every manly virtue. Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most successful, because the most profound and intrepid, of leaders. If a veil could be drawn over the deeds of Naples, his public character might be deemed without a fault; but no human being was ever yet perfect; and that alloy of frailty which has descended to all from our first parents, long concealed in him by the intensity of patriotic devotion, was at length revealed by the fascination of female wickedness.*

The battle of Trafalgar was soon followed by another victory, which at any other Victory of Sir period would have excited the most R. Strachan. lively satisfaction, but was hardly noticed in the transports consequent on that stupendous event. Admiral Dumanoir, who had escaped from the disaster at Cadiz, and crossed the Bay of Biscay in hopes of getting either into Rochefort or Brest harbours, fell in, on the 2d of November, with the frigates of Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, who immediately made signal that a strange fleet was in sight. The British admiral instantly gave chase, which was continued two days and nights, during which the light of the moon rendered the enemy visible, until at length, at noon on the 4th of November, the two Nov. 4. squadrons were so near that Dumanoir was obliged to lie to and receive battle. The English fleet at first consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; but during the chase one of the former was driven away by stress of weather, and in the action which followed four line-of-battle ships and four frigates alone were engaged. The French had four sail of the line only, and some of the guns were dismounted from the effects of the battle of Trafalgar. The battle began at noon, by each of the British line-of-battle ships engaging one of the enemy, and lasted with great vigour for four hours, when it terminated in the capture of every one of the French ships; but not till they were almost totally dismasted, and had sustained a loss of 730 killed and wounded. Crippled and dispirited as they were, it was not to be expected that the four French ships could have withstood the shock of four fresh English line-of-battle ships, supported by four frigates, who took an important part in the action; and the heavy loss which they sustained proved that they had not surrendered till the last extremity. Sir Richard Strachan brought his four prizes into harbour, which somewhat consoled the English for the absence of so many of those taken at Trafalgar; and their satisfaction was increased by the British loss being only 24 killed and 111 wounded.†

It is observed by Mr. Hume, that actions at sea are seldom if ever so decisive as those at land: a remark suggested by the repeated indecisive actions between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II., but which affords a

Reflections on the decisive nature of these successes.

* South., ii., 276, 280. Coll., i., 214.

* Dupin's Voyages, iv., 66. Bretton, iii., 463.

† Dum., xiii., 232, 238. James, iv., 154, 163.

striking proof of the danger of generalizing from too limited a collection of facts. Had he extended his retrospect farther, he would have observed that the most decisive and important of all actions recorded in history have been fought at sea: that the battle of Salamis rolled back from Greece the tide of Persian invasion, that of Actium gave a master to the Roman world, that of Lepanto arrested forever the dangers of Mohammedan invasion in the South of Europe, and that of La Hogue checked, for nearly a century, the maritime efforts of the House of Bourbon. Equally important in its consequences as the greatest of these achievements, the battle of Trafalgar not only at once secured the independence of England, and destroyed all Napoleon's hopes of maritime greatness, but annihilated for half a century the navies of France and Spain. The losses of the Moscow campaign were repaired in six months: even the terrible overthrow of Leipsic was almost obliterated by the host which was marshalled round the imperial eagles at Waterloo; but from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered; and during the remainder of the war, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Napoleon, no considerable fleet with the tricolour flag was ever seen at sea. Error frequently attends hasty or partial induction; but from a sufficiently broad and extensive view of human affairs, conclusions of general and lasting certainty may be formed.

It is stated by Napoleon, that a fleet of thirty ships of the line, with guns and complement of men complete, may be considered as corresponding at sea to an army of 120,000 men at land.* Judging by this standard, the battle of Trafalgar, which destroyed fully twenty-five ships of the line and made prize of twenty, must be considered as equivalent to a victory where 90,000 men out of 120,000 were destroyed. The annals of war exhibit no instance of such a success with land-forces: it is double what even the bulletins claimed for Napoleon at Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Even at Waterloo, where alone a blow approaching to that inflicted at Trafalgar was struck, the loss of the French has never been estimated at above 40,000 men. The loss by which that decisive victory was purchased on the side of the British alone was 9999; on that of the allies, above 20,000; whereas the total loss of the English at Trafalgar was only 1690 men: a smaller number than perished in many inconsiderable actions attended with little or no result in Spain.† This affords a striking instance how comparatively bloodless, when viewed in relation to the importance of the successes achieved, are victories at sea than land; and although the losses of the defeated party are much more severe, yet even they bear no sort of proportion to the enormous effusion of blood in land-fights. Lord Collingwood estimates the killed and wounded at Trafalgar, where the French navy was in a manner annihilated, "at several thousand;"‡ while the Moscow campaign, where four hundred thousand men perished, was found insufficient to beat down the military power of Napoleon.

The battle of Trafalgar affords a decisive proof that it is owing to no peculiar manœu-

vre, ill-understood by others, of breaking the line, that the extraordinary successes of the English at sea are owing, but that the superior prowess and naval skill of their sailors are alone the cause of their triumphs. In truth, the operation of breaking the line, whether at sea or land, is an extremely critical and hazardous one, and never will be attempted, or if attempted, succeed, but by the party conscious of and possessing greater courage and resources in danger than its opponent. From its superior sailing, and the lightness of the wind, the Royal Sovereign was in action at Trafalgar when the rear of the column was still six miles distant, and full a quarter of an hour before another British ship fired a shot; and the whole weight of the conflict, for the same reason, fell upon the twelve or fourteen British ships which first got into action, by whom six sevenths of the loss was sustained.* So far from the French and Spanish fleets being doubled up and assailed by a superior force, the British fleet itself was doubled up; and the victory was, in fact, gained by half its force before the remainder got into action. The arrival of this remainder, indeed, gave those first engaged a decisive advantage, and enabled the ships which hitherto had borne up against such desperate odds to overwhelm in their turn their dispirited, and now outnumbered, opponents; but had they not been, from the first, superior, and greatly superior, to their antagonists, they must have been taken prisoners in the outset of the fray, and lain useless logs alongside of their captors when the rear of the columns was getting into action. Would any but a superior enemy have ventured to plunge, like Collingwood and Nelson, into the centre of their opponent's fleet, and, unsupported, single out the hostile admiral for attack, when surrounded by his own vessels? What would have been the fate of Alava and Villeneuve, of the Santa Ana and the Bucentaur, if they had thus engaged Collingwood and Nelson, the Royal Sovereign and the Victory, at the muzzle of their guns, in the middle of the English fleet, when three or four other hostile line-of-battle ships were pouring in their shot on all sides? Would they not have been compelled to strike their colours in ten minutes, before the tardy succeeding vessels could come up to their support? In breaking the line, in short, whether at sea or land, the head of the column must necessarily be engaged with a vastly superior force, before the rear and centre can get up to its support; and if from accidental causes their arrival, as at Trafalgar, is long delayed, it may happen that this contest against desperate odds may continue a very long time—quite long enough to prove fatal to an ordinary assailant. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that Nelson, Duncan, and Rodney did wrong, and ran unnecessary hazard by breaking the line at Trafalgar, Camperdown, and Martinique—quite the reverse: they did perfectly right; but that it is the manœuvre suited only to the braver and more skillful party, and never can prove successful but in the hands of the power possessing the superiority in courage and prowess, though not in numbers. It will succeed when the head of the column can sustain itself against double or treble its own force before the centre or rear

And on the manœuvre of breaking the line.

* Napoleon, ii., 124.

† The loss at Talavera, out of 19,900 British, was 5000; that at Albuera, 4500 out of 7500; and out of 16,000, who formed the storming columns at Badajoz, nearly 4000 lay on the breaches and in the ditches of that terrible fortress!

‡ Coll., i., 163, 164.

* "The total loss was 1690; of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of the twenty-seven vessels of the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns."—JAMES, iv., 111.

get up, but in no other circumstances. The case is precisely the same at land: the party breaking the line there runs the greatest risk of being made prisoner, if not able to bear up against superior forces, before support arrive from the rear; and an antagonist who can trust his troops in line to resist the head of the column, will soon obtain a decisive advantage by assailing the attacking column on both flanks. This was what the Duke of Wellington felt he could do, and constantly did, with British troops; and, accordingly, Jomini tells us that the system of attacking in columns and breaking the line never succeeded against the close and murderous fire of the English infantry. It was the same with the Russians. Napoleon's system of bringing an overwhelming force to one point, and there breaking the line, answered perfectly as long as he was engaged with the Austrians, who laid down their arms, or retired the moment they saw an enemy on their flank; but when he applied it to the Russians, he soon found the attacking column fiercely assailed on all sides by the troops among whom it had penetrated; and the surrender of Vandamme, with 7000 men, in the mountains of Bohemia, in 1813, taught him that it is a very different thing to get into the rear of an army drawn from the North and one from the South of Europe.

It is frequently said by the French writers, that at this period the fate of Europe depended upon chance, and that, if the naval officers, to whom Napoleon remitted to report on Mr. Fulton's proposal for the navigation of vessels by steam, had given a different opinion, and that invention had been adopted at Boulogne, there can be no doubt that the invasion might have been successfully accomplished. There appears no solid ground for this opinion. Great discoveries, destined, like those of gunpowder, printing, and steam, in the end, to change the face of the world, never come to maturity but by slow degrees. The sublimest genius, the most overwhelming power, is not able so to outstrip the march of time as to give to one generation that general use of a discovery destined by Nature for another. Even if it were otherwise, and steam navigation could in a few years have been brought to perfection, or, at least, into common application, in the French navy, unquestionably the English would not have been idle: the mighty engine would have yielded its powers equally to both sides, and their relative situation would have remained the same as before. If steamers would have enabled the flotilla, under all winds, to issue from Boulogne harbour, and attempt the passage of the Channel, they would have enabled the English blockading squadrons at all seasons to maintain their station, and put it in their power to have sent in fire-ships, which would have carried conflagration and ruin into their crowded harbour. Propelled by this powerful force, one armed steamship, at dead of night, would have burst open the chains at the entrance of the basin, while succeeding ones, in rapid succession, brought flames and explosion into its forests of shipping. Gunpowder did not diminish the superiority of the English at sea. The victory of Nelson at Trafalgar was not more decisive than that of Edward III. at Sluys: the countrymen of Collingwood, who ventured unsupported into the midst of the combined fleet, need never fear the mechanical force which augments the facility of getting into close action,

and increases the rapidity with which the different vessels of the squadron can be brought together to the decisive point.

But it is impossible to form an equally clear opinion as to the consequences which would have followed if Napoleon, with a hundred and thirty thousand men, had succeeded in effecting a landing on the coast of Kent. He has told us that he would have advanced direct to London, of which he calculated upon getting possession in four days, and there he would instantly have proclaimed parliamentary reform, a low suffrage for the new voters, the downfall of the oligarchy, the confiscation of the property of the Church, a vast reduction of taxation, an equitable adjustment of the national debt, and all the other objects which the Revolutionary party in this country have ever had at heart, and the prospect of obtaining only one of which, five-and-twenty years afterward, produced so extraordinary a change in the dominant multitude of the English people. It was Napoleon's constant affirmation, that the majority in number of the English nation was opposed to the war, which was maintained solely by the influence and for the purposes of the oligarchy; and that, if he could once have roused the multitude against their rule, Great Britain would speedily have become so divided as to be no longer capable of resisting the power of France.* "I

* "I would have hastened over my flotilla," said Napoleon, "with 200,000 men (it was only 135,000), landed as near Chatham as possible, and proceeded direct to London, where I calculated upon arriving in four days from the time of my landing. I would have proclaimed a republic, the abolition of the nobility and House of Peers, the distribution of the property of such of the latter as opposed me among my partisans: liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would have introduced a great reform. I would have published a proclamation, declaring that we came as friends to the English, and to free the nation from a corrupt and flagitious aristocracy, and restore a popular form of government, a democracy: all which would have been confirmed by the conduct of my army, as I would not have allowed the slightest outrage to be committed by my troops. I think that, between my promises and what I would actually have effected, I should have had the support of a great many. In a large city like London, where there are so many canaille and so many disaffected, I should have been joined by a formidable body, and I would, at the same time, have excited an insurrection in Ireland. You would never have burned your capital; you are too rich and fond of money. How often have the Parisians sworn to bury themselves under the ruin of their capital rather than suffer it to fall into the hands of the enemies of France, and yet it has twice been taken! The hope of a change for the better, and a division of property, would have operated wonderfully among the canaille, especially that of London. The canaille of all nations are nearly alike. I would have made such promises as would have had a great effect. I would have abolished flogging in the army, and promised your seamen everything, which would have made a great impression on their minds. The proclamation that we came as friends to relieve the English from an onerous and despotic aristocracy, whose object was to keep the nation eternally at war, in order to enrich themselves and their families with the blood of the people, together with the proclaiming of a republic, the abolition of the monarchical form of government and the nobility, the declaration of the forfeiture of such of the latter as should resist, and its division among the partisans of the Revolution, with a general equalization of property, would have gained me the support of the canaille, and of all the idle, profligate, and the disaffected in the kingdom." Thus far the Emperor Napoleon: to which it may be added, that, amid the divisions and Democratic transports consequent on these prodigious innovations, he would quietly have laid his grasp on Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and smiled at his revolutionary allies on this side of the Channel when they called on him to redeem his pledges, farther than spoiling some of the higher orders, and, if they proved refractory, have marched a file of grenadiers into the Chapel of St. Stephen.—See O'MEARA, i., 349-352.

What if Napoleon had succeeded in effecting a landing?

Democratic changes which he would have instantly proclaimed.

would not," said he, "have attempted to subject England to France; I could not have united two nations so dissimilar. If I had succeeded in my project, I would have abolished the monarchy, and established a republic instead of the oligarchy by which you are governed. I would have separated Ireland from England, and *left them to themselves, after having sown the seeds of Republicanism in their morale.* I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would have introduced a great reform."*

His designs if he had succeeded in that object.

doubtful to no one who recollects that the British troops defeated the French in every encounter, without exception, from Vimiera to Waterloo, and that Napoleon himself said to Lord Whitworth there were a hundred chances to one against his success. But would she have remained true to herself under the temptation to swerve produced by such means? This is a point upon which there is no Briton who would have entertained a doubt till within these few years; but the manner in which the public mind has reeled from the application of inferior stimulants since 1830, and the strong partiality to French alliance which has recently grown up with the spread of Democratic principles, has now suggested the painful doubt whether Napoleon did not know us better than we knew ourselves, and whether we could have resisted those methods of seduction which had proved fatal to the patriotism of so many other people.

The spirit of the nation, indeed, then ran high against Gallic invasion; unanimity unprecedented animated the British people; but, strong as that feeling was, it is now doubtful whether it would not have been supplanted, in a large portion of the nation at least, by a still stronger, and the sudden offer of all the glittering objects of Democratic ambition would not have shaken the patriotism of a considerable portion of the British, as it unquestionably would of the great bulk of the Irish people. No man can say how he would keep his senses under the application of some extraordinary and hitherto unknown stimulant, as if he were at once elevated to a throne, or saw the mountains fall around him, or the earth suddenly open beneath his feet; and even the warmest friend to his country will probably hesitate before he pronounces upon the stability of the English mind under the influence of the prodigious excitement likely to have arisen from the promulgation of the political innovations which Napoleon had prepared for her seduction. If he is wise, he will rejoice that, in the providence of God, his country was saved the trial, and acknowledge with gratitude the inestimable obligations which she owes to the illustrious men whose valour averted a danger under which her courage, indeed, would never have sunk, but to which her wisdom might possibly have proved unequal. The true crisis of the war occurred at this period. It was the arm of Nelson which delivered his country from her real danger; thenceforth the citadel of her strength was beyond the reach of attack. At Waterloo she fought for victory; at Trafalgar, for existence.

Their probable result.

* O'Meara, i., 350, 469.

CHAPTER XL.

CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER, 1805.

ARGUMENT.

Austria, deceived by Napoleon's Measures, crosses the Inn.—Her Forces advance across Bavaria to the Black Forest.—Efforts of Napoleon to gain Prussia.—Negotiations between the two Powers.—Russians refused a Passage across the Prussian Territories.—March of French Troops from the Shores of the Channel to the Banks of the Rhine.—Composition and Direction of these Forces.—Violation of the Prussian Territory by Bernadotte's Corps.—Great Indignation excited by this at Berlin.—Measures concerted between Russia, Sweden, and England in the North of Germany.—Neutrality of Naples.—Napoleon's Arrival on the Rhine, and Proclamations to his Troops.—Mutual Manifestoes by the belligerent Powers.—Movements of the French Troops to surround the Austrians.—Mack's defensive Arrangements.—Four thousand Imperial Grenadiers are cut to Pieces by Murat.—Recompenses bestowed by Napoleon on the Soldiers engaged in the Combat.—Measures of Mack to extricate himself.—Bloody Combat at Hasslach.—Surrender of four thousand Austrians at Memmingen.—Completion of the Investment of Ulm.—Napoleon's Address to his Soldiers at the Bridge of the Lech.—Mack resolves to detach the Archduke Ferdinand to Bohemia, and himself remain at Ulm.—Combat at Elchingen.—Retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand, with great Loss.—Surrender of Werneck, with eight thousand Men.—The Heights around Ulm are carried by Napoleon.—Negotiations for the Surrender of Mack.—He capitulates at first conditionally, and then unconditionally.—The Army of Mack defiles before Napoleon.—Napoleon's Message to the Senate at Paris.—His Proclamation to his Soldiers.—The Blame of these Disasters is divided between Mack and the Aulic Council.—Errors of the Cabinet of Vienna in the general Plan of the Campaign.—The Archduke Charles is kept on the Defensive in Italy.—The Bridge at Verona is forced by Massena.—The Archduke resolves to retreat, in order to cover Vienna, and falls back by the Tagliamento to Laybach in Carinthia.—Advance of Napoleon's Army through Bavaria.—Defensive Measures of the Austrian Government.—Increasing Irritation of Prussia.—Arrival of the Emperor Alexander at Berlin, and Conclusion of a secret Convention with the Prussian Government.—Nocturnal Visit to the Tomb of the Great Frederic.—Landing of the Allies in Hanover.—Operations in the Tyrol.—Surrender of Jellachich and the Prince de Rohan, and Abandonment of that Province.—Napoleon advances into Upper Austria.—Austrians' Proposals of Peace, which come to Nothing.—Kutusoff withdraws to the left Bank of the Danube.—Continued Advance of the French towards Vienna.—Destruction of Part of Mortier's Corps by Kutusoff.—Desperate Action at Dierstein.—Mortier recrosses the Danube.—Napoleon advances rapidly to Vienna.—Description of that City.—Surprise of the Bridge over the Danube.—Napoleon passes through the Capital, and establishes himself at Schönbrunn.—Subsequent Movements of the Armies.—Finesse of Kutusoff in parrying the Attempts of the French to circumvent him.—Heroic Action of Bagration, who at length makes good his Retreat.—Junction of the Russian Armies.—Measures of Napoleon.—Conduct of the French at Vienna.—Forces on both Sides.—Napoleon reconnoitres the Field of Austerlitz.—Dangers of his Situation.—Simulated Negotiations on both Sides to gain Time.—Haugwitz arrives from Berlin.—The Allies advance to Wischaw.—Preparatory Movements on both Sides.—Allied Order of Battle.—Description of the Field of Battle.—Dispositions of the French Troops.—Nocturnal Illumination of the French Lines.—Movements on both Sides in the Morning.—Battle of Austerlitz: its Results.—Dangers of Napoleon's Situation, notwithstanding his Success.—The Austrians sue for an Armistice.—Interview of the Emperor Francis with Napoleon.—Armistice concluded with Russia and with Austria.—Dissimulation of Prussia, and Accommodation with that Power.—Treaty of Alliance with the Cabinet of Berlin, which gains Hanover.—Affairs of Naples and of the North of Germany.—Peace of Presburg.—Dethronement of the King of Naples.—Reflections on this Step.—Napoleon returns to Vienna.—Munich, the Rhine, and Paris.—Reflections on the Campaign.—Importance of the Valley of the Danube as the Theatre of Contest between France and Austria.—

Vast Growth of the Military Power of France since the last Peace.—A similar Increase during Peace characterized all the Reign of Napoleon.—Great Abilities displayed by Napoleon in the Arrangements for this Campaign.—Errors of the Allies.—Ruinous Effects of the Indecision of Prussia.—Ability displayed by Mr. Pitt in the Formation of the Confederacy.—His last Illness and Death.—His Character and mighty Achievements.—Principles of his domestic Administration.—Progressive and steady Growth of his Fame.—Erroneous Views of foreign Writers on his Designs.—His Errors.—Opinion of the Democratic Party in England on him.—Funeral Honours paid to his Memory.

In proportion as the time approached when his great projects against Austria were to be carried into execution, Napoleon redoubled his ostensible efforts for the invasion of Great Britain. These preparations, which never had been more than a feint from the moment that intelligence of the stoppage of Villeneuve's fleet by Sir Robert Calder's action, and the subsequent retreat of that admiral to Cadiz, had been received, completely produced the desired effect. Austria, deceived by the accounts which were daily transmitted of the immense accumulation of forces on the coasts of the Channel, the embarkation of the emperor's staff and heavy artillery, and the continual exercising of the troops in the difficult and complicated operation of getting on shipboard, deemed the moment come when she could safely commence hostilities, even before the arrival of the Russian auxiliaries. She broke ground, accordingly, by crossing the Inn and invading the Bavarian territories, fondly imagining that the French troops were still on the shores of the Channel, and that she would be able, by a rapid advance, to rouse Bavaria and the lesser powers of Germany to join her standard, and appear before their arrival, with the whole forces of the Empire, on the banks of the Rhine. But she grievously miscalculated, in so doing, the activity and resources of the French emperor, and soon found, to her cost, that she had been the dupe of his artifices, and had unwittingly played his game as effectually as if she had intentionally prostrated before his ambition the resources of the monarchy.*

The forces with which the Aulic Council engaged in this enterprise were 80,000 men; and the Russians were still so far removed as to render it impossible to reckon upon their co-operation in the first movements of the campaign. They had, with reason, calculated upon being joined by the whole forces of Bavaria; but, as already noticed, the paternal anxiety of the elector rendered these hopes abortive, and threw the whole weight of that electorate into the opposite side of the scale. The army of the Imperialists was numerous, gallant, and well appointed, but hardly equal to the task of meeting unaided the united French and Bavarian forces, even if led by commanders of equal talent and experience.

Austria, deceived by Napoleon's measures, crosses the Inn.

Sept. 9.

They advance through Bavaria to the Black Forest.

What, then, was to be expected from them when advancing under the guidance of Mack to meet the grand army grouped round the standard of Napoleon? In vain the British government transmitted to the cabinet of Vienna a detailed statement, obtained from the imperial staff at Boulogne, of the amount and composition of the French army, showing above a hundred and thirty thousand men, of all descriptions, ready to march, and asked whether it was against England or Austria that this force was really intended to act. With infatuated self-confidence, their host continued to advance; soon it overran the Bavarian plains, entered the defiles of the Black Forest, and occupied with its outposts the openings from that rocky ridge into the valley of the Rhine.†

From the moment that it was evident that hostilities were unavoidable, Napoleon ^{Efforts of Napoleon to gain Prussia.} was indefatigable in his endeavours to engage Prussia on his side. The instructions to Duroc, his envoy at Berlin, were to represent to the Prussian government, "that there was not a moment to lose; that it was indispensable that an alliance should forthwith be concluded between the two states; that the confederacy of Russia, Austria, and England was equally menacing to both; that during the negotiations for a conclusion of the treaty, it was necessary that Prussia should make an open declaration against Austria, or, at least, a formidable demonstration on the Bohemian frontier; that the emperor was about to make an autumnal campaign; that, having dispersed the armament of Austria before the month of January, France and Prussia might have their united forces against Russia, for which purpose the emperor offered them the aid of eighty thousand, ^{Negotiations between the two powers.} amply provided with everything necessary for a campaign." The answer of the Prussian cabinet to these propositions was in the main favourable. They admitted "that the union of France and Prussia could alone provide against the rest of the Continent such a barrier as would ensure the maintenance of general tranquillity." The French plenipotentiary, taking these words in a more favourable sense than they were perhaps intended, immediately commenced the drawing out of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two powers; but when it was communicated to the Prussian government, their temporizing policy reappeared: they were willing to unite with France in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities, but hesitated at taking any step which might involve them in the contest; and evinced, amid all their anxiety for the

acquisition of Hanover, an extreme apprehension of the consequences of a Russian war. To overcome their scruples, Napoleon did not hesitate to engage that "he would retain none of his conquests on his account, and that the Empire of France and Kingdom of Italy shall receive no acquisition.*" But the terrors of the Prussian cabinet were not to be overcome by these obviously hypocritical professions, and they persisted in their resolution to enter into no engagement which might involve them in hostilities.

Matters were in this doubtful state when the Russian minister at Berlin presented a letter from the Emperor of Russia, in which he proposed an interview with his Prussian majesty on the frontiers of their respective dominions, and requested permission for his troops to pass through his territories on their route for Bavaria. The pride of Frederic William instantly took fire, and he replied by a positive negative against the passage of the Moscovites through any part of his dominions, but expressed his willingness to meet his august neighbour at any place which he might select. Prussia, at the same time, renewed its negotiations with France for the acquisition of Hanover as a deposit, until the conclusion of the war: a proposition to which Napoleon testified no unwillingness to accede, provided "France lost none of its rights of conquest by the deposit."‡

While these unworthy negotiations were tarnishing the reputation of the Prussian monarchy, the French troops were in full march from the shores of the Channel to the banks of the Rhine. The instructions given by Napoleon to all the chiefs of the grand army for the tracing of their route, and the regulation of their movements, were as perfect a model of the combination of a general, as the fidelity and accuracy with which they were followed were of the discipline and efficiency of his followers. The stages, the places of rest, the daily marches of every regiment were pointed out with undeviating accuracy over the immense circumference from Cherbourg to Hamburg; relays of horses provided to convey by post those who were more remote, twenty thousand carriages collected for their rapid conveyance, and the immense host caused to converge, by different routes, through France, Flanders, and the north of Germany, to Ulm, the centre where it was anticipated the decisive blows against the Austrian monarchy were to be struck.† The troops simultaneously commenced their march from the coast of the Channel in the beginning of September, and performing, with the celerity of the Roman legions, the journeys allotted to them, arrived on the Rhine from the 17th to the 23d of the same month. They were all in the highest spirits, buoyant with health, radiant with hope; the exercises and discipline to which they had been habituated during the two preceding years in their camps on the shores of the ocean having enabled them to overcome fatigues with ease which would have been deemed impos-

September 21. Russians denied a passage through the Prussian territories.

March of the French troops towards Bavaria.

* Though totally deficient in the decision, promptitude, and foresight requisite for a commander in the field, Mack was by no means without a considerable degree of talent, and still greater plausibility in arranging on paper the plan of a campaign; and so far did this species of ability impose on Mr. Pitt, that he wrote to the cabinet of Vienna, recommending that officer to the command of the German army. The just and decisive opinion expressed of him by Nelson at Naples, in 1798, has already been noticed. With all his great qualities as a civil statesman, Mr. Pitt had but little capacity for military combinations, and this is the judgment, in this particular impartial, pronounced upon him by Napoleon. — See NAPOLEON in Month., ii., 432.

† Dum., xiii., 12.

‡ Instructions to Duroc, 24th of August, 1805. BIGNON, xv., 334. These instructions, written the very day on which Napoleon received accounts of the entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol, and when he dictated to Daru the march of the grand army from Boulogne across Germany (*Ante*, ii., 329, 330), are a singular monument of his vigour and rapidity of determination.

* Bignon, iv., 338, 341.

† Bignon, iv., 343, 346.

‡ See the orders, addressed by Napoleon to the seven marshals commanding the corps of the army, in Dumas, xiii., 309, 340; *Pièces Just.* Many of them are dated at nine, ten, eleven at night, or midnight; but in all is to be seen the same extraordinary union of minuteness and accuracy of detail, with grandeur and extent of general combination.

sible at that period by any other soldiers of Europe.*†

The army which Napoleon thus directed against the Imperialists was the Composition most formidable, in respect of numbers, equipment, and discipline, of these forces, which modern Europe had ever witnessed. Divided into eight corps, under the command of the most distinguished marshals of the Empire, it consisted of 180,000 men, and had been brought, by long exercise both in camps and in the field, to an unrivalled pitch of discipline and splendour.‡ The plan of Napoleon was to direct the corps of Ney, Soult, and Lannes, with the Imperial Guards and the cavalry under Murat, to Donaworth and Dettingen; Davoust and Marmont were to march upon Neubourg; and Bernadotte joined to the Bavarians upon Ingolstadt; while Angereau, whose corps was conveyed by post from the distant harbour of Brest, received orders to cover the right flank of the invading army, and extend itself over the broken country which stretches from the Black Forest to the Alps of Tyrol and the Grisons. A single glance at the map will be sufficient to show that these movements were calculated to envelop altogether the Austrian army, if they remained in heedless security in their advanced position in front of Ulm; for while the bulk of the French, under Napoleon in person, descended upon their right flank by Donaworth, Bernadotte, with the corps from Hanover, got directly into their rear, and cut off the line of retreat to Vienna, while Angereau blocked up the entrance to the defiles of the Tyrol. It was of the utmost moment to the success of these great operations that the movements of the troops should, as long as possible, be concealed; and the despotic power of the French emperor gave him every facility for the attainment of this object. A rigorous embargo was immediately laid on in all parts of the Empire; the post was everywhere stopped; the troops were kept ignorant of the place of their destination; and such were the effects of these measures, that they were far advanced on their way to the Rhine before it was known either to the cabinets of London or Vienna that they had broken up from the heights of Boulogne.§

The other corps of the army, traversing their own or a friendly territory, experienced no obstacle on their march; but that of Bernadotte, in its route across Germany, from Hanover to Bavaria, came upon the Prussian state of Anspach. Napoleon was not a man to be restrained by such an obstacle; he had foreseen it, and given positive orders to Bernadotte to disregard the neutrality of that power. "You will traverse its territories," said he, "avoid resting there, make abundance of protestations in favour of

Prussia, testify the greatest possible regard for its interests, and meanwhile pursue your march with rapidity, alleging as an excuse the impossibility of doing otherwise, which really is the fact." These instructions were punctually obeyed, and Bernadotte, at the head of sixty thousand men, including the Bavarians and corps of Marmont placed under his orders, disregarding the remonstrances of the local authorities, traversed the Prussian territory and assembled around Eichstadt, with his advanced guard on the Danube, between Neubourg and Ingolstadt, at the end of the first week of October. The master stroke was delivered: the left wing of the French in great force was interposed between the Austrians and their own dominions, while they were reposeing in fancied security around the ramparts of Ulm.*

Great was the astonishment and indignation at Berlin when the unexpected intelligence of this outrage to their independence was received. It at once revealed the humiliating truth, long obvious to the rest of Europe, but which vanity and partiality to their own policy had hitherto concealed from the Prussian cabinet, that the alliance with France neither was based on a footing of equality, nor on any sense of mutual advantage; that it had been contracted only for purposes of ambition by Napoleon; that he neither respected nor feared their power; and that, after having made them the instruments of effecting the subjugation of other states, he would probably terminate by overturning the independence of their own. The weight of these considerations was much increased by the recollection that this outrage had been inflicted by a nation whom, for ten years, it had been the policy of Prussia to conciliate by all the means in their power; while, on the other hand, the simple refusal to grant a passage through their territories had been sufficient to avert the march of the Russian troops, although the cabinet of Berlin had, during that time, been far from evincing the same compliance to the wishes of the Czar. These indignant feelings falling in with a secret sense of shame at the unworthy part they were about to take in the great contest for European independence which was approaching, produced a total alteration in the views of the Prussian cabinet: while the more generous and warlike part of the capital, at the head of which were the queen, Prince Louis, and Baron Hardenberg, loudly gave vent to their indignation, and openly expressed their joy at the occurrence of a circumstance which had at length opened the eyes of government to the ruinous consequences of the temporizing policy which they had so long pursued. All intercourse with the French embassy was immediately prohibited; an energetic note, demanding satisfaction, was forthwith presented to the minister of that power at Berlin; and permission was given to the Russian troops to traverse in their march the Prussian territories. The projected interview between the Czar and the Prussian monarch to adjust that matter was adjourned, as the difficulty had been solved by the measure of Napoleon: the troops which had been directed towards the Russian frontiers were countermanded, and three powerful armies of observation formed: one of sixty thousand men in Franconia, under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe; one in Lower

* Dum., xiii., 13, 14. Bign., iv., 360. Jom., ii., 103, 104. Bour., vii., 10.

† The celerity with which the march of Marshal Ney's corps was performed is particularly remarkable.

‡ The composition of this army was as follows:

1,	Corps commanded by Bernadotte.
2,	" by Marmont.
3,	" by Davoust.
4,	" by Soult.
5,	" by Lannes.
6,	" by Ney.
7,	" by Angereau.
8,	" by Murat (cavalry).
9,	" Guards by Mortier and Bessieres.
10,	" Bavarians, by Wrede.

—See Jom., ii., 104; Dum., xii.

§ Jom., ii., 105, 106. Dum., xiii., 13, 15.

* Dum., xiii., 27, 28. Bign., iv., 345, 346.

Saxony, of fifty thousand, under the Duke of Brunswick; and one in Westphalia, of twenty thousand, under the command of the Prince of Hesse.* This impolitic step of Napoleon is linked with many important consequences: it produced that burst of angry feeling which at length brought Prussia into the lists with France in 1806: it is thus connected with the overthrow and long oppression of that power, and may be considered as one of the many causes, at this time entering into operation, which in their ultimate results produced the resurrection of European freedom, and the fall of the French Empire.

While the precipitance of Napoleon was thus producing a storm in the north of Germany, a treaty was concluded between Russia, England, and Sweden, by which the latter power engaged to furnish an auxiliary corps of 12,000 men to act in Pomerania, in concert with a Russian force of

double the amount, under the orders of Count Osterman Tolstoy. This army was to be farther re-enforced by the German legion in the service of England, an addition which would raise it to nearly fifty thousand men: an army, it was hoped, adequate not only to the task of reconquering the electorate of Hanover, for which it was immediately destined, but to determine at last the wavering conduct of Prussia, and give an impulse to the northern states of Germany, which might precipitate them in a united mass on the now almost defenceless frontiers of Holland and Flanders.† Had Prussia boldly taken such a line, what a multitude of calamities would have been spared to itself and to Europe!

More fortunate in the south than the north of Sept. 12. Europe, Napoleon at this period concluded a convention with the court of Naples. Naples for the neutrality of that kingdom during the approaching contest. A negotiation was at the same time set on foot with the Holy See for the admission of a French garrison into Ancona; but the pope had suffered too severely from the conquests and exactions of the Republicans to admit of such a concession, and both parties protracted the discussions, with a view to gain time for the issue of military operations.‡

These negotiations at either extremity of the line of military operations might have been attended with important effects upon the final issue of the war, if affairs had been delayed for any considerable time. But Napoleon was meanwhile preparing those redoubtable strokes in the heart of Germany which were calculated at once to prostrate the strength of Austria, intimidate or overawe the lesser powers, and frustrate the great combinations formed by the English and Russian cabinets for the deliverance of Europe.

The emperor arrived at Strasbourg on the 27th of September, and immediately addressed to his soldiers one of those heart-stirring proclamations which contributed almost as much as his military genius to the success of his arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the campaign of the third coalition has commenced: Austria has passed the Inn, violated its engagements, attacked and chased our ally from his capital. We will not again make peace without sufficient guarantees: our generosity shall not again make us forget

what we owe to ourselves. You are but the advanced guard of the great people: you may have forced marches to undergo, fatigues and privations to endure; but whatever obstacles we may encounter, we shall overcome them, and never taste of repose till we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies." To the Bavarian troops he thus addressed himself: "Bavarian soldiers! I come to put myself at your head, to deliver your country from the most unjust aggression. The house of Austria wishes to destroy your independence, and incorporate you with its vast possessions. You will remain faithful to the memory of your ancestors, who, sometimes oppressed, were never subdued. I know your valour, and feel assured that, after the first battle, I shall be able to say with truth to your prince and my people, you are worthy to combat in the ranks of the grand army."*

The movements of the opposite armies in Germany were now rapidly bringing matters to a crisis. Mack, at the first intelligence of the approach of the French troops, had concentrated his forces at Ulm, Memmingen, and Stockach, with advanced posts in the defiles of the Black Forest, contemplating only an attack, as in former wars, in front, and expecting to be able to stem the torrent of such an invasion as effectually in a defensive position, around the ramparts of Ulm, as Kray had done the incursion of Moreau in the former war. He was in total ignorance of the great manœuvre of Napoleon in turning his flank with his left wing, and interposing between his whole army and the Austrian frontier. This decisive movement, the knowledge of which had been carefully kept from the enemy, by a whole French corps, diffused as light troops along the ridge behind which it was going forward, was now rapidly approaching its consummation. The united corps of Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, and Soult, with the Bavarians, a hundred thousand strong, had arrived at the same moment on the Danube in the rear of Mack, and without a moment's hesitation passed that river at Donauwörth, Neubourg, and Ingolstadt. Pursuing their course without interruption, they speedily arrived on the communications of the Austrian army with Vienna, and by the middle of Oct. 6 and 7. October Marmont and Soult were established in great strength at Augsburg, directly on the road from the imperial headquarters to the hereditary states; while Napoleon himself, at the head of the remainder of his army, led by Murat and Ney, was pressing upon them from the westward, both on the right and left banks of the Danube.†

Struck, as by a thunderbolt, by this formidable apparition in the rear, Mack had but one resource left, which was to have fallen back with all his forces to the Tyrol, the road to which was still open, and sought only to defend the approach to Vienna by accumulating a formidable mass in that vast fortress on the flank of the invading army. But the Austrian general had not resolution enough to adopt so daring a design, and probably the instructions of the Aulic Council fettered him to a more limited plan of operations. He confined himself, therefore, to concentrating his forces on the line of the Iller, between Ulm and Memmin-

Movement of the French troops to surround the Austrians.

Oct. 6 and 7.

Oct. 12.

Mack's defensive arrangements.

* Bign., iv., 346, 347. Dum., xiii., 28, 31. Hard., viii., 476, 480.

† Dum., xiii., 31, 33.

‡ Bign., iv., 356, 357. Bot., iv., 287.

* Bign., iv., 362. Norv., ii., 386.

† Dum., xiii., 35, 38. Jom., ii., 108, 109. Norv., ii., 388.

gen, hastily threw up intrenchments to defend the latter town, and, grouping his masses round the ramparts of the former, fronted to the eastward, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus unexpectedly appeared in his rear. At the same time he despatched orders to General Auffenberg, who commanded twelve battalions of grenadiers and four squadrons of cuirassiers at Innspruck, to join him by forced marches, and as soon as he arrived, despatched him to support the corps of Reinmayer, who was at the head of the vanguard near Donaworth.*

The brave Imperialist, while pursuing, in unsuspecting security, his march to the place of his destination, suddenly found himself enveloped at Vertingen, four leagues from Donaworth, by an immense body of French cavalry. It was the corps of Murat, eight thousand strong, which, rapidly sweeping round the Austrian infantry, menaced them on every side. In this extremity, Auffenberg formed his whole division into one great square, with the cuirassiers at the angles, and in that order boldly awaited the attack of the enemy. Down came the French dragoons like a tempest, rending the air with their cries, and speedily swept away the imperial horse stationed outside the infantry, while courageously resisting the immensely superior forces of the enemy. Still the square remained, and from its sides, fronting every way, there issued a redoubtable, rolling fire, which reminded the French veterans of their own unceasing discharges at Mont Thabor and the Pyramids. The combat was long and obstinate: in vain Nansouty, with the heavy dragoons, charged them repeatedly on every side; the Imperialists stood firm; their sustained running fire brought down rank after rank of the assailants, and the issue of the combat seemed extremely doubtful, when the arrival of Oudinot with a brigade of French grenadiers changed the fortune of the day. These fresh troops, supported by cannon, opened a tremendous fire upon one angle of the square: the Austrians, worn out with fatigue, were staggered by the violence of the discharge, and Nansouty, seizing the moment of disorder, rushed in at the wavering part of the line, and in an instant an aperture was made which admitted several thousand of the enemy into the centre of the Austrian square. Collecting with heroic resolution the yet unbroken part of his troops, Auffenberg succeeded in forming a smaller square, which effected its retreat into some marshes in the neighbourhood of the Danube, which arrested the pursuit of the French horse; but three thousand prisoners, many standards, and all their artillery, remained in the hands of the enemy.†

Although the courage with which the Austrians fought on this occasion appeared to be reflecting in every part of Europe a favourable augury for the final issue of the contest, yet to the inconsiderate multitude, who judge only from the result, the effect was very different, and the brilliant termination of the first action in the campaign was an event as animating to the French as it was depressing to the imperial soldiers. Napoleon, with his usual skill, availed himself of the opportunity to exhibit a spectacle which might electrify the minds of his troops. Two days after the action he repaired in person

to Zurmurhausen, where he passed in review all the corps who had been engaged in it; with his own hand he distributed crosses, orders, and other recompenses to the most deserving, and pronounced a flattering eulogium on General Excellmans, when he presented the standards taken from the enemy. Another officer, who, at the head only of two dragoons, had so imposed on the terrors of the broken Imperialists the night after the action as to make a hundred of them lay down their arms, received a place in the Imperial Guard. Never did sovereign in modern times understand so completely the art of exciting enthusiasm in the minds of his followers, by the distinction conferred on individual merit, in whatever rank of the army; and it was as much owing to this circumstance, as the greatness of his military genius, that the superior successes of the grand army, which he commanded in person, to those at a distance, under the orders of his lieutenants, was owing.*†

While the powerful advanced guards of the grand army, viz., the corps of Ney on the left bank of the Danube, and that of Murat on the right, were thus engaging the whole attention of the enemy, the remainder of that immense host, on the right and left, was rapidly sweeping round the flanks and rear of the Austrian troops. Soult soon joined Marmont at Augsburg; the Imperial Guards were shortly after established at the same place; Davoust, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived at Aicha, all directly in the rear of the Imperialists, while the corps of Kienmayer, almost enveloped in such immense masses, deemed itself fortunate in being able to effect its retreat by the bridge of Neubourg into Bavaria, and the city of Munich. Thither it was immediately followed by the corps of Bernadotte, who established himself in that capital, while the corps of Marmont and Davoust were moved in the same direction, in the view of forming a powerful army of observation, which might repel any attempt on the part of the Russians or imperial reserves from the hereditary states to disengage the army of Mack, now entirely surrounded by the French forces. But information soon arrived that the Russians were at such a distance as to be unable to take any part in the decisive operations which were approaching; and therefore Bernadotte alone was left in observation in Bavaria, and the other corps were drawn in a circle round the north and east of the Austrians at Ulm. Ney, in particular, was directed to occupy all the bridges over the Danube, and push forward his advanced guards on the right bank of the river, to give instantaneous warning of any attempt which the enemy might make to break through the net which surrounded him, and regain Bohemia by passing the rear and communications of the grand army.‡

Mack, instead of falling back to the Tyrol,

* Bign., iv., 265, 366. Dum., xiii., 45, 46.

† Generosity, as well as excellence of military conduct, attracted the notice of the emperor. At the passage of the Lech, a corporal who had been cashiered by his superior officer on account of some irregularity of discipline, beheld that officer at the point of perishing in the waves of the river. Forgetting his injury, the brave man brought in and saved him. The emperor caused him to be plunged into his presence, and after publicly eulogizing his conduct, appointed him to a situation round his own person, and gave him the star of honour.—BIGNON, iv., 365, 366.

‡ Dum., xiii., 49, 52. Jom., ii., 110, 111.

* Dum., xiii., 41, 42. Jom., ii., 108, 109.

† Dum., xiii., 43, 45. Jom., ii., 109. Bign., iv., 364.

October 9.
Recompenses
bestowed by
Napoleon on
the soldiers
engaged.

Oct. 8th and
9th.

Measures of which was the only retreat which Mack to extricate himself. now really remained to him, persisted in the idea that, by directing the mass of his forces to the northeast, he might yet regain the Bohemian frontier. He therefore moved forward all his troops, as they successively arrived from the Black Forest and the neighbourhood of the Lake of Constance, in that direction, and on the 8th of October established his own headquarters at Burgau, midway between Ulm and Augsburg, while the defence of Ulm was intrusted to General Jellachich, who laboured assiduously, night and day, not only with the garrison, but the whole inhabitants of the town and five thousand peasants in the vicinity, at strengthening the works on the heights adjoining the place. Between the 5th and 8th of October, the movement of the Austrian army was completed; it now faced towards Bavaria and the Lech, having its left resting on the Danube, over which it still held the bridges of Ulm and Gunzbourg. The latter post, being of great importance to the Austrians, was occupied by eight thousand of their best troops. They

October 9. were there attacked by Marshal Ney, at the head of superior forces, and after a bloody conflict the bridge was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the Imperialists driven out of the town, with the loss of above two thousand men. Disconcerted by this check, and despairing, from the vast accumulation of forces on the banks of the Danube and Lech, of success in any attempt to break through in that direction, Mack withdrew his headquarters to Ulm, and

October 10. Ney, rapidly following his footsteps, narrowed the circle on the north and east, which enveloped the Austrians in that city.*

In their advance towards Ulm, the vanguard of Ney encountered a body of Austrians, twenty thousand strong, posted in an admirable situation at Hasslach. October 11. lach, and supported by a powerful artillery in position on the rugged heights which adjoin that hamlet. The French were so far advanced before they perceived the strength of the enemy, which was more than double their own, that retreat was impossible, while attack seemed hopeless. In these circumstances, their commander, General Dupont, took the most audacious, often, in such situations, the most prudent course: he vigorously assailed the enemy, and in the evening, the arrival of successive reinforcements in some degree restored the equality of the combat. The weight of the contest took place at the village of Jungingen, which was taken and retaken six times during the course of the day; but, although they maintained a heroic struggle with inferior forces at that point, the French were unsuccessful at others; their cavalry having been overthrown by the Imperialist horse, who assailed them in rear, and their cannon and baggage swept off by their redoubtable cuirassiers, and brought in triumph to the walls of Ulm. At night Dupont retired, leaving, indeed, a third of his troops on the field of battle, but justly proud of having, with forces so inferior, maintained so honourable a combat, and bringing with him, as a set-off against the loss of his artillery, nearly two thousand prisoners taken during the terrible strife in the village from the imperial infantry.†

The honour of the Austrian arms was in some

degree maintained by the divided trophies of this bloody conflict; but it was shortly after severely tarnished by a less creditable transaction at Memmingen. On the 11th of October, Soult was detached by Napoleon, with his whole corps, from Augsburg against this town, and after cutting to pieces a regiment of Austrian cuirassiers, whom he encountered on his road, he completed the investment of the place on the 13th. The garrison, four thousand strong, destitute of provisions, intimidated by the great display of force which appeared round their walls, and discouraged by the disastrous issue of the combat which had hitherto taken place, capitulated on the first summons; and then began that ruinous system of laying down their arms in large bodies, which, during this campaign, more even than their numerous disasters, tarnished the lustre of the imperial annals. Rapidly pursuing his success, Soult, on the day following, crossed the Iller, and with three of his divisions marched to Biberach, so as to bar the road to Upper Swabia, which hitherto had lain open to the enemy, while the fourth took post on the south-east before the ramparts of Ulm, the investment where they were shortly after joined of Ulm.

by the corps of Marmont and Lannes. On the same day, Napoleon, with the Imperial Guard, advanced from Augsburg to Burgau, and established his headquarters there for the night, while Ney, on the north, completed the circle of enemies drawn round the unhappy Imperialists. The fate of Mack was already sealed: a hundred thousand French were grouped round the ramparts of Ulm, where fifty thousand Austrians, in deep dejection, were accumulated together.*

In advancing towards Ulm on the following morning, at the head of his guards, Napoleon came, at the bridge of the Lech, upon the corps of Marmont, which had been established there on the preceding day. The weather was dreadful; the snow already fell in heavy flakes; the cold was intense; and the soldiers, burdened not only with their arms, but provisions for several days in every man's knapsack, were slowly toiling over a road rendered almost impassable by the multitude of carriages which had already furrowed its surface. Insensible to the severity of the elements, Napoleon instantly halted, dismissed his own suite to a distance, formed the private soldiers into a dense circle around him, and there harangued them for half an hour, in a loud voice, on the situation and prospects of the campaign. He thanked them for the constancy with which they had encountered difficulties and endured privations the severest to which they could be exposed in war; demonstrated to them the situation of the enemy, cut off from his own country, surrounded by superior forces, and obliged to fight, as at Marengo, in order to open the only avenue which remained for his escape. In the great battle which was approaching, he confidently promised them victory if they continued to act with the resolution and constancy which they had hitherto evinced. This speech, the circumstances of which resemble as much the harangues of the Roman generals to their legions as they are characteristic of the French army at that period, and the pecu-

* Dum., xliii., 53, 56. Norv., ii., 389, 390.

† Jom., ii., 114. Dum., xliii., 57, 62. Bign., iv., 376.

* Jom., ii., 115, 116. Dum., xliii., 67, 68. Bign., iv., 368.

liar turn of mind in their chief, was listened to with profound attention, but no sooner was it concluded than shouts and warlike exclamations broke out on all sides, and the joyful visages of the soldiers demonstrated that they fully appreciated the immense advantages which their own exertions and the skill of their chief had already secured for them.*

While the formidable legions of Napoleon October 13. were thus closing round the imperial array, the most stormy debates took place at the headquarters at Ulm as to the course which should be pursued. Fully alive, as all were, to the extent and imminence of the danger, opinions were yet painfully divided as to the means of salvation which yet remained to the army. On the one hand, it was urged that the only

Mack resolves to detach the Archduke Ferdinand to Bohemia, and himself remain at Ulm.

chance of safety which was left was to form the troops into one solid mass, and attempt to force a passage either towards Bohemia or the Tyrol; on the other, that the most advisable course was to detach the Archduke Ferdinand with the cavalry and light troops towards the former of these provinces, while Mack himself held Ulm, from whence he might hope either to be delivered by the Russians, or effect his retreat into the latter. A more fatal resolution than that of dividing their forces, in presence of such an enemy, could not possibly have been adopted; but the urgent necessity of providing, at all hazards, for the escape of a member of the imperial house overpowered every other consideration, and it was ultimately determined that Mack, with the bulk of the army, should run the hazard of remaining at Ulm, to engage the attention of the enemy, while the archduke endeavoured, at the head of the cavalry and light troops, to gain the Bohemian mountains.†

At the same moment that this desperate resolution was formed by the Austrian generals, Napoleon was preparing for a general attack on the following day on the position which they occupied. His army formed a vast circle round Ulm, at the distance of about two leagues from the ramparts. The advanced posts of the two armies were everywhere in presence of each other.

October 4. Early on the following morning Napoleon himself ascended to the Chateau Elchingen. of Adelhausen, from the elevated terrace of which he was surveying, by the advancing line of fire, the progress of his tirailleurs in driving in the outposts of the enemy, when his attention was arrested by a violent cannonade on the right. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney, who, at the head of sixteen thousand men, was commencing an attack on the Bridge and Abbey of ELCHINGEN. The Austrians, fifteen thousand strong, with forty pieces of cannon, under Laudon, had there established themselves in one of the strongest positions which could be imagined. The village of the same name, composed of successive piles of stone houses intersected at right angles by streets, rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the banks of the Danube to a vast convent which crowns the summit of the ascent. All the exposed points on these heights were lined with artillery, all the windows filled with musketeers. The bridge over the Danube had been only imperfectly destroyed by the retiring Austrians on the preceding day; but

the tottering arches were commanded by the cannon and infantry with which all the opposite heights were covered, and they still had a strong advanced guard on the northern bank of the river. Undeterred by such formidable obstacles, Ney approached with his usual intrepidity to the attack. Dressed in full uniform, he was everywhere to be seen at the head of the columns, leading the soldiers to the conflict, or rallying such as were staggering under the close and murderous fire of the Austrians. Nothing could at first resist the impetuosity of the French: the imperial outposts on the north bank of the river were attacked with such vigour that the assailants passed the bridge pell-mell with the fugitives, and, hotly pursuing them up the streets, arrived at the foot of the vast walls of the convent at the summit. There they were arrested by a severe plunging fire from the top of the battlements, while the Imperialists, who had been forced from the streets, took a strong position on the right, from whence they enfiladed the front of the abbey, and threatened to retake the town. Thither they were speedily followed by the French. The same division which had forced the passage of the bridge advanced in the van of the attacking column; and a desperate conflict ensued in front of the wood, which the Austrians held with invincible resolution. In vain the French brought up fresh columns to the fight. The regiments of the Archduke Charles and of Erlach, with heroic bravery, made good their ground, and, though reduced to a fourth of their numbers, still maintained, at the close of the day, their glorious defence. But towards evening, Laudon, though still in possession of the wood and abbey, found that his position was no longer tenable. The French, now in full possession of the bridge, had caused large bodies both of horse and foot to defile over. Already their cavalry was sweeping round the Austrian rear, and menacing their communications; and at length he retired, having sustained a loss in that desperate strife of 1500 killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners.*†

The resistance of these gallant troops, though fatal to too many of themselves, proved the salvation of the Archduke Ferdinand, and preserved the house of Hapsburg from the disgrace of having one of its princes fall a prisoner into the hands of the enemy. During the desperate strife at Elchingen, the archduke October 15. disposed the troops with which his sortie was to be effected into two divisions, with the one of which he made a feint of advancing towards Biberach, while Werneck, at the head of the other, moved upon Albeck and Herdenheim. The latter corps fell, with forces greatly superior, upon the division of Dupont, stationed on the road it was following, already severely weakened by the combat at Hasslach, and those brave troops were on the point of being overwhelmed by superior numbers, when Murat, with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, came up to their support. The arrival of these reinforcements gave the French as great a superiority of numbers as their adversaries had previously en-

* Dum., xiii., 72, 74. Jom., ii., 118, 119. Norv., ii., 393, 394. Ney, ii.

† It is from this glorious action that Marshal Ney's title of Duke of Elchingen was taken. He exposed his person without hesitation throughout the day, and seemed even to court death; but fate reserved him for greater and more melancholy destinies.—Jom., ii., 118.

* Dum., xiii., 68, 69. Bign., iv., 369, 370.

† Jom., ii., 112. Norv., ii., 392, 393.

joyed, and the Austrians were compelled to retire before nightfall in the direction of Herdenheim. On the day following they were again assailed in their march by Murat, who made eighteen hundred of their wearied columns prisoners; but having been joined by the archduke, who had now returned from his feint towards Biberach, the remainder resolutely continued their endeavours to force their way through the enemy. With characteristic adherence to old custom, even in circumstances where it is least advisable to follow it, the Imperialists had encumbered this light corps, whose existence depended on the celerity of its movements, with five hundred wagons, heavily laden. They were speedily charged by the French horse and captured, with all the drivers and escort by which they were accompanied. Despairing, after these disasters, of bringing his infantry in safety through the hourly increasing masses of his pursuers, the archduke in the night continued his retreat with the light horse, and by great exertions reached Donaworth. The vigour and celerity of the French pursuit were unexampled. Some of the divisions, in dreadful weather, and through roads almost impassable for carriages, marched twelve leagues a day. The cavalry were continually on horseback; and, animated by the prospect of gaining so brilliant a prize, the troops of all arms made the utmost efforts in the pursuit. But the perseverance and skill of the Austrian cavalry triumphed over every obstacle; and after surmounting a thousand dangers, the archduke succeeded in crossing the Altmühl, and by Reidenberg and Ratisbon gaining the Bohemian frontier, where he was at length enabled to give some days' repose to his wearied followers. But it was with a few hundred horse alone that he escaped from the pursuit. The remainder of the corps, exhausted with fatigue, and despairing of safety,* were surrounded at Trochtelfingen by the cavalry of Murat, and to the number of eight thousand men laid down their arms.

Surrender of
Werneck with
8000 men.
October 18.

While these astonishing successes were rewarding the activity of Murat's corps, Napoleon in person was daily contracting the circle which confined the main body of the Imperialists around the ramparts of Ulm. This city, become so celebrated from the disasters which the Austrians there experienced, is surrounded by a wall flanked with bastions and a deep ditch; but it lies in the bottom of a valley, overhung on the north by the heights of Michelsberg and La Tuileries, which on the other side of the Danube command it in every part.† These heights, during the campaign of 1800, had been covered by a vast intrenched camp, constructed by the provident wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and it was by their aid that Kray was enabled to arrest the victorious army of Moreau for six weeks before its walls. Totally destroyed by the French after the capitulation of that city, these works had been hastily attempted to be reconstructed by Mack, after he saw his retreat cut off in the present campaign; but the ramparts were incomplete; the redoubts, unarmed, were little better than a heap of rubbish; and the garrison had not a sufficient force at their disposal to man the extensive lines which were in preparation. The

consequence was that these important heights, the real defence of Ulm, fell an easy prey to the enemy. Animated by the presence of the emperor, who had established his headquarters at Elchingen, and in person directed the operations, the French troops cheerfully advanced amid torrents of rain, and almost up to the knees in mud, to the attack.* Ney speedily carried the Michelsberg, while Suchet made himself master of La Tuileries; and before nightfall the French bombs established on the heights were carrying terror and consternation into every part of the city.

Arrived on the heights of the Michelsberg, Napoleon beheld Ulm, crowded with Negotiations troops, stretched out within half for the surren- cannon-shot at his feet, while the po- der of Mack. der of Mack. sitions occupied by his legions precluded all chance of escape to the Austrian army, now reduced by its repeated losses to little more than thirty thousand combatants. Satisfied that they could not escape him, and encouraged by the surrender of Werneck, of which he had just received accounts, he summoned Mack to surrender, and returning himself to his headquarters at Elchingen, despatched an officer of his staff, Philippe de Ségur, to conduct the negotiation. Mack at first was persuaded, or attempted to make the French believe he was persuaded, that his situation was by no means desperate, and that he would in a short time be succoured by the Russians. He accordingly expressed the greatest indignation at the mention of a capitulation; insisted that the Russians were at Daulchaw, within five days' march; and ultimately only agreed to surrender if in eight days he was not relieved. "You behold," said he, "men resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity, if you do not grant them eight days. I can maintain myself longer. There are in Ulm three thousand horses, which we shall consume, before surrendering, with as much pleasure as you would do in our place." "Three thousand horses!" replied Ségur. "Ah, marshal, the want which you experience must already be severe indeed, when you think of so sad a resource." Mack, however, continued firm, and Ségur returned to Napoleon's headquarters to give an account of his unsuccessful mission.†

Certain that the Austrians could not be relieved within the time specified by their general, Napoleon sent back Ségur, on the following day, with a written ultimatum, grant- Oct. 19. ing the eight days, counting from the 17th, the first day when the blockade was held to have been established, which in effect reduced the eight days to six. "Eight days or death!" replied the Austrian general, and, at the same time, he published a proclamation, in which he denounced the punishment of death against any one who should mention the word "surrender!"‡

* Dum., xiii., 80, 84. Jom., ii., 120, 122.

† Bour., vii., 25, 27. Dum., xiii., 84, 86. Rapp, *Memoirs*, 28, 31.

‡ The proclamation was in these terms: "In the name of his majesty I render responsible, on their honour and their duty, all the generals and superior officers who should mention the word 'surrender,' or who should think of anything but the most obstinate defence: a defence which cannot be required for any considerable time, as in a very few days the advanced guards of an imperial and a Russian army will appear before Ulm to deliver us. The enemy's army is in the most deplorable situation, as well from the want of provisions as the severity of the weather: it is impossible that he can maintain the blockade beyond a few days; and as to trying an assault, it could only be done by little detachments; our ditches are deep, our bastions strong; no-

* Dum., xiii., 92, 97. Jom., ii., 124, 126. Nov., ii., 397, 398. Rapp, 39, 44.

† Personal observation.

They capitulated at first conditionally. Shortly after, Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the French headquarters. His astonishment and confusion were extreme when the bandage was removed from his eyes, and he found himself in presence of the emperor and his brilliant staff. The emperor began the conversation by painting in the gloomiest colours the situation of the Austrian army. He cited the example of Jaffa, where he had been obliged to put the garrison, four thousand strong, to the sword, and declared that similar obstinacy would lead the imperial army to the same lamentable fate. He pointed out the hopelessness of all ideas of rescue from the Russians, who had not yet reached the Bavarian frontier, and the increase which his blockading force would soon receive from the troops who had been victorious over Werneck, and captured the garrison of Memmingen.* The prince returned to Ulm with these untoward tidings; and Mack, falling suddenly from the height of confidence to the depth of despair, agreed to surrender, and on the following day the capitulation was signed, by which the fortress of Ulm was to be given up, and the whole army lay down its arms, on the 25th, if not before that time relieved by the Russian or Austrian army.†

These terms were sufficiently disgraceful to the Austrian arms, but Mack had not yet exhausted the cup of humiliation: Napoleon, to whom every hour was precious, and who already began to experience the inconvenience of so great an accumulation of men without magazines at a single point, perceiving the weakness of the adversary with whom he had to deal, sent for Mack to his headquarters at Elchingen, and there so completely bewildered him by a recital of the disasters which had attended the army, and the impossibility of their either being relieved by the Russians, or escaping to the defiles of the Tyrol, that the unhappy man, who had now entirely lost his senses, agreed to evacuate the place and surrender on the following day, on condition that the corps of Ney should not quit Ulm till the 25th. In this way, without any reason whatever, the whole other troops employed in the blockade, amounting to nearly seventy thousand men, were rendered instantly disposable for ulterior operations.‡

In consequence of this new article in the ca-

thing is more easy than to destroy the assailants. Should provisions fail, we have more than three thousand horses, which will maintain us for a considerable time."—Dum., xiii., 87.

* "You expect the Russians?" said Napoleon. "Do you really, then, not know that they have not yet reached Bohemia? Do you suppose I am not fully informed as to your situation? If I let you return on your parole, who will assure me that the soldiers, at least, will not immediately, in defiance of the capitulation, be employed against me? I have too often already been the dupe of such artifices on the part of your generals. This is not an ordinary war: after the conduct of your government, I have no measures to keep with it. It is you who have attacked me; I have no faith in your promises. Mack might engage for himself, but he could not do so for his soldiers. If the Archduke Ferdinand was here, I could trust him, but I know he is not. He has crossed the Danube, but I will get hold of him yet. Do you suppose I am to be made a fool of? Here is the capitulation of Memmingen; show it to your general: I will grant him no other: the officers alone can be allowed to return to Austria; the soldiers must be prisoners of war. The longer he delays the worse will be his ultimate fate."—Bour., vii., 31, 33.

† Rapp, 35, 36. Jom., ii., 124. Dum., xiii., 87, 88. Bour., vii., 35. See the capitulation in Dum., xiii., 396.

‡ Jom., ii., 127. Dum., xiii., 97, 98. Rapp, 36.

pitulation, a spectacle took place on Oct. 20. The following day unparalleled in the army of Mack modern warfare, and sufficient to defile before Napoleon. have turned the strongest head. On that memorable morning, the garrison of Ulm, thirty thousand strong, with sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay down its arms. Napoleon, surrounded by a numerous and magnificent staff, took his station before the fire of a bivouac on a rocky eminence forming part of the heights on the north of the city; for five hours the immense array defiled before him—the men in the deepest dejection, the officers in sullen despair, at the unparalleled disgrace which had befallen their arms. Klenau, Giulay, Gotesheim, Lichtenstein, were there—names celebrated in the achievements of former wars, and destined to acquire still greater distinction in those more glorious ones which followed. Napoleon addressed himself to these brave men in delicate and touching terms: "Gentlemen," said he, "war has its chances. Often victorious, you must expect sometimes to be vanquished. Your master wages against me an unjust war. I say it candidly, I know not for what I am fighting; I know not what he desires of me. He has wished to remind me that I was once a soldier; I trust he will find that I have not forgot my original avocation. I will, however, give one piece of advice to my brother, the Emperor of Germany: let him hasten to make peace; this is the moment to remember that there are limits to all empires, however powerful. The idea that the house of Lorraine may come to an end, should inspire him with distrust of fortune. I want nothing on the Continent: it is ships, colonies, and commerce which I desire; and their acquisition would be as advantageous to you as to me." Thus spoke Napoleon on the 20th of October, 1805: on the day following the empire of the seas was forever wrested from his arms by the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar, and on that day eight years he himself was flying from a greater disaster to the arms of France on the field of Leipsic.††

Little anticipating these calamities, the emperor enjoyed the splendid spectacle which was going forward. Under the appearance of perfect calmness, he concealed a mind intoxicated with the glory which surrounded him. The imperial soldiers, amid all their misfortunes, were filled with admiration at the conqueror by whom they had been overcome: as they defiled before him, the march of the columns insensibly became slower, and every eye was turned to the hero who filled the world with his renown; but

* Bign., iv., 374, 375. Dum., xiii., 99, 100.

† As the procession of captives continued to defile before him, Napoleon said to the Austrian generals, "It is truly deplorable that such honourable men as yourselves, whose names are spoken of with honour wherever you have combated, should be made the victims of an insane cabinet, intent on the most chimerical projects. It was already a sufficient crime to have attacked me in the midst of peace, without any declaration of war; but this offence is trivial to that of bringing into the heart of Europe a horde of barbarians, and allowing an Asiatic power to mix itself up with our disputes. Instead of attacking me without a cause, the Aulic Council should rather have united their forces to mine, in order to repel the Russian force. Such an alliance is monstrous; it is the alliance of the dogs and wolves against the sheep. Had France fallen in the strife, you would not have been long of perceiving the error you had committed." At this moment a general officer recounted aloud an insulting expression which he had heard from the common soldiers in regard to the Austrian captives. "You must have little respect for yourself," said Napoleon, with an air of marked displeasure, "to insult men bowed down by such a misfortune."—SAVARY, i., 101, 102.

when they had passed, the recollection of their situation fell at once upon them, and, without waiting till they arrived at the place where their arms were to be deposited, and in defiance of the commands of their officers, they threw them violently on the ground, and from the vast and now disorderly array a confused murmur of grief and indignation arose. In the French army, on the other hand, nothing but joy and exultation were to be seen: never had the enthusiasm of the soldiers been so great, never the devotion to the emperor so unbounded; and reviewing the movements of the campaign by which these astonishing successes had been gained, the veterans said to each other, "The little corporal has discovered a new method of carrying on war—he makes more use of our legs than our bayonets."*†

Ever anxious to make his greatest successes the means of exciting additional feelings of exultation in the inhabitants of his capital, Napoleon sent to the Conservative Senate of Paris the forty standards taken from the army at Ulm, accompanied by a flattering message, in which he said, "Senators, behold in this present which the sons of the grand army make to their fathers, a proof of the satisfaction which I experience at the manner in which you have seconded my efforts. And you, Frenchmen, make your brothers march; let them hasten to combat at our sides, in order that we may be able, without farther effusion of blood or additional efforts, to repel far from our frontiers all the armies which the gold of England has assembled for our destruction. A month has not elapsed since I predicted to you that the emperor and the army would do their duty; I am impatient for the moment when I may be able to say, 'The people have done theirs.'" Careful, at the same time, to secure the attachment of his allies, he sent six pieces of cannon to the Duke of Wirtemberg, and 25,000 muskets to the Elector of Bavaria. Shortly after he addressed to his soldiers one of those proclamations which so often electrified Europe, by the stupendous successes which they commemorated, and the nervous eloquence in which they were couched. On this occasion it was hardly possible to exaggerate the triumphs of the army: with a loss not exceeding eight thousand men, they had taken or destroyed nearly eighty thousand of their enemies.‡

* Dum., xiii., 101. Rapp, 37.

† During the rapid and complicated movements which led to the capture of Ulm, the emperor was indefatigable in his exertions. For three days and nights he had hardly ever off his clothes, incessantly on horseback; in the rudest weather he shared the fare and hardships of the meanest of his soldiers. In vain was he expected by the authorities at Augsburg, and magnificent preparations made for his reception: he slept in the villages, surrounded by his staff, in the humble cottages of the peasants.—BIGN., iv., 376.

‡ *Jom.*, ii., 130. *Dum.*, xiii., 103, 104.

§ "Soldiers of the grand army! In fifteen days we have concluded a campaign. We have kept our promise; we have chased the troops of Austria from the Bavarian territories, and re-established our ally in the possession of his states. That army which, with so much ostentation and presumption, had advanced to our frontiers, is annihilated. But what signifies that to England? We are no longer at Boulogne, and his subsidies will be neither greater nor less. Of 100,000 men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they will replace our conscripts in the labours of the fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, their whole park of ammunition, and ninety standards, are in our power; from that whole army not fifteen thousand have escaped. Soldiers, I announced to you a great battle, but, thanks to the faulty combinations of the enemy, I have obtained these great advantages without incurring any risk; and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, this great result has not weak-

The blame of these disasters was wholly laid, by the Austrian government, on General Mack; he was subjected to a court of inquiry, and condemned to imprisonment for twenty years in consequence, upon the conclusion of the war. Napoleon interceded for him, but in vain. Historic justice, however, requires that it should be stated, that although this unfortunate general was obviously inadequate to the difficult task imposed upon him of commanding a great army which was to combat Napoleon; and although he evidently lost his judgment, and unnecessarily agreed to a disgraceful abridgment of the period of the capitulation at the close of the negotiations, yet the whole disasters of the campaign are not to be visited on his head. The improvidence of the imperial government, the faults of the Aulic Council, have also much to answer for. Mack's authority was not firmly established in the army; the great name of the Archduke Ferdinand overshadowed his influence; the necessity of providing for the safety of a prince of the imperial house overbalanced every other consideration, and compelled, against his judgment, that division of the troops to which the unexampled disasters which followed may immediately be ascribed.* It is reasonable to impute to this unfortunate general extreme improvidence in remaining so long at Ulm, when Napoleon's legions were closing around him, and great weakness of judgment, to give it no severer name, in afterward capitulating, without trying some great effort, with concentrated forces, to effect his escape. But there appears no reason to suppose, as the Austrian government did, that he wilfully betrayed their interests to Napoleon; and it is to be recollected, in extenuation of his faults, that his authority, controlled by the Aulic Council, was in some degree shared with an assembly of officers, and that he was at the head of troops habituated to the discreditable custom of laying down their arms, on the first reverse, in large bodies.

While these stupendous events were paralyzing the imperial strength in the centre of Germany, the campaign had been opened, and already fiercely contested on the Italian plains. The Aulic Council, from whose errors the European nations have suffered so often and so deeply, had, in the general plan of the campaign, committed three capital faults. The first was that of commencing a menacing offensive war in Germany with the weaker of their two great armies. The second, that of remaining on the defensive in Italy, in presence of inferior forces, with the greatest array which the monarchy had on foot. The third, that of retaining in useless inactivity a considerable body of men,

Errors of the cabinet of Vienna in the general plan of the campaign.

ened us by the loss of 1500 men. Soldiers, this astonishing success is owing to your boundless confidence in your emperor; to your patience in undergoing fatigues; to your rare intrepidity! But we will not rest here. Already I see you are burning to commence a second campaign. The gold of England has brought against us the Russian army from the extremities of the universe; we will make it undergo the same fate. To that combat is, in an especial manner, attached the honour of the French infantry. It is there that it is to be decided for the second time that question, already resolved in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the first or second in Europe. There are no generals there whom it would add to my glory to vanquish. All my care shall be to obtain the victory with as little an effusion of blood as possible. My soldiers are my children." Amid his customary exaggeration there was much truth in this proclamation.—RAPP, 47, 48.

* Rapp, 36. *Jom.*, ii., 130.

with no enemy whatever to combat, on the Tyrol, which might at different times have cast the balance in the desperate struggles which took place to the north and south of its mountains. While Mack, with eighty thousand men, was pushed forward to bear the weight of the grand army of double its own strength, in the valley of the Danube, the Archduke Charles, with above ninety thousand, was retained in a state of inactivity on the Adige, in presence of Massena, who had only fifty thousand;* and twenty thousand men were scattered over the Tyrol, where they had no more formidable enemy in their front than the peaceful shepherds of Helvetia.

No sooner was the cabinet of Vienna made aware, from the rapid march of Napoleon's troops across Germany, and the distance at which the Russians still were from the scene of action, of the imminent danger to which their army in Swabia was exposed, than they despatched orders to the Archduke Charles to remain on the defensive, and detach all the disposable troops at his command to the succour of Mack at Ulm. That gallant prince accordingly restrained the impetuosity of his numerous and disciplined battalions on the Adige, retained his forces on the left bank of that stream, and detached thirty regiments across the Tyrol towards Germany. By this means he lost the initiative, often of incalculable importance, at least with able commanders and superior forces, in war; was compelled to forego the opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the troops of Massena in his front; to depress the spirits of his soldiers by keeping them in inactivity till the disasters in Germany had extinguished their hopes; and all this for no good purpose, as before his re-enforcements could emerge from the gorges of Tyrol the die was cast, and the troops in Ulm had defiled as captives before the French emperor.†

The forces in Italy were divided by the Adige, not only along the course of that river from the Alps to the Po, but in the city of Verona itself; the town, properly so called, and the castles on the right bank, being in the hands of the French, while the suburbs in the left bank were in those of the Austrians. Strong barricades were drawn across the bridges which united the opposite sides of the river; and the archduke, reduced by the orders of the Aulic Council and the catastrophe in Swabia to a melancholy defensive, was strengthening with fieldworks the celebrated position of Caldiero, the importance of which had been so strongly felt in former campaigns, when Massena, stimulated by the orders of the emperor, and the accounts he was daily receiving of the advance of the grand army to the north of the Alps, resolved to commence operations. He denounced, accordingly, the armistice which had been agreed on till the 18th of October, and in the night preceding arrived alone in Verona, where preparations had for some time past been secretly making for forcing the bridges and gaining the entire command of the river at that point. At midnight on the night of the 18th, after removing, with as little noise as possible, their own barricades on the bridge, they attached a petard to the strong barrier of separation, and at daybreak, while a violent

cannonade at other points distracted the attention of the enemy, the explosion took place, and the obstacle was thrown down. It displayed, however, a yawning gulf behind it, where the bridge had been cut by the Imperialists; but this proved only a momentary obstacle to the French soldiers; some threw themselves into boats, and rowed across the stream; others brought planks, and hastily threw them over the opening; the barricades at the opposite end were speedily forced; and under cover of a thick fog, which signally favoured their operations, the intrenchments on the opposite side were stormed, and the combat continued, from street to street, and from house to house, till night. A violent storm then separated the combatants, when, although the Austrians still held their forts in the town, the passage was secured to the French, a *tête du pont* established, and three battalions left intrenched on the left bank of the stream. This operation was a masterpiece of skill, secrecy, and resolution on the part of the French general; it cost the Austrians two thousand men, and, what was of still greater importance, gave their antagonists the command of the passage with the loss of little more than half that number.*

Conceiving himself threatened with a speedy attack in consequence of this audacious and fortunate enterprise, the archduke lost no time in making preparations to repel it. The position of Caldiero, already strong, was rendered almost impregnable. Its line of rocky heights, extending from the foot of the Alps to the shores of the Adige, strengthened in every accessible point by redoubts, intrenchments, and palisades, seemed to defy an attack; while the natural advantages of the ground, broken by cliffs, woods, and vineyards, from which even the arms of Napoleon had recoiled, appeared to oppose an invincible barrier to the farther advance of the French troops. Massena remained inactive from the 18th to the 29th of October, but having then received intelligence of the astonishing successes of Napoleon in the plains of Swabia, he resolved to resume the offensive; but how to assail seventy thousand men, strongly intrenched, with a force not fifty thousand, was a problem which even the genius of the conqueror of Zurich might find it difficult to solve. Nevertheless, he resolved upon making the attempt.

The triumph at Ulm was announced to the soldiers by a loud discharge of artillery in the evening, and on the following morning, before their exultation had subsided, he made his dispositions for an attack. To assail such a position, guarded by an army superior to his own, in front, was a desperate enterprise; but the French general conceived that, by bringing the bulk of his forces to his own left, he might turn the Imperialists by the mountains, and compel them to lose all the labour they had employed in strengthening it. Massena himself, with two divisions, was to engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack and loud cannonade in front of the position; while Verdier, at the head of the right wing, was to cross the Adige below Verona, and endeavour to turn his left, and Molitor, with the left wing, was to gain the mountains, and threaten his right. Molitor made great progress on the first day, and Massena, with the centre, advanced almost to the foot of the enemy's intrenchments; but after the

* Jom., ii., 139. Dum., xiii., 108, 109.

† Jom., ii., 139. Dum., ii., 109. Bign., iv., 360, 361.

* Bign., iv., 362, 363. Dum., ii., 112, 119. Jom., ii., 140.

most gallant efforts, they were driven back before night to their own ground in front of Verona; while Verdier, on the right, confined himself to a heavy firing along the line of the Adige. On the following day, however, the French dispositions were more completely carried into effect. Their centre, issuing in great strength from Verona, carried all the villages occupied by the imperial light troops, and arrived at the foot of the formidable redoubts of Caldiero; while Molitor gallantly advanced against the almost impregnable heights on their right, and Verdier made the utmost efforts to effect his passage on the lower part of the river. But all his endeavours were unsuccessful; and though his active efforts and threatening aspect detained a considerable portion of the Imperialists on the Lower Adige, the contest fell exclusively on the centre and left wing. Confident in the strength of their extreme right, and indignant at the idea of being assailed by inferior forces in their intrenchments, the Austrians deployed in great masses from their centre and left, and gallantly engaged their antagonists in the plain. A terrible combat ensued. The heads of the imperial columns were repeatedly swept away by the close and well-directed discharge of the French artillery; while the French, when they impetuously followed up their successes, were, in their turn, as rudely handled by the heavy fire of the Austrian redoubts. The heat of the battle took place round the village of Caldiero, which was speedily encumbered with dead. Massena and the archduke themselves charged at the head of their respective reserves, and exposed their persons like the meanest soldiers; but all the efforts of the French were unable to overcome the steady valour of the Germans. Several of Molitor's divisions on the left penetrated to the foot of the redoubts, and more than one battalion actually reached their summit, but they were instantly there cut to pieces by the point-blank discharge of the imperial cannon, rapidly turned against them from the adjoining intrenchments. At length night closed on this scene of slaughter, but not before four thousand brave men were lost to both parties, without either being able to boast of a decided advantage; for if the French had broken several columns of imperial infantry, and made twelve hundred prisoners, they had suffered at least as much, and the redoubtable intrenchments were still in the hands of their antagonists.*

On the following morning, Massena renewed the combat with greater prospect of success. On the preceding evening, Verdier had at length succeeded in throwing across two battalions, which were arrested by the Austrian columns in the marshes adjoining the river; but at day-break they were re-enforced by a whole division, and advanced, combating all the way, on the dikes which ran up from the Adige to the Austrian position. Soon a bridge was completed, and the whole right wing crossed over, which, following up the retiring columns of the Imperialists, was at length stopped by the redoubt of Chiavecto del Christo, which in this quarter formed the key of their position, and, if taken, would have drawn after it the loss of the battle. Sensible of its importance, Verdier made the utmost efforts to carry this intrenchment, but the gallantry of the defence was equal to that of the attack. General Nordman, who commanded the

Austrians, saw all his cannoniers killed by his side, and was himself struck down; but his place was instantly taken by COUNT COLLOREDO, afterward one of the most distinguished of the imperial generals, who continued the stubborn defence till the archduke, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in disengaging this band of heroes. Verdier was now assailed, in his turn, at once in front and both flanks; his corps was at length forced back, he himself severely wounded; and such were the losses of the French in this quarter, that it was with difficulty that they maintained themselves on the left bank of the Adige.*†

But, notwithstanding this success, the archduke was already preparing a retreat. The Archduke John had arrived at his headquarters, and brought with him a complete confirmation of the disasters in Germany, which had already circulated in obscure rumours through his army. It was no longer possible to think of preserving Italy; the heart of the Empire was laid open, and it was necessary to fly to the protection of the menaced capital. The better to disguise his movement, he made preparations as if for resuming the offensive, and several strong corps were pushed forward in the mountains towards the French left, and some detachments already appeared in the rocky ridges between the Adige and the Lake of Guarda. Alarmed at this movement, Massena stood on the defensive, and concentrated his forces in front of Verona; but, while he was in hourly expectation of an attack, the archduke had caused all his heavy cannon and baggage to defile towards the rear, and when the French videttes approached the intrenchments which had been so obstinately contested, they found them stripped of artillery, guarded only by a few of the enemy's rear-guard. Massena's whole army instantly broke up and advanced in pursuit, but the Imperialists had gained a full march upon them. The whole artillery and baggage had already defiled by one road in admirable order; dense columns of infantry, interspersed between them, covered their movements, and a strong rear-guard, under General Frimont, presented a menacing front to the pursuers. The excessive fatigue of his troops, however, rendered some repose necessary; and for this purpose, as well as to gain time for his immense array of carriages to defile in his rear, he resolved to hold firm in the neighbourhood of Vicenza, which is surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and by its position on the Bachiogione, whose stream was rendered impassable by floods, commanded the only line either for the retreat of the Germans or the pursuit of the French. There he continued, accordingly, with a powerful rear-guard, in battle array the whole of the 3d of November, and on the following night, leaving Vogelsang with four battalions in the town, he continued his retreat in the most leisurely manner. That intrepid rear-guard, with

The archduke resolves to retreat to cover Vienna.

Nov. 2.

Nov. 3.

* Dum., xiii., 143, 149. Jum., ii., 144, 145. Austrian Official Report.

† We have the best possible evidence, that of Napoleon himself, that these murderous actions terminated, upon the whole, to the advantage of the Austrians. "The Archduke Charles," says he, "had gained considerable advantages over Massena at Caldiero; in effect, the Prince of Essling was beaten." The archduke spoke of the action with his accustomed modesty and truth in his official despatches.—See *Napoleon in MONTH.* ii., 108, and 116, and *HARD.* viii., 499.

* Dum., xiii., 119, 143. Jum., ii., 141, 142.

heroic firmness, continued to make good the post, despite equally the menaces and assaults of Massena, till daybreak on the 4th, and then withdrew in perfect safety to the left bank of the river, having afforded, by their admirable steadiness, time for the park of artillery to gain a march on the other troops, and for the two wings under Rosenberg and Davidowich to unite themselves to the centre of the army. It was no ordinary skill on the part of the general, and steadiness on that of the soldiers, which could, in presence of a victorious enemy, commanded by such an officer as Massena, secure the safe retreat of seventy thousand men by a single defile and bridge, immediately after a bloody battle of three days' duration, who had been a few hours before scattered over a line of fifteen leagues in breadth.*

From Vicenza the archduke retired by forced marches through the rich and watered plains of the Brenta and Piave, towards the mountains of Friuli, separating himself altogether from Venice, into which he threw a strong garrison of eighteen battalions. When he arrived on the Tagliamento he halted for a day, and sustained a severe combat with the French advanced guard, in order to gain time to receive the information which was to decide him whether to march by Tarvis and Villach to unite his forces with those of the Archduke John in the neighbourhood of Saltzbourg, or proceed by the direct route through Laybach to Vienna. The disastrous intelligence, however, which he there received of the total wreck of General Mack's army rendered it necessary to continue his retreat as rapidly as possible by the latter of these routes to Vienna. Skillfully availing himself of every obstacle which the swollen torrents of that stream, as well as the Piave and the Isonzo, could afford, he conducted his march with such ability that, though it lay through narrow defiles and over mountains charged with the snows of winter, no serious loss was sustained, nor the spirits of the soldiers weakened, before they descended, in unbroken strength, into the valley of the Drave and the streams which make their way to the great basin of the Danube.†

Meanwhile Napoleon, whose genius never appeared more strongly than in the vigour with which, by separate columns, he followed up a beaten army, was pursuing with indefatigable activity the broken columns of the Austrian troops. On the 24th of October he arrived at Munich, where he was received with every imaginable demonstration of joy, and a general illumination gave vent to the universal transports. Augsburg was made the grand dépôt of the army, while the leading corps, under Bernadotte, Davoust, Murat, and Marmont, pressed on in ceaseless march towards the hereditary states. Speedily the Isar was passed; the French eagles were borne in exultation through the forest of Hohenlinden, and nothing arrested their march till they reached the rocky banks of the Inn, and appeared before the fortress of Brannau. At the same time, Marshal Ney, who had remained at Ulm, in terms of the capitulation, till the 25th of October, received orders to move with his whole corps upon the Tyrol, in order to

clear the vast fortress which its mountains composed of the enemy's forces, while Augereau's corps, which, having broken up from Brest, had latest come into the scene of action,* and had recently crossed the Rhine at Huningen, was moved forward by forced marches to menace the western frontier of that romantic province.

While disasters were thus accumulating on all sides upon the Austrian monarchy, the cabinet of Vienna did their utmost to repair the fatal blow which had so of the Austrians. nearly prostrated the whole strength of the state. How to arrest the terrible enemy who was pouring in irresistible force and with such rapidity down the valley of the Danube, was the great difficulty. Courier after courier was despatched to the Archduke Charles to hasten the march of his army to the scene of danger; the Archduke John was directed to evacuate the Tyrol, and endeavour to unite his forces to those of his brother to cover the capital; the levies in Hungary and Lower Austria were pressed forward with all possible rapidity; and the emperor himself, after issuing an animating proclamation to the inhabitants of Vienna,† set out in person to hold a conference with the Russian general, Kutusoff, who was advancing with the utmost rapidity, concerning the best means of arresting the march of the enemy. But when he arrived at his headquarters at Wells, the extent of the danger became apparent. The remnant of the Austrian army, under Meerfeld and Kienmayer, which had joined him, hardly amounted to twenty thousand men; his own

* Dum., xiii., 241, 248. Savary, i., 103, 2d Part. *Jom.*, ii., 144.

† "The Emperor of France has compelled me to take up arms. To his ardent desire of military achievements, his passion to be recorded in history under the title of a conqueror, the limits of France, already so much enlarged and defined by sacred treaties, still appear too narrow. He wishes to unite in his own hands all the ties upon which depend the balance of Europe. Far from attacking the throne of the Emperor of France, and keeping steadily in view the preservation of peace which we so publicly and sincerely stated to be our only wish, we declared, in the presence of all Europe, 'That we would in no event interfere in the internal concerns of France, nor make any alteration in the new Constitution which Germany received after the peace of Luneville.' Peace and independence were the only objects which we wished to attain; no ambitious views, no intention such as that since ascribed to me, of subjugating Bavaria, had any share in our councils. But the sovereign of France, totally regardless of the general tranquillity, listened not to these overtures. Wholly absorbed in himself, and occupied only with the display of his own greatness and omnipotence, he collected all his force, compelled Holland and the Elector of Baden to join him, while his secret ally, the Elector of Palatine, false to his sacred promise, voluntarily delivered himself up to him; violated in the most insulting manner the neutrality of the King of Prussia at the very moment that he had given the most solemn promises to respect it; and by these violent proceedings he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a part of the troops which I had ordered to take a position on the Danube and the Iller. I am tranquil and at ease in the midst of twenty-five millions of my subjects, equally dear to my heart and house. With fortitude the Austrian monarchy arose from every storm which menaced it during the preceding centuries. Its intrinsic vigour is still undecayed. There still exists in the breasts of those good and loyal men, for whose prosperity and tranquillity I combat, that ancient patriotic spirit which is ready to make every sacrifice, and to dare everything to save what must be saved—their throne and their independence, the national honour and the national prosperity. From this spirit of patriotism on the part of my subjects I expect, with a proud and tranquil confidence, everything that is great and good; but, above all things, unanimity, and a quick, firm, and courageous co-operation in every measure that shall be ordered to keep the rapid strides of the enemy off from our frontier until those numerous and powerful auxiliaries can act, which my exalted ally, the Emperor of Russia, and other powers, have destined to combat for the liberties of Europe and the security of thrones and of nations."—*Ann. Reg.*, 1805, 713.

* Dum., xiii., 150, 161. *Jom.*, ii., 143.

† *Jom.*, ii., 143, 144. Dum., xiii., 165, 171.

troops hitherto come up were not thirty thousand; and how was it possible, with such considerable forces, to withstand Napoleon at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand combatants? It was therefore resolved to abandon the line of the Inn and retire towards Vienna, after breaking down all the bridges over the numerous streams which fell into the Danube, and lay across their line of march,* so as to impede the enemy's advance, and effect a junction with the Russian reserves which were approaching under Bennigsen and the Archduke Constantine, or the gallant army which was hastening to the scene of danger under the Archduke Charles.

But, while everything seemed thus to smile upon Napoleon in the south of Germany, north which menaced him with destruction. The cabinet of Berlin had taken umbrage to an extent which could hardly have been anticipated, and which was greatly beyond the amount of the injury inflicted, at the violation of the territory of Anspach. It was not the mere march of the French corps through a detached portion of their dominions which occasioned this feeling of irritation: it was the secret consciousness that the insult was deserved which had envenomed the wound. For ten years Prussia had flattered herself that, by keeping aloof, she would avoid the storm; that she would succeed in turning the desperate strife between France and Austria to her own benefit, by enlarging her territory and augmenting her consideration in the north of Germany; and hitherto success had in a surprising manner attended her steps. At once all her prospects vanished, and it became apparent, even to her own ministers, that this vacillating policy was ultimately to be as dangerous as it had already been discreditable. So far from having increased the respect with which she was regarded, it was now plain that she had entirely lost it; and a power which, under the guidance of the Great Frederic, had stepped forth as the arbiter of the north of Germany, was now treated with the indifference and neglect which is the bitterest ingredient in the cup of the vanquished. The veil suddenly dropped from the eyes of her ministers: they now distinctly perceived that, instead of security, they had reaped only danger from former submission; and that, as a reward for so long a period of forbearance, they could look only, like Ulysses, for the melancholy satisfaction of being last devoured. Under the influence of these feelings, the resolution of the cabinet was violently shaken; the king openly inclined to hostile measures, but the indignation of the nation knew no bounds; Prince Louis, whose rash and inconsiderate, though vehement and generous character, could ill brook the long inactivity of the Prussian arms, publicly and on all occasions gave vent to his desire for war; the popularity of the queen rose almost to idolatry; the consideration of Haugwitz, the author of the temporizing system, rapidly sunk, and all eyes were turned to Baron Hardenberg, whose resolute counsels to adopt a more manly policy had been long known, as the only minister fit, at such a crisis, to be intrusted with the direction of affairs.†

Matters were in this inflammable state when the Emperor Alexander arrived at Berlin, and employed the whole weight of

his great authority, and all the charms of his captivating manners, to induce the king to embrace a more manly and courageous policy. Under the influence of so many concurring causes, the French influence rapidly declined; Duroc left the capital on the 2d of November, without having been able to obtain an audience for some days previously, either from the king or emperor; and on the day following, a secret convention was signed between the two monarchs for the regulation of the affairs of Europe, and the erection of a barrier against the ambition of the French emperor. By this convention it was stipulated that the treaty of Luneville was to be taken as the basis of the arrangement, and all the acquisitions which France had since made were to be wrested from it: Switzerland and Holland were to be restored to their independence, and, without overturning the kingdom of Italy, it was to be merely stipulated that they were never to centre in the same individual. Haugwitz was to be intrusted with the notification of this convention to Napoleon, with authority, in case of its acceptance, to offer a renewal of the former friendship and alliance of the Prussian nation, but in case of refusal to declare war, with an intimation that hostilities would commence on the 15th of December.*

The conclusion of this convention was followed by a scene as remarkable as it was romantic, and which was ultimately attended by consequences of the highest importance upon the destinies of Europe. When they signed it, both were fully aware of the perilous nature of the enterprise on which they were venturing, as the Archduke Anthony had arrived two days before with detailed accounts of the disastrous result of the combats around Nov. 4. Ulm. Inspired with a full sense of the dangers of the war, the ardent and chivalrous mind of the queen conceived the idea of uniting the two sovereigns by a bond more likely to be durable than the mere alliances of cabinets with each other. This was to bring them together at the tomb of the Great Frederic, where it was hoped the solemnity and recollections of the scene would powerfully contribute to cement their union. The emperor, who was desirous of visiting the mausoleum of that illustrious hero, accordingly repaired to the church of the garrison of Potsdam, where his remains are deposited, and at midnight the two monarchs proceeded together by torchlight to the hallowed grave. Uncovering when he approached the spot, the emperor kissed the pall, and taking the hand of the King of Prussia as it lay on the tomb, they swore an eternal friendship to each other, and bound themselves, by the most solemn oaths, to maintain their engagements inviolate in the great contest for European independence in which they were engaged. A few hours after Alexander departed for Galicia, to assume in person the command of the army of reserve, which was advancing through that province to the support of Kutusoff. Such was the origin of that great alliance, which, though often interrupted by misfortune, and deeply checkered with disaster, was yet destined to be brought to so triumphant an issue, and ultimately wrought such wonders for the deliverance of Europe.†

Arrival of Alexander at Berlin, and conclusion of a treaty with Russia.

Nocturnal visit to the tomb of the Great Frederic.

* Dum., xiii., 248, 250. Jom., ii., 144.

† Hard., viii., 479, 481. Dum., xiii., 250, 251. Nap. in Las Cas., iv., 229.

* Hard., viii., 481, 482. Martens, vii. Dum., xiii., 253, 254.

† Hard., viii., 482. Dum., xiii., 254, 255.

It would have been well for the common cause, if, when Prussia had thus taken her part, her cabinet had possessed resolution enough to have interfered at once and decidedly in the war: the disaster of Austerlitz, the catastrophe of Jena, would thereby, in all probability, have been prevented. But, after the departure of the emperor, the old habit of temporizing returned, and the precious moments, big with the fate of the world, were permitted to elapse without any operation being attempted. Haugwitz did not set out from

Potsdam till the 14th; the Prussian armies made no forward movement towards the Danube, and Napoleon was permitted to continue without interruption his advance to Vienna, while eighty thousand disciplined veterans remained inactive in Silesia on his left flank, amply sufficient to have thrown him back with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine. Even the arrival of Lord Harrowby at Berlin, a few days after the departure of Haugwitz, with full powers and the offer of ample subsidies from Mr. Pitt, could not prevail on the government to accelerate the commencement of active operations. Apparently, the cabinet of Berlin were desirous of seeing what turn affairs were likely to take before they openly commenced hostilities, forgetting that the irrevocable step had already been taken; that Duroc, upon leaving their capital, had proceeded straight to the emperor's headquarters on the Danube; that the convention which had been concluded could not be kept a secret; that Napoleon, in consequence, was made their determined foe, and that every hour now lost was adding to his means of selecting his own time for their future destruction.*†

But, though Prussia was thus inactive, Napoleon was not without very serious allies in Han- subject of anxiety in the north of Germany. A combined force of

English, Russians, and Swedes, thirty thousand strong, had recently disembarked in Hanover, and the Prussian troops who occupied that electorate had offered no resistance: a sure proof of a secret understanding between the cabinet of Berlin and that of London, in virtue of which it was to be restored to its rightful owners. The danger of an enemy in that quarter was very great, for the whole French army of occupation had been withdrawn, with the exception of the garrison of Hameln; and not only were its inhabitants warlike, and ardently attached to the English government, but there was every reason to apprehend that the flame, once lighted, might spread to Holland, where the partisans of the

house of Orange had received an immense accession of strength from the calamities in which their country had been involved from the French alliance. Hardly any regular troops remained to make head against these dangers; but Napoleon contrived to paralyze the disaffected, by pompous announcements in the *Moniteur* of the formation of a powerful army of the North, of which Louis, in the first instance, was to take the command, but which might soon expect to be graced by the presence of the emperor himself.*

On his right flank, Marshal Ney was more successful in achieving the conquest of the Tyrol, and relieving him from the Tyrol.

all anxiety in regard to that important bulwark of the Austrian monarchy. This romantic region, so interesting from its natural beauties, the noble character of its inhabitants, and the memorable contest of which it was afterward the theatre, will form the subject of a separate description hereafter, when the campaign of 1809 is considered.† The imperious necessity to which the Austrian government was subjected, of withdrawing their forces from Tyrol for the protection of the capital, prevented it from becoming the theatre of any considerable struggle at this time. Resolved to clear these mountain fastnesses of the imperial troops, Napoleon ordered Ney to advance from Ulm over the mountains which form the northern barrier of the valley of the Inn, right upon Innsbruck, while a powerful Bavarian division, which had already occupied Salzburg, advanced by the great road from that town by Reichenhall to the same capital, and menaced Kuffstein, the principal stronghold on the eastern frontier of the province. Both invasions were successful. General Deroz, commanding the Bavarian troops, wound in silence along the margin of the beautiful lakes which lie at the foot of the rocky barrier which separates the province of Salzburg from that of Tyrol, and suddenly pushing up the steep ascent, amid a shower of balls from the overhanging cliffs and woods, which were filled with Tyrolese marksmen, carried the intrenchments and forts at their summit with matchless valour, and drove back the Imperialists, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, to the ramparts of Kuffstein. The whole eastern defences of Tyrol were laid open by this bold irruption: the imperial regulars retired over the mountains towards Leoben, while the Tyrolese levies were shut up under the cannon of Kuffstein, which was soon blockaded. Contemporaneous with this attack on the eastern frontier of the province, Augereau moved forward from the neighbourhood of the Lake of Constance, so as to threaten Feldkirch and its western extremity; while at the same time Marshal Ney advanced, at the head of ten thousand men, against the barrier of Scharnitz, the ancient *Porta Claudia*, a celebrated mountain intrenchment which commands the direct mountain road from Bavaria to Innsbruck, and was known to be almost impregnable on the only side from which it could, to all appearance, be assailed. An attack in front, though supported by all the fire and impetuosity of the bravest of the French troops, was repulsed with very heavy loss; success seemed utterly hopeless. But the genius of Marshal Ney at length overcame every obstacle. Dividing his corps into three divisions, he succeeded, with one commanded by Loison, in ma-

* Dum., xiii., 255, 256. Hard., viii., 488, 489. Savary, i., 104.

† There were not wanting, however, numbers who openly counselled a bolder policy, and prophesied all the disasters which would ensue from any longer adherence to the procrastinating system. In a council of war, held at Potsdam soon after intelligence of the disasters at Ulm was received, the Duke of Brunswick ordered Colonel Massenbach, a young pupil of the celebrated Tempelhoff, to deliver his opinion on the present state of affairs. "The armies are in presence of each other," said he; "a decisive battle must soon be fought. If Napoleon is beaten, his retreat through the Tyrol is secured by Marshal Ney's recent occupation of that province, and he will be beyond the reach of the Prussian forces. It is indispensable, therefore, that the Prussian army in Silesia should instantly march to the support of the allies, and that a strong body should threaten their communications with the Rhine, in order to compel them to divide their forces. If both these measures are not adopted, and the Russians are beat, all is lost." General Ruchel, however, an older officer, ridiculed the apprehensions of such a catastrophe; and the Duke of Brunswick, with his wonted irresolution, broke up the council without having come to any determination.—HARD., viii., 489.

* Jom., ii., 145. Dum., xiii., 249.

† See post. chap. I.

king himself master of the fort of Leitach, in the rear of the intrenchments; from whence his victorious troops pressed on in two columns to scale the precipices which overhung them on the southern side, to the summit of which the peasants, as a place of undoubted security, had removed their wives and children. The combat was long and doubtful: securely posted in the cliffs and thickets above, the Tyrolese marksmen kept up a deadly fire on the French troops, who, breathless and panting, were clambering up by the aid of the brushwood which nestled in the crevices, and their bayonets thrust into the fissures of the rock. Fruitless, however, was all the valour of the defenders: in vain rocks and trunks of trees, thundering down the steep, swept off whole companies at once; as fast as they were destroyed others equally daring succeeded them, and pressed with ceaseless vigour up the entangled precipice. The summit was at length carried, and the French eagles, displayed from the edge of the perpendicular cliff in their rear, was the signal for the renewal of the attack on the intrenchments by the division stationed in their front. They were no longer tenable; a shower of balls from the heights behind, against which they had no defence, rendered it impossible either to man the works or stand to the guns.* A panic seized the garrison; they fled in confusion, and the victorious assailants, besides a mountain barrier hitherto deemed impregnable, had to boast of the capture of 1500 prisoners.†

The immediate trophy of this victory was the Surrender of capture of Innspruck, with sixteen Jellachich and thousand stand of arms. The whole the Prince de northern barrier of the Inn was abandoned; General Jellachich, who

commanded in the western part of the Tyrol, retired to the intrenched camp of Feldkirch, while the Archduke John withdrew all his forces from the valley of the Inn and took post upon the Brenner, in the hope of rallying to his standard the corps in the eastern and western districts of the province before he commenced his final retreat into the hereditary states. It was too late,

Nov. 15. however. Surrounded and cut off from all hope of succour, Jellachich, with five thousand men, was obliged to capitulate at Feldkirch, upon condition of not serving for a year against France, and leaving all his artillery to grace the triumphs of the victors. The Archduke John, upon hearing of this catastrophe, abandoned the crest of the Brenner during the night, and retired by Klagenfurth to Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother and the gallant army of Italy. But the Prince of Rohan was not equally fortunate. That gallant officer, who was stationed with six thousand men near Nauders and Finstermurg, on the western frontier of the province, found himself by these disasters cut off from any support, and isolated among the enemy's columns in the midst of the mountains of Tyrol. Disdaining to capitulate, he formed the bold resolution of cutting his way through all the corps by which he was surround-

ed, and joining the garrison left in Venice. Surprising success at first attended his efforts. Descending the course of the Adige, he surprised and defeated Loison's division at Bolzano, and thus opened a way for himself by Trent and the defiles of the Brenta to the Italian plains. Already the mountains were cleared; Bassano was passed, and the wearied troops were joyfully winding their way across the level fields to the shores of the Lagunæ, when they were met by St. Cyr, who commanded the force stationed in observation of that town, and completely defeated at Castel Franco.

Dispirited by Nov. 24. such a succession of disasters, and seeing no remaining means of escape, this gallant band, still five thousand strong, was obliged to lay down its arms. At the same time, the fortress of Kuffstein capitulated, on condition of the garrison being allowed to Nov. 18. march back to the hereditary states, which was readily agreed to. Thus, in little more than three weeks, not only were the Imperialists entirely driven from the Tyrol, long considered as the impregnable bulwark of the Austrian monarchy, though garrisoned by five-and-twenty thousand regular troops, and at least an equal amount of well-trained militia, but more than half of the soldiers were made prisoners, and all the strongholds had passed into the hands of the enemy. Finding the reduction complete, Ney, before the end of November, marched with his whole forces to Salzbourg to co-operate with Massena, who was approaching the same quarter against the Archduke Charles, while Augereau withdrew to Ulm,* to observe the motions of Prussia, and the occupation of the Tyrol was committed to the Bavarian troops.

It was not inability to defend the Tyrol which led to this rapid abandonment of that important province. Notwithstanding the disasters at Scharnitz and Feldkirch, the Archduke John could still have maintained his ground among its rugged defiles, aided by the numerous warlike inhabitants, whose attachment to the house of Austria has long been conspicuous: it was the pressing danger of the heart of the Empire, and the paramount necessity of providing a covering force for the capital, which rendered it absolutely imperative to withdraw the regular forces. Napoleon's progress down the valley of the Danube was every day more alarming. The formidable barrier of the Inn was abandoned almost as soon as it was taken up: forty-five thousand men could not pretend to defend so long a line against a hundred and fifty thousand. The intrenchments of Muhldorf, the ramparts of Brannau, armed as they were with art-

Oct. 31.illery, were precipitately evacuated, and the Inn crossed by innumerable battalions at all points. The advantages of the latter fortress appeared so considerable that the French emperor gave immediate orders for its conversion into the grand dépôt of the army. Meanwhile Murat, Nov. 3. at the head of the cavalry and the advanced guard, continued to press the retiring columns of the enemy: a skirmish in front of Mersbach, a more stubborn resistance Nov. 4. near Lambach, at the passage of the Traun, while they evinced the obstinate valour of the new enemy with whom they had now to contend, hardly retarded the march of the Nov. 6. invaders an hour; the determined opposition of

* Bign., iv., 390, 391. Jom., ii., 167, 168. Dum., xiii., 280, 288.

† An interesting incident occurred at Innspruck. The 76th French regiment had, in the campaign of 1799, lost two of its standards. When walking in the arsenal at Innspruck, one of its officers beheld them among the other warlike trophies of the Tyrolese! Instantly the intelligence spread that their lost ensigns were recovered, and the veterans hastening in, kissed the tattered remnants, and wept for joy at again beholding the companions of their former glory. —BIGNON, iv., 391.

* Dum., xiii., 280, 293. Jom., ii., 168, 170.

the Austrians near the foot of the mountains,* at the Bridge of Steyer over the Ens, only delayed Marshal Davoust with the right wing of the army a day; and at length the imperial headquarters were established at Lintz, the capital of Upper Austria.

The emperor profited by the two days' delay at Lintz, which the destruction of the bridge at that place, and the necessity of giving some repose to the troops, occasioned, to give a new organization to his army, with a view to the surrounding and destroying of Kutusoff's corps. Four divisions of the army, amounting in all to twenty thousand men, were passed over to the left bank of the Danube, and placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who received instructions to advance cautiously, with numerous videttes out in every direction, and always somewhat behind the corps of Lannes, which moved next to them on the right of the river. A flotilla was prepared to follow the army with provisions and stores down the sinuous course of the Danube, and such directions given to the numerous corps on its right bank as were best calculated to ensure the separation of the Russians from the Archduke Charles and the ultimate destruction of both. Nor was it only in warlike preparations that the emperor was engaged during his sojourn at Lintz. Duroc joined him there from Berlin, with accounts of the accession of Prussia to the confederacy of Russia and England; Nov. 8. upon which he instantly directed the formation of an army of the North, under the command of his brother Louis, composed of six divisions: a force, as already mentioned, which, although existing on paper only, was likely to overawe the discontented powers in the north of Germany, while, at the same time, a Spanish auxiliary corps, twelve thousand strong, under a leader destined to renown in future times,† the Marquis LA ROMANA, which was already on its march through France, was ordered to hasten its advance, and follow in the same direction.

At Lintz the emperor received also the Elector of Bavaria, who hastened to that city to render him the homage due to the deliverer of his dominions; and on the same day Count Giulay arrived with proposals for an armistice, with a view to a general peace. The ruined condition of the army which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, the general consternation which prevailed, and the distance at which the principal Russian forces still were, and the imminent danger that the capital, with its magnificent arsenals, would immediately fall into the hands of the invaders, had prevailed in the Austrian cabinet over their long-continued jealousy of France. Napoleon received the envoy courteously, but after observing that it was not to a conqueror at the head of two hundred thousand men that propositions should be addressed from a beaten army unable to defend a single position, sent him back with a letter to the emperor containing the conditions on which he was willing to treat. These were, that the Russians should forthwith evacuate the Austrian territory, and retire into Poland, that the levies in Hungary should be instantly disbanded, and Tyrol and Venice ceded to the French dominions. If these terms were not agreed to, he declared he would continue, with-

out an hour's intermission, his march towards Vienna.*

These rigorous terms were sufficient to convince the allies that they had no chance of salvation but in a vigorous prosecution of the contest. The most pressing entreaties, therefore, were despatched to the Russian headquarters to hasten the advance of their reserves, while a strong rear-guard took post at Amstetten, to give time for the main body and artillery to complete their march without confusion through the narrow defile of the Danube. A bloody conflict ensued there between that heroic rear-guard and the French advanced column, under Oudinot, and the cavalry of Murat; in which, although the allies were ultimately forced to retreat from the increasing multitude of the enemy,† they long stood their ground with the utmost resolution, and gained time for the army in their rear to arrive at the important rocky ridge behind St. Polten, the last defensible position in front of Vienna, and which covered the junction of the lateral road running from Italy through Leoben with the great route down the valley of the Danube to the capital. To wrest this important position from the enemy, the right wing of the army, sixty thousand strong, under Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte, was directed, through the mountains on the right, to turn their left flank; Murat, Lannes, and Oudinot, with the left, of above fifty thousand combatants, manœuvred on their right, while the emperor in person, at the head of the corps of Soult and the Imperial Guard, was destined to strike the decisive blows in the centre. But the allies, until the arrival either of the Russian main body, or of the Archduke Charles, were in no condition to withstand such formidable forces: either of the enemy's wings greatly outnumbered their whole army. Kutusoff, therefore, decided with reason that it had become indispensable to abandon the capital; and that, by withdrawing his forces to the left bank of the river, he would both relieve them from a pursuit which could not fail in the end to be attended with disaster, and draw nearer to the reinforcements advancing under Buxhowden, which might enable them to renew the conflict on a footing of equality. Skilfully concealing, therefore, his intention from the enemy, he rapidly moved his whole army across the Danube at Mautern, over the only bridge which traverses that river between Lintz and Vienna, and having burned its eight-and-twenty arches of wood behind him, succeeded, for some days at least, in throwing an impassable barrier between his wearied troops and their indefatigable pursuers. Arrived at St. Polten, the French found it occupied only by light Austrian troops, who retired as they advanced: no force capable of arresting them any longer remained on the road to Vienna; and their light infantry eagerly pushing forward, on the following day reached Burkersdorf, within four leagues of the capital. About the same time Davoust, while

* Sav., ii., 104. Dum., xiii., 298, 300. Jom., ii., 146.

† A remarkable instance of courage occurred here on the part of a French cannonier. The Russian cuirassiers, by a gallant charge along the high road, had seized a battery of horse artillery which was firing grape at them within half musket shot, and sabred most of the gunners. One of them, however, though wounded, contrived to crawl to his piece, and putting the match to the touchhole, discharged it right among the enemy's horsemen with such decisive effect that the whole squadron turned and fled.—Dumas, xiii., 303, 304.

* Sav., ii., 102, 103. Dum., xiii., 264, 277. Jom., ii., 133, 134.

† Dum., xiii., 294, 298. Jom., ii., 145. Sav., ii., 103.

November 9.
Continued advance of the French towards Vienna.

Nov. 10.

toiling with infinite difficulty among the rocky and woody Alpine ridges which formed the romantic southern barrier of the valley of the Danube, came unexpectedly on the rear-guard of Meerfeld, which, unsuspecting of evil, was pursuing its course in a southern direction, by a cross road, to avoid the pursuit of Marmont.

Nov. 8. Suddenly assailed, it was pierced through the centre, and thrown into such confusion that the fugitives escaped only by dispersing in the neighbouring woods and mountains, leaving three thousand prisoners and sixteen pieces of cannon in the hands of the enemy.*†

But while these great advantages were attending the standards of Napoleon on the right bank of the Danube, an unwonted disaster, nearly attended with fatal consequences, befell them on the left. Murat, at the head of the advanced guard of the grand army, had pressed on with his wonted ardour to the neighbourhood of Vienna, in so precipitate a manner as drew forth a severe reproof from the French emperor, who was well aware that, divided as his troops were by so great a stream, the most imminent danger would attend those on the left bank, now that the Russians had wholly passed over to that side. The catastrophe which he apprehended was not long of arriving. Mortier, following the orders which

Nov. 11. he had received to keep nearly abreast of, though a little behind the columns on the right bank, and intent only upon inflicting loss upon the Russian troops, which he knew had passed the river, and conceived to be flying across his line of march from the Danube towards Moravia, was eagerly emerging from the defiles of Diernstein, between the Danube and the rocky hills beneath the towers of the castle where Richard Cœur de Lion was once immured, when he came upon the Russian rear-guard under Miloradovitch, posted in front of Stein, on heights commanding the only road by which he could advance, and supported by a powerful artillery.

He instantly commenced the attack Desperate action at Diernstein. at break of day, though little more than the division of Gazan had emerged from the formidable defile in his rear. The combat soon became extremely warm: fresh troops arrived on both sides; the grenadiers fought man to man with undaunted resolution, and it was still doubtful which party would prevail in the murderous strife, when towards noon intelligence arrived that the division of Doctoroff, ably conducted by the Austrian general Smith, who was perfectly acquainted with the country, had by a circuitous march through the hills reached his rear, and already occupied Diernstein and the sole line of his communications. Thus, while the French marshal had the bulk of Kutusoff's force on his hands in front, his re-

rear was cut off, and with a single division of his corps he found himself enveloped by the whole Russian army.*

Mortier instantly perceived that nothing but an immediate attack on Doctoroff's division, so as to clear the road in his rear, and permit the remainder of his corps to advance to his assistance, could save him from destruction. He had an hour before gone back in person to the division of Dupont, which was the next that was coming up, in order to hasten their march; and it was with great difficulty that, pursuing a devious path through the overhanging slopes, he succeeded in regaining the division of Gazan, now hard pressed both in front and rear. Forming his troops in close column, he advanced against Doctoroff, with the determination to force his way through at the point of the bayonet, or perish in the attempt. In silence, but with undaunted resolution, they advanced, to the mouth of the terrible defile they had passed in the morning, little anticipating such a disaster; but they found the bottom of the ravine filled with dense masses of the enemy, while the river on one side, and the walls of rock on the other, precluded all hope of turning them on either side. Compelled to combat both in front and rear, they made but little progress. Incessant discharges mowed down their ranks, and destruction seemed inevitable, when the sound of a distant cannonade from the farther extremity of the pass revived the hope that succour was approaching. In truth, it was the division of Dupont, which, fully aware of the imminent danger of their general, was advancing with all imaginable haste to his succour, and was already engaged with the rear of Doctoroff's division, which gallantly faced about to repel them. This extraordinary conflict continued till nightfall with unparalleled resolution on both sides. The combatants in the dark or by the light of the moon continued the strife; the whole defile resounded with the incessant roar of firearms; while the ancient Gothic towers, which once held in chains the crusading hero, were illuminated by the frequent discharges of artillery which flashed through the gloom at their feet. Gradually, however, Gazan's division was broken; upward of two thirds of their number had fallen; three eagles were taken; and Mortier himself, whose lofty stature made him conspicuous, being repeatedly intermingled with the Russian grenadiers, owed his safety to the vigour and dexterity with which he wielded the sabre. His officers, desirous of preventing so brilliant a prize from falling into the hands of the enemy, besought him to step on board a bark on the river, and make his way to the other side, but the brave marshal refused to leave his comrades.† This heroic constancy at length received its reward. The distant fire was heard to be sensibly approaching; it was Dupont, who, forcing his way with heroic courage through the defile, was gradually compelling Doctoroff to give ground before him, but who now, in his turn, found himself between two fires. The brave Smith, at the head of the Russian column, was killed by a discharge of grapeshot at the moment when he was making a decisive charge on the remains of Gazan's di-

* Dum., xiii., 307, 309. Jom., ii., 148, 149.

† When travelling on the road to Vienna, in the uniform of a colonel of chasseurs, which he commonly wore, Napoleon met a carriage containing a priest and an Austrian lady in great distress. He stopped and inquired into the cause of her lamentations. "Sir," said she, "I am on my way to demand protection from the emperor, who is well acquainted with my family, and has received from it many obligations. My house has been pillaged and my gardener killed by his soldiers." "Your name?" replied he. "De Bunny, daughter of M. de Marbœuff, formerly governor of Corsica." "I am charmed," rejoined Napoleon, "to have the means of serving you. I am the emperor." The astonishment of the fair suppliant may easily be conceived. She was sent to headquarters, attended by a detachment of chasseurs of the guard, treated with the greatest distinction, and sent back highly gratified by the reception she had met with.—RAPPE, 54, 55.

* Sav., ii., 105. Dum., xiv., 1, 13. Jom., ii., 150, 151.

† "No," said he, "reserve that resource for the wounded. One who has the honour to happy to share their lot and perish with them. We have still two guns and some boxes of grapeshot; we are almost at Diernstein; let us close our ranks and make a last effort."—DUMAS, xiv., 14

vision. The French, who had exhausted all their ammunition, were roused by the cheers of their deliverers, which were now distinctly heard, to try a last effort with the bayonet. Assailed both in front and rear, Doctoroff's division was driven up a lateral valley, which afforded them the means of escape; and, amid the cries of "France! France! you have saved us," the exhausted grenadiers of Gazan threw themselves into the arms of their comrades.*

This untoward affair gave singular vexation to Napoleon. It was not the mere loss of three thousand men, which in so mighty a host was of little consequence—that of the allies had amounted to two thirds of that number, and it could easily be repaired—it was the blot on his arms, the derangement of the plans of the campaign, which was the source of annoyance. Mortier, on the day after the battle, esteemed himself fortunate in being able, by the aid of the French flotilla on the Danube, to make his way across the river with his whole corps, leaving the left bank entirely in the hands of the enemy. The object of his movements was frustrated. All hopes of surrounding and destroying Kutsoff before the arrival of the second Russian army were at an end. What was still more mortifying to his military feelings, both the courage and capacity of the enemy had been clearly demonstrated. His troops had not only been defeated, but outgeneralled; and the Moscovites, in their first serious engagement of the campaign, had gained greater trophies than the Austrians could boast of since the battle of Marengo. He paused, therefore, a day at St. Polten; and, abandoning all thoughts of harassing any farther the retreat of Kutsoff, turned all his attention to the capture of Vienna and the acquisition of the bridge there, which, besides its other immense advantages, would render totally impossible the junction of the Archduke Charles with the Russian forces.†

Orders, therefore, were immediately given to Lannes and Murat to advance with all possible expedition upon Vienna, and by every means in their power endeavour to gain possession of the bridges over the Danube, whether an armistice was agreed on or not.‡ Meanwhile, the Emperor Francis retired from the capital, after confiding the charge of it, at this eventful crisis, to Count Wurba, the grand chamberlain, who executed with great fidelity the difficult duty committed to his charge. The citizens were overwhelmed with consternation when they found themselves deserted by the government, and assembled in tumultuous crowds to demand arms to defend their hearths and ramparts, but it was too late. The means of resistance no longer remained; and Vienna, which never yet had yielded to an enemy, was compelled to send a deputation to Napoleon's headquarters to treat of a capitulation. An active negotiation was kept up as to

the terms on which an armistice could be granted, but the French emperor would abate nothing of his rigorous demands, that the Hungarian insurrection should instantly be disbanded, and the Tyrol, with the duchy of Venice, be immediately ceded to France.*

Built in the superb basin formed on the south by the Alps of Styria, on the east by the Carpathian Mountains, on the west by the range of the Bisamberg and the hills of Bohemia and Upper Austria, Vienna, the subject of this anxious negotiation, yields to no capital of Europe, Constantinople and Naples excepted, in the beauty and salubrity of its situation. Anciently the frontier station of the Roman Empire against the Sarmatian wilds, its situation on the frontier of civilization has in every age rendered it a military post of the highest importance. The Hungarians alone had forced its gates in the thirteenth century, but the inhabitants hardly regarded as conquest the success achieved by those who were now their own subjects. Its heroic resistance to an innumerable army of Turks in 1688, gave time for Sobieski to approach with the flower of the Polish chivalry; and the subsequent defeat of three hundred thousand Mussulmans beneath its walls delivered Eastern, as the victory of Tours had saved Western Europe from the barbarian yoke. The old city is surrounded by a wall, flanked by strong bastions; but it contains only 100,000 souls, hardly a third of the present inhabitants of the capital. The remainder dwell in the immense suburbs which surround it on every side, separated from the ancient rampart only by a broad glais, conducive alike to the health and beauty of the metropolis. They are girded around by intrenchments, but such as are not defensible against a more skilful enemy than the Turks, from whose incursions they were intended to protect the inhabitants. Vienna cannot vie with Paris, Rome, or London, in the splendour or riches of its architectural decoration, though the Church of St. Stephen, surmounted by one of the highest steeples in Europe, from the summit of which the Polish lances were first discovered gleaming in the setting sun on the ridges of the Bisamberg, possesses the greatest interest; and the imperial library presents a room three hundred feet in length, of surpassing grandeur. But in a military point of view its capture was an object of the very highest importance, commanding as it did the only bridge below Linz over the Danube, and containing the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, stored with two thousand cannon and above a hundred thousand stand of arms.†

The Emperor Francis had withdrawn from Vienna to Presburg, where he stimulated the armament of the Hungarians against the insurrection, and thence he repaired to the fortified town of Brunn, in Moravia, in order to concert measures with Alexander, who was hourly expected there from Berlin, for the farther prosecution of the war. Meanwhile, the French forces in great strength approached Vienna, and Napoleon renewed his orders to Lannes and Murat to endeavour, by all possible means, to gain possession of the bridge which led across the river to the northern provinces of the Empire. The interchange of couriers, which was frequent between the out-

* Bign., iv., 402, 403. Dum., xiv., 9, 15. Jom., ii., 151, 152. Sav., ii., 105.

† Jom., ii., 153. Dum., xiv., 17, 18. Sav., ii., 105.

‡ "As soon as ten o'clock on the 12th has arrived, you may enter Vienna. Endeavour to surprise the bridge of the Danube, and if it is broken down, make it your study to find the readiest means of passing the river; that is the great affair. Should M. Guilay, before ten o'clock, present himself with proposals for a negotiation, you may suspend your march on Vienna; but, notwithstanding, use all your efforts to secure the passage of the river."—Orders to Murat, 12th November, 1805, in DUMAS, xiv., 20.

* Jom., ii., 153, 154. Dum., xiv., 17, 25. Sav., ii., 105.

† Personal observation. Jom., ii., 155, 156. Dum., xiv., 23, 25.

posts of the two armies, on account of the negotiation which was going forward, gave an enemy, little scrupulous as to the means he employed, too fair an opportunity for accomplishing this object. Meerfelt, in retiring from Vienna, had intrusted the important post of the bridges over the Danube to Prince Auersberg, who, with a strong rear-guard, was stationed at that, the sole avenue to the northern part of the imperial dominions. At daybreak on the 13th of Nov. 13. November, General Sebastiani entered Vienna at the head of a brigade of dragoons, closely followed by Murat, Lannes, and General Bertrand, with a powerful body of grenadiers. Without halting an instant, they passed through the town, crossed the suburb of Leopold on its opposite side, and marched straight to the great wooden bridge of Thabor, the head of which, on the right bank, was still held by an advanced guard of the Austrians. Everything was ready for the destruction of the arches; the matches were set, the combustibles laid, the train ready; a powerful battery was stationed at the opposite extremity: Auersberg had but to give the word, and in a few minutes the bridge was wrapped in flames, and all communication with the left bank was cut off. The better to conceal their designs, Lannes and Murat advanced on foot at the head of their troops; everything bore a friendly appearance; the soldiers in column had their arms slung over their shoulders; they were surrounded by a host of stragglers, as in time of profound peace: so frequent had been the interchange of couriers between the respective headquarters, that for three days there had been a kind of armistice between the two armies. The unsuspecting simplicity of the Germans was deceived by these appearances: General Belliard advanced, with Lannes and Murat, with his hands behind his back, as if strolling out for a morning saunter: they called out to the imperial officers "not to fire, as the armistice was concluded," and the Austrians, trusting to their good faith, joined them, and began to converse about the approaching peace. As the conversation grew warmer, the French generals, followed by the grenadiers, insensibly advanced upon the bridge: for some time the Austrian officer did not take the alarm, but at length, seeing that it was more than half passed, and that the French grenadiers were quickening their pace, he lost patience, and ordered the artillery to fire. The moment was terrible: the gunners stood to their pieces, the matches were raised; in an instant the bridge would have been swept with grapeshot, when Lannes walked straight up to him, saying, with a loud voice, "What are you about? do you not see?" At this instant the grenadiers rushed forward: the Austrian officer was seized, and continued assurances held out that the armistice was signed; while the column advanced with a rapid step along the bridge, covering, by its mass, a train of sappers and miners, who followed immediately behind, and threw all the combustibles placed along its length into the river. The artillerymen on the opposite side, seeing their own officers intermingled with the French, fell into the snare, and forebore to fire: the critical moment was passed; the French grenadiers crossed the bridge, and suddenly assailing the battery on the other side, seized the guns before the cannoniers could recover from their consternation. Instantly the grenadiers of Oudinot and Suchet succeeded them; and the French found themselves masters of both banks of the Danube, by

a stratagem conducted with a skill and intrepidity which would be worthy of the highest admiration, were it not tarnished by a breach of faith, which neither ability nor success can either palliate or excuse.*

This surprise of the bridge of Vienna gave the highest satisfaction to Napoleon, and it was, in truth, one of the most important events of the campaign. It was now in his power, from the central position of the capital, with his army *à cheval* on the river, to direct an overwhelming force either against the Russians or the Archduke Charles, as he pleased; the junction of these two powerful converging armies, or even their engaging together in common operations, was thenceforth impossible. Impatient to profit by such extraordinary good fortune, the emperor, at daybreak the following morning, crossed the bridge and established his headquarters at Schoenbrunn, from which the young archduchess, Marie Louise, his future empress, had just before fled. The important effects of the capture of the bridge soon appeared. The Archduke Charles, whose columns were rapidly approaching the capital, was obliged to incline to the right, with a view, by a long circuit towards Hungary, to endeavour to regain his communications with the allied army. On the north of the river, convoys of all sorts rapidly arrived at Vienna; the hospital-train were established there; the immense stores found in the arsenal enabled the French to countermand all their warlike apparatus which had been ordered up from Metz and Strasbourg; while one half of the army passed over to the north bank, threw back Kutusoff's advanced posts towards Moravia, and the other half, spread out from Kuffstein in Tyrol towards the frontiers of Hungary, interposed between the Danube and the hitherto unconquered battalions of the Archduke Charles.†

The unexpected surprise of the bridge of Vienna contributed not a little to aggravate the danger and embarrass the situation of Kutusoff. All the advantages which he had derived from his masterly movements across the Danube were now lost; the river no longer protected his rear from disaster; and alone, in presence of a force four times greater than his own, he had to continue a painful retreat to the second Russian army. He instantly fell back, and Brunn was assigned as the point of junction with the Austrian forces who had evacuated the capital. Napoleon, without a moment's delay, continued the pursuit in different columns, with a view to prevent the union. So strongly were the Austrians impressed with the idea that an armistice had been concluded, that General Noslitz, on the 15th of November, when reached by the French dragoons, allowed them to pass without opposition through his squadrons, which gave them the means of falling unexpectedly on the heavy convoy which was struggling through the desperate roads in his rear. The rear-guard of the Imperialists was soon overtaken, encumbered as it was with great loads of artillery and stores, which had been taken from the arsenal of Vienna: one hundred and ninety pieces of cannon, and equipments to an immense amount, fell, al-

Napoleon passes through Vienna, and establishes headquarters at Schoenbrunn.

* Bour. vii., 49, 50. Rapp, 56, 60. Sav., ii., 105, 106. Dum., xiv., 27, 31. Jom., ii., 157, 159.

† Sav., ii., 107, 108. Dum., xiv., 31, 33. Bour., vii., 50, 51.

most without a combat, into the hands of the enemy. Leaving this easy prey to be secured by the corps which followed, Murat pushed forward, at the head of the whole cavalry and a corps of infantry about fifty thousand strong, to endeavour to reach Znaim before the enemy, which, if done, would have prevented the junction of the Russian and Austrian forces. Meanwhile Mortier and Bernadotte, who had both crossed the Danube, and were following fast on the traces of the Russian general, thundered without intermission in his rear. His destruction seemed inevitable.*

Burning with anxiety to anticipate the enemy in his arrival at Znaim, and encouraged by the success of his stratagem with Auersberg, Murat resolved to try a similar device with Kutusoff, and for this purpose despatched a flag of truce, announcing the conclusion of the armistice, in the hope of thereby stopping the march of the Russian columns; but he soon found that he had a very different antagonist to deal with in such an attempt from the unsuspecting Austrians. Sprung from another race, and endowed with very different mental qualities, the Russians are as skilled as the Germans are deficient in the arts of dissimulation; and they have repeatedly shown themselves superior in address to all the diplomatists of Europe. Kutusoff, whose acuteness was of the highest order, and who was inferior to none of his countrymen in the finesse of negotiation, instantly saw in this attempt the means of extricating the greater part of his army from its embarrassment. He received the French envoy in the most friendly manner, and pretended not only to enter cordially into the negotiation, but, in his anxiety to put an immediate end to hostilities, sent the emperor's aid-de-camp, Winzingerode, to propose the terms, which were, that the Russians should retire into Poland, the French withdraw from Moravia, while, in the mean time, both armies should remain in the situation which they at present occupied.† Murat fell into the snare: Bagrathion, who was in presence of the French videttes with eight thousand men, indeed remained stationary; but, meanwhile, the remainder of the army defiled rapidly in his rear, and gained the important post of Znaim, which opened up their communication with the retiring Austrians and their own reserves, which were approaching. The Emperor Napoleon was highly indignant when he heard that an armistice had been concluded, and despatched immediate orders for an attack; but, before his answer could be received, twenty hours had been gained, Znaim was passed, and the main body of the Russians were in full march to join their allies, leaving only Bagrathion and his division in presence of the enemy.‡

* Jom., ii., 159, 160. Dum., xiv., 33, 36, 45. Sav., ii., 108.

† "In agreeing to this proposal for an armistice," says Kutusoff, in his official account of the transaction, "I had in my view nothing but to gain time, and thereby obtain the means of removing to a greater distance from the enemy, and saving my army. The adjutant-general, Winzingerode, sent me a duplicate of the proposed convention for my ratification; without affixing my signature, I delayed my answer for twenty hours, waiting for that of the French emperor, and, meanwhile, paused the main body of the army to continue its retreat, which thereby gained two marches on the enemy. In so doing, I was well aware that I was exposing the corps of Prince Bagrathion to almost certain ruin; but I esteemed myself fortunate in being able to save the army by the destruction of that corps."—DUMAS, xiv., 48.

‡ Jom., ii., 160, 161. Dum., xiv., 44, 51. Bign., iv., 432, 434.

At noon on the 16th, despatches arrived from Napoleon disavowing the armistice, and directing an immediate attack on the enemy. Kutusoff had directed Bagrathion to keep his ground to the last extremity, in order to gain time for the retreat of the army; nothing more was requisite to induce that heroic general, with his brave followers, to sacrifice themselves to his brave country. He was soon assailed, at once in front and both flanks, by Lannes, Oudinot, and Murat, to whose aid Soult, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived soon after the action commenced. The village of Grund was the key of the Russian position, and incredible efforts were made on both sides to gain or retain possession of that important point. For long the Moscovites made good their ground: in vain column after column bravely advanced to the attack; the resistance they experienced was as obstinate as the attack was impetuous; and after several hours' murderous fighting, this band of heroes remained unbroken in the midst of their numerous enemies. Towards nightfall, however, the immense and constantly increasing masses of the enemy prevailed; the thinned ranks could no longer be preserved by a constant feeling towards the centre; the French grenadiers broke into the village, and almost all the wounded Russians fell into their hands. Still the survivors maintained the desperate struggle: man to man, company to company, they fought in the houses, in the streets, in the gardens, with unconquerable resolution. The constant discharges of firearms and artillery spread a broad light in the midst of the gloom of a November night, and midnight found them still engaged in mortal combat. In the strife three thousand Russians fell or were made prisoners; but Bagrathion effected his retreat with the remainder, hardly five thousand, unbroken from amid forty thousand enemies: a glorious achievement, which gave an earnest of the future celebrity of a hero whose career was closed with immortal renown on the field of Borodino.*

Nothing now could prevent the junction of the allied forces, and it took place on the 19th at Wischau, in Moravia, without farther molestation. This great event produced an immediate change in the measures of Napoleon. It was no longer a dispirited band of forty thousand men, which was retiring before forces quadruple their own, but a vast army, seventy-five thousand strong, animated by the presence of the emperor in person, which was prepared to resist his efforts. The situation of Napoleon was, in consequence, daily becoming more critical. The necessity of guarding so many points, and keeping up a communication from Vienna to the Rhine, had greatly reduced his army: the Archduke Charles, with seventy thousand tried veterans, was rapidly approaching from the south; the Hungarian insurrection was organizing in the east; seventy-five thousand Russians were in his front, while Prussia, no longer concealing her intentions, was preparing to descend from Silesia with eighty thousand men on his communications. The measures of Napoleon were calculated with his wonted ability to ward off so many concurring dangers. Calculating that at least ten days must elapse before the Russian

Heroic action of Bagrathion, who at length makes good his retreat.

Junction of the Russian armies. Measures of Napoleon.

* Dum., xiv., 50, 55. Sav., ii., 108, 109. Jom., ii., 160, 161. Bign., iv., 434, 435.

armies, after the fatiguing marches which they had undergone, could be ready for active operations, he resolved to make the most of that precious interval to impose upon the different enemies with whom he was surrounded. Knowing well that the great secret of war is to expand forces, when a variety of enemies are to be restrained and a moral impression produced, and concentrate them when a decisive blow is to be struck, he resolved to take advantage of this breathing-time to disseminate his troops in every direction. Heavy contributions were imposed upon the conquered territories of Austria: Marmont was pushed forward on the road to Styria to observe the Archduke Charles; Davoust received orders to advance upon Presburg to overawe the Hungarians; Bernadotte, with his corps and the Bavarians, was removed towards Iglau and the frontiers of Bohemia to observe the motions of the Archduke Ferdinand, who, with the ten thousand men who had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, and the levies of that province, was assuming a menacing attitude on the upper Danube; while Mortier, with his corps, which had suffered so much in the preceding combats, formed the garrison of Vienna. The corps of Soult and Lannes, with the imperial guard and the cavalry under Murat, advanced on the road to Brunn to make head against the now united Russian armies.*

Meanwhile the French armies maintained the most exemplary discipline at Vienna, the French and the inhabitants, somewhat recovered from their consternation, were enabled to gaze without alarm on the warriors whose deeds had proved so fatal to the fortunes of their country. Commerce revived, the gates were open, provisions flowed in from all quarters, and, excepting from the French sentinels at the gates and uniforms in the streets, it could hardly have been discovered that an enemy was in the occupation of the capital. General Clarke was appointed governor of the city, and a provisional government was organized throughout all the conquered provinces, whose first care was to preserve discipline among the soldiers, and then next to enforce the collection of the enormous contributions which the conqueror had imposed on the inhabitants. The greatest courtesy was evinced towards the academies and scientific institutions, and even considerable payments made from the military chest for the support of these useful establishments: admirable measures, demonstrating the ascendant of discipline and European courtesy over the savage passions of war, and which would have been deserving of unqualified admiration if they had not been accompanied by withering exactions, levied under authority of Napoleon himself, and the coercion of private plunder had not been all turned to the account of the great imperial robber.† At the same time, in the bulletins which he published, the whole calamities of the war were, as usual, ascribed to the English and the corrupting influence of their gold, while, with a rudeness un-

worthy of so great a man, and especially unbecoming in the moment of triumph, he insulted his fallen enemies in his official publications, and did not even spare the Emperor of Austria in the point where chivalrous feelings would have been most anxious to have forborne, the character and influence of the empress herself.*

Meanwhile the allied armies had effected their junction in the neighbourhood of Wischau; 104 battalions, including ^{forces on the two sides.} 20 Austrian, and 159 squadrons, of which 50 were of the same nation, presented a total of 75,000 effective men. A division of the imperial guard, under the Grand-duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor of Russia, and a corps under Benningen, which were hourly expected, would raise it to nearly ninety thousand. The forces which the French emperor had at his immediate disposal to resist this great array were much less considerable, and hardly amounted, at that moment, to 70,000 combatants; but such was the exhaustion of the Russian troops, after incessant marching and fighting for two months, that it was resolved to put them into cantonments for ten days round Olmutz before resuming active operations. The troops were animated by the best spirit, and enthusiastically devoted to their sovereign, whose presence among them never fails to rouse to the highest pitch the loyal feelings of the Russian soldiers; but in equipment and skill in the art of war it had already become evident that they were decidedly inferior to their redoubtable adversaries, and that nothing but the indomitable firmness of Northern valour had hitherto enabled them to maintain their ground against them.†

The hostile chiefs gradually drew near to each other. Napoleon advanced his headquarters to Brunn, a fortified place containing considerable magazines recently abandoned by the allies, and which afforded him the immense advantage of a secure dépôt for his stores, sick, and wounded, in the immediate vicinity of the theatre of action. A few days after, ^{Nov. 20. Napoleon reconnoitred the field of Austerlitz.} when out on horseback reconnoitring the ground in the neighbourhood with his staff, he was much struck with the importance, both as a field of battle and a strategical point, of the position of AUSTERLITZ. The two chief roads of that part of Moravia, that from Nikolsbourg to Olmutz, and from Brunn towards Hungary by Holitsch, cross at that town, which renders it a military position of the highest value. "Gentlemen," said he to the generals and officers, "observe well the ground here: within a few days it will be your field of battle." The importance attached by both parties to the possession of this intersection of the roads led to a severe combat of cavalry between the advanced guard of the French, in presence of Napoleon himself, and the rear-guard of the enemy, in which neither party could boast of decisive success, although the increasing force of the enemy compelled the allies at nightfall to retire. Advices at the same time arrived that the advanced guard of Massena had entered into communication with Marmont's corps, which formed the southern extremity of the grand army, so that Napoleon could now calculate for the decisive shock upon the united strength of the armies of Italy and Germany.‡

* Dum., xiv., 55, 58. Jom., ii., 162, 163. Bign., iv., 435.

† The contribution levied on Vienna and the conquered part of Upper and Lower Austria was 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000 sterling: a sum fully equivalent to £8,000,000 in this country. The public stores, the legitimate objects of conquest at Vienna, were immense: 2000 pieces of artillery, of which 500 were heavy for siege; 100,000 muskets; 600,000 quintals of powder; 600,000 balls, and 160,000 bombs. Fifteen thousand muskets were sent as a present to the Bavarians, besides the colours taken from them in 1740, when their government made common cause with France.—See BIGNON, iv., 412

* Bign., iv., 412, 417. Jom., ii., 157. Dum., xiv., 37, 40.

† Dum., xiv., 61, 63. Jom., ii., 165, 166. Bign., iv., 435.

‡ Bign., iv., 436. Dum., xiv., 104, 105, 118.

But all this, notwithstanding, the French emperor was fully aware of the dangers of his situation. If Massena and the Italian army had entered into communication with his extreme right, the united forces of the Archdukes Charles and John, nearly ninety thousand strong, were rapidly approaching to the assistance of the allies; and it had already become evident that Mortier would be unable to retain Vienna for any length of time from their arms. The danger of losing his line of communication in rear was the more alarming that the forces in his front were rapidly increasing; and the arrival of the Archduke Constantine at headquarters had already raised their efficient force to eighty thousand men, assembled in a strong position under the cannon of Olmutz. Prussia, he was well aware, was arming for the fight; and he might shortly expect to have his communications on the Upper Danube menaced by twenty thousand of the soldiers of the Great Frederic.* Everything depended upon striking a decisive blow before these formidable enemies accumulated around him; and he was not without hopes that the inexperience or undue confidence of his opponents would give him the means of accomplishing this object, and terminating the war by a stroke which would at once extricate him from all his difficulties.

The more to inspire the allies with the false confidence which might lead to such a result, Napoleon despatched Savary with a letter to the Emperor Alexander to offer his congratulations to that monarch on his arrival with his army, and propose terms of accommodation.† About the same time Counts Giulay and

Stadion arrived at the headquarters of the French emperor. After two days spent in fruitless negotiations, Napoleon demanded a personal interview with the Emperor Alexander. Instead of coming in person, the Czar sent his aid-de-camp, Prince Dolgoroucki, whom Napoleon met at the advanced posts. "Why are we fighting?" said Napoleon when the aid-de-camp was admitted into his presence. "Let the Emperor Alexander, if he complains of my irruptions, make corresponding invasions on his own side, and all discussion will cease between us." The Russian represented that such a conduct would be repugnant to the principles of his cabinet, and that the emperor had only taken up arms to succor Austria, and obtain for the Continent a solid peace, without either personal interest in the matter or animosity against France, which he desired to see powerful and happy, as well as all the other European states; that his empire was already so vast that its extension was no object of ambition; and that his sole desire was the prosperity of his subjects. Napoleon replied that the allies wished to deprive him of his crown, and reinstate the Bourbons. This Dolgoroucki denied; and he denied, also, that they desired to restore his Italian possessions to the King of Sardinia; but admitted that they insisted on the independence of Holland, and an indemnity for the loss of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia.

other powers of Europe to recognise the new order of things in your country. If now I entertain different sentiments, it is because France has adopted different principles, which have given the European powers just cause of disquietude for their independence." I have been called on by them to concur with them in establishing an order of things which may tranquillize all parties, and it is to accomplish that purpose that I have come hither. You have been admirably served by fortune, it must be admitted, but I will never desert an ally in distress, or separate my cause from that of the Emperor of Germany. He is in a critical situation, but not beyond the reach of remedy. I command brave soldiers, and if your master drives me to it, I will command them to do their duty. You are already a great and powerful nation, and by your uniformity of language, feelings, and laws, as well as physical situation, must always be formidable to your neighbours. What need have you of continual aggrandizement? Since the peace of Luneville, you have acquired first Genoa, and then Italy, which you have subjected to a government which places it entirely at your disposition."

* Dum., xiv., 120, 121. Bign., iv., 438, 339. Jom., ii., 171, 172.

Nov. 25. "Sire," said Napoleon, "I send my aid-de-camp, General Savary, to your majesty, to offer you my compliments on his arrival at the headquarters of your army. I have charged him to express the esteem which I entertain for your majesty, and the anxious desire which I feel to cultivate your friendship. I indulge the hope that your majesty will receive him with that condescension for which you are so eminently distinguished, and that you will regard me as one of the men who are most desirous to be agreeable to you. I pray God to keep your imperial majesty in his holy keeping." The Emperor Alexander replied from Olmutz on the 27th in these terms: "I have received, sir, with the gratitude of which it was deserving, the letter which General Savary brought, and hasten to return my best acknowledgments: I have no other desire but to see the peace of Europe established on safe and honourable conditions. I desire, at the same time, to seize every occasion of being personally agreeable to you: receive the assurance of it, as well as of my high consideration."

"When I arrived at the Russian headquarters," says Savary, "I found the officers and staff declaiming against the ambition of the French government, and full of confidence in the success of their arms. The emperor received me in the most gracious manner, and made a sign for his attendants to retire. I could not avoid a feeling of timidity and awe when I found myself alone with that monarch. Nature had done much for him; it would be difficult to find a model so perfect and gracious; he was then twenty-six years of age. He spoke French in its native purity, without the slightest tinge of foreign accent, and made use on all occasions of our most classical expressions. As there was not the least affectation in his manner, it was easy to see that this was the result of a finished education. The emperor said, when I put the letter into his hand, 'I am grateful for this step on your master's side; it is with regret that I have taken up arms against him, and I seize with pleasure the first opportunity of testifying that feeling towards him. It is long since he has been the object of my admiration; I have no wish to be his enemy, any more than that of France. He should recollect that in the time of the late Emperor Paul, though then only grand-duke, when France was overwhelmed by disasters and met with nothing but obloquy from the other cabinets, I contributed much, by directing the Russian cabinet to take the lead, to induce the

"Genoa has been acquired by us," answered Savary, "in spite of ourselves. Its political power was annihilated, its harbour blockaded by the English, its commerce destroyed, its means of defence against the Barbary powers at an end. Necessity, therefore, not less than inclination, compelled them to throw themselves into the arms of a foreign power. France was subjected to the whole charges of its defence before the formal act of annexation took place. As to Italy, it is altogether our conquest. We have watered its fields with our blood; twice it has gained its political existence by our efforts. If it began with Republican institutions, it was in order to be in harmony with its protecting power. The changes which have since taken place in its government were intended to make it still follow the phases of our Constitution. It has the same laws, usages, and internal regulations as France. It must lean on some foreign power, and has only France and Austria to choose between. We have fought for ten years to wrest it bit by bit from that power: could we permit its inhabitants to choose an alliance which would at once deprive us of the whole fruit of our labours? If Austria has not abandoned all thoughts of Italy, we are still ready to combat her for it; if she has, it is of very little moment what its form of government is. The emperor, in sending me to your majesty, was far from doubting that the war took its origin in these questions; if so, I not only see no possibility of peace, but anticipate a universal hostility." It was easy to see that an accommodation was impossible between powers actuated by such opposite sentiments. Savary returned, after three days spent in parleying, without having accomplished the professed object of his mission, but effectually gained its real design in making the French emperor acquainted with the self-confidence and vehemence which prevailed at the allied headquarters.—SAVARY, ii., 112, 128.

"Let the Emperor of Russia imitate my conduct," said Napoleon, "and we shall soon come to terms of accommodation." "He will never desert his allies," replied Dolgoroucki. "Then we must fight," rejoined Napoleon: "I wash my hands of the consequences;" and with that abruptly broke off the conference. But, though

Nov. 28. it had only lasted half an hour, much had been done in that time to blind the allies as to the real state of affairs. The emperor met him at the advanced posts, as if solicitous to conceal what was passing in the interior of the army. Preparations for a retreat were ostentatiously put forward, field-works were hastily thrown up in front of the ground occupied by the army, and Dolgoroucki withdrew with the firm conviction, which he did not fail to communicate to his sovereign, that the French emperor had lost all his former confidence, and that his great object now was to extricate himself from the perilous situation in which he was placed.*†

On the same day Count Haugwitz arrived at the French headquarters with the ultimatum of Prussia, as agreed on in Berlin. the treaty of November 3. Since that time the measures of the cabinet of Berlin had been decidedly hostile. A combined force of Russians and Swedes had occupied the electorate of Hanover, a strong body of English troops had landed at Stade, and a proclamation from the King of England announced that the electorate was now placed under the protection of Prussia, and all the former authorities reinstated in their functions as before the French invasion. The Swedes were in full march towards the Elbe, and the Prussians towards Franconia, while a powerful force of the same nation was collecting in Silesia to bring immediate succour to the allied army. Even the garrison of Berlin had received orders to march to support the military movements which were in preparation. The eloquent declamations of the celebrated historian, Müller, had wrought up the public mind to a perfect phrensy; warlike enthusiasm filled every breast; and the most exaggerated reports of the disasters of the French were received with insatiable avidity. Napoleon was well aware of all this, and of the object of Haugwitz's mission. He therefore resolved to temporize, and, if possible, dissipate the clouds which were collecting by a decisive stroke, before they burst upon his head. He therefore refused to enter into discussion with the Prussian minister, and recommended him, after a short interview, to open conferences at Vienna with Talleyrand, instead of remaining amid the tumult of his bivouacs; and the wily diplomatist, not sorry of an opportunity of waiting the issue of events before finally committing his country in a contest which he had so long laboured to prevent, readily obeyed his directions.‡

† When forces so vast were preparing to aid them, both in the North and South, it was the obvious policy of the allies to advance to Wischau. remain on the defensive, and rest secure in their strong position under the cannon of Olmutz, until the Archduke Charles had brought up his veteran battalions, and Prussia had de-

scended in force into Silesia and Franconia. But although the expedience of doing so was fully appreciated at headquarters, it was resolved, in a council of war held on the 27th, to advance forthwith against the enemy. The Russian troops, miserably provided, at that period, with commissaries, and totally destitute of magazines in that part of the country, which it had never been expected would form the theatre of war, were suffering extremely from want of provisions, while the French, having the rich provinces of Lower Austria and Hungary in their rear, were amply supplied with provisions of all sorts. The allied generals, too, were aware of the inferiority in number of the French troops assembled round Brunn, and were ignorant of the admirable disposition of the other corps in echelon in their rear, by which the two armies could in a few days be restored to an equality. Influenced by these sentiments, a forward movement was resolved on, with a view to pass the left flank of the French army, cut them off from their communication with Vienna and the reserve under Massena, and at the same time establish their own connexion with the powerful succour approaching under the Archduke Charles. The movement commenced on the 27th, at daybreak, when the whole army advanced in five columns, moving parallel to each other, against the enemy. The French were not in sufficient force at the advanced posts to resist so formidable an assailant; a detachment was made prisoners, and after a sharp combat the little village of Raunsitz was abandoned by Murat to Bagrathion. Encouraged by this success of its advanced guard, the Russian main body followed joyfully and rapidly in its footsteps. Headquarters were moved on to Wischau, and the outposts were pushed forward to within two leagues of Austerlitz.*

This sudden irruption produced an immediate concentration of the French army. Preparatory orders instantly to raise their cantonments and fall back behind Brunn, keeping only detachments in front of that place. Bernadotte was directed to leave the Bavarians alone at Iglau, and advance by forced marches to the field of action; Davoust to come up with all imaginable haste to Nikolsbourg, on the right of the French position; Mortier to abandon Vienna to a division of Marmont's army, and hasten with his whole corps to the environs of Brunn; and Marmont to draw near to the capital with all his forces. In this way Napoleon's army, which, before the concentration commenced, was little more than fifty thousand strong, would be raised in a few days to ninety thousand men; but before these distant succours could arrive great successes might be obtained, and the emperor was in no small disquietude how to arrest the enemy before his forces were reassembled. Fortunately for him, their movements were slow and vacillating. On the 29th they marched forward only two leagues, directing their chief force towards the French left; but on the day following they retraced their footsteps, and, advancing with the left in front, bivouacked at Hoqueditz, and their light troops were seen from the French outposts marching across their position towards the right of the army. Napoleon spent the whole of both days on horseback at the advanced posts, watch-

* Sav., ii., 115, 128. Bign., iv., 437, 442.

† When Dolgoroucki had retired, Napoleon said to the officers around him, "The allies should wait till they are on the heights of Montmartre before they make such propositions;" a remarkable expression, which subsequent events rendered prophetic.—Bour., vii., 67.

‡ Hard., viii., 497, 498. Bign., iv., 437, 438. Jom., ii., 171.

* Dum., xiv., 150, 152. Hard., viii., 505, 506. Jom., ii., 172.

ing their movements. After surveying the heights of Pratzen, the highest ground in the neighbourhood, and obviously of the first importance if the battle was fought in its environs, he said to his generals, "If I wished to prevent the enemy from passing, it is here that I should station myself; but that would only lead to an ordinary battle, and I desire decisive success. If, on the other hand, I draw back my right towards Brunn, and the Russians pass these heights, they are irretrievably ruined." In pursuance of this design, the heights were abandoned; the right was drawn back, as if it was fearful of encountering the enemy.* Austerlitz was evacuated, and the French army concentrated round Brunn, ready to take advantage of the first imprudent step which might be made by their adversaries.

At length, on the morning of the 1st of December, the intentions of the enemy were clearly manifested. Napoleon beheld, as he himself says, "with inexpressible delight," their whole columns, dark and massy, moving across his position, at so short a distance as rendered it apparent that a general action was at hand. Carefully avoiding the slightest interruption to their movement, he merely watched, with intense anxiety, their march; and when it had become evident, from the direction they were following, and the number of troops which had already passed, that the resolution to turn the right flank of the French army had been decidedly taken, he said, with the prophetic anticipation of military genius, "To-morrow, before nightfall, that army is my own." In truth, the allies, under the direction of Weyrother, whose repeated defeats at Rivoli and Höhenlinden had not yet taught him the quality of the antagonists with whom he had to deal, were venturing upon one of the most hazardous operations in war—a flank march in column in front of a concentrated enemy, and that, too, when that enemy was Napoleon, at the head of seventy-five thousand men.†

Meanwhile the allies, in great strength, animated by the presence of their respective sovereigns, and in the highest spirits, were marching in five massy columns within two cannon shots of the French outposts. Their design was to turn the right flank of the enemy, so as, in case of disaster, to cut them off from Vienna, and throw them back on the mountains of Bohemia; and with that view they proposed to commence the action by a vigorous attack on that wing, which, it was hoped, would be speedily defeated and thrown back in confusion on the centre. Their first column, under Doctoroff, had advanced beyond the right flank of the French as far as Aujezd; the second, commanded by Langeron, occupied the important heights of Pratzen, directly before their right wing; the third, under Prybyszewski, crowned the eminences immediately behind that elevated point; the fourth and fifth, under Miloradowitch and Lichtenstein, followed in order, showing their flank to the enemy, and stretching along the whole front of his position; while the reserve, under the Grand-duke Constantine, occupied the heights in front of Austerlitz. In all, 114 battalions and 172 squadrons, amounting to full eighty thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were cavalry in the finest condition.‡

The French army, in concentrated masses, occupied a position in advance of the Description fortress of Brunn, midway between of the field that town and Austerlitz. The em- of battle. peror's tent was placed on an elevated slope on the right of the great road leading across his line from Brunn to Austerlitz, at the distance of two leagues and a half from the former place, a little in front of Bellowitz, between the two streams which, descending towards the south, unite their waters at Punlowitz.* From this elevated point the whole extent of the line was visible, though many parts of it were obscured by rising grounds, copsewoods, and villages, which, intersected by numerous small fishponds, formed a sort of intrenched camp, within which the French army was placed. Their right rested on the Lake Moenitz, formed by the confluence, in that undulated country, of the two rivulets above mentioned; their left on the Bosenitzberg, an elevated hill, the first of the wooded chain which separates the basin of the Schwarza from that of the March, and which was intrenched and crowned with artillery. The front of the whole position was covered by broad marshes, which on either side bordered the streams, intersected at right angles by the great road from Brunn to Olmutz, and by various country roads from village to village, which, from the morasses and little lakes by which they were bordered, appeared easily susceptible of defence. Right in front of the position, on the opposite side of the rivulet, lay the line of waving heights, gradually rising to the elevated point of the Pratzen, which were already covered with the enemy's troops, who, congregated in formidable masses on that imposing ridge, sought to conceal the general movement of the troops in their rear, to turn the right flank of Napoleon.†

By great exertions, the French emperor had succeeded in assembling an im- Disposition of mense force for the decisive battle the French which was approaching. The left troops. wing, under Lannes, was stationed at the foot of the hills, having a powerful advance guard of cavalry in front of the fortified position of the Bosenitzberg. Next to these were placed the corps of Bernadotte, who, by forced marches, had arrived in line from Iglau on the Bohemian frontier. To their right, on the right of the high road, were stationed the grenadiers of Oudinot, with the cavalry under Murat; and the imperial guard, under Bessieres, in second line behind them. The centre was composed of the corps of Marshal Soult, which was uncommonly strong, and occupied the villages opposite the heights of Pratzen, which had been abandoned to the enemy. The right wing, under Davoust, who, by incredible efforts, had come up from Hungary, was thrown back in a semicircle, with its reserves at the Abbey of Raygern in the rear, and its front line stretching to the Lake Moenitz. Before the night of the 1st of December, above-ninety thousand men were here assembled within the space of two leagues, all veterans inured to war, and burning with impatience to signalize themselves in the decisive battle which was to take place on the morrow.‡

* These names will convey no idea to readers in this country, but they will be of value to the traveller who explores in that distant region the theatre of this memorable conflict.

† Personal observation. Dum., xiv., 130, 143. Jom., ii., 175, 176.

‡ Dum., xiv., 142, 147. Sav., ii., 131, 134. Jom., ii., 177.

* Norv., ii., 407, 408. Jom., ii., 174, 175. Dum., xiv., 133, 134. Bign., iv., 439, 440.

† Hard., viii., 596, 597. Dum., xiv., 132, 135. Norv., ii., 148. Jom., ii., 175, 176. Sav., ii., 130.

‡ Dum., xiv., 134, 135. Nap., ii., 176.

Napoleon spent the whole of that day on horseback, riding along the ranks, visiting the outposts, speaking to the soldiers, and studying the ground. When a standard of the Italian army appeared, he spoke to the men in those words of brief but nervous eloquence by which he knew so well how to win their hearts; many of the veterans he even distinguished by name, and reminded them of the dangers and glories they had shared together. "Soldiers!" said he, "we must finish this war by a decisive blow;" and loud cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" proved that he had not miscalculated the ardour of his followers. He continued riding through the bivouacs, animating the men, till long after nightfall, and then retired to his tent, where he dictated one of those magical proclamations which so often, on the eve of great events, contributed to the astonishing victories which he won.* Suddenly, as he rode along, surrounded by his generals, fires were seen kindling on all sides; a brilliant illumination arose in all the bivouacs; the heavens were filled by the ruddy glow; and loud shouts in every direction announced some extraordinary transport among the soldiers. It was the enthusiasm of the common men, which, wrought to the highest pitch by the interest of the moment and the presence of their beloved emperor, celebrated thus, by the spontaneous combustion of the wood of their huts and the straw of their bivouacs, the first anniversary of his coronation.†

The night was cold, but clear, though a thick fog, as is not unusual in that country, covered all the lower grounds, and hardly enabled the sentinels to discern each other at ten yards' distance. At four in the morning the emperor mounted on horseback. All was still among the immense multitude who were concentrated in the French lines; buried in sleep, the soldiers forgot alike their triumphs and the dangers they were about to undergo. Gradually, however, a confused murmur arose from the Russian host; the lights multiplied towards Aujezd and the southeastern parts of the horizon, and all the reports from the outposts announced that the advance from right to left had already commenced along their whole line. In effect, their orders had been despatched at midnight; all their columns were in full march, within two hours after, to turn the French right. At three o'clock, a detachment of Austrian horse presented themselves before Tilnitz, the outermost village in their possession on that

side, and shortly after an attack with infantry and artillery was made on that important post. No sooner did Napoleon hear the sound of distant cannonade in that direction, than he ordered Soult to bring his columns up to the very entrance of the defiles formed by the villages and woods in the low grounds on either side of the rivulet, in order that the instant the enemy appeared sufficiently engaged in their perilous cross-march, his numerous battalions might be at once thrown on their flank. The soldiers accordingly advanced, every heart throbbing with anxiety, every eye turned to the east, where still, in that wintry season, no glimmering of light appeared. Gradually the stars, which throughout the night had shone clear and bright in the summit of the firmament, began to disappear; the ruddy glow of the east announced the approach of day, and the tops of the hills, illuminated by the level rays, appeared clear and sharp above the ocean of fog that rolled in the valleys. At last the sun rose in unclouded brilliancy—that "Sun of Austerlitz," which he so often afterward apostrophized as illuminating the most splendid periods of his life. As the mist sunk and the upper eminences in the lower grounds became visible, the magnitude of the fault which the enemy had committed became apparent: the heights of Pratzen, the key to their position, which the evening before had been crowned with artillery and glittering with armed men, were now deserted; it was evident that the left wing, advancing towards Tilnitz, had descended to the low grounds, and that the allies, intent on outflanking their opponents, had entirely abandoned the thought of retaining their position. The marshals who surrounded Napoleon saw the advantage, and eagerly besought him to give the signal for action; but he restrained their ardour, and, turning to Soult, said, "How long would it take you from hence to reach the heights of Pratzen?" "Less than twenty minutes," replied the marshal; "for my troops are in the bottom of the valley, covered with mist and the smoke of their bivouacs; the enemy cannot see them." "In that case," said Napoleon, "let us wait twenty minutes; when the enemy is making a false movement we must take good care not to interrupt him." Burning with impatience, the marshals stood around awaiting the signal; but before that time was fully elapsed, a violent fire was heard on the right, towards Tilnitz, and an aid-de-camp arriving in haste, announced that the enemy had commenced the attack in great force in that quarter. "Now, then, is the moment," said Napoleon; and the marshals set off at the gallop in all directions for their respective corps. At the same time, the emperor mounted his horse, and, riding through the foremost ranks, "Soldiers," said he, "the enemy has imprudently exposed himself to your blows; we shall finish the war with a clap of thunder."*

The French army occupied an interior position, from whence their columns started like rays from a centre, while the allies were toiling in a wide semicircle round their outer extremity. Marshal Soult, in the centre, first got into action; but long before he could pass the hollow ground which separated the two armies, the Russian left wing, under Buxhowden, had gained considerable successes. So violent was their onset, so great their supe-

* "Soldiers! The Russian army has presented itself before you to revenge the disaster of the Austrians at Ulm. They are the same men whom you conquered at Hollabrunn, and on whose flying traces you have followed. The positions which we occupy are formidable, and while they are marching to turn my right, they must present their flank to your blows. Soldiers! I will myself direct all your battalions. I will keep myself at a distance from the fire if, with your accustomed valour, you carry disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks; but should victory appear for a moment uncertain, you shall see your emperor expose himself to the first strokes, for victory must not be doubtful on this occasion, especially when the reputation of the French infantry is at stake, which is so dear an interest to the honour of the whole nation." This is perhaps the first instance recorded in history where a general openly announced to his soldiers the manoeuvre by which he expected they would prove victorious, while the promise that he was not, except in the last extremity, to put himself at their head, affords the clearest indication of the mutual confidence which long service together had established between them.—See DUMAS, xiv., 148, 149.

† Dum., xiv., 146, 149. Sav., ii., 132, 133. Jom., ii., 176, 177.

* Dum., xiv., 160, 161. Jom., ii., 179, 180. Sav., ii., 133, 134. Bign., iv., 444.

riority of force at the first encounter, that the French were driven from the village of Tiltitz, and Buxhowden was advancing through the defile which leads from thence to Sokelnitz, beyond the extreme right of their position. Alarmed at the progress of the enemy on the right, Napoleon ordered Davoust, who, with his reserve, was concealed behind the Abbey of Raygern, to advance to check them; but before he could come up Sokelnitz also was carried, amid loud shouts, and the French right wing appeared completely turned. But it was in such moments that the cool judgment and invincible tenacity of Marshal Davoust appeared most conspicuous. Arranging his forces in battle array beyond the village of Sokelnitz, he received the Russians, when issuing from it disordered by success, with such resolution, that they were not only arrested in their advance, but driven out of that village with the loss of six pieces of cannon. Buxhowden, however, returned in greater force; the French were again expelled, blood flowed in torrents, and both parties maintained the conflict with invincible resolution.*

Affairs were in this state on the right, when Soult, with his powerful corps, was suddenly thrown on the Russian centre. The fourth Russian column, under Kollowrath, was just beginning to ascend the slopes of Pratzen, which had been entirely evacuated by the third corps, which preceded it, when its outposts perceived the immense, dark mass of French infantry emerging out of the mist in the low grounds on their right. Kutusoff instantly saw his danger; the enemy's centre, in order of battle, was ready to assail the combined army while in open columns of march. But if a fault in generalship had been committed, nothing that resolution could do to repair it was wanting. The Emperor Alexander was with the centre column, and his was not a character to sink tamely before misfortune. By his directions, Kutusoff gave immediate orders for the corps which had descended from the heights of Pratzen to reoccupy that important position. The infantry of Miloradowitch rapidly wheeled into order of battle from open column, was formed in two lines, and every disposition made in the utmost haste to receive the enemy. Before they could be completed, however, the first line of Soult had ascended the heights: its attack was so impetuous that the Russian front line was broken and driven back upon the second with the loss of several pieces of cannon; the heights of Pratzen, after a desperate conflict of two hours' duration, were carried, and six battalions, which occupied a hill forming the highest part of the ridge, cut to pieces. The danger was extreme; the allied army, surprised in their line of march, were pierced through the centre, and the left wing in advance entirely separated from the remainder of the army.†

While this important success was gained in the centre, the French left, under Bernadotte and Lannes, were also warmly engaged with the enemy. They, too, surprised the combined forces in their line of march; and Napoleon sent repeated orders to these generals to attack the enemy promptly and vigorously, in order to prevent them from sending forward any succours to the centre, where the decisive blow was to be struck. They advanced to the attack in the order prescribed for the whole army, with the front line in

order of battle, the second in columns, with the artillery between them, and Murat in reserve with the cavalry behind the second line: a disposition everywhere attended with the happiest effects. The Russian right wing, when moving along without any conception that the enemy was at hand, were thunderstruck at finding themselves suddenly assailed by French columns emerging in battle array out of the mist in the low grounds; and so complete was the surprise, that the reserve under the Grand-duke Constantine was one of the first to find itself engaged. Their dispositions, however, were speedily made: the artillery was rapidly brought forward to the front, and under cover of its fire the marching columns, with all imaginable haste, were wheeled into line. Gradually, however, the French infantry gained ground; and, taking advantage of their success, the cavalry under Kellerman were assailing even the imperial Russian guard, when Prince Lichtenstein, at the head of the splendid Austrian cuirassiers, charged them with such vigour that they were instantly broken, and the allied horse, following up their success, broke through the first French line, swept through the openings between the second, and interposed in the interval between the corps of Bernadotte and Lannes. Here, however, they were in their turn charged by Murat at the head of a large body of Napoleon's cavalry, and driven back through both French lines, who threw in a flanking fire on their disordered squadrons with such effect that nearly half their numbers were stretched on the plain.*

This murderous strife on the left was attended with no decisive success to either party, but it had long the desired effect of preventing any succours being sent from that quarter to the centre, now severely pressed by Soult. At length Kutusoff, seriously alarmed at the progress of that sturdy assailant, recalled a large part of Lichtenstein's cavalry to make head against the enemy on the heights of Pratzen: they joined the horse of Ouvaroff, and formed a mass of thirty squadrons, which it was hoped would suffice to keep up the communication between the centre and right wing of the allies. Meanwhile, the Grand-duke Constantine, perceiving the danger of Kollowrath's troops, and alarmed at the progress which Lannes and Bernadotte were making on his own side, brought forward the Russian imperial guard, and, descending from the heights, advanced midway into the low grounds to meet the enemy. They were received by the division of Vandamme; and while a furious combat was going on between these rival bodies of infantry, the French were suddenly assailed in flank by

* Dum., xiv., 176, 181. Jom., ii., 186. Bign., iv., 445, 446.

† The combat of Lannes and Bernadotte, on the left, was remarkable for the perfect success with which the troops arranged in the order prescribed by Napoleon, baffled all the efforts of the allies, whose numerous and magnificent cavalry had there a full opportunity of acting. The first line was uniformly drawn up in battle array, the second in squares of battalions, the artillery and light horse in front, with the heavy cavalry arrayed in several lines in the rear of the whole. Thus, if a charge of horse, which was frequently the case, broke the first array, it passed, while disordered by success, through the intervals between the squares in the rear, from whose front and flanks it sustained a heavy fire. If they escaped that, the horsemen were suddenly assailed, when blown and dispersed, by a solid mass of heavy cavalry in the rear, which never failed to bring them back in confusion through the squares, who by this time had reloaded their pieces, and whose flanking fire completed the destruction of their gallant assailants. The heavy brigade of horse at Waterloo suffered extremely from a similar disposition to baffle the most intrepid charges of the finest cavalry in the world.—See DUMAS, xiv., 183.

* Jom., ii., 183. Dum., xiv., 160, 165. Norv., ii., 410.

† Dum., xiv., 170, 172. Jom., ii., 185, 186. Bign., iv., 445.

the Russian cuirassiers of the guard, two thousand strong, in the finest order, led by Constantine in person. The shock was irresistible: in an instant the French column was broken, three battalions were trampled under foot, and the 4th regiment lost its eagle. Napoleon saw there was not a moment to be lost in repairing the disorder, and immediately ordered up Marshal Bessieres with the cavalry of the guard to arrest that terrible body of horse. Rapp put himself at the head of their advanced guard, and, preceded by four pieces of horse-artillery, set off at the gallop to restore the combat. "Soldiers!" said he, "you see what has happened below there: they are sabring our comrades; let us fly to their succour." Instantly spurring their chargers, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy. The Russians had scarcely time to re-form their squadrons after their glorious success when this fierce enemy was upon them: they were broken, driven back over the dead bodies of the square they had destroyed, and lost their artillery. Rallying, however, in a few minutes with admirable discipline, they returned to the charge: both imperial guards met in full career; the shock was terrible; and the most desperate cavalry action that had taken place during the war ensued, and lasted for above five minutes. The infantry on both sides advanced to support their comrades; the resolution and vigour of the combatants were equal; squadron to squadron, company to company, man to man, they fought with invincible firmness, and soon the ground was strewn with the dead and the dying. At length, however, the stern obstinacy of the Russians yielded to the enthusiastic valour of the French: the cavalry and infantry of their guard gave way, and, after losing their artillery and standards, were driven back in confusion almost to the walls of Austerlitz,* while from a neighbouring eminence the Emperors of Russia and Germany beheld the irretrievable rout of the flower of their army.†

This desperate encounter was decisive of the fate of the day. Pierced through the middle, with the bravest of their troops destroyed, the Russians no longer fought for victory, but for existence. In effect, the defeat of the centre, which was now borne back above a mile from the field of battle, exposed the left wing between Aujezd and Sokelnitz to the most imminent danger. Rapidly following up his success, Napoleon caused his reserves and Imperial Guard to wheel to the right to aid Soult in attacking the rear of that wing, while Davoust, near Sokelnitz, pressed its front. They first came up with a division of six thousand men, who were retracing their steps, too late to support the centre. Assailed at once in front and both flanks by immense masses of infantry and cavalry flushed with victory, this body was speedily defeated and half its number made prisoners. Rapidly advancing from left to right, the victorious French next came upon Langeron, who shared the same fate; and the survivors from his divisions, flying for refuge to Buxhowden, first communicated to that general the melancholy intelligence of the disasters which had befallen the central column of the army. He immediately formed his troops into close column, and began to debouche from

Aujezd with a view to regain, by a road between the margin of the lakes in his rear and the high grounds which adjoin them to the south, the remains of the army at Austerlitz. But, before they had proceeded half a mile, the marching column was furiously attacked in flank at different points by the victorious French, who succeeded in piercing it through the middle, and separating Buxhowden, with a few battalions in advance, from the remainder of the array. The unhappy body which was cut off, consisting of eight-and-twenty battalions, under Doctoroff and Langeron, was soon assailed in front, flank, and rear by the Imperial Guard, Soult, and Davoust. After a brave resistance, they were at length overwhelmed: seven thousand were taken or destroyed on the spot, and great numbers sought to save themselves by crossing, with their artillery and cavalry, a frozen lake or morass which adjoined their line of march. The ice was already beginning to yield under the enormous weight, when the shells from the French batteries bursting below the surface, caused it to crack with a loud explosion: a frightful yell arose from the perishing multitude, and above two thousand brave men were swallowed up in the waves.*

While these decisive successes were gained in the centre and right, the French left had also entirely prevailed over its opponents. Encouraged by the cries of victory which they heard to their right, and the sight of their battalions on the heights, which in the morning had been crowded with the enemy, the French troops in that quarter redoubled their efforts, and Lannes, Bernadotte, and Murat exerted all their energies to complete the discomfiture of their gallant opponents. For five hours the combat continued without any decisive advantage, the sharp rattle of the musketry interrupted at intervals by thundering charges of horse; but at noon the allies sensibly gave way. The heights of Blasowitz, the plateau of Kruh, the village of Hollubitz, were successively carried; and at length the Russians, entirely dislodged from the ridge of eminences they had occupied in the morning, were assembled in one close column by Bagrathion, and commenced their retreat in the direction of Austerlitz. Suchet and Murat, at the head of their respective divisions of infantry and cavalry, succeeded in breaking part of that mass and dislodging it from the road of Olmutz, where almost the whole of the baggage of the allies fell into the hands of the victors. By great exertions and heroic resolution, Bagrathion succeeded, before nightfall, in effecting his retreat with the remainder to Austerlitz, already filled with the wounded, the fugitives, and the stragglers from every part of the army.†

Thus terminated the battle of Austerlitz, the most glorious of all the victories of Napoleon, that in which his military genius shone forth with the brightest lustre; and the stroke which at once re-established his affairs and prostrated Europe was most clearly owing to the manifest superiority of his manœuvres. The loss of the allies was immense. Thirty thousand men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners;‡ a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, four hundred caissons, and forty-five standards, remained the trophies of the victor's

Results of the battle.

* Rapp, 61, 62. Dum., xiv., 191, 195. Jom., ii., 187, 188. Sav., ii., 135, 136.

† It is the moment when Rapp returned, with his charger all bloody, to announce this decisive success, that Gerard has selected for the admirable and well-known picture of the battle of Austerlitz.—Rapp, 62.

* Dum., xiv., 195, 203. Jom., ii., 189, 190. Sav., ii., 137. † Jom., ii., 190, 191. Dum., xiv., 182, 189. Sav., ii., 136. Bign., iv., 449.

‡ The prisoners were 19,000 Russians and 600 Austrians; but a large proportion of them were wounded.

triumph, and the disorganization of the combined forces was complete. It is true these advantages had been dearly purchased: twelve thousand French had been killed or wounded in the struggle; but the allies were cut off from the road to Olmutz, and their line of retreat towards Hungary exposed them to be harassed by Davoust in flank, while Napoleon's victorious legions thundered in their rear. Such was the consternation produced by this disaster that, at a council held at midnight at the emperors' lodgings, it was resolved by a great majority that the farther prolongation of hostilities was hopeless; and at four in the morning Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the headquarters of Napoleon to propose an armistice.*

There was no difficulty in coming to an understanding. Napoleon was too well aware of the magnitude of the danger from which he had escaped, and the serious nature of the perils with which he was still environed, to hesitate about accepting any offers which might detach the Emperor of Germany from the alliance. He had gained, it is true, one of the most brilliant victories on record in the annals of war; and the Russian army was threatened with a disastrous retreat, which would in all probability double its losses; but it was the very immensity of the success which he had achieved which was the source of his embarrassment. Was he prepared, in the depth of winter, to follow the Moscovite standards into the recesses of Poland or the Ukraine, and incur the hazard of rousing a national war by approaching the frontiers of old Russia? Supposing he were, what were the enemies which he would leave on his flanks and rear? The Archduke Charles, at the head of eighty thousand men, in the finest condition, was approaching Vienna, and had already summoned the French garrison in that capital to surrender, while his opponent, Massena, was still far on the other side of the Julian Alps. Hungary, with its ancient spirit, was rising *en masse* at his approach. The Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the Bohemian levies, had just chased the Bavarians from Iglau. The Russian reserves were approaching Olmutz, while Prussia, with a hundred thousand men, was preparing from Saxony to pour into Franconia, and entirely cut off all communication with the Rhine. How was it possible, with such forces accumulating in his rear, to advance farther into the wilds of Sarmatia in pursuit of his Scythian foe? Yet how could he remain where he was, to permit them to encircle him with their arms? Or how retreat without commencing a series of disasters which would certainly dissipate the magical influence of his success, and might lead to the total overthrow of his power?†

Impressed with these ideas, it was with the most lively satisfaction that Napoleon heard of the arrival of the Austrian envoy at his headquarters, and foresaw the means of extricating himself from his present embarrassments, not only without farther danger, but the utmost possible éclat. As on the Carinthian Mountains in 1797, and at Marengo in 1801, he found an audacious and perilous advance followed by the highest triumph and success. Profoundly skilled in dissimula-

tion, however, he carefully concealed these sentiments in the recesses of his bosom, and to the Prince Lichtenstein spoke only of the magnitude of the sacrifices which he made in consenting to any accommodation, and the immense advantages which, by the continuance of hostilities, were within his grasp. The better to increase the terror of his arms, he refused to suspend the march of his victorious legions, and appointing the following day for the interview with the Emperor of Germany, gave orders, in the mean time, for following up the enemy with the utmost possible vigour.*

Meanwhile the allied army, extremely weakened and in deep dejection, continued its retreat, not without sustaining a considerable loss from the attacks made on its rear-guard. They crossed the Marche, and the Emperor of Russia established his headquarters at the Chateau of Hollitch; but the Emperor Francis remained nearer the French outposts at Czeitech, in order to be ready for the conference which Napoleon had fixed for the day following. The latter moved on to the advanced posts, and received the Emperor of Germany at a windmill on the roadside near Sarutichitz, still shown to travellers, where the fire of the bivouac protected them from the inclemency of the weather. "I receive you," said Napoleon, "in the only palace which I have inhabited for the last two months." "You have made such good use," replied Francis, "of that habitation, that it should be agreeable to you." The officers of their respective suites then retired, and the two emperors conversed for above two hours, in the course of which the terms of accommodation were verbally agreed on. Napoleon took advantage of that opportunity to display all his talent in the colouring which he gave to his own conduct, and the dark shades in which he represented that of the allies. Everything, as usual, was laid on England. It was the incessant ambition, corrupting gold, and Machiavelian policy of those islanders which had so long divided the Continent; the blood and misery of the European powers were the means by which they elevated themselves to greatness, and, amid universal suffering, engrossed the commerce of the world; the reproaches which they lavished on his ambition were in reality applicable to themselves; the cause of France was the cause of Austria, was the cause of Russia, was the cause of the civilized world; and the real enemy of them all was that perfidious power, which, having nothing in common with European nations but its situation, continually sowed the seeds of dissension on the Continent, and, secure from attack itself, found the principal source of its grandeur in the misfortunes of the states by which it was surrounded. The Emperor Francis was in no condition to enter the lists of controversy with the conqueror of Austerlitz; but he did not forget his own dignity in misfortune, and sullied his character by none of those sallies against his former allies, which Napoleon, with his usual disregard of truth, put into his mouth in the bulletins.†

The conference lasted two hours, after which the two emperors embraced and separated with all the marks of mutual esteem. The conditions had been

Armistice
with Russia.

* Jom., ii., 190, 193. Dum., xiv., 207, 209. Sav., ii., 137. Bign., iv., 450, 451.

† Jom., ii., 191. Dum., xiv., 208, 210. Hard., ix., 2, 4. Sav., ii., 138.

* Bign., iv., 462. Jom., ii., 191, 192. Dum., xiv., 209, 210.

† See this admitted in Dum., xiv., 214, 216. Bign., iv., 453.

verbally agreed on, and it was arranged that Presburg should be the seat of the negotiations, and that an armistice should immediately take place at all points. The Emperor of Russia was no party to the conference, but the Emperor of Austria engaged his word of honour for his ally that he would accept the conditions which were offered, namely, that hostilities should cease between the two armies, and that his troops should retire by slow marches, without farther molestation, to their own country.* Savary was sent next day to the Emperor Alexander to invite him to accede to these terms, which was immediately agreed to; and, without requiring any other guarantee than his word, Napoleon immediately stopped the advance of his columns.† In truth, after the secession of Austria, the war, at least in that quarter, had no longer an object, and the Emperor of Russia justly deemed himself fortunate in being able to extricate his army, without farther danger, from its perilous situation. Anxious to conciliate the good-will of so powerful an adversary, Napoleon returned several of the Russian officers who had been made prisoners, without exchange; and Alexander set out two days after, by post, for St. Petersburg.‡

On the 6th of December an armistice was formally concluded at Austerlitz, by which it was stipulated that, until the conclusion of a general peace, the French should continue to occupy all those portions of Upper and Lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Moravia, at present in their possession; that the Russians should evacuate Moravia and Hungary in fifteen days, and Galicia in a month; that all insurrectionary

* Though not a party to this conference, the Emperor Alexander derived great benefit from it in securing the retreat of the troops under his command. Their only means of retreat over the Moravo was by the bridge of Goding, which was defended by an Austrian division under General Meerfeld. Davoust had already commenced his march against that point, and had arrived within little more than a mile of it, at the entrance of a defile where the Austrians had placed their artillery, when Alexander suspended the operations by a note written with his own hand, in which he announced the conference which was going forward between the Emperors of France and Germany. Whether Davoust could have gained possession of the bridge at Goding is very doubtful, as, independent of the Austrians, six-and-twenty thousand Russians were at hand, who would have come up before evening, and fought with the courage of despair.—See SAVARY, ii., 144, 145.

† Savary reached the Emperor of Russia's headquarters at four in the morning of the 5th. He found that monarch already dressed, and he immediately received an audience. "I am very happy to see you again," said Alexander, "on an occasion so glorious for you; that day will take nothing from the reputation which your master has earned in so many battles. It was my first engagement, and I confess that the rapidity of his manoeuvres has never given me time to succour the menaced points: everywhere you were at least double the number of our forces." "Sire," replied Savary, "your majesty has been misinformed. Our force, upon the whole, was twenty-five thousand less than yours, and even of that the whole was not very warmly engaged, but we manoeuvred much, and the same division combated at many different points in different directions; it was that which apparently multiplied our numbers. Therein lies the art of war; the emperor, who has seen forty pitched battles, is never wanting in that particular. He is still ready to march against the Archduke Charles, if your majesty, by accepting the armistice, does not dispose of it otherwise." "What guarantee does your master require," replied Alexander, "and what security can I have that your troops will not prosecute their movements against me?" "He asks only your word of honour, and has instructed me, the moment it is given, to suspend the march of Marshal Davoust." "I give it with pleasure," rejoined the emperor; "and should it ever be your fortune to come to St. Petersburg, I hope I may be able to render my capital agreeable to you."—SAVARY, ii., 142, 143.

‡ Sav., ii., 140, 141. Dum., xiv., 210, 218. Bign., iv., 454.

movements in Hungary and Bohemia should be stopped, and no armed force of any other power be permitted to enter the Austrian territories. This latter clause was levelled at the Prussian armaments, and it afforded the cabinet of Berlin a decent pretext for withdrawing from a coalition into which they had entered on so untoward an occasion. Napoleon issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he spoke with just pride of their great achievements, and awarded a liberal recompense to the wounded and widows of those who had fallen in the battle.* At the same time he paraded the Russian prisoners, above sixteen thousand in number, in the most ostentatious manner through the streets of Vienna on their road to France,† and returned himself to Schoenbrunn to superintend the negotiations about to commence at the town of Presburg.‡

Faithful to the principles which he had sworn to adhere to at the tomb of the Great Frederic, Alexander no sooner found himself delivered from the toils of his redoubtable adversary, than he sent to Berlin the Grand-duke Constantine and Prince Dolgoroucki, offering to place all his forces at the disposition of the Prussian cabinet if they would vigorously prosecute the war; but the veteran diplomatist to whom the fortunes of Prussia were now committed had very different objects in view, and he was prepared, by an act of matchless perfidy, to put the finishing stroke to that system of tergiversation and deceit by which, for ten years, the conduct of the cabinet of Berlin had been disgraced. Haugwitz, as already mentioned, had come to Vienna to declare war against Napoleon, and the 15th of December was the day fixed for the commencement of hostilities; but the battle of Austerlitz totally deranged their plans, and the very day before he was admitted to a second audience of the French emperor, the armistice had completely detached Austria from the coalition. Nothing could be more natural than that so calamitous an event should make a total change in his views of the policy of the war, and the severest morality could not condemn a statesman who sought to withdraw his country from a contest which now appeared hopeless, and in which, from being an accessory, it was now likely to be called, without any adequate preparation, to sustain the principal part. But, not content with this, Haugwitz resolved to go a step farther. On the breaking up of the confederacy into which he had just entered, he determined to

Disimulation of Prussia, and accommodation with that power.

* In the bulletin he said, with his usual condensed energy, "Soldiers! I am content with you; you have decorated your eagles with immortal glory: peace cannot now be far removed. When everything necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country is obtained, I will lead you back to France. My people will again behold you with joy; and it will be enough for one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for all your fellow-citizens to exclaim, 'there is a brave man.'" Liberal gratifications at the same time were made to all the wounded; the generals received 3000 francs each, and the common soldiers a Napoleon each: the pensions to the widows of the generals were 6000 francs, or £240; of the colonels, 2400, or £96; of the common men, 200, or £8 sterling, yearly.—See SAVARY, ii., 148, and BIGNON, iv., 460.

† Bign., iv., 460. Dum., xiv., 214, 222. Sav., ii., 148.

‡ On his road there, Napoleon met a large convoy of wounded Austrians on their route for the hospitals of the capital; he immediately descended from his carriage, and uncovering as the wagons passed, while his suite did the same, he said, in a loud voice, "Honour to the brave in misfortune." So well did this great man know how to win the affections and command the admiration of the very soldiers who had lavished their best blood in combating his power.

secure a part of the spoils of his former allies; and if he could not chase the French standards beyond the Rhine, at least wrest from England Dec. 7. those Continental possessions which she now appeared in no condition to defend. With matchless effrontery, he changed the whole object of his mission; and when admitted into the presence of Napoleon after the victory, congratulated him upon his success, and proposed a treaty, the basis of which should be the old project of annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions until the conclusion of a peace between France and England.*

Although Napoleon had not received full accounts of the treaty of the 3d of November, yet he was aware of its substance, and well acquainted with all the military movements which Prussia had been making in conjunction with the Russian reserve, thirty thousand strong, which had advanced from Warsaw to Breslaw. Upon receiving Haugwitz, therefore, he broke out into a vehement declamation against the perfidy of the Prussian cabinet, informed him that he was acquainted with all their machinations, and that it now lay with him alone, after concluding peace with Austria, to turn his whole forces against them; wrest from them Silesia, whose fortresses, unarmed and unprovoked, were in no condition to make any defence; excite an insurrection in Prussian Poland, and punish them in the most signal manner for their matchless perfidy. Reasons of state, however, he added, sometimes compelled sovereigns to bury in oblivion the best-founded causes of animosity: on this occasion he was willing to overlook their past misconduct, and ascribe it entirely to the efforts of England; but this could be only on one condition: that Prussia should at length abandon its doubtful policy, and enter heart and hand into the French alliance. On these terms he was still willing to incorporate Hanover with their dominions, in exchange for some of its detached southern possessions, which were to be ceded to France and Bavaria. Overjoyed at the prospect thus afforded of extricating his country, not only without loss, but with a great accession of territory, from its perilous situation, Haugwitz at once accepted the stipulations; and it was agreed that Prussia should enter into an alliance with France, and receive, besides the margravate of Bareuth, the whole electorate of Hanover in full sovereignty, as well as all the other Continental dominions of his Britannic majesty; and, on the other hand, cede to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, and the principalities of Neuchâtel and Cleves to France, and accede to all the conditions of the general peace of Presburg. A formal treaty to this effect was signed Dec. 15. by Haugwitz on December 15, the very day when hostilities were to have commenced. Thus the Prussian minister extricated himself, not only without loss, but with apparent advantage, from his perilous situation. But the ultimate effects of this treacherous conduct were in the highest degree disastrous: it excited a just indignation in the government of Great Britain,†

Treaty of alliance with Prussia, who gains Hanover.

without really propitiating that of France;* and by inducing a false security in the cabinet of Berlin, rendered the fall of that power, when it was driven into hostilities in the following year, as irretrievable as, in the estimation of a large part of Europe, it was deserved.†

To complete the picture of the operations of this memorable year, and render intelligible some important clauses in the treaty of Presburg by which it was concluded, it is only necessary to give a summary of the operations in the south of Italy and the north of Germany, which were contemporaneous with these decisive strokes on the Danube and in the heart of Austria.

The court of Naples had entered somewhat late indeed, but cordially, into the alliance against France. Notwithstanding Affairs of Naples. the treaty of the 21st of September, al-

dice of England which affairs had taken at Vienna, that, four days after the treaty was signed, a long and official Dec. 19. note was despatched by Hardenberg to Lord Harrowby, English ambassador at Berlin, in which it was declared that Prussia would regard the entry of French troops into Berlin as a declaration of war, and various arrangements were proposed for the farther continuance of the Russian, Swedish, and English troops in the north of Germany. So overwhelmed was Hardenberg with confusion at discovering, six days afterward, by despatches from Haugwitz, what that minister had agreed to in regard to Hanover at Vienna, that he was led into an angry debate with the French ministers, which, in April following, on the requisition of Napoleon, led to his dismissal from office. Napoleon, with his habitual disregard of truth, some months afterward published in the *Moniteur* an article, in which he declared that Hardenberg, whom he cordially hated, had written this letter to Lord Harrowby without the authority of the cabinet, and that he had for "base bribes prostituted himself to the eternal enemies of the Continent."‡ This insinuation M. Bignon, albeit the chosen panegyrist of Napoleon, much to his credit, indignantly repelled: "A party man," says he, "and of an impassioned temperament, M. de Hardenberg was at the same time upright and honourable. That ever since the treaty of 3d November, Napoleon should regard him as the chief of the party hostile to France, and attack him as such, was all fair, but he had no right to accuse of venality a man far above such a reproach."—See BIGNON, v., 240, and HARDENBERG, ix., 30, 42.

Great was the general indignation at Berlin when the particulars of this extraordinary treaty were made known. The war party, in particular, with the queen and Prince Louis at its head, whose patriotic feelings had been roused to the highest pitch by the anticipated accession of Prussia to the European league, were unmeasured in their vituperation at this disgraceful spoliation of Great Britain, at that very moment a friendly and allied power. The question as to the ratification of the treaty was long and anxiously debated in the cabinet; national ambition and cupidity contending with the principles of public faith and a more enlarged view of ultimate expedience. At length Hardenberg and the opposition so far prevailed that the treaty was ratified only under the following reservations: That Napoleon was to obtain at a general peace a formal cession of Hanover to Prussia, and that till that was done the occupation was to be provisional only; a thin device, totally inadequate to blind the world to the real nature of the transaction.—See HARDENBERG, ix., 50, 59; BIGNON, v., 241, 242.

* "The conduct of Prussia," said Mr. Fox, then minister for foreign affairs, in his place in Parliament, "was a union of everything that was contemptible in servility with everything that was odious in rapacity. Other nations have been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many of their provinces, but none except Prussia has been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation, that of being compelled to become the ministers of the rapacity and injustice of a master."—23d April, 1806; *Parl. Deb.*, vi., 891.

† Hard, ix., 47, 49. Bign., v., 17, 19. Sav., ii., 149, 150. ‡ "You have come," said Napoleon to Haugwitz, on his first interview with him after the battle of Austerlitz, "to present your master's compliments on a victory, but fortune has changed the address of the letter." From that moment, in Napoleon's mind, the ruin of Prussia was resolved on; but he prudently determined, in the mean time, to dissemble his resentment, and in the first instance suggest to that power an acquisition of territory, which, by embroiling it irretrievably with England, would sow the seeds of ruin in what still remained of the coalition, and expose it, single and unaided, to the deadly strokes which he already meditated against its existence.—See BIGNON, v., 14.

* Bign., v., 14, 17. Hard., ix., 14, 28. Sav., ii., 148, 149.

† As this treaty is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of Prussia, it is due to the many high-minded and honourable men which the cabinet of Berlin contained, and especially that able statesman and intrepid counsellor, Baron Hardenberg, to say that it was signed by Haugwitz, of his own authority, at Vienna, without the knowledge or concurrence of the government at home; and that, so far were they from contemplating the extraordinary turn to the preju-

ready mentioned, by which the neutrality of that power had been stipulated, a combined fleet, having on board ten thousand Russian and three thousand English troops, cast anchor in the Bay of Naples, and soon after landed without experiencing any opposition. It was anticipated by the allies, what in effect happened, that this armament would have the effect of embroiling the court with the French emperor. Ferdinand, indeed, upon the arrival of this force, published a manifesto, in which he declared his resolution to abide by the treaty of neutrality and inability to resist the allied forces, and he publicly engaged in no measure of hostility against France; but his army was put on the war establishment, and placed under the direction of a Russian general. The queen did everything in her power to engage the cabinet in the war, and the French ambassador, disbelieving, or affecting to disbelieve, the court's professions of neutrality, immediately left Naples in great indignation; and the government, seeing a war inevitable, was taking measures for organizing a force in the south of Italy, when the battle of Austerlitz came, like a flash of lightning, to deliver them up unprotected to the wrath of the victor.*

It is probable that the common cause did not suffer materially from the absence of the pusillanimous troops of Naples from the theatre of war; but the case was very different with the forces which had been assembled in the north of Germany. Anxious to strike an important blow in that quarter, but not deeming their strength sufficient to venture on the Continent till the intentions of Prussia were declared, the British government had fitted out a considerable expedition, composed of the king's German legion and a strong body of English troops, amounting altogether to 18,000 men, which arrived in October in Swedish Pomerania, under the command of General Don and Lord Cathcart. To these were soon after joined a Swedish corps of 12,000 men, and a Russian force, under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, of 10,000; and it was the intention of the allies that the united force, of which the King of Sweden was to receive the command, having liberated Hanover and raised the military force of that electorate, should advance towards Holland, and, after freeing the United States from their chains, threaten the north of France. Many causes conspired to produce the miscarriage of this well-conceived expedition. The vehemence of the King of Sweden could not brook the vacillating conduct of the cabinet of Berlin, and he threatened that power in so unbecoming a manner, that the allies, who at that moment were negotiating to effect the accession of Prussia to the confederacy, were obliged to interfere in order accommodate matters, upon which he resigned the command and retired to Stralsund. Three weeks were consumed in negotiations to repair the breach; and when at length he was prevailed on to resume the direction, the period of successful action had passed. It was already the middle of November, and all that this powerful force could effect was to commence the siege of Hameln, when the battle of Austerlitz changed the face of Europe. The immediate effect of that blow, followed as it soon after was by the accession of Prussia to the French league, was

to dissolve this ill-combined armament; the Russians retired to Mecklenberg, the English re-embarked their forces, and the Swedes took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund.*

The negotiations with Austria, dictated by the irresistible power of Napoleon, Peace of Presburg, 27th Dec., 1805. a close. By the peace of Presburg, 1805. she was in a manner isolated from France, and to appearance rendered incapable of interfering again in the contests of Western Europe. To Bavaria she was compelled to cede the Tyrol and the Inviertel; to the kingdom of Italy, the whole Continental dominions of Venice. The whole changes to the south of the Alps, which had been the original cause of the war, were recognised. The electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg were elevated to the throne of their respective dominions, with large accessions of territory to each: to the former, besides the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, the principality of Echstadt, and various lesser lordships in Germany; to the latter, the five towns of the Danube, part of the Brisgau, and several other fiefs. Baden acquired the remainder of the Brisgau, with the Ortenau and town of Constance. In exchange for so many sacrifices, Austria merely received the small electorate of Salzburg and the possessions of the Teutonic order, which, from their dispersion in different states, were almost a nominal acquisition. But what was of still greater importance, the Emperor Francis was forced to engage "to throw no obstacles in the way, either as chief of the Empire, or as co-sovereign, of any acts which, in their character of sovereigns, the kings of Wirtemberg or Baden might think proper to adopt;" a clause which, by providing for the independent authority of their infant kingdoms, virtually dissolved the Germanic Empire. The counter stipulations were entirely illusory: Napoleon guaranteed, jointly with Austria, the independence of the Helvetic Confederacy, which he held in chains, and that of the Batavian Republic, which he already destined as a separate appanage for his brother Louis.†

Disastrous as these conditions were to the Austrian monarchy, the secret articles contained stipulations still more humiliating. By them it was provided that Austria was to pay a contribution of 40,000,000 francs, or £1,600,000, in addition to nearly an equal sum already levied by the French authorities in the conquered provinces, and the loss of all the military stores and magazines which had fallen into their hands, which were either sent off to France or sold for their behoof.‡ But her government judged wise-

* *Jom.*, ii., 196, 197. *Ann. Reg.*, 1805, 187, 188.

† *Martens*, iv. *Sup.*, vi., 212, 220. *Jom.*, ii., 195. *Dum.*, xiv., 236, and 339, 331.

‡ The losses of Austria by this treaty were:

	Population.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
She received.....	2,975,620	1,417	17,075,000
	271,000	86	2,900,000
Clear loss.....	2,704,620	1,331	14,175,000
Bavaria gained.....	681,000	526	3,490,000
Wirtemberg gained....	132,400	53	691,000
Baden gained.....	143,620	54	508,000
Kingdom of Italy gained	1,856,000	711	10,000,000

Besides this, the sums drawn from Austrian contributions, and from the sale of the vast warlike magazines which fell into the hands of the French, amounted to 85,000,000 francs, or £3,500,000.—*HARDENBERG*, ix., 472, and *BIGNON*, v., 32.

After this accession of territory, the newly-elected states stood as follows:

* *Bot.*, iv., 198, 199. *Ann. Reg.*, 1805, 193. *Jom.*, ii., 198, 199. *Bign.*, v., 35, 37.

ly that all these losses, how serious soever, might one day be repaired, if the nucleus of the army were preserved entire; and therefore they redeemed, at a heavy ransom, in virtue of permission contained in the secret articles of the treaty, a large portion of stores and artillery which had become the booty of the victor, and in secret resolved to exert all their efforts to repair in silence the military strength of the monarchy. It is this system, firmly resolved on and steadily executed, which has enabled them to rise superior to all their reverses, which has brought them triumphant through a war of twenty years' duration, and obliterated the effect of a series of defeats which would have prostrated the strength of any other people: a memorable example of the vast effect of perseverance in human affairs, and the manner in which it can not only compensate, in nations equally as individuals, the want of more brilliant acquirements, but obtain the final mastery over the greatest efforts of transitory passion.*†

This treaty was immediately followed by a measure hitherto unprecedented in the history of the King of Europe.—the pronouncing of dethronement against an independent sovereign, for no other cause than his having contemplated hostilities against the French emperor. On the 26th of December a menacing proclamation proceeded from Presburg, in the 37th bulletin, which evidently bore marks of Napoleon's composition, against the

house of Naples. The conqueror announced that Marshal St. Cyr would advance by rapid strides to Naples, "to punish the treason of a criminal queen, and precipitate her from the throne. We have pardoned that infatuated king, who thrice has done everything to ruin himself. Shall we pardon him a fourth time? shall we a fourth time trust a court without faith, without honour, without reason? No! *The dynasty of Naples has ceased to reign; its existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe and the honour of my crown.*" St. Cyr immediately received orders to march, in order to carry this decree into execution. Such was the first of those sentences of dethronement which

Napoleon afterward pronounced against the European monarchs, which substituted his own family for the ancient possessors in so many of the adjoining thrones, and ultimately, by a just retribution, overturned his own.*

This extraordinary severity towards a monarch who was only mediating hostilities against the French emperor, and had certainly done less injury to his dominions than any European dynasty, was one of the most unjustifiable acts of that relentless conqueror, and, at the same time, descriptive of that mixture of caution and prudence by which his ambitious enterprises were always regulated. Let the case be put as the French themselves stated it. The ambassador and cabinet of Naples, with the dagger at their throat, and under the threat of immediate invasion, had agreed, on the 21st of September, to a treaty of neutrality, which was ratified by the court, under the like menaces, on the 8th of October. The arrival of the Russian and English squadron in the Bay of Naples six weeks afterward liberated them from their apprehensions, and the cabinet was preparing to violate the former treaty, and join in the coalition against France. Such a departure from national faith was dishonourable: it was a fair ground for hostility, and might have justified exactions of considerable magnitude: but was it a sufficient reason for dethronement? That is the point; and if it is, what European dynasty has not, fifty times over, justly provoked this severity? How often, on this principle, has Napoleon himself deserved that penalty for having violated solemn treaties, when it suited his own convenience, almost before the ink with which they were signed was dry? And what excuse is to be made for the Revolutionary government of France, which so often sent its armies into the adjoining states to proclaim war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and everywhere rouse, by its emissaries and proclamations, the Democratic authorities to break through all former national engagements, upon the principle that treaties made by despots can never bind the emancipated sons of freedom! But this has in every age been the system of the Revolutionary party. None so loud as they are in the condemnation of the principles, when acted on by others, on which their own entire previous conduct had been founded.

In fact, however, this unprecedented act of dethroning an independent sovereign, merely because he was making preparations for hostilities contrary to a subsisting treaty, was instigated by a different motive. Already Napoleon had formed the secret design of encircling France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of subsidiary crowns, and of placing on all the neighbouring thrones the members of his own family. He began with Naples, because its inhabitants were the most unwelcome, and therefore the least likely to offer any resistance to the change; and because an unerring instinct led him to regard as enemies every member of the Bourbon family, wherever situated. Subsequent instances of the same rapacious policy will occur in the cases of Holland, Spain, and Prussia; and without a constant reference to this grand object, it is impossible to explain the extraordinary rigour which he uniformly manifested towards the inconsiderable states in his vicinity, and the comparative lenity evinced to the great military monarchies whose

	Population.	Army.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
Bavaria.....	3,250,000	60,000	1,760	21,000,000
Wirttemberg..	1,154,000	20,000	346	8,000,000
Baden.....	569,000	10,000	260	6,000,000
But Austria retained	24,900,000	230,000	10,936	110,000,000

Bavaria by this means was rendered as powerful as Prussia was at the accession of the Great Frederic.—HARDENBERG, ix., 472, 474. App., and 23, 24, and *Stat. des Etats Autrichiens, par le Baron LICHTENSTEIN.*

* Hard., ix., 17, 19, 25. Dum., xiv., 426, 428.

† It is evident, from the statistical details given in the preceding note, that Napoleon had no intention, by the peace of Presburg, of totally overthrowing the Austrian monarchy. He wished only to throw its strength to the eastward, and prevent it from coming in contact with, or feeling jealousy at, his acquisitions in Italy or Germany. He proposed to interpose a barrier of subordinate kingdoms, dependant on France, between his empire and the hereditary states—the kingdom of Italy to the south of the Alps, those of Bavaria and Wirttemberg to the north of those mountains. Talleyrand, improving upon this idea, went so far as to propose the cession to Austria of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, as the means of giving them the command of the Danube, inducing them to extend themselves to the eastward, and throwing a perpetual bone of contention between the cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Napoleon deemed this too hazardous for immediate execution, as precluding all hope of accommodation with Russia, with whom he was extremely desirous of concluding a treaty, with a view to turning his undivided force against England.—See BIGNON, v., 87.

* Bign., v., 34. Hard., ix., 20

hostilities had always been as implacable as they were formidable.

The remaining career of Napoleon during this memorable year was a continued triumphal procession. On the 29th of December he announced the conclusion of peace to his soldiers,* and at the same time complimented the burgher guard of Vienna on their exemplary conduct during the occupation of their capital by his troops, and, as a mark of his esteem, restored to them the city arsenal, containing, besides its arms, a number of standards taken in the wars with the Turks. He could well afford to be generous: the public arsenal had yielded to him two thousand pieces of cannon, which were already far advanced on their road to France. At Munich he arrived on the 31st of

December, and on the day following appeared the proclamation in which he announced to the enraptured inhabitants the elevation of the elector to the royal dignity. There also he was met by the Empress Josephine: a succession of fêtes of unprecedented splendour succeeded, in the course of which Eugene Beauharnois, as the deserved reward of valour, probity, and glory, received the hand of the Princess Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria. At the same time, the grandson of the Elector of Baden was married to Stephanie Beauharnois, adopted daughter of the French emperor. On this occasion Napoleon, in default of his own lawful issue, called Eugene Beauharnois to the succession of the throne of Italy. The formation of a common system of conglomeration was at the same time announced to the Senate in these terms: "We reserve to ourselves the power to make known by ulterior dispositions the bonds which we propose to establish, *after our own demise*, between all the states in alliance with the French Empire, which, as depending on a common interest, absolutely require a common tie." Finally, a hundred days after the army had crossed the Rhine at Strasbourg, the emperor recrossed the same river at the same place, and proceeded by rapid journeys, under triumphal arches, amid applauding multitudes, to Paris, where he arrived on the 25th of January. A hundred days! unparalleled in the past history of Europe for the magnitude and splendour of the events which they embraced; during which had occurred the capitulation of Ulm, the triumphs of Austerlitz, the shock of Trafalgar;† but destined to be eclipsed by another hundred days, in future time, fraught with still more momentous occurrences, the recollection of which shall endure till time itself shall be no more.‡

* "Peace has just been signed with the Emperor of Austria. You have, in the last autumn, made two campaigns; you have seen your emperor share your dangers and your fatigues; I wish, also, that you should see him surrounded with the grandeur and splendour which belong to the sovereign of the first people in the universe. You shall all be there; we shall celebrate the memory of those who have died in these two campaigns in the field of honour; the world shall ever see us ready to follow their example, or to do even more than we have hitherto accomplished, if necessary, to vindicate our national honour, or resist the efforts of those who give way to the seductions of the eternal enemies on the Continent." Almost before the cannon of Austerlitz had ceased to sound, Napoleon was contemplating a Prussian war.—BIGNON, v., 41.

† Bignon, v., 39, 53. Dum., xiv., 237, 239.

‡ The public authorities had prepared a magnificent reception for Napoleon; but he disappointed them by entering Paris in the night, unattended by any escort. He had previously sent the forty-five standards taken at Austerlitz to the Senate, who deposited them with extraordinary pomp in the halls of the Luxembourg.—JOMINI, ii., 209.

The campaign of Austerlitz is the most remarkable, in a military point of view, which the history of the war afforded. In no other year were events of such magnitude crowded together, nor had achievements so vast rewarded the combinations of genius. When we recollect that in the beginning of August the French army was still cantoned on the heights of Boulogne, and that by the first week of December Vienna was taken, and the strength of Austria and Russia finally prostrated in the heart of Moravia, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the successes gained, and the celerity with which ruin was brought on the coalesced powers. The march across France and Germany, the enveloping of Mack, the advance to Vienna, the thunderbolt of Austerlitz, were all concluded in four months! In the first division of the war, Austria struggled for six years in doubtful hostility against the Republic; in the second, she brought it to the brink of ruin, and yielded only, after a desperate strife of four years, to the ardent genius of Napoleon and the scientific combinations of Moreau; but in the third, she was utterly prostrated, though supported by all the might of Russia, under Alexander in person, in two months after her troops first came into collision with France! The extent of these triumphs, great as it is, is less surprising than its celerity; and we are naturally led to ask where, in these disastrous days, were the heroes who so long arrested the arms of Napoleon under the walls of Mantua, and drove the troops of the Directory, at the point of the bayonet, from the banks of the Adige to the shores of the Var? Blunders undoubtedly were committed, misfortunes occurred, but they were not peculiar to this season or this campaign; and in the long catalogue of imperial fatuity parallels are not wanting to the advance to Ulm or the flank march of Austerlitz. What was it, then, which made these false steps for the first time in European history irretrievable, and rendered errors in tactics the cause, not of the loss of towns or the retreat of armies, but the overthrow of empires and the dissolution of confederacies?

This astonishing result was doubtless, in some degree, owing to the French emperor having now for the first time chosen as the theatre of war the valley of the Danube, the natural avenue to the hereditary states, the line where neither fortresses nor mountains impeded his march, but a great navigable river constantly furnished the means of transport and supplies to the army. In former wars, the contest lay in corners of the Empire; in the plains of Flanders, among the fortresses of Italy, or the ridges of the Alps; and a disaster, however great, led only to the loss of the immediate theatre of combat: but in the present all these minor objects were relinquished, and the main strength of the invader was concentrated in the direct road from Paris to Vienna. By a singular infatuation, with which the Archduke Charles is no ways chargeable, as he had clearly pointed out the danger, the Aulic Council had left this wide avenue totally defenceless; and while they sent the bulk of their forces, under their best commanders, to the Italian plains, on which side the Empire was already protected by the fortified line of the Adige and the ridges of the Alps, they intrusted the defence of the shores of the Danube, though threatened by Napoleon in person, to an

inferior army, under the guidance of an inexperienced commander. The ruinous effects of this error were perceived, not only in the magnitude of the disasters which were incurred, but the irretrievable consequences with which they were attended. Like a skilful player at chess, Napoleon struck at the heart of his adversaries' power while they were accumulating forces round his extremities; and when he held Vienna in his grasp, and struck them to the earth at Austerlitz, the army of the Archduke Charles, equal in numbers to his own, was uselessly employed in traversing the defiles of the Rætian Alps.

This extraordinary success, however, was not gained without proportionate risk; and it was evident, even to the most superficial observer, that the imprudence of the allies in giving battle at Austerlitz had extricated him from the most perilous situation in which he had stood since the commencement of his career. At Marengo Italy only was at stake, and his retreat, in case of disaster, was open by the St. Gothard and the St. Bernard: at Campo Formio the principal army of France was still unengaged, and Moreau, with a vast force, was preparing to advance to his support through Southern Germany; but before the battle of Austerlitz his last reserves had arrived: the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand men, was menacing one flank, while Prussia, with an equal force, was preparing to descend upon another, and the Emperor of Russia was in his front with a host hourly increasing and nearly equal to his own. Delay in such circumstances was ruin; advance with such force in his rear was impossible; retreat was the first step to perdition. Vast as the forces of France were at the commencement of the campaign, they were fairly overmatched by the banded strength of Europe: great as the talents of Napoleon were, his daring stroke at the vitals of his enemies had brought him into a situation from whence extrication, save by their imprudence, was impossible. They had nothing to do but retreat towards Poland or Hungary, and the invader must, to all human appearance, have been enveloped and destroyed. To hazard a battle when such chances were accumulating against him, after the experience they had had of the prowess of his troops, appears such an act of imprudence, that one is almost tempted to believe that Providence, as part of its great design for the government of human affairs, had struck the allied chiefs with judicial blindness, in order that the mighty drama might end in a deeper tragedy—a still more righteous moral retribution.

But, though this rapid advance to the heart of the Empire was one of the immediate causes of the extraordinary conquests of the French emperor, yet it was by no means the principal; and though, perhaps, his triumphs might not have been so rapid, the result would probably have been the same under a more cautious system, although he had chosen any other theatre for the contest. It was the astonishing increase in the military power of France during the five years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities which was the principal cause of the rapid overthrow of the Austrian power. Napoleon poured down the valley of the Danube with a hundred and eighty thousand men, while Massena held the Archduke Charles in check in Italy

with twice the numbers which fought the battle of Marengo. Forces so vast never had before been brought into action at any period of the war: nor was this display merely an ephemeral effort; it was from an armed body of six hundred thousand men* that France maintained the contest, and she was capable of keeping them on foot for an indefinite period. It was at once evident, upon the commencement of hostilities, that her military power had increased more during five years of peace than nine years of previous warfare; and that Austria, nearly a match single-handed for her ancient rival when she laid down her arms, was totally unequal to the contest when she resumed them.

This great change is one of the most remarkable transitions of the war, and more descriptive than any other which occurred of that profound and unceasing system of military aggrandizement which formed the leading feature in the foreign policy of Napoleon. When he sheathed his victorious sword at the peace of Luneville, moderation and equity breathed in all his proclamations, and he professed the most anxious desire to cultivate only the arts of peace. But in the midst of these professions, and while the Continent was in a state of profound tranquillity, he was silently but incessantly augmenting his warlike resources, increasing his levies, disciplining his forces, new-modelling his army, incorporating all lesser states with his dominions; and the fruit of these perpetual pacific advances appeared in the most decisive manner on the resumption of hostilities, when he was enabled at once to beat down powers which had previously waged a long and doubtful war with the Republic. It was on this principle that his conduct was invariably founded: every interval of warfare was employed only in the preparation of additional military forces or the annexation of some minor state to his dominions; and he never appeared so terrible as when he first came to a rupture with the powers with whom he had contracted the closest alliances and been longest on terms of the most apparent cordiality. Five years of Continental peace followed the treaty of Luneville; but a hundred and eighty thousand men sprung up, as if by enchantment, to follow the standards of Napoleon on its termination: ten years of neutrality or alliance with the cabinet of Berlin ensued after the treaty of Bâle; but at one stroke he felled the Prussian monarchy to the earth, when she at last took up arms: for twelve years Spain laid her treasures and resources at his feet; but he rewarded that fidelity by the dethronement of her sovereign and the seizure of her dominions: he professed eternal friendship to Alexander at Tilsit; but during the five years of alliance which followed he was preparing the five hundred thousand warriors whom he afterward led to the Kremlin. It is the perception of this undeviating policy, and of the enormous additions which every interval of peace made to his warlike strength, which forms

Similar growth during peace characterized all the reign of Napoleon.

* Strength of the French army in August, 1805.

Troops of the line	341,000 men.
Light infantry	100,130
Light horse	60,554
Heavy horse, or of the line	16,944
Artillery	46,489
Engineers	900
Gendarmerie	15,691
Imperial Guard	8,500

Besides Coast guard, 100,000 strong. .590,208
—See PUCHET, 576-8.

the true and unanswerable vindication of the conduct of the British cabinet throughout the struggle. That he had from the very first signalized England for destruction, he has told us himself, and proved by every part of his conduct. To what advantage he could turn the shortest breathing-time in warfare, even on that element where his power was weakest, is demonstrated by the vast increase in the French marine on the breaking out of hostilities: an increase which, compared with its situation at the peace of Amiens, is a more signal instance of warlike resurrection than even the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz. Had any one predicted, in 1800, that, before five years had elapsed, Napoleon was to have the means of assembling seventy sail of the line in the Channel, and actually to combat Nelson with a force superior to the greatest fleet England could fit out, he would have been deemed much less worthy of credit than if he had foretold that at the same period Austria was to be prostrated in a single campaign. Peace was impossible with an enemy actuated by such a principle, and capable of turning to such account every interval of war; and the result has abundantly proved the justice of these views, for while the military strength of France arose more terrible after every pacification on the Continent of Europe, her naval power, thus wonderfully recruited during the peace of Amiens, never recovered the unbroken warfare which followed the disaster of Trafalgar.

Doubtless the abilities displayed by Napoleon during this campaign were of the very highest order. The secrecy and rapidity of the march of so vast a body of troops across France; the semicircular sweep by which they interposed between Mack and the hereditary states, and compelled the surrender of that unhappy chief with half his army; the precision with which nearly two hundred thousand men, converging from the shores of the Channel, the coasts of Brest, the marshes of Holland, and the banks of the Elbe, were made to arrive each at the hour appointed around the ramparts of Ulm; the swift advance on Vienna; the subsequent fanlike dispersion of the army to overawe the hereditary states; their sudden concentration for the decisive fight at Austerlitz; the skill displayed in that contest itself, and the admirable account to which he turned the fatal cross-march of the allied sovereigns, are so many proofs of military ability never exceeded even in the annals of his previous triumphs. At the same time, it is not to be imagined that the difference in the magnitude of the results which were obtained is to be considered as the measure of the talent displayed in this as compared with other campaigns. It was the immensity of the force now at the disposal of the French emperor, and the incomparable discipline and organization which it had obtained while encamped on the shores of the Channel, which were the principal cause of the difference. It is no longer a general supplying by consummate talents, as at Arcola and Rivoli, for deficiency of numbers, that we see maintaining a long, doubtful, and desperate strife; we behold a mighty conqueror, whose power was irresistible, sweeping over the earth with the fierce tempest of Scythian war. In the results of this campaign were evinced more than the military talents of the general: the previous preparations of the emperor, the deeply-matured combinations of the statesman, produced their

natural results: he did not now take the field with a force which left anything to chance; he appeared with such a host as almost made him the master of fate; and the fruit of five years' pacific preparation appeared in the reduction of the contest to a desperate strife of a few months' duration.

Great, however, as were the abilities, unbounded the resources of the French emperor in this memorable campaign, ^{Errors of the allies.} it was not to them alone that he was indebted for its unparalleled triumphs. The errors of the Austrians, the infatuation of the allied cabinets, had their full share in the general result. Untaught by the disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the Aulic Council rushed inconsiderately into the field, and, leaving the Archduke Charles with eighty thousand in Italy, they exposed Mack, with an inferior force, to the shock of Napoleon in the valley of the Danube. When that ill-fated commander found himself cut off from his line of communication with Vienna by the interposition of Bernadotte in his rear, instead of instantly taking a decisive part, and falling with his whole forces upon the enemy behind him, or retiring by the only road which was yet open to the mountains of the Tyrol, he remained for ten days paralyzed at Ulm, sending out detachments, first in one direction, then in another, all of which met with superior forces and were defeated, thereby both breaking down the spirit of his own troops and giving the invader time to envelop with his immense masses their fortified position. In vain had the foresight of the Archduke Charles, at the close of the preceding war, surrounded the heights of Ulm with a vast intrenched camp, capable of bidding defiance to and stopping the advance of the greatest invading force: the improvidence of the Aulic Council, by providing no magazines within its walls, had rendered these preparations of no avail; and Mack found himself, after a week's blockade, reduced to the necessity of feeding on horseflesh, and ultimately capitulating, with thirty thousand of the best troops of the monarchy. When the rapid advance of Napoleon towards Vienna threatened to separate the Russian forces from the retreating columns of the Archduke Charles, and everything depended on the destruction of the bridge of the capital, the credulous simplicity of the officer in command at that important station delivered it unscathed into his hands, and gave him the means of interposing safely between their converging armies, and striking tremendous blows from his central position, first on the one bank and then on the other. When the allies were reduced to their last throw on the plains of Moravia; when everything counselled a cautious policy, and forces capable of annihilating the invaders were accumulating on all sides; when the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand undiscouraged veterans, was within sight of the steeples of Vienna, and Prussia, with a hundred thousand men, was preparing to descend upon the Danube; when, by simply retreating and drawing the enemy on, with such formidable armies in his rear, the allies must inevitably have led him to destruction or driven him to a disastrous retreat, their ill-judged confidence compelled them prematurely into action, and their rash flank march, in presence of such a general and such an army, enabled him to gain a decisive victory when on the verge of destruction.*

* In a memoir presented to the British government by the

But most of all is Prussia answerable for the ruinous effects of this campaign. She was clearly warned of her danger: the indecision of Prussia. Mr. Pitt had prefigured it to her in colours brighter than the light. The violation of the territory of Anspach had demonstrated in what manner she was regarded by the conqueror—that he contemned her menaces, despised her power, and reserved for her only the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. Then was the time to have taken a decisive part; then was the moment to have made amends for the vacillations of ten years, and, by a cordial union with Austria and Russia, put a final stop to the progress of the enemy. No one can doubt that, if she had done so, such would have been the result. A simple declaration of war would have arrested the decisive march of Bernadotte into the rear of Mack; allowed time for his army to have retired to the Inn; permitted the Russians to join the unbroken strength of the Austrian monarchy; and compelled Napoleon, instead of a menacing offensive with superior, to have commenced a cautious defensive with inferior forces. When the boundless calamities which such a determination would, to all human appearance, have prevented to Europe are con-

cabinet of Vienna, after the peace of Presburg, the disasters of the campaign were ascribed, 1. To the failure, on the part of the allied powers, to realize in the north of Germany those promised diversions which might have prevented him from accumulating his whole force in that country, and especially that in the electorate of Hanover on the Austrian forces on the Danube. 2. To the unexpected violation of the territory of Anspach, which compelled the Austrian army either to fall back on the Inn, or see itself cut off from its base of operations. 3. To the fault of General Mack, who, instead of adopting the former alternative, and retiring to form a junction with Kutsoff in the hereditary states, remained immovable on the Iller till he was surrounded by superior forces. 4. To the delay experienced in the march of the second Russian army, in consequence of the armaments of Prussia, which, until its intentions were fixed by the Emperor Alexander in person, detained it above a month in observation on the Polish frontier. 5. To the negligence of Prince Auersberg in not destroying the bridge over the Danube at Vienna, which at once gave them the command of both banks, and exposed Kutsoff to imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed before he could effect a junction with the reserves under Buxhowden.—See HARD., viii., 512.

There can be no doubt that these causes all conspired to bring about the enormous calamities of the campaign. But without disputing their influence, and fully admitting the ruinous effects of the indecision of Mack, and the want of foresight of the Aulic Council in not having provided adequate magazines either at Ulm or in Moravia, it must yet, in common fairness, be admitted that Prussia and England had an equal share in bringing about the common calamities. The vacillations of the former power from the first paralyzed both Russia and England: the former by detaining those forces long in Poland, which, earlier advanced, might have changed the fate of the campaign; the latter by preventing, from the dread of irritating so weighty a power, those important operations in the north of Germany, which would so materially have relieved the overwhelming pressure of Napoleon on the Danube. Hanover was the ill gotten spoil which at that critical moment tied up the hands of Prussia, and brought on her the catastrophe of Jena and Tilsit. England must take her share also of the common responsibility, not only in having, in conjunction with Russia, suggested the unhappy appointment of Mack to the command,* but also, by abstaining from all Continental hostilities till the campaign was decided, permitted that accumulation of force by which he was overwhelmed. Great Britain, secure in her seagirt citadel, had then 500,000 men in arms. Had she despatched eighty thousand of this vast force early in the campaign to a decisive point, had her troops marched up from the heights of Boulogne for the Rhine, and boldly attacked the enemy in Flanders, the march of troops which cut off the retreat of Mack would have been prevented; and Prussia would probably have been determined, by such a demonstration, to have thrown her weight into the scale in time to prevent the subjugation of Europe.

* Hard., viii., 512.

sidered, it is impossible not to be filled with the most poignant regret at the temporizing policy which occasioned their continuance, or to avoid the feeling, that as to Prussia, more than any other power, these misfortunes had been owing, so it was a most righteous dispensation which made them fall more heavily on her than on any of the states which had bravely struggled to avert them.

In fact, the forces which Mr. Pitt had now arrayed for this last and decisive struggle against France were of the most formidable description; and the success with which he had triumphed over all the jealousies of the European powers is the brightest page in his diplomatic career. After repeated failures, the great work was at length accomplished: the Continental sovereigns were united in a cordial league to stop the progress of the conqueror, and armies fully adequate to the task were assembled at their command. Disaster had at last taught them wisdom; the presence of a common danger had, at that moment at least, extinguished their jealousies. For the first time since the commencement of the war, Austria and Prussia stood forth, backed by Russia, for the fight, and five hundred thousand veterans, led by their sovereigns in person, were prepared to roll back to the Rhine the tide of Gallic invasion. The principles of the coalition were as just as its forces were immense; and the powers who had suffered so much from French ambition were bound by a secret compact neither to attempt any conquest on its original territory, nor interfere in the internal frame of its government.* Restitution of what it had reft from others, security against its aggression in future, alone were to be insisted on. To say that this great and equitable confederacy was unsuccessful—that its fortunes were shaken at Ulm, thrown down at Austerlitz—is no impeachment whatever, either of the justness of its principles or the wisdom of its general combinations. Mr. Pitt necessarily intrusted the execution of its details to the allied sovereigns or their generals, and it was by them that the fatal errors were committed. No foresight on his part could have prevented the inconsiderate advance to Ulm, or the ruinous cross-march at Austerlitz—no efforts that he could make, and he spared none, were able to bring Prussia at the critical moment into the field. The vulgar, in all ages, are governed merely by the result, and award praise or censure according as victory is won or lost; but it is the noblest province and first duty of history to separate the accidental from the intrinsic in estimating the merits of human conduct. Judging by this standard, it will give the highest praise in diplomatic ability to Mr. Pitt for the formation of this confederacy, and the extinction of the jealousies on all sides which had so long hindered its construction; and disregard, in the estimate of that merit, its calamitous result, as much as, in weighing the military greatness of Napoleon, it will overlook the disastrous issue of his later campaigns, and award to him a higher place for his last conflict with superior forces in the plains of Champagne, than when triumphing on the heights of Austerlitz, or striking down the Prussian monarchy on the field of Jena.

The dissolution of this great confederacy,

* See note, 11th of January, 1805, Mr. Pitt to Russian ambassador.—*Ante*, ii., 309.

Ability displayed by Mr. Pitt in the formation of this confederacy.

His last illness and death. which he had so long laboured to construct, and from which he confidently expected such important results, was fatal, however, to the master-spirit which had formed it. The constitution of Mr. Pitt, long weakened by the fatigues and the excitement incident to his situation, sunk at length under the dissolution of the confederacy. In vain he tried the waters of Bath—in vain he retired for a while from the fatigues of office: his constitution was worn out by the labours, the anxiety, and the excitement which have proved fatal to so many Parliamentary leaders, and, while yet hardly advanced beyond middle life, he already felt the weakness of age. Upon a frame thus enfeebled, the disappointment and anguish arising from the prostration of the last hopes of European freedom by the defeat of Austerlitz, fell with accumulating force. From the time the disastrous news were received he hourly declined, and political distress accelerated an event already approaching from natural causes. A devouring fever seized his blood—delirium quenched the fire of his genius. In the intervals of rest his thoughts, however, still were riveted to the fortunes of his country. After a melancholy survey of the map of Europe, he turned away, saying, "Henceforth we may close that map for half a century;" so little could the greatest intellect anticipate that general resurrection of the principles of freedom which even then was beginning, and which his own efforts had so largely contributed to produce. At the close of a lingering illness, which he bore with the wonted fortitude of his character, he expired at his house in London, on the 23d of January, 1806, exclaiming, with his last breath, "Alas! my country!" not less the victim of devotion to patriotic duty than if he had been pierced through the heart on the field of battle.*

Thus perished, at the age of forty-seven, while still at the zenith of his intellectual powers, William Pitt. Considered with reference to the general principles by which his conduct was regulated, and the constancy with which he maintained them through adverse fortune, the history of Europe has not so great a statesman to exhibit. Called into action at the most critical and eventful period in the annals, not merely of his country, but of modern times, he firmly and nobly fulfilled his destiny: placed in the vanguard of the conflict between ancient freedom and modern Democracy, he maintained his ground from first to last, under circumstances the most adverse, with unconquerable resolution. If the coalitions which he formed were repeatedly dissolved; if the projects which he cherished were frequently unfortunate, the genius which had planned, the firmness which had executed them, were never subdued; and from every disaster he rose only greater and more powerful, till exhausted nature sunk under the struggle. If the calamities which befell Europe during his administration were great, the advantages which accrued to his own country were unbounded; and before he was called from the helm he had seen not merely its independence secured by the battle of Trafalgar, but its power and influence raised to the very highest pitch by an unprecedented series of maritime successes. Victories unexampled in the annals of naval glory attended every period of his career: in the midst of a desperate strife in Europe he extended

the colonial empire of England into every quarter of the globe; and when the Continental nations thought all the energies of his country were concentrated on the struggle with Napoleon, he found means to stretch his mighty arms into another hemisphere, strike down the throne of Tip-poo Saib in the heart of Hindostan, and extend the British dominion over the wide extent of the Indian Peninsula. Under his administration the revenue, trade, and manufactures of England were doubled, its colonies and political strength quadrupled; and he raised an island in the Atlantic, once only a remote province of the Roman Empire, to such a pitch of grandeur as to be enabled to bid defiance to the world in arms.

But these external successes, great as they were, were but a part of the lasting Principles of benefits of Mr. Pitt's government. his domestic administration. It was the interior which was the scene of his real greatness; there the durable monuments of his intellect are to be seen. Inheriting from his father, the great Lord Chatham, a sincere love of freedom; early imbued with liberal principles, the strenuous supporter of the relaxation of the fetters of trade, financial improvement, Catholic emancipation, and such a practical and equitable system of parliamentary reform as promised to correct the inequalities complained of, without injustice to individuals or danger to the state, he was, at the same time, as fully alive to the extreme risk of legislating precipitately on such vital subjects, or permitting Democratic ambition, under the name of a desire of improvement, to agitate the public mind at a hazardous time by attempts to remodel the institutions of society. No sooner, therefore, did the French Revolution break out, and it had become evident that a social convulsion was designed, than he threw his weight into the opposite scale; and though the advocate for a strict neutrality, till the murder of the king had thrown down the gauntlet to every established government, when once fairly drawn into the contest he espoused it with the whole ardour and perseverance of his character, and became the soul of all the confederacies which, during the remainder of his life, were framed to oppose a barrier to the diffusion of its principles and the ravages of its armies. The steady friend of freedom, he was on that very account the resolute opponent of Democracy: the deadly, because the unsuspected, enemy by whose triumphs in every age its principles have been subverted and its blessings destroyed. When the greatest intellects in Europe were reeling under the shock; when the ardent and philanthropic were everywhere rejoicing in the prospects of boundless felicity which the regeneration of society was supposed to be opening; when Mr. Fox was pronouncing the Revolutionary Constitution of France "the most stupendous monument of political wisdom and integrity ever yet raised on the basis of public-virtue in any age or country," his superior sagacity, like that of Burke, beheld amid the deceitful blaze the small black cloud which was to cover the universe with darkness. Watching with incessant vigilance the changeful forms of the Jacobin spirit, ever unravelling its sophistry, detecting its perfidy, unveiling its oppression, he thenceforth directed the gigantic energies of his mind towards the construction of a barrier which might restrain its excesses; and if he could not prevent it from bathing France in blood and ravaging Europe with war, he at least effectually opposed its entrance into the British dominions.

* Gifford's Pitt, iii., 347, 360. Ann. Reg., 1806, 13, 14.

With admirable foresight, he there established a system of finances adequate to the emergency, and which proved the mainspring of the continued, and at length successful, resistance which was opposed to revolutionary ambition;* with indomitable perseverance, he rose superior to every disaster, and incessantly laboured to frame, out of the discordant and selfish cabinets of Europe, a cordial league for their common defence. Alone of all the statesmen of his age, he from the outset appreciated the full extent of the danger, both to the independence of nations and the liberty of mankind, which was threatened by the spread of Democratic principles, and continually inculcated the necessity of relinquishing every minor object to unite in guarding against the advances of this new and tremendous enemy. And the event has abundantly proved the justice of these principles, for while liberty perished in a few months in France, amid the fervour of Revolutionary ambition, it steadily grew and flourished in the British Empire; and the forty years which immediately followed the commencement of his resistance to Democratic ambition were not only the most glorious, but the freest of its existence.

Châteaubriand has said, "that while all other contemporary reputations, even that of Napoleon, are on the decline, the fame of Mr. Pitt alone is continually increasing, and seems to derive fresh lustre from every vicissitude of fortune." It is not merely the greatness and the constancy of the British statesman which has drawn forth this magnificent eulogium; it is the demonstration which subsequent events have afforded of the justice of his principles which is the real cause of the steady growth and enduring stability of his fame. Without the despotism of Napoleon, the freedom of the Restoration, the revolt of the barricades, and the military government of Louis Philippe, his reputation would have been incomplete in foreign transactions; without the passing of the Reform Bill, and the subsequent ascendant of Democratic ambition in Great Britain, his worth would never have been appreciated in domestic government. Every hour, abroad and at home, is now illustrating the truth of his principles. He was formerly admired by a party in England as the champion of aristocratic rights; he is now looked back to by the nation as the last steady asserter of general freedom: his doctrines were formerly prevalent chiefly among the great and the affluent; they are now embraced by the generous, the thoughtful, the unprejudiced of every rank; by all who regard passing events with the eye of historic inquiry, or are attached to liberty as the birthright of the human race, not the means of elevating a party to absolute power. To his speeches we now turn as to a voice issuing from the tomb, fraught with prophetic warnings of future disaster. It is contrast which gives brightness to the colours of history; it is experience which brings conviction to the cold lessons of political wisdom. Many and eloquent have been the eulogiums pronounced on Mr. Pitt's memory, but all panegyrics are lifeless compared to that furnished by Earl Grey's administration.

Foreign writers of every description have fallen into a signal mistake in estimating the policy of this great statesman. They all represent

him as governed by an ardent desire to elevate his own country—the mortal enemy, on that account, of the French nation—and as influenced through life by a Machiavelian desire to promote the confusion and misery of the Continent, in order that England might thereby engross the commerce of the world. There never was a more erroneous opinion. For the first ten years of his political life, Mr. Pitt was not only noways hostile to France, but its steadfast friend. So far from being actuated by a commercial jealousy of that country, he had embraced the generous maxim of Mr. Smith's philosophy, that the prosperity of every state is mainly dependant on the prosperity of those which surround it.* Had he been influenced by the malevolent designs which they suppose, he would not have adhered to a strict neutrality when France was pierced to the heart in 1792, but before the revolutionary levies were completed, have raised the standard to avenge the interference of its government in the American war. It was not against France, but *Republican* France, that his hostility was directed; it was not French warfare, but French propagandism, which he dreaded; and his efforts would have been equally persevering to resist Russia or Austria by the aid of the Gallic legions, if these insidious principles had emanated from their states.

If, from the contemplation of the general principles of Mr. Pitt's government, we turn to the consideration of the particular measures which he often embraced, we shall find much more room for difference of opinion. Unequalled in the ability with which he overcame the jealousies and awakened the activity of cabinets, he was by no means equally felici-

Erroneous views of foreign writers on his designs

* In the debate on the Treaty of Commerce with France, on February 12, 1787, Mr. Fox said, "France is the natural enemy of Great Britain; and she now wishes, by entering into a commercial treaty with us, to tie up our hands and prevent us from engaging in alliances with other powers. All the most glorious periods of our history have been when in hostility; all the most disgraceful when in alliance with that power. It is the disgrace of the Tories that they have interfered to stop these glorious successes. This country should never, on any account, enter into too close an alliance with France; the true situation is the bulwark of the oppressed whom that ambitious power has attacked."

"The honourable gentleman has said," observed Mr. Pitt, "that France is the natural enemy of England: I repudiate the sentiment. I see no reason whatever why two great and powerful nations should always be in a state of hostility merely because they are neighbours; on the contrary, I think their prosperity is mutually dependant on each other, and as a British subject, not less than a citizen of the world, I entertain the sincerest wish for the prosperity and happiness of that great country. To suppose that one nation is unalterably the enemy of another nation, is weak and childish; having no foundation in the experience of nations, it is a libel on the constitution of human societies, and supposing the existence of diabolical malice in the original frame of man."* Nor were these sentiments merely uttered in the heat of debate; they were carried into effect in every great and important legislative measure; and this statesman, whom the Continental writers represent as the eternal, inveterate enemy of France, concluded a commercial treaty between that country and Great Britain, which in liberality far surpasses anything ever proposed by the warmest modern advocates of free trade. It stipulated "a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each party in all the kingdoms of Europe." The wines of France were to obtain admission on the same terms as those of Portugal: their brandy on paying a duty of 7s. a gallon; their oil on the same terms as that of the most favoured nation; their hardware, cutlery, and iron-work on a duty *ad valorem* of 10 per cent. ! So wide is the common opinion of the principles of this great statesman from the truth!—See the *Treaty in Parl. Hist.*, xxvi., 234-240.

* See Chap. XLI., "on the British Finances."

* Parl. Hist., xxvi., 392, 402.

tous in the warlike measures which he recommended for their adoption. Napoleon has observed that he had no turn for military combinations,* and a retrospect of the campaigns which he had a share in directing must, with every impartial mind, confirm the justice of the opinion. By not engaging England as a principal in the contest, and trusting for land operations almost entirely to the Continental armies, put in motion by British subsidies, he prolonged the war for an indefinite period, and ultimately brought upon the country losses and expenses much greater than would have resulted from a more vigorous policy in the commencement. By directing the national strength chiefly to colonial acquisitions, he succeeded, indeed, ultimately in wresting from the enemy all their maritime possessions, and raising the commercial prosperity of the country to the very highest pitch; but this was done at the cost of a war of twelve years' duration, and an addition of above three hundred millions to the national debt; whereas, by the vigorous application of a comparatively inconsiderable English force to the heart of the enemy's power at the outset, or when their resources were failing, before the arrival of Napoleon at the helm, he would, in all human probability, have gained the same object at a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and, at the same time, liberated the Continent from Gallic oppression. In warlike combinations he was too much inclined to follow out the Austrian system of simultaneous operations over an extensive circle; and to waste those forces on the reduction of sugar islands, or useless descents with small bodies on the coasts of France, which, if concentrated upon the decisive point, would have accelerated by twenty years the triumphs of Toulouse and Waterloo. In justice to the British statesman, however, it must be observed, that at that period eighty years of repose, and the disastrous results of the American war, had weakened the military spirit of the nation, and dimmed the recollections of its ancient renown; and that no one deemed it capable of those vast and persevering efforts on land which at length brought the contest to a glorious termination.

"It is needless," say the Republicans, "to raise statues to Mr. Pitt's memory, he has raised up an indestructible monument to himself in the national debt. His name will never be forgotten as long as taxes are paid by the British people." If, however, it is apparent that the war, both with the Republic and Napoleon, was unavoidable, and, from the principles on which it was conducted, incapable of adjustment, those burdens, generally speaking, are to be regarded as the salvage paid for the safety of the Empire, and are no more chargeable on his memory than the losses sustained during a gale are on the skilful pilot who has weathered the storm. The real point for consideration is, whether these vast expenses were not unnecessarily swelled by the adoption of an over-cautious, and therefore protracted, system of warfare, and whether much of the debt might not have been avoided by contracting it in a different and less, ultimately, burdensome form. And probably the warmest of

his partisans will find it difficult to defend the frequent practice which he adopted, of borrowing in the three per cents.; in other words, giving a bond for a hundred pounds to the public creditor for every sixty advanced: a system which, although favourable to public credit at the moment, from the low rate at which it enabled him to contract the largest loans, led to an enormous addition to the national burdens in after times; prevented the return of peace from making the due diminution in the interest of the debt; and saddled the nation with the ultimate payment of above a third more than it ever received.

Mr. Pitt's eloquence and talents for debate were of the very highest order, his Funeral honours paid to our memory. command of financial details unbounded, and his power of bringing a vast variety of detached facts or transactions to bear on one general argument—the noblest effort of oratory—unequalled in modern times. Many of his speeches, delivered extempore during the heat of debate, will bear a comparison with the most finished specimens of written Greek or Roman eloquence. In private life his conduct was irreproachable: concentrated on national objects, he had none of the usual passions or weaknesses of the great; his manners were reserved and austere; his companions, in general, men inferior in years and capacity to himself; he had many admirers—few friends. Superior to the vulgar desire for wealth, he was careless, though addicted to no expenses, of his private fortune; and the man who had so long held the treasury of Europe and the Indies was indebted to the gratitude of the nation for a vote of forty thousand pounds to pay the debts which he owed at the time of his death. In this vote Mr. Fox cheerfully and honourably concurred, but he resisted the motion for a monument at the public expense to his memory, upon the ground that, however splendid his abilities or praiseworthy his integrity had been, the principles of his conduct were not such as to entitle him to the character of "an excellent statesman."† The monument which the House of Commons, by a great majority, voted, was placed above his grave in Westminster Abbey, already illustrated by the ashes of so many of the great and good in English history; but the historian who surveys the situation of the British Empire at the close of the contest, which he so nobly maintained, and recollects that the liberty of mankind was dependant on its success, will award him a wider mausoleum, and inscribe on his grave the well-known words, "Si monumentum quæris circumspece."

* *Parl. Deb.*, vi., 42, 62, 71, 138.

† "When I see a minister," said Mr. Fox, "who has been in office above twenty years, with the full command of places and public money, without any peculiar extravagance or waste, except what might be expected from the multiplicity of duties to which his attention was directed, exerting his influence neither to enrich himself nor those with whom he is connected, it is impossible not to conclude that he has acted with a high degree of integrity and moderation. In the course of his long administration, the only office which he took to himself was the wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But I cannot concur in a motion for funeral honours upon Mr. Pitt as an 'excellent statesman.' Public honours are matters of the highest importance, and we must not, in such cases, yield our consent if it is opposed by a sense of public duty."—*Parl. Deb.*, vi., 61, 62.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR. PITT'S SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

ARGUMENT.

Importance of the Subject.—Astonishing financial Efforts of England during the War.—Historical Sketch.—Public Income of the State before the Commonwealth.—Great Increase of the public Burdens during the Usurpation.—Permanent Addition to them on the Accession of William III.—Reasons which led to the Introduction of the National Debt.—Corresponding Increase of the Expenditure of France on the Accession of Louis Philippe.—Progressive Growth of the Public Debt during the succeeding Century.—Table illustrating its Increase.—Alarming financial Aspect of the Country at Mr. Pitt's Accession to Power in 1764.—Principle on which he proposed to remedy the existing Evils.—His strong Expressions on the Importance of the Subject in Parliament, and his simultaneous Adoption of Measures for National Defence.—Establishment of the Sinking Fund, and Mr. Pitt's Speech introducing it.—Mr. Fox gives the Plan his cordial Support.—It is passed by the Legislature, and made applicable to all future Loans.—Modification introduced on the System in 1802.—Immense Results with which it was attended.—Table showing the progressive Growth of the Sinking Fund.—Obloquy to which it began to be exposed.—General Diffusion of this Delusion, which is the more Dangerous, as it involves much abstract Truth mixed with Error.—Ultimate Extinction of the Sinking Fund in 1832.—Table showing its progressive Growth, Decline, and final Extinction.—Comparison of the Arguments for and against its Continuance.—He saw clearly the Objections since urged against the System.—Proof of the Justice of Mr. Pitt's Principles which has been afforded by the Result during the last twenty Years.—It is clearly the only Way of effecting a Reduction of the Debt.—Durable and far-seeing System which he had established.—Had it been adhered to, the whole Debt would have been discharged in 1843.—Tables showing the progressive Growth of a Sinking Fund kept up at fifteen or ten Millions, from 1816 to 1836.—Causes which have led to the Decay of this System.—Table showing the amount of indirect Taxes repealed since 1816.—Great Error in not repealing at once all the direct Taxes on the Peace.—Imprudent Remission of indirect Taxes since that Time.—Little Good has been derived from their Repeal.—Immense Burdens under which the Nation prospered during the War.—Argument on this Subject.—Temporary Advantages which would have attended the Keeping up the Sinking Fund.—Ample Funds which existed for its Maintenance, even when providing largely for the public Relief.—Public Errors which led to its Abandonment, and their distressing Effects.—Lord Castlereagh's Error in 1816 regarding the income Tax.—Advantages of the Funding System.—Its Dangers.—Mr. Pitt's Views on the Subject.—Modification which they received from the first Continental Peace in 1797.—He proposed to augment largely the Supplies raised within the Year.—Trebling of the assessed Taxes, which were intended to be a War-burden only.—First Introduction of the income Tax.—Details of Mr. Pitt's Plan on the Subject.—Objections urged against it.—It is adopted by Parliament.—Advantages of the new System.—Mr. Pitt's permanent Taxes were all in the indirect Form.—Their Advantage.—Arguments in Favour of indirect Taxation.—Reply to the Objections against them.—Cases in which indirect Taxes, being excessive, become direct Burdens on Production.—General Character of Mr. Pitt's financial Measures: their Grandeur and Foresight.—Their Errors.—Undue Extent to which he carried the Funding System.—Niggardly Use of the military Forces of England.—Injudicious System of borrowing in the Three per Cents.—Its Effect in preventing the Reduction of Interest by Government on the Return of Peace.—Temporary Diminution of Interest with which it was attended was no adequate Compensation for these Evils.—In Mr. Pitt's View, however, the Sinking Fund was speedily to obviate all these ruinous Consequences.—Table of the whole Expenses of every Year in every Department during the War.—Vast Effects of the Suspension of Cash Payments in 1797.—Its powerful Operation in increasing the present Resources of the State.—Table showing the Paper and Coin issued, with the Exports, Imports, Shipping, and Revenue of every Year during the War.—

Great temporary Advantages also of the Funding System.—Undue Ascendency of popular Power was the real Cause which undid Mr. Pitt's durable System for the Reduction of the Debt; and it must ultimately ruin the British Empire.—But will still more impel the British Race to the New World.

It would be to little purpose that the mighty drama of the French Revolutionary wars was recorded in history, if the mainspring of all the European efforts, the BRITISH FINANCES, were not fully explained. It was in their boundless extent that freedom found a never-failing stay, in their elastic power that independence obtained a permanent support. When surrounded by the wreck of other nations; when surviving alone the fall of so many confederacies, it was in their inexhaustible resources that England found the means of resolutely maintaining the contest, and waiting calmly, on her citadel amid the waves, the return of a right spirit in the surrounding nations. Vain would have been the prowess of her seamen, vain the valour of her soldiers, if her national finances had given way under the strain; and the conquerors of Trafalgar and Alexandria must have succumbed in the contest they so heroically maintained, if they had not found in the resources of government the means of permanently continuing it. Vain even would have been the reaction produced by suffering against the French Revolution: vain the charnel-house of Spain and the snows of Russia, if England had not been in a situation to take advantage of the crisis; if she had been unable to alimient the war in the Peninsula when its native powers were prostrated in the dust; and the energies of awakened Europe must have been lost in fruitless efforts, if the wealth of England had not at last arrayed them, in dense and disciplined battalions, on the banks of the Rhine.

How, then, did it happen that this inconsiderable island, so small a part of the Roman Empire, was enabled to expend wealth greater than ever had been amassed by the ancient mistress of the world; to maintain a contest of unexampled magnitude for twenty years; to keep on foot a fleet which conquered the united navies of Europe, and an army which carried victory into every corner of the globe; to acquire a colonial empire that encircled the earth, and subdue the vast continent of Hindostan, at the very time that it struggled in Spain with the land-forces of Napoleon, and equipped all the armies of the North for the liberation of Germany? The solution of the phenomenon, unexampled in the history of the world, is without doubt to be in part found in the persevering industry of the British people, and the extent of the commerce which they maintained in every quarter of the globe; but the resources thus afforded would have been inadequate to so vast an expenditure, and must have been exhausted early in the struggle, if they had not been organized and sustained by an admirable system of finance, which seem-

Importance of the subject.

Astonishing financial efforts of England during the war.

ed to rise superior to every difficulty with which it had to contend. It is there that the true secret of the prodigy is to be found; it is there that the noblest monument to Mr. Pitt's wisdom has been erected.

The national income of England at an early period was very inconsiderable, and totally incommensurate to the important station which she occupied in the scale of nations. In the time of Elizabeth it amounted only to £400,000 a year, and that of James I. to £450,000; and even including all the subsidies received from Parliament during his reign, £480,000 a year: sums certainly not equivalent to more than £800,000, or £1,000,000 of our money.* That enjoyed by Charles I. amounted, on an average, to £895,000 annually: a sum perhaps equal to £1,500,000 in these times.†

It was the Long Parliament which first gave the example of a prodigious levy of money from the people in England; affording thus a striking instance of the eternal truth, that no government is so despotic as that of the popular leaders, when relieved from all control on the part of the other powers in the state. The sums levied in England during the Commonwealth, that is, from the 3d of November, 1640, to the 5th of November, 1659, amounted to the enormous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of £83,000,000, being at the rate of nearly £5,000,000 a year; or more than five times that which had been so much the subject of complaint in the times of the unhappy monarch who had preceded it: The permanent revenue of Cromwell was raised from the three kingdoms to £1,868,000; or considerably more than double that enjoyed by Charles I.‡ The total public income at the death of Charles II. was £1,800,000, of James II. £2,000,000; sums incredibly small, when it is recollected that the price of wheat was

not then materially different from what it is at the present moment.*†

These inconsiderable taxes, however, were destined to be exchanged for others of a very different character, upon the accession of the house of Brunswick to the throne. The intimate connexion of the princes of that family with Continental politics, and the long wars in which, in consequence, the nation was involved, soon led to a more burdensome system of taxation, and the raising of sums annually from the people which in former times would have been deemed incredible. So great was the increase of the public burdens during the reign of William, that the national income, in the thirteen years that he sat on the throne, was nearly doubled; being raised from £2,000,000 a year to £3,895,000. But the addition made to the public revenue was the least important part of the changes effected during this important period. It was then that the NATIONAL DEBT began; and government was taught the dangerous secret of providing for the necessities, and maintaining the influence of present times, by borrowing money and laying its payment on posterity.‡

Various motives combined to induce the government, immediately after the Revolution, to adopt the system of borrowing on the credit of the state. Notwithstanding the temporary unanimity with which the Revolution had been brought about, various heart-burnings and divisions had succeeded that event, and the exiled dynasty still numbered a large and resolute body, especially in the rural districts, among their adherents. Extensive patronage and no small share of corruption were necessary to secure the influence of government over a nation thus divided: foreign wars were deemed requisite to maintain the ascendancy of the Protestant principles, to which the king owed his accession to the throne, and the Continental connexions of the house of Orange imperiously required the intervention of Great Britain in those desperate struggles by which the very existence of the Commonwealth of Holland was endangered. The same causes which led to the duplication of the public burdens of France by Louis Philippe after the Revolution of 1830, produced a similar increase in the taxes of Great Britain after the change of dynasty in 1688, and engendered the dangerous system of borrowing on the security of the assessments of future years.§ It was justly thought

* Hume, v., 412; vi., 112. † Ib., vii., 341. Pebrer, 45. ‡ "It is seldom," says Hume, "that the people gain anything by revolutions in government, because the new settlement, jealous and insecure, must commonly be supported with more expense and severity than the old; but on no occasion was the truth of this maxim more sensibly felt than in England after the overthrow of the royal authority. Complaints against the oppression of ship-money, and the tyranny of the star chamber, had roused the people to arms, and, having gained a complete victory over the crown, they found themselves loaded with a multiplicity of taxes formerly unknown, while scarce an appearance of law and liberty remained in any part of the administration."§

The following are some of the items in this enormous aggregate of £83,000,000 raised from the nation during the Commonwealth—a striking proof of the despotic character of the executive during that period:

Land-tax	£32,000,000
Excise	8,000,000
Tonnage and poundage	7,600,000
Sale of church lands	10,035,000
Sequestrations of bishops, deans, and inferior clergy, for four years	3,528,000
Sequestrations of private estates in England	4,564,000
Fee-farm rents for five years	2,963,000
Compositions with delinquents in Ireland	1,000,000
Sales of estates in Ireland	3,567,000
Other lesser	10,074,000
Total	£83,331,000

—PEBRER, 139, 140.

Of this sum, there was drawn	
from England	£1,517,274
from Scotland	143,652
from Ireland	207,790
	£1,868,716

—*Ibid.*, 140.

* Hume, vii., 115.

* The quarter of wheat from 1636 to 1701 was, on an average.....5s. 11½d.
from 1700 to 1765.....40s. 6d.
from 1764 to 1794.....44s. 7d.

In 1835, the average of the quarter in Great Britain was 38s. 8d., and the average of the last five years was only 48s. —SMITH'S *Wealth of Nations*, i., 358, and *Corn Average*, 1835. † Pebrer, 59, 60.

‡ The following is a statement of the budgets of France before and after the Revolution of July. It is a curious and instructive object of contemplation to observe a similar convulsion leading, in countries so widely different in their character, customs, and institutions as France and England were at the accessions of the dynasties of Orange and Orleans to their respective thrones, to a result so precisely similar:

	FRANCE.	
1824	951,000,000, or about	£38,100,000
1825	946,000,000, or	37,800,000
1826	942,000,000, or	37,600,000
1827	986,000,000, or	38,730,000
1828	939,000,000, or	37,300,000
1829	975,000,000, or	38,840,000
1830 Revol. in July.	981,000,000, or	38,930,000

Permanent addition to them on the accession of William III.

Reasons which led to the introduction of the national debt.

Corresponding increase of the expenditure of France on the accession of Louis Philippe.

that the present influence of government could in this way be increased to an extent altogether impracticable if the expenditure of each year were to be limited to the supplies raised within itself; and that, by the distribution of the debt among a great number of public creditors, an extensive and influential body might be formed, attached by the strong tie of individual interest to the fortunes of the ruling dynasty; because they were aware that their claims would be disregarded by the legitimate monarchs if restored to the throne. The expedient, therefore, was fallen upon of contracting a debt transferable by a simple power of attorney, in the smallest shares, from hand to hand; and capable of being used almost like the highest and most valuable species of bank notes, in the transactions of the nation. To the steady prosecution of this system, and the formation of a secure deposit by its means for the savings of the nation, much of the subsequent prosperity and grandeur of England is to be ascribed: but, like all other human things, it has its evils as well as its advantages; and in the perilous facility of borrowing, which the magnitude of the national resources and the fidelity with which the public engagements were fulfilled produced, is to be found the remote but certain cause of financial embarrassments, now to all appearance irremediable.

It is unnecessary to follow the successive steps by which both the public revenue and the national debt of Great Britain were increased after this period. Suffice it to say, that both were largely augmented during the glorious War of the Succession; that the long and pacific administration which followed effected no sensible reduction in their amount; that the checkered contest of 1739, and the more triumphant campaigns of the Seven Years' War, contributed equally to their increase; and that the disasters of the American struggle were attended by so great an augmentation of the national burdens, that at its termination in 1783, in the opinion both of Mr. Hume and Adam Smith, they must inevitably prove fatal in the end to the independence of the nation. At the close of the last contest the public revenue was £12,000,000, and the debt £240,000,000,* the interest of which absorbed no less than £9,319,000 of the annual income of the state; the loans contracted during that last unfortunate contest having been no less than one hundred millions.†

France.		
1831 Louis Philippe.	1,511,000,000, or about	£60,000,000
1832 Do.	1,100,000,000, or "	44,000,000
1833	1,120,000,000, or "	44,500,000

—See *Stat. de France*, published by government.
* Febrer, 245.

† The following table exhibits, in a clear and condensed form, the increase of the public revenue, and the progressive growth of the debt, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present time:

	Debt.	Interest.	Public Revenue.
National debt at the Revolution.....	£664,263	39,865	2,001,885
Increase during the reign of William...	15,730,439	1,271,087	
Debt at the accession of Queen Anne....	16,394,702	1,310,952	3,895,205
Increase during the reign of Queen Anne	37,750,661	2,040,416	
Debt at the accession of George I.	54,145,363	3,351,368	5,691,803
Decrease during the reign of George I..	2,053,128	132,807	
Debt at the accession of George II.	52,092,235	3,217,561	6,762,463
Decrease during the peace.....	5,137,612	253,526	

It was at this period that Mr. Pitt came into office, on the resignation of Mr. Fox and the coalition ministry. His alarming financial aspect of the country on Mr. Pitt's accession to power in 1784. His ardent and sagacious mind was immediately turned to the consideration of the finances, and the means of extricating the nation from the embarrassments, to ordinary observers inextricable, in which it had been involved by the improvident expenditure of preceding years. It was evident, from a retrospect of history, that no sensible impression had been made on the debt by any efforts of preceding times; that though a sinking fund had long existed in name, yet its operations had been very inconsiderable; and that all the economy of the long periods of peace which had intervened since the Revolution, had done little more than discharge a tenth of the burdens contracted in the previous years of hostility. The interest of the debt absorbed now more than two thirds of the public revenue. It was impossible to conceal that such a state of things was in the highest degree alarming; not only as affording no reasonable prospect that the existing engagements could ever be liquidated, but as threatening, at no distant period, to render it impossible for the nation to make those efforts which its honour or independence might require. It was easy to foresee that, in the course of events, wars and changes would arise, which would render it indispensable for the government to assume a menacing attitude, and possibly engage in a long course of hostilities; but how could any administration venture to assume the one, or the people bear the other, if an immense load of debt hung about their necks, absorbing alike by its interest their present revenues, and paralyzing by its magnitude the credit by which their resources might be increased on any unforeseen emergency?

	Debt.	Interest.	Public Revenue.
Debt at the opening of the war, 1739.....	46,954,623	2,964,035	6,874,000
Increase during the war.	31,338,689	1,096,979	
Debt at the end of the war, 1748.	78,293,312	4,061,014	6,923,000
Decrease during the peace.....	3,721,472	664,267	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1756.	74,571,840	3,396,737	7,127,164
Increase during the war.	72,111,004	2,444,104	
Debt at the end of the war in 1763.	146,682,844	5,840,851	8,523,440
Decrease during the peace.....	10,739,793	364,000	
Debt at the opening of the American war, 1776.	135,943,051	5,476,841	10,265,405
Increase during the war.....	102,541,819	3,843,084	
Debt at the peace of 1783.....	238,484,870	9,319,925	11,962,000
Decrease during the peace.....	4,751,261	143,569	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1793.....	233,733,609	9,176,356	16,658,814
Increase during the war.....	295,105,668	10,252,152	
Debt at the peace of Amiens, 1st February, 1801.....	528,839,277	19,428,508	34,113,146
Increase during the second war.....	335,983,164	12,796,796	
Debt at the peace of Paris, 1st February, 1816.....	864,822,441	32,225,304	72,210,512
Decrease since the peace.....	82,155,207	3,883,841	
Debt on the 5th of January, 1832.....	£782,667,234	£28,341,463	£50,990,000

—MOREAU and PEBBER'S *Tables*, 70, 89, 152, 245, and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i., 1.

These dangers took strong possession of the mind of Mr. Pitt; but, instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of the subject, he applied the energies of his understanding with the greater vigour to overcome them. Nor was it long before he perceived by what means this great object could with ease and certainty be effected. The public attention at this period had been strongly directed to the prodigious powers of accumulation of money at compound interest; and Dr. Price had demonstrated, with mathematical certainty, that any sum, however small, increasing at that ratio, would in a given time extinguish any debt, however great.* Mr. Pitt, with the instinctive sagacity of genius, laid hold of this simple law to establish a machine by which the vast debt of England might without difficulty be discharged. All former sinking funds had failed of producing great effects, because they were directed to the annual discharge of a certain portion of debt; not the formation, by compound interest, of a fund destined to its future and progressive liquidation; they advanced, therefore, by addition, not multiplication, in an arithmetical, not a geometrical progression. Mr. Pitt saw the evil, and not merely applied a remedy, but more than a remedy; he not only seized the battery, but turned it against the enemy. The wonderful powers of compound interest, the vast lever of geometrical progression, so long and sorely felt by debtors, were now to be applied to creditors; and, inverting the process hitherto experienced among mankind, the swift growth of the gangrene was to be turned from the corruption of the sound to the eradication of the diseased part of the system. Another addition, like the discovery of gravitation, the press, and the steam-engine, to the many illustrations which history affords of the lasting truth, that the greatest changes both in the social and material world are governed by the same laws as the smallest; and that it is by the felicitous application of familiar principles to new and important objects, that the greatest and most salutary discoveries in human affairs are effected.

Mr. Pitt's mind was strongly impressed with the incalculable importance of this subject, one before which all wars or subjects of present interest, excepting only the preservation of the Constitution, sunk into insignificance. From the time of his accession to office in 1784, his attention had been constantly riveted to the subject, and he repeatedly expressed, in the most energetic language, his sense of its overwhelming magnitude. "Upon the deliberation of this day," said he, in bringing forward his resolutions on the subject on the 29th of March, 1786, "the people of England place all their hopes of a full return of prosperity, and a revival of that public security which will give vigour and confidence to those commercial exertions on which the flourishing state of the country depends. Yet not only the public and this house, but other nations are intent upon it; for upon its deliberations, by the success or failure of what is now proposed, our rank will be decided among the powers of Europe. To behold this country, when just emerging from a most unfortunate war, which had added such an accumulation to

sums before immense, that it was the belief of surrounding nations, and of many among ourselves, that we must sink under it—to behold this nation, instead of despairing at its alarming condition, looking boldly its situation in the face, and establishing upon a spirited and permanent plan the means of relieving itself from all its encumbrances, must give such an idea of our resources as will astonish the nations around us, and enable us to regain that pre-eminence to which, on many accounts, we are so justly entitled. The propriety and even necessity of adopting a plan for this purpose is now universally allowed, and it is also admitted that immediate steps ought to be taken on the subject. It is well known how strongly my feelings have been engaged, not only by the duties of my situation, but the consideration of my own personal reputation, which is deeply committed in the question, to exert every nerve, to arm every vigilance, to concentrate my efforts towards that great object, by which alone we can have a prospect of transmitting to posterity, that which we ourselves have felt the want of, an efficient sinking fund for the national debt. To accomplish this is the first wish of my heart, and it would be my proudest hope to have my name inscribed on a pillar to be erected in honour of the man who did his country the essential service of reducing the national debt."†

In pursuance of these designs, Mr. Pitt proposed that a million yearly—composed partly of savings effected in various branches of the public service, to the amount of £900,000, and partly of new taxes, to the amount of £100,000—should be granted to his majesty, to be vested in commissioners chosen from the highest functionaries in the realm; that the payments to them should be made quarterly; and that the whole sums thus drawn should be by them invested in the purchase of stock, to stand in the name of the commissioners, the dividends on which were to be periodically applied to the farther purchase of stock, to stand and have its dividends invested in the same manner. In this way, by setting apart a million annually, and religiously applying its interest to the purchase of stock, the success of the plan was secured; because the future accumulations would spring, not from any additional burdens imposed on the

Establishment of the sinking fund, and Mr. Pitt's speech introducing it.

* Parl. Hist., xxvi., 1205, 1313, 1109.

† It is worthy of especial notice, however, that though thus deeply impressed with the paramount importance of raising up an effective sinking fund for the reduction of the public debt, Mr. Pitt was equally resolute not to attempt it by any measure by which the public security might be impaired, and, on the contrary, at the very same time strongly advocated and carried a bill for the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth, which required several hundred thousand pounds. "He would not be seduced," said he, "by the plausible and popular name of economy; he would not call it only plausible and popular, he would rather say the sacred name of economy, to forego the reality; and for the sake of adding a few hundred thousand pounds at the outset to the sinking fund, perhaps render forever abortive the sinking fund itself. Every saving, consistently with national safety, he would pledge himself to make; but he would never consent to starve the public service, and to withhold those supplies, without which the nation must be endangered."‡ Every measure of this great man was directed to great and lasting national objects; he was content to impose present burdens, to forego present advantages, and incur present unpopularity, for the sake of ultimate public advantage; the only principle which ever yet led to greatness and honour, either in nations or individuals, as the opposite system, gilded by present popularity or enjoyment, is the certain forerunner of ultimate ruin.

* Parl. Hist., xxvi., 1109.

* A penny laid out at compound interest at the birth of our Saviour, would in the year 1775 have amounted to a solid mass of gold eighteen hundred times the whole weight of the globe.

people, but the dividends on the stock thus bought up from individuals, and vested in the public trustees. The powers of compound interest were thus brought round from the side of the creditor to that of the debtor—from the fundholders to the nation; and the national debt was eaten in upon by an accumulating fund, which, increasing in a geometrical progression, would to a certainty, at no distant period, effect its total extinction.* “If this million,” said Mr. Pitt, “to be so applied, is to be laid out with its growing interest, it will amount to a very great sum in a period that is not very long in the life of an individual, and but an hour in the existence of a great nation; and this will diminish the debt of this country so much as to prevent the exigencies of war from raising it to the enormous height it has hitherto done. In the period of twenty-eight years, the sum of a million, annually improved, would amount to four millions per annum. But care must be taken that this sum be not broken in upon. This has hitherto been the bane of this country; for if the original sinking fund had been properly preserved, it can easily be proved that our debts at this moment would not have been very burdensome; but this, hitherto, has been found impracticable, because the minister has uniformly, when it suited his convenience, gotten hold of this sum, which ought to have been regarded as most sacred. To prevent this, I propose that this sum be vested in certain dignified commissioners, to be by them applied quarterly to buy up stock; by which means no considerable sum will ever be open to spoliation, and the fund will go on without interruption. Long, and very long, has the country struggled under its heavy load, without any prospect of being relieved; but it may now look forward to the object upon which the existence of the country depends. A minister could never have the confidence to come down to the House and propose the repeal of so beneficial a law—of one so directly tending to relieve the people from their burdens. The essence of the plan consists in the fund being invariably applied in diminution of the debt; it must forever be kept sacred, and especially so in time of war. To suffer the fund at any time, or on any pretence, to be diverted from its proper object, would be to ruin, defeat, and overturn the whole plan.”†

* The following table will exemplify the growth of capital when its interest, at the rate of 5 per cent., is steadily applied to the increase of the principal. Suppose that £20,000,000 is borrowed; and that, instead of providing by taxes for the interest merely of this large sum, provision is made for £1,200,000 yearly, leaving the surplus of £200,000 to be annually applied in the purchase of a certain portion of the stock, by commissioners, for the reduction of the principal, the dividends on the stock so purchased being annually and progressively employed in the same manner. The progressive growth in ten years will stand as follows:

First year's surplus	£200,000
Second	210,000
Third	220,500
Fourth	231,250
Fifth	242,532
Sixth	254,378
Seventh	266,684
Eighth	279,386
Ninth	292,114
Tenth	306,661
	£2,500,105

The wonderful rate at which this fund increases must be obvious to every observer, and it is worthy of especial notice, that this rapid advance is gained without imposing one farthing additional upon the country, by the mere force of an annual fund, steadily applied year after year, with all its fruits, to the reduction of the principal debt.

† Parl. Hist., xxvi., 1309, 1329.

‡ The speech delivered by Mr. Pitt on this occasion, which went over the whole details of our financial system, is one

Nor was Mr. Fox behind his great rival in the same statesmanlike and heroic sentiments; but he pointed out too prophetic a spirit the dangers to which the reserved fund might be exposed, amid the necessities or weakness of future administrations. “No man,” said he, “in existence was, or ever had been, a greater friend to the principle of a sinking fund than I have been from the very first moment of my political life. I agree perfectly with the right honourable gentleman in his ideas of the necessity of establishing an effective sinking fund for the purpose of applying it to the diminution of the national debt, however widely I may differ from him as to the subordinate parts of the plan. Formerly, the payment of the national debt was effected by a subscription of individuals, to whom the faith of Parliament had been pledged to pay off certain specified portions, at stated periods. Under that system, when the nation, or when Parliament, stood bound to individuals, the pledge was held as sacred as to pay the interest of the national debt at present; whereas, under the new system, when no individual interests were concerned, nothing would prevent a future minister, in any future war, from coming down to the House and proposing the repeal of the sinking fund, or enabling government to apply the whole money or stock in the hands of the commissioners to the public service. What would prevent the House from agreeing to the proposition? or was it at all likely that, under the exigency of the moment, they would not immediately agree to it, when so much money could so easily be got at, and when they could so readily save themselves from the odious and unpleasant task of imposing new taxes on themselves and their constituents?”* Memorable words from both these great men! when it is recollected how exactly the one predicted the wonderful effects which experience has now proved his system was calculated to have produced, in reducing, in a period of time smaller than the most ardent imagination could have supposed, a debt double the amount of that which he estimated as so great an evil; and with how much accuracy the other pointed out the vulnerable point in its composition, and predicted the cause, springing from the necessities or weakness of future administrations, which would ultimately prove its ruin!

The bill passed both Houses without a dissentient voice; and on the 26th of May May 26, 1786. the king gave it the royal assent in person, to mark his strong sense of the public importance of the measure.

of the most luminous of his whole Parliamentary career. An intimate friend of his has recorded, “That having passed the morning of this most important day in providing and examining the calculations and resolutions for the evening, he said he would take a walk to arrange in his mind what was to be said in the House in the evening. His walk did not last above a quarter of an hour, and when he came back he said he believed he was prepared. He then dressed, and desired his dinner to be sent up; but hearing that his sister, and another lady residing with her in the family, were going to dine with him at the same early hour, he desired that they might dine together. Having passed nearly an hour with those ladies, and several friends who called on their way to the House, talking with his usual liveliness and gaiety, as if he had nothing on his mind, he then went immediately to the House of Commons, and made that elaborate and far-extended speech, as Mr. Fox called it, without one omission or error.”—See No. V. WILLIAM PITT. *Blackwood's Magazine*, xxvii., 852; a series of papers on the character of this illustrious man, by one of the ablest writers of the age, containing by far the best account of his policy and character extant in any language.

* Parl. Hist., xxvi., 1318.

The sinking fund thus provided was amply sufficient to have discharged all the existing debt within a moderate period; and so well aware was its author of its vast productive powers, that he observed, that when it rose to four millions, it should be submitted to Parliament whether it should thenceforth be suffered to increase at compound interest. But the events which followed, soon not only rendered illusory all danger of the debt being too rapidly reduced, but made an addition to the system unavoidable to meet the new and overwhelming obligations contracted during the war. Some expedient, therefore, was necessary to provide for the liquidation of these vast additional debts; and it was in the means taken to do so that the extensive foresight and unshaken constancy of Mr. Pitt are to be discerned. He laid it down as a principle, which was never, on any pretence whatever, to be departed from, that, when any additional loan was contracted for, provision should be made for its gradual liquidation. "We ought," said Mr. Pitt, "not to confine our views to the sinking fund, compared with the debt now existing. If our system stops there, the country will remain exposed to the possibility of being again involved in those embarrassments which we have in our own time severely experienced, and which apparently brought us to the verge of bankruptcy and ruin. To guard against such dangers hereafter, we should enact that, whenever any loan shall take place in future, unless it be raised on annuities, which will terminate in a moderate number of years, there should, of course, be issued out of the consolidated fund,* to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, an additional sum, sufficient to discharge the capital of such loan in the same period as the sinking fund, after reaching its largest amount, will discharge what will then remain of the present debt. To do this, one hundredth part of the capital borrowed would be sufficient to be raised from the country on such emergencies; for instance, supposing it were necessary to raise by loan ten millions, £100,000 should be raised in addition to the existing funds appropriated to the redemption of the debt, in order to relieve the country within a given time of this additional burden. In addition to this, I propose that £200,000 a year additional should, from this time forward, be regularly granted out of the ordinary revenue of the country to the sinking fund." Mr. Fox stated, "that he had ever maintained the necessity of establishing a fund for reducing the national debt,† and that as strongly when on the ministerial as the opposition benches. He had not the power to promote it as effectually as Mr. Pitt, but he wished it as warmly." In pursuance of the united opinion of these great men, it was enacted by the statute passed on the occasion, "that whenever, in future, any sums should be raised by loans on perpetual redeemable annuities, a sum equal to one per cent. on the stock created by such loan should be issued out of the produce of the consolidated fund quarterly, to be

March 30,
1792.

placed to the account of the commissioners.* Every additional loan was thus compelled to draw after itself, as a necessary consequence, a fresh burden, by the annual payment of which the extinction of the principal might to a certainty, in little more than forty years, be expected.

Under this system the whole loans were contracted, and the sinking fund was managed till 1802; and as immense sums were borrowed during that period, the growth of the sinking fund was far more rapid than had been originally contemplated. In that year an alteration of some importance was made, not, indeed, by Mr. Pitt, but by Mr. Addington, then chancellor of the Exchequer, with his consent and approbation. "The capital of the debt," said he, "is now £488,000,000; its interest, including the charges of the sinking fund, £23,000,000: it is impossible to contemplate either the one or the other without the utmost anxiety. What I now propose is, that the limitation which was formerly provided against the accumulation of the original sinking fund should be removed; and that both that original fund and the subsequent one, created by the act of 1792, should be allowed to accumulate till they have discharged the whole debt." This proposition was unanimously agreed to; it being enacted "that this fund should accumulate till the whole existing redeemable annuities should be paid off." By this act, the original sinking fund of £1,000,000, with the £200,000 subsequently granted, and the one per cent. on all the subsequent loans, were combined into one consolidated fund, to be applied continually, at compound interest, till the whole debt then existing was paid off, which it was calculated would be in forty-five years.†

Under these three acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, the sinking fund continued to be administered with exemplary fidelity, not only during Mr. Pitt's life, but after his death, till 1813, when a total change in the system took place, which eventually led to its ruin, and has, to all appearance, rendered the financial state of the country almost desperate. To obtain a clear view of the practical effects of Mr. Pitt's system, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat the march of events, and give a summary of the operation of the sinking fund which he established down to the period when it was abandoned by his more embarrassed and less provident successors.

From the accounts laid before Parliament, it appears that the sinking fund of a million which Mr. Pitt established in 1786, had increased by accumulation at compound interest, and the vast additions drawn from the one per cent. on all subsequent loans, to the enormous sum of fifteen millions and a half yearly in 1813, while the debts which it had discharged during that period amounted to no less than £238,231,000 sterling. This great increase had taken place in twenty-seven years, whereas Mr. Pitt had calculated correctly that his original million would be only four millions in twenty-eight years: the well-known period of the quadruplication of the sum at compound interest of 5 per cent. The subsequent £200,000 a year granted certainly accelerated in a certain degree the rate of its advance; but the true cause of the extraordinary and unexpected rapidity of its increase is to be found in the vast accumula-

Modification introduced upon the system in 1802. April 14, 1802.

* The consolidated fund was a certain portion of the ordinary taxes, which were amassed together and devoted to certain fixed objects of national expenditure. The surplus of this fund, as it was called, or the excess of those branches of revenue above the charges fixed on them, was annually appropriated, during war, among the ways and means to the current war expenditure.

† Parl. Hist., xxix., 1050, 1058.

* 32 Geo. III., c. 69.

† Parl. Hist., xxxvi. 890, 892.

tion which the one per cent. on subsequent loans produced. This distinctly appears from the table compiled below, showing the sums paid off by the sinking fund in every year from 1786 to 1813, the loans contracted during that period, the stock redeemed by the commissioners, and the proportion of each loan paid to them for behoof of the public debt. It thence appears how rapidly and suddenly the sinking fund rose, with the immense sums borrowed at different periods during the war; and when it is recollected that the loans contracted from 1792 to 1815 were £585,000,000, it will not appear surprising that even the small sum of one per cent. on each, regularly issued to the national debt commissioners, should have led to this extraordinary and unlooked-for accumulation.*

It is this subsequent addition of one per cent.

Obliquely to on all loans contracted since the institution of the sinking fund which it became exposed. has been at once the cause of its extraordinary increase and subsequent ruin. While the nation in general were entirely satisfied with Mr. Pitt's financial statements, and, delighted with the rapid growth of the sinking fund, never examined whether the funds for its prodigious extension were provided by the fictitious supply of loans or the solid growth of the revenue above the expenditure, a few more sagacious observers began to inquire into the solidity of the whole system, and mistaking its past operation, which had been almost entirely during war, for its permanent character, loudly proclaimed that it was founded entirely on a delusion; that a great proportion of the sums which it paid off had been raised by loans; that, at all events, a much larger sum than the amount of the debt annually redeemed had been annually borrowed since the commencement of the war; that it was impossible that a nation, any more than an individual, could discharge its debts by mere financial operations; and that the only way of really getting quit of encumbrances was by bringing the expenditure permanently under the income.†

These doctrines soon spread among a consid-

erable part of the thinking portion of the nation; but they made little general impression till the return of peace had diverted into different channels the attention of the people, formerly concentrated on the career of Napoleon; and Democratic ambition, taking advantage of national distress, had begun to denounce all that had formerly been done by the patriots who had triumphed over its principles. Then they speedily became universal: attacks on the sinking fund were rapidly diffused and generally credited—the delusion of Mr. Pitt's system—the juggle so long practised on the nation, were in every mouth; the meanest political quacks, the most despicable popular demagogues, ventured to discharge their javelins at the giants of former days; and a system on which the greatest and best of men in the last age had been united, in commendation of which Mr. Fox had vied with Pitt, and Sheridan with Burke, was universally denounced as the most complete and ruinous deception that ever had been palmed off by official fraud on the credulity of mankind.

Had these doctrines been confined to the declamation of the hustings or the abuse of newspapers, they would have furnished the subject only of curious speculation on the way in which principles, just to a certain extent, and truths, undeniable as they were originally stated, became perverted, when they were employed as an engine for the purposes of faction or ambition. But, unhappily, the evil soon assumed a much more serious complexion: the prevailing ideas spread to the Legislature, and the statesmen who succeeded to the government, imbued partly with the declamation of the period, influenced partly by the desire of gaining a temporary popularity by the reduction of the public burdens, without any regard to the interests of future times, went on borrowing or abstracting from the sinking fund till it was totally extinguished during the great convulsion of 1832; and the commissioners for the

General diffusion of this delusion.

Which is the more dangerous, as it involves much abstract truth mixed with error.

* Table showing the sums paid to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt in every year, from 1786 to 1816; the stock redeemed by them in each year; the loans contracted, and proportion of those loans paid to those commissioners in every year for that period; with the public revenue of the state for the same time.—MOREAU'S TABLES; FEBREYER'S TABLES, 153, 154, 240; *Parl. Pap.*, 1822, &c., 145; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i, 1; COLQUHOUN, 292, 294.

Table showing the progressive growth of the sinking fund.

Years.	Sinking fund.	Stock redeemed by sinking fund.	Loans contracted.	Proportion of loan paid to sinking fund.	Expenditure, including interest of debt, funded and unfunded, and sinking fund.	Total debt, including sinking fund.	Revenue.
1792	£1,458,504	£1,507,100			£16,179,347	£9,437,862	£16,382,435
1793	1,534,970	1,962,650	£4,500,000		17,434,767	9,890,904	17,674,395
1794	1,630,815	2,174,405	12,307,451	£1,630,615	22,754,366	10,715,941	17,440,890
1795	1,672,000	2,804,945	42,090,646	1,872,200	29,305,477	11,081,159	17,374,890
1796	2,143,996	3,083,455	42,738,196	2,143,595	39,751,091	12,345,987	18,243,876
1797	2,639,724	4,300,670	14,620,000	2,639,724	40,791,533	13,683,129	18,668,925
1798	3,369,218	6,716,153	18,000,000	3,361,752	50,739,557	16,405,402	20,518,750
1799	4,294,325	7,858,109	12,500,000	3,984,352	51,341,798	20,106,885	23,607,945
1800	4,649,871	7,291,338	18,500,000	4,285,208	59,296,081	21,661,025	28,004,036
1801	4,767,992	7,315,002	34,410,000	5,117,723	61,617,968	23,508,805	28,085,829
1802	5,310,511	8,091,454	23,000,000	5,685,542	73,079,468	25,436,894	38,401,738
1803	5,922,979	7,733,421	10,000,000	5,685,542	62,373,480	25,066,212	49,335,978
1804	6,287,940	10,287,243	10,000,000	6,018,179	54,912,890	25,066,212	49,652,471
1805	6,851,200	11,395,692	21,526,699	6,521,394	67,619,475	26,669,646	53,695,124
1806	7,615,167	12,234,064	18,000,000	7,181,482	76,056,796	28,963,702	58,902,291
1807	8,323,329	12,807,070	12,500,000	7,829,588	75,154,548	30,336,859	61,524,113
1808	9,479,165	14,171,407	12,000,000	8,908,673	78,369,689	32,052,537	63,042,746
1809	10,188,607	13,965,824	19,532,000	9,555,853	84,797,080	32,781,592	64,927,371
1810	10,904,451	14,352,771	16,311,000	10,170,104	88,792,551	33,986,223	66,099,340
1811	11,660,601	15,659,194	24,000,000	10,813,016	94,360,728	35,248,933	67,327,432
1812	12,502,860	18,147,245	27,871,325	11,543,881	99,004,241	36,288,790	68,337,432
1813	13,483,160	21,108,442	58,763,100	12,439,631	107,644,085	38,443,147	69,226,215
1814	15,379,262	24,120,867	18,500,000	14,181,006	122,235,660	41,755,235	70,926,215
1815	14,120,963	19,149,684	45,135,589	12,748,231	129,742,390	42,902,430	72,131,214
1816	13,452,696	20,280,098	3,000,000	11,902,051	130,305,958	43,902,999	66,834,494

† Hamilton on the Sinking Fund, and others.

reduction of the national debt issued an official intimation that their purchases for the public service had altogether ceased. The principle acted upon since that time has been to apply to the reduction of debt no more than the annual surplus of the national income above its expenditure; and as that surplus, under the present Democratic system, can never be tinction of the expected to be considerable, Mr. Pitt's sinking fund may now, to all practical purposes, be considered as destroyed.*

In the preceding observations, the march of events has been anticipated by nearly thirty years, and changes alluded to which will form the important subject of analysis in the subsequent volumes of this, or some other history. But it is only by attending to the dissolution of Mr. Pitt's system, and the effects by which that change has been, and must be attended, that the incalculable importance of his financial measures can be appreciated, or the wisdom discerned which, so far as human wisdom could, had

* The following table exhibits the progression and decline of the sinking fund from the time of its being first instituted in 1786, till it was broken upon by Mr. Vansittart in 1813, and till its virtual extinction in 1832.

Table showing its progressive growth, decline, and final extinction.

Years.	Stock redeemed.	Money applied to redemption of debt.	Total Amount of funded debt.
1786		£500,000	£239,693,900
1787	£662,000	1,000,000	239,200,719
1788	1,503,000	1,000,000	237,697,665
1789	1,506,000	1,155,000	236,191,315
1790	1,558,000	1,230,000	234,632,465
1791	1,587,500	1,371,000	233,044,965
1792	1,507,100	1,458,504	231,537,865
1793	1,952,650	1,634,372	209,614,446
1794	2,174,405	1,572,957	234,034,718
1795	2,604,945	2,143,697	247,877,237
1796	3,083,455	2,639,956	301,861,306
1797	4,390,670	3,393,214	355,323,774
1798	6,790,023	4,093,164	351,525,836
1799	8,102,875	4,528,568	414,936,334
1800	9,550,094	4,908,379	423,367,547
1801	10,713,138	5,528,315	447,147,164
1802	10,491,325	6,114,033	497,043,489
1803	9,436,389	6,494,694	522,231,786
1804	13,181,667	7,436,929	528,260,642
1805	12,860,629	9,402,658	545,803,318
1806	13,759,607	10,625,419	573,529,932
1807	15,341,799	10,185,579	593,634,287
1808	16,064,962		601,733,073
1809	16,181,689	11,359,579	604,257,474
1810	16,656,643	12,095,691	614,789,091
1811	17,584,234	13,075,977	624,301,936
1812	20,733,354	14,078,577	635,583,448
1813	24,246,059	10,064,057	661,409,958
1814	27,522,230	14,830,937	740,023,535
1815	22,599,653	14,241,397	752,657,236
1816	24,001,083	13,945,117	756,311,940
1817	23,117,541	14,514,457	796,200,192
1818	19,460,989	14,339,483	776,742,403
1819	19,648,469	16,305,590	791,867,314
1820	31,191,702	17,499,773	794,960,480
1821	24,518,585	17,219,957	801,565,310
1822	23,605,931	18,889,319	795,312,767
1823	17,966,680	7,482,325	796,530,144
1824	4,828,530	10,652,059	791,701,612
1825	10,583,732	6,093,475	781,123,292
1826	3,312,834	5,621,231	778,128,265
1827	2,836,528	5,704,706	783,801,739
1828	7,281,414	4,667,965	777,476,890
1829	7,035,414	4,569,485	772,332,540
1830	6,425,465	4,545,465	771,251,932
1831	3,304,729	2,673,907	757,456,997
1832	9,079	6,821	
1833			
1834			
1835			

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i., and ii., 6, 8; PEBREY'S *Tables*, 247; MOREAU'S *Tables*.

N.B.—This table exhibits the progress of the sinking fund and stock redeemed in Great Britain and Ireland, which explains its difference from the preceding table, applicable to Great Britain alone.

guarded against the evils which must, in their ultimate consequences, dissolve the British Empire.

It is perfectly true, as Mr. Hamilton and the opponents of the sinking fund have argued, that neither national nor individual fortunes can be mended by mere financial operations, by borrowing with one hand while you pay off with another; and unquestionably Mr. Pitt never imagined that, if the nation was paying off ten millions a year and borrowing twenty, it was making any progress in the discharge of its debt. In this view, it is of no moment to inquire what proportion of the debt annually contracted was applied to the sinking fund; because, as long as larger sums than that fund was able to discharge were yearly borrowed by the nation, it is evident that the operation of the system was attended with no present benefit to the state: nay, that the cost of its machinery was, for the time at least, an addition to its burdens. But all that notwithstanding, Mr. Pitt's plan for the redemption of the debt was not only founded on consummate wisdom, but a thorough knowledge of human nature. He never looked to the sinking fund as the means of paying off the debt while loans to a larger amount than it redeemed were contracted every year; * he regarded it as a fund which would speedily and certainly effect the reduction of the debt in time of peace. And the admirable nature of the institution consisted in this, that it provided a system, with all the machinery requisite for its complete and effective operation, which, although overshadowed and subdued by the vast contraction of debt during war, came instantly into powerful operation the moment its expenditure was terminated. This was a point of vital importance: indeed, without it, as experience has since proved, all attempts to reduce the debt would have proved utterly nugatory. Mr. Pitt was perfectly aware of the natural impatience of taxation of mankind in general, and the especial desire always felt that, when the excitement of war ceased, its expenditure should draw to a termination. He foresaw, therefore, that it would be impossible to

* Mr. Pitt's speech on the budget, in 1798, affords decisive evidence that he laboured under no delusion on the subject of the operation of the sinking fund during war, but always looked forward to its effects when loans had ceased by the return of peace, as exemplifying its true character, and alone effecting a real reduction of the debt. "By means of the sinking fund," said he, "we had advanced far in the reduction of the debt previous to the loans necessarily made in the present war, and every year was attended with such accelerated salutary effects as outran the most sanguine calculation. But, having done so, we have yet far to go, as things are circumstanced. If the reduction of the debt be confined to the operations of that fund, and the expenses of the war continue to impede our plans of economy, we shall have to go far before the operation of that fund, even during peace, can be expected to counteract the effects of the war. Yet there are means by which I am confident it would be possible, in not many years, to restore our resources, and put the country in a state equal to all exigencies. Not only do I conceive that the principle is wise and the attempt practicable to procure large supplies out of the direct taxes from the year, but I conceive that it is equally wise and not less practicable to make provision for the amount of the debt incurred and funded in the same year; and if the necessity of carrying on the war shall entail upon us the necessity of contracting another debt, this principle, if duly carried into practice, with the assistance of the sinking fund to co-operate, will enable us not to owe more than we did at its commencement. I cannot, indeed, take it upon me to say that the war will not stop the progress of liquidation, but if the means I have pointed out are adopted and resolutely adhered to, I will leave us at least stationary."—*Parl. Hist.*, xxxiii., 1053, 1054

get the popular representatives at the conclusion of the war to lay on new taxes, and provide for a sinking fund to pay off the debt which had been contracted during its continuance. The only way, therefore, to secure that inestimable object, was to have the whole machinery constructed and in full activity during war, so that it might be at once brought forward into full and efficient operation upon the conclusion of hostilities; without any legislative act or fresh imposition whatever, by the mere termination of the contraction of loans.

The result has completely proved the wisdom of these views. Crippled and mangled as the sinking fund has been by the enormous encroachments made upon it by the administrations of later times, it has yet done much during the peace to pay off the debt: amply sufficient to demonstrate the solidity of the principles on which it was founded. In sixteen years, even after these copious reductions, it has discharged more than eighty-two millions of the debt, besides the addition of seven millions made by the bonus of 5 per cent. granted to the holders of the five per cents., who were reduced to four: that it has paid off in that time nearly ninety millions.* It is not a juggle which, in a time so short in the lifetime of a nation, and during the greater part of which Great Britain was labouring under severe distress in almost all the branches of its industry, was able, even on a reduced scale, to effect a reduction so considerable.

Nor has the experience of the last twenty years been less decisive as to the absolute necessity of making the provision for the liquidation of the debt part of a permanent system, to which the national faith is absolutely and unequivocally bound, and which depends for no part of its efficiency upon the votes or financial measures of the year. Since this ruinous modification of Mr. Pitt's unbending, self-poised system was introduced; since the fatal precedent was established of allowing the minister to determine, by annual votes, how much of the sinking fund was to be applied to the current services of the year, and how much reserved for its original and proper destination, the encroachment on the fund has gone on continually increasing, till at length it has, to all practical purposes, swallowed it entirely up. The sinking fund, when thus broken upon, has proved, like the chastity of a woman, when once lost, the subject of continual subsequent violation, till the shadow even of respect for it is gone. If such has been the fate of this noble and truly patriotic establishment, even when no increased burden was required to keep it in activity, and the temptation which proved fatal to its existence was merely the desire to effect a reduction of taxes long borne by the nation, it is easy to see how utterly hopeless would have been any attempt to make considerable additions to the annual burdens upon the

conclusion of hostilities with a view to effect a diminution of its public debt; and how completely dependant, therefore, the sinking fund was for its very existence upon Mr. Pitt's system of having all its machinery put in motion at the time the loans were contracted during war, and its vast powers brought into full view without any application to the Legislature, by the mere cessation of borrowing on the return of peace.*

Not a shadow of a doubt can now remain that Mr. Pitt's and Mr. Addington's anticipations were well founded, and that, if their system had been adhered to since the peace, the whole national debt would have been discharged by the year 1843. The payment of eighty millions, under the mutilated system, since 1815, affords a sample of what might have been expected had its efficiency not been impaired. Even supposing that, for the extraordinary efforts of 1813, 1814, and 1815, it had been necessary to borrow from the commissioners the whole sinking fund during each of these years, still, if the nation and its government had possessed sufficient resolution to have resumed the system with the termination of hostilities, and steadily adhered to it since that time, the debt discharged by the year 1836 would, at 5 per cent., have been nearly six hundred millions, and the sinking fund would now have been paying off above forty millions a year. Or, if the national engagements would only have permitted the sinking fund to have been kept up at ten millions yearly from the produce of taxes, and if the accumulation were to be calculated at four per cent., which, on an average, is probably not far from the truth, the fund applicable to the reduction of debt would now have been above twenty millions annually, and the debt already discharged would have exceeded three hundred and thirty millions! A more rapid reduction of

Had it been adhered to, the whole debt would have been discharged in 1843.

It is clearly the only way of effecting a reduction of the debt.

been less decisive as to the absolute necessity of making the provision for the liquidation of the debt part of a permanent system, to which the national faith is absolutely and unequivocally bound, and which depends for no part of its efficiency upon the votes or financial measures of the year. Since this ruinous modification of Mr. Pitt's unbending, self-poised system was introduced; since the fatal precedent was established of allowing the minister to determine, by annual votes, how much of the sinking fund was to be applied to the current services of the year, and how much reserved for its original and proper destination, the encroachment on the fund has gone on continually increasing, till at length it has, to all practical purposes, swallowed it entirely up. The sinking fund, when thus broken upon, has proved, like the chastity of a woman, when once lost, the subject of continual subsequent violation, till the shadow even of respect for it is gone. If such has been the fate of this noble and truly patriotic establishment, even when no increased burden was required to keep it in activity, and the temptation which proved fatal to its existence was merely the desire to effect a reduction of taxes long borne by the nation, it is easy to see how utterly hopeless would have been any attempt to make considerable additions to the annual burdens upon the

* In Mr. Pitt's Financial Resolutions in the year 1799, which embrace a vast variety of important financial details, there is the clearest indication of the lasting and permanent system to which he looked forward with perfect justice for the entire liquidation of the public debt. One of these resolutions was, "That, supposing the price of 3 per cent. stock to be on an average, after the year 1800, £90 in time of peace, and £75 in time of war, and the proportion of peace and war to be the same as for the last hundred years, the average price of peace and war will be about £85; that the whole debt created in each year of the present war will be redeemed in about 40 years from such year respectively, and the whole of the capital debt existing previous to 1793 will be redeemed in about 47 years from the present time; that from 1808 to 1833 (at which time the capital debt created in the first year of the present war would be redeemed, and the taxes applicable to the charges thereof would become disposable) taxes would be set free in each year of peace to the amount of £133,000, and of war to that of £168,000; that the amount of the sum annually applicable to the reduction of the debt would in the course of the same period gradually rise from £5,000,000 to £10,400,000; and that, on the suppositions before stated, taxes equal to the amount of the charges created during each year of the present war will be successively set free, from 1833 to 1840, to the amount in the whole of £10,500,000, and about 1846, farther taxes to the amount of £4,200,000, being the sum applicable from 1808 to the reduction of the debt existing previous to 1793; making in all, when the whole debt is extinguished in 1846, a reduction of £19,000,000 yearly." Such was the far-seeing and durable system of this great statesman; and experience has now proved that, if his principles had been adhered to, and the taxes applicable to the charges of the debt had not been imprudently repented, these anticipations would have been more than realized, notwithstanding the vast increase of the debt since that time.

Durable and far-seeing system which he had established.

* Funded debt on January 5, 1816.....£816,311,940
Unfunded do. 48,510,501
Total.....£864,822,441

Total debt on 5th January, 1833: viz.,

Funded.....£754,100,549
Unfunded..... 27,752,650
781,853,199

Paid off in sixteen years.....£82,969,242

--Annual Finance Statement, 1833, and PEBBEE, 246, and PORTER'S Parliamentary Tables, ii., 6.

funded property would not probably have been consistent, either with a proper regard to the employment of capital, or the due creation of safe channels of investment, to receive so vast an annual discharge from the public treasury.*

Everything, therefore, conspires to demonstrate that Mr. Pitt's system for the reduction of the national debt was not only founded on just principles and profound foresight, but an accurate knowledge of human nature and a correct appreciation of the principles by which such a salutary scheme was likely to be defeated, and the means by which alone its permanent efficiency could be secured. And no doubt can now remain in any impartial mind that, if that system had been resolutely adhered to, the whole debt contracted during the war with the French Revolution might have been discharged in nearly the same time that it was contracted.

What is it, then, which has occasioned the subsequent ruin of a system constructed with so much wisdom, and so long adhered to, under the severest trials, with unshaken fidelity?

The answer is to be found in the temporary views and yielding policy of succeeding statesmen; in the substitution of ideas of present expedience for those of permanent advantage; in the advent of times, when government looked from year to year, not from century to century; in the mistaking the present applause of the unreflecting many for that sober approbation of the thoughtful few, which it should ever be the chief object of an enlightened statesman to obtain. When a Greek orator was applauded by the multitude for his speech, the philosopher chid him; "For," said he, "if you had spoken wisely, these men would have given no signs of approbation." The observation is not founded

on any peculiar fickleness or levity in the Athenian people, but on the permanent principles of human nature, and that general prevalence of the desire for temporary ease over considerations of permanent advantage, which it is the great object of the moralist to combat, and to the influence of which the greatest disasters of private life are owing. And, without relieving subsequent statesmen of their full share of responsibility for an evil which will now in the end probably consign the British Empire to destruction, it may safely be affirmed that the British people, and every individual among them, must bear their full share of the burden. A general delusion seized the public mind. The populace loudly clamoured for a reduction of taxation, without any regard to the consequences, not merely on future times, but their own present advantage; the learned fiercely assailed the sinking fund, and, with hardly a single exception, branded the work of Pitt and Fox as a vile imposture, unfit to stand the test of reason or experience; the opposition vehemently demanded the remission of taxes; the government weakly granted the request. Year after year passed away under this miserable delusion; tax after tax was repealed amid the general applause of the nation;* the general concurrence in the work of destruction for a time almost obliterated the deep lines of party distinction, and, amid mutual compliments from the opposition to the ministerial benches, the deep foundations of British greatness were loosened, the provident system of former times was abandoned; revenue to the amount of forty-two millions a year surrendered without any equivalent, and the nation, when it awakened from its trance, found itself saddled forever with eight-and-twenty millions as the interest of debt, without any means of redemption, and a Democratic constitution which rendered the construction of any such in time to come utterly hopeless.

The people were entitled to demand an instant relaxation from taxation upon the termination of hostilities; the pressure of the war taxes would have been insupportable when its excitement and expenditure were over. The income-tax

* Tables showing the progressive growth of the Sinking Fund of fifteen or ten millions, since 1816 to 1836.

Table I., showing what the Sinking Fund, accumulating at 5 per cent., if maintained at £15,000,000 a year, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836.

1816	£15,000,000	Br't forward ..	£212,660,625
1817	15,750,000	1827	25,530,240
1818	16,537,500	1828	26,839,360
1819	17,363,870	1829	28,181,423
1820	18,231,973	1830	29,590,464
1821	19,143,566	1831	31,579,590
1822	20,100,774	1832	33,158,577
1823	21,005,038	1833	34,816,000
1824	22,052,284	1834	35,524,625
1825	23,157,048	1835	37,238,312
1826	24,315,572	1836	39,099,214
Carry forward	£212,660,625	Tot. in 20 years	£534,127,430

Table II., showing what the Sinking Fund, if maintained from the taxes at £10,000,000 sterling, and if accumulating at 4 per cent. only, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836.

1816	£10,000,000	Br't forward ..	£138,243,760
1817	10,400,000	1827	16,032,580
1818	10,816,000	1828	16,673,880
1819	11,264,000	1829	17,340,832
1820	11,715,560	1830	18,034,464
1821	12,671,544	1831	18,754,840
1822	13,175,404	1832	19,505,032
1823	13,705,540	1833	20,285,232
1824	14,253,760	1834	21,096,640
1825	14,822,948	1835	21,930,504
1826	15,415,944	1836	23,107,724
Carry forward	£138,243,760	Tot. in 20 years	£331,005,428

Supposing the stock, in the first case, purchased on an average at 90 by the commissioners, the £534,027,464 sterling money would have redeemed a tenth more of the stock, or £587,000,000 of the stock. Supposing it bought, in the second case, at an average at 85, which would probably have been about the mark, the £342,000,000 sterling money would have purchased nearly a seventh more of stock, or £385,357,000, being just about a half of the debt existing at this moment.

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* Table showing the amount of direct and indirect taxes repealed since 1814.

	Net produce.	Gross produce.
1814, War duties on goods, &c.....	£232,000	£948,861
1815, Ditto.....	222,000	222,749
1816, Property-tax and war malt.....	17,547,900	17,886,666
1817, Sweet wines.....	37,000	37,812
1818, Vinegar, &c.....	9,500	9,524
1819, Plate glass, &c.....	269,000	273,573
1820, Beer in Scotland.....	4,000	4,000
1821, Wool.....	471,000	490,113
1822, Annual malt and hides.....	2,139,000	2,164,037
1823, Salt and assessed taxes.....	4,185,000	4,286,389
1824, Thrown silk and salt.....	1,801,000	1,805,467
1825, Wine, salt, &c.....	3,676,000	3,771,019
1826, Rum and British spirits.....	1,967,000	1,973,915
1827, Stamps.....	84,000	84,038
1828, Rice, &c.....	51,000	52,227
1829, Silk, &c.....	126,000	126,406
1830, Beer, hides, and sugar.....	4,070,000	4,264,425
1831, Printed cottons, and coals.....	1,583,000	3,189,312
1832, Candles, almonds, raisins, &c.....	747,000	754,996
1833, Soap, tiles, &c.....	1,000,000	1,100,000
1834, House duties.....	1,200,000	1,400,000
	£42,135,500	£44,845,529
Laid on in the same time.....	5,813,000	
Net taxation reduced.....	£36,312,500	
Of which was direct.....	18,690,000	
Indirect.....	17,490,000	
	£36,180,000	

—See *Parl. Paper*, 14th June, 1833, and *Budget*, 1834, *Part* Deb.

Great error in not repealing at once all the direct taxes on the peace.

could no longer be endured; the assessed taxes and all the direct imposts should at once have been repealed; no man, excepting the dealers in articles liable to indirect taxation, should have paid anything to government. This was a part, and a most important part, of Mr. Pitt's system. He was aware of the extreme and well-founded discontent which the payment of direct taxes to government occasions; he knew that nothing but the excitements and understood necessities of war can render it bearable. His system was therefore to provide for the extra expenses of war entirely by loans or direct taxes, and to devote the indirect taxes to the interest of the public debt and the permanent charges of government, those lasting burdens which could not be reduced without injury to the national credit or security on the termination of hostilities. In this way a triple object was gained: the nation during the continuance of war was made to feel its pressure by the payment of heavy annual duties, while upon its conclusion the people experienced an instant relief in the cessation of those direct payments to government, which are always felt as most burdensome; and at the same time the permanent charges of the state were provided for in those indirect duties, which, although by far the most productive, are seldom complained of, from their being mixed up with the price of commodities, and so not perceived by those who ultimately bear their weight. Mr. Pitt's system of taxation, in short, combined the important objects of heavy taxation during war, instant relief on peace, and a permanent provision for the lasting expenses of the state, in the way least burdensome to the people. The influence of these admirable principles is to be seen in the custom so long adhered to, and only departed from amid the improvidence of later times, of separating, in the annual accounts of the nation, the war charges from the permanent expenses, and providing for the former by loans and temporary taxes, for the most part in the direct form, while the latter were met by lasting imposts, which were not to be diminished till the burdens to which they were applicable were discharged.

Following out these principles, the income-tax, the assessed taxes, the war malt-tax, and, in general, all the war taxes, should have been repealed on the conclusion of hostilities, or as soon as the floating debt contracted during their continuance was liquidated; but, on the other hand, the indirect taxes should have been regarded as a sacred fund set apart for the permanent expenses of the nation, the interest of the debt, and the sinking fund; and none of them repealed till, from the growth of a surplus after meeting those necessary charges, it had become apparent that such relief could be afforded without trenching on the financial resources of the state. That the growth of population and the constant efforts of general industry would progressively have enabled government, without injuring these objects, to afford such relief, at least by the repeal of the most burdensome of the indirect taxes, as the salt-tax, the soap and candle tax, and part of the malt-tax, is evident, from the consideration that the taxes given up since the peace amount to £42,000,000, and, consequently, after the repeal of the income-tax, assessed taxes, and these oppressive indirect taxes, an ample fund for the maintenance of the sinking fund,

even at the elevated rate of fifteen millions a year, would have remained.* Thus Mr. Pitt's system involved within itself the important and invaluable qualities of providing amply for the necessities of the moment, affording instant relief on the termination of hostilities, and yet reserving an adequate fund for the liquidation of all the national engagements in as short a time as they were contracted.

If, indeed, the nation had been positively unable to bear the burden of the sinking fund of fifteen millions drawn from the indirect taxes, it might have been justly argued that the evil consequences of its abandonment, however much to be deplored, were unavoidable, and, therefore, that the present hopeless situation of the debt may be the subject of regret, but cannot be reproached as a fault to any administration whatever. But, unfortunately, this is by no means the case. To all appearance, the nation has derived no material benefit from a great part of the taxes thus improvidently abandoned, but has, on the contrary, suffered in all its present interests, as well as future prospects, from the change.

In proof of this, it is only necessary to recollect that during the war the nation not only existed, but thrived under burdens infinitely greater than have been imposed since its termination, and that, too, although the exports and imports at that period were little more than half of what they have since become. During the last four years of the war, the sum annually raised by taxes was from sixty-five to seventy-five millions, while twenty years after it was from forty-five to fifty: although, during the first period, the exports ranged from forty-five to sixty millions, and the imports from twenty-five to thirty; while, during the latter, the exports had risen to seventy-five millions, and the imports to forty-five.† Without doubt, the prosperity of the latter years of the war was, in a great degree, fictitious; most certainly it depended to a certain extent on the feverish excitement of an extravagant issue of paper, and was also much to be ascribed to a large portion of the capital of the nation being at that period annually borrowed and spent in an unproductive form, to its great present benefit and certain ultimate embarrassment. It is equally clear that, if this had gone on for

Little good has been derived from this repeal of indirect taxes.

Immense burdens under which the nation prospered during the war.

* Total taxes repealed since the peace, £42,115,000: Might have been repealed, viz.:

Property-tax and war malt.....	£17,547,000	Ample funds which existed for its maintenance even when providing largely for the public relief.
War duties on goods.....	1,154,000	
Annual malt and hides.....	2,139,000	
Salt and assessed taxes.....	4,185,000	
Candles.....	600,000	
Soap-tax.....	800,000	
House-tax.....	1,200,000	

£27,625,000

Leaving to support the sinking fund. - 14,490,000

£42,115,000

Besides £5,813,000 of fresh taxes imposed during the same period.

	Raised by Taxes.	Official value. Exports. Great Britain and Ireland.	Official value: Imports. Great Britain and Ireland.
1813.....	£63,211,000	£38,226,263	£25,163,411
1814.....	70,926,000		Records destroyed by fire.
1815.....	72,131,000	52,573,034	33,755,264
1816.....	76,834,000	58,624,600	32,987,396
1830.....	£55,824,802	£69,691,302	£46,245,241
1831.....	54,810,190	71,429,004	49,713,889
1832.....	50,990,315	76,071,572	44,586,241

—*PEBBLE'S Tables*, 159, 341; *PORTER'S Parl. Tables*, i., 48, and ii., 49.

some years longer, irreparable ruin must have been the result. But there is a medium in all things. As much as the public expenditure before 1816 exceeded what a healthful state of the body politic could bear, so much has the expenditure since that time fallen short of it. Violent transitions are as injurious in political as private life. To pass at once from a state of vast and unprecedented expenditure to one of rigid and jealous economy, is in the highest degree injurious to a nation; it is like making a man who has for years drank two bottles of port a day suddenly take to toast and water. It may sometimes be unavoidable, but, unquestionably, the change would be much less perilous if gradually effected.

It was unquestionably right, at the conclusion of the war, to have made as large a reduction as was consistent with the public security in the army and navy, and to stop at once the perilous system of borrowing money. Such a reduction at once permitted the repeal of the whole direct war-taxes. But having done this, the question is, Was it expedient to go a step farther, and make such reductions in the indirect taxes, of which no serious complaint was made, as amounted to a practical repeal of the sinking fund? That was the ruinous measure! The maintenance of that fund at twelve or fifteen millions a year, raised from taxes, with its growing increase, would, to all appearance, have been a happy medium, which, without adding to, but, on the contrary, in the long run diminishing the national burdens, would, at the same time, have prevented that violent transition from a state of expenditure to one of retrenchment, under the effects of which, for eighteen years after the peace, all branches of industry, with only a few intervals, continued to labour.

No one branch of the government expenditure would have gone farther to uphold, during this trying time, the industry and credit of the country, and diffuse an active demand for labour through all classes, than that which was devoted to the sinking fund. Such a fund, beginning at twelve or fifteen millions a year derived from taxes, and progressively rising to twenty or thirty millions, annually applied to the redemption of stock, must have had a prodigious effect, both in upholding credit and spreading commercial enterprise through the country. It would have produced an effect precisely opposite to that which the annual absorption of the same sum, during the war, in loans occasioned. The public funds, under the influence of the prodigious and growing purchases of the commissioners, must have been maintained at a very high level; it is probably not going too far to say, that since 1820 they would have been constantly kept from 90 to 100. The effect of such a state of things in vivifying and sustaining commercial enterprise, and counteracting the depression consequent upon the great diminution of the government expenditure in other departments, must have been very great. The money given for the stock purchased by the commissioners would have been let loose upon the country; their operations must have continually poured out upon the nation a stream of wealth, constantly increasing in size, which, in the search for profitable investment, could not have avoided giving a most important stimulus to every branch of national industry. The sinking fund must have operated like a great

forcing-pump, which drew a large portion of the capital of the country annually out of its unproductive investment in the public funds, and directed it to the various beneficial channels of private employment. Doubtless the funds necessary for the accomplishment of this great work must have been drawn from the nation, or the proceeds of the stock purchased by the commissioners, just as the produce of the taxes is all extracted from the national industry; but experience has abundantly proved that such a forcible direction of a considerable part of the national income to such a productive investment is often more conducive to immediate prosperity, as well as ultimate advantage, than if, from an undue regard to popular clamour, it is allowed to remain at the disposal of individuals. It is like compelling a spendthrift and embarrassed landowner not only to provide annually for the interest of his debts, but to pay off a stated portion of the principal, which, when assigned to his creditors, is immediately devoted to the fertilizing of his fields and the draining of his morasses. Nor is this all. The high price of the funds consequent upon the vast and growing purchases of the commissioners would have gone far not only to keep up that prosperous state of credit which is essential to the well-being of a commercial country, but would have induced numbers of private individuals to sell out in order to realize the great addition to their capitals which the rise of the public securities had occasioned. To assert that this forced application yearly of a considerable portion of the national capital to the redemption of the debt would have altogether counteracted the decline in the demand for labour consequent on the transition from a state of war to one of peace, would be going farther than either reason or experience will justify; but this much may confidently be asserted, that the general prosperity consequent on this state of things could not have failed to have rendered the taxation requisite to produce it comparatively a tolerable burden; that the nation would, to all appearance, have been much more prosperous than it has been under the opposite system, and, at the same time, would have obtained the incalculable advantage of having paid off, during these prosperous years, above two thirds of the national debt. This prosperity doubtless would have been partly owing to a forced direction of capital; but whatever danger there may be in such a state of things while debt is annually contracted, there is comparatively little when it is continued only for its discharge; and when an artificial system has contributed to the formation of a burden, it is well that it should not be entirely removed till that burden is reduced to a reasonable amount.

Every one, when this vast reduction of indirect taxes was going on, to the entire destruction of the sinking fund and Mr. Pitt's provident system of financial policy, looked only, even with reference to present advantage, to one side of the account. They forgot that, if the demands of government on the industry of the nation were rapidly reduced, their demands on government must instantly undergo a similar diminution; that, if the Exchequer ceased to collect seventy millions a year, it must cease also to expend it. Every reduction of taxation, even in those branches where it is not complained of, was held forth as an alleviation of the burdens of the nation, and a reasonable ground for popularity to its rulers; whereas, in

Argument on this subject.

Temporary advantages which would have attended keeping up the sinking fund.

Public errors which led to its abandonment, and their distressing effects.

truth, the relief even at the moment was more nominal than real, as though a diminution of those burdens was effected: it took place frequently in quarters where they were imperceptible, and drew after it an instantaneous and most sensible reduction in the demand for labour and the employment of the industrious classes, at a time when it could ill be spared, from the same effect having simultaneously ensued from other causes. Great part of the distress which has been felt by all classes since the peace was the result of the general diminution of expenditure, which the too rapid reduction of so many indirect taxes, and consequent abandonment of the sinking fund, necessarily occasioned, and which the maintenance of its machinery till it had fulfilled its destined purpose would, to a very great degree, have alleviated. It augments our regret, therefore, at the abandonment of Mr. Pitt's financial system, that the change had not even the excuse of present necessity or obvious expedience for its recommendation, but was the result of undue subservience to particular interests, or desire for popularity on the part of our rulers, unattended even by the temporary advantages for the sake of which its incalculable ultimate benefits were relinquished.

Lord Castlereagh made a most manly endeavour, in 1816, to induce the people to submit for a few years to that elevated rate of taxation by which alone permanent relief from the national embarrassments could be expected; but he committed a signal error in the tax which he selected for the struggle, and deviated as much from Mr. Pitt's principles in the effort to maintain the heavy impost as subsequent administrations did in their abandonment of others of a lighter character. The income-tax, being a direct war impost of the most oppressive and invidious description, was always intended by that great statesman to come to a close with the termination of hostilities; and its weight was so excessive, that it was impossible and unreasonable to expect the people to submit any longer to its continuance. Nothing could be more impolitic, therefore, than to commit government to a contest with the people on so untenable a ground. It was the subsequent repeal of indirect taxes to the amount of above five-and-twenty millions a year, when they were not complained of, and the fall in the price of the taxed articles, from the change in the value of money, had rendered their weight imperceptible, which was the fatal deviation from Mr. Pitt's principles. The administrations by whom this prodigious repeal was effected are not exclusively responsible for the result: it is not unlikely, that from the growing preponderance of the popular branch of the Constitution, it had become impossible to carry on the government without the annual exhibition of some such fallacious benefit, to gain the applause of the multitude; and it is more than probable that, from the excessive influence which in later years it acquired, the maintenance of any fixed provident system of finance had become impossible. But they are to blame, and posterity will not acquit them of the fault, for not having constantly and strenuously combated this natural, though ruinous popular weakness; and if they could not prevail on the House of Commons to adhere to Mr. Pitt's financial system, at least laid on them the responsibility of all the consequences of its abandonment.

It was impossible to explain Mr. Pitt's system

for the reduction of the debt, without anticipating the course of events, and unfolding the ruinous results which have followed the departure from its principles. The paramount importance of the subject must plead the author's apology for the anachronism: and it remains now to advert, with a different measure of encomium, to the funding system on which that statesman so largely acted, and the general principles on which his taxation was founded.

It is evident that in some cases the funding system, or the plan of providing for extraordinary public expenses by loans, of the funding system. the interest of which is alone laid as a burden on future years, is not only just, but attended with very great public advantage. When a war is destined apparently to be of short endurance, and a great lasting advantage may be expected from its results, it is often impossible, and, if possible, would be unjust, to lay its expenses exclusively upon the years of its continuance. In ordinary contests, indeed, it is frequently practicable, and when so, it is always advisable, to make the expenses of the year fall entirely upon its income, so that at the conclusion of hostilities no lasting burden may descend upon posterity. But in other cases this cannot be done. When, in consequence of the fierce attack of a desperate and reckless enemy, it has become necessary to make extraordinary efforts, it is often altogether out of the question to raise supplies in the year adequate to its expenditure: nor is it reasonable, in such cases, to lay upon those who, for the sake of their children as well as themselves, have engaged in the struggle, the whole charges of a contest of which the more lasting benefits are probably to accrue to those who are to succeed them. In such cases, necessity in nations, not less than individuals, calls for the equalization of the burden over all those who are to obtain the benefit; and the obvious mode of effecting this is by the funding system, which, providing at once by loan the supplies necessary for carrying on the contest, lays its interest as a lasting charge on those for whose behoof the debt had been contracted. Nor is it possible to deny, amid all the evils which the abuse of this system has occasioned, its astonishing effect in suddenly augmenting the resources of a nation; or to resist the conclusion deducible from the fact, that it was to its vigorous and happy application at the close of the war that the extraordinary successes by which it was distinguished are in a great degree to be ascribed.*

But this system, like everything good in human affairs, has its limits; and if extraordinary benefits may sometimes arise from its adoption, extraordinary evils may still more frequently originate in its abuse. Many individuals have been elevated, by means of loans contributed at a fortunate moment, to wealth and greatness; but many more have been involved, by the fatal command of money which it confers for a short period, in irretrievable embarrassments. Unless suggested by necessity

* Loans contracted by the British government in the latter years of the war.

1812, £24,000,000	1814, £58,763,000
1813, 27,871,000	1815, 18,500,000

Of these great loans upward of £12,000,000, was, in 1813, 1814, and 1815, applied annually to foreign powers; in consequence of which, the whole armies of Europe came to be arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine; while, at the same time, the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 60,000 men, was maintained on the southern frontier of France.—MOREAU'S *Tables*; PEBBER, 246.

and conducted with prudence; unless administered with frugality and followed by parsimony, borrowing is, to nations not less than individuals, the general road to ruin. It is the ease of contracting compared with the difficulty of discharging; the natural disposition to get a present command of money, and leave the task of paying it off to posterity, which is the temptation that, to communities not less than single men, so often proves irresistible. Opulent nations, whose credit is high, become involved in debt from the same cause which has drowned almost all the great estates in Europe with mortgages: the existence of the means of relieving present difficulties, by merely contracting debt, is more than the firmness either of the heads of families or the rulers of empires can resist. And there is this extraordinary and peculiar danger in the lavish contraction of debt by government, that by the great present expenditure with which it is attended, a very great impulse is communicated at the time to every branch of industry, and thus immediate prosperity is generated out of the source of ultimate ruin.

Mr. Pitt was fully aware both of the immediate advantages and ultimate dangers of the funding system. His measures, accordingly, varied with the aspect which the war assumed, and the chances of bringing it to an immediate issue, which present appearances appeared to afford. During its earlier years, when the Continental campaigns were going on, and a rapid termination of the strife was constantly expected, as was the case with the Spanish Revolution in 1823, or the Polish in 1831, large loans were annually contracted, and the greater part of the war-supplies of the year were raised by that means; provision being made for the permanent raising of the interest, and the sinking fund for its extinction, in the indirect taxes which were simultaneously laid on, and to the maintenance of which the national faith was pledged, till the whole debt thus contracted, principal and interest, was discharged.* It is no impeachment of the wisdom of this system, so far as finance goes, that the expectations of a speedy termination of the contest were constantly disappointed, and that debt to the amount of £116,000,000 was contracted before the Continental peace of Campo Formio in 1797, without any other result than a constant addition to the power of France. The question is not whether the resources obtained from these loans were beneficially expended, but whether the debts were contracted yearly under a belief, founded on rational grounds, that by a vigorous prosecution of the contest, it might speedily be brought to a successful issue. That this view, so far as mere finance considerations are concerned, was well founded, is obvious from the narrow escapes which the French Republic repeatedly made during that period, and the many occasions on which the jealousies of the allies, or the niggardly exertion of its military resources by Great Britain, threw away the means of triumph when within their grasp. The financial measures of the British ministry, therefore, during this period, were justifiable and prudent:

* 1793,	Loan contracted,	£4,500,000
1794	12,907,451	
1795	42,090,646	
1796	42,736,196	
1797	14,629,000	

£116,863,293

—MOREAU'S Tables.

the real error consisted in the misapplication, or undue husbanding of its land-forces, for which it is not so easy to find an apology.

But after the peace of Campo Formio this system of lavish annual borrowing, in expectation of an immediate and decisive result, necessarily required a modification. Great Britain was then left alone in the struggle.

Modification which they received from the first Continental peace in 1797.

Her Continental allies had all disappeared from the field of battle; and the utmost that she could now expect was to continue a defensive warfare, till time or a different series of events had again brought their vast armies to her side. To have continued the system of borrowing for the war expenses of the year, in such a state of the contest, would have been to go on with measures which were likely to lead to perdition. The war having now assumed a defensive and lasting complexion, the moment had arrived when it became necessary to bring the taxes within the year nearer to a level with the expenditure. This change, and the reasons for it, are thus detailed in Mr. Pitt's speech on the budget for the year 1798: "Nineteen millions is the sum which is required for extraordinary expenses in the present year. According to the received system of financial operations, the natural and ordinary mode of providing for this would be by a loan. I admit that the funding system, which has so long been the established mode of supplying the public wants, is not yet exhausted, though I cannot but regret the extent to which it has been carried. If we look, however, at the general diffusion of wealth and the great accumulation of capital; above all, if we consider the hopes which the enemy has of wearing us out by the embarrassments of the funding system, we must admit that the true mode of preparing ourselves to maintain the contest with effect and ultimate success is to reduce the advantages which the funding system is calculated to afford within due limits, and to prevent the depreciation of our national securities. We ought to consider how far the efforts we shall exert to preserve the blessings we enjoy will enable us to transmit the inheritance to posterity unencumbered with those burdens which would cripple their vigour, and prevent them from asserting that rank in the scale of nations which their ancestors so long and gloriously maintained. It is in this point of view that the object ought to be considered. Whatever objections might have been fairly urged against the funding system in its origin, no man can suppose that, after the form and shape which it has given to our financial affairs, after the heavy burdens which it has left behind it, we can now recur to the notion of making the supplies raised within the year, on such a scale of war expense as we are now placed in, equal the expenditure. If such a plan, how desirable soever, is evidently impracticable, some medium, however, may be found to draw as much advantage from the funding system as it is fit, consistently with a due regard to posterity, to afford, and at the same time to obviate the evils with which its excess would be attended. We may still devise some expedient by which we may contribute to the defence of our own cause and to the supply of our own exigences, by which we may reduce within equitable limits the accommodation of the funding system, and lay the foundation of that quick redemption which will prevent the dangerous consequences of an overgrown accumulation of our public debt.

"To guard against the undue accumulation of the public debt, and to contribute that share to the struggle in which we are engaged which our abilities will enable us, without inconvenience to those who are called upon to contribute, to afford, appears essentially necessary. I propose, with this view, to reduce the loan for this year (1798) to twelve millions, and to raise seven millions by additional taxation within the year. I am aware that this sum does far exceed anything which has been raised at any former period at one time; but I trust that, whatever temporary sacrifices it may be necessary to make, the House will see that they will best provide for the ultimate success of the struggle by showing that they are determined to be guided by no personal considerations, and that while they defend the present blessings they enjoy, they are not regardless of posterity. If the sacrifices required be considered in this view; if they be taken in reference to the objects for which we contend, and the evils we are labouring to avert, great as they may be compared with former exertions, they will appear light in the balance.

"The objects to be attained in the selection of the tax to meet this great increase are threefold. One great point is, that the plan should be diffused as extensively as possible, without the necessity of such an investigation of property as the customs, the manners, and the pursuits of the people would render odious. The next is, that it should exclude those who are least able to contribute or furnish means of relief. The third, that it should admit of those abatements which, in particular instances, it might be prudent to make in the portion of those who might be liable under its general principles. No scheme, indeed, can be practically carried into execution in any financial arrangement, much more in one embraced in such difficult circumstances as the present, with such perfect dispositions as to guard against hardships in every individual instance; but these appear to me to be the principles which should be kept in view in the discussion of the proper method to be adopted for meeting the large deficiency, which, from the contraction of the loan, it will become necessary to make good by taxation within the present year.*

In pursuance of these admirable principles, Trebling of the assessed taxes, which fell chiefly on the rich, such as servants, horses, carriages, and that the house and window tax, which in a great measure are borne by the middling ranks, should only be doubled; both under various restrictions, to restrain their severity in affecting the humbler class of citizens. This was agreed to by the committee of the House of Commons; and thus the first step was made in the new system of contracting the loan within narrower limits, and making the supplies raised within the year more nearly approach to its expenditure. But the produce of the tax fell greatly short of the expectations of government, as they had calculated on its reaching seven millions, whereas it never cleared four millions and a half; a deficiency which rendered a recurrence to borrowing necessary in that very year.†

The trebled assessed taxes thus imposed, however, were, according to Mr. Pitt's plan, to be con-

tinued only for a limited time, and were to be a kept up only as a war-burden. "I propose," said he, "that the increased assessment now voted shall be continued till the principal and interest of the loan contracted this year shall be discharged: so that after the seven millions shall have been raised within this year, the same sums continued next year, with the additional aid of the sinking fund, will pay off all that principal and intermediate interest. If you feel yourselves equal to this exertion, its effects will not be confined to the benefits I have stated in the way of general policy; it will go to the exonerating of the nation from increased burdens. Unless you feel that you have a right to expect that, by less exertion, you will be equally secure, and indulge in the hope that, by stopping short of this effort, you will produce a successful termination of the war, you must put aside all apprehensions of the present pressure, and by vigorous exertion, endeavour to secure your future stability, the happy effects of which will soon be seen and acknowledged. I am aware it will be said it would be fortunate if the system of funding had never been introduced, and that it is much to be lamented that it is not terminated; but if we are arrived at a moment which requires a change of system, it is some encouragement for us to look forward to benefits which, on all former occasions, have been unknown, because the means of obtaining them were neglected. Raise the present sums by taxation in two years, and you and your posterity are completely exonerated from it; but if, on the other hand, you fund its amount, it will entail an annual tribute for its interest, which in forty years will amount to no less than forty millions. These are the principles, this is the conduct, this is the language fit for men legislating for a country, that from its situation, character, and institutions, bears the fairest chance of any in Europe for perpetuity. You should look to distant benefits, and not work in the narrow, circumscribed sphere of shortsighted, selfish politicians. You should put to yourselves this question, the only one now to be considered, 'Shall we sacrifice, or shall we save to our posterity a sum of between forty and fifty millions sterling?' And above all, you should consider the effect which such a firm and dignified conduct would have on the progress and termination of the present contest, which may, without exaggeration, involve everything dear to yourselves, and decide the fate of your posterity."* Here was a great change of system, and a remarkable approximation to a more statesmanlike and manly mode of raising the supplies required for the existing contest. Instead of providing taxes adequate to the interest merely of the sums borrowed, direct burdens were now to be imposed, which in two or three years would discharge the whole principal sums themselves: an admirable plan, and the nearest approximation which was probably then practicable to the only safe system of finance, that of making the supplies raised within the year equal or nearly equal to the expenditure, but which was soon departed from amid the necessities or profusion of future years; and which, from the heavy burdens which it imposes at the moment, and from its withdrawing as much capital from the private employment of labour as it added to the public, was necessarily attended both with greatly more suffering, and far less

* Parl. Hist., xxxiii., 1042, 1045.

† Parl. Hist., xxxiii., 1076.

* Parl. Hist., xxxiii., 1054, 1055.

counteracting prosperity, than the more encouraging and delusive system of providing for all emergencies by lavish borrowing, which had previously, and for so long a period, been adopted.

The new system, thus commenced, was continued with more or less resolution during all the remainder of Mr. Pitt's administration. But in spite of the clear perception which all statesmen had now attained of the ultimate dangers of the funding system, it was found to be impossible to continue the new plan to the full extent originally contemplated by its author. In the next year, the war again broke out under circumstances the most favourable to the European powers, and sound policy forbade a niggardly system of finance, when, by a great combined effort, it appeared possible to attain, during the absence of Napoleon on the sands of Egypt, all the objects of the war in a single campaign. Impressed with these considerations, Mr. Pitt proposed the income-tax in 1799; a great step in financial improvement, and, if considered as a war impost, and regulated according to a just scale, the most productive and expedient that could be adopted. The grounds on which this great addition to the national burdens was proposed, were thus stated by Mr. Pitt: "The principles of finance which the House adopted last year were, first, to reduce the total amount to be at present raised by loan; and next, to provide for the deficiency by a temporary tax, which should extinguish the loan within a limited time. The modifications, however, which it became necessary to introduce into the increase of the assessed taxes last year, considerably reduced its amount, and it is now necessary to look for some more general and productive impost, which may enable us to continue the same system of restraining the annual loan within reasonable limits. With this view, it is my intention that the presumption on which the assessed taxes is founded shall be laid aside, and that a general tax shall be imposed on all the leading branches of income. No scale, indeed, can be adopted which shall not be attended with occasional hardship, or withdraw from the fraudulent the means of evasion; but I trust that all who value the national safety will co-operate in the desirable purpose of obtaining, by an efficient and comprehensive tax upon real ability, every advantage which flourishing and invigorated resources can confer upon national efforts."*

In pursuance of these principles, he proposed that no income under £60 a year should pay anything; that from that up to £200 a year, it should be on a graduated scale; and that for £200 a year and upward, it should be ten per cent. No one was to be called on to disclose to the commissioners; but if he declined, he was to be liable to be assessed at the sum which they should fix: if he gave in a statement of his receipts, he was, if required, to confirm it on oath. Funded property was to be assessed as well as any other sources of income, and the profits of tenants were to be estimated at three fourths of the rack-rent of their lands. The total taxable income of Great Britain he estimated at £102,000,000 a year, and calculated the produce of the tax at ten millions sterling. In consideration of this great supply, he proposed to reduce the trebled assessed

taxes to their former level, and to restrict the loan to £9,500,000, for which the income-tax was to be mortgaged, after the mortgage imposed for the loan of the former year had been discharged.*

In opposition to this bill, it was urged by Sir William Pulteney and a considerable body of respectable members, "That the general and wise policy of the country, from the Revolution downward, had been to lay taxes on consumption, and consumption only; and to this there was no exception but the land-tax, which was of inconsiderable amount; for even the window-tax was a burden on a luxury which might be diminished at pleasure. Now, however, the dangerous precedent is introduced of levying a heavy impost, not on expenditure or consumption, but income: that is, of imposing a burden which by no possibility can be avoided. If this principle be once introduced, it is impossible to say where the evil may stop; for what is to hinder the government to increase the tax to a fifth, a third, or even a half; that is, to introduce the confiscations which have always distinguished arbitrary governments, and have been in an especial manner the disgrace of the French Revolution? The great danger of this tax, therefore, is, that it not only sanctions a most odious and dangerous inquisition into every man's affairs, but it is so calculated as to weigh with excessive severity on the middling orders of society, while it would bear but slightly in comparison upon the highest, and totally exempt the lowest. It would destroy the middling class, and do it soon; it would totally prevent the accumulation of small capitals, the great source of general prosperity, and then we should have only two classes in the community, and a miserable community it would be, of noblemen and peasants. The principle that every man should contribute according to his means is doubtless just; but is this a contribution according to means? Quite the contrary; it is a tax which falls with undue severity upon some classes, and improper lightness on others. A person possessing permanent and independent income might spend what portion of it he chose without injury to his heirs; but income resulting from personal industry or from profession stood in a very different situation, for it was necessary that a part of the income of these descriptions should be laid by as a provision for old age or helpless families. Expenditure, therefore, is the only sure criterion of taxation, because it alone is accommodated to the circumstances or necessities of each individual taxed: and if a few misers, under such a system, may avoid contributing their proper share, they are only postponing the day of payment to their heirs, who in all probability will be the more extravagant; and far better that such insulated individuals should escape, than the far-spread injustice should be inflicted, which would result from the adoption of the proposed alteration."†

The income-tax, notwithstanding these objections, was adopted by the House of Commons in the year 1799; for the loan of that year being, for Great Britain and Ireland, £18,500,000, besides £3,000,000 of Exchequer bills. But in comparing the amount of the loans which would have been necessary if this system of increasing the supplies raised within the year had not been

* *Parl. Hist.*, xxxiv., 5, 6.

† *Ib.*, xxxiv., 134, 147.

adopted, with that actually contracted under the new system, it was satisfactorily shown by Mr. Pitt that no less than £120,000,000 would ultimately be saved to the nation by the more manly policy, when the interest which was avoided was taken into account: a striking proof of the extraordinary difference to the ultimate resources of a country, which arises from raising the supplies within the year, and providing them in great part by the funding system.*

The regulation of Mr. Pitt, however, in regard to these direct taxes, was, in one important particular, a deviation from his general financial policy, and the embarrassing consequences of this deviation speedily became conspicuous. At the first imposition of the treble assessment, it was intended as an extraordinary resource, which there was no likelihood would be required beyond one or two years, and, in consequence, it was mortgaged for a considerable proportion of the loans contracted in the years when it was in operation; and the same principle was continued when it was commuted for the income-tax. But when this system continued for several years in succession, it came to violate the principle that these direct taxes, being a painful impost, should be continued only while the war lasted; for in the years from 1793 to 1801 the amount thus fixed as a preferable burden on the direct war-taxes was no less than fifty-six millions. The magnitude of this mortgage obliged Mr. Pitt, in 1801, to return to his old mode of contracting loans, by providing, in the increase of indirect taxes, for their interest and the sinking fund required for their redemption; and in 1802, when Mr. Addington came to arrange the finances for a peace establishment, he got quit altogether of this embarrassing load on the direct taxes, which would have required them, contrary to all principle, to be continued for nine years after the war had ceased, and boldly funded at once the whole of this £56,000,000, as well as £40,000,000 of unfunded debt which existed at the end of the war; and for the whole of this immense sum of £96,000,000 he contrived to find sufficient taxes, even when adhering to Mr. Pitt's system of making provision in the funding of loans, not only for its annual interest, but the sinking fund destined for its redemption. There can be no doubt but this was a very great improvement, and that it restored this branch of our finances to their true principle, which is, that the whole sums required for the interest and redemption of the debt should be raised by indirect taxes, and direct burdens reserved only for the extraordinary efforts intended during the continuance of the war—to make the supplies raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure.†

The changes which have now been mentioned embraced all the leading principles of Mr. Pitt's financial system. In subsequent years the same policy was adopted which had been introduced with so much success in later times, of augmenting as much as possible the supplies raised within the year, and diminishing as much as might be the loan which it was still necessary annually to contract. And of the success with which this system was attended, and the rapid growth of the machinery erected for the extinction of the debt, the best evidence is preserved in the honest testimony of his Whig successor in the important office of chancellor of the Exchequer: "In the

year 1803," said Lord Henry Petty, afterward Lord Lansdowne, "the proportions of the sinking fund to the unredeemed debt was as one to eighty-two; the former being £5,835,000, and the latter £480,572,000. But in the year ending the 1st of February, 1806, the sinking fund amounted to £7,566,000, and the unredeemed debt was then £517,280,000, making the proportion one in sixty-eight. After this it is unnecessary for me to enter into any eulogium on the sinking fund, or to detain the House with any panegyric on its past effects or future prospects. Its advantages are now fully felt in the price of stock and contracting of loans; and, independent of all considerations of good faith, which would induce the House to cling to it as their sheet-anchor for the future, they were pledged to support it, having had positive experience of its utility. And of the vast importance of raising a great part of the supplies within the year, no better proof can be desired than is furnished by the fact that during the first ten years of the war the increase of the debt was £253,000,000, being at the rate, on an average, of twenty-five millions a year;* whereas during the three years of the present war, from 1803 downward, the total sum borrowed has been £36,000,000, being at the rate of twelve millions a year only."

With the exception, however, of the war taxes thus imposed for a special purpose, and which were pledged to be temporary burdens, enduring only for the year in which they were raised, or at most for a year or two after it, all the other taxes imposed by Mr. Pitt were in the indirect form. And in particular, the interest of the loans annually contracted, when laid as a permanent burden on the nation, and for the immediate redemption of the principals of which the war taxes were not mortgaged, as was done in 1799, were all provided for in this mitigated form. The wisdom of this arrangement cannot be better stated than in the words of Mr. Hume: "The best taxes are such as are levied upon consumption, especially those of luxury, because such taxes are least felt by the people. They seem in some measure voluntary, since a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed. They are paid gradually and insensibly; they naturally produce sobriety and frugality, if judiciously imposed; and, being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying. Taxes, again, upon possessions, are levied without expense, but have every other disadvantage. Most statesmen are obliged to have recourse, however, to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other. Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state was the alterations which Constantine introduced into the finances, by substituting a universal direct tax in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excise which formerly composed the revenue of the Empire. The people in all the provinces were so grinded by this imposition, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found to be preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans."† It is to be regarded, therefore, as a capital excellence in Mr. Pitt's

Advantages of the new system.

embraced all the leading principles of Mr. Pitt's financial system.

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Mr. Pitt's permanent taxes were all in the indirect form. Their advantages.

* Parl. Hist., xxxiv., 1153. † Parl. Deb., viii., 573, 576.

* Ann. Reg. 1806, 70. Parl. Deb., vi., 567, 570.

† Hume's Essays, i., 365, 366.

financial measures, that he not only provided in permanent imposts for the interest of the whole public debt and the sinking fund necessary for its redemption, but made that provision exclusively in taxes in the indirect form, the burden of which is imperceptible, and is never the subject of any general complaint; whereas the direct taxes, which are always felt as so oppressive, were reserved, as a last resource, for the unavoidable exigencies of war, and specially set apart for those years only when the excitement and necessities of the actual contest were experienced.

In addition to these forcible reasons for ever, Arguments except in cases of obvious necessity, for indirect and when its resources are exhausted, taxation. preferring indirect to direct taxation, there is another of perhaps still greater importance, which has never yet met with the attention it deserves. It has often been observed with surprise by travellers, that though the sums which are extracted from the people in a direct form by the Turkish pachas or the Indian rajahs have frequently the effect of totally ruining industry, yet they are inconsiderable when compared to the immense revenue derived from the customs and excise in the European states, without any sensible impediment to its exertions. The reason is obvious: it consists in the difference upon the meadows beneath, between drawing off water from the fountain-head and drawing it off at a vast distance below, after it has fertilized innumerable plains in its course. If you abstract money in a direct form from the cultivator or the artisan, the revenue taken goes at once from the producer to the public treasury; but if you withdraw it from the person who ultimately sells the manufactured article to the consumer, it has, before it is withdrawn, put the industry of a dozen different classes of persons in motion. The sum received by the government may be the same in both cases: but how immense the difference between the effect upon general industry when it is seized upon by the tax-collector early in its course, and only withdrawn after it has given all the encouragement to different branches of employment it is capable of effecting! Fifty different individuals are often put to their shifts to meet the burden of an indirect tax—a direct one falls in undivided severity on one alone. So important is this distinction, that it may safely be affirmed that no nation ever yet was ruined by indirect taxation; nor can it be so, for before it becomes oppressive it must cease to be productive. Many, however, have been exterminated by much smaller sums levied in the direct form, that method of raising the supplies being attended with this most dangerous quality, that it is often most productive when it is trenching most deeply on the sources of future existence.

Nor is there any foundation for the obvious Reply to the objections against them. industry are taxed in the person of the consumer, he must diminish the quantity which he can purchase, and thus industry will be as effectually paralyzed as if the impost were laid directly upon the producer. Plausible as this argument undoubtedly is, the common sense and experience of mankind have everywhere rejected its authority. No complaint was made during the war of fifty-five millions levied annually, by means of indirect taxes, on the people of Great Britain; but so burdensome was the income-tax, producing only fourteen millions a

year, felt to be, that all the efforts of government could not keep it on for one year after its termination. When the voice of the people was directly admitted, through the portals opened by the Reform Bill, upon the Legislature, it was not the forty-two millions levied annually in the indirect form, but the four millions and a half extracted directly by the assessed taxes, which was made the subject of such loud complaint that a great reduction in those burdens became indispensable. The people, however unfit to judge of most matters in legislation, may be referred to as good authority in the estimation of the burdens which are most oppressive upon them at the moment. Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this universal opinion among all practical men, how adverse soever it may be to the theoretical opinions of philosophers. Indirect taxes, if judiciously laid on, and not carried to such an excess as to render them unproductive, often do not, in reality, fall on any one individual with overwhelming severity; they are defrayed by the economy, skill, or improved machinery of all the many persons who are employed in the manufacture of the taxed article. The burden is so divided as to be imperceptible. Portioned out among fifteen or twenty different hands, the share falling on each is easily compensated. A slight increase in the economy of the manufacturer, a trifling improvement in the machinery of its production, in the many hands engaged in its preparation, more than extinguish the burden. The proof of this is decisive: the manufactures of England not only existed, but prospered immensely, under the combined pressure of the heavy indirect taxation and the enormous rise of prices occasioned by the suspension of cash payments during the war; many of them, though the value of money had fallen to a half during its continuance, were sold at half the price at its termination which they were at its commencement. Of all the parts of Mr. Pitt's financial system, none was more worthy of admiration than that which provided for all the permanent expenses of the nation in the indirect taxes: of all the errors committed by his successors, none has been more prejudicial than the obstinate retention of direct, and the lavish relinquishment of indirect taxes.*

* It results from these principles, that when an indirect tax is very heavy, and laid on a raw material, or one subjected to but a slight manufacturing process, it is frequently impossible for the producer either to compensate the tax by increased skill or economy of the article, or lay it upon the consumer. In such cases the tax ceases to be an indirect impost on consumption; it becomes a direct burden on production, and if unduly heavy, may terminate in the total ruin of the class on whom it was imposed. A signal instance of this occurred in regard to the heavy impost duties on sugar. The burden formerly of 30s., then 27s., and now of 24s. the hundred weight on West India sugar, was little felt during the war, when that article sold for forty or forty-five pounds the hogshead (from £6 to £6 10s. the cwt.); but when, on the return of peace, prices fell to £12 or £15 the hogshead (from 50s. to 60s. the cwt., including duty), it became intolerably severe. It then became nearly a hundred per cent. on the rude material; the same as if a duty of fifty shillings a quarter had been laid on wheat raised in England for the home consumption. Nor had either the planter or the refiner the means of eluding this tax to any considerable degree, by either raising the price of the article to the consumer, or diminishing by economy or machinery the cost of its production: the cost of raising rude agricultural produce can hardly ever be diminished to any considerable extent by the application of machinery; and the stoppage of the slave-trade necessarily, in the first instance at least, increased the cost of production, while the only way in which it seemed possible to render the burden tolerable was by augmenting the quantity raised, which necessarily depressed to an undue extent the price

Cases in which indirect taxes, by being excessive, become direct burdens on production.

Such were the general features of Mr. Pitt's financial policy. Decried by the spirit of party during his own lifetime, and that of the generation which immediately succeeded; stigmatized by the age which found itself oppressed by the weight of the burdens he had imposed, and which had forgotten the evils he had averted; obliterated almost, amid the temporary expedients and conceding weakness of the governments by whom he was succeeded, it is yet calculated to stand the test of ages, and appears now in imperishable lustre from the bitter and experienced, though now irrevocable consequences of its abandonment. Grandeur of conception, durability of design, far-seeing sagacity, were its great characteristics. It was truly conceived in a heroic spirit. Burdening, perhaps oppressing the present generation, it was calculated for the relief of future ages: inflicting on its authors a load of present odium, it was fitted to secure the blessings of posterity when they were mouldering in their graves. Founded on that sacrifice of the present to the future which is at once the greatest violence to ordinary inclinations, the invariable mark of elevated understanding, and the necessary antecedent of great achievements, it required for its successful development patience, self-denial, and magnanimity in subsequent statesmen equal to his own. It fell because such virtues could not be found in the age by which he was succeeded. In contemplating his profound plans for the ultimate and speedy liberation of England, even from the enormous burdens entailed on its finances by the Revolutionary war, we

which it bore in the market. Being unable to diminish the cost of production from these causes, all the efforts of the planters to make head against their difficulties and defray the interest of their mortgages, by raising more extensive crops of sugar, only tended to lower prices and throw the taxes as an exclusive burden on themselves. The proof of this is decisive: the price of sugar in America is generally higher than in England, if the duty be deducted, sometimes by fully a third. In 1831, the price per cwt. was in Great Britain 23s. 8d., excluding duty, while in America it was 26s. per cwt. in the same year. Taking into view the greater expense of freight to Britain than America from these islands, there can be no doubt that almost the whole tax has been paid in many years by the producers, amounting though it now does to 100 per cent. Nothing more is requisite to explain the almost total ruin which has fallen on these splendid colonies, even before the last fatal measure of emancipating the slaves was carried into effect.—See *Comma's Report*, 1832, on *West Indies*, p. 7.

In all fiscal measures on this subject there is one principle to be constantly kept in view, to the neglect or oversight of which, more than anything else, the ruin of the West Indies is to be ascribed. This is, that while many branches of manufacturing industry possess the means, by improvements in machinery or the division of labour, of compensating very heavy fiscal burdens, the raisers of rude produce can hardly ever do the same; so that, unless they can succeed in laying the tax upon the consumer, which is very often altogether beyond their power, they are forced to pay it entirely themselves, and it becomes a ruinous direct burden on industry. No doubt can exist on this head, when it is recollected not merely how slight is the improvement which agriculture has ever received from the aid of machinery, but that, while in the most highly civilized states, such as England, the cost of raising manufactures is always, notwithstanding heavy taxes and a plentiful currency, less than in ruder states, it is always much greater of producing agricultural produce. Great Britain can undersell the world in manufactures, but her farmers would be ruined without a corn-law; a fact strikingly illustrative of this vital distinction, and pointing to a very different rate of indirect taxation when applied to rude produce and manufactured articles, which has never yet met with adequate attention.—See BERNARD'S *Theory of the Constitution*, 356, 358: a work which, amid much exaggeration and declamation, contains many just and profound observations on the changes the country has undergone during the last half century, and is deserving of much more attention than it has received.

feel that we are conversing with one who lived for distant ages, and who voluntarily underwent, not the fatigues which are forgotten in the glory of the conqueror, but the obloquy consequent on the firmness of the statesman in the prosecution of what he felt to be for the ultimate good of the nation. In comparing his durable designs with the temporary expedients of the statesmen who preceded and followed him, we experience the same painful transition as in passing from the contemplation of the stately monuments of ancient Egypt, wrought in granite, and calculated for eternal duration, to that of the gaudy but ephemeral palaces of the Arabs, who dwell amid their ruins, and whose brilliancy cannot conceal the perishable nature of the materials of which they are composed.

While doing justice, however, to the great qualities of this illustrious financier, Their errors. it is indispensable not to draw a veil over his faults; and the application of his own principles to the measures which he sometimes adopted will best explain the particulars in which he was led astray.

I. The first great defect which history must impute to the financial measures of Undue extent Mr. Pitt, is having carried too far of the funding system. and continued too long the funding system. system, and not earlier adopted that more manly policy of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies within the year, the benefits of which he himself afterward so fully explained. During the years 1793 and 1794, indeed, when formidable armies menaced France on every side, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands was broke through to an extent never achieved by Marlborough or Eugene, a speedy termination of the war might reasonably be expected, and it was just, therefore, to lay the vast expenses of those years in a great degree on the shoulders of posterity. But after that crisis was passed; after Flanders and Holland had yielded to the victorious arms of Pichegru; after Spain had retired from the struggle, and the Republic, instead of contending for its existence on the Rhine, was pursuing, under Napoleon, the career of conquest in Italy, it had become evident that a protracted contest was to be expected, and measures of finance suitable to such a state of things should have been adopted. The resolute system of raising a considerable portion of the supplies within the year should have been embraced, at latest, in 1796, and the enormous loans of that and the two following years reduced to one half. Those loans amounted to seventy-five millions; if forty millions had been raised in the time by taxation, in addition to the imposts actually paid, the difference in the sum since paid by the nation down to this time, on account of the loans of those years, would have been above £120,000,000! So prodigious is the difference in the ultimate accumulation of burdens, between the energetic and intrepid system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, and the more acceptable but delusive policy of providing at the moment only for the interest, and leaving to posterity the charge of providing for the liquidation of the principal.

II. But if the insidious advantages of the funding were to be preferred to the ultimate benefits of the taxing system, it was indispensable that the warlike forces of England. resources of the state should have been put forth on a scale and in a way calculated to reap sudden advantages commensurate to the

immense burdens thus imposed on posterity; that the contest, if gigantic and expensive, was at least to be short and decisive. That the military power of England was capable, if properly directed and called forth, of making such an effort, is now established by experience. The more the history of the campaigns from 1793 to 1800 are studied, the more clearly will it appear that the armies of France and the coalition were very equally poised; that the scale sometimes preponderated to one side and sometimes to the other, but without any decisive advantage to either party. After three years of protracted strife, the Republican armies, in the close of 1795, were still combating for existence on the Rhine, and gladly accepted a temporary respite from the victorious arms of Clairfait: after three additional years of desperate warfare, they were struggling for the frontiers of the Var and the Jura with the terrible armies of Suwarrow and the Archduke Charles. No doubt can remain, therefore, that the forces on the opposite sides of that great contest were, at that period at least, extremely nearly matched. With what effect, then, might the arms of England have been thrown in upon the scene of warfare; and how would the balance, so long quivering in equilibrium, have been subverted by the addition of fifty thousand British soldiers on the theatre of Blenheim or Ramilies! Herein, therefore, lay the capital error of Mr. Pitt's financial system, considered with reference to the warlike operations it was intended to promote, that while the former was calculated for a temporary effort only, and based on the principle of great results being obtained in a short time by an extravagant system of expenditure, the latter was arranged on the plan of the most niggardly exertion of the national strength, and the husbanding of its resources for future efforts, totally inconsistent with the lavish dissipation of its present funds. No one would have regretted the great loans from 1793 to 1799, amounting though they did to a hundred and fifty millions sterling, if proportional efforts in the field had at the same time been made; and it was evident that nothing had been omitted which could have conduced to the earlier termination of the war: but our feelings are very different when we recollect that during these six years, big with the fate of England and the world, only 208,000 men were raised for the regular army, and that a nation reposing securely in a seagirt and inaccessible citadel never had above twenty thousand soldiers in the field, and that only in the first two years of the war, out of a disposable force of above a hundred thousand. Mr. Pitt's plans for military operations were all based on the action of Continental armies, while the troops of his own country were chiefly employed in distant colonial expeditions; picking up pawns in this manner at the extremity of the board, when by concentrated moves he might have given checkmate to his adversary at the commencement of the game. His military successes, in consequence, amounted to nothing, while his financial measures were daily increasing the debt in a geometrical progression: and thence, in a great measure, the long duration and heavy burdens of the war.

III. But the greatest of all Mr. Pitt's errors, and the one which was the most inexcusable, because it was most at variance with the admirable foresight and enduring fortitude of his other financial measures, was the extent to which

Injudicious
system of bor-
rowing in the
3 per cents.

he carried the ruinous system of borrowing in the three per cents.; in other words, inscribing the public creditor for £100 in the books of the Bank of England, in consideration of only sixty advanced to the nation. That this policy had the effect of lowering the interest of the loans contracted, and thereby diminishing the burdens of the nation at the moment, may be perfectly true, but what was the advantage thus gained, compared to the enormous burden of saddling the nation with the payment of forty pounds additional to every sixty which it had received? The benefit was temporary and inconsiderable; the evil permanent and most material. Of the seven hundred and eighty millions which now compose the national debt, about six hundred millions has been contracted in the three per cents.; and if this whole debt were to be paid off at par, the nation would have to pay, in all, two hundred and fifty millions more than it ever received. Supposing it to be redeemed by a sinking fund at 80, on an average, which, taking a course of years together, of peace and war, is probably not far from the mark, and which coincides with Mr. Pitt's estimate in 1799, the surplus to be paid above what was received would still be two hundred millions.

Nor have the evils of this most improvident system of borrowing been limited to the great addition thus unnecessarily made to the capital of the national debt. Its effect upon the burden of the interest has been equally unfortunate. Doubtless the loans were, in the first instance, contracted during the war on more favourable terms, as to interest, than could have been obtained if the money had been borrowed in the five per cents.; that is, if a bond for £100 had been given for each £100 only paid into the treasury. But, as a set-off against this temporary and inconsiderable advantage, what is to be said to the experienced impossibility, with funds so contracted, of lowering the interest in time of peace? It is impossible to lower the interest of the three per cents. till interest generally falls below three per cent.; because, if it were attempted when the rate was higher, all the stockholders would immediately demand their money, and government, being unable to borrow below the market rate, would become bankrupt. Nevertheless, it may safely be affirmed that interest, on an average, since 1815, has not exceeded, if it has reached, four per cent. Had the national debt all been contracted in the five per cents., it might all have been subjected to the operation which in 1824 proved so successful with the five per cents., and which, on £157,000,000 only of the debt, the amount of that stock, saved the nation at that time £1,700,000 a year, to which is to be added the half of that sum since gained by the reduction of the same stock to three and a half, which, after taking into view the dissentients, has saved the nation, *forever*, £2,400,000 yearly. Calculating the interest of the £600,000,000 in the three per cents. (£360,000,000 sterling) at £18,000,000 a year, the proportion of this annual burden, which would have been saved by the first reduction of one per cent., would have been £3,600,000, and by the second of half per cent., £1,800,000 more; in all, £5,400,000 *forever*. The sum already saved to the nation, on interest alone, paid since 1824, would have been above fifty millions sterling. Every twenty years, in future, the sum saved, with interest, would exceed a hundred and fifty millions a year!

Its effect in
preventing the
reduction of
interest in
peace.

The temporary reduction of interest obtained by contracting the debt in this ruinous manner will bear no sort of comparison with these serious losses with which the system was ultimately attended. It appears, from the curious table of loans contracted during the war, compiled by Moreau, that the difference in the interest of the loans in the three per cents. and the five per cents. was seldom above half a per cent., generally not more than a quarter.* What is the additional burden thus undertaken during the contest, to the permanent reduction which the opposite system would have enabled government to have effected on the return of peace? Even supposing the difference of interest on the loans while the war lasted had been on an average one per cent., what was this burden, during its continuance, to the reduction of the interest *forever* to four or three and a half per cent.? This thing is so clear that it will not admit of an argument; and if the public necessities had rendered it impossible to have raised the additional interest during the year, it would have been better to have contracted an additional loan every year while the disability lasted, to defray the additional interest, than, by contracting the debt on such disadvantageous terms, disabled posterity forever from taking advantage of the return of peace to effect a permanent reduction of the public debts. So strongly, indeed, has the impolicy of this mode of contracting debt now impressed itself upon the minds of our statesmen, that by a solemn resolution in 1824, Parliament pledged itself never again, under any pressure, to borrow money in any other way than in the five per cents.; a resolution worthy of the British Legislature, and which it is devoutly to be hoped no British statesman will ever forget,

* Take, for example, the following loans, contracted in the three and five per cents. at different periods during the war:

	Sums borrowed, actually paid into Treasury.	Interest.	Rate per cent.
1794. Loan in 5 per cts.	£1,907,451	£96,326	5 per ct.
Do. in 3 per cts.	10,806,000	502,791	4-3-4 per ct.
1795. Loan in 5 per cts.	1,490,646	80,494	5-1-8 per ct.
Do. in 3 per cts.	17,777,163	841,374	4-3-4 per ct.
1796. Loan in 5 per cts.	2,034,889	101,744	5 per ct.
Do. in 3 per cts.	8,500,000	493,145	5-1-2 per ct.
1797. Loan in 5 per cts.	17,815,918	1,006,242	5-1-2 per ct.
Do. in 3 per cts.	13,000,000	625,500	5-3-4 per ct.
1801. Loan in 5 per cts.	2,227,012	111,380	5-1-8 per ct.
1806. Loan in 3 per cts.	27,519,544	1,344,487	5-1-8 per ct.
1807. Loan in 5 per cts.	1,293,200	64,660	5-1-8 per ct.
Do. in 3 per cts.	10,800,000	512,400	4-1-2 per ct.; but £140 of stock created for each £60 paid.
1809. Loan in 5 per cts.	7,932,100	408,878	5-1-8 per ct.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cts.	11,600,000	538,433	4-2-3 per ct.
1811. Loan in 5 per cts.	4,909,350	258,315	5-1-8 per ct.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cts.	11,925,243	569,500	4-3-4 per ct.
1814. Loan in 5 per cts.	5,549,400	277,470	5-1-7 per ct.
Do. in 3 per cts.	12,345,076	574,362	4-3-4 per ct.
1815. Loan in 5 per cts.	10,313,000	603,310	5-4-5 per ct.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cts.	27,000,000	1,517,400	5-1-2 per ct.

--See PEBBER'S *Tables*, 246, from MOREAU.

It clearly appears, from this most instructive table, that the difference between the interest paid on loans in the three and five per cents., from the beginning to the end of the war, varied only from a half to an eighth per cent. And the real difference was even less than here appears, for the public creditors were, frequently in the three per cents., subscribed for much more than £100 in consideration of £60 advanced. In particular, in 1807, they received no less than £140 of stock for each £60 paid.

but which is too likely to be overlooked, like so many other praiseworthy determinations, amid the warlike profusion or Democratic pressure of subsequent times.*

It is true, as Mr. Pitt contemplated the extinction of the whole public debt before the year 1846 by the operation of the sinking fund, and had provided means, which, if steadily adhered to, would unquestionably have produced that result even at an earlier period, the disastrous effects which have actually occurred from this mode of contracting so large a portion of the debt are not to be charged so strongly as an error in his financial system. In the contracting of loans, present relief was, in his estimation, the great object to be considered, because the means of certainly redeeming them within a moderate period, on the return of peace, were simultaneously provided. It was of comparatively little importance that the interest of the three per cents. could not be reduced during peace, when the speedy liquidation of the principal itself might be anticipated; and the addition of nearly double the stock to the sum borrowed appeared of trifling moment, when the only mode of redeeming the debt which any one contemplated was the purchase of stock by the sinking fund commissioners at the current market rates. Still, though these considerations go far to excuse, they do by no means exculpate Mr. Pitt in these measures. Admitting that the reduced rate of interest during the war might be considered as a fair set-off against the enhanced rate for the pacific period of nearly the same amount which elapsed before the debt was discharged, still what is to be said in favour of a system which redeems at 85 or 90 a debt contracted at 58 or 60? In looking forward to this method of liquidating the debt, as calculated to obviate all the evils of inscribing the public creditor for a larger amount of stock than he had advanced of money, Mr. Pitt forgot the certain enhancement of the price of stock by the admirable sinking fund which he himself had established, and that the more strongly and justly he elucidated the salutary tendency of its machinery to uphold the public credit, the more clearly did he demonstrate the ruinous effect of a method of borrowing which turned all that advance to the disadvantage of the nation in discharging its engagements.†

* The author was early in life impressed with the disastrous effects of this borrowing in the three per cents., but it was long before he found any converts to an opinion now generally received. In the year 1813, when a student at college, he maintained the doctrines stated in the text on this subject, in a company consisting of the most eminent and intelligent bankers in Scotland; and, in particular, contended that, if Mr. Pitt could not have afforded to pay annually from the taxes a larger interest for his loans than he actually undertook, he should have "borrowed a little loan to pay the interest of the great loan, rather than have contracted debt in the three per cents." They all, however, disputed the justice of the opinion, maintaining that money could not have been obtained on other terms, and the "little loan" became a standing joke against the author for many years after. Should these lines meet the eye of Mr. Anderson of Moreau, one of the oldest and most valued of the author's friends, and now one of the leading partners of the highly respectable firm of Sir William Forbes & Co., of Edinburgh, he will recur, perhaps, not without interest, to this incident.

† It is a common opinion, that the great expenses of Mr. Pitt's administration were owing to the subsidies so imprudently and needlessly advanced to foreign powers, to induce or enable them to carry on the contest. This, however, is a mistake. The loans and subsidies to foreign powers during the whole war only amount-

In Mr. Pitt's view the sinking fund was to remedy all these evils.

Table of the whole expenses of every year, in every department, during the war.

To Mr. Pitt's financial system there belongs a subject more vital in its ultimate effects than any which has been considered, and the whole results of which are far from being exhausted. The SUSPENSION OF CASH PAYMENTS in 1797, already noticed in the transactions of that year, was a measure of incomparably more importance than any financial step of the past or the present century, and, when taken in conjunction with the almost total destruction of the Spanish mines in America, in consequence of the revolution which broke out in that country in 1808, and the subsequent and unavoidable resumption of cash payments, by the bill of 1819, in Great Britain, opened the way to a series of changes in prices, and, of consequence, in the relative situation, power, and influence of the different classes of society, more material than any which had occurred since the discovery of the mines of Potosi and Mexico, and to which the future historian will perhaps point as the principal cause of the great revolution of England in 1832, and the ultimate fall of the British Empire. This important and vital subject, however, so momentous in its consequences, so interesting in its details, requires a separate chapter for its development, and will more appropriately come to be considered in a future volume, when the effects of the monetary changes during the whole war are brought into view, and the commencement of another set of causes, having an opposite tendency from the rapid decay of the South American mines at its close, is, at the same time, made the subject of discussion.

At present, it only requires to be observed, that the effects of the suspension of cash payments, whether good or evil, are not fairly to be ascribed to Mr. Pitt. They were not, like the consequences of the issue of assignats in France, the result of a barbarous and inhuman confiscation, nor like subsequent changes in this coun-

try, of theoretical or abstract opinions. They were forced on the British statesman by stern necessity. Bankruptcy—irretrievable national bankruptcy stared him in the face if the momentous step were any longer delayed. Once taken, the fatal measure could not be recalled; a resumption of cash payments during the continual pressure and vast expenditure of the war was out of the question. The nation has had ample experience of the shock it occasioned, and the protracted misery it produced, at a subsequent period, even in the midst of profound peace. To have attempted it during the whirl and agitation of the contest, would at once have prostrated all its resources.

No doubt, however, can remain, that the suspension of cash payments contributed essentially to increase the available resources of Great Britain for carrying on the war. An extension of the circulating medium, especially if accompanied by a great and increasing present expenditure, never fails to have this effect. It is when the subsequent stoppage or contraction takes place that the perilous nature of the experiment becomes manifest. Great immediate prosperity to all around him is often produced by the prodigality of the spendthrift; but if he trenches deep, amid this beneficent profusion, on the resources of future years, the day of accounting will inevitably come alike to himself and his dependants. In seeking for the causes of the vast and continued warlike exertions of England during the war, and of the apparently boundless financial resources which appeared to multiply, as if by magic, with every additional demand, just as in investigating the causes of the difficulties under which all classes have laboured since the peace, a prominent place must be assigned to the alterations on the currency, as productive of present strength as they were conducive to future weakness. No finan-

Its powerful operation in increasing the present resources of the state.

ed to £52,528,470; of which no less than £33,000,000 were advanced during the last three years. At Mr. Pitt's death the sum was only £6,370,000. The subsidies granted, with the years when they were received, and the other items of the expenditure of the war, were as follow.—(MOREAU.)

	Subsidies to Foreign Powers.	Army.		Civil List.	Ordnance.	Navy Total.	Total charge of Debt, Funded and Unfunded.	Total Expenditure.
		Ordinary.	Extraordinary.					
1793	£2,198,200	£4,167,312		£1,021,536	£843,603	£2,464,307	£10,715,941	£22,754,366
1794	4,000	9,209,236		1,027,761	1,500,767	4,219,156	11,081,159	29,305,477
1795	810,500	14,562,737		1,025,842	1,968,008	8,135,140	12,345,987	39,751,091
1796	99,500	13,738,350		1,125,053	2,590,000	7,780,868	13,683,129	40,761,583
1797	—	16,208,690		1,081,046	2,121,552	11,984,031	16,405,402	50,739,857
1798	120,012	7,986,297	3,165,854	1,111,370	1,715,355	12,591,728	20,108,885	51,241,798
1799	325,000	9,898,716	4,241,433	1,208,067	2,221,516	13,036,490	21,572,867	59,296,081
1800	2,613,178	9,971,880	3,906,000	1,247,420	1,918,967	14,890,488	21,661,029	61,617,988
1801	200,114	8,836,208	5,347,174	1,290,136	2,165,909	17,303,370	23,908,885	73,072,466
1802	—	6,951,193	2,635,061	1,338,766	1,500,733	11,704,400	25,436,894	62,373,480
1803	—	8,134,315	3,165,092	1,425,545	1,887,150	17,979,878	25,066,212	54,912,890
1804	—	12,183,891	3,560,804	1,417,517	3,550,142	11,759,332	36,669,646	67,619,475
1805	—	10,758,343	6,261,387	1,914,104	4,782,289	14,466,498	29,963,702	76,056,796
1806	—	9,282,492	5,239,000	1,676,323	5,511,064	16,084,098	30,336,859	75,154,548
1807	—	9,956,684	5,847,562	1,680,061	4,190,748	16,775,762	32,032,537	78,369,669
1808	1,400,000	11,353,390	5,872,054	1,724,147	5,108,960	17,467,891	32,781,502	64,797,080
1809	2,050,000	12,591,041	5,872,054	1,696,994	4,374,184	19,236,037	33,986,223	68,792,551
1810	2,660,103	11,357,023	7,178,677	1,651,297	4,652,333	20,054,412	35,248,933	74,360,728
1811	2,977,747	13,753,163	10,116,166	1,589,097	4,557,509	19,540,679	36,388,790	99,604,241
1812	5,315,898	15,382,050	9,605,313	1,748,349	4,232,416	20,500,339	38,443,147	107,044,085
1813	11,294,416	18,500,985	10,968,535	1,748,526	3,404,582	21,906,624	41,755,235	129,235,660
1814	10,021,624	16,532,945	17,662,610	1,675,152	4,480,739	21,961,567	49,012,440	129,742,399
1815	11,035,248	23,172,137		1,682,021	2,963,892	16,373,870	43,902,989	130,305,958
Totals	53,128,470	384,787,438		32,936,125	71,082,262	328,236,415	619,830,178	1,490,000,888

This most instructive table proves at a glance how little share either the foreign subsidies or civil expenditure had in the vast outlay of seventeen hundred millions during the war. The first was only a thirty-third, the latter hardly a fifth-teenth of the total expenditure. The vast sums absorbed by the debt is a striking feature, amounting to more than a third of the whole; but it was in a certain degree unavoidable. The cost of the navy, amounting to about a fifth, is not to be regretted, for it gave England the naval dominion of the globe. It was the prodigious expenditure for the army, amounting to almost a fourth of the whole, which is the real subject of regret, attended as it was with no exploits worthy of being recorded till the last eight years of the war; concurring thus with what every other consideration indicates, that it was the nugatory use of that arm, and the ignorance which prevailed as to its efficacy, which was the real reproach to Mr. Pitt's administration.

cial embarrassments of any moment were experienced subsequent to 1797; in vain Napoleon waited for the blowing up of the funding system, and the stoppage of England's financial resources; year after year the enormous expenditure continued; loan after loan, with incredible facility, was obtained, and at the close of the war, when the revenues of France and all the Continental states were fairly exhausted, the treasures of Great Britain were poured forth with a profusion unexampled during any former period of the struggle. No existing wealth, how great soever, could account for so prodigious an expenditure. Its magnitude points to an annual creation of funds even greater than those which were dissipated. It is in the vast impulse given to the circulation by the suspension of cash payments, and subsequent extension of paper credit of every description, that one great cause is to be found of the never-failing resources of Great Britain during so long a period. Her fleets commanded the seas; her commerce extended into every quarter of the globe; her colonies embraced the finest and richest of the tropical regions; and in the centre of this magnificent dominion was the parent state, whose quickened and extended circulation spread life and energy through every part of the immense fabric. Great as was the increase of paper in circulation after the obligation to pay in specie was removed, it was scarcely equal to the simultaneous increase in exports, imports, and domestic industry; and almost boundless as was the activity of British enterprise during those animating years, it must have languished from want of commensurate credit, if not sustained by the vivifying influence of the extended currency.*

It is evident, also, that the funding system, with all its dangers and ultimate evils, of which the nation since the peace has had such ample experience, was eminently calculated to increase this feverish action of the body politic, and

produce a temporary flow of prosperity, commensurate, indeed, to the ultimate embarrassments with which it was to be attended, but still exciting a degree of transient vigour, which could never have arisen under a more cautious and economical system of management. The contracting and immediately spending loans, to the amount of thirty or forty millions a year, in addition to a revenue raised by taxation of equal amount, had an extraordinary effect in encouraging every branch of industry, and enabling the nation to prosper under burdens which at first sight would have appeared altogether overwhelming. Government is proverbially a good paymaster, and never so much so as during the whirl and excitement of war. The capital thus sunk in loans was, indeed, withdrawn from the private encouragement of industry, but it was so only in consequence of being directed into a channel where its influence, in that respect was still more powerful and immediate than it ever would have been in the hands of individuals: it was in great part dissipated, indeed, in a form which did not reproduce itself, and afforded no means of providing for its charges hereafter; but still that circumstance, how fatal soever to the resources of the state in future times, did not diminish the temporary excitement produced by its expenditure. Under the combined influence of this vast contraction of loans and extended paper circulation, the resources of the nation were increased in a rapid and unparalleled progression: exports and imports doubled, the produce of taxes was continually rising, prices of every sort quickly rose, interest was high, profits still higher, and all who made their livelihood by productive industry, or by buying and selling, found themselves in a state of extraordinary and increasing prosperity. That these favourable appearances were, to a certain extent, delusive; that the flood of prosperity thus let in upon the state was occasioned by exhausting, in a great degree, the reservoirs of wealth for future emer-

* Table showing the amount of Bank Notes in circulation from 1792 to 1815, with the Commercial Paper under discount at the Bank during the same period, and the Gold and Silver annually coined at the Bank, with the Exports, Imports, and Revenue for the same period.

Years.	5l. Notes in Circulation.	Under 5l.	Commercial Paper rendered at Bank.	Bullion coined.	Total of Notes.	Official Value Imports from Great Britain.	Official Value Exports from Great Britain.	Revenue.	British Vessels Tonnage.
1792	11,307,380	—	—	1,171,563	11,307,380	19,659,358	24,904,850	17,864,464	1,540,145
1793	11,388,910	—	—	2,747,430	11,388,910	19,659,357	20,390,179	17,707,983	—
1794	10,744,020	—	—	2,558,895	10,744,020	22,294,893	26,748,062	17,899,294	—
1795	14,017,510	—	2,946,500	493,416	14,017,510	23,736,889	27,123,338	18,456,298	—
1796	10,729,520	—	3,505,000	464,680	16,729,520	23,187,319	30,518,913	18,548,628	—
1797	9,674,780	867,585	5,350,000	2,600,297	11,114,120	21,013,956	28,917,010	19,592,646	—
1798	11,647,610	1,448,220	4,490,600	2,967,565	13,095,830	25,122,203	27,317,087	20,492,995	—
1799	11,494,150	1,465,560	5,403,900	449,962	12,959,610	24,066,700	29,556,637	35,311,018	—
1800	15,372,980	1,471,540	6,401,900	189,937	16,854,800	28,257,781	38,381,617	34,069,457	1,905,439
1801	13,578,520	2,634,760	7,905,100	450,242	16,203,280	30,435,268	34,838,564	35,516,351	—
1802	12,574,860	2,612,020	7,523,300	437,019	15,186,880	28,308,373	37,873,324	37,111,620	—
1803	12,350,970	2,968,960	10,747,600	596,445	15,849,980	25,104,541	28,075,239	33,203,937	—
1804	12,546,560	4,531,270	9,982,400	718,397	17,077,830	26,454,281	31,071,108	45,515,152	—
1805	13,011,010	4,860,160	11,365,500	54,668	17,871,170	27,341,720	30,540,491	50,555,190	—
1806	13,271,529	4,458,600	12,380,100	405,106	17,730,120	25,504,478	32,984,101	54,071,908	—
1807	12,840,790	4,109,890	13,484,600	None.	16,950,680	23,326,845	30,588,084	59,406,731	—
1808	14,093,690	4,695,170	12,950,100	371,714	14,183,860	25,660,953	29,956,629	62,147,601	—
1809	14,241,360	4,301,500	15,475,700	298,946	18,542,860	30,170,292	45,667,216	63,879,802	—
1810	15,159,180	5,860,420	20,070,600	316,936	21,019,600	37,613,294	42,656,843	67,825,597	2,406,044
1811	16,246,130	7,114,090	14,355,400	312,263	23,360,220	25,240,704	37,837,252	65,309,100	—
1812	15,951,290	7,457,030	14,291,600	None.	23,408,320	24,925,922	27,982,977	65,752,125	2,478,799
1813	15,407,320	7,713,610	12,330,200	519,722	23,210,930	Records destroyed by fire.	—	68,302,860	—
1814	16,455,540	8,345,540	13,285,800	None.	24,801,080	32,622,771	51,358,398	70,240,313	—
1815	18,226,400	9,035,250	14,917,100	None.	27,261,650	31,822,053	57,420,437	72,203,142	—
1816	18,021,220	9,001,400	11,416,400	None.	27,013,620	26,374,921	48,216,186	62,640,711	2,648,593

—*Parl. Deb.*, vii., xiv., xv.; *App. Parl. Hist.*, xxxv., 1563. COLQUHOUN, 99. MOREAU'S *Tables*, and PERRER, 279. MARSHALL'S *Digest*, p. 97, 147, 236.

Thus, in the twenty-four years from 1792 to 1816, the circulation of England, including the large and small notes and commercial paper discounted at the Bank, was more than tripled; the revenue tripled, and the exports more than doubled; the imports increased a half. The increase of commercial paper from 1792 to 1810 was sevenfold: indicating, perhaps, the greatest and most rapid rise in mercantile transactions in the whole history of the world.

gencies; and that a long period of languor and depression was to follow this feverish and unnatural tract of excitement, is indeed certain; but still the effect at the moment was the same, and in the activity, enterprise, and opulence thus created were to be found the most powerful resources for carrying on the contest. How beneficial soever to the finances of the state, in future times, it might have been to have raised the whole supplies by taxation within the year, it was impossible that from such a prudent and parsimonious system there could have arisen the extraordinary vigour and progressive creation of wealth which resulted from the lavish expenditure of the national capital in maintaining the conflict; and but for the profuse outlay, which has been felt as so burdensome in subsequent times, the nation might have sunk beneath its enemies, and England, with all its glories, been swept forever from the book of existence.

Had Mr. Pitt's system, attended as it was, however, with this vast expenditure of capital instead of income on the current expenses, made no provision for the ultimate redemption of the debt thus contracted, it would, notwithstanding the prodigious and triumphant results with which it was attended, have been liable to very severe reprehension. But every view of his financial policy must be imperfect and erroneous, if the sinking fund, which constituted so essential a part of the system, is not taken into consideration. Its great results have now been completely demonstrated by experience; and there can be no question that, if it had been adhered to, the whole debt might have been extinguished with ease before the year 1840: that is, in nearly as short a time as it was created. Great as were the burdens of the war, therefore, he had established the means of rendering them only temporary; durable as the results of its successes have proved, the price at which they were purchased admitted, according to his plan, of a rapid liquidation. It is the subsequent abandonment of the sinking fund, in consequence of the unnecessary and imprudent remission of so large a proportion of the indirect taxes, which is the real evil that has undone the mighty structure of former wisdom; and for a slight and questionable present advantage, rendered the debt, when undergoing a rapid and successful process of liquidation, a lasting and hopeless burden on the state. The magnitude of this change is too great to be accounted for by the weakness or errors of individuals: the misfortune thus inflicted upon the country too irreparable to be ascribed to the improvidence or shortsighted policy of subsequent governments. Without exculpating the members of the administrations who did not manfully resist, and, if they could not prevent, at least denounce the growing delusion, it may be safely affirmed, that the great weight of the responsibility must be borne by the nation itself. If the people of Great Britain have now a debt of seven hundred and seventy millions, with hardly any fund for its redemption, they have to blame, not Mr. Pitt, who was compelled to contract it in the course of a desperate struggle for the national independence, and left them the means of its rapid and certain liquidation, but the blind Democratic spirit,

which first, from its excesses in a neighbouring state, made its expenditure unavoidable, and then, from its impatience of present sacrifice at home, destroyed the means of its discharge. "All nations," says M. Tocqueville, in his profound work on American Democracy, "which have made a great and lasting impression on human affairs, from the Romans to the English, have been governed by aristocratic bodies: the instability and impatience of the Democratic spirit render the states in which it is the ruling power incapable of durable achievements."* The abandonment of a system fraught with such incalculable future advantages as the sinking fund, but requiring a present sacrifice for its maintenance, affords decisive evidence that the balance of the Constitution had become overloaded in reality, before it was so in form, on the popular side, and that the period had arrived when an ignorant impatience of taxation was to bring about that disregard of everything but present objects which is the invariable characteristic of the majority of mankind. With the prevalence of aristocratic rule in England, that noble monument of national foresight and resolution progressively prospered: with its decline the efficiency of the great engine of redemption was continually impaired amid the general influence of the unthinking multitude; and at length, upon its subversion by the great change of 1832, it finally, to all practical purposes, was destroyed. Irretrievable ultimate ruin has thus been brought upon the state: for not only is the burden now fixed upon its resources inconsistent with the permanent maintenance of the national independence, but the steady rule has been terminated, under which alone its liquidation could have been expected. But if the sun of British greatness is setting in the Old, it is, from the same cause, rising in renovated lustre in the New World. The impatience of the Democratic spirit, both in the British isles and on the shores of the Atlantic; the energy it develops, the insatiable desires it creates, the national burdens which it perpetuates, the convulsions which it induces, all conspire to impel the ceaseless wave of emigration to the West; and the very distresses consequent on an advanced stage of existence force the power and vigour of civilization into the primeval recesses of the forest. In two centuries the name of England may be extinct, or survive only under the shadow of ancient renown; but a hundred and fifty millions of men in North America will be speaking its language, reading its authors, glorying in its descent. Nations, like individuals, were not destined for immortality; in their virtues equally as their vices, their grandeur as their weakness, they bear in their bosoms the seeds of mortality; but in the passions which elevate them to greatness, equally as those which hasten their decay, is to be discerned the unceasing operation of those principles at once of corruption and resurrection which are combined in humanity, and which, universal in communities as in single men, compensate the necessary decline of nations by the vital fire which has given an undecaying youth to the human race.

And it must ultimately ruin the British Empire.

But will still more impel the British race to the New World.

* Tocqueville, ii., 237.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESEBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CONTINENTAL WAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1806.

ARGUMENT.

Immense Results of the Campaign of Austerlitz.—The Office of Premier is offered to Lord Hawkesbury, and declined.—General Opinion on the Necessity of a Coalition of Parties.—Mr. Fox is sent for.—State of Parties in the Country.—Composition of the new Cabinet.—Their first Measures.—The Budget.—Return of Napoleon to Paris.—Financial Crisis there.—Its ostensible Causes.—Immediate Origin of the Explosion was the Absorption of Gold for the German War.—Measures of Napoleon to remedy the Evil.—Real Causes of the Catastrophe.—Financial Changes in Consequence introduced into France, and Imposition of its Armies as a Burden on Foreign States.—French Budget for 1805, and Exposition of the Minister of the Interior.—Erection of the Column in the Place Vendôme.—Advance of the French against Naples.—Successful Invasion of Calabria.—Joseph Bonaparte created King of the Two Sicilies.—Naples threatened by Sir Sydney Smith.—General Stuart lands in the Bay of St. Euphemia.—Regnier resolves to attack him.—Battle of Maida.—Great Moral Effect of this Victory; but its immediate Results are less considerable.—Surrender of Gaeta.—Retreat of the English, and Suppression of the Insurrection.—Domestic Reforms of Joseph in Naples.—Louis Bonaparte is created King of Holland.—Creation of Military Fiefs in the Kingdom of Italy.—Napoleon's secret Views in these Measures.—Audience given to the Turkish Ambassadors.—Naval Operations.—Sailing of a Division of the Brest Fleet.—Defeat of the first Squadron at St. Domingo.—Disasters of the second Division under Villaurmez.—Capture of Linois, and lesser Naval Operations.—Reflections on these last Naval Disasters of France.—Greatness of the French Navy under Louis XVI.—Napoleon's Change of System in regard to Naval War.—Reflections on the Growth of the English Maritime Power.—Its probable Influence on the future Destinies of the World.—Reduction of the Cape of Good Hope.—Sir Home Popham resolves to attack Buenos Ayres, which falls.—Embarrassment of Government at this Success.—It is retaken by the South Americans.—Differences with America in regard to Neutral Rights.—Violent Measures of Congress.—The Commissioners appointed on both Sides adjust the Differences.—Continental Affairs.—Growing Coldness between France and Prussia.—Jealousy of the two Cabinets.—The Prussian Cabinet seizes on Hanover.—Measures of Retaliation adopted by Great Britain.—Mr. Fox's Speech on the Subject.—Napoleon's Opinion of Prussia in this Transaction.—His farther Measures of Aggression on Germany.—Universal Indignation which they excite in the North of Germany.—Gentz's Pamphlet on the Subject.—Formation of the Confederacy of the Rhine.—Powers admitted to the Confederation.—The Emperor Francis renounces the Crown of Germany.—Addresses of Napoleon and the Emperor Francis to the German States.—Great Sensation which these Events produce at Berlin.—Warlike Preparations of Prussia.—Renewed Causes of Irritation between France and Russia.—Difference about the Mouths of the Cattaro, which is occupied by the Russians.—The French, in return, seize Ragusa.—Actions in its Neighbourhood.—D'Oubril concludes a Treaty between France and Russia, which is disavowed by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.—Opening of the Negotiations between France and England.—Later Power insists on Russia being a Party to the Negotiation.—Basis of Utipossidets, which France departs from.—Continuance of the Negotiation, and gradual Estrangement of the Parties.—Its farther Progress.—The Demands of France become more extravagant, and the Negotiation is broken off.—Real Views of the Parties in this Proceeding.—State of Affairs at Berlin.—Prussian Ultimatum, and Preparations for War on both Sides.—Murder of Palm.—Great Sensation which it occasioned.—Proceedings of the Military Commission by which he was condemned.—Influence which it had in producing the Rupture of the Negotiation.—Last Instructions of Mr. Fox to Lord Lauderdale.—His Eyes were at length opened to the real Nature of the War.—His Illness and Death, and Character.—Extraordinary Talents in Debate; but his Fame is on the Decline as a just Thinker.—Reasons of this Change.

THE peace of Presburg appeared to have finally subjected the Continent to the Empire of

France. The greatest and most formidable coalition which had ever been arrayed against its fortunes was dissolved; the military strength of Austria had received, to all appearance, an irreparable wound; Prussia, though irritated, was overawed, and had let the favourable moment for striking a decisive blow elapse without venturing to draw the sword; and even the might of Russia, hitherto held in undefined dread by the states of Southern Europe, had succumbed in the conflict, and the northern autocrat was indebted to the generosity of the victor for the means of escaping from the theatre of his triumph. When such results had been gained with the great military monarchies, it was of little moment what was the disposition of the lesser powers; but they too had been terrified into submission, or retired from a contest in which success could no longer be hoped for. Sweden, in indignant silence, had withdrawn to the shores of Gothland; Naples was overrun; Switzerland was silent; and Spain consented to yield its fleets and its treasures to the conqueror of Northern Europe. England, it is true, with unconquerable resolution and unconquered arms, still continued the contest; but after the prostration of the Continental armies and the destruction of the French marine, it appeared no longer to have an intelligible object; while the death of the great statesman, who had ever been the uncompromising foe of the Revolution, and the soul of all the confederacies against it, led to a well-founded expectation that a more pacific system of government might be anticipated in his successors.

The hopes entertained by Napoleon of such a temporary accommodation with England as might leave him at liberty, by fostering his naval power, to prepare the means of its final subjugation, were soon, to all appearance, likely to be realized. The death of Mr. Pitt dissolved the administration of which he was the head. His towering genius could ill bear a partner in power or rival in renown. Equals he had none—friends few; and with the exception of Lord Melville, whom the pending accusation had compelled to retire from government, perhaps no statesman had ever possessed his unreserved confidence. There were many men of ability and resolution in his cabinet, but none of weight sufficient to take the helm when it dropped from his hands; and when he sunk into the grave, the ministry, which was supported by his single arm, fell to the earth. The king, indeed, who was aware of the danger of introducing a change of policy in the middle of a desperate conflict, and still retained a keen recollection of the humiliation to which he had been subjected in consequence of the India Bill introduced by the Whigs in 1784, made an attempt to continue the government in the same hands, and immediately after Mr. Pitt's death, commissioned Lord Hawkesbury to form a new administration on the same basis; but that experienced and cau-

tious statesman soon perceived that the attempt, at that period at least, was impossible, and the only use he made of his short-lived power was to accept the wardenship of the Cinque Ports, which had been held by Mr. Pitt, and was the most lucrative sinecure in the gift of the crown; an appointment which gave rise to keen and acrimonious discussion in both houses of Parliament under the succeeding administration.*

Independently of the acknowledged weakness of the ministry after Mr. Pitt ceased to sustain its fortunes, the state of public opinion rendered it extremely doubtful whether any new administration could command general support which was not founded on a coalition of parties, and a union of all the principal statesmen of the time to uphold the fortunes of the state. The defeat of Austerlitz, and the consequent exposure of Great Britain to the necessity of maintaining the war single-handed against the forces of combined Europe, had made a deep impression on the public mind. Many believed some change of system to be necessary; and the opinion was sensibly gaining ground, that, having unsuccessfully made so many attempts to overthrow the power of Revolutionary France by hostility, the time had now arrived when it was not only expedient, but necessary, to try whether its terrors might not be disarmed by pacific relations. Complaints against the abuses of government—some real, some imaginary—during the conduct of so long and costly a war, had multiplied to a very great degree; the opposition journals had increased in number and vehemence of declamation; and the vote against Lord Melville in the House of Commons had shaken the opinion of numbers in the integrity of government in that point where Mr. Pitt's administration had hitherto been regarded as most pure. The Tories, it was said, are exhausted by perpetual service for twenty years; the hopes of the state are to be found in the ranks of the Whigs; or, at all events, the time has now arrived when these absurd party distinctions should cease, and all true friends to their country, on whichever side of politics, must unite for the formation of a liberal and extended administration, on so broad a basis as to bring its whole capacity to bear on the fortunes of the state during the perilous times which are evidently approaching. A general wish, accordingly, was felt for the formation of a government which should unite "all the talents" of the nation, without regard to party distinction; a natural wish at all times, and frequently indulged by the British people, but which has never led to any good result in the history of England, and never can do so, except in such a crisis of national danger as would have led the Romans to appoint a dictator, and calls for the suspension of all difference in foreign or domestic policy in the warding off immediate danger, by which all are equally threatened.†

Yielding at length, though unwillingly, and with sinister presentiments, to the inclinations of the people and the necessity of his situation, the king, on the 26th of January, sent a messenger to Lord Grenville, so long the firm supporter of Mr. Pitt's foreign administration, requesting his attendance at Buckingham House, to confer with his majesty on the formation of a government. Lord Grenville suggested Mr. Fox as the person he should

consult on the subject. "I thought so, and I meant it so," replied the king; and immediately the formation of an administration was intrusted to these two illustrious men.*

The anxious wish expressed both by the sovereign and the nation that the government should be formed on the ^{State of parties in the country.} broadest possible basis, so as to include all the leading men of the country, led to a coalition of parties, which, although it gave great apparent stability at the outset, was little calculated, in the end, to ensure the permanence of the administration. Three distinct and well-defined parties, independent of the partisans of Mr. Pitt's cabinet, then divided the Legislature and the nation. The ardent Whigs, who had adhered through all the horrors of the French Revolution to Democratic principles, were represented by Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine, and embraced all the zealous adherents of Republican institutions throughout the country. Parliamentary Reform, Catholic Emancipation, the Repeal of the Test Acts, the Abolition of Slavery, Peace with France, were inscribed on their banners. Another section of the Whig party existed, who had recently been arrayed in fierce hostility against their former allies. They were composed of the old Whig families which had receded with Mr. Burke, at the commencement of the French Revolution, from the popular side, and acted with Mr. Pitt till his resignation in 1800, but never coalesced with his government after his resumption of power. This party, led in Parliament by Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, and Mr. Windham, embraced many powerful aristocratic families and a large portion of private worth and ability, but their hold of the affections of the populace was not so considerable as that of their stancher brethren. In hostility to France and fierce opposition to Revolutionary principles, they yielded not to the warmest partisans of Mr. Pitt; but in domestic questions they inclined to the popular side, and might be expected to form a salutary check on the innovating ardour of the more Democratic portion of the government. Less considerable from general support or parliamentary eloquence than either of these great parties, the adherents of Mr. Addington's administration, who had remained in opposition ever since they were displaced from power, were still of importance from their business talents and the intimate acquaintance they had with the machinery of government. Lord Sidmouth (formerly Mr. Addington) was the leader of this portion of the old Tory administration, whom exclusion from office had led to coalesce, not in the most creditable manner, with their ancient antagonists, and, from the known pacific inclinations of their chief, no serious difference of opinion in the cabinet was anticipated, at least so far as foreign affairs were concerned.

The leaders of these three parties were combined in the new cabinet; but the preponderance of Mr. Fox's adherents was so great as to render the ^{Composition of the cabinet.} ministry, to all intents and purposes, a Whig administration, which speedily appeared in the universal removal of all Tory functionaries from every office, even the most inconsiderable, under government. Mr. Fox, though entitled, from his talents and influence, to the highest appointment under the crown, contented himself with the important office of secretary for foreign affairs,

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 18, 21. Parl. Deb., iv., 67, 75.

† Ann. Reg., 1806, 17, 25.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 21.

deeming that the situation in which most embarrassment was likely to be experienced, and where his own principles were likely soonest to lead to important results. Lord Grenville was made first lord of the treasury; Mr. Erskine, lord-chancellor; Lord Howick (formerly Mr. Grey), first lord of the admiralty; Mr. Windham, secretary at war; Earl Spencer, secretary of state for the home department.* The cabinet exhibited a splendid array of ability, and was anxiously looked forward to by the country, with the undefined hope which naturally arises upon admitting a party whose leaders had been so long celebrated by their eloquence and genius for the first time, after so long an exclusion, to the administration of public affairs. But, amid the general satisfaction, there were many who observed with regret that all the members of the recent government were excluded from office, and anticipated no long tenure of power to a coalition which departed thus widely from the path of its predecessors, and voluntarily excluded the aid of all who had grown versant in public affairs, while the admission of the lord-chief-justice into the cabinet was justly regarded by all as a most dangerous innovation, fraught with obvious peril to that calm and dispassionate administration of judicial duties,† which had so long been the glory of English jurisprudence.

Notwithstanding the essential and total change

First measures of the new ministry and the accession of a party to power. The budget. The measures of their rivals as fraught with irreparable injury to the best interests of the state, no immediate change in the measures of government took place; and Europe beheld with surprise the men who had invariably characterized the war as unjust and impolitic, preparing to carry it on with a patience and foresight in no degree inferior to that of their predecessors: a striking circumstance, characteristic alike of the justice of the reasons which Mr. Pitt had assigned for its continuance, and the candour of the party who had now succeeded to power. The budget of Lord Henry Petty was but a continuation of the financial system of Mr. Pitt, modified by the altered situation of affairs, and the necessity which had obviously arisen of making provision for a protracted maritime struggle. The system of raising as large as possible a proportion of the taxes within the year, so happily acted upon since 1798 by the late government, was continued and extended; and, in pursuance thereof, it was proposed to carry the war taxes from fourteen to nineteen millions and a half—an increase which was effected by raising the income-tax from six and a half to ten per cent., and an addition of 3s. a hundred weight on sugar.‡ The loan, notwithstanding this great addition, was still £18,000,000, to provide for the interest of which, and a sink-

ing fund to redeem the principal, the war wine-duty was declared permanent, producing £500,000 a year, and an additional duty laid on pig iron, calculated to produce as much more, besides lesser duties, to the amount, in all, of £1,136,000.*

The great addition to the income-tax was loudly complained of as a grievous burden and total departure from all the professions of economy so often made by ministers; but there is reason to believe that indirect taxes could not have been relied on to produce so great an increase as was required in the public revenue; and there can be no doubt that, in adopting the manly course of making so great a demand on present income rather than increase the debt, they acted a truly patriotic and statesmanlike part.

The return of Napoleon to Paris, where he arrived on the night of the 26th of January, to the great disappointment of the municipality and people, who had made the most magnificent preparations for his triumphal reception, was very necessary, from the financial crisis which had there occurred, and which threatened to involve the government in the most serious embarrassments. This catastrophe, partly arising from political, partly from commercial causes, had long been approaching, and the public consternation was at its height when the emperor re-entered the Tuileries. Without undressing or going to bed, he sent for the minister of finances at midnight, and spent the whole remainder of the night in a minute and rigid examination of that functionary, and all the persons connected with his establishment. At eleven next day, the council of finance was assembled; it sat nine hours, and when it broke up, M. Mollien was appointed minister of finances, and M. de Marbois, the former minister, dismissed.†

This panic, which at the time excited such consternation at Paris, and might, if the issue of the campaign had been doubtful, have been attended with the most disastrous effects, arose from very simple causes. During the whole of 1805, the Bank of France, yielding to the flood of prosperity which on all sides flowed into the Empire, and urged on by the constant demand for discounts on the part of all the contractors and others engaged in the public service, from the expenditure of government constantly keeping in advance of the receipts of the treasury, had been progress-

Its ostensible causes.

* The budget of this year stood as follows:

	Charges.	Supplies.
	Great Britain.	Great Britain.
Navy	£15,281,000	
Army	18,500,000	
Ordinance	4,718,000	
Miscellaneous	2,170,000	
Arrears of subsidies	1,000,000	
Vote of credit	2,000,000	
	£43,569,000	
		Supplies.
		Great Britain.
Malt and personal estate duties		£2,750,000
Grants from captured ships		1,000,000
Lotteries		380,000
Surplus of consolidated fund		3,500,000
War taxes	19,500,000	
Deduct as outstanding at end of year	1,500,000	
Loan	18,000,000	
		£43,630,000

Exclusive of the permanent income on the one hand, and permanent charges on the other, which added largely to both sides of the account: the charges of the debt being £23,000,000, and the total sum raised by taxes and other sources of revenue £55,796,000, while the total expenditure was £72,750,000.—*Parl. Deb.*, vi., 566, 569. *PARTER'S Parl. Tables*, i., 1. † *Bign.*, v., 86. *Bour.*, vii., 111.

* The cabinet was composed of the following members:

Lord Erskine—Lord-chancellor.
 Earl Fitzwilliam—President of the Council.
 Viscount Sidmouth—Lord Privy Seal.
 Lord Grenville—First Lord of the Treasury.
 Lord Howick—First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Earl Moira—Master-general of the Ordnance.
 Earl Spencer—Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
 Mr. Fox—Foreign Affairs.
 Mr. Windham—Secretary at War.
 Lord Henry Petty—Chancellor of the Exchequer.
 Lord Ellenborough—Chief-justice, with a seat in the cabinet.—*Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 26.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 26, 28.

‡ *Parl. Deb.*, vi., 566, 574. *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 71.

ively enlarging its discounts: before the emperor set out for the army, they had risen from thirty to sixty millions, double the usual amount. In the midst of the apparent prosperity produced by that excessive increase, the sagacious mind of Napoleon perceived the seeds of future evil; and amid all the turmoil of his military preparations at Boulogne, he repeatedly wrote to the minister of finances on the subject, and warned him of the danger of the Bank of France trusting too far the delusive credit of individuals engaged in extensive transactions, or pushing to an undue length, in the form of a paper circulation, the royal privilege of coining money.* The immense discounts which occasioned the peril were almost entirely granted to the functionaries engaged in the public service, and who, being obliged to make good their payments to government by a certain day, and embarrassed by this remote period to which all payments from the public treasury were postponed, were frequently driven to this resource to supply the deficiencies arising from the backward payments of individuals, and whose credit was in some sort interwoven with that of the general administration. A few rich companies also had shared in the liberality of the bank, who were engaged in most extensive speculations in all parts of the world, and so deeply implicated in the furnishing of the precious metals to the bank, that their support on its part was almost a matter of self-preservation. The greatest of these was that of which M. Ouvrard was the leading partner, and its engagements with the Bank of France were to an enormous amount. This great capitalist had for several years been engaged in vast contracts for the service of the Spanish fleet, and so extensive were his transactions, that almost all the treasures of Mexico found their way into his coffers. Gradually he had introduced himself into the principal departments of the French service: and before the middle of 1805 nearly seventy millions (£2,800,000) was owing chiefly to the company of which he was a member by the public treasury of that country. The long delays thrown in the way of the liquidation of this debt by the government occasioned an excessive multiplication of paper securities, which soon fell considerably in value in the money market; but so implicated was government in these trans-

actions, that it was compelled to go on in the same perilous course, and thus increase the depreciation which had already become sufficiently alarming. The consequence was, that the bills of the public contractors sunk so much in value, that they would no longer pass current in the market; at length they fell so low as 10 instead of 100: a universal disquietude prevailed,* and the demands upon the public treasury had already become very heavy, at the moment when it had little else than paper securities in its coffers.

Matters were in this critical state when the breaking out of the German war, and departure of the army for the Rhine, occasioned an immense and immediate demand for metallic currency, which alone would pass in foreign states, both on the part of government and individuals. Napoleon, for the different branches of the public service, took fifty millions of francs (£2,000,000) from the Bank of France. Unable, after this great abstraction, to meet his other engagements, the minister of finances had recourse to Ouvrard, Vanlerbergh, and Seguire, who advanced 102,000,000 (£4,080,000) to the public treasury, and received, in return, long dated bills for 150,000,000. To meet this advance, Ouvrard hastened to Madrid to obtain a supply of piasters from the Spanish government, and such was the ascendancy which he had acquired at that capital, that he shortly after concluded a treaty with the King of Spain, in virtue of which his company, during the whole remainder of the war, acquired "an exclusive right to carry on the whole trade to the Spanish colonies, and to import the *whole treasures* and merchandise brought from thence to the European shores." Never before had such a power been vested in any company: the treasures of the whole world were to pass through their hands. But though this treaty gave Ouvrard the prospect of obtaining, before a year expired, from America 272,000,000 francs (£11,400,000) in hard dollars, yet this would not furnish a supply for present necessities; and the efforts of all the capitalists of Europe, which were put in requisition for the occasion, were unable to meet the crisis or avert a catastrophe. Desprez and several of the greatest capitalists in Paris failed: this immediately occasioned a terrific run upon all the other public functionaries, as well as the bank and the treasury; paper would no longer pass; credit was at an end; and M. Vanlerbergh, one of the greatest of the national contractors, was prevented from failing solely by an advance to a great amount from the public treasury. The consequences would have been fatal to the Empire had a disaster at the same time occurred in Germany, for the government were absolutely without the means of replenishing any branch of the public service; but the battle of Austerlitz and the treaty of Presburg operated as a charm in dispelling the panic: with the cessation of Continental war the demand for the precious metals immediately ceased; and the crisis was in fact over when the return of the emperor to the Tuileries entirely restored the public confidence. But the danger had been so pressing, that nothing but the instantaneous termination of the war could have averted it; and by merely protracting the contest in Moravia for a few months, the allies would infallibly have brought

Immediate cause of the explosion was the absorption of gold for the German war.

* His words are, in a letter to the minister of finances, "The evil originates in the bank having transgressed the law. What has the law done? Sept. 24, 1805. It has given the privilege of coining money in the form of paper to a particular company; but what did it intend by so doing? Assuredly, that the circulation thus created should be based on solid credit. The bank appears to have adopted a most erroneous principle, which is, to discount to individuals, not in proportion to their real capital, but the number of shares of its capital stock which they possess." That, however, is no real test of solvency. How many persons may be possessed of fifty or a hundred such shares, and yet be so embarrassed that no one would lend them a single farthing? The paper of the bank is thus issued in many, perhaps a majority of cases, not on real credit, but a delusive supposition of wealth. In one word, in discounting after this manner the bank is *coining false money*. So clearly do I see the dangers of such a course that, if necessary, I would stop the pay of my soldiers rather than persevere in it. I am distressed beyond measure at the necessities of my situation, which, by compelling me to live in camps and engaging me in distant expeditions, withdraw my attention from what would otherwise be the chief object of my anxiety, the first wish of my heart, a good and solid organization of all which concerns the interest of banks, manufactures, and commerce." What admirable wisdom in this great man, conceived at the camp of Boulogne, in the midst of the boundless arrangements which the march of the army to Ulm, already commenced, must have required, and of which his correspondence furnishes such ample proof!—

See BIGNON, v., 85, 86.

* Bign., v., 85, 93. Bour., vii., 92, 100.

the French government to a national bankruptcy.*

Napoleon was highly indignant at these measures of barrissements, and fully appreciated the magnitude of the peril from which he had been extricated by the fortunate victory of Austerlitz.† Public opinion, as usual, followed the impulse set by its leaders; the imprudent facility of the minister of finances became the general object of reprobation; and the greatest wits of the capital exerted their talents in decrying his administration.‡ The emperor minutely scrutinized the embarrassments of the bank and the treasury; it was found that the total deficit of the public contractors to the government amounted to 141,000,000 francs (£5,600,000), of which Ouvrard and Vanlerbergh owed nearly two thirds, and measures of severity were immediately ordered against all the defaulters, who were thrown into prison without distinction. The gigantic company of M. Ouvrard and his partners was in consequence reduced to bankruptcy, but in the end nearly the whole deficit was recovered for the nation. The system of providing for the public service by means of contractors was shortly after abandoned: but a few years after the government was under the necessity of resuming it; and Napoleon ultimately made the most ample amends to the injured M. de Marbois, by appointing him president of the Chamber of Accounts.§

In fact, though it suited the interests of the emperor to represent this alarming catastrophe as exclusively the result of the imprudent facility of the minister of finances, and the inordinate profusion of discounts by the bank, yet the evil in reality lay a great deal deeper, and the crisis was, in fact, occasioned by the vicious system to which the extravagant expenditure of the imperial government had driven the finance ministers. Although the budgets annually presented since Napoleon seized the government had exhibited the most flattering aspect, yet in reality they were in a great degree fictitious, and intended to conceal the labouring condition of the finances.

The actual receipts of the treasury for the last five years had been a hundred millions below the annual expenses.¶ In addition to this, the payments of the finance minister required to be almost all made in the course of each year, while the period of its receipts for the same time, according to the established mode of collecting the revenue, extended to eighteen months. Thence there arose an indispensable necessity for a recourse to money-lenders, who instantly advanced cash to the treasury, and received in return bills payable when the tardy receipts of the revenue might be expected to be realized. In this way, while the receipts and expenditure, as exhibited in the budget annually presented to the chambers, were nearly equal, there was in reality a most alarming deficit; and it was only by largely anticipating, by the discount of bills accepted

by the treasury, the revenue of succeeding terms or years, that funds could be provided for the liquidation of the daily demands upon it. Recourse was at first had to the receivers-general of the departments to make these advances; and this system succeeded, though with some difficulty, during the comparatively economical years of 1803 and 1804; but the vast expenditure of 1805, occasioned partly by the equipment of the expedition at Boulogne, partly by the cost of the Austrian war, rendered their resources totally unavailing; and it became necessary to apply to greater capitalists, who, in anticipation of future payments, could afford to make the great advances required by government. M. de Marbois was thus driven by necessity to M. Ouvrard and the company of the Indies, which was already the contractor for the supplies to almost all the forces, both by land and sea; and thus became invested with the double character of creditor of the state for advances made on Exchange bills, and also for payment of the supplies furnished to the different branches of the public service. Thence the deep implication of this company with the transactions of government; and the necessity of the Bank of France supporting, by extraordinary and lavish discounts, the credit of individuals or associations, from whom alone government derived the funds requisite for its immense engagement. The monetary embarrassments of 1805, therefore, like almost all others, were occasioned by an extravagant expenditure; but they arose not on the part of individuals, but of government; the crisis was not commercial, but political. Thence the singular and instructive fact that the whole inordinate discounts, of which Napoleon so loudly complained, were made, not to individuals engaged in private undertakings, but to the contractors for the public service; the root of the evil lay in the extravagant expenditure of the emperor himself, which rendered the anticipation of future revenues indispensable, to a perilous extent, in every branch of government. Considered in this view, this financial crisis was not a mere domestic embarrassment, but an important event in the progress of the contest: it indicated the arrival of the period when France, almost destitute of capital from the confiscations of the convention, and severely weakened in its national credit by the injustice committed during its rule, was unable from its own resources to obtain the funds requisite for carrying on the gigantic undertakings to which its ruler was driven in defence of its fortunes; and when foreign conquest and extraneous spoliation had become indispensable, not merely to give vent to the vehement passions, but maintain the costly government and repair the financial breaches occasioned by the Revolution.*

Napoleon, however much he was disposed to lay the fault, according to his usual system, on others, was in secret perfectly aware of the perilous pass to which his financial affairs had now been brought, and, like Alexander, he trusted to his sword to cut the Gordian knot. M. Marbois had long before represented to him the danger of "having for the bankers of the state those to whom its ministers were indebted;" and Napoleon was so sensible of this, that he had long before expressed his resolution, in military fashion, of having M. Ouvrard arrested, and

* Bign., v., 89, 94. Bour., vii., 100, 111. Sav., ii., 157, 109.

† "Beaten," says Savary, "in the depths of Moravia, deprived by inconceivable imprudence of all the resources on which he was entitled to calculate, he would have been wholly unable to repair his losses, and his ruin from that moment was inevitable."—SAVARY, ii., 161.

‡ The unbending firmness of M. de Marbois being mentioned in laudatory terms in presence of Madame de Staël, "He" said she; "he is nothing but a willow wand painted to look like bronze."—BOUR., vii., 111.

§ Bour., vii., 111. Bign., v., 96, 97. ¶ Bign., v., 193.

* Bign., v., 87, 88.

Financial changes in consequence introduced in France.

made to disgorge some of what he called his ill-gotten wealth, but he had never been able to emancipate himself from his influence.* The crisis of 1805, however, made decisive measures necessary. "I will have no alliance," said he, "between the bank and the treasury. If such existed, a simple movement of the funds might reveal the most important state secrets. We cannot too soon sign an arrêt for the emancipation of the treasury." The difficulty was, that the treasury had to pay every twelve months a hundred and twenty millions (£5,000,000) more than it received, in consequence of the backwardness of all payments to the Exchequer. To liquidate part of this debt, sixty millions (£2,500,000) was funded in the five per cents.; the capital of the Bank of France was doubled; and deposit-banks, under the name of "caisses de service," where the receivers-general of the revenue were invited to deposit the sums they had drawn as soon as ever they were received, and encouraged to do so by being offered interest for all sums so deposited prior to the time when they were bound to make them forthcoming. By this means, the necessity of having recourse to paper credit to raise funds upon anticipated revenues was in a great measure avoided, and the collection of the taxes conducted with much greater regularity than formerly.†

But these financial improvements, great as they were, did not strike at the root of the evil, which was a permanent expenditure by government greatly beyond its income. To cure this by means of loans, the well-known practice in Great Britain, was impossible in a country so ruined in its commercial relations and interests as France then was. The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz solved the difficulty. From the moment that the grand army crossed the Rhine, it was fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of Germany.‡ On the Nov. 18. 18th of November, an edict of the emperor directed the transmission of all the funds to the army of the North to cease; and on the 18th of December a similar order was given in regard to the army of Italy. Thus the three principal armies of the Empire ceased to be any longer a charge to its finances, and the tributary or conquered states bore the burden of the greater part of that enormous military force by which they were overawed or retained in subjection. This system continued without intermission during the whole remainder of the reign of Napoleon; and the budgets annually presented to the Chambers were, in consequence, as the Duke

de Gaeta, their principal author, himself confesses, no true statement of the imperial expenses.* They were delusive even in what concerned the domestic finances of France, by always exaggerating the income and diminishing the expenditure; but, as concealing the greater part of the enormous contributions levied by the army in the allied or conquered states, totally fallacious.†

The budget of France for 1805, presented to the Chambers in February, 1806, accordingly exhibited no true picture of the national finances; but even as it was, it showed an expenditure of 700,000,000 of francs (£28,000,000), and an income of only 588,000,000 (£23,600,000), the balance being made out by contributions levied from foreign states.‡ But although Napoleon knew as well as any one the perilous nature of the crisis which the government had recently experienced, it was no part of his policy to permit his subjects to share his disquietude, and he resolved to dazzle the world by a splendid exposition of the state of the Empire. The report drawn up by Champagny, minister of the interior, contained a picture of the state of the Empire, which, from the magnitude of the victories which it recounted, and the splendour of the undertakings which it commemorated, might well bear a comparison with Pliny's panegyric of Trajan. It represented the navigation of the Seine and the Soane as essentially improved; Alexandria surrounded with impregnable fortifications; Genoa furnishing its sailors and naval resources to France; Italy delivered from the presence of the English; the sciences, the arts encouraged; the capital about to be adorned by the most splendid monuments; the Alps and the Apennines yielding to the force of scientific enterprise, and the noble routes of the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Comiché, and the Mont Genevre opening to loaded chariots a path amid heretofore impassable snows; numberless bridges established over the Rhine, the Meuse, the Loire, the Soane, and the Rhone; harbours and wet-docks in a rapid state of construction in five-and-thirty maritime cities; the works of Antwerp and Cherbourg promising soon to rival the greatest naval establishments of England.

* Gaeta, i., 272, 434. † Bign., v., 99, 100

‡ The income was exhibited as follows:

Receipts.	FRANCS.
Direct taxes	311,649,196
Registration and stamps	172,763,591
Customs	52,725,918
Lottery	13,880,000
Postoffice	10,000,000
Excise	25,000,000
Salt	3,000,000
Total from France	588,998,705 francs, or £23,600,000
— from Italy	30,000,000 or 1,200,000
— from Germany and Holland	100,000,000 or 4,000,000
Total	718,998,705 francs, or £28,820,000
Expenditure.	FRANCS.
Army	271,500,000
Navy	140,000,000
Church	30,000,000
Interest of debt	69,140,000
Civil list	27,000,000
Minister of Finance	43,349,800
— of Justice	21,200,000
— of Interior	29,500,000
— of Treasury	8,000,000
— of Police	700,000
Miscellaneous	20,765,339
	666,155,139 francs, or £26,600,000

—See DUC DE GAETA, i., 304. BIGN., v., 102. PEUCHET, 560.

* "Bourrienne," said he, in 1800, "my part is taken: I will cause M. Ouvrard to be arrested." "General," replied the secretary, "have you any proofs against him?" "Proofs? What are required? He is a contractor, a scoundrel. He must be made to disgorge. All of his tribe are villains. How do they make their fortunes? at the public expense. They have millions, and display an insolent extravagance when the soldiers are without shoes or bread. I will have no more of this." He was accordingly arrested and thrown into prison; but, as there was no evidence whatever against him, he was speedily liberated, and soon, from his great capital, regained all his former influence with the government.—BOUR., vii., 94, 95.

† Bign., v., 89, 189, and 195.

‡ From the castle of Louisberg in Wirtemberg, Napoleon wrote, so early as the 4th of October, 1805, to the minister of finances at Paris, "The army maintains the most exact discipline; the country hardly feels the presence of the troops. We live here on *Bons*: I have no need of money from you." These *Bons* were treasury bills, which were discharged by the French government out of the contributions levied on the inhabitants, or the sums extracted from the conquered countries.—BIGN., v., 100.

The exposition concluded with a rapid view of the advantages which France had derived from the successive coalitions which had been formed against its existence. "The first coalition, concluded by the treaty of Campo Formio, gave the Republic the frontier of the Rhine, and the states which now form the kingdom of Italy; the second invested it with Piedmont; the third united to its federal system Venice and Naples. Let England be now convinced of its impotence, and not attempt a fourth coalition, even if subsequent events should render such a measure practicable. The house of Naples has irrevocably lost its dominions: Russia owes the escape of its army solely to the capitulation which our generosity awarded; the Italian Peninsula, as a whole, forms a part of the great empire; the emperor has guaranteed, as chief supreme, the sovereigns and constitutions which compose its several parts." In the midst of these just subjects of exultation, Napoleon had not the moral courage to admit the terrible disaster of Trafalgar. That decisive event was only alluded to in the following passage of his opening speech to the Chambers: "The tempests have made us lose some vessels after a combat imprudently engaged in. I desire peace with England; I shall not on my side retard its conclusion by an hour. I shall always be ready to terminate our differences on the footing of the treaty of Amiens." Thus, while the Neapolitan dynasty, for merely making preparations for war, was declared to have ceased to reign, England, which had struck so decisive a blow at his maritime strength, was invited to a pacification on terms of comparative equality: a striking instance of that resolution to crush the weak, and temporize till the proper time arrived with the powerful, which formed so remarkable a feature of Napoleon's policy.*

The return of Napoleon to Paris was the signal for the commencement of magnificent public structures in that capital. The municipality voted a monument to the emperor and the grand army, which, after much hesitation as to the design, it was at length resolved to make a triumphal column, composed of the cannon taken in the Austrian campaign, surmounted by a statue in bronze of the emperor. The design was speedily carried into effect; five hundred imperial guns, melted down and cast anew, assumed the mould of the principal actions of the campaign, which wound, like the basso-relievo on Trajan's pillar at Rome, to the summit of the structure, a hundred and twenty feet from the ground, where the statue of Napoleon, since carried off by the Emperor Alexander as a trophy of victory to St. Petersburg, was placed. Since the accession of Louis Philippe it has been replaced by an admirable bronze representation of the great conqueror in his gray riding-coat, which has become canonized in the minds of the French by the feelings of admiration, almost amounting to devotion, with which his memory is regarded. Magnificent fêtes were projected by the emperor to signalize the return of the grand army to the capital; but they were adjourned, first on account of the sojourning of the troops on the Austrian frontier, next from the menacing aspect of Prussia, and finally abandoned after the gloom and bloodshed of the Polish campaign.†

The ominous announcement, made from the depths of Moravia, that the dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign, was not long allowed to remain a dead letter. Massena was busily employed, in January, in collecting his forces in the centre of Italy, and before the end of that month fifty thousand men, under the command of Joseph Bonaparte, had crossed the pontifical states and entered the Neapolitan territory in three columns, which marched on Gaeta, Capua, and Itri. Resistance was impossible; the small Russian and English forces which had disembarked to support the Italian levies, finding the whole weight of the war likely to be directed against them, withdrew to Sicily; the court, thunder-struck by the menacing proclamation of the 27th of December, speedily followed their example; the governors of the cities first exposed to invasion hastened to appease the conqueror by submission; a vain attempt at negotiation by means of Prince St. Theodore did not suspend for an instant the march of the victorious troops; in vain the intrepid Queen Caroline, who still remained at Naples, armed the lazzaroni, and sought to infuse into the troops a portion of her own indomitable courage; she was seconded by none; Capua opened its gates; Gaeta was invested; the Campagna filled with the invaders; she, vanquished but not subdued, was compelled to yield to necessity, and follow her timid consort to Sicily; and on the 15th of February Naples beheld its future sovereign, Joseph Bonaparte, enter its walls.*

But, although the capital was thus occupied by the invaders, and the reigning family had taken refuge in the seagirt shores of Sicily, the elements of resistance still existed in the Neapolitan dominions. The Prince of Hesse-Philpsthall had the command of Gaeta, and he had inspired the garrison of eight thousand men which he commanded with a share of his own gallant resolution. When summoned to capitulate, this gallant officer replied that his honour would not permit him to lower his colours till the last extremity; and the long resistance which he made, coupled with the natural strength of the place, which could be approached, like Gibraltar, only by a neck of land strongly fortified, inspired the Sicilian cabinet with the hope that something might yet be done for the deliverance of its Continental dominions. During the first tumult of invasion the peasantry of Calabria, in despair at the universal desertion of the kingdom, both by their government and its allies, submitted to the enemy; and General Regnier, with a considerable corps, at first experienced little resistance in his occupation of the principal strongholds of the country. But the protraction of the siege of Gaeta, which occupied Massena with the principal army of the French, gave them time to recover from their consternation; and the cruelty of the invaders, who put to death without mercy all the peasants who were found with arms in their hands, on the pretence that they were brigands, drove them to despair. A general insurrection took place in the beginning of March, and the peasants stood firm in more than one position; but they were unable to withstand the shock of the veterans of France, and in a decisive action in the plain of Campo-Tenese, their tumultuary levies, though fifteen thousand strong, were en-

* Bign., v., 104, 110. Hard., ix., 91.

† Bign., v., 112, 113.

* Dum., xv., 95, 99. Bign., v., 114, 116. Hard., ix., 56, 58.

tirely dispersed. The victorious Regnier penetrated even to Reggio, and the standards of Napoleon waved on its towers, in sight of the English videttes on the shores of Sicily.*

When hostilities had subsided, Joseph repaired in person to the theatre of war, and sought, by deeds of charity, to alleviate its distresses, while his beneficent mind contemplated great and important public works to ameliorate that savage and neglected district. He visited the towers of Reggio, admired the magnificent harbour of Tarentum, and had already formed the design of canals and roads to open up the sequestered mountains of Calabria. In the midst of these truly princely projects he received at Scigliano, the principal town of the province, the decree by which Napoleon created him King of the Two Sicilies. By so doing, however, he was declared not to lose his contingent right of succession to the throne of France; but the two crowns were never to be united. At the same time, the Venetian states were definitively annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that capital was to give his title to the eldest son of its sovereign. The beautiful Pauline, now married to Prince Borghese, received the duchy of Guastalla, subsequently united to the same dominions; the Princess Eliza was created Princess of Lucca Piombino; Murat was made Grand-duke of Berg, with a considerable territory; and the emperor reserved to himself twelve duchies in Italy, of which six were in the Neapolitan dominions, which were bestowed on the principal officers of his army.†

Thus, while he was elevating the members of his family to the neighbouring thrones, the military hero of the Revolution already gave indications of his secret design, by reconstructing the titles of honour which it had cost so much bloodshed to destroy, to overturn its principles.

Events, however, soon occurred which showed the infant sovereign what an insecure tenure he had of his dominions. Hardly had he returned to Naples to receive the congratulations of his new subjects on his elevation, when the island of Capri, the celebrated retreat of the Emperor Tiberius, whose romantic cliffs bound the horizon to the south of the Bay of Naples, was wrested from his power by an English detachment, and nothing but the generous forbearance of the commander of the squadron, Sir Sydney Smith, saved his capital and palace from a bombardment, amid the festive light of an illumination. Shortly after, a still more serious disaster occurred in the southern provinces of his dominions, attended in the end with important effects on the fortune of

the war. Encouraged by the prolonged resistance of Gaeta, and the accounts which were brought from all quarters of the disaffections which prevailed in Calabria, the English commanders in Sicily resolved upon an effort by land and sea, with the double view of exciting an insurrection on the one side of the capital, and relieving the fortress which so gallantly held out on the other. In the beginning of July an expedition set sail from Palermo, consisting of somewhat less than five thousand men, which landed in the Gulf of St. Euphemia; and the commander, Sir John Stuart, issued a proclamation, calling on the Calabrians to repair to his standard and unite their efforts to expel the intruding sovereign. Few or none, however, of the peasantry appeared in arms; no intelligence of more distant armaments was received; and the English general was beginning to hesitate whether he should not re-embark his troops, when advices were received that Regnier, with a French force not greatly exceeding his own, was encamped at Maida, about ten miles distant. With equal judgment and resolution, Sir John Stuart immediately resolved to advance against his opponent; and if he could not expel the enemy from the Neapolitan territories, at least give the troops of the rival nations an opportunity, so much longed for, of measuring their strength on a footing of comparative equality. He moved forward his forces, accordingly, in quest of the enemy. On the 5th of July the outposts of the two armies were within sight of each other, and both sides prepared for a decisive conflict on the following morning, the French never doubting that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; the English anxious, but not apprehensive that it would be found, in the hour of trial, that they had not degenerated from their ancestors of Blenheim or Poitiers.*

When the English army arrived in sight, the corps of Regnier, consisting of five thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery, was strongly posted on a range of wooded heights which skirted the little plain stretching from their feet towards the sea; while the British, bivouacking in that marshy and unhealthy expanse on the banks of the Amato, were in a situation of all others the most exposed to the pestilential gales of the malaria, at that sultry season in full activity. But Regnier, inspired with a supercilious contempt for his opponents, with whom he had combated in Egypt, and the defeats from whom, there received, he had entirely ascribed, in his subsequent publication, to the errors of General Menou, and encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements in the night, which raised his forces to seven thousand five hundred men,† resolved to leave nothing to the diseases of the climate, and march at once to the encounter. Hastily, therefore, he descended from the heights, crossed the sluggish stream, and advanced against the enemy.‡

Surprised, but nothing dismayed at the unexpected appearance of forces so much more considerable than they had anticipated, the British troops awaited, with undiminished resolution, the attack. Their right rested on the Amato, at the point where its lazy current fell into the sea; the thickets and underwood which enveloped its mouth were filled

* Bot., iv. Hard., ix., 88, 90. Dum., xv., 107, 116.

† "The interests of our crown," said Napoleon, "and the tranquillity of the Continent of Europe, require that we should secure in a stable and definitive manner the fate of the people of Naples and Sicily, fallen into our power by the right of conquest, and forming part of the great Empire: we therefore declare our well-beloved brother, Joseph, King of the Two Sicilies." By the same decree, Berthier was created Prince of Neuchâtel, which had been ceded by Prussia; Talleyrand obtained, with the title of Prince of Benevento, the principality of the same name, which belonged to the pontifical states; Bernadotte became Prince of Pontecorvo; Cambacérès and Le Brun, Dukes of Parma and Placentia. Substantial reservations in favour of the crown of France accompanied the creation of these inferior feudatories; a million yearly was reserved from the Neapolitan revenues, to be distributed among the French soldiers.—Hard., ix., 94, 95. Bion., v., 131.

‡ Bign., v., 131. Hard., ix., 93, 94. Colletta, ii., 14, 15.

* Bot., iv., 210, 211. Colletta, ii., 19. Ann. Reg., 1806, 142. Dum., xv., 142, 145.

† Bot., iv., 211.

‡ Ibid., iv., 211. Dum., xv., 144. Ann. Reg., 1806, 142.

with light troops, which kept up a destructive fire on the assailants as they approached; but notwithstanding the heavy loss which they sustained in consequence, the French bravely advanced, and, impatient of victory, after a few volleys had been exchanged, rushed forward with the bayonet. But they little knew the enemy with which they had now to deal. No sooner did the English right, consisting of the light companies of the 26th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st, and 85th regiments, perceive the levelled steel of their opponents, than they too advanced with loud cheers to the charge; the 1st light infantry, a famed French regiment, as gallantly pressed forward, and the rival nations approached each other till their bayonets literally crossed. At that appalling moment French enthusiasm sank before British intrepidity: their battalions broke and fled, but were instantly overtaken amid deafening shouts, with such slaughter, that in a few minutes seven hundred lay dead on the spot, and a thousand, including General Compere, were made prisoners. Taking advantage of this overthrow, the brigade under General Auckland, which was immediately to the left of the victorious right, also pressed forward, and drove the enemy in that quarter from the field of battle. Defeated thus in the centre and right, Regnier made an attempt with his cavalry, in which arm the British were totally deficient, to overwhelm the left: a rolling fire of musketry repelled them from the front of the line; but their squadrons, rapidly wheeling round the immovable infantry, succeeded in turning its left, and this movement might have yet retrieved the day, when the French cavalry, in the midst of their advance, were assailed by a close and well-directed fire in flank from the 28th regiment, which had that morning landed, and came up most opportunely at the decisive moment to take a part in the action. This unexpected discharge totally disconcerted the horse, which fled in disorder from the field of battle; and the enemy, routed at all points, withdrew their shattered battalions across the Amato, weakened by the loss of half their numbers.*†

The battle of Maida, though hardly noticed by the French nation amid the blaze of Ulm and Austerlitz, had a most important effect upon the progress of the war. It is often by the feelings which it excites, and the moral impression with which it is attended, more than by its immediate results, or the numbers engaged on either side, that the importance of a victory is to be estimated. In this point of view, never was success more important than that thus achieved. True, the forces engaged were inconsiderable, the scene remote, the probable immediate advantages trifling; but of what avail was all that? it was a duel between France and England, and France had fallen in the conflict. At last the rival states had come into collision on terms approaching to equality, and without the paralyzing effect of lukewarm or dubious allies, and the result had been decisive: the veterans of Napoleon had fled before the British steel. Indescribable was the national exultation at this glorious result. The disasters of the early years of the war were forgotten, or ascribed to their true cause, general inexperience

in the military art: confidence, the surest presage of victory when guided by prudence, was transferred from the naval to the land service; and, reposing securely on the fights of Alexandria and Maida, all classes openly expressed their ardent desire for an early opportunity of measuring the national strength on a greater scale with the conquerors of Continental Europe. Publications began to issue from the press which strongly urged the adoption of a more manly system of military policy, and the descent of the British in large bodies on the shores of Germany or Italy;* the people no longer hesitated to speak of Cressy and Azincour. The British historian need entertain no fears of exaggerating the moral influence of this success, even with so inconsiderable a force. He will have occasion to portray a similar result to the enemies of his country, from the successes of the Americans with detached ships at the close of the war.† Napoleon was well aware of its importance: he received the accounts of the defeat at Maida with a degree of anguish which all his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal. "Sive tanta, sive minor victoria fuit, ingens eo dic res, ac nescio, an maxima illo bello, gesta sit; non vinci enim ab Hannibale, vincen-tibus, tunc difficilior fuit, quam postea vincere."‡

But, though productive in the end of the most important consequences, from the ^{its immediate} moral feelings which it inspired, the ^{results are less} victory of Maida was not attended ^{considerable} at the moment with any durable results. In the first instance, indeed, considerable advantages were gained. Every town and fort along the coast of Calabria fell into the hands of the victors. The whole artillery, stores, and ammunition collected for the invasion of Sicily were taken or destroyed. The French forces made a precipitate retreat on all sides, and the insurrection spread like wildfire through the whole southern provinces of the Neapolitan dominions. A few days after the town of Crotona, containing a thousand men, chiefly wounded, surrendered to the insurgents. Their detachments were cut off on all sides, and massacred with savage cruelty by the peasantry, whose ferocity General Stuart in vain endeavoured to appease, by a proclamation earnestly imploring them not to disgrace their cause by a deviation from the usages of civilized warfare. So general was the disaster, that Regnier was unable to stop his retreat till he reached the intrenched camp of Cassano, where the junction of Verdier's division enabled his shattered army, weakened by the loss of eight thousand men, at length to make head against the enemy.§

These disasters might have been attended with important results upon the whole campaign in the Peninsula, could ^{Surrender of} Gaeta have held out till the combined English and Neapolitan forces approached its walls. But the progress of the siege, and the vigour of Massena, who commanded the attacking army, rendered this impossible. After a gallant resistance, and the display of great skill on both sides, which rendered this siege one of the most memorable of the whole war, a practicable

* Sir J. Stuart's Despatch, Ann. Reg., 1806, 591, 593. Bot., iv., 211, 212. Collecta, ii., 20. Dum., xv., 146, 148.

† The total loss of the British was only 44 killed and 284 wounded. The Ducness of Abrantes states the loss of the French at 5000 men.—D'ABRANTES, ix., 136: and Sir J. STUART'S Despatch, Ann. Reg., 1806, 594.

* In particular, Captain Pasley's able and energetic treatise on the military policy of England, a work which had a powerful effect in directing the public attention to this important subject.

† D'Ab., ix., 136. ‡ Liv., xxiii., 16. § Dum., xv., 148, 155. Ann. Reg., 1806, 595. Bot., iv., 213. Jom., ii., 238. Bign., v., 126.

breach was effected in front of the citadel, while a second, of smaller dimensions, was formed on its flank. Already a column of three thousand grenadiers was prepared for the assault.

July 18. Prince Hesse Philipsthal had some days before been mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and removed on board an English vessel to Sicily. His successor was not animated with his dauntless spirit: proposals of capitulation were made; and Massena, glad on any terms to render his force disposable for still more pressing exigencies, granted them the most honourable conditions. The garrison, still seven thousand strong, marched out with the honours of war, and on the 18th of July the French flag waved on its classic and almost impregnable battlements.*†

The surrender of Gaeta, by rendering disposable the whole besieging force of Massena, eighteen thousand strong, made the insurrection in Calabria hopeless, and the ulterior stay of the English army on the Neapolitan shores impossible.

Sir John Stuart, therefore, slowly bent his steps towards the straits of Messina; and at length, on the 5th of September, after a residence of two months, the last detachments of the English embarked for Palermo, leaving, of necessity, though on this occasion for the last time, the stain too often thrown on their arms, of exciting a people to resistance whom they subsequently abandoned to their invaders. Meanwhile the advance of Massena, though stubbornly resisted and attended with great bloodshed, was a succession of triumphs. The insurgents kept their ground bravely at the romantic defile of Lauria, so well known to travellers in Calabria,

Aug. 5. but were at length turned by the Monte Galdo, and defeated with great slaughter. A guerilla warfare ensued, attended with savage cruelty on both sides. The stream of the Calore, which flowed through the theatre of the contest, descended to the sea charged with the bodies of the slain. But after several months

Nov. 10. of carnage, the French troops regained all the ground they had occupied prior to the descent of the English; and an amnesty, judiciously published by King Joseph, at length put a period to this sanguinary and hopeless contest, in which they lost, by sickness and the sword, little short of fifteen thousand men.†

No monarchy in Europe stood more in need of reformation than that of Naples when Joseph took possession of its throne. The administration of justice, the administration of the finances, the general police of the country, stood equally in need of amendment. Hence the remarkable fact, that

Domestic reforms of Joseph in Naples.

* Bign., v., 127, 128. Dum., xv., 155, 170. Bot., iv., 214.
† The physical difficulties experienced by the assailants in this memorable siege were of the most formidable description; its details, which are fully given by General Mathieu Dumas, are highly interesting to the military reader. No less than 120,000 cannon-shot and 22,000 bombs were fired by the garrison upon the besiegers before they returned a single gun; but when their batteries were opened on the 10th of July, the superiority of their fire became soon apparent. Gaeta, named after the nurse of *Æneas*,* underwent a desperate siege from the Austrians in 1707, when it surrendered only after a murderous assault by Marsina Dam. Thirty years afterward it was besieged and taken, when defended only by an insufficient garrison.—See DUMAS, xv., 155, 170.
‡ Dum., xv., 171, 179. Jom., ii., 239, 246. Bot., iv., 214, 217. Ann. Reg., 1806, 143, 148.

* *Tu quoque litteribus nostris, Æneia nutrix, Eternam moriens famam, Caieta, dedisti.*—*Verg.*, lib. vii.

the most democratically inclined of the whole community were those of the higher ranks who had travelled, or received the advantages of a liberal education, while the supporters of the arbitrary government, and all the abuses consequent in its train, were to be found among the rabble of cities and the peasantry of the country. A state of things which, however at variance with what is generally prevalent in a constitutional monarchy, arises naturally from the feelings brought into action in such circumstances as here occurred, and has been since abundantly verified by the experience of the southern monarchies of Europe when exposed to revolutionary convulsions. Joseph Bonaparte, who was endowed by nature with an inquisitive and beneficent spirit, found ample room for, and soon effected the most extensive ameliorations. Without conceding in an undue degree to the Democratic spirit, he boldly introduced reforms into every department. The estates held by the nobles by a military tenure were deprived of their unjust exemption from taxation; their castles, villages, and vassals subjected to the common law of the realm; the number of convents was restrained; part of their estates appropriated to the discharge of the public debt; part devoted to the establishment of schools in every province for the youth of both sexes. Academies for instruction in the military art, in naval science, in drawing, a national institute, and various other useful institutions, were established in the capital. Roads, bridges, harbours, and canals were undertaken or projected, and a general spirit of activity diffused by the energy of the government. Great part of these improvements have survived the ephemeral dynasty with which they originated, and constitute part of the lasting benefits produced by the disastrous wars of the French Revolution.*

The conquest of Naples and ascent of the throne of the Two Sicilies by the brother of Napoleon was not the only usurpation which followed the peace of Presburg. The old commonwealth of Holland was destined to receive a master from the victorious emperor; while the Republic of Venice, incorporated, by the decree of the 30th of March, with the kingdom of Italy, furnished a noblesse to surround and support his throne. Since their conquest by the French, under the victorious arms of Pichegru, the Dutch had uniformly shared in all the revolutionary convulsions of the parent Republic; and the authority latterly conferred on the Grand Pensionary in 1805 had almost rendered it a monarchical government. Meanwhile the misfortunes of the state were unparalleled. Its most valuable colonies had been conquered by the English, and were, to all appearance, indefeasibly united to that absorbing power. The Cape of Good Hope had become a half-way house to their vast dominions in Bengal; the island of Ceylon had recently been added to their possessions in the Indian Archipelago; and Surinam itself, the entrepôt of the commercial riches of Holland, in the Eastern seas, had fallen into their hands. Their harbours were blockaded, their commerce ruined, their flag had disappeared from the ocean, and the state, as usual at the close of revolutionary convulsions, had fallen under the despotism of ignoble men, whose tyranny over others was equalled only by their base adulation of the

Louis Bonaparte created King of Holland.

* Colletta, ii., 1, 15. Bign., v., 135, 139.

foreign rulers of the commonwealth. The people, desperate of relief, and worn out by obscure tyrants, in the election of whom the respectable classes had taken no share, were desirous of any change which promised a more stable and creditable order of things. Encouraged by these dispositions, Napoleon resolved to place his brother Louis on the throne of Holland. With this view a Dutch deputation, composed of persons entirely in his interest, was instructed to repair to Paris and demand his appointment. A treaty was soon concluded, which, on the preamble "that it had been found by experience that the annual election of a chief magistrate was the source of continual discord, and that, in the existing state of Europe, a hereditary government could alone guaranty the independence and furnish securities to the civil and religious of the state," declared Louis the King of Holland. A few days after the new monarch was proclaimed, and issued a decree, in which he promised to maintain the liberties of his people, whose independence was guaranteed by the emperor; but the elusory nature of that independence was made painfully evident by the characteristic speech which Napoleon made to his brother on the occasion. "Never cease to regard yourself as a Frenchman. The dignity of constable of the empire shall be reserved to you and your descendants. It will recall to your recollection the duties you have to discharge *towards me*, and the importance which I attach to the guardianship of the strong places which I intrust to you, and which compose the northern frontier of my states."*

At the same time, the incorporation of the Venetian States with the kingdom of Italy afforded the emperor an opportunity of laying the foundation of that territorial noblesse by which he hoped to add stability and lustre to his throne. Twelve military fiefs were created out of the ceded districts, which Napoleon reserved for the most distinguished of his marshals and ministers, while a fifteenth of the revenue which they yielded to the treasury at Milan was set apart to form appanages suitable to those dignities. A revenue of 1,200,000 francs (£48,000) was at the same time destined, from the taxes of the kingdom of Italy, to form a fund, out of which he was to recompense his soldiers, and soon divided among a great variety of claimants. Thus Napoleon was rendering the conquests of his arms not only the source of power to himself, but of emolument to his followers in every degree.†

The system upon which Napoleon now openly entered of placing his relations and family on the thrones of the adjoining kingdoms, and surrounding France with a girdle, not of affiliated Republics, but of dependant dynasties, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, a mere ebullition of personal vanity or imperial pride. It had its origin in profound principles of state policy, and a correct appreciation of the circumstances, both of which had elevated him to the throne, and surrounded him when there. He clearly perceived that it was Revolutionary passion, converted by his genius into the spirit for military conquest, which had placed him on his present pinnacle of power, and that he was regarded with a jealous eye by the old European dynasties, who both

dreaded, from dear-bought experience, the fervour which had elevated him to the throne, and were averse to the principles which had overturned the ancient family. He felt that, of necessity, however disguised under the semblance of friendship, his hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him; and this being the case, the only permanent bond of alliance on which he could depend was that which united him to his own family, and cemented with his own the interests of inferior royalities, dependant on the preservation of his great parent diadem. "I felt my isolated position," says he, "and threw out on all sides anchors of safety into the ocean by which I was surrounded; where could I so reasonably look for support as in my own relations? could I expect as much from strangers?" Such were the views of Napoleon, and that, *situated as he was*, they were founded on reason, is perfectly obvious. That the measures to which they led him, of displacing the adjoining monarchs, and seating on their thrones the members of his own family, were calculated to excite, in the highest degree, the jealousy and hostility of the other Continental powers, and thus had a powerful influence in producing his ultimate overthrow, is, indeed, equally certain; but these considerations afford no ground for impeaching the soundness of the principles by which his conduct was regulated. They show only that he was placed in circumstances which required a hazardous game to be played, and afford another to the many illustrations which the history of this eventful period exhibits of the eternal truth, that those who owe their elevation to Revolutionary passion, whatever form it may have assumed, are driven on before a devouring flame, more fatal in the end to those who are impelled by than those who resist its fury.*†

On the same day on which a king was given by the French emperor to the United Provinces, an ambassador arrived from the grand signior, who came to congratulate him on his accession to the imperial dignity. He was received with the utmost condescension; and the words used by Napoleon on the occasion are well worthy of being recorded, when taken in conjunction with his subsequent conduct to that power by the treaty of Tilsit. "Everything," said he, "that can happen, either of good or bad fortune, to the Ottomans, will be considered in the same light by France. Have the goodness, M. Ambassador, to transmit these words to Sultan Selim. Let him ever recollect that my enemies, who are also his own, may one day penetrate to his capital. He never can have any cause of apprehension from me: united to my throne, he need fear nothing from his enemies." Within a year after these words were spoken, Napoleon signed, on the Niemur, a treaty with Russia, for the partition of the whole Turkish territories in Europe.‡

But while fortune seemed thus lavishing her choicest gifts on Napoleon by land, and the dynasties of Europe were melting away before his breath, disaster, with equally unvarying course, was attending all his maritime operations, and the sceptre of the ocean had irrevocably passed into the hands of his enemies.

* Bign., v., 132, 143. Las Cas., vii., 127.

† "The truth is," said Napoleon, "that I was never master of my own movements; I was never altogether my own. I was always governed by circumstances."—Las Cas., vii., 124, 125.

‡ Bign., v., 145.

* Hard., ix., 99, 100. Bign., v., 141, 142.

† Bign., v., 139, 140

The victory of Trafalgar, with the subsequent achievements of Sir Richard Strachan, had almost entirely destroyed the great combined fleet which, under Villeneuve, had issued from Cadiz; but the squadrons at Rochefort and Brest, upon the co-operation of which Napoleon had so fondly calculated, still existed; and he was not yet sufficiently humbled by disaster to renounce altogether the hope of deriving some advantage from their resources. He resolved to employ the remainder of his naval forces, not in regular battles with the English fleet, but in detached operations with smaller squadrons, against their remote colonies or merchant vessels. Half the Brest fleet, consisting of eleven line-of-battle ships, were victualled for six months; and in the middle of December, when the Channel fleet was blown off the station by violent winds, they stood out to sea, and shortly after divided into two squadrons: the first, under Admiral Leissegues, consisting of five ships of the line and two frigates, were destined to carry out succour to St. Domingo; while the second, under Villameuz, embracing six ships of the line and two frigates, received orders to make for the Cape of Good Hope, and do as much injury as possible to the English homeward-bound merchant fleets. But a cruel destiny awaited both squadrons, which annihilated the enemy's remaining naval forces, and almost closed the long series of British maritime triumphs during the war.*

Admiral Leissegues arrived without any accident at St. Domingo, and disembarked his troops and stores; but the damage he had experienced from the wintry storms during the passage of the Atlantic rendered some repairs necessary, which were undertaken in the open roadstead of that harbour. The imprudent security which had dictated that resolution was soon severely punished. On the 6th of February Admiral Duckworth, who had been detached from the blockading squadron before Cadiz in pursuit of the enemy, hove in sight with seven ships of the line and four frigates. Four of the English ships engaged each a single adversary, while the three others united against the Imperial, a splendid vessel of 130 guns, which bore the admiral's flag, and was equal to the encounter of any two of its opponents. So unequal a contest as that with three, however, could not be of long endurance. Notwithstanding all their efforts to escape, the French squadron were overtaken and brought to close action: a desperate conflict of two hours ensued, which terminated in the whole of their line-of-battle ships being taken or destroyed; three having struck their colours, and two, including the superb Imperial, driven ashore and burned. The frigates stood to sea during the confusion of this murderous engagement, and escaped. Nothing could exceed the gallantry with which the French in all the ships stood to their guns: on board the three taken alone, the killed and wounded were no less than 760, while the total loss of the British was only 64 killed and 294 wounded. The Imperial, before it ran ashore, had seen 500 of its bravest sailors mowed down by the irresistible fire of the English vessels.†

Though not overtaken by so overwhelming a

disaster, the cruise of Admiral Villameuz, with the remainder of the Brest fleet, was in the end nearly as calamitous. Having received intelligence, when he approached the Cape, of the capture of that settlement by the British, he stood over for Brazil, where he watered and revictualled at Bahia, and moved northward towards the West Indies, in hopes of falling in with the homeward-bound Jamaica fleet. Thither he was tracked by Sir Alexander Cochrane with four sail of the line, who, though not in sufficient strength to risk an engagement, followed him at a distance, and, by means of his look-out frigates, observed all his movements. On the 12th of July Sir John Borslase Warren arrived from England at Barbadoes. His squadron had been fitted out and performed the voyage with unexampled rapidity, having left Spithead only on the 4th of June: Sir Richard Strachan soon after made his appearance with a second fleet in the same latitude, while a third, under Admiral Louis, put to sea in the end of August to intercept their return. As it was now evident that the attention of the English government was fully fixed on this squadron, the last which the enemy had at sea, the most serious apprehensions began to pervade the French that they would share the fate of their comrades on the coast of St. Domingo; and under the influence of these feelings the Veteran, of 74 guns, commanded by Jerome Bonaparte, separated from the rest of the squadron, and without any orders stood away in the night of the 30th of July for France. Discouraged by this defection, and perceiving no possibility of maintaining his position, Villameuz saw no resource but to make sail for the first friendly harbour in Europe. In doing so, however, he was assailed by a furious tempest, which totally dispersed his fleet: the Foudroyant, severely disabled, with difficulty reached the Havana, pursued by the English frigate Anson under the very guns of the Moro Castle: the Impetueux was standing in for the Chesapeake, when she was descried by Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, driven ashore and burned, her crew being made prisoners; two other seventy-fours were destroyed by the English in the same bay; the Cassant alone, which was supposed to have foundered at sea, regained Brest about the middle of October in the most deplorable condition. Jerome Bonaparte, in the Veteran, made a rich prize in returning to Europe; but, chased by some English vessels when he reached the Bay of Biscay, he was obliged to let go his booty, and after a hard run only reached the coast of France by steering his vessel ashore under the batteries of the little harbour of Concarneau, where the bulk was abandoned, but the crew and guns got into safety.*

The squadron under Admiral Linois, which had so long wandered almost unmo- lested in the Indian Ocean, and done very great damage to our commerce in the East, after its inglorious repulse by the China mercantile fleet, of which an account has already been given, made an attack on the Centurion, 74 guns, and a few English merchantmen, in the Bay of Vesigabatam; but though they took one of the merchantmen, and drove another on

* Dum., xv., 84, 86. Ann. Reg., 1806, 229.

† Dum., xv., 86, 89. Ann. Reg., 1806, 229. Bign., v., 156.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 230, 231. Bign., v., 157, 158. Dum., xv., 90, 94.

shore, they could make no impression on the line-of-battle ship, which, with undaunted resolution, bore up against triple odds, and at length succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Finding that the

March 13, 1806. Cape of Good Hope had been conquered by the British, Linois at length bent his steps homeward, and had reached the European latitudes, when he fell, in the night, into the middle of Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, and, after a short action, was taken, with the Marengo of 80 and the Belle

Poule of 40 guns. Next day five large frigates, with troops on board, bound for the West Indies, were met at sea by a British squadron under Sir Samuel Hood, and, after a running fight of several hours, four out of the five were made prisoners. The only division of the enemy at sea at that period which escaped destruction was the Rochefort squadron, under Admiral Lallemand, which had the good fortune not to fall in with any of the British fleets, and at length, after a cruise of six months, regained its harbour, having made eight hundred prisoners from merchant vessels in the course of its voyage. From its singular good fortune in eluding the pursuit of all the fleets sent in search of it by the British government, Lallemand's was called by the English sailors the invisible squadron. He had the luck to meet and capture the

Dec. 15, 1805. Calcutta of 56 guns, which, unsuspecting danger, fell into the middle of his fleet of four line-of-battle ships; and his safe return was celebrated as a real triumph by the French,* who in those disastrous days accounted an escape from the enemy at sea as equivalent to a victory.

These maritime transactions conduct us to an important epoch in the war—that in which the French and Spanish naval disasters were TOTALLY DESTROYED, and the English fleet, by general consent, had attained to UNIVERSAL DOMINION. There is something solemn, and apparently providential, in this extraordinary ascendancy acquired on that element by a single power. Nothing approaching to it had occurred since the fall of the Roman Empire. Napoleon afterward acquired important additions of maritime strength. The fleets of Russia, the galleys of Turkey, the impotent rage of Denmark, were put at his disposal; but he never again adventured on naval enterprises, and, with the exception of an unhappy sortie of the Brest fleet, which was soon terminated by the flames of Basque Roads, no sea-fight of any moment occurred to the conclusion of the war. Fearless and unresisted, the English fleets thenceforward navigated the ocean in every part of the globe, transporting troops, convoying merchantmen, blockading ports, with as much security as if they had been traversing an inland sea of the British dominions. Banded Europe did not venture to leave its harbours: all apprehensions of invasion disappeared, and England, relieved from all danger of domestic warfare or colonial embarrassment, was enabled to direct her undivided attention to land operations, and launch forth her invincible legions in that career of glory which has immortalized the name of Wellington.

It was not thus at the commencement of the struggle, nor had it been thus in the preceding war. The mild and pacific Louis XVI. had nursed up the French marine to an unprecedented pitch of

power. The French and Spanish fleets had rode triumphant in the Channel. Gibraltar had been revictualled in presence of superior forces only by the admirable skill of Admiral Howe; and more than once it had seemed for a moment doubtful whether the ancient naval greatness of England was not about to yield to the rising star of the Bourbons. When the war broke out, Louis bequeathed to the convention a gallant fleet of eighty ships of the line, and a splendid colony in St. Domingo, which equalled all the other sugar islands of the world put together. But revolutionary convulsions, however formidable in the creation of a military, can hardly produce a naval power. The transports of Brissot and the society of Les Amis des Noirs cut off the right arm of their maritime strength by the destruction of St. Domingo; the confiscations of the convention utterly ruined their commercial wealth; the blockade of their harbours deprived them of the only means of acquiring naval experience. One disaster followed another, till not only their own fleets were destroyed, but the navies of all Europe were so utterly paralyzed that the English flag alone appeared on the ocean, and the monarch whose will was obeyed from Gibraltar to the North Cape, and from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, did not venture to combat the sloops which daily insulted him in his harbours.

This astonishing result led to a total change in the weapons by which Napoleon thereafter combated Great Britain, and impelled him into that insatiable career of conquest which ultimately occasioned his ruin. He at once perceived that it was in vain, at least for a very considerable time, to make any attempt to withstand the English at sea, and that the prospect of ultimately rivalling their power on that element could only be entertained after a costly construction of ships of war, during a long course of years, in all the harbours of Europe. Abandoning, therefore, all idea of renewing any maritime contest, till his preparations, everywhere set on foot for the formation of a navy, were completed, he turned his mind to the conversion of his power at land to such a course of policy as might strike at the root of the commercial greatness of England. Thence the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, based on the project of totally excluding British goods and manufactures from all the European monarchies, which required for its completion the concurrence of all the Continental powers, which could everywhere be enforced only by the most rigid police, and could succeed only through the intervention of universal dominion. From the moment that this ruling principle obtained possession of his mind, the conquest of Europe, or at least the subjection of all its governments to his control, became a matter of necessity; for if any considerable state was left out the barrier would be incomplete, and through the chasm thus left in the defences, the enemy would speedily find an entrance. The termination of the maritime war, therefore, is not only an era of the highest importance, with reference to the separate interests of England, but the commencement of that important change in the system of Continental warfare which necessarily brought Napoleon to the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.

Doubtless the highest praise is due to the long line of brave and illustrious men who, during a series of ages, reared up this astonishing pow-

Napoleon's changes of system in regard to the naval war.

Greatness of the French navy under Louis XVI.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 229. Bign., v., 153, 154.

Reflections on
the growth of
the English
maritime
Power.

er. It was not, like the empires of Napoleon or Alexander, constructed in a single lifetime, nor did it fall with the fortunes of the heroes who gave it birth. It grew, on the contrary, like the Roman power, through a long succession of ages, and survived the death of the most renowned chiefs who had contributed to its splendour. So early as the time of Edward III., the English navy had inflicted a dreadful wound on that of France: thirty thousand of the vanquished had fallen in a single engagement; and the victory of Sluys equalled in magnitude and importance, though, from the frequency of subsequent naval triumphs, it has not attained equal celebrity with, that of Cressy or Azincour. The freeborn intrepidity of Blake, the fire of Essex, the dauntless valour of Hawke, contributed to cement the mighty fabric: it grew and hardened with every effort made for its overthrow; the power of Louis XIV., the genius of Napoleon, were alike shattered against its strength; the victories of La Hogue and Trafalgar equally bridled, at the distance of a century from each other, the two most powerful monarchs of Europe; and the genius of Nelson only put the keystone in the arch which already spanned the globe. The world had never seen such a body of seamen as those of England during the Revolutionary war: dauntless to their enemies, yet submissive to their chiefs—brave in action, yet cool in danger—impetuous in assault, yet patient in defence—capable of the utmost efforts of patriotic devotion, yet attentive to the most minute points of naval discipline—submissive to orders equally when facing the muzzles of an enemy's broadside, or braving the storms of the Northern Ocean—capable of enduring alike the vertical rays of the torrid zone, or the frozen serenity of an arctic winter—cherishing, amid the irregularities of naval life, the warmth of domestic affection; and nursing, amid the solitude of the waves, the ennobling sentiments of religious duty. By such virtues, not a transient, but an enduring fabric is formed. It is by such fortitude that a lasting impression on human affairs is produced. But amid all our admiration for the character of the British navy, destined to rival in the annals of the world the celebrity of the Roman legions, we must not omit to pay a just tribute to the memory of their gallant and unfortunate, but not on that account less estimable antagonists. In the long and arduous struggle which for three centuries the French navy maintained with the English, they were called to the exercise of qualities perhaps still more worthy of admiration. Theirs was the courage which can resolutely advance, not to victory, but defeat; the heroism which knows how to encounter not only danger, but obloquy; which can long and bravely maintain a sinking cause, uncheered by one ray of public sympathy; which, under a sense of duty, can return to a combat in which disaster only can be anticipated; and sacrifice not only life, but reputation, in the cause of a country which bestowed on success alone the smiles of general favour. Napoleon constantly lamented that his admirals, though personally brave, wanted the skilful combination, the daring energy, which distinguished the leaders of his land-forces, and gave the English admirals such astonishing triumphs; but had he possessed more candour, or been more tolerant of misfortune, he would have seen that such daring can be acquired only in the school of victory; that, as self-confidence is its soul, so

despondence is its ruin; and that, in reality, the admirals who encountered not only danger, but disgrace, in combating the arms of Nelson, were often more worthy of admiration than those who led his land-forces to certain victory at Jena or Austerlitz.

As the English navy has thus risen by slow degrees to universal dominion, so the analogy of history leads to the conclusion that great and durable results are to be produced by its agency. And without presuming to scan too minutely the designs of Providence, in which we are merely blind, though free agents, it may not be going too far to assert that the ultimate object for which this vast power was created is already conspicuous. The Roman legions bequeathed to the world the legacy of modern Europe; its empires and monarchies are but provinces of their dominion, regenerated by the fierce energy of Northern valour. The English navy will transmit to mankind the still more glorious inheritance of transatlantic greatness. A new world has been peopled by its descendants, and imbued with its spirit: freedom, tempered by power, will follow in its footsteps: more closely than the march of the Roman legions will the career of civilization follow the British flag. The era is fast approaching in this narrative, when another power, equally slow in its growth, equally permanent in its progress, will arise to greatness in the east of Europe: the cross is inscribed on its banners; wo to the crescent is the watch-cry of its people; and while the brilliant meteor of Napoleon, rising on the fleeting ascendant of passion and crime, is extinguished in blood, these two colossal empires, alike irresistible by sea and land, will each lay the foundations of the spread of Christianity through half the globe.

The destruction of the French naval squadrons was not the only maritime operation of this year. Before Mr. Pitt's death, he had prepared an expedition, under Sir David Baird, for the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope, consisting of 5000 men; the naval armament being under the direction Sir Home Popham. On the 4th of January, 1806, the expedition reached Table Bay; but the violence of the surf precluding the possibility of disembarking at that quarter, they were obliged to land in Leopard Bay, from whence they moved immediately towards the capital. On the 8th they came up with the Dutch forces, five thousand strong, chiefly cavalry in battle array, upon an elevated plateau which the road crossed on the summit of the Blue Mountains. The Hollanders withstood several discharges without flinching; but no sooner were preparations made for charging with the bayonet than they broke and fled, leaving seven hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle, while the loss of the victors was only two hundred and twelve. This action decided the fate of the colony: Cape Town surrendered; General Jansens, who had retired with three thousand men towards the Hottentot country, was induced by an honourable capitulation, which provided for his safe return to Europe with all his forces, to abandon a hopeless contest; and within eight days from the time when the troops were first landed, the British flag waved on all the forts, and this valuable colony was permanently annexed to the English dominions.*

* Ann Reg., 1806, 233, 234. Dum., xv., 69, 73.

This well-concerted enterprise added an important settlement to the British colonial girdle, which already almost encircled the earth; but the facility with which it was conducted inspired the commanders with an overweening confidence, which ultimately led to serious disasters. Sir Home Popham had at a former period been privy to certain designs of Mr. Pitt for operations in concert with General Miranda against South America, and had even been appointed in December, 1804, to the Diadem, of 64 guns, "for the purpose of co-operating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend towards our attaining a position on the Continent of South America favourable to the trade of this country."* But this intention had been afterward abandoned, or at least suspended, in consequence of the urgent remonstrances of Russia against any such remote employment of the British forces; and when he arrived at the Cape, Sir Home had no authority, express or implied, to employ any part of the forces under his command on any other expedition. But his ardent imagination had been strongly impressed by the brilliant results, both to the nation and the officers engaged in the service, which might arise from such a destination of part of the force which had effected the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope; and having persuaded Sir David Baird, the governor of that settlement, to a certain extent to enter into his views, he set sail in the beginning of April from Table Bay, taking with him the whole naval force under his command, and fifteen hundred land troops. With these, and two companies which he had the address to procure from St. Helena, he steered straight for the mouth of the Rio della Plata.†

The expedition reached the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres on the 24th of June, and was immediately disembarked.

General Beresford, who commanded the land-forces, immediately proceeded against that town, while the naval forces distracted the attention of the enemy by threatening Montevideo, where the principal regular forces were collected. Buenos Ayres, chiefly defended by militia, was unable to withstand the energetic attack of the invaders, and a capitulation was soon concluded, which guaranteed private property: a stipulation which the English commanders religiously observed, though cargoes of great value were lying afloat in the river, and might, by the established usages of war, have been declared good prize. But public stores to a great amount fell into the hands of the victors; of which 1,200,000 dollars were forthwith forwarded to government, while quicksilver to double the amount was seized for the benefit of the captors.‡

Government were extremely embarrassed how to act when intelligence of this unlooked-for success reached the British islands. Not that they felt any doubt as to the inexpediency and unhappy tendency of the enterprise; for on the first information that the expedition was in contemplation, they had despatched orders to countermand its sailing, which, unhappily, arrived too late to put a stop to its progress. But they were unable to stem or moderate the delirium of joy which pervaded the minds of the mercantile

classes on receipt of the despatches. The English, subject beyond any other people, perhaps, of whom history makes mention, to periodical, though, fortunately, not very lasting fits of insanity, were suddenly seized with the most immoderate transports: boundless fields of wealth, it was thought, were opened, endless markets for the produce of manufacturing industry discovered; and those fabled regions which formed the El Dorado of Sir Walter Raleigh appeared about to pour their inexhaustible treasures into the British islands. Under the influence of these extravagant feelings every principle of reason, every consideration of policy, every lesson of experience was swept away: speculations the most extravagant were entered into, projects the most insensate formed, expectations the most ridiculous entertained;* and government, unable to withstand the torrent, were obliged to dissemble their real feelings, and give a certain countenance to ideas which could be fraught only with ruin to all who acted upon them.

But long before the cabinet of St. James were either required to come to a resolution in what manner they were to act in regard to their new acquisition, or the boundless consignments

It is retaken by the South Americans, August 4.

which were in preparation could have crossed the Atlantic, the conquest itself had returned to the government of its former masters. Ashamed of their defeat by a handful of foreigners, and recovered from the consternation which the unexpected occurrence of an invasion had at first produced, the Spaniards began to entertain serious thoughts of expelling the intruders. An insurrection was secretly organized in the city of Buenos Ayres, almost under the eyes of the English commanders, without their being aware of what was going forward: the militia of the surrounding districts were assembled; Colonel Linieres, a French officer in the Spanish service, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in crossing over from Montevideo at the head of a thousand regular troops; and on the 4th of August the small English garrison, assailed by several thousand men from without, found itself menaced with insurrection in the interior of the city. The state of the weather rendered embarkation impossible: a desperate conflict ensued in the town, and the English troops, after sustaining for several hours an unequal con-

Aug. 12.

flict with the enemy, in greatly superior force in the streets, and a still more deadly because unseen foe in the windows and on the roofs of houses, were obliged to capitulate. The terms of the surrender were afterward violated by the Spaniards, and the whole remaining troops, thirteen hundred in number, made prisoners of war, after having lost nearly two hundred in killed and wounded. Sir Home Popham, the author of these calamities, succeeded in making his escape with the squadron, and cast anchor off the mouth of the river, where he maintained a blockade till re-enforcements enabled the British to resume the offensive, attended in the end with still more unfortunate circumstances in the succeeding year. General Miranda, whose projects against South America had been the remote cause of all these disasters, disappointed in his expectations of assistance both from the British and American governments, set sail from New-York at the head of a most inadequate force of one sloop and two schooners; and after under-

* Lord Melville's evidence in Sir H. Popham's trial, March 9, 1807. † Ann. Reg. 1806, 234, 235. Dum., xv., 73, 75.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1806, 235, 236. Dum., xv., 73, 75.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 237, 238.

going many hardships and landing on the Spanish Main, was obliged to re-embark, and make the best of his way back to Trinidad.*

Differences at this period arose which threatened to involve the British government in a far more serious contest with the United States of North America. They originated in grievances which unquestionably gave the Americans much ground for complaint, although no fault could be imputed to the English maritime policy; and they were the necessary result of their having engrossed a large portion of the lucrative carrying-trade between the belligerent powers. The first subject of complaint was the impressment of seamen said to be British in the American service. The next, the alleged violation of neutral rights, by the seizure and condemnation of vessels engaged in the carrying trade between France and her own or allied colonies. The first, though a practice of all others the most likely to produce feelings of irritation among those upon whom it was exercised, arose unavoidably from the similarity of habits and identity of language in the two states, which of course rendered desertion frequent from the one service to the other; and was a necessary consequence from the right of search which the American government, by a solemn treaty in 1794, had recognised, and which constituted the basis of the whole maritime laws of Europe. It was impossible to expect that, when British officers, in the course of searching neutral vessels for contraband articles, came upon English sailors who had deserted to their service, they should not reclaim them for their own country. If abuses were committed in the exercise of this delicate right, that was a good reason for making regulations to check them as far as possible, and provide for a due investigation of the matter, but none for abrogating the privilege altogether.† The

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 240, 241.

† On the part of the Americans it was contended, "That the practice of searching for and impressing seamen on board their vessels was not only derogatory to the honour of their flag as an independent nation, but led to such outrages and abuses, that, while it continued, no lasting peace or amity could be expected with Great Britain. It continually happened that native Americans were impressed, and obliged to serve in the English navy on pretence of their being British-born subjects; and such was the similarity of language and external appearance between the two nations, that even with the fairest intentions such mistakes must frequently happen. A practice which leads to such intolerable abuses cannot be tolerated by an independent state. It is in vain to appeal to abstract right, or the practice of other states: the close similarity of the Americans and English renders the exercise of it infinitely more grievous in their than it could be in any other case. The American government are willing to concur in any reasonable measures to prevent British deserters from finding refuge on board the American ships, but they can no longer permit the liberty of their citizens to depend on the interested or capricious sentence of an English officer."

To this it was replied on the part of Great Britain, "That no power but her own could release a British subject from the allegiance which he owed to the government of his nativity; and that, provided she infringed not the jurisdiction of other independent states, she had a right to enforce their services wherever she found them; that no state could, by the maritime law, prevent its merchant vessels being searched for contraband articles; and if, in the course of that search, her subjects were discovered, who had withdrawn from their lawful allegiance, on what principle could the neutral refuse to give them up? It is impossible to maintain that a belligerent may search neutral vessels for articles of a certain sort, held contraband and belonging to that neutral, and not at the same time vindicate its own subjects, if simultaneously discovered. The right of impressment is a necessary corollary for the right of search; it is, in truth, the exercise of a still clearer privilege. The difficulty of distinguishing an Englishman from an American is no reason for abandoning the right of searching for subjects of the

second arose from the decisions of the English Admiralty Courts, which now declared good prize neutral vessels carrying colonial produce from the enemy's colonies to the mother-state, though they had landed and paid duties in the neutral country,* contrary to the former usage, which admitted that step as a break in the continuity of the voyage, and protected the cargo.† The ground of the distinction, as explained by Sir William Scott, was, that, to bring the neutral within the exception, it was necessary that there should be a *bona fide* landing and payment of duties; and so it had been expressly stated in Lord Hawkesbury's declaration on the subject, issued in 1802; whereas, under the system of revenue laws established in the United States, this was not done, but, on the contrary, the payment of the duties was only secured by bonds, which were cancelled by debentures for the same sums the moment the goods were re-exported, which was usually done, without unloading, next day, so that the whole was a mere evasion, and cost only 3½ per cent. on the amount of the sums nominally paid. It was strictly conformable to legal principle to refuse to recognise such an elusory proceeding as sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage, and permit the goods to set out on their travels anew, as from a neutral state; but it was equally natural that the sufferers under this distinction should exclaim loudly against its severity, and ascribe to the British courts inconsistent conduct, in first recognising as legal a trade from the enemy's colony to the mother-state, interrupted by payment of duties at a neutral harbour, and then, after extensive capital had, on the faith of that recognition, been sunk in the traffic, declaring the vessels engaged in it good prize.‡

To these serious and lasting subjects of discord was added the irritation produced by an unfortunate shot from the British ship *Leander*, on the coast of America, which killed a native of that country, and produced so violent a commotion, that Mr. Jefferson issued an intemperate proclamation, forbidding the crew of that and some other English vessels from entering the harbours of the United States. Meetings took place in all the principal cities of the Union, at which violent resolutions on all the subjects of complaint were passed by acclamation. Congress caught the flame, and, after some preliminary angry decrees, passed a non-importation act against the manufactures of Great Britain, to take effect on the 15th of November following. The English people were equally loud in the assertion of their maritime rights,§ and everything announced the commencement of a fresh trans-

Violent measures of Congress.

former state, whatever reason it may afford for discrimination and forbearance in the exercise of it. If the right is abused, the officer guilty of the wrong will meet with exemplary punishment: if the Americans can show that a native of the United States has by mistake been seized for a Briton, he will be immediately released; but it is impossible for Great Britain to relinquish for an instant a right essential to the existence of her navy, and the knowledge of which alone prevents her ships of war being deserted for the higher wages which the lucrative commerce of neutrals enables them to offer as a bribe to the principal defenders of her independence. If such a change is ever to be made, it can only be on the neutrals providing some substitute for the present practice equally efficacious, and not more liable to abuse, which has never yet been done."—See Ann. Reg., 1806, 244, 245.

* The Essex, May, 1805, per Sir W. Scott.

† Case of Polly, July 5, 1800. Rob., ii., 368.

‡ Robinson's Reports, iii., 241, 249. Ann. Reg., 1806, 246, 248.

§ Ann. Reg., 1806, 247, 249.

atlantic war by a state already engaged with more than half of Europe.

But, fortunately for both countries, whose real interests are not more closely united than their popular passions are at variance, the adjustment of the matters in dispute was placed in wiser and cooler heads than the vehement populace of either. Commissioners were sent from America to negotiate with Great Britain, and endeavour to obtain some clear and precise rule for regulating their trade with the enemy's colonies, not liable to be changed by orders of council or decisions of courts as to the intentions of parties. These commissioners were Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney on the part of the United States, and Lords Holland and Auckland on that of Great Britain. The instructions of their respective governments were of the most conciliatory kind, and the gentlemen on both sides entered upon their duties in a correspondent spirit. Under such auspices the negotiation, how difficult and embarrassing soever, could hardly fail of being brought to a successful issue. With respect to the impressment of seamen, the subject was found to be surrounded with such difficulties, that the American commissioners, in opposition to the letter of their instructions, found themselves constrained to consent, in the mean time, to a pledge by the British government that they would issue directions for the exercise of this right with the greatest delicacy and forbearance, and to afford immediate redress upon any representation of injury sustained by them, reserving the final discussion of the matter to a future opportunity; but on the other points in controversy a satisfactory adjustment was effected. A clear and precise rule was laid down for the regulation of the circuitous trade by the enemy to their colonies, which defined the difference between a continuous and interrupted voyage, and stipulated that, besides the goods being landed and the duties paid, there should remain, after the drawback, a duty of one per cent. on European and two per cent. on colonial produce; and an extension of the maritime jurisdiction of the United States was agreed to, to five miles from the shore of their territory. Thus, by good sense and moderation on both sides, were these difficult questions satisfactorily adjusted, and the British nation honourably extricated from an embarrassment which threatened, under far more perilous circumstances, to renew the dangers of the armed neutrality or the Northern coalition.*

While England was thus extending her naval dominion into every part of the globe, and asserting with equal forbearance and spirit the maritime rights essential to the preservation of the vast fabric, Napoleon was rapidly advancing in his career of universal terrestrial empire. Prussia was the first power which felt the humiliation to which these incessant advances led in all the adjoining states. The singular treaty has already been mentioned which was concluded by Count Haugwitz on the 15th of December, whereby he substituted for the intended warlike defiance an alliance purchased by the cession of Hanover from the unconscious and neutral England. Great was the embarrassment of the cabinet of Berlin when this unexpected intelligence arrived. On the

one hand, the object of their ambition for the last ten years seemed now about to be obtained, and the state to be bounded by an adjoining territory which would bring it an addition of nearly a million of souls; on the other hand, some remains of conscience made them feel ashamed of thus partitioning a friendly power, and they were not without dread of offending Alexander by openly sharing in the spoils of his faithful ally. At length, however, the magnitude of the temptation and the terror of Napoleon prevailed over the king's better principles, and it was determined not simply to ratify the treaty, but to send it back to Paris with certain modifications; and, as a colour to the transaction, and also, perhaps, as a salvo to their own consciences, it was agreed to "accept the proposed exchange of Hanover for the Margraviates, on condition that the completion of it should be deferred till a general peace, and the consent of the King of Great Britain in the mean time be obtained;" while it was represented to the English minister at Berlin that arrangements had been concluded with France for ensuring the tranquillity Jan. 26, 1806. of Hanover, which "stipulated expressly the committing of that country to the exclusive guard of the Russian troops and to the administration of the king until the conclusion of a general peace." But not a word was said of any ulterior designs of definitively annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions; and in the mean time the French troops were replaced by the Prussian in that electorate, a large part of the army disbanded, and a proclamation to the same effect issued by the king in taking possession of that territory.*

But it was alike foreign to the character and the designs of Napoleon to admit any modification, how trifling soever, in the treaties which he had concluded with the ministers of inferior powers. The utmost indignation, therefore, was expressed at St. Cloud at the modifications proposed to be inserted in the treaty. "From that moment," says Bignon, "on the part of Napoleon the question was decided: all sincere friendship was become impossible between Prussia and him; it was regarded only as a suspected power, whose hollow friendship had ceased to have any value in his eyes." On the 4th of February it was officially announced to Haugwitz, that, "as the treaty of Vienna had not been ratified within the prescribed time by the Prussian government, the emperor regarded it as no longer binding." This rigour had the desired effect: Prussia had not resolution enough to resist; and on the 15th of Feb. 15. February a new and still more disgraceful treaty was signed by Haugwitz at Paris, which openly stipulated not only the annexation of Hanover to the Prussian dominions, but the exclusion of the British flag from the ports of that electorate. It was ratified on the 26th, and immediately carried into execution. March 28. Count Schulenberg took possession of Hanover on the part of the Prussian monarchy, and immediately issued a proclamation closing its harbours against English vessels; and on the 1st of April a patent appeared, formally annexing the electorate to the Prussian dominions, on pretence that, when belonging to Napoleon by the right of conquest, it had been transferred to

Continental
affairs. Cold-
ness between
France and
Prussia.

Increasing
jealousies
between the
two cabi-
nets. They
seize on
Hanover.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 248, 250. Art. 11 and 12, Treaty.

* Hardenberg's Letter, 26th Jan., 1806, to Mr. Jackson. Ann. Reg., 1806, 158. Hard., ix., 52, 58. Bign., v., 223, 226

Prussia, in consideration of three of her provinces ceded to France.*

This system of seizing possession of the territories of neutral or friendly states, in order to meet the wishes or suit the inclinations of greater powers, when bounding their dominions, to which Napoleon, through his whole administration, was so much inclined, had succeeded perfectly when the objects of spoliation were powers, like Venice or Naples, too weak to manifest their resentment; but Prussia was egregiously mistaken when she applied it to Great Britain. So early

Feb. 3. as the 3d of February, Count Munster, the Regent of Hanover, had protested against the occupation of that electorate by the Prussian forces, from having observed in the conduct of their generals various indications of an intention to do more than take possession of it for a temporary purpose;

March 17. and the mildest remonstrance, accompanied by a request of explanation, had been made by Mr. Fox at a subsequent period, when the intentions of the cabinet of Berlin became still more suspicious. But no sooner did intelligence arrive of the exclusion of the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, and the Prussian proclamation announcing that they took possession of the country in virtue of the French right of conquest, than that spirited minister took the most decisive measures to show that perfidious government the dispositions of the power they had thought fit to provoke. The British ambassador was immediately recalled from Berlin; the Prussian harbours declared in a state of blockade; an embargo laid on all vessels of that nation in the British harbours; while a message from the king to both houses of Parliament

April 23. announced his resolution to assert the dignity of his crown, and his "anxious expectation for the arrival of that moment when a more liberal and enlightened policy on the part of Prussia should remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a power with whom his majesty had no other cause of difference than that now created by these hostile acts."† An

May 14. order of council was soon after issued, authorizing the seizure of all vessels navigating under Prussian colours; and such was the effect of these measures, that the Prussian flag was instantly swept from the ocean; and before many weeks had elapsed four hundred of its merchant vessels had found their way into the harbours of Great Britain.

In the speech which he made shortly after in Mr. Fox's House of Commons, Mr. Fox drew speech on in vivid colours, and depicted with all the subject. the force of his eloquence, the humiliating and disgraceful part which Prussia had taken in this transaction. "The Emperor of Russia," said he, "after he left Austerlitz, abandoned the whole direction of his troops that remained in Germany to the King of Prussia, and this country had promised him powerful assistance in pecuniary supplies. These were the means which he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations; and what use did he make of them? Why, to seize a part of the territories of those powers who had been supporting him in the rank and situation that had enabled him to negotiate on fair terms with the French emperor.

or. At first he pretended only to take interim possession of the electorate of Hanover, till the consent of its lawful sovereign could be obtained to its cession at a general peace; but latterly this thin disguise was laid aside, and he openly avowed that he accepted it in full sovereignty from France, to which it belonged by right of conquest. Such a proceeding rests upon no other conceivable foundation, but that worst emanation of the disorders and calamities of Europe in recent times—the principle of transferring the people of other states from one power to another, like so many cattle, upon the footing of mutual ambition or convenience. We may not at present be able to prevent the transfer, but let us protest solemnly against its injustice, and vigorously make use of the forces which Providence has given us to make the guilty league feel the consequences of our just indignation. The pretext that Prussia received this territory from Napoleon, to whom it belonged by right of conquest, is as hollow as it is discreditable. It was merely occupied in a temporary way by the French troops; it formed no part of the French Empire; above all, its cession had never been agreed to by this country; and where is there to be found an instance in history of such a cession of a military acquisition pending the contest? The conduct of Prussia in this transaction is a compound of everything that is contemptible in servility, with everything that is odious in rapacity. Other nations have yielded to the ascendancy of military power: Austria was forced, by the fortune of war, to cede many of her provinces; Prussia alone, without any external disaster, has descended at once to the lowest point of degradation—that of becoming the minister of the injustice and rapacity of a master.*

In consenting to this infamous transaction, the cabinet of Berlin were doubtless actuated by the desire to deprecate the wrath and conciliate the favour of the French emperor. It is worth while to examine, therefore, whether that object was gained, and in what light their conduct was viewed by that dreaded conqueror. "From the moment," says Bignon, "that the treaty of the 15th of February was signed, Napoleon did more than hate Prussia—he conceived for that power the most profound contempt. All his views from that day were based on considerations foreign to its alliance: he conceived new projects—he formed new plans, as if that alliance no longer existed. In the mean time, he pressed the execution of all the stipulations it contained favourable to France; he would not permit the delay of a single day."† Hardenberg had the good fortune to escape the disgrace of being privy to these proceedings: he had, from his known hostility to Napoleon, been obliged to withdraw from the Prussian cabinet before they were finally consummated.

The effects of this unmeasured contempt of Prussia soon appeared, in a series of measures, which overturned the whole constitution of the Germanic Empire, and ultimately brought that power into hasty and ill-fated collision with the French Empire. On March 15, Murat, without any previous concert with the cabinet of Berlin, was invested with the duchies of Berg and Cleves, ceded to France, by the treaty of the 15th

Napoleon's opinion of Prussia in this transaction.

His farther measures of aggression on Germany.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 159. Bign., v., 232, 234. Hard., ix., 107.

† Hard., ix., 207, 210. Bign., v., 233. Ann. Reg., 1806, 159, 161. Parl. Deb., vi., 882, 886.

* Parl. Deb., vi., 890, 892. Ann. Reg., 1806, 161.

† Bign., v., 232.

† Hard., ix., 107.

of February, by Bavaria, in exchange for the Prussian provinces of Anspach and Bayreuth, in Franconia. The establishment of a soldier of fortune, the brother-in-law of Napoleon, in the very heart of his Westphalian provinces, was not calculated to allay the now awakened jealousy of Prussia; and this feeling was strongly increased when the French troops, towards the end of April, took possession of the abbacies of Werden, Essen, and Elten, on pretence that they belonged to the Duchy of Cleves, without any regard to the claims of Prussia to these territories, founded on a prior right. This irritation was augmented by the imperious conduct of the French generals in the north of Germany, who openly demanded a contribution of 4,000,000 florins (£200,000) from the city of Frankfurt; and, in terms equally menacing, required a loan from the city of Hamburg to a still larger amount; while, in Bremen, every kind of merchandise suspected to be English was seized without distinction, and committed to the flames. Six millions of francs (£240,000) was the price at which the imperial robber condescended, in a time of profound peace, to tender to the city of Hamburg and the Hanse towns his protection. The veil which had so long hung before the eyes of the Prussian government now began to fall; they perceived, with indescribable pain, that their long course of obsequiousness to France had procured for them only the contempt of that power, and the hostility of its enemies.*

No words can paint the mingled feelings of shame, patriotism, and indignation which burst forth in all ranks in Prussia, when the rapid course of events left no longer any doubt, not only that their rights and interests were totally disregarded by France, in favour of whom they had made so many sacrifices, but that they had sunk to this depth of degradation without any attempt to assert their dignity as an independent power. The queen and Prince Louis, who had so long mourned in vain the temporizing policy and degraded position of their country, now gave open vent to their indignation; nor did they appeal in vain to the patriotic spirit of the people. The inhabitants of that monarchy, clear-sighted and intelligent beyond almost any other, as well as enthusiastic and brave, perceived distinctly the gulf into which their country was about to fall: one universal cry of indignation burst forth from all ranks; it was not mere warlike enthusiasm, but the profoundest feeling of national shame and humiliation which animated the people. The young officers loudly demanded to be led to the combat: the elder spoke of the glories of Frederic and Rosbach: an irresistible current swept away the whole nation. Publications, burning with indignant eloquence, issued from all the free cities in the north of Germany where a shadow even of independence was still preserved, and that universal fervour ensued which is the inevitable forerunner of great events for good or for evil. Guided by wisdom and prudence, it might have led to the most splendid results; impelled by passion and directed by imbecility, it induced unheard-of disasters.†

* Bign., v., 247, 370. Ann. Reg., 1806, 164. Hard., ix., 126, 224, 225. Bour., vii., 137, 138.

† Ann. Reg., 1806, 165. Hard., ix., 117, 119.

‡ One of the most remarkable of these was a pamphlet published by the celebrated Gentz, which at the time produced a very great sensation. "The war hitherto conducted against France," said he, "was just and necessary in its origin, and

Strong as were the patriotic feelings which the conquests and rapacity of the French had awakened in a large portion of the German people, they were not as yet universal: the hour of the resurrection of the Fatherland had not arrived. By appealing to the blind ambition of some of their princes, and flattering the inconsiderate feelings of many of their people, Napoleon had contrived to animate one portion of its inhabitants against the other; and on this division of opinion he had formed the project of reducing the whole to servitude. The first design of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE had been formed, as already noticed, the year before, during the residence of the emperor at Mayence; but it was brought to maturity, from his witnessing the enthusiasm excited among the lesser states in Germany by the victories in which they had shared, gained under the standards of France over Austria, and the regal dignity to which they had elevated their sovereigns. France on this occasion played off with fatal effect the policy so uniformly followed by its chiefs since the Revolution, that of rousing one portion of the population in the adjoining states against the other, and raising itself, by their mutual divisions, to supreme dominion over both. As his differences with Russia assumed a more envenomed character, and the hostility of Prussia became more apparent, Napoleon felt daily more strongly the necessity of uniting the states in alliance with him into a durable confederacy, which should enable him at all times to convert their military resources to his own purposes. It was no small matter to have such an outwork beyond the great frontier rampart of the Rhine; their contingents of troops would place nearly a fourth of the military force of Germany at his disposal; and, what was to him perhaps of still greater importance, under the pretence of stationing the vast contingent of France in such a situation as to protect its allies, he might lay the whole expenses of two hundred thousand men on the allied states.*

Influenced by such desires on both sides, the negotiations for the conclusion of the Powers admitted to the treaty were not long of being brought tithed to a termination. The plenipoten- confederacy.

certainly it has not become less so during its progress. If it has hitherto failed from false measures, are we to regard everything as lost? Is Germany destined to become what Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy now are? But how is our salvation to be obtained? By assembling what is dispersed, raising what is fallen, resuscitating what is dead. We have had enough of the leagues of princes: they have proved as futile as they are precarious. There remains to us but one resource: that the brave and the good should unite; that they should form a holy league for our deliverance: that is the only alliance that can defy the force of arms, and restore liberty to nations and peace to the world. You, then, who, amid the universal shipwreck, have yet preserved the freedom of your souls, the honesty of your hearts, who have hearts capable of sacrificing your all for the good of your fellow-citizens, turn your eyes upon your country; behold it mutilated, bleeding, weighed down, but not destroyed; in all but the grave there is hope. It is neither to England nor Russia that we must look for our deliverance, how desirable soever the co-operation of these powers may be; it is to Germany alone that the honour of our deliverance is reserved. It is Germany which must raise itself from its ruins, and accomplish the general emancipation. We shall do more: we shall deliver France itself, and restore to that power a free and pacific existence, consistent with the independence of Europe."—GENTZ, *Europe en 1806*, and HARD., ix., 122, 123. On the eve of the battle of Jena, what could appear more misplaced than this prophecy! yet how exactly it was accomplished at a future time! a remarkable instance of the manner in which genius, piercing through the clouds of present events, can discern the ultimate changes in which they are to terminate.

* Hard., ix., 153, 155. Bign., v., 300, 303. Lucches, i., 124, 131.

tiaries of all the powers who were to be admitted into the confederacy assembled at Paris in the beginning of July, and on the 12th of July 12. that month the act of the confederation was signed. The members of it were the Emperor of the French, the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, the Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Elector of Baden, the Grand-duke of Berg, the Landgrave of Hesse d'Armstadt, the Princes of Nassau Weilberg, Nassau Usingen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, Salm-Salm, and Salm-Kerboung, Isenberg-Birchstein, Prince Lichtenstein d'Aremberg, and Count de la Leyen. The Archduke Ferdinand, Grand-duke of Wurtzberg, acceded to the confederacy a short time afterward. By the

Sept. 30. act of confederation, the states in alliance were declared to be severed forever from the *Germanic Empire*; rendered independent of any power foreign to the confederacy, placed under the protection of the Emperor of the French; and any hostility committed against any of them was to be considered as a declaration of war against the whole.* Several of the allies received accessions of territory or dignity: the free towns of Frankfort and Nuremberg were handed over, the first to the Prince Primate, the second to the King of Bavaria: all the members of the confederacy were invested with the full sovereignty of their respective states, and received a gift of the foreign territories encircled in their dominions.† Lastly, a separate article provided the military contingent which each of the confederates was to furnish for their common protection: which were, for France 200,000; and for the German States 58,000 men; but subsequent experience soon proved that Napoleon received military aid to double the amount of these numbers from them all.‡

This confederacy was by far the most important blow which Napoleon had yet levelled at the independence of the European states. It was no longer an inconsiderable power, such as Switzerland, Venice, or Holland, which received a master from the conqueror: the venerable fabric of the Germanic Empire had been pierced to the heart, her fairest provinces had been reft from the Empire of the Cæsars. The impression produced in Europe by this aggression was proportionally great: sixteen millions of men were by a single stroke transferred from the Cæsars to a foreign alliance; and profound pity was felt for the emperor, the first sovereign of Christendom, who was thus despoiled of a large portion of the dominions which, for above a thousand years, had been enjoyed by his predecessors. Nor was this feeling of commiseration lessened by what immediately followed. On the 1st of August notification was sent to the Diet of Ratisbon of the formation of the confederacy, both on the part of the Emperor of France and the coalesced princes. The former deemed it

unnecessary to assign any reasons for his conduct; but the latter pleaded, as their excuse for violating their engagements to the Empire, the inconsistency between their present situation and their ancient bonds, and the necessity, amid the weakness of their former chief, of looking out for a new protector, who might possess force adequate to secure them from insult. Under such flimsy devices did these selfish princes conceal a dereliction of loyalty and desertion of their country, calculated to produce unbounded calamities to Germany, and which they themselves were destined afterward to expiate in tears of blood. But how keenly soever the Emperor Francis might feel the open blow thus levelled at his dignity, and the formation of a separate and hostile state in the heart of his dominions, he was not in a situation to give vent to his resentment. Soult still held the battlements of Brannau: on one pretext or another, the evacuation of the German States, which by the treaty of Presburg was to be effected at latest in three months, had been delayed: the French battalions were in great strength on the Inn, the prisoners made during the campaign had not been restored, while the dispirited Austrian troops had not yet recovered the rude shocks of Ulm and Austerlitz. Wisely yielding, therefore, to a storm which they could not prevent, the imperial cabinet dissembled their feelings; and, justly considering this stroke as entirely subversive of the Empire, the Emperor Francis, by a solemn deed, re-nounced the throne of the Cæsars, and declared himself the first of a new series of the emperors of Austria.*†

Though in appearance levelled at the Emperor Francis as chief of the Empire, this violent dislocation of the Germanic body was in reality still more formidable to Prussia, from the close proximity of its frontier to the coalesced states. The sensation, accordingly, which it produced at Berlin was unbounded: all classes, from the cabinet of the king to the privates in the army, perceived the gulf which was yawning beneath their feet; they saw clearly that they were disregarded and despised, and reserved only for the melancholy privilege of being last devour-

Great sensation which these events produce at Berlin.

* Join., ii., 240, 243. Bign., v., 317, 319. Hard., ix., 157.

† Napoleon set forth, in his communication to the Diet of Ratisbon announcing the Confederation of the Rhine, "The Germanic Constitution is no longer but a shadow; the diet has ceased to have any will of its own. His majesty the emperor and king can, therefore, no longer recognise its existence. He has accepted, in consequence, the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. In his pacific views he declares that he will never carry his views beyond that river. He has hitherto been faithful to all his promises." The confederated princes declared, "The results of the last three wars having proved that the Germanic body was really dissolved, the princes of the west and south have deemed it expedient to renounce all connexion with a power which has ceased to exist, and to range themselves under the banners of the Emperor of the French, who is bound alike by the interests of his glory as well as those of his Empire to secure to them the enjoyment of external and internal tranquillity." With more truth and dignity the Emperor Francis said, in his act renouncing the throne of the Empire, "Being convinced of the impossibility of discharging any longer the duties which the imperial throne imposed upon us, we owe it to our principles to abdicate a crown which could have no value in our eyes, when we were unable to discharge its duties and deserve the confidence of the princes electors of the Empire. Therefore it is that, considering the bonds which unite us to the Empire as dissolved by the Confederation of the Rhine, we renounce the imperial crown, and by these presents absolve the electors, princes, and states, members of the supreme tribunal, and other magistrates, from the duties which unite them to us as their legal chief."—See HARD., ix., 159, 162.

* Arts. 1, 7, 12, and 35.

† Arts. 24, 25.

‡ See Treaty, Ann Reg., 1806, 818. Marten's Traité, iv., 313, 329.

§ The contingents were settled as follows:

France.....	200,000
Bavaria.....	30,000
Wirtemberg.....	12,000
Baden.....	3,000
Berg.....	5,000
Darmstadt.....	4,000
Nassau, Hohenzolki, and others.....	4,000
	258,000

ed. The increasing aggressions of Napoleon or his vassals speedily made them aware that this was their destiny. Murat advanced claims to the principality of Embden, and the three abbas which formed part of the indemnity awarded to Prussia for its cessions in Franconia, as well as to the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The twenty-fourth article of the Confederation of the Rhine conferred on that military chief the sovereignty of all the German principalities of the house of Orange, and rendered its head, brother-in-law to the king, tributary to the vassal of Napoleon; while the injurious treatment to which the Prince of Latour and Taxis, brother-in-law of the Queen of Prussia, was exposed, was a fresh outrage to that monarch in the most sensitive part. To avoid, however, if possible, an immediate rupture with the court of

Sept. 27. Berlin, they were given to understand by the French emperor that, if they were desirous to form a league of the states who were attached more or less to Prussia in the north of Germany, France would not oppose its formation. But they were informed, shortly after, that

Oct. 3. the Hanse towns, which Napoleon reserved for his own immediate protection, could not be permitted to join that northern confederacy: that Saxony could not be allowed to form part of it against its will; while the Elector of Hesse was invited to join the confederacy of the Rhine, and, on his refusing to comply, struck at by a resolution which cut off his access to part of his own dominions. But all these causes of complaint, serious as they were, sunk into insignificance compared to that which arose when it was discovered by M. Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, that France had entered into negotiations with England on the footing of the restitution of Hanover to its lawful sovereign; that, while continually urging the cabinet of Berlin to look for indemnities for such a loss on the side of Pomerania, Napoleon had engaged to Russia, in the treaty signed with D'Oubril, its ambassador at Paris, to prevent them from depriving the King of Sweden of any part of his German dominions;* and that, while still professing sentiments of amity and friendship to Frederic William, he had offered to throw no obstacles in the way of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, including the whole of Polish Prussia, in favour of the Grand-duke Constantine. Irritated beyond endurance by such a succession of insults, and anxious to regain the place which he was conscious he had lost in the estimation of Europe, the King of Prussia

Aug. 9. War- part his armies on the war footing, like preparations despatched M. Krusemark to St. Petersburg, and M. Lacobi to London,

sia. to endeavour to effect a reconciliation with these powers, opened the navigation of the Elbe, concluded his differences with Sweden, assembled his generals, and caused his troops to defile in the direction of Leipsic. The torrent of public indignation at Berlin became irresistible: the war party overwhelmed all opposition; in the general tumult, the still small voice of reason, which counselled caution and preparation in the outset of so great an enterprise, was overborne; Prince Louis and his confederates openly boasted that Prussia, strong in the recollection of the Great Frederic, and the discipline he had bequeathed to his followers, was able,

single-handed, to strike down the conqueror of Europe; the young officers repaired at night to sharpen their sabres on the window-sills of the French ambassador; warlike and patriotic songs resounded, amid thunders of applause, at the theatres; and the queen roused the general enthusiasm to the highest pitch by displaying her beautiful figure on horseback in the streets of Berlin, at the head of her regiment of hussars, in the uniform of the corps.*

While Prussia, suddenly and violently awakening from the trance of ten years, was thus taking up arms and rushing headlong into a contest, single-handed, with the conqueror of Europe, negotiations of an important character, terminating in a resolution equally warlike, had taken place with Russia and England.

The retreat of the Emperor Alexander and his army from the disastrous field of Austerlitz had apparently extinguished all causes of discord between the vast empires of Russia and France. Their territories nowhere were in contact. The vast barrier of Germany, with its two thousand walled cities and forty millions of warlike inhabitants, severed them from each other. They had parted with mutual expressions of esteem, and the interchange of courteous deeds between the victor and the vanquished. The conclusion of the peace of Presburg, by releasing the Czar from all obligations towards his unfortunate ally, seemed to have still farther removed the possibility of a rupture, while the withdrawing of Austria from the Continental alliance left no rational ground for renewing the contest on account of any danger, how imminent soever, to the balance of power from the aggressions of Napoleon. But, notwithstanding all these favourable circumstances, the secret ambition of these potentates again threw them into collision, and the quarter where the difference arose indicated that it was the glittering prize of Constantinople which brought them to the fields of Eylau and Friedland.

Cattaro, a small barren province situated to the south of Ragusa, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, derives its value from the excellence of its harbour, which is the largest and safest in that sea, and the skill of its seamen, which has always secured them an honourable place in its naval transactions. By the treaty of Presburg it had been provided that this province should be ceded by the Imperialists to the French within two months after its final ratification. When this period had expired, the French commissioners authorized to take possession had not arrived, and the Russian agent there, taking advantage of that circumstance, succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who are almost all of Greek extraction, that their intended transference to France had fallen to the ground, and that they were at liberty to tender their allegiance to whom they chose. In pursuance of these investigations, the people, who are cupied by the styled Montenegrins, and ardently Russians, desired the establishment of a power professing the Greek faith within their bounds, rose in a tumultuous manner, shut up the Austrian commander, who had only a slender garrison at his disposal, within the fortress, and commenced a strict blockade, in which they were soon sup-

Renewed causes of discord between France and Russia.

Differences about the mouths of the Cattaro.

Which is investigated, the people, who are cupied by the styled Montenegrins, and ardently Russians.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 187. Bign., v., 369, 390. Hard., ix., 167, 176.

* Hard., ix., 176, 181. Bign., v., 409, 415. Ann. Reg., 1806, 167.

ported by a Russian man-of-war, which arrived from Corfu. After a short blockade he surrendered the place to the insurgents, who immediately transferred it to the Russians, by whom it was occupied in force; but the circumstances attending the transaction were so suspicious that the Austrian subaltern officers in the fortress protested against its surrender, and the governor was afterward brought to a court-martial at Vienna for his conduct on this occasion, and sentenced to confinement in a Transylvanian fortress for life.*

Nothing that has since transpired authorizes the belief that Austria was privy to this transaction; nor does any motive appear which could induce her, for so trifling an object, to run the risk of offending the Emperor Napoleon, whose terrible legions were still upon the Inn. But no sooner did he receive intelligence of it than Napoleon ordered Marshal Berthier to delay the evacuation of the fortress of Brannau, on the Austrian frontier; and the march of all the French troops towards the Rhine was countermanded. In this way, the important object was gained of keeping a hundred and fifty thousand men still at free quarters on the German States. He made no effort to dispossess the Russians and Montenegrins from Cattaro; but, on the pretext that, because the Austrians had failed in performing their obligations to him, he was at liberty to look for an indemnity wherever he could find it, seized upon the neighbouring city of Ragusa, a neutral power with whom they had no cause whatever of hostility. There Lauriston, who commanded the French garrison, was shortly after besieged by the Russians, both by land and sea; but before anything of moment could be transacted in that quarter, the Austrians, exhausted by the prolonged stay of such an immense body of men on their territory, made such energetic remonstrances to the cabinet of St. Petersburg on the subject, that they agreed to the evacuation of Cattaro; and M. d'Oubril, who was despatched from the Russian cabinet to Paris, ostensibly to negotiate the exchange of prisoners, but really to conclude a treaty between the two powers, brought authority for its surrender to the French. But, in consequence of that ambassador having exceeded his instructions, the treaty which he concluded was not ratified by the Emperor Alexander; and as hostilities for that reason still continued, Lauriston was reduced to the last extremity in Ragusa, and saved from destruction only by the opportune arrival of Molitor, who advanced at the head of reinforcements from Dalmatia. The territory of Ragusa was now fully occupied by the French, and continued in their hands till the end of September, when it was invaded by a powerful body of Russians and Montenegrins; but these troops having been drawn out of their intrenchments by a skilful stratagem on the part of Marmont, were attacked and defeated with great loss, and even experienced some difficulty in regaining the fortresses of Castel Nuovo and Cattaro, from whence they had issued.†

M. d'Oubril came to Paris by Vienna; but, notwithstanding his conferences with the English and Austrian ministers at that capital, he ap-

pears, when he arrived at Paris, to have misunderstood, in an unaccountable manner, his instructions. Talleyrand and the French ministers made such skilful use of the dependence of the negotiations with England, which Lord Yarmouth was at that moment conducting at Paris, and of the threat totally to destroy Austria if hostilities were resumed, that they induced in the Russian ambassador a belief that a separate peace with that power was on the eve of signature, and that nothing but an instant compliance with the demands of the emperor could save Europe from dismemberment, and Russia from all the consequences of a single-handed contest with Napoleon. Under the influence of these fears and misrepresentations, he suddenly signed a treaty as disgraceful to Russia as it was contrary to the good faith which she owed to Great Britain. Not content with surrendering the mouths of the Cattaro, the subject of so much discord, to France, without any other equivalent than an illusory promise that the French troops should evacuate Germany in three months, he stipulated also, in the secret articles, "that if, in the course of events, Ferdinand IV. should cease to possess Sicily, the Emperor of Russia should unite with the Emperor of France in all measures calculated to induce the court of Madrid to cede to the Prince-royal of Naples the Balearic Isles, to be enjoyed by him and his successors with the title of king—the harbours of those islands being shut against the British flag during the continuance of the present war; that the entry to these isles should be closed against Ferdinand himself and his queen; and that the contracting parties should concur in effecting a peace between Prussia and Sweden, without the latter power being deprived of Pomerania." Ragusa also was to be evacuated, and the integrity of the Ottoman dominions guaranteed by both the contracting parties: a provision which forms a striking contrast to the agreement for the partition of that power concurred in within a year afterward at Tilsit. Thus did Napoleon and D'Oubril concur in spoliating the King of Naples of the dominions which were still under his command, without any other indemnity than a nominal throne of trifling islands to his son; give away Sicily, garrisoned by English troops, without consulting either the court of Palermo or the cabinet of London; dispose of the Balearic Islands without the knowledge or consent of the King of Spain; and stipulate the retention of Pomerania by Sweden at the very moment that France held out the acquisition of that duchy as an equivalent which should reconcile Prussia to the loss of Hanover.*

M. d'Oubril seemed to be aware, at the time he signed this extraordinary treaty, that he had exceeded or deviated from his instructions; for no sooner was it concluded, than he set off in person to render an account of it at St. Petersburg, observing, at the same time, "I go to lay the treaty and my head at the feet of my imperial master." In effect, before he reached the Russian capital, intelligence of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine had arrived, which unexpected event greatly strengthened the influence of the party hostile to France. A

D'Oubril concludes a treaty at Paris between France and Russia.

July 20.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 149, 150. Bign., v., 258, 262. Hard., ix., 195, 196.

† Ann. Reg., 1806, 150, 151. Bign., v., 258, 265. Hard., ix., 219, 221

* Mart., Sup., iv., 305, 309. Hard., ix., 119, 120. Bign., v., 325, 329.

Which is disapproved by the cabinet of St. Petersburg.

change of ministry had ensued: Prince Adam Czartorinski, and the chiefs inclined for a separate accommodation, were displaced, and succeeded by the Baron Budberg, and the nobles who supported the English in opposition to the French alliance. The treaty was, in consequence of these events, formally disavowed by the imperial government, as "entirely in opposition to the instructions which D'Oubril had received," though they professed their willingness to resume the negotiations on a basis which had been communicated to the cabinet of the Tuileries. By this disavowal, indeed, the Russian government was saved the dishonour which must forever have attached to it had so disgraceful a treaty been unconditionally ratified; but upon comparing the powers conferred on the ambassador by one ministry, with the refusal to ratify the treaty by its successor, it was difficult to avoid the inference, that the difference in reality arose from a change of policy in the imperial cabinet, not any deviation from instructions on the part of its ambassador; and all reflecting men began to conceive the most serious apprehensions as to the consequences which might ensue to the liberties of Europe from the alliance of two colossal powers, which thus took upon themselves, without any authority, to dispose of inferior thrones, and partition the territories of weaker states.*†

The rapid succession of more important events left no time for the advance of the fresh negotiations thus pointed at by the cabinet of St. Petersburg. All eyes in Europe were turned to the conferences between France and England, which had been long in dependance at Paris; and the turn which it was now taking left little hope that hostilities in every quarter could be brought to a termination.

This celebrated negotiation took its rise from a fortuitous circumstance equally creditable to the government of both powers. An abandoned exile, in a private audience with Mr. Fox in February, had proposed to that minister to assassinate Napoleon. Either penetrating the design of this wretch, who had once been an agent of the police in Paris, or inspired by a generous desire to prevent the perpetration of so atrocious an offence, the English minister, after Feb. 10. having at first dismissed him from his presence, had the assassin apprehended, and sent information to M. Talleyrand of the proposal. This upright proceeding led to a courteous reply

from that minister, in which, after expressing his satisfaction at the new turn which the war had taken, which he regarded as a presage of what he might expect from a cabinet of which he fondly measured the sentiments according to those of Mr. Fox, "one of the men who seem expressly made to feel the really grand and beautiful in all things," he repeated the passage in the exposition of the state of the Empire by the minister of the interior, wherein Napoleon declared that he would always be ready to renew conferences with England on the basis of the treaty of Amiens. Mr. Fox replied that he was inspired with the same sentiments; and thus commenced a negotiation under the most favourable of all auspices, mutual esteem on the part of the powers engaged in it.*

The basis proposed by Mr. Fox was, that the "two parties should assume it as a principle that the peace was to be honourable to themselves and their respective allies." "Our interests," said Talleyrand, "are easily reconciled, from this alone, that they are distinct. You are the masters of the sea. Your maritime forces equal those of all the kings of the earth put together. We are a great Continental power, but other nations have as great armies on foot as ourselves. If, in addition to being omnipotent on the ocean from your own strength, you desire to acquire a preponderance on the Continent by means of alliances, peace is not possible." Talleyrand strongly urged the English minister to lay all the allies on either side out of view, and conclude a separate accommodation; but in this design he was unsuccessful. Mr. Fox insisted, with honourable firmness, that Russia should be made a party to the treaty. "Do you wish us to treat," said he, "conjointly with Russia? We answer yes. Do you wish us to enter into a separate treaty,† independent of that power? No?" Finding the English minister immovable on this point, M. Talleyrand had recourse to equivocation; and it was agreed that the intervention of the Continental powers to the treaty should be obtained.

The next step in the negotiation was to fix the basis on which the interests and Basis of uti-honour of England and France possidetis fixed. themselves were to be adjusted. To ascertain this important point in a manner more satisfactory than could be done by the slow interchange of written communications, M. Talleyrand sent for Lord Yarmouth, one of the English travellers whom Napoleon had detained a prisoner ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and proposed to him the basis on which June 13. France was willing to enter into an accommodation. These were the restitution of Hanover, which, after great difficulty, Napoleon was brought to agree to, and the retention of Sicily by England or its allies; the recognition

* Bign., v., 330, 344. Hard., ix., 221, 222.

† The powers conferred on M. d'Oubril bore, "We authorize, by these presents, M. d'Oubril to enter into negotiations with a view to the establishment of peace, with whoever shall be sufficiently authorized on the part of the French government, and to conclude and sign with them an act or convention on bases proper to consolidate peace between Russia and France, and to prepare it between the other belligerent powers; and we promise on our imperial word to hold good and execute faithfully whatever shall be agreed to and signed by our said plenipotentiary, and to admit to it our imperial ratification in the term that shall be specified." On the other hand, the act of disavowal bore, "The pretended act of pacification concluded by M. d'Oubril has been submitted to a council speedily summoned to that effect, and compared with the instructions which he had received here, and the instructions transmitted to him from Vienna before his departure from that town; and they found that M. d'Oubril in signing that treaty has not only deviated from the instructions he had received, but acted in a manner directly contrary to the sense and spirit of the orders themselves." The penalty inflicted on the ambassador, however, that of mere banishment to his estates, did not look like any very serious deviation from instructions.—See MARTEN'S *Sup.*, iv., 305, 312, and HARD., ix., 222.

* Bign., v., 266, 269. Hard., ix., 184, 187. Parl. Deb., viii., 92, 94.

† Parl. Deb., viii., 103, 108. Bign., v., 267, 274.

‡ "I inquired," said Lord Yarmouth, "whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said, 'Vous l'avez,' he replied, '*nous ne vous la demandons pas*; si vous la possédiez, elle pourroit augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.' Considering this to be very positive, both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it would be improper to make farther questions. We ask nothing of you (*nous ne vous demandons rien*), amounting to an admission of *uti-possidetis*, as applicable to his majesty's conquests. Talleyrand concluded with these words: '*Les sentiments de la France sont entièrement*

of the Emperor of France by England, and of the integrity of the Ottoman dominions by France.* These terms Lord Yarmouth justly considered as equivalent to the establishment of the principle of *uti-possidetis*, and stated them as such in his communication made the same day to Mr. Fox on the subject.

At the time when the proposals were made by which France the French government, no accommodation had been effected with June 13.

Russia; and it was an object of the highest importance to induce Great Britain, on any terms, to accede to the basis of a negotiation. But when the next communication from Talleyrand was made, circumstances had entirely changed. D'Oubril had expressed his willingness to sign a separate peace on behalf of Russia, and Napoleon was resolved to take advantage of this circumstance to exact more favourable conditions than he had at first agreed to from the British government. When pressed, there-

fore, by Lord Yarmouth to adhere to the principle of *uti-possidetis*, and in particular to agree to the King of Naples retaining Sicily, he replied that, though the sentiments of the emperor in favour of peace had undergone no alteration, "yet that *some changes had taken place*, the possibility of which he had hinted at when I last saw him," alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and farther mentioned that the emperor had received reports from his brother, and the general officers under his command, stating that *Naples could not be held without Sicily*, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island; that the restitution of Hanover for the honour of the British crown, the retention of Malta for the honour of the navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the interests of commerce, should be sufficient inducements to the cabinet of St. James's to enter into the negotiation; that, if a confidential communication had been made three months before, the questions both of Holland and Naples might have been arranged in the manner most satisfactory to Great Britain; but that now, when their dominions had been settled on the emperor's brothers, any abandonment of any portion of them would be "considered by the emperor as a retrograde measure, equivalent to an abdication." Lord Yarmouth continued to insist, in terms of Mr. Fox's instructions, for the basis of *uti-possidetis* as the one originally proposed by France, and to which Great Britain was resolved to adhere; that it was on the faith of this basis, more especially as applied to Sicily, that the conferences alone were continued; that any tergiversation or cavil, therefore, on that capital article would be considered as a breach of the principle of the negotiation in its most essential part; that full powers were now communicated to him to conduct the negotiation; but that the possession of Sicily was a *sine qua non*, without which it was useless to continue the conferences.

Talleyrand upon this offered the *Hanse* June 26.

July 1. *Towns* as an equivalent for the King of Naples; and when this was refused, to give Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa as an indemnity to his Sicilian majesty: looking out

thus, according to the usual system of Napoleon,

in every direction for indemnities at the expense of minor neutral states, rather than surrender one foot of his own acquisitions.*

This clear departure, on the side of France, from the basis of the negotiation originally laid down by its own minister, and open avowal of the principle that neutral and weaker powers were to be spoliated in order to reconcile the pretensions of the greater belligerents, augured but ill for its ultimate success, and the notes which were interchanged gradually assumed a more angry character; but the conferences were still continued for a considerable time. Mr. Fox, with the firmness which became a British minister, invariably insisted that Sicily should be retained by the king, and enjoined Lord Yarmouth to demand his passports if this were not acceded to. July 9

The changes in Germany consequent on the Confederation of the Rhine were admitted by Talleyrand, but offered to be concealed if peace with great Britain were concluded. Mr. Fox refused to be any party to the project of despoiling Turkey and Ragusa, independent and neutral states, to provide an equivalent for the abandonment of Sicily; but threw out a hope that, by the cession of part of the Venetian States, with the city of Venice, from the kingdom of Italy to the King of Naples, an accommodation might be listened to. To this, as making the proposed equivalent come from his own allies, Napoleon would by no means consent. Advice was received at Paris that an army of thirty thousand men had been assembled at Bayonne. All the officers in Paris belonging to corps in Germany received orders instantly to join their respective regiments, and the signature of a separate treaty between France and Russia, in which the cession of Sicily in exchange for the Balearic Isles taken from Spain was a principal article, came to the knowledge of the British plenipotentiary.†

The conclusion of the separate peace between Russia and France on the day following these communications, did not, of course, lessen the expectations of the latter power, though it removed all difficulty arising from the condition to which Great Britain had uniformly adhered, of making the cabinet of St. Petersburg a party, either directly or in substance, to the pacification. But the demands of France did not rise in the manner that might have been expected after so great an advantage: she was still willing to allow Great Britain to retain Malta, the Cape, and her acquisitions in India, and to restore Hanover; full powers were given to Lord Yarmouth, which were exchanged with those of General Clarke, and specific retention of Sicily by the King of Naples was no longer insisted for, it being agreed by Great Britain that an adequate equivalent, if provided by lawful means, should be accepted. Napoleon continued to urge the acquisition of the Hanse Towns, either by Prussia as a compensation for Hanover, or by his Sicilian majesty; and held out the menace that, by not acceding to such an arrangement, the invasion of Portugal would be rendered inevitable, for which an army was already assembled at Bayonne. Nay, he even hinted at ulterior views

Continuation of the negotiations, and gradual estrangement of the parties.

July 19.

July 20.

Progress of the negotiation. July 21.

July 30.

changés; l'aigreur qui caractérisait le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus. Et ce que nous désirons le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bon intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande Bretagne."—LORD YARMOUTH'S Communication, No. 12; *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 110.

* Lord Yarmouth's Commun., *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 110.

* Lord Yarmouth's and Mr. Fox's Despatches, June 19, July 1, 5, and 12. *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 110, 115.

† Mr. Fox's and Lord Yarmouth's Despatches, July 9, 18, 19, and 20. *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 113, 125.

in regard to the Spanish Peninsula, which the resistance of England would cause to be developed, as they had been in Holland and Naples. But, regardless of these threats, Mr. Fox firmly insisted for the original basis of *uti possidetis*, as the only one which could be admitted; and as matters appeared as far as ever from an adjustment, Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris with full powers to treat from the British government.*

Under the auspices of Lord Lauderdale the negotiation was protracted two months longer, without leading to any satisfactory result. The English minister continued incessantly to demand for a return to the principle of *uti possidetis* as the foundation of the negotiation; and the French cabinet as uniformly eluded, or refused the demand, and insisted for the evacuation of Sicily by the English troops, and its surrender to Joseph, and the abandonment of all the maritime conquests of the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, by Great Britain. Lord Lauderdale, in consequence, repeatedly demanded his passports, and the negotiation appeared on the point of terminating, when intelligence was received in London of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty signed by M. d'Oubril.

This important event made no alteration in the proposals of Great Britain, farther than an announcement that any treaty now concluded must be with the concurrence of Russia; but it considerably lowered those of France, and Talleyrand announced that France "would make great concessions for the purpose of obtaining peace." These were afterward explained to be the restoration of Hanover to Great Britain, the confirmation of its possession of Malta, the cession of the Cape, Tobago, and Pondicherry to its empire, and the grant of the Balearic Isles, with an annuity from Spain, in lieu of Sicily, as a compensation to the King of Naples. To these terms the English cabinet would by no means accede; and as there was no longer any appearance of an accommodation, Lord Lauderdale demanded and obtained his passports, nine days after Napoleon had set out from Paris to take the command of the army destined to act against Prussia.†

Thus this negotiation, begun under such favourable auspices, both with England and Russia, broke off with both powers on the subject of the possession of Sicily and of the mouths of the Cattaro. Apparently these were very inconsiderable objects to revive so dreadful a contest, and bring the armies of the south and north of Europe to Eylau and Friedland; but, in reality, the secret ends which the hostile powers had in view were more considerable in contending for these distant possessions than might be at first imagined. It was not merely as an appanage of the crown of Naples that Napoleon so obstinately insisted on Sicily for his brother: it was as the greatest island in the Mediterranean, as opening the way to the command of that inland sea, and clearing the route to Egypt and the Indies, that it became a paramount object of desire; it was not an obscure harbour on the coast of the Adriatic which brought the colossal empires of France and

Russia into collision; it was a settlement on the skirts of Turkey, it was the establishment of a French military station within sight of the Crescent, which was the secret matter of ambition to the one party, and jealousy to the other. Thus, while Sicily and Cattaro were the ostensible causes of difference, India and Constantinople were the real objects in the view of the parties; and the negotiation broke off upon those eternal subjects of contention between England, Russia, and France, the empire of the seas and the dominion of Continental Europe.*

The intelligence of the refusal of Alexander to ratify D'Oubril's treaty with France excited an extraordinary transport at Berlin, which was much heightened when, shortly after, it became evident that the negotiations at Paris for an accommodation with Great Britain were not likely to prove successful. The war party became irresistible: a sense of national degradation had reached every heart; the queen was daily to be seen on horseback at the head of her regiment in the streets of Berlin.† The enthusiasm was universal, but in the guards and officers of that distinguished corps it rose to a pitch approaching to phrensy: in proportion to the force with which the bow had long been bent one way, was the violence with which it now rebounded to the other. Wiser heads, however, saw little ground for rational confidence in this uncontrolled ebullition of popular effervescence; and even the heroic Prince Louis let fall some expressions indicating that he hoped for more efficient support in the field than the declaimers of the capital.‡ Lucchesini, who had so long conducted the Prussian diplomacy at the French capital, sent despatches to his government full of acrimonious complaints of the cabinet of the Tuileries, which, either by accident or design, fell into the hands of the French police, and were laid before Napoleon. He instantly demanded the recall of the obnoxious minister, who left Paris early in September, and was succeeded by Knobelsdorf, whose mission was mainly to protract matters, that the cabinet of Berlin might complete its preparations, and, if possible, gain time for the distant succours of Russia to arrive on the Elbe. But as the troops on both sides were hastening to the scene of action, and it was evident of how much importance it was that the strength of Russia should be thrown into the scale before a decisive conflict took place, Napoleon easily penetrated their design, and resolved himself to commence hostilities. His troops for some weeks past had been rapidly defiling from Brannau, the Inn, and the Neckar towards the banks of the Elbe, and a hundred thousand men were approaching the Thuringian Forest. He set out, therefore, from Paris to put himself at their head on the night of the 26th of September, conveyed the guard by post to Mayence, and was already far advanced on his journey to the theatre of war, when the Prussian ultimatum was delivered at Paris by M. Knobelsdorf. Its conditions were, 1st, That the French troops

State of affairs at Berlin.

Aug. 26.

Sept. 3.

September 7. Prussian ultimatum, and preparations for war on both sides.

Sept. 26.

Oct. 1.

* Bign., v., 363, 365.

† Bign., v., 409.

‡ He repeated with emphasis the lines of the poet Gleims, in allusion to the warlike bards of Berlin:

"Sie singen, laut in hohen Chor,
Vom Tod, fürs Vaterland uns vor,
Doch kommt ein einziger Husar,
So lauft die ganze Barden Schaar."

* Lord Yarmouth's and Mr. Fox's Despatches, July 28, August 3, 1806. Parl. Deb., viii., 125, 138.

† Parl. Deb., viii., 173, 203. Bign., v., 343, 359. Lord Lauderdale's Despatch, 26th Sept., 1806.

Real views of the parties in this negotiation.

should forthwith evacuate Germany, commencing their retreat from the day when the King of Prussia might receive the answer of the emperor, and continue it without interruption. 2d, That Wesel should be detached from the French Empire. 3d, That no obstacles should be thrown in the way of the formation of a counter league in the north of Germany. No stronger proof of the infatuation which had seized the cabinet of Berlin can be desired than the fact of their having, in the presence of Napoleon and the grand army, and without any present aid either from Russia, Austria, or England, proposed terms suitable rather to the day after the rout of Rosbach than the eve of the battle of Jena.*

The public mind was violently excited at this period in Germany against the French, not merely by their prolonged stay beyond the Rhine, and the enormous expenses with which it was attended, but by a cruel and illegal murder, committed by orders of Napoleon, on a citizen of one of the free cities of the Empire, who had sold a work hostile to their interests. Palm, a tradesman in Nuremberg, had been instrumental, with many other booksellers, in circulating the celebrated pamphlet by Gentz, already mentioned, in which the principle of resistance to French aggression was strongly inculcated, and another by Arndt, entitled "The Spirit of the Age," of a similar tendency, but in neither of which was any recommendation of assassination or illegal measures held forth. The others were fortunate enough to make their escape; but

Aug. 12. Palm was seized by the French soldiers, dragged before a military commission of French officers, assembled by the emperor's orders at Brannau, and there sentenced to be shot, which inhuman decree was immediately carried into execution, without his being so much as allowed to enter on his defence.†

Aug. 25. Palm was seized by the French soldiers, dragged before a military commission of French officers, assembled by the emperor's orders at Brannau, and there sentenced to be shot, which inhuman decree was immediately carried into execution, without his being so much as allowed to enter on his defence.†

* Jom., ii., 274. Bign., v., 443. Hard., ix., 266.

† The judgment of the military commission convicting Palm and sentencing him to death, bore in its preamble, "Considering that wherever there is an army, the first and most pressing duty of its chief is to watch over its preservation; that the circulation of writings tending to revolt and assassination menaces not only the safety of the army, but that of nations; that nothing is more urgent than to arrest the progress of such doctrines, subversive alike of the law of nations and the respect due to crowned heads; injurious to the people committed to their governments; in a word, subversive of all order and subordination, declares unanimously, That the authors, printers, publishers, and distributors of libels bearing such a character, should be considered as guilty of high treason, and punished with death." Such were the doctrines in which the phrensy of the French Revolution, which began by proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage, the contest which opened by an invitation to the people of all countries to throw off the yoke of crowned heads, terminated! It is hard to say whether the barefaced falsehood, delusive sophistry, or cold-blooded cruelty of this infamous conviction are most conspicuous. The pamphlets which Palm had sold contained no doctrines whatever recommending assassination or any private crime. If they had, they were published not in the dominions of France, or by any person who owed allegiance to its emperor, but in the free city of Nuremberg, in the heart of the German Empire; and they were addressed, not to the subjects of Napoleon, but the Germans, aliens to his authority and enemies of his government. The French armies, contrary to the express terms of the peace of Presburg, were remaining in and devouring the resources of that country, upon the hollow pretext that Russia, a separate power at war with France, had, in the usual course of hostility, conquered a town ceded by Austria to the French Empire. The pamphlets published were nothing but appeals to the Germans to unite against this foreign oppression, and certainly never had men a more justifiable cause of hostility. Even applying Napoleon's principles to himself, what punishment would they fix on the head of him who published proclamations calling on the Venetians, the Irish, and Swiss

This atrocious proceeding, for which there is not a shadow of excuse, either in the nature of the publication charged, or in the law of nations, excited the most profound indignation in Germany: men compared the loud declamations of the Republican partisans in favour of the liberty of the press with that savage violation of it by their military chief; and concluded that the only freedom which they really had at heart was license for their own enormities, and the only system of government which was to be expected from their ascendancy that of military force. A dignified proclamation, issued about the same time by the Senate of Frankfort, after recounting the enormous contributions which they had paid to the Republican armies in 1796, 1799, Aug. 19. 1800, and 1806, concluded with declaring their inability to preserve the independence of their country, which had been transferred to the Elector of Mayence, and recommending submission to the arms of France. Aug. 27. Augereau replied to this proclamation by a stern requisition to have the authors of it delivered up to him in twenty-four hours: the fate of Palm was universally anticipated for the last magistrates of the state, but after they had been arrested, Napoleon, alarmed at the universal horror which that tragic event had excited, deemed it prudent to drop farther proceedings.*

The death of this unfortunate victim did not pass unrevenge, either upon Napoleon or the French people. It fell deep and profoundly on the generous heart of Mr. Fox, whose enthusiastic hopes of the extension of general freedom by the spread of Republican principles were thus cruelly belied by the deeds perpetrated by its leaders in the name of the French people, and contributed, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to produce that firm resolution to adhere to the basis originally laid down by Napoleon for the negotiation which ultimately led to its abandonment. The carnage of Spain, the catastrophe of Moscow, the conquest of France, the rock of St. Helena, are thus directly associated with this deed of blood. The brave and the free thenceforward saw clearly in every part of Europe that no hope for public or private liberty remained but in a determined resistance to the aggressions of France; that slavery and chains followed in the rear of the tricolour flag. Napoleon has frequently said that, if Mr. Fox had lived, peace would have been concluded, and all the subsequent misfortunes of his reign averted; but the truth of history must dispel the illusion, and the English annalist cannot permit the insidious praises of an enemy to deprive one of the brightest ornaments of his country of the honour of having at last been awakened to a sense of the nature of revolutionary ambition, and possessed the magnanimity instantly to act upon the conviction. In the last instructions, dictated a few weeks before his death, to Lord Yarmouth, there is to be found the firmest resolution to insist on the original basis of the negotiation, and never to consent to any other: Earl Spencer, who succeeded him, had merely to follow in the path thus clearly chalked out.† In several of the

to throw off the yoke of their respective governments, and avowed his intention, when he landed in England, to call on the whole subjects of the British Empire to throw off the rule of their sovereign and parliament, establish annual parliaments, and universal suffrage!—See Bign., v., 337, 338.

* Hard., ix., 246, 250. Bign., v., 337, 339.

† "In the instructions," says Mr. Fox, in his last impor-

Mr. Fox's eyes are at last opened to the real nature of the war. speeches which he had made after he had obtained the direction of foreign affairs, is to be found a candid admission that his opinion as to the necessity and justice of the war had undergone a total alteration.* Thus the discord of earlier years was at length by this great man forgotten in the discharge of patriotic duty: the two lights of the age came finally to concur in the same policy; if Mr. Pitt struggled for fifteen years, amid difficulty and disaster, to carry on the war, it was Mr. Fox who bequeathed the flood of glory in which it terminated to his successors; and after having spent the best part of his life in recommending less honourable and enlightened measures of concession to his country, in his last moments "nailed her colours to the mast."†

Last instructions tant official despatch, "given to Lord Lauderdale of Mr. Fox to dale, the repeated tergiversations of France Lord Lauderdale. during the negotiation are detailed. It is from thence alone that any delay has arisen. The offers made through Lord Yarmouth were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conferences after his lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded; in the former, it had been distinctly disclaimed. This produced a delay attributable solely to France: our answer was immediate and distinct; the new demand was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed negotiation in its most essential parts. To obviate the cavil on the want of powers, full powers were sent to you, but with an express injunction not to use them till the French government should return to its former ground with respect to Sicily. M. Talleyrand, upon being informed of this determination, proposed to give the Hanse Towns in lieu of Sicily to the King of Naples. The moment this proposal was received here it was rejected; and the same despatch which conveyed that rejection carried out his majesty's commands, if the demand for Sicily should still be persisted in, to demand his passports and return to England. M. Talleyrand, upon this, made fresh proposals, supported by Russia, as affording the means of preventing the meditated changes in Germany, and stated "that these changes were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place." That despatch was received here on the 12th, and on the 17th, in direct violation of these assurances, the German confederation treaties were both signed and published. Such are the unfounded pretences by which the French government seeks to attribute to delays on our part the results of its own injustice and repeated breach of promise." Such was Mr. Fox's dying view of the negotiation up to the beginning of August; and it surely contains no confirmation of Napoleon's assertion that, if he had lived, peace would have been concluded. Its last stages, down to his death on the 17th of September, were conducted in strict conformity to the instructions he had given to Lord Lauderdale.—See Mr. Fox's *Despatches*, August 3d and 14th, 1806; *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 138, 164.

* In the debate on Mr. Windham's military system, on April 3, 1806, Mr. Fox said, with admirable candour, "Indeed, by the circumstances of Europe, I am ready to confess that I have been weaned from the opinions which I formerly held with respect to the force which might suffice in time of peace: nor do I consider this as an inconsistency, because I see no rational prospect of any peace which would exempt us from the necessity of watchful preparation and powerful establishments. If we cannot obtain a safe and honourable peace, of which it is impossible in the actual state of affairs to be sanguine, and if we are not successful in carrying it on, we must be reduced to that state which I, for one, cannot contemplate without apprehension.—'toto divors orbe Britannæ,' and he left to our own resources and colonial possessions. In such an arduous and difficult struggle, demanding every effort and every exertion, or, indeed, under any system which we may act upon, a large army is indispensable."—*Parl. Deb.*, vi., 715, 716.

† This memorable final coincidence of opinion between Pitt and Fox on the necessity of continuing the war, is not the only instance of a similar approximation equally honourable to both parties. Ten years before, the two champions of the Constitution and of revolution, Mr. Burke and Sir James Mackintosh, the well-known author of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, had in like manner, come to view the origin of the convulsion in the same light. "The enthusiasm," said Mackintosh, in a letter to Burke, "with which I once embraced the instruction conveyed in your writings is now ripened into cold conviction by the experience and conviction of more mature age. For a time, seduced by the love of what I thought liberty, I ventured to oppose, without ever

The health of this illustrious man had for some weeks past been declining, and in the middle of July he was compelled to discontinue his attendance in Parliament, though he was still assiduous in his duties at the Foreign Office. Notwithstanding all the efforts of medical skill, his complaint daily became more alarming. Symptoms of dropsy rapidly succeeded, and yielded only for a brief space to the usual remedies. On the 7th of September he sunk into a profound state of weakness, and on the 13th of the same month breathed his last, having entertained almost to the end of life confident hopes of recovery.*

Thus departed from the scene of his greatness, within a few months after his illustrious rival, Charles Fox. Few men during life have led a more brilliant career, and none were ever the object of more affectionate love and admiration from a numerous and enthusiastic body of friends. Their attachment approached to idolatry. All his failings, and he had many, were forgotten in the generous warmth of his feelings and the enthusiastic temper of his heart. "The simplicity," says Mackintosh, "of his character communicated confidence; the ardour of his eloquence roused enthusiasm; the gentleness of his manners inspired friendship." "I admired," says Gibbon, "the powers of a superior man, as they were blended in his attractive character with the simplicity of a child. No human being was ever more free from any taint of malignity, vanity, or falsehood." Nothing can more strongly mark the deep impression made by this part of Mr. Fox's character than the words of Burke, pronounced six months after all intercourse between them had ceased: "To be sure, he is a man made to be loved."†

A man of pleasure in every sense of the word, dissipated and irregular in private life, having ruined his private fortune at the gaming-table, and often emerging from such haunts of vice to make his greatest appearances in Parliament, he yet never rose without, by the elevation of his sentiments and the energy of his language, exciting the admiration not only of his partisans, but his opponents. The station which he occupied in the British Parliament was not that merely of the leader of a powerful and able party. He was at the head of the friends of freedom in the human race. To his words the ardent and enthusiastic everywhere turned as to those of the gifted spirit intrusted with their cause. To his support the oppressed and destitute universally looked as their last and best refuge in periods of disaster. "When he pleaded," says Chateaubriand, "the cause of humanity, he reigned—he tri-

ceasing to venerate, that writer who had nourished my understanding with the most wholesome principles of political wisdom. I speak to state facts, not to flatter. You are above flattery. I am too proud to flatter even you. Since that time a melancholy experience has undeceived me on many subjects, in which I was then the dupe of my own enthusiasm. I cannot say I even now assent to all your opinions on the present politics of Europe. But I can with truth affirm that I subscribe to your general principles, and am prepared to shed my blood in defence of the laws and constitutions of my country." Burke answered from the bed of death: "You have begun your opposition by obtaining a great victory over yourself; and it shows how much your own sagacity, operating on your own experience, is capable of adding to your own extraordinary talents and to your early erudition. It was the show of virtue, and the semblance of public happiness, which could alone mislead a mind like yours. A better knowledge of their substance alone has put you on the way that leads the most securely and certainly to your end." What words between such men!—See MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i., 87, 88.

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 258. † Mackintosh's *Mem.*, i., 324.

Death of Mr. Fox.

Sept. 13.

umphed. Ever on the side of suffering, his eloquence acquired additional power from his gratuitous exertions in behalf of the unfortunate. He crept even to the coldest heart. A sensible alteration in the tone of the orator discovered the man. In vain the stranger tried to resist the impression made upon him; he turned aside and wept."

Mr. Fox was the greatest debater that the Extraordinary English Parliament ever produced. ry talents in Without the admirable arrangement debate.

and lucid order which enabled Mr. Pitt to trace, through all the details of a complicated question, the ruling principle which he wished to impress upon his audience, he possessed a greater power of turning to his own advantage the incidents of a debate or admissions of an antagonist, and was unrivalled in the power and eloquence of his reply. In the outset of his speech he often laboured under a hesitation of expression, and was ungainly or awkward in manner; but, as he warmed with the subject, his oratory became more rapid, his delivery impassioned, and, before it closed, the enraptured senate often hung in breathless suspense on his words. He was an accomplished classical scholar, and was master of an extraordinary power of turning to the best advantage the information which he possessed, or had gained during the debate; but his habits were too desultory, his indolence too great, his love of pleasure too powerful, to permit him to acquire extensive knowledge.* Respectable as an historian, the fragment on the annals of the Revolution which he composed is justly admired, from the purity of its style and the manliness of its sentiments; but the pen was too cold an instrument to convey the fervid bursts of his eloquence, and the reader will look in vain for the impassioned flow of the Parliamentary orator. It is in the debates of the House of Commons that his real greatness is to be seen; and a vigorous intellect will seldom receive higher gratification than from studying the vehement declamation, the powerful and fervent reasoning by which his great speeches are there distinguished.

But all this notwithstanding, the fame of Mr. Fox is on the decline. With the extinction of the generation which witnessed his parliamentary efforts—with the death of the friends who were captivated by his social qualities, his vast reputation is sensibly diminishing. Time, the mighty agent which separates truth from falsehood—experience, which dispels the most general illusions—suffering, which extinguishes the warmest anticipations when unfounded in human nature, have separated the wheat from the chaff in his principles. In so far as he sought to uphold the principles of general freedom, and defend the cause of the unfortunate and oppressed, in whatever country—in so far as he protected in legislation the freedom of the press, and stopped the infamous traffic in human flesh, his efforts will ever command the respect and sympathy of mankind; but in so far as he sought to advance this cause by advocating the principles of Democratic power—in so far as he supported the wild prospects of the French Revolutionists, and palliated when he could not defend their atrocious excesses—in so far as he did his utmost to transfer to this country the same destructive doctrines,

and, under the name of Reform, sought to give an entrance here to Jacobin fanaticism and infidel zeal—in so far as he counselled peace and recommended concession, when peace would have been the commencement of civil warfare, and concession a crouching to revolutionary ambition, he supported principles calculated to destroy all the objects which he himself had in view, and induce the very tyranny against which the thunders of his eloquence were directed.

The doctrines that all abuses are owing to power being confined to a few hands; that the extension of political influence to the lower classes is the only antidote to the evil; that virtue, wisdom, and intelligence will be brought to bear on public affairs when those classes are intrusted with their direction; and that the growth of Democratic ascendancy is the commencement of social regeneration, are sometimes amiable from the philanthropy of those who support them, and always will be popular from the agreeable flattery they convey to the multitude. They are liable to only one objection, that they are altogether visionary and chimerical, founded on a total misconception of human nature, and invariably lead, when put in practice, to results diametrically the reverse of what were held forth or expected by their supporters. Abuses, by the introduction of a Democratic regime, it is soon found, instead of being diminished, are multiplied tenfold; tyranny, instead of being eradicated, is enormously increased; personal and social security, instead of being established, are kept in perpetual jeopardy; the weight of public opinion, instead of an antidote to evil, becomes its greatest promoter, by being exerted in favour of those by whom its enormities are perpetrated.* It is by the opposing influence of these powers that the blessings of general freedom are secured under a constitutional monarchy: no hope remains of its outliving the spring-flood which drowns the institutions of a state; when these antagonist forces are brought, for any length of time, to draw in the same direction. The liberties of England long survived the firm resistance which Mr. Pitt opposed to Revolutionary principles; but those of France perished at once, and perhaps forever, under the triumph in which Mr. Fox so eloquently exulted on the other side of the Channel. Taught by

Reasons of this change.

* No man more frequently quoted or referred to Adam Smith, but he had never read the Wealth of Nations.

* "In the contests of the Greek commonwealth," says Thucydides, "those who were esteemed the most depraved, and had the least foresight, invariably prevailed; for, being conscious of this weakness, and dreading to be overchecked by those of greater penetration, they went to work hastily with the sword and poniard, and thereby got the better of their antagonists, who were occupied with more refined schemes." "In turbis atque seditiosis," says the Roman annalist, "pessimo cuique plurima vis; pax et quies bonis artibus aluntur." "Enfin je vois," said the French demagogue, when going to the scaffold, "que dans les révolutions l'autorité toujours reste aux plus scélérats." "A Democratic Republic," said the British statesman, "is not the government of the few by the many, but of the many by the few, with this difference, that the few who are thus elevated to power are the most profligate and worthless of the community." "Democracy," says the author of the *Vindicta Gallica*, "is the most monstrous of all governments, because it is impossible at once to act and control; and, consequently, the sovereign power is there left without any restraint whatever. That form of government is the best which places the efficient direction in the hands of the aristocracy, subjecting them in its exercise to the control of the people at large." What a surprising coincidence between the opinions of such men in such distant ages! He is a bold speculator who, on such a subject, differs from the concurring authority of Thucydides, Sallust, Danton, Mr. Pitt, and Sir James Mackintosh.—THUCYDIDES, l. iii., c. 39. SALLUST, *de Bello Cat.* RIOUFFE, 67. *Parl. Hist.*, xxi., 902. MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i., 92.

this great example, posterity will not search the speeches of Mr. Fox for historic truth, or pronounce him gifted with any extraordinary political penetration; on the contrary, it must record with regret, that the light which broke upon Mr. Burke at the outset of the Revolution, and on Mr. Pitt before its principal atrocities began, only shone on his fervent mind when descending to the grave; and award to him, during the greater part of his career, the praise rather of an eloquent debater, a brilliant sophist, than either a profound thinker or a philosophic observer. But recollecting the mixture of weakness in the

nature of all, and the strong tendency of political contention to dim the clearest intellect and warp the strongest judgment, it will, while it condemns a great part of his principles, do justice to his motives and venerate his heart; it will indulge the pleasing hope that a longer life would have weaned him from all, as he honourably admits it had done from many of his earlier delusions; and admire the magnanimous firmness with which, on the bed of death, he atoned for his past errors, by bequeathing, in a moment of extraordinary gloom, the flag of England unlowered to his successors.

CHAPTER XLIII.

CAMPAIGN OF JENA—FALL OF PRUSSIA.

ARGUMENT.

Efforts of Prussia to obtain the Aid of Russia and England, and of Austria.—But the Cabinet of Vienna resolves to remain Neutral.—Instructions to Mr. Adair, at the Austrian Capital, on the Subject.—Spain indicates a hostile Disposition against France.—The lesser German Powers incline to France.—Preparations of Prussia.—Forces on both Sides.—Her want of Foresight, and neglect of Defensive Measures.—Imprudent Conduct of the Prussian Generals.—Proclamation of Napoleon to his Soldiers.—Reply of Prussia.—Reflections on these Proclamations.—Preparatory Movements of the Prussians.—Counter-movement of Napoleon.—The Duke of Brunswick abandons the Offensive.—Commencement of Hostilities, and Defeat of detached Bodies of the Prussians.—Death of Prince Louis.—Discouragement of the Prussians, who are completely turned by the French.—Movements on both Sides preparatory to a general Action.—Result of these Manœuvres.—The Prussian Army is again divided.—The King marches to Auerstadt.—Napoleon's Dispositions for the approaching Action.—Positions of the Army on both Sides.—Battle of Jena.—Defensive Measures of the Prussians.—The Prussians are defeated.—Arrival of Ruchel on the Field, who is also overwhelmed.—Preparatory Movements which led to the Battle of the King's Army.—Battle of Auerstadt.—Desperate Struggle which there ensued.—Additional Forces come up on both Sides.—Dreadful Fight on the Sonnenberg, on the Right.—The Prussian Reserve advances, and is overthrown.—Disastrous Retreat of the Prussians from both Fields of Battle.—Loss on both Sides in these Actions.—Unparalleled Disasters of the Retreat.—Capture of Erfurt with thirteen thousand Men.—The King of Prussia confers the chief Command on Prince Hohenlohe, and retires to Magdebourg.—Measures of Napoleon, to follow up his Victory.—Soul defeats Kalkreuth.—The Duke of Wirtemberg is overthrown by Bernadotte at Halle.—Saxony is overrun by the French.—Investment of Magdebourg, which is abandoned by Hohenlohe, who is pursued, assailed, and made Prisoner.—March and Escape of the Duke of Saxe Weimar.—Disgraceful Surrender of Stettin and Custrin.—Blücher's Corps is pursued to Lubeck, and is there defeated, after a desperate Conflict.—He retires to Rat-Kau, and is there made Prisoner.—Fall of Magdebourg, and of Hameln and Nieubourg on the Weser.—Napoleon detaches Saxony from the Coalition, but refuses to treat with Prussia.—Napoleon visits Potsdam and the Tomb of the Great Frederic.—Berlin, Spandau, and Charlottenberg are occupied by the French.—Affair of Prince Hatzfeld, and his Pardon by Napoleon.—His Proclamation and Addresses to his Soldiers, and unpardonable Severity to the Queen, the Duke of Brunswick, and Elector of Hesse Cassel.—Cruel Expressions regarding both in the Bulletins.—Enormous Contributions levied on Prussia and the North of Germany.—Napoleon's unworthy Expressions on Gentz, and Sir James Mackintosh's Opinion of him.—Military Organization of the Country, from the Rhine to the Vistula, under Napoleon.—Negotiation with Prussia.—Armistice concluded, which the King refuses to ratify.—Advance of Jerome Bonaparte into Silesia, and of the French Troops to the Vistula.—Siege and Surrender of Glogau.—Treaty between France and Saxony.—Berlin Decree against English Commerce.—Occupation of Hamburg.—Immense Results of the Campaign.—General Despondency which it occasioned in Europe.—Talents and Rashness displayed by Napoleon during its Progress.—Reflections on the sudden Fall of Prussia.—Blücher's Opinion on its probable Resurrection.

NOTWITHSTANDING the inconsiderate haste with which Prussia had taken up ^{Efforts of Prussia to obtain the aid of Russia and England.} arms, the cabinet of Berlin made some attempts to induce the other aid of Russia powers of Europe to share with them the dangers of the conflict. With England it was no difficult matter to effect a reconciliation. At the first authentic accounts of the change in the policy of Frederic William, an order in council was issued, raising the blockade of the Prussian harbours. M. Jacobi, the Prussian ^{Sept. 25.} minister in London, returned to that capital immediately after he had left it; and the British ministry had the generosity to resume its amicable relations with the cabinet of Berlin before an explanation had been given on the subject of Hanover. With Sweden an accommodation was also without difficulty ef- ^{Aug. 17.} fected, on the footing of the troops of that power taking possession of Lauenburg, which they did in the name of the King of Great Britain. It was not so easy a matter to convince the cabinet of St. Petersburg of this unlooked-for change in the Prussian councils; and, taught by the long vacillation of its policy, they were for some time unwilling to yield to the general joy which was diffused through the Russian capital on the intelligence that war was resolved on. But no sooner was Alexander informed, by confidential letters brought by General ^{Sept. 18.} Krusemark from the King of Prussia, that he had embarked seriously in the contest, than he instantly wrote, promising an immediate succour of seventy thousand men, and announcing his intention of himself marching at the head of a chosen army to aid in the support of his faithful ally.*

Important as the announcement of the intentions of Russia were, the accession ^{And of Austria.} of Austria would have been of still more value to the common cause, from its closer proximity to the scene of action, and the strong positions which the Bohemian Mountains afforded on the flank of the probable theatre of war. The Prussian ambassador, accordingly, was indefatigable in his endeavours to rouse the cabinet of Vienna to a sense of the vital importance of joining heart, and hand in the approaching conflict for the liberties of Europe. He represented to Count Stadion, then prime minister at Vienna, "that the losses inflicted on Austria by the treaty of Presburg were so immense, that the emperor,

* Hard., ix., 272, 275. Bign., v., 413, 415. Dum., xv., 285, 287.

of necessity, must at some future period look out for the means of repairing them. The loss of the Tyrol is of such irreparable importance to Austria that no doubt can be entertained that she will take advantage of the first opportunity to resume it from Bavaria, by rousing the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that important province to their ancient masters. Napoleon has justly conceived the most serious apprehensions for the faithful observance of that treaty which he himself has been the first to violate. Does he not, in defiance of his engagements, still hold the fortress of Brannau and the line of the Inn six months after he was bound by a solemn treaty to have evacuated Germany with all his forces? The recent establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and dissolution of the Germanic Empire, too clearly demonstrate with what ulterior views the French government is actuated in regard to the countries beyond the Rhine. Honour, necessity, the existence of its people, have forced the King of Prussia to take up arms alone; but a powerful Russian army, and the well-known generosity of England, diminish its perilous chances.* Now, therefore, is the time for Austria and Prussia to lay aside their jealousies springing from the conquest of Silesia, and unite their forces against the common enemy, who is about to make the Confederation of the Rhine an outwork from whence to enslave all the other states of Germanic origin.*

Forcible as these considerations were, and strongly as the cabinet of Vienna felt their justice, there were yet many circumstances which forbade them to yield on this occasion to their inclinations. The conduct of Prussia for the last ten years had been so dubious and vacillating; her hostility to Austria, especially on the division of the indemnities, so evident; her partiality for the French alliance so conspicuous; her changes of policy during the last year so extraordinary, that no reliance could be placed on her maintaining a decided line of conduct for any length of time together, and, least of all, continuing steadfast in that sudden and perilous hostility in which she had now engaged, and the vehemence of which was the worst possible guarantee for its endurance. Who could ensure that she would not desert this alliance as she had done the first coalition against France, or change her policy as suddenly as she had done her recent hostility against England, and leave to Austria, irrevocably embarked, the whole weight and dangers of the contest? The Archduke Charles, on being consulted as to the state of the army, reported that the infantry, which had not yet been rejoined by the prisoners taken during the campaign, was hardly a half of its full complement; the cavalry but recently remounted, and for the most part unskilled in military exercises; the artillery numerous, but the majority of the gunners without any experience. The treasury was empty, great part of the most valuable provinces of the monarchy had been torn away, and those which remained were exhausted by enormous war contributions, wrung from them by the enemy. Influenced by these considerations, the cabinet of Vienna resolved to preserve a strict neutrality, and issue a proclamation to that effect; and however much the historian may lament that determination, from a knowledge of the boundless calamities which an opposite

course might have saved to both monarchies, it is impossible to deny that, situated as Austria was at that time, it was the most prudent resolution which its government could have adopted, and that, if Prussia was left single-handed to maintain the cause of European independence, it was no more than what she was bound to expect from the selfish and temporizing policy which she had so long followed.*†

Hopes were not wanting to the cabinet of Berlin of efficacious aid in another quarter where it was least expected, and of a kind to paralyze a considerable part of the French forces. Spain, bereft of her navy by the battle of Trafalgar, blockaded in her harbours, destitute of commerce, cut off from all intercourse with her colonies, had felt all the burdens of war without any of its glories. The public indignation was hourly accumulating against the Prince of Peace, whose ignoble birth, exorbitant power, and immense wealth, rendered him as much an object of jealousy to the Castilian noblesse as the uniform disasters which had attended his administration made him detested by the people. Still, however, that ruling favourite persevered, against the almost unanimous wishes of the kingdom, in the French alliance, till his pride was offended at the haughty conduct of Napoleon, who excluded the Spanish ambassador from any share in the negotiations for a general peace at Paris, and it was revealed to him that in those conferences he had seriously proposed to take the Balearic Islands from the Spanish crown, and confer them as an indemnity for Sicily, together with a revenue drawn from Spain, on the King of Naples; while the assembling of a powerful army at Bayonne, ostensibly directed against Portugal, sufficiently indicated a design to overawe both states of the Peninsula. The light now suddenly flashed upon the Spanish rulers. They perceived, as Prussia had done during the same negotiation, that the French emperor made use of the powers with whom he was in alliance as mere dependancies, excluding them from any participation in treaties in which they were deeply interested, and disposing of their provinces to others without condescending even to ask their consent to the transfer. No sooner, therefore, did they receive intelligence of the rupture of the conferences between Great Britain and France at Paris; and the resolution of Prussia to take up arms, than they resolved to detach themselves from the French alliance, and join their forces to those of European independence. Despatches from the Prussian envoy at Paris to the Prince of Peace on this subject were

Spain indicates hostile dispositions against France.

* Hard., ix., 279, 281. Bign., v., 416, 419. Lucchesini, ii., 106, 112.

† The instructions of Mr. Adair, the British ambassador at Vienna at that period, were, not to stimulate the Austrian government to hurry into a war, of which the consequences, if unsuccessful, might be fatal to that country, but to offer its government, if they deemed the opportunity favourable for engaging in hostilities, or if the necessities of their situation compelled them to such a course, the whole pecuniary aid which Great Britain was capable of affording. Of the wisdom of this course of proceeding, no one who considers the precarious situation of Austria at that crisis can entertain a doubt; and it affords another proof of the clear insight which Mr. Fox at that period had obtained into the insatiable ambition of Napoleon, and of the magnanimity with which that upright statesman instantly acted upon his conviction. "A man," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "unjustly styled by Napoleon and his adherents the last prop of the pacific dispositions of the cabinet of St. James."—Vide LUCCHESINI, ii., 96, 97, note; and BIGN., v., 417.

* Hard., ix., 277, 281.

secretly intercepted and deciphered by the French government, which from that moment resolved on the overthrow of the Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon at the first convenient opportunity, while the Prince of Peace, deeming concealment of his designs no longer necessary, issued two proclamations, in the middle of October, in which he enjoined the immediate completion of the ranks of the army, and the formation of the national militia, under their constitutional leaders, in all the provinces of the monarchy. Thus was the ambition and reckless disregard of national rights by Napoleon again reviving, on a surer basis, because that of experience and common danger, the great original European coalition against France; and on the eve of the battle of Jena were the first sparkles of that terrible conflagration visible, which afterward burned with such fury in Russia, Germany, and the Spanish Peninsula.*

But although the greater and distant powers, with the exception of Austria, were thus arming in favour of the coalition, the lesser states nearer the scene of action were overawed by the influence and the authority of France. Napoleon was daily receiving accessions of strength from the states which bordered on the Confederation of the Rhine. The Archduke Ferdinand, though brother to the Emperor of Austria, gave the first example of defection by joining his states of Wurtzburg to that alliance; the Elector of Hesse, whom interest as well as family connexions strongly inclined to the cause of Prussia, was nevertheless so overcome by his apprehensions as to persist, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the cabinet of Berlin, in a forced neutrality; the Elector of Cassel, summoned to each of the hostile camps, and sorely perplexed between his inclinations and his apprehensions, put his troops on the war footing of twenty thousand men, and contrived to protract his ultimate decision till the battle of Jena rendered submission to France a matter of necessity. Saxony alone, continuous along its northern frontier with Prussia, and capable, from its strength, of adopting a more generous resolution, openly joined the cabinet of Berlin, but twenty thousand men were all that it brought to the standards of the Great Frederic.†

The whole weight of the contest, therefore, fell on Prussia; for although great and efficacious aid might be expected to be derived in time from Russia, and succours were hoped for from England, both in men and money, yet these auxiliaries were as yet far distant. The Moscovite battalions were still cantoned on the Niemen; those of England had not yet left the Thames; while Napoleon, at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops, was rapidly approaching the Thuringian Forest. Nothing daunted, however, by this formidable prospect, Frederic William gallantly took the field, and directed all the disposable troops of the monarchy towards Saxony and Erfurth. The total military strength of the kingdom was 240,000 men, of whom 120,000 were assembled on the frontier, 12,000 in observation in Westphalia, for the approaching campaign; the remainder being dispersed in garrison depôts, or not yet in a state for active operations. Such was

the general enthusiasm, and so little did they anticipate the terrible reverse which awaited them, that the Prussian guards marched out of Berlin, singing triumphant airs, amid the shouts of the inhabitants, almost in a state of sedition from the tumultuous joy they experienced on at length being about to measure their strength with the enemy.††

The memorable military operations of the year 1813, and the tenacious hold which Napoleon then kept of the fortresses on the Elbe, when assailed by the greatly superior forces of the coalition, have demonstrated that no position in Europe is more susceptible of defence than the course of that river; and that, supported by the ramparts of Magdebourg, Wittenberg, Dresden, and Torgau, an inferior force can there, for a considerable time, prolong its defence against an enemy possessing an overwhelming superiority in the field. Had these fortresses been properly armed and provisioned, and the Prussians been commanded by a general capable of turning to the best advantage the means of defence which they afforded, it is probable that as protracted a contest might have been maintained as Napoleon supported in 1796 on the Adige, or Kray in 1800 around the bastions of Ulm, and time gained for the arrival of the Russians before a decisive blow was struck in the centre of Germany. But not only had no preparations for such a defensive system been made, but the nation, as well as its rulers, were in such a state of exaltation as to despise them. None of these important bulwarks were provisioned; hardly were guns mounted on their ramparts. The interior fortified towns on the Oder and in Silesia were, for the most part, in the most deplorable state. No depôts were formed, no provision for recruiting the army in case of disaster made. They had not even a rallying-point assigned in the event of defeat, though the strong fortresses of Magdebourg, Wittenberg, and Torgau lay immediately in the rear of the theatre of war, and the Elbe spread its ample stream to arrest the victor. Careless of the fu-

Her grievous want of foresight and defensive measures.

* Lucches, ii., 117, 118. Dum., xv., 289. Jom., ii., 275, 276. Hard., ix., 299, 300.

† Napoleon's army was divided into nine corps, and stationed as follows, on the 3d of October, when he arrived at Wurtzburg:

First corps—Bernadotte—at Lichtenfelds.
Second do.—Marmont—Illiria.
Third do.—Davoust—Bamberg.
Fourth do.—Soult—between Amberg and Bamberg.
Fifth do.—Lefebvre, succeeded by Lannes—in front of Schweinfurth.
Sixth do.—Ney—Nuremberg.
Seventh do.—Augereau—Wurtzburg.
Cavalry do.—Murat—between Wurtzburg and Cronach.
Imperial Guard—Bessières and Lefebvre, after Lannes got the 5th corps—Wurtzburg.

The bulk of the army was grouped round Cobourg and Bamberg. The whole bearing on the Prussians, exclusive of Marmont in Illiria, was 150,000 men.

The Prussians, when the campaign opened, were divided into three armies: the right wing, under General Ruchel, of 30,000 men, was stationed on the frontiers of the Hessian territories; the centre, 55,000 strong, commanded by the king in person, with his lieutenant-general, the Duke of Brunswick, under his orders, was behind the Elbe around Magdebourg, with its advanced guard on the Saale; the left wing, composed of 40,000 men, including the Saxons, was commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, with Prince Louis, the king's brother, under him. It assembled in Saxony; its extreme left rested on the Bohemian Mountains, and its advanced posts were pushed as far as Hof and the Kirchberg. A detached corps of 12,000 men, in Westphalia, was under the orders of a general destined for future celebrity—BLÜCHER.—See DUMAS, xv., 290, 514; and JOM., ii., 275, 276; and the *Official Report of the Russian Strength to the Duke of Brunswick*, HARD., ix., 484, App. G.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 221. Lucches, ii., 100, 101. Hard., ix., 285, 286.

† Bign., v., 435, 442. Dum., xv., 287, 288.

ture, chanting songs of victory, and enjoying its triumphant march through the villages, the army bent its steps towards Erfurth; strong in the recollection of the Great Frederic, stronger still in the anticipation of the overthrow of Napoleon, and dreaming rather of the banks of the Rhine or the plains of Champagne, than of the shores of the Vistula or the fields of Poland.*

But if the infatuation of the army was great, greater still was the delusion of its commanders. The Duke of Brunswick, though an able man of the last century, and enjoying a great reputation, was altogether behind the age, and totally ignorant of the perilous chances of a war with the veteran legions and numerous columns of Napoleon. The disasters of the late campaigns were by him ascribed entirely to timidity or want of skill in the Austrians: the true way to combat the French, he constantly maintained, was to assume a vigorous offensive, and paralyze their military enthusiasm by compelling them to defend their own positions. That there was some truth in this opinion, no one acquainted with the character and history of the French army could deny; but, unfortunately, it required for its successful application both a general and an army very different from the Prussian at this period. The former did not possess the energy and rapidity, the latter the strength or experience requisite for so perilous a system. Bold even to rashness in the original conception of the campaign, the Duke of Brunswick was vacillating and irresolute when he came to carry it into execution; and, while his opponent was counting hours and minutes in the march of his indefatigable legions, frequently lost whole days in deliberation or councils of war, and sometimes changed the destination of the forces when their movements were half completed. The troops, indeed, were numerous and perfectly disciplined; the artillery admirable; the cavalry magnificent; the staff skilful and highly educated, but in matters of theory and detail, rather than the practical disposal of large masses in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy. But what the whole army, from the general to the lowest drummer, were alike ignorant of, was the terrible vehemence and rapidity which Napoleon had introduced into modern war, by the union of consummate skill at headquarters with enormous masses and a vast application of physical force: combining thus the talent of Cæsar or Turenne with the fierce tempest of Scythian warfare. Applying, then, to the present the experience of the past age, the usual error of second-rate men, they calculated their measures upon the supposition of a war of manœuvres, when one of annihilation awaited them, and advanced as against the columns of Daun or Laudohn, when they were in presence of Napoleon and a hundred and fifty thousand men.†

As usual in such cases, the contending parties prefaced the war of arms by mutual manifestoes, calculated to rouse the spirit of their respective forces, or vindicate their hostility in the eyes of Europe. That of Napoleon, which bore intrinsic evidence of his composition, was, as usual, admirably calculated to dazzle and stimulate his followers. "Soldiers! the order for your return to France was already issued: you had already ap-

proached it by several marches; triumphal fêtes awaited you; preparations for your reception were already made in the capital: but, while we were surrendering ourselves to a too confiding security, new conspiracies were formed under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war have been heard from Berlin: for two months provocations have daily been offered to us; the same insane spirit which, taking the advantage of our dissensions fourteen years ago, conducted the Prussians into the plains of Champagne, still prevails in their councils. If it is no longer Paris which they propose to raze to its foundation, it is now their standards which they announce their intention of planting in the capitals of our allies; it is Saxony which they wish to compel to renounce, by a shameful transaction, its independence, and range itself by their side; it is your laurels which they wish to tear from your brows: they insist upon our evacuating Germany at the mere sight of their army! The fools! Let them learn that it is a thousand times easier to destroy the great capital than to wither the honours of a great people and its allies. Their projects were then confounded: they found in the plains of Champagne defeat, shame, and death; but the lessons of experience are forgotten, and there are men in whom the feelings of hatred and jealousy are never extinguished. Soldiers! there is not one among you who would return to France by any other path but that of honour. We should never re-enter there but under arches of triumph. What, then! shall we have braved the seasons, the seas, the deserts; vanquished Europe, repeatedly coalesced against us; extended our glory from the east to the west, to return at last to our country like deserters, after having abandoned our allies, and to hear it said that the French Eagle fled at the mere sight of the Prussian standards? But they have already arrived at our advanced posts. Let us then march, since moderation has not been able to awaken them from this astonishing trance: let the Prussian army experience the same fate which it did fourteen years ago: let them learn that if it is easy, by means of the friendship of a great people, to acquire power and dominions, its enmity, though capable of being roused only by an abandonment of every principle of wisdom and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean."*

Less fitted to rouse the military passions and warlike enthusiasm of its subjects than this master-piece of Napoleon, the Prussian manifesto, drawn by Gentz, was yet a model of dignified reason, and concluded with a sentiment as to the ultimate issue of the contest, which subsequent events have rendered prophetic. "All our efforts, and those of our allies, to preserve peace have proved unsuccessful; and if we are not willing to abandon to the despotism of an implacable enemy, and to deliver over to his devouring armies, the whole north of Germany, and perhaps of Europe, a war is inevitable. His majesty has resolved upon it because the honour and security of the state are in danger: he would have deemed himself happy could he have attained the same end by pacific means; but it is with the firmest confidence that he takes the command of the army which is about to combat for its country and national honour, because the cause in which it is engaged is just. His majesty is well aware that for long

* Hard., ix., 297, 300. Lucches., ii., 117, 120.

† Hard., ix., 301, 303. Jom., ii., 279.

* Dum., xiv., 4, 6.

the army desired war; and even when circumstances prevented him from yielding to its wishes, they commanded his respect, because they took their origin in those feelings of honour and patriotism which have ever distinguished the Prussian forces. The nation, in a body, has manifested the warm interest which it takes in this war; and that strong expression of enthusiasm has confirmed his majesty in the opinion that now it is not only unavoidable, but in unison with the wishes of every people. His majesty is convinced that the desire to preserve the national honour unchanged, and the glory which the Great Frederic has shed over our arms, will suffice to excite the army to combat with its accustomed valour, and to support with constancy all its fatigues.

"But this war possesses even a more general interest. We have to deal with an enemy who all around us has beaten the most numerous armies, humbled their most powerful states, annihilated their most venerable constitutions; ravished from several nations their honour, from others their independence. A similar fate awaited the Prussian monarchy: numerous armies menaced your frontiers; they were daily augmenting; it had become your turn to fall into the gulf, to bow beneath a strange yoke; and already his pride and rapacity coveted the spoils of the north of Germany. Thus we combat for our independence, for our hearths, for all that is dear to us; and if God gives victory to the just side, to our arms, to the courage which burns in the heart of every Prussian, we shall be the liberators of oppressed millions. Every warrior who shall fall on the field of battle will have sacrificed his life in the cause of humanity; every one who survives will acquire, besides immortal glory, a just title to the gratitude, the triumph, the tears of joy of a liberated country. Who among us could endure the thoughts of becoming the prey of a stranger? While we combat for our own safety, to avert from us the deepest humiliation to which a nation can be subjected, we are the saviours of all our German brethren; the eyes of all nations are fixed on us as the last bulwark of liberty, security, or social order in Europe.*"

The opposite style of these two eloquent proclamations is very remarkable. Both are addressed to some of the strongest passions of the human breast; both are master-pieces of manly oratory; but the language which they severally employ is strikingly characteristic of the different situations in which their authors respectively stood. Napoleon speaks to his soldiers only of an insult offered to their arms; of glory and triumphs, and victories to be won; Frederic William, equally firm, but less sanguine as to the result, disguises not the dangers and chances of the struggle, but reminds them of the duty they owed to themselves, their country, the cause of the human race. The former invokes the Eagles of France, and calls on the soldiers to follow their glorious career: the latter appeals to the God of battles, and anticipates from his aid a final triumph to the arms of freedom. The battle of Jena and chains of Tilst seemed for long to have announced an abandonment of this cause by the care of Providence: but let these words be borne in mind, and compared with the final issue of the contest.†

* Dum., xvi., 8, 10.

† Napoleon had no gallantry or chivalrous feeling in his

Animated by those heart-stirring addresses, the forces on both sides rapidly approached each other, and their advanced posts were in presence on the 8th of October. Then began the terrible contest of the north with the south of Europe, never destined to be extinguished till the domes of the Kremlin were reddened with flames, and the towers of Notre Dame were shaken by the discharge of the Russian batteries. The first plan discussed at Berlin was for the whole army to debouche in two columns by the two great roads, those of Saalfeld and Adorf, and Gotha and Eisenach, and commence the offensive towards the valley of the Maine, on the east and west of the Thuringian Forest, the intermediate passes of which were to be occupied by a central corps; but this plan was soon abandoned, as exposing the army to a perilous division of force in presence of so powerful and enterprising an enemy. The design ultimately adopted was to advance with the right in front, which was pushed on to Eisenach: next in echelon followed the centre, commanded by the king in person, which, united with the corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, was to advance upon Saalfeld and Jena, while each wing was covered by a detached corps of observation, the right by Blücher, on the confines of Hesse, the left by Tauenzin, on the side of Bayreuth. The object of this movement was to determine the hesitations of the Electors of Hesse and Cassel, and effect the junction of their contingents to the Prussian army, and at the same time pierce the centre of the valley of the Maine, which was the base of the enemy's operations, and cut them off from their communication with France. Both objects were important, and the design well conceived, had the Duke of Brunswick possessed a force adequate to its execution; but it necessarily involved his army in great hazard in presence of a numerous and skilful enemy; and by leaving open to his advance the great roads to Dresden and Leipsic, exposed the Prussians to the very hazard of being themselves turned and cut off from their communications and magazines when endeavouring to inflict that injury upon their opponents.*

Napoleon was not a man to let slip the oppor-

breast. The Prussian minister had, with the ultimatum of the cabinet of Berlin, given a pressing request for an answer to the Prussian headquarters by the 8th of October. "Marshal," said he to Berthier, "they have given us a rendezvous for the 8th: never did a Frenchman refuse such an appeal: we are told that a beautiful queen is to be a spectator of the combat: let us, then, be courteous, and march without resting for Saxony." Francis I. might have used the same language; but what followed in the first bulletin of the campaign, dictated by Napoleon himself? "The emperor was right when he spoke thus: for the Queen of Prussia is with the army, dressed as an Amazon, bearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, writing twenty letters a day to spread the conflagration in all directions. We seem to behold Armida in her madness setting fire to her own palace. After her fellows Prince Louis of Prussia, a young prince full of bravery and courage, hurried on by the spirit of party, who flatters himself he shall find a great renown in the vicissitudes of war. Following the example of these illustrious persons, all the court cries 'to arms!' but when war shall have reached them with all its horrors, all will seek to exculpate themselves from having been instrumental in bringing its thunder to the peaceful plains of the North." Such was the language in which Napoleon spoke of the most beautiful princess in Europe, rousing her subjects to patriotic resistance! How singularly prophetic is the concluding part of the sentence of what he himself experienced just six years afterward in the frozen fields of Russia!—*First Bulletin of 1806. Bull. Nap., ii., 11, 12.*

* Prussian plan of operations. Dum., xvi., 19. Jom., ii., 279, 280.

Counter-movement of Napoleon. opportunity which this hazardous attempt afforded, of not merely defeating, but destroying their army. Confident in the numbers and experience of his troops, which rendered a situation comparatively safe to them which was to the last degree perilous to their opponents, he instantly resolved to retort upon the enemy the measure they were preparing to play off upon him; and by throwing forward his army with the right in front, turn the Prussian left, and cut them off from their magazines on the Elbe, and the heart of the monarchy. On Oct. 8.

On the 8th of October, the French army was concentrated around Bamberg: at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Napoleon put himself in motion, and his columns marched towards Saxony on three great roads: on the right, Soult and Ney, with a Bavarian division, moved from Bayreuth by Hof, on Plauen; in the centre, Murat, with the cavalry, with Bernadotte and Davoust, marched from Bamberg by Cronach, on Saalbourg; on the left, Lannes and Augereau, breaking up from Schweinfurt,* advanced by Cobourg and Graffenhal upon Saalfeld. The effect of these movements was to bring the centre and right of the French directly upon the Prussian magazines and reserves, while they were stretching forward on the left, to interpose between their antagonists and the Rhine.

The Prussians were in the midst of their perilous advance to the French left, when intelligence of this rapid accumulation of forces on their centre and left reached the Duke of Brunswick's headquarters. It was indispensable to renounce forthwith the hazardous enterprise, and orders were instantly despatched to countermand the advance, and direct the concentration of the army in the neighbourhood of Weimar: the principal column, commanded by the king, at Erfurth; Ruchel at Gotha; Hohenlohe at Hochdorf; the reserve, under the Duke of Wirtemberg, at Halle. Thus the Prussians, in presence of the greatest general and most powerful army of modern times, were thrown into a change of position, and a complicated series of cross-movements, with their flank exposed to the enemy—the situation of all others the most perilous in war, and which, not a year before, had proved fatal to the combined army, when attempting a similar movement in front of Austerlitz. To complete their danger, the concentration, from the orders which they received, took place on the centre and right; whereas it was on the left, towards Hof, that it should have been made to resist the rapid march of the invaders upon their magazines and resources.†

But before the junction of the Prussian forces, even in this false direction, could be effected, the formidable legions of Napoleon were already upon them. As might have been expected, when surprised in this manner in the middle of a lateral movement, they were attacked at the same time in different quarters, and in all by greatly superior columns of the enemy. The French masses, dense and strong, marching on the great chaussées, fell perpendicularly upon the flank of their opponents when endeavouring, by cross and often deplora-

ble roads, to reach the points of rendezvous assigned to them. The consequences might easily have been anticipated: they were defeated in every quarter, and lost, in the very outset of the campaign, the moral influence of an advance. On the 9th, Tauenzein, who was at the moment in front of Schleitz with six thousand Prussians and three thousand Saxons, was attacked by Bernadotte, at the head of greatly superior forces, and, after a gallant resistance, dislodged from his position with the loss of several hundred men. The day following, Murat marched on Gera, and on the road fell in with and captured a convoy of five hundred carriages and a pontoon train: an extraordinary proof of the advantage the French had already gained, when, on the third day after hostilities had commenced, they had fallen in with and captured a large part of the baggage of the enemy! Nor was the French left, under Lannes and Augereau, less successful. On the 10th, the former of these generals arrived on the heights of Saalfeld, and animated his troops to the highest degree by reading to them the proclamation of Napoleon on the opening of hostilities; and on the same day, in continuing his advance, fell in with Prince Louis, who commanded the rear-guard of the Prussian right, and had been stationed at Rudolstadt and Blankenberg by Prince Hohenlohe to cover the cross-march of his columns, who were then endeavouring to reach the points of rendezvous assigned them by their commander-in-chief. This gallant prince, in common with his immediate superior, Prince Hohenlohe, had long expressed the opinion, which they had in vain endeavoured to impress upon the Duke of Brunswick, that Napoleon meditated an attack on the Prussian left, and that a concentration of their troops in that direction should have been made some days before.* Unable to prevent the disastrous resolution to assemble on the right, he now set himself with heroic bravery to mitigate its effects. The forces under his command were only eleven battalions and eighteen squadrons of hussars, with eighteen pieces of cannon; and with these he had to withstand the shock of Lannes, with twenty-five thousand men. Notwithstanding this fearful preponderance of force, he resolved to hold firm during the remainder of the day, to gain time for the evacuation of the considerable magazines which were collected close in his rear at Saalfeld. In this gallant but unhappy determination he was confirmed from an opinion that it was only by resuming the old Prussian system of a vigorous offensive, that the spirits of the

* In the great council of war held, on the 5th of October, at Erfurth, when the Duke of Brunswick's project of continuing the march across the Thuringian Forest was discussed, Prince Hohenlohe, Prince Louis, and Colonel Massenbach, his chief of the staff, strongly represented that, by continuing the march in that direction, the army would be exposed to certain ruin; that they would soon arrive at a country where the ground was entirely favourable to the operations of the enemy, and adverse to their own method of fighting; and that, if the French were inclined, as seemed more than probable, to turn either of the wings of the army, nothing could favour his design so much as the plunging the Prussian host by columns in the forest. These sage observations made no sort of impression on the Duke of Brunswick; and all the modification of his plan which these generals could effect, was, that the troops should halt for a day on the 8th of October, and on the following morning throw out strong reconnoitring parties, and receive bread for eight days before engaging in the defiles of Thuringia. It may safely be affirmed that that council, by continuing this fatal advance, determined the result of the campaign.—See DUM., xvi., 25, 26, and *Saalfeld Allgemeine Geschichte* iii., 299.

* Jom., ii., 280, 281. Dum., xvi., 19, 26. Bign., v., 465, 466. Norv., ii., 456, 457.

† Jom., ii., 280. Dum., xvi., 26, 31. Bign., v., 466, 467. Hard., ix., 303.

soldiers, which had been much sunk by the general order to retreat on the preceding day, could be revived. The sensible increase of the enemy all around him on the following day—even the turning of his right flank by Suchet with a powerful body of light troops, which rendered his position no longer tenable, could not induce him to abandon his ground; and when the attack commenced, the Prussians were surrounded on all sides. Notwithstanding this, they made a gallant resistance, and enabled the artillery and chariots to leave Saalfeld in safety. Returning from the town to his gallant comrades, who still made good their ground in its front, Prince Louis found them dropping fast under the murderous fire of the French tirailleurs. Soon their retreat was converted into a rout by the ravages of the hostile artillery; and the prince himself, while combating bravely with the rear-guard, and striving to restore order among the fugitives, was surrounded by the enemy's hussars: "Surrender, colonel," said their chief, not knowing the rank of his opponent, "or you are a dead man." The prince answered only by a blow with his sabre, which wounded without disabling his adversary, who replied with a mortal stroke, which laid the heroic prince dead at his feet.

In this disastrous encounter the Prussians lost twelve hundred prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded, and thirty pieces of cannon; but this was the least part of their misfortunes. The heroic Prince Louis was no more: he had fallen, it is true, while bravely combating on the field of honour, but his body had remained the trophy of the victors, and the continued advance of the enemy too surely indicated that defeat had attended the first serious exploit of the Prussian arms.* Their army was now broken in upon in several points; its concentration interrupted; its magazines in part seized; its line of march intercepted, and the dejected columns, without any fixed rallying-points, were wandering about in every direction, while the terrible French legions, in dense masses, were falling perpendicularly on their flank. These disasters rapidly communicated themselves to the minds of the soldiers. The death of Prince Louis, above all, equally dear to the officers and private men, diffused a universal gloom. So grievous a calamity in the outset of the campaign was taken as the worst augury of its future fortunes; and, as is usual with great bodies in a violent state of excitement, the transition was immediate from the preceding exaltation to an extraordinary degree of depression.†

Meanwhile the movements preparatory to a decisive battle continued, though in a very different spirit, on both sides. In deep dejection, and with infinite difficulty, the Prussians at length concentrated their forces in two great masses under the king in the neighbourhood of Weimar,

and under Hohenlohe near Jena. It was in the highest exultation, on the other hand, and in the full anticipation of victory, that the French made a sweep which brought them completely round the Prussian army. The early triumphs with which the campaign had opened had given Napoleon hopes of rapid and decisive success. He no longer feared that he would be obliged to have recourse to the mattock.* The confusion of the enemy's columns had dissipated the prestige of the Great Frederic. Encouraged by these events, he now hesitated not to follow out the brilliant career which had opened to his arms. A complete conversion, turning on the pivot of the left, took place in the direction of his columns, who wheeled round so as to face the Northern Ocean. Davoust, Bernadotte, and Murat marched upon Naumberg, where on the next day they made themselves masters of considerable magazines. Soult was Oct. 13. advancing on Jena, where Lannes was already established, while Ney and Augereau were at Roda and Kohla, in its immediate neighbourhood. Such was the confusion of the Prussian movements, and the bad understanding which already prevailed between them and the Saxons, that, when the French took up the ground which the allies had just quitted in the environs of Jena, they found the fields and roads covered with arms, cuirasses, and chariots, like the scene of a defeat. The Saxons had pillaged the Prussians, the Prussians the Saxons. Baggage and ammunition wagons had been abandoned by their drivers, and lay scattered in confusion, while some guns even had been spiked to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.†

The result of these different marches was in the highest degree favourable to the imperial arms. By the advance on Naumberg they had cut the enemy off from the line of their retreat to Leipsic, and thrown their left back in such a manner that the French on the banks of the Saale had their back to the Elbe, and faced the Rhine, while the Prussians had their back to the Rhine, and could only hope to regain their country by cutting their way through the enemy. Finding affairs in a situation so much more favourable than he could possibly have anticipated, Napoleon, to gain additional time to complete the encircling of his antagonists, despatched, on the 12th, an officer of his household with proposals Oct. 12. of peace to Frederic William, taking care meantime not to suspend for one instant the march of his columns; but the letter did not reach that monarch till after the battle was over. In the evening of the 12th, the army of Hohenlohe, which, with all the additions it had received from Ruchel, did not exceed forty thousand men, was grouped in dense masses on a ridge of heights to the north on the road from Jena to Weimar, between the Ilm and the Saale. Its advanced posts were on the Landgrafenberg, a steep hill between its position and the town of Jena, from the summit of which the whole lines of the Prussians could be descried, and over which the only road to the attack of their position in front lay. The

* No sooner was the rank of the slain prisoner known than Marshal Lannes, with deserved courtesy, showed it all the honours due to so illustrious a character. He was interred with military honours in the cemetery of the Princes of Cobourg, at Saalfeld; and Berthier wrote on the 12th to the chief of the Prussian staff, announcing that the emperor had ordered it to be restored, if it was desired that he should rest in the tomb of his ancestors: an offer which the disasters immediately ensuing rendered it impossible for the royal family at that time to comply with.—BIGNON, v., 469.

† Lucches, ii., 137, 140. Bign., v., 468, 470. Dum., xvi., 51, 58.

* In setting out for the Prussian campaign, Napoleon expected to experience a more formidable resistance than he had yet met with in Europe. The exploits of the Seven Years' War had filled him with the highest idea of the troops trained in the school of its illustrious hero, and he frequently said to his assembled officers at Mayence, "We shall have earth to move in this war."—See JOMINI, ii., 282.

† Dum., xvi., 58, 64. Jom., ii., 282, 283. Lucches, ii., 140, 141.

army of the King of Prussia, under the immediate command of the Duke of Brunswick, on the other hand, sixty-five thousand strong, was concentrated at the distance of somewhat more than a league in the rear of Hohenlohe, near Weimar. Thus the whole Prussian army, consisting of above a hundred thousand men, of which eighteen thousand were superb cavalry, with three hundred pieces of cannon, were at length concentrated in a field of battle, where their far-famed tactics had a fair theatre for development; and notwithstanding the early disasters of the campaign, an opportunity was afforded them of reinstating affairs at the sword's point. Each army had passed its opponent, and mutually intercepted the other's communications; but there was this extreme difference between the two, that the army of the Duke of Brunswick, cut off from all its magazines, had no resource but in victory, whereas that of Napoleon, though severed from the Rhine, had a clear line of retreat, in case of disaster, to the Maine and the Danube.*

It would have been well for the Prussians had they continued and given battle in this concentrated position; but the intelligence of the advance of Davoust and Murat upon Naumberg, which arrived at headquarters on the night of the 12th, led to a renewed separation, attended in the end with the most frightful disasters. Conceiving that the French emperor had no intention of immediate combat, and being anxious for the safety of that town, where the principal magazines of the army were placed, the Duke of Brunswick came to the ruinous resolution of again dividing his forces; and while Hohenlohe was left in position near Jena, as a rear-guard to cover the retreat of the army, the principal body, with the king at its head, moved at daylight for Sulza, and at night arrived on the heights of AUERSTADT. Thus, at the very moment when Napoleon, with above a hundred thousand men, was making his dispositions for a general battle on the day following, and surmounting the difficulties of the approach to the enemy's position on the heights in his vicinity, the Prussian general dislocated the imposing mass of his soldiers, and, diverging to the left with two thirds of his forces, engaged in a hazardous flank march of ten leagues in presence of his antagonists, leaving a comparatively inconsiderable rear-guard to be crushed by more than double its force in its position in the rear. Such was the dearth of provisions which already prevailed in the allied camp from the capture of their magazines by the enemy, that no regular supply of bread was dealt out to the men after the long and fatiguing march, but great numbers lay down, wearied and superfluous, to sleep on the ground which was to cover their grave on the morrow.†

Meanwhile Napoleon, never suspecting this division of the enemy's force, and supposing they were to follow the principles of the Great Frederic, which were to combat in concentrated masses, and on as confined a field of battle as possible, was endeavouring, with his wonted energy, to overcome the all but insurmountable difficulties of the passage of the Landgrafenberg, by which access was to be afforded to his columns for the at-

tack of the Prussian position. No sooner had the French light troops dislodged the enemy's patrols from these important heights than the emperor repaired to them in person, from whence he distinctly beheld the Prussian army still reposing at leisure on its formidable position on the opposite ridge. Not doubting that he would have to deal with their whole army on the following day, he pressed without intermission the march of his columns, and soon arranged the forces of Lannes, who first arrived with his infantry above by the steep and rugged ascent to its summit, in such formidable masses around its declivities on the other side, that the enemy, who were now sensible of their error in abandoning so important a point, and were making preparations to retake it, were obliged to desist from the attempt. This valuable height, therefore, from which the whole of the Prussian position and all the movements of their troops were distinctly visible, remained in the hands of the French; and its elevation not only gave them that advantage, but entirely concealed from their observation the rapid concentration of troops on the Jena side of the mountain, which would at once have revealed the intentions of a decisive attack on the following day. Still the difficulty of surmounting the ascent was very great, and for artillery and wagons it was as yet totally impassable. Nothing, however, could long withstand the vigour of Napoleon and his followers. He stood on the spot till the most rugged parts of the ascent were widened by blasting the solid rock, or smoothed by pioneers, and when the men were exhausted, revived their spirits by himself working with the tools, and exhibiting his old experience as a gunner, in surmounting the difficulty of dragging the cannon up the pass. Animated by such an example, and the vigorous exertions of the successive multitudes who engaged in the task, the difficulties which the Prussian generals deemed altogether insurmountable were rapidly overcome: before eight in the evening the ascent was passable for cavalry and artillery, and at midnight the whole corps of Lannes, with all its guns and equipage, reposed in crowded array on the ridges and flanks of the mountain; the Imperial Guard, under Lefebvre, bivouacked on its summit; Augereau on its left; Soult and Ney received orders to march all night to the right in order to turn the enemy after the combat was engaged by his left; Murat was in reserve at Jena, while Davoust and Bernadotte were directed, the first to fall back to Naumberg, in order to threaten the enemy's rear, the second to advance to Dornberg and cut off his retreat to the Prussian dominions. The two armies were now so near that their fires were within cannon-shot, and the sentinels touched each other: the lights of the Prussians, dispersed over a space of six leagues, threw a prodigious glow over the whole heavens to the northwest; those of the French, concentrated in a small space, illuminated the heights in the middle of their position. Surrounded by his faithful guards, the emperor, after having despatched his last orders to his marshals, wrapped himself in his cloak, and shared the frigid bivouac of the soldiers on the summit of the Landgrafenberg.*

At four in the morning of the 14th he was already on horseback, and, surrounded by his generals, rode along the front of the line of Suchet and Ga-

Situation of the armies on both sides

* Dum., xvi., 72, 79. Jom., ii., 284, 285. Bign., v., 471, 478. Lucches., ii., 141, 151.

† Lucches., ii., 141, 144. Jom., ii., 284, 285. Bign., v., 472. Dum., xvi., 79, 83.

* Jom., ii., 285, 286. Bign., v., 473, 474. Dum., xvi., 83, 94. Saalf., iii., 301, 305. Camp. de Saxe, i., 260.

zan's divisions, which were first to be engaged, and were already under arms: "Soldiers!" said he, "the Prussian army is turned, as the Austrian was a year ago at Ulm; it no longer combats but to find the means of retreat. The corps which should permit itself to be broken would be dishonoured. Fear not its renowned cavalry; oppose to their charges firm squares and the bayonet." Loud acclamations rent the air at these words, but the morning was still dark: the first streaks of dawn were only beginning to appear, and a thick, cold fog obscured every object around. Burning with impatience, the soldiers awaited the signal of attack, but for two long hours they were kept shivering in their lines. At length at six, when the day, though still misty, was light, and the emperor judged that his marching columns would be so far advanced on their respective routes as to justify the commencement of the action in front, he gave the signal for the attack. Meanwhile, the Prussians, little suspecting the tempest which awaited them, were securely reposing in their position, and, anticipating a day of complete repose on the 14th, had made no provision either for marching or battle. This fatal security had been increased by the opinion generally received at Hohenlohe's headquarters, that the flag of truce who had appeared at their advanced posts on the preceding day and been forwarded with his despatches to the king, bore proposals of peace, and that nothing serious would be attempted till his answer was received. Their position was strong, and admirably chosen: secure from attack on either flank, and approachable in front only by narrow and steep defiles, in which, if the heads of the enemy's columns were vigorously resisted and hindered from deploying, horse, foot, and cannon would be jammed up together, and the disaster of Hohenlinden might have been repaid with interest to the French army. But the departure of the king with two thirds of the army, and the total absence of any preparations for an attack on the part of those who remained, deprived them of this advantage, and relieved Napoleon from a risk in the outset of the campaign, greater, perhaps, than he underwent even during the perilous changes which signalized its later stages.*

Great was the astonishment of the Prussian outposts, when, through the gray mist of the morning, they beheld the French battalions close upon them, and advancing swiftly in the finest order to the attack. They made a gallant resistance, and did their utmost to prevent the French from debouching from the defiles at the mouth of which they were stationed; but being altogether unprepared for the attack, and completely surprised, they were not long able to make good their posts, and fell back, with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, to the main body of the army. The ground thus gained by Suchet was of the utmost importance, for it enabled the heads of the French columns, after emerging from the defiles, to extend themselves to the right and left, and gain room for the successive corps as they came up to deploy. Roused by the first discharge of firearms in front, Prince Hohenlohe rode through the mist from his headquarters in the rear at Cappellendorf towards the front; but, still confident that it would only prove a skirmish, said to General Muffling,

"that his troops should remain quiet in their camp till the fog had risen; and that, if circumstances demanded it, he would move forward the division of Grawert, as he did not wish the Saxons to combat at all that day." Soon, however, messengers arrived in breathless haste from the outposts with urgent demands for assistance, and Grawert was rapidly advanced towards Vierzehn-Heiligen to support Tauenzein, who there with difficulty kept his ground against the impetuous attacks of Suchet. Meanwhile, the whole army of the Prussians, alarmed by the sharp and incessant fire of musketry in their front, stood to their arms, and re-enforcements were sent to the points in advance which were menaced; but in spite of all their exertions the enemy gained ground, the villages of Closwitz and Kospoda, at the foot of the eminence on which the lines of Hohenlohe were posted, were successively carried, and all the low grounds in front of his position were filled with troops. Still the mist was so thick as to be almost impenetrable: the contending bodies could not see each other till they were within a few yards' distance; and under cover of this veil, and in the midst of the confusion arising from an unexpected attack, the movements of the assailants were completed, the defiles passed, and the precious moments, when the heads of his columns might have been driven back into the gorges by a vigorous attack, as those of the Imperialists were at Hohenlinden, forever lost.*

At length, at nine o'clock, the increasing rays of the sun dispersed the fog, and his light shone forth in unclouded brilliancy. Then, and not till then, the Prussians perceived the full magnitude of the danger. On every side they were beset by assailants, no longer struggling through steep and narrow gorges, but deployed, with all their cavalry and artillery, on the open expanse to which they led. Directly in their front, the whole corps of Lannes, having made itself master of the villages at the foot of the Prussian position, was preparing to ascend the slope on which they stood; immediately to its right, Ney, and beyond him Soult, had already cleared the defiles, and were drawn up in line or column on the open ground; while Augereau on the left was pressing forward to turn their flank; and the Imperial Guard, with Murat's cavalry, were stationed in reserve on the slopes of the Landgrafenberg. Above ninety thousand men had outflanked on either side, and were preparing to crush forty thousand, in a strong position, indeed, but totally inadequate to so desperate an encounter. Surprised, but not panic-struck, the Prussians drew up their lines in admirable order in the form of an obtuse triangle, with the apex in front, to avoid the danger of being turned on their flanks, and instructions were despatched to Ruchel, who, with the reserve, twenty thousand strong, was at a short distance on their right, to hasten his march to the scene of action. Before he could arrive, however, the battle had commenced: the preparatory movements were made on either side in the finest style, the French columns advancing, and the Prussians retiring to their chosen ground with all the precision of a field-day. But though they stood their ground bravely, and received the assailants with a close and well-directed fire, the odds were too great to give any

Battle of Jena,
October 14.

Defensive
measures of
the Prussians.

* Lucches, ii., 154, 155. Saalf, iii., 305, 507

* Lucches, ii., 154, 155. Jom., ii., 286, 287. Dum., xvi., 94, 97.

hopes of success. Ney, indeed, whose impetuous courage led him to begin the attack before his columns were properly supported, and who had, by a charge of cuirassiers, carried a battery of thirteen pieces on an eminence which severely galled his soldiers, was for a few minutes in imminent danger: the Prussian cavalry broke the French horse, and enveloped the infantry in such numbers as would inevitably have proved fatal to less experienced troops; but the brave marshal instantly formed his men in squares, threw himself into one of them, and there maintained the combat by a rolling fire on all sides, till Napoleon, who saw his danger, sent several regiments of horse, under Bertrand, who disengaged him from his perilous situation. But on all other points the French obtained early and decisive success. Ney, extricated from his difficulties, with an intrepid step ascended the hill, and, after a sharp conflict, carried the important village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, in the centre of the Prussian position: in vain Hohenlohe formed the flower of his troops to regain the post; in vain these brave men advanced in parade order, and with unshrinking firmness, through a storm of musketry and grape; the troops of Lannes came up to his support, and the French established themselves in such strength in the village as to render all subsequent attempts for its recapture abortive. Emboldened by this success, Ney next attacked the right of the Prussian line towards Isserstaedt, which Augereau with the French left had already carried: a devouring fire ran along the whole right wing, and the French were for some time arrested by the intrepid resistance of their adversaries; but the odds were too great, and, despite of all their efforts, the allies were compelled to give ground in that quarter. But on the left of Vierzehn-Heiligen the Prussians had obtained some advantage: their numerous and magnificent cavalry had made several successful charges on the French infantry when advancing on the open ground beyond its enclosures; several cannon had been taken, and Hohenlohe for a short time flattered himself with the hope of obtaining decisive success.*

Matters were in this state when the approach of Ruchel with his corps, twenty thousand strong, to the field of battle from the right, confirmed the Prussian general in these flattering anticipations; and he despatched a pressing request to him to direct the bulk of his forces to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, already the theatre of such desperate strife.† Thither, accordingly, the brave Prussian directed his steps; but before he could arrive at the decisive point, matters had essentially changed for the worse, and he came up only in time to share and augment the general ruin. The lapse of time had now enabled the French to bring their immense superiority of force to bear upon the enemy at all points: Soult, by a heavy and well-directed fire, had driven the cavalry from the field on their left, while Lannes and Augereau, pressing them at once in front and flank on their right, had forced back their

infantry above half a mile. Emerging from the villages which had been the theatre of such obstinate conflict, the French forces advanced with loud shouts and in irresistible strength towards the Prussians, who, weakened and dispirited, and in some places almost mown down by the terrible fire of their adversaries, were now yielding on all sides, though hitherto their retreat was conducted in the most orderly manner. Napoleon saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and from his station on the heights in the rear, sent orders to Murat with the whole cavalry to advance and complete the victory. This terrible mass was irresistible. Twelve thousand horse, fresh, unwearied, in the finest array, animated by the shouts of triumph which they heard on all sides, bore down with loud cheers on the retreating lines of the Prussians. In an instant the change was visible: in vain their cavalry, so brilliant and effective in the early part of the day, strove to make head against the assailants, and cover the retreat of the infantry and cannon; their horses, wearied by eight hours of fighting or fatigue, were unable to withstand the fresh squadrons and ponderous cuirassiers of Murat, and by their overthrow contributed to the disorder of the foot-soldiers. After a gallant resistance, the lines were broken; horse, foot, and cannon pressed tumultuously together to the rear, closely followed by the bloody sabres of Murat; in the general confusion all order was lost: the infantry and cavalry were blended together, the guns and caissons abandoned to the victors.*

In the midst of this appalling scene, the columns of Ruchel, still in battle array, arrived at Ru- emerged through the cloud of fugitives to stem the torrent.† It was a overwhelmed movement extremely similar to the arrival of Dessaix on the field of Marengo; but he had to meet Napoleon, not Melas. The fresh troops, though advancing in good order, and with an undaunted countenance, were speedily assailed on all sides: an ephemeral advantage gained by their cavalry was speedily, in the disorder of success, turned into disaster; in front they were charged with the bayonet by the French grenadiers, in flank assailed by an endless succession of Murat's dragoons; the villages of Romstedt and Cappellendorf were strewn with their dead, and Ruchel himself, while bravely animating his men, was wounded in the breast by a musket-ball, and carried off the field. After a terrible combat of an hour's duration, this powerful reserve, which in any other circumstances would have changed the fortune of the day, was broken, dispersed, and almost totally annihilated. It was no longer a battle, but a massacre. In frightful disorder, the whole army rushed like an impetuous torrent from the field; but nearly the whole right wing was cut off by the rapidity of Soult's advance, and made prisoners. Almost all the artillery of the allies was taken, and the victors entered Weimar pell-mell with the fugitives, at the distance of six leagues from the field of battle.

* Dum., xvi., 97, 115. Jom., ii., 286, 287. Bign., v., 475, 476. Saalf., iii., 306. Lucches., ii., 156.

† At this crisis, Hohenlohe wrote to Ruchel, "It is highly gratifying to me to hear at this moment that your excellency has arrived to my support. Send all the force you can to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, the chief point of attack. You are a brave man and sincere friend. At this moment we beat the enemy at all points; my cavalry has captured some of his cannon."—DUM., xvi., 114.

* Dum., xvi., 97, 120. Bign., v., 476. Jom., ii., 287. Saalf., iii., 307, 308. Camp. de Saxe, i., 262, 263.

† The rapid change for the worse in the prospects of the Prussians since he first approached the field, may be discerned in the altered tone of the next letter despatched to him by Prince Hohenlohe. "Lose not a moment in advancing with your as yet unbroken troops. Arrange your columns so that through their openings there may pass the broken bands of the battle: be ready to receive the charges of the enemy's cavalry, which in the most furious manner rides on, presses and sabres the fugitives, and has driven into one confused mass the infantry, cavalry, and artillery."—LUCCHESI, ii., 157.

Behind that town, on the road to Auerstadt, Hohenlohe, at six o'clock, collected twenty squadrons, whose firm countenance till nightfall gave some respite to the wearied foot-soldiers, who were now dispersed through the fields in every direction; while Napoleon, according to his usual custom, rode over the bloody theatre of death, distributing prizes to those who had most distinguished themselves, and giving directions for the care and consolation of the wounded.*

While this terrible disaster was befalling the united corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the King of Prussia was combating under very different circumstances, but with little better success, on the plateau of AUERSTADT. Little expecting any engagement on the morrow, this fine army, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick in person, had bivouacked in close array around the village of that name: the queen was only prevailed on by the most pressing entreaties late in the evening to retire with a slender guard to Weimar. Informed of the occupation of Naumberg by a considerable force, the duke directed the division of Schmettau to occupy the heights of Koessen, and present themselves in battle array before the enemy, whom he supposed to be at the utmost a few thousand strong, while under their cover the remainder of the army leisurely continued its march towards the Elbe. These orders were obeyed, but Schmettau's division, contenting themselves with occupying the heights in the neighbourhood, neglected to send forward detachments to seize the defile of Koessen: an omission which was speedily taken

Oct. 14. advantage of by Davoust on the morning of the 14th, who, falling back to Naumberg according to his directions, early seized upon the important pass. At six on that morning, the French marshal had received an order from Napoleon, dated three o'clock A. M., from his bivouac on the Landgrafenberg, in which he announced his intention to attack in a few hours the Prussian army, which he imagined to be concentrated in his front, and ordered Davoust to march without loss of time upon Apolda, in order to fall upon their rear, leaving him the choice of his route, provided he took a part in the action. The despatch added: "If the Prince of Ponte Corvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned to him at Dornberg." Davoust instantly repaired to the headquarters of Bernadotte, who at that moment was in communication with his corps in the neighbourhood of Naumberg, and showed him this order, proposing that they should march together to Apolda; but that officer, relying on the ambiguous expression in the despatch, which indicated that the emperor "hoped he would be in the position assigned to him at Dornberg," did not conceive himself entitled to deviate from his previous instructions, and set out with his whole corps in the direction of that town.†

Left then to his own resources, Marshal Davoust, notwithstanding, set himself to march in the direction which Napoleon had assigned. His forces were considerable, amounting to twenty-six thousand infantry and four thousand horse: a body perfectly adequate to its destined task of falling on the rear of the allied army, when defeated in front by

Napoleon, but little calculated to withstand the shock of fifty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, whom the king was leading in person to the encounter. The Prussians, on their side, were as little prepared for an action, and deeming their flank march sufficiently secured by Schmettau's division on the heights of Koessen, were in open column and straggling, advancing on their march towards the Elbe, when suddenly, at eight o'clock, on the plateau, they were met by the vanguard of Davoust, which had emerged from the long and steep ascent so well known to travellers who visit that memorable field, and were already in battle array on either side of its summit. The thick mist which here, as at Jena, concealed the movements of the opposing armies, prevented the troops seeing each other till they were only a few yards distant; and both parties deeming their adversaries only an inconsiderable detachment, fell back to collect forces to clear their advance—the Prussians to drive the enemy back again down the defile, and secure the flank of the army from insult; the French to clear their front, and pursue their route by the cross-road they were on to Apolda. Speedily re-enforced, both sides returned to the charge. Davoust supported the advanced guard by the whole division of Gudin, with instructions to maintain themselves to the last extremity on the level space at the upper end of the defile, in order to gain time for the remainder of the corps to debouche; while the King of Prussia, impatient at the check given to the march of his army, ordered Blücher, with two thousand five hundred hussars, to ride over the Sonnenberg and clear the plateau of the enemy. Little anticipating the formidable resistance which awaited them, the Prussian cavalry were thrown into disorder by the close and steady fire of the French infantry, which speedily formed themselves into squares. Their cavalry were, indeed, overthrown by the overwhelming mass of the Prussian horse;* but all the efforts of that gallant body, even when guided by the impetuosity of Blücher, were shattered against the compact mass of Gudin's infantry, and the terrible discharges of grape which issued from his artillery.

Surprised at the obstinacy of the resistance, the king, adopting the opinion of Marshal Mœllendorf, who insisted that it was only a detached column which occasioned the delay, and disregarding the advice of the Duke of Brunswick, who strongly counselled a general halt, and the formation of the army in order of battle till the mist cleared away and the enemy's force could be ascertained, continued the attack by means merely of successive divisions as they came up to the ground. The divisions of Wartensleben and the Prince of Orange were ordered to pass the defile of Auerstadt, where the road runs through a winding hollow skirted with copewood or rough slopes, and advance to the support of the discomfited cavalry. The former, who first emerged from the defile, was directed to assail the flank of Gudin's division, which had advanced on the plateau beyond the village of Hassen-Haussen; at this moment the mist was dissipated, and the sun shone in full brilliancy on the splendid squadrons and regular lines of the Prussians. The Duke of Brunswick put himself at the head of the infantry, and led them gallantly to the attack,

* Dum., xvi., 120, 133. Bign., v., 475, 476. Lucches, ii., 157, 158. Hard., ix., 305, 306. Saalf., iii., 307, 308.
† Dum., xvi., 137, 141. Bign., v., 480. Jom., ii., 290.

* Jom., ii., 290, 291. Dum., xvi., 139, 147. Bign., v., 480, 481. Saalf., iii., 306.

while Schmettau and Blücher pressed them with their respective divisions of foot and horse on the other flank. But the brave troops of Gudin, forming themselves into squares, resisted all the charges with unconquerable resolution; and the nature of the ground, which permitted the successive divisions to come up to the support of either side only by degrees, the one by the long and winding defile of Auerstadt, the other up the steep ascent of Koessen, rendered it impossible for the Prussians to bring all their overwhelming force to bear at once upon the enemy. The conflict, therefore, was most severe. The French troops, stationed behind the hedges, enclosures, and garden walls of Hassen-Hausen, kept up an uninterrupted and murderous fire upon the enemy. The Duke of Brunswick was mortally wounded by a ball in the breast while leading on a charge. Schmettau experienced the same fate. Wartensleben had his horse shot under him; and the Prussians, discouraged by the loss of their leaders, wavered in the attack, which, being made in line, and not in column, was not pressed with the requisite vigour. Still the terrible discharge of artillery and firearms continued. Gudin's division had lost nearly half their numbers, and it was evident they could not long maintain their ground against their redoubtable and hourly increasing adversaries.*

From this peril, however, they were at length relieved by the arrival of the other divisions of Davoust's army. Morand was the first who got up the defile: his troops, as they successively arrived on the summit, drew up on the left of Gudin, towards the Sonnenberg; and shortly after, Friant, with his division, debouched upon the right, and extended to the foot of the Spielberg. The combat was now equal, or, rather, the advantage was on the side of the French, for their three divisions were superior in strength to those of Schmettau, the Prince of Orange, and Wartensleben, to which they were opposed. Prince William of Prussia, at the head of a powerful body of cavalry, which had surmounted the Sonnenberg and arrived on the French left, furiously assailed Morand's division immediately after it formed, but those veteran troops, with admirable coolness, threw themselves into squares, and with rapid discharges received the repeated and impetuous attacks of the Prussian horse. In vain those gallant cavaliers, with headlong fury, drove their steeds to the very muzzles of the French muskets. In vain they rode round and enveloped their squares; ceaseless was the rolling fire which issued from those flaming walls; impenetrable the hedge of bayonets which the front rank, kneeling, presented to their advances. The heroic devotion of Prince William in vain led them again and again to the charge; still the fire continued, still the bayonets stood firm. At length he himself was wounded, half his followers stretched on the field, and the remainder sought refuge, in disorder, partly on the heights of the Sonnenberg, partly in the enclosures of Neuzalza.†

While this desperate conflict was going on on the left of Hassen-Hausen, the division of Friant had debouched from the defile, extended itself on the ground to its right, and chased

the enemy who assailed it back to the village and heights of Spielberg, which were speedily carried. The left of the Prussians was thus threatened; but it was not there that the principal danger lay. The progress of Morand on their right was much more alarming. On that side, not content with repulsing the furious attacks directed against them, the French had now assumed the offensive, and were rapidly pressing forward to the heights of Sonnenberg, from whence their guns would command the whole field of battle, and render untenable the position of the Prussian reserves, which had hitherto taken no part in the action. Sensible that the battle was lost without resource if these important heights fell into the hands of the enemy, the king put himself at the head of a chosen body of troops, and bravely led them to the charge. But if the attack was gallant, the defence was not less obstinate: Morand himself was to be seen at the head of his regiments, and for some minutes the balance quivered; but insensibly the French gained ground, and at length their artillery, dragged up to the summit of the heights, was placed in battery, and opened such a tremendous fire of grape upon the enemy's columns as completed their discomfiture in that quarter, and with the bloodstained Sonnenberg and the village of Rehausen, the whole left of the field of battle fell into the hands of the invaders.*

The experienced eye of Marshal Davoust now told him that the moment for striking the decisive blow had arrived. The heights of Eckartsberg commanded the line of the enemy's retreat, as those of Sonnenberg did the field of battle: by moving forward his centre and seizing that important point, their defeat would be rendered complete, and all possibility of their rallying prevented. Thither, accordingly, Gudin's division advanced, driving before them the broken remains of Schmettau's and Wartensleben's divisions, which had lost nearly half their numbers during the sanguinary strife in which they had been engaged. But the Prussians made one effort more to regain the day. Their broken battalions, which had retired from the field, were rallied under cover of the powerful reserve commanded by Kalkeuth, who assumed the direction upon Moellendorf being wounded, consisting of two divisions, which had hitherto taken no part in the action, and placed in front; while the whole cavalry, re-formed under Blücher's orders, was posted in a second line immediately behind the infantry, to take advantage of any hesitation which might appear in the enemy's columns. Wearing by a morning's march and four hours' hard fighting, the French soldiers had now to withstand the shock of fifteen thousand fresh troops, to whom they had no corresponding reserve to oppose. Had the quality of the troops on the opposite side been equal, this powerful addition to the enemy's forces, at such a moment, must have proved decisive; but, nevertheless, they were totally defeated, and this last success put the keystone to the arch of Marshal Davoust's fame. Though strongly posted on an eminence, and protected by the fire of a powerful battery, they were charged with such intrepidity by Gudin's division, supported by a part of Friant's, that they were driven from their position with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon.

* *Jom.*, ii., 292, 293. *Dum.*, xvi., 139, 156. *Bign.*, v., 482. *Saalf.*, iii., 306. Personal observation.

† *Jom.*, ii., 192, 193. *Dum.*, xvi., 156, 161. *Bign.*, v., 483. *Saalf.*, iii., 306.

* *Dum.*, xvi., 161, 164. *Bign.*, v., 483, 484. *Jom.*, ii., 294. *Lucches.*, ii., 146, 147.

At the same time, Morand repulsed an attack against the troops which he had stationed on the heights of Sonnenberg: the artillery, from that commanding position, carried death through all the ranks of the enemy; and at length his gallant troops descended from the eminence, and carrying all before them, drove the reserves opposed to their advance through the defile of Auerstadt. Thither Blücher's cavalry followed the retreating columns: the guards still kept their ranks, and retired in good order in open square, and by their firm countenance enabled the broken infantry to rally at a distance from the field of battle, where Davoust reposed amid his heroic followers.*

The King of Prussia, who, during this disastrous day, had manifested the most signal coolness and intrepidity, and, during the repeated charges which he made at the head of his troops, had lost two horses killed under him, gave directions for the army to retreat in the direction of Weimar, intending to fall back on the corps of Prince Hohenlohe, of whose disaster he was still ignorant. But as the troops were in extreme dejection, and with little order following the great road which leads to that place, they were suddenly startled in the twilight by the sight of an extensive line of bivouac fires on the heights of Apolda. These lights were made by the corps of Bernadotte, who, adhering to his original instructions to march to Dornberg, had arrived in this position, after passing that town, late in the evening, and, ignorant of the combats which had taken place, was preparing to fall on the rear of the Prussian army on the following day. His too strict adherence to the letter of the orders he had received deprived him of the glory of sharing in either battle, endangered Davoust's corps, and had wellnigh cost him his own life, from the indignation of the emperor; but, nevertheless, this sudden apparition of a fresh corps of unknown strength upon the flank of their line of retreat at that untimely hour, compelled the Prussians to change their direction and abandon the great road.† About the same time, obscure rumours began to circulate through the ranks of a disaster experienced on the same day at Jena; and soon the appearance of fugitives from Hohenlohe and Ruchel's corps, flying in the utmost haste across the line which the troops retiring with the king were following, announced but too certainly the magnitude of the defeat sustained in that quarter. A general consternation now seized the men: despair took possession of the firmest hearts, as the cross tide of the battalions

flying from Jena mingled in greater proportions with the wreck which had survived the fight of Auerstadt: the confusion became inextricable, the panic universal—infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and leaving their guns, horses, and ammunition-wagons, fled in mingled disorder across the fields, without either direction, command, or rallying-point. The king himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner during the tumult and horrors of the night; and it was not till five in the morning that, by a long circuit, he arrived at Sommerda, where he received the official news of the melancholy disaster at Jena, accompanied by the letter, offering an accommodation, so insidiously despatched by Napoleon the day before that great victory.‡

Such were the astonishing battles of Jena and Auerstadt, which in a single day Less on both sides in these Prussian monarchy, and did that in a few actions. hours which all the might of Austria, Russia, and France, in the Seven Years' War, had been unable to effect. The subsequent disasters of the campaign were but the completion of this great calamity—the decisive strokes were given on the banks of the Saale. The loss of the Prussians was prodigious: in the two fields there fell nearly twenty thousand killed and wounded, besides nearly as many prisoners; and two hundred pieces of cannon, with twenty-five standards, were taken. Ten thousand of the killed and wounded fell at Auerstadt: an honourable proof that, if infatuation led them into the field, valour inspired them when there. Nor was that victory bloodless to the conquerors: their total loss was fourteen thousand men; of whom seven thousand five hundred belonged to Davoust's corps: a striking indication of the dauntless intrepidity with which they had fought.§ Napo-

* Dum., xvi., 171, 178. Jom., ii., 295, 298. Bign., v., 486, 487. Hard., ix., 307. Lucchesi, ii., 148.

† Napoleon's official account of the battle of Jena, in the fourth bulletin of the campaign, is characterized by that extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and unceasing jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, which in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a meanness in an especial manner reprehensible. Davoust was the real hero of the day, since, with thirty thousand men, he had defeated the King of Prussia in person, at the head of sixty thousand. His own achievement in overthrowing forty thousand, or, including Ruchel, sixty thousand, with ninety thousand veteran troops, including the whole cavalry of Murat, is nothing in comparison. Nevertheless, he represents the action as all fought in one field; speaks of the enemy, eighty thousand strong, as being commanded by the king and the Duke of Brunswick in person, and, after dilating fully on his own achievements, dismisses the wonderful exploits of Davoust in the following words: "On our right, the corps of Marshal Davoust performed prodigies. Not only did he keep in check, but maintained a running fight for three leagues with the bulk of the enemy's troops, who were seeking to debouche on the side of Koessen. That marshal has displayed alike the distinguished bravery and firmness of character which are the first qualities of a warrior. He was seconded by Generals Gudin, Friant, Morand, Daultanne, chief of the staff, and by the rare intrepidity of his brave corps." Who could imagine that it was the glorious battle of Auerstadt which was here narrated? The injustice to Davoust is so manifest, that it is admitted even by the eulogists of Napoleon.—See BIGN., v., 487, 488, and Fourth Bulletin, 1806, in *Camp. de la Saxe*, i., 265.

‡ Dum., xvi., 177. *Camp. de Saxe*, i., 265. Dum., xvi., 180.

§ Davoust's loss at Auerstadt was 270 officers and 7200 privates, killed and wounded. Of these, 134 officers and 3500 privates belonged to Gudin's division of 7000 men: in other words, more than a half of that band of heroes had fallen. This was the bravest action fought by the French troops during the whole contest; but the valour both of the corps and the division was inferior to that displayed by the English in more than one action of the Penin-

* Dum., xvi., 164, 171. Jom., ii., 294. Lucchesi, ii., 146, 148. Bign., v., 485, 486.

† Napoleon's anger at Bernadotte, on account of his not supporting Davoust, and taking a share in the battle of Auerstadt, knew no bounds. "If I should send him to a council of war," said he, "nothing could save him from being shot. I will not speak to him on the subject, but I will let him see what I think of his conduct. He has too much honour not to be aware himself that he has committed a disgraceful action." In truth, however, Napoleon had no sufficient grounds for this ebullition. If Bernadotte did not take a part in the action, it was because his own latest instructions expressed a hope that he should go to Dornberg rather than march towards Auerstadt with Davoust. Had he violated these instructions, and, in consequence, the Prussian army had escaped by Dornberg, its natural and most probable line of retreat, what defence could Bernadotte have offered for his conduct? "I was piqued," said that marshal, "to be addressed in the language of authority by Davoust, but I did my duty. Let the emperor accuse me if he pleases, I will answer him. I am a Gascon, but he is still more so."—BOURRIENNE, vii., 161, 162.

leon, with his usual disregard of truth, called his whole loss in both battles 4000—little more than a fourth part of its real amount.

Great as were these results, however, they unparalleled were but a part of the effects which disasters of ultimately flowed from these memorable battles. The disasters consequent on the retreat of the Prussians exceeded anything hitherto recorded in modern history—equalled only by the still greater calamities which followed the flight from Waterloo. Nothing had been provided for such a contingency: no rallying-point assigned, no line of march prescribed, no magazines collected. The extraordinary circumstance of four generals of the army—the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Moellendorf, General Schmettau, and General Ruchel—being killed or mortally wounded, left the confused mass of fugitives without a head: the unparalleled calamity of the survivors from two different defeats, experienced on the same day, crossing each other, and becoming intermingled during the horrors of a nocturnal retreat, rendered it impossible for them to know whose orders were to be obeyed. Thus, when morning dawned on the scene of ruin, the soldiers from the three armies of Ruchel, Hohenlohe, and the Duke of Brunswick collected, as chance threw them together, in disorderly groups, and inspired only with a common panic, fled in different directions, as accident or intelligence guided their steps. Vast numbers of stragglers wandered at large through the fields, or hurried, with so little knowledge of the country, from the scene of danger, that, instead of avoiding, they fell headlong into the jaws of the enemy. It is in the extraordinary confusion arising from this disastrous retreat, and the terror which seized the minds of both officers and men at finding themselves thus huddled together with soldiers to whom they were perfect strangers, that the true cause of the unparalleled disasters which followed the battle of Jena is to be found.*

The effect of the general consternation which prevailed speedily appeared in the Capture of Erfurth with fate which befell the fragments of the 14,000 men, the mighty army. Six thousand fugitives, almost without leaders, had taken refuge the day after the battle in Erfurth, whose embattled walls and almost inaccessible citadels promised the means of at least a temporary defence. It contained, also, the grand park and reserve artillery stores of the army, with the greatest part of its camp equipage. Thither, also, the Prince of Orange, Marshal Moellendorf, and a great number of the wounded of distinction, besides seven thousand private soldiers, in the same mutilated state, had been conveyed. Such, however, was the terror of the governor at finding himself thus suddenly overwhelmed by a mass of wounded and stragglers, incapable of aiding in the defence, but who would speedily consume its slender stock of provisions, that he thought the best thing he could

do was to negotiate a capitulation, on condition that the officers should retire on their parole into Prussia, and the private men remain prisoners of war. On these terms the place surrendered,* and with it fourteen thousand men, including Marshal Moellendorf and the Prince of Orange; a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and immense military stores, fell into the hands of the enemy.

Hohenlohe, who had retired, covering the retreat of the fugitives beyond Weimar with a considerable body of cavalry in good order, at nightfall on the 14th found himself so completely overwhelmed by the crowd of stragglers, who attached themselves during the night to his squadrons, that by degrees his array melted away; and it was only by making frequent circuits, and repeatedly crossing the fields, that he was enabled to reach Dernstedt at seven on the following morning, at the head of sixty horsemen. On the day following, the king, who had arrived at Sondershausen, accompanied only by his aid-de-camp, conferred the command of all the troops which had combated at Jena and Auerstadt upon Prince Hohenlohe, with the exception of the two divisions under the orders of Kalkreuth, the reserve at the latter battle, which it was thought would still be in some sort of order; but in the general confusion this corps had dispersed like the rest, and there remained only eight battalions around his standard. Magdebourg was assigned as the rallying-point to the army, within the almost impregnable walls of which fortress it was hoped the wreck of its mighty array could be reorganized, and a defensive struggle maintained till the arrival of the Russians from the Vistula, and the re-enforcements which were collecting in the interior of the kingdom. Thither, accordingly, the king repaired, attended only by a few horsemen, to make preparations for the reception of the army; and there he was quitted by the British envoy, Lord Morpeth,† who, seeing no chance of diplomatic concerns being attended to amid the general confusion, returned to London to render an account to his bewildered cabinet of the extraordinary events which he had witnessed in the outset of his mission.

But if there was any one thing more than another in which the genius of Napoleon shone prominent, it was in his vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. The present was not an opportunity to be lost of displaying this essential quality of a great general. Without an instant's delay, therefore, he prepared to pursue the extraordinary advantages he had gained. From all parts of Germany his forces had been assembled to one point, in order to strike the decisive blow. That done, the next object was to disperse them like a fan over the conquered territory, to carry everywhere the impression of their victory, and the terrors of their arms. On the night after the battle, Napoleon, instead of retiring to rest, sat up dictating orders to all the corps of his army for the directions they were to follow in pursuing the enemy. On the extreme right, Bernadotte, whose numerous corps was still untouched, received orders to advance from Apolda to Neustadt, to cut off the

Oct. 16. The King of Prussia gives the command to Hohenlohe, and retires to Magdebourg.

Measures of Napoleon to follow up the victory.

sular war, if the number of killed and wounded, a fair test with armies both of which have been victorious, is taken as the criterion. At Talavera, out of 19,500 English soldiers, 5000 were killed and wounded, nearly the same proportion as fell of the victors at Auerstadt; but at Albuera, out of 7000 English troops, only 1500 were wounded at the close of the fight; and 9999 red-coats fell at Waterloo, out of a force of native English not exceeding 36,000 men.

—See DUMAS, xvi., 177; NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, iii., 541; and WELLINGTON'S *Official Account of the Battle of Waterloo*, Ann. Reg., 1815, App. to Chron.

* Dum., xvi., 178, 182. Bign., vi., 3, 5. Jom., ii., 297. Hard., ix., 307.

* Dum., xvi., 200, 202. Jom., ii., 298. Lucches., ii., 159. † Dum., xvi., 184, 192. Bign., vi., 7, 8. Hard., ix., 307.

line of retreat from Weimar to Naumberg, and so shut out the army from the great road to Magdebourg. Davoust was to return to Naumberg to hold that important post, and keep himself in readiness to debouche on the Elbe before the enemy could arrive there; Soult was to move on Buttelsstadt, the point in rear of the fields of battle, where the greatest number of fugitives had assembled; Murat and Ney were to march direct upon Erfurth,* and reduce that important place; while Lannes and Augereau were directed to take a position in advance of Weimar; and the Imperial Guard and Napoleon's headquarters were transferred to that town.

Soult was the first who came up with the enemy. At Greussen his cavalry reached the retiring squadrons of Kalkeuth's division, which alone preserved any semblance of an army. That general proposed a suspension of arms, in order to gain time, declaring that he knew an armistice had been concluded, and for the purpose of arranging its conditions repaired to the advanced posts in order to a conference with the French general. The terms, as might be expected, could not be agreed on. The statement was made in perfect good faith, under the impression founded on the letter from Napoleon offering an accommodation, written the day before, but not received till the night after the battle; and it gave the Prussian commander leisure to cause a considerable part of his forces to defile in safety to the rear.

Oct. 15. Enraged at finding himself thus overreached, Soult, the moment the conferences were broken off, attacked the Prussian rear-guard posted in front of Greussen, which, after a short resistance, was cut to pieces, and the victors entered that town pellmell with the vanquished. Following up his success, the French marshal, early the following morning, resumed the pursuit, and again came up

Oct. 16. with the enemy at Nordhausen, where they were again defeated, with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon and three thousand men. Unable, from want of provisions, to keep his men together, and having no other means of escape to any part of his forces, the Prussian general divided his troops into two bodies, with instructions to follow different routes to Magdebourg. An almost total dispersion immediately followed this order. The stragglers came into that fortress by companies, squadrons, and groups of single men in hardly any array; and thus was the disorganization of the only divisions of the army which still preserved their ranks rendered complete within three days after the battle. Collecting prisoners at every step, Soult continued

Oct. 21. rapidly to advance, and on the 21st his vanguard reached the Elbe, and planted their victorious standards around the walls of Magdebourg.†

A more important action awaited the arms of Bernadotte. This able chief, whose too literal adherence to the letter of his instructions had deprived him of all the laurels of Auerstadt, was burning with anxiety to achieve some exploit worthy of the deeds of his comrades and his own renown, when fortune threw the wished-for opportunity in his way. The Duke of Wirtemberg, who commanded the Prussian reserve, fourteen thousand strong, stunned by the

intelligence of the disasters of the army at Jena, was making the best of his way back to Magdebourg and the Elbe, when he was beset on all sides at Halle by the corps of Bernadotte. The Prussians, who were brought into action, had not shared in the preceding defeats; notwithstanding the great superiority of force on the part of the French, they made a brave resistance, and there might be seen what elements of success existed in their army had they been opposed by less, or guided by greater ability. Assailed with the utmost impetuosity by the vanguard of the French, under Dupont, at Passendorf, they were driven in haste back to the islands in the Saale, over which the road passes; but in that defile they stood firm, and, supported by a cloud of light troops who lined the dikes on either hand along the margin of the stream, long withstood their assailants and debarred all access to the gates. After an obstinate resistance, however, a column of grenadiers, headed by Dupont himself, rushed across the bridges, carried the guns which enfiladed them, and rapidly pursuing their success, pushed on and made themselves masters of the town. The Prussians had now no alternative to gain time for the retreat of their main body to Magdebourg but to prevent, as long as possible, the French troops from debouching from the gates on its opposite side, and the gallant efforts of the Duke of Wirtemberg long delayed them at that important point; but at length the increasing numbers of the French, and the murderous fire of the artillery which they brought up and planted on the ramparts, drove the Prussians from their strongholds in the gardens and walls of the suburbs, and enabled the columns to issue from the gates. Charged while retreating in open square along the level plain, the Prussians, during a running fight of four leagues, sustained severe loss from the enemy, and lost nearly their whole artillery; but they combated with heroic resolution, and still kept their ranks, when the pursuit ceased on the approach of night. Then the combat terminated on the right bank of the river, but on the left bank a greater disaster awaited the allied arms. Three thousand Prussians had broken up from their quarters near Magdebourg, in order to join the main body of the reserve at Halle, and, ignorant of the occupation of that town by the French, fell into the midst of such superior forces that they were almost all either killed or made prisoners. Honourable as this affair was to the Prussians, it augmented in an alarming degree the dangers of the army by dissipating its last regular corps: four thousand prisoners and thirty pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors, whose loss did not exceed twelve hundred men; while the broken remains

Oct. 19. of the vanquished crossed the Elbe in such haste that they were unable completely to burn the bridge behind them, which was speedily restored by the French, who established themselves in force on the right bank, and drew their posts round Magdebourg.*

Meanwhile the other corps of the army continued their triumphant progress, with Saxony is hardly any opposition, through Saxony. Four days after the battle of the French. Auerstadt Marshal Davoust took possession of Leipsic: strange coincidence, that the French army should for the first time enter that

* See the orders in Dum., xvi., 192, 193.

† Dum., xvi., 191, 200. Jom., ii., 299. Norv., ii., 465, 466. Lucches., ii., 161.

* Jom., ii., 300, 301. Dum., xvi., 214, 223. Saalf., iii., 307, 308.

city on the very day on which, seven years afterward, they were there to experience so terrible an overthrow!* Napoleon gave testimony of the rigorous warfare which he was about to commence on English commerce, by there issuing an edict of extraordinary severity against British merchandise.† Rapidly following up his success, Davoust, two days afterward, reached Wittenberg, at the very time that the retiring Prussians were preparing to blow up its great bridge over the Elbe; the French grenadiers rushed so rapidly over the arches that the enemy had not time to set fire to the train, and thus that important passage was secured. On the same

Oct. 19. day Lannes made himself master of the passage at Dessau. Thither Napoleon followed with his guards three days afterward; Oct. 23. and regarding the capture of Berlin as certain and a secondary object, he already began to give directions for the march of his troops from the Elbe to the Oder. Davoust's corps was pushed on towards that capital, Napoleon having permitted, as a reward for his transcendent heroism at Auerstadt, that his corps should be the first to enter the capital of the fallen monarch.‡

Such was the rapidity of the French advance that they arrived around Magdebourg before a large portion of the broken Prussians had taken refuge within its walls. Napoleon saw clearly the importance of accumulating as large a number as possible of the enemy in a situation where he foresaw they would, ere long, become his prisoners, and therefore he gave orders to leave the entrance to the place open, and dispersed his cavalry in all directions to drive the stragglers into that devoted fortress.|| Murat's horsemen inundated the plain; and the garrison of the town, ill provided with subsistence, already began to feel the pangs of hunger from the multitude of useless soldiers

who were driven to its shelter. Summoned to surrender by Marshal Soult, the governor replied that he hoped to gain the esteem of the besiegers by an honourable defence; but the confusion of the garrison, and the evident discouragement of the multitudes of insulated men who thronged around the gates, rendered it more than probable that his means of defence could not be prolonged for a very long period. Hohenlohe, despairing of preventing the investment of the place with so disorganized a wreck as was collected within its walls, and aware that the want of provisions would, in the end, compel its surrender, resolved to depart with all the forces which still maintained the appearance of order, and make for the great line of fortresses on the Oder; but such was the universal confusion which prevailed, that he could only collect fifty battalions and a hundred and sixty squadrons in a state to keep the field. With those he departed on the day following, leaving fifty skeleton battalions, hardly amounting to twelve thousand combatants, within the walls.*

Upon leaving Magdebourg, Hohenlohe, abandoning Berlin to its fate, made for Stettin, situated near the mouth of the Oder, by the route of Spandau. But when he drew near to that place, he received intelligence that on that very day it had capitulated to the first summons of the advanced posts of the cavalry under Murat, and that Davoust on the same day was to make his entrance into the capital. Driven thus to a circuit to avoid the taken towns, he moved by Grandsee to Zeydenick, in order to reach, if possible, before the enemy, the defile of Lochnitz, near Stettin, which would have secured his retreat to that important fortress. Aware of the importance of anticipating the Prussian general in these movements, Napoleon sent Murat forward with the cavalry to get before him to the defile, while Lannes advanced as rapidly as possible in pursuit of his steps with his indefatigable infantry. By forced marches, Murat got the start even of the horsemen who formed the advanced guard of Hohenlohe's corps; and, on leaving Zeydenick, they were assailed by that active officer himself, at the head

Who is pursued, assailed, and made prisoner at Prentzlow, Oct. 25.

* On Oct. 18, 1813.

† "Your city," said Napoleon, "is known throughout Europe as the principal depot of English merchandise, and on that account the enemy most dangerous to France. The emperor and king commands, 1. In the four-and-twenty hours immediately following this notification, every banker, merchant, or manufacturer having in his possession any funds the produce of English manufactures, whether they belong to a British subject or the foreign consignee, shall declare their amount in a register appointed for that special purpose. 2. As soon as these returns are authentically received, domiciliary visits shall be made to all, whether they have declared or not, to compare the registers with the stock in hand, to ascertain its correctness, and punish by military execution any attempt at fraud or concealment." Well may the honest General Mathieu Dumas exclaim, "What a deplorable abuse of victory!"—DUMAS, xvi., 225.

‡ Bign., vi., 8, 9. Jom., ii., 302. Dum., xvi., 223, 227. Luchess., ii., 162.

§ Bernadotte was unavoidably detained a day longer than he was ordered in marching to the Elbe, and, in consequence, did not cross that river till the 23d and 24th, instead of the 21st and 22d, before which time the corps of the Duke of Wittenberg had defiled through Magdebourg, and was in full march for the Oder. This escape of a considerable part of the best-organized corps of the Prussians excited to the highest degree the indignation of Napoleon, who took occasion bitterly to reproach him with this delay, as well as his conduct in not marching with Davoust to Auerstadt. Already were to be seen the germs of that mutual discontent which seven years afterward, on those very plains, brought Bernadotte in arms against the French emperor on the field of Leipsic.—BIGNON, vi., 9; DUMAS, xvi., 230.

|| "Magdebourg," said Napoleon, "is a net where all the isolated men who have wandered about since the battle may be taken. We must, therefore, invert our manoeuvres, and beat all the country for fifteen leagues around; we shall thus collect numbers of prisoners, and also gain accounts of the direction taken by the strong columns of the enemy, of whose route we have as yet no certain intelligence."—DUMAS, xvi., 232.

Oct. 26. of Lasalles' dragoons. Confounded at being thus anticipated in a quarter where they expected a leisurely retreat, the Prussian horse made but a feeble resistance: even the famous regiment of the Queen's Dragoons was driven back after a gallant effort, surrounded, and almost cut to pieces; and the Prussian cavalry were compelled to fall back on their infantry, with the loss of 300 slain, and renounce all hope of pursuing the direct road to Stettin. Driven thus from his line of retreat, and his right flank being exposed to the attack of Marshal Lannes, Hohenlohe, after waiting three hours in the vain hope of being joined by Blücher, who had retreated to the same quarter, changed his direction, and moved upon Boitzenberg, where he arrived on Oct. 27. the 27th, hoping to reach Stettin by the circuitous route of Prentzlow; but, in attempting to do so, the unhappy prince found himself again beset by his indefatigable pursuers. No sooner was Murat informed of his change of direction, than he marched across the country all night, from the one road to the other, again got before him, and assailed the Prussian horse at once in front and flank with his terrible dragoons on the

* Bign., vi., 10, 11. Dum., 223, 237. Jom., ii., 304, 308.

Oct. 28. following morning, as they were continuing their march two leagues beyond Prentzlow. To troops wearied by incessant marching for a fortnight together, and discouraged by such a succession of disasters, the shock of his victorious squadrons was irresistible: the Prussian cavalry were speedily broken, and fell back in disorder to the suburbs of Prentzlow, already encumbered with infantry and artillery. To complete their misfortunes, Marshal Lannes appeared at this critical moment on their right flank, having, with indefatigable perseverance, marched all night from Templin on the direct road. Murat now summoned Hohenlohe to surrender, which the latter refused, and brought up a powerful battery of cannon to answer the fire of the French artillery, which was severely galling his troops as they attempted to debouche from the town. This battery was immediately attacked and carried; a regiment of infantry and cavalry which advanced to support it broken and made prisoners. Prince Augustus of Prussia, at the head of his regiment, which was still two leagues in the rear of Prentzlow, was surrounded, and, after heroically resisting the repeated charges of the French cuirassiers, during a march in hollow square of four miles, was at length made prisoner, with almost all his men, while bravely resisting to the last. Overwhelmed by such a multitude of calamities, and seeing no chance of escape, while every hour increased the forces against him by permitting the formidable battalions of Lannes to arrive on his rear and flank, Prince Hohenlohe, after several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a capitulation, was Oct. 28. obliged to lay down his arms, on condition that the officers should be dismissed on their parole. With him were taken fourteen thousand men, including the flower of the Prussian army: the guards, six chosen regiments of cavalry, forty standards, and fifty pieces of field-artillery. Notwithstanding their many defeats and disastrous circumstances, this grievous surrender did not take place without the most profound grief by the Prussian troops: the officers retired from the circle where it had been agreed to in stern silence, or shedding tears; many of them fiercely and indignantly accused their commanders of treachery, and invited their comrades to cut their way through the enemy, sword in hand; the private soldiers, by loud sobs and lamentations, gave vent to their grief, and, flinging their muskets on the ground, slowly and mournfully pursued their way into the town; while a loud flourish of trumpets, the quick rattle of drums, and the triumphant shouts of the soldiers, announced the successive arrival of the French regiments at the scene of their triumph.*

Of the army, late so splendid and numerous, there remained only in the field the corps of the Duke of Weimar and Duke of Saxe General Blücher. The former of these, which formed the advanced guard of the host which advanced to the Saale, and had been pushed on through the Thuringian Forest to Vërra, in the view of threatening the rear of the French army, had become entirely detached, by subsequent events, from the principal body, and thus escaped the catastrophes of both defeats. Almost forgotten in the rapid succession of succeeding triumphs, the duke was left to his own direction, and no sooner received

accounts of the ruin of the main army, than he took steps for making the best of his way back to the Elbe. He had much difficulty in steering his way through the numerous corps of enemies which traversed the intervening country in every direction; but by great exertions he contrived to escape, and rallying to his standard a considerable detachment of Ruchel's corps, which had been separated from the remainder, reached the Elbe in safety at Stendal, with fourteen thousand men, by Seesen, Schladen, and Lutter. He was there superseded in the command by the King of Prussia, and his corps passed Oct. 26. into the hands of General Winning, who gave them a day's rest at Kigritz. As the approach of the French corps rendered those quarters dangerous, he broke up and retired towards the Oder, and by good fortune, and no small share of skill, he succeeded in reaching the banks of that river in safety in the first week of October, where he joined Blücher with the cavalry which had escaped from Auerstadt. Their united forces now amounted to twenty-four thousand men.*

Meanwhile the fortresses on the Oder fell in the most disgraceful manner. The Disgraceful day after the capitulation of Hohenlohe, a brigade which had escaped Stettin and Custrin. from the wreck of his corps presented itself at the gates of Stettin; the governor sternly refused them admittance, upon the pretence that his provisions were only adequate to the support of his own garrison. Next day, Oct. 28.

however, he capitulated, on the first summons, to the advanced guard of Marshal Lannes; and the French, without firing a shot, became masters of a fortress of the first order, armed with a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, and garrisoned by six thousand men. The brigade of Prussians, shut out from its walls, was soon after surrounded at Anclam and made Oct. 29. prisoners. Encouraged by these repeated successes, the French soldiers deemed nothing beyond the reach of their arms; and the advanced guard of Davoust's corps, which had traversed the district between the Elbe and the Oder without meeting with any enemies, presented itself before Custrin, and threatened the garrison with a severe bombardment if they did not instantly capitulate. This menacing outpost consisted merely of a regiment of foot, and had only two pieces of artillery at its command. On the other hand, the governor of the town had ninety pieces of cannon mounted on the ramparts, and four hundred in the arsenal; four thousand brave men for a garrison, and every requisite for a prolonged defence. Nevertheless, such was the terror produced by Napoleon's arms, and such the skill with which the French officer, General Gauthier, concealed the real amount and description of his force, that the Prussians capitulated almost on the first summons; and one of Oct. 31.

the strongest places in the kingdom, amply garrisoned, situated in an island of the Oder, and invested only on one side, had the disgrace of surrendering to a regiment of foot with only two pieces of cannon. The besiegers could not approach it to take possession till the garrison furnished them with boats! These disgraceful capitulations, at which the brave troops involved in them were so much exasperated that it was with difficulty they could be induced to yield obedience to their officers in carrying them into execution, demonstrated that the Prussian

* Dum., xvi., 275, 299. Jom., ii., 308, 312. Bign., vi., 19, 21. Saalf., iii., 309, 310. Hard., ix., 313.

* Dum., xvi., 269, 272, 303, 306. Bign., vi., 23.

generals were so overwhelmed by the magnitude of their misfortunes, that they deemed the monarchy irrevocably ruined, and that *saave qui peut* had become the only remaining principle of their conduct. Astonished at his good fortune in effecting the reduction of such a fortress without firing a shot, Marshal Davoust inspected the fortifications on the day following, which he found in the best condition, and, deeming his base on the Oder now sufficiently secured, pushed on his light troops to Posen, in Prussian Poland; while six thousand Bavarians formed the investment of Glogau, the only remaining stronghold on its banks which was still in the hands of the enemy, and Angereau established himself at Frankfort, the well-known emporium of Eastern Prussia.*

The only corps of the Prussian army which had hitherto escaped destruction was that formed by the union of Blücher's cavalry with the Duke of Saxe Weimar's infantry, and commanded by the former of these generals.† Though its resistance, however, was more honourable, its ultimate fate was not less calamitous. No sooner was he informed of the junction of these two corps in the north of Prussia, than Napoleon ordered their pursuit by forces so considerable that escape became impossible. Bernadotte was instructed to follow closely on its footsteps; while Murat was despatched by a circuit to cut it off on the right from Stralsund and Rostock, under the cannon of which it might have found shelter; and Soult threw himself on the left, to bar the communication with the Lower Elbe. Oct. 28. Blücher arrived at Boitzenberg the day after the ill-fated Hohenlohe had left that town; and, having there learned the catastrophe which had befallen that brilliant portion of the army, he

renounced all hope of retiring before the enemy, and retraced his steps, in order to unite with General Winning and the Duke of Saxe Weimar's corps, which took place at Kratz-emberg on the day following; and, finding himself now at the head of eighteen thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, he resolved to move to the right, recross the Elbe, raise the siege of Magdebourg, and, supported by that fortress and Hameln, maintain himself as long as possible in the rear of the emperor's army. The project was boldly conceived and intrepidly executed; but the three corps now directed against him, numbering nearly sixty thousand combatants, rendered its execution impossible. A sharp conflict took place with his rearguard at Nossentin, in which five hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the French; but the next day the junction of Bernadotte with Soult rendered it necessary for the gallant Prussian to be more circumspect. An opportunity, however, soon occurred of taking his revenge. Next day the French hussars were charged and put to the route by the Prussian light dragoons, at the entrance of a defile. Colonel Gerard and three hundred horsemen were made prisoners; but the cavalry having fallen back on the support of their infantry, headed by Bernadotte in person, the Prussians were in their turn repulsed with severe loss. Finding the enemy's forces so considerable that all chance of making good his way to the Lower Elbe was out of the question, Blücher resolved to fall back by Gadebush on Lubeck, where he hoped to find resources to recruit his wearied troops, and whose decayed bastions he flattered himself he would soon be able to put in a respectable state of defence. Before arriving at that city, he was summoned by Bernadotte to surrender, and informed that he was beset by forces triple his own. "I will never capitulate," was the brief and characteristic reply of the Prussian general; and, continuing his march, he entered Lubeck on the evening of the 5th, closely followed by his indefatigable pursuers.*†

Unfortunately for Lubeck, it was still surrounded by a ruined wall and deep ditches filled with water; and this gave Blücher an excuse for representing it as a military post, and dis- regarding all the remonstrances of the magistrates, who loudly protested against this violation of their neutrality. Hastily planting the few heavy cannon which he still retained to defend the principal gates, Blücher caused the greater part of his forces to defile through the town, and take post on the low marshy ground on the opposite side, on the confines of the Danish territory. At daybreak on the following morning the French columns were at the gates, and every preparation made for an instant assault. In spite of a heavy fire of grape and musketry from the old walls, the French advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the assault.

* Dum., xvi., 308, 321. Bign., vi., 23, 24. Jom., ii., 317. Saalf., iii., 311, 312.

† In the course of the pursuit, a convoy of twelve hundred Swedes fell into the hands of Bernadotte, who treated them with unusual courtesy and kindness. From the gratitude of the Swedes for this treatment arose the interchange of good deeds which terminated in his elevation to the throne of Gustavus Adolphus. At that period events, in appearance the most trivial, were big with the fate of nations.—See SAALFELD, iii., 313, and BIGNON, vi., 24.

* Hard., ix., 320.

† See Bigu., vi., 7, and Norv., ii., 466.

† Ante, ii., 68.

§ Rapp, 57, 58, 59. Bigu., iv., 406. Ante, ii., 363, 364.

The corps of Bernadotte advanced against the Burg-Thor, or gate which looked to the north; that of Soult approached the Huxter-Thor and Mahlen-Thor, or gates of Hanover. After sustaining a terrible discharge from the bastions, which were armed with the Prussian field-pieces, the French advanced guard, under Generals Merle and Frere, succeeded in breaking through with their hatchets the exterior palisades of the Burg-Thor, and rapidly following the Prussian regiments which held that outwork, entered the gate pell-mell with the fugitives, and made themselves masters of the adjoining bastions. At the same moment Soult's divisions threatened the gates opposed to their attack; but so murderous was the fire which the Prussians kept up from the walls which flanked their approaches, that the assailants were unable to make any progress till Bernadotte's divisions, having penetrated into the town, threatened to take the defenders in rear. Even then, however, the brave Prussians, at this gate, to the number of two thousand, faced both ways, and, besieged in their turn, sustained the double attack within and without. Posted on the roofs of houses, and on the summits of the ramparts, they kept up an incessant fire till their cartridges were exhausted, when they were all either killed or made prisoners. So rapid was the advance of the French through the Burg-Thor that Blücher, who had retired to his lodgings, after having made his dispositions, to dictate orders, had barely time to mount his horse with his son and a single aid-de-camp and ride off; all the rest of his staff were made prisoners. Having joined the remaining troops in the town, that brave general, with his gallant followers, prolonged the defence. He himself repeatedly charged down the König-Strasse at the head of a body of cavalry, but was unable to clear it of the French soldiers, who had now broken into the houses near the gate, and from thence kept up a fire of such severity upon the street as rendered it impossible for the dragoons to advance to its farther extremity. Presently the besiegers brought up their field-pieces, the guns on the ramparts were turned upon the town, and repeated discharges of grape from both sides swept the pavement, and occasioned a terrific slaughter. With invincible resolution, however, the Prussians maintained the combat. From street to street, from church to church, from house to house, the conflict continued. Blood flowed on all sides. The incessant rattle of the musketry was almost drowned in some quarters by the cries of the wounded and the shrieks of the inhabitants, who in that day of wo underwent all the horrors consequent on a town carried by assault. By degrees, however, the superior numbers of the French, who were soon re-enforced by part of Murat's corps, prevailed over the heroic resolution of the Prussians. With difficulty Blücher succeeded, towards evening, in collecting five thousand men, with whom he forced his way through by the gate of Holstein, and rejoined his cavalry, which lay at Schwertau, on the opposite side of the town, near the Danish frontier;* while the remainder of his corps in the town, consisting of eight thousand men, were slain before nightfall in that terrific fight, or fell into the hands of the enemy.†

The situation of Blücher, with his cavalry and this slender body of infantry, was ^{He retires to Ratkau, and is there made prisoner.} now altogether desperate. He was driven up to Ratkau, in the extremity of Germany, on the very edge of the Danish territory, where a powerful body of troops was collected to prevent his entrance. In the night he received intelligence that Travemünde, a fortified town on the sea-coast, to which he proposed to have retired, had been taken by Murat with a battalion which he had sent forward to garrison that important post, where he hoped to have embarked; and, to complete his misfortunes, information arrived in the morning that the salt marshes between Schwertau and that town were not passable by the army. At the same time a flag of truce arrived from Murat, while his numerous squadrons had already driven the Prussian infantry out of Schwertau, and were closing in, in all directions, on his last position. Overcome by stern necessity, the hardy veteran, with tears in his eyes, agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which all his troops laid down their arms.* On this occasion were taken ten battalions and fifty-three squadrons, amounting to four thousand foot-soldiers, and three thousand seven hundred cavalry, with forty pieces of cannon, the remainder of his fine train of artillery having been left on the ramparts of Lubeck.

To complete the disasters of the Prussian monarchy, nothing was wanting but the surrender of Magdebourg, and that important bulwark was not long of falling into the hands of Marshal Ney. Although its garrison was in great part composed of fugitives of all regiments, who had made their escape into that asylum from the disasters of Jena and Auerstadt, yet such was the strength of its works, and the ample store of provisions and magazines of all sorts which existed within its walls, that a prolonged defence might confidently have been anticipated. Nevertheless, if its fall was not quite so disgraceful as that of Stettin and Custrin, it was such as to affix a lasting stigma on the Prussian arms. After fifteen days of a blockade, Marshal Ney commenced operations in form; but before having recourse to the tedious method of regular approaches, he resolved to try the effect of a bombardment. Furnaces for this purpose were heated to throw four-and-twenty pound shot, red hot, into every part of the town, while a copious shower of bombs was ready to bring terror and conflagration upon the inhabitants. It was not necessary, however, to proceed to these extremities. The citizens of Magdebourg preserved a vivid traditional recollection of the horrors which their forefathers underwent after the memorable storm by Count Tilly in 1631, when the whole town was reduced to ashes. No sooner, therefore, did the first flaming projectiles begin to descend upon

these fortresses fell by assault. It is the duty of the historian to condemn equally such outrages, by whomever committed; and certainly in this work no veil shall be thrown over these atrocities when they come to be recounted. But it would be well if they would reserve a little of their humane indignation for the sufferers under their own soldiery on similar catastrophes. On this occasion, though they pass it lightly over, the cruelties and devastation committed by Bernadotte's and Soult's corps for two days after the town was taken, notwithstanding all the efforts of those marshals, were equal to the very worst deeds that ever stained the British arms.—See the frightful details, drawn with a graphic hand, in *Lettre de Villers à la Comtesse Fanny Beauharnais*, Amst., 1808.

* Dum., xvi., 322, 333. Jom., ii., 317, 318. Bign., vi., 24, 25. Saalf., iii., 313. Hard., ix., 322.

† The French writers make it a just reproach to the English army, that its soldiers committed such disgraceful excesses at St. Sebastian, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, when

* Dum., xvi., 333, 339. Jom., ii., 317, 319. Hard., ix., 321, 322. Saalf., iii., 313.

their houses, than they besieged General Kleist, the governor, with entreaties for a capitulation. That officer, deeming the Prussian monarchy destroyed, and seeing no use in singly prolonging a contest now become hopeless, agreed to a capitulation on the same terms as Stettin, in virtue of which this important frontier town, the bulwark of the monarchy, with its redoubtable ramparts still untouched, and not even an outwork lost, containing sixteen thousand troops in arms, and four thousand in hospital, six hundred pieces of cannon, eight hundred thousand pounds of powder, a pontoon train complete, and immense magazines of all sorts, fell into the hands of the enemy, who hardly mustered a greater force without its walls.*

After these stunning calamities, it was not to be expected that the fortresses on and Nieubourg the Weser, which were now left far in the rear of the storm of war, should long continue to hold out. A host of fugitives from Jena and Auerstadt had taken refuge in those strongholds, particularly Hameln and Nieubourg, into the former of which General Lecoq, who had been separated in the confusion of the disastrous night which followed those battles, had thrown himself, with four thousand men, who still preserved a military array. There he speedily found himself blockaded by the forces of the King of Holland, who had advanced by Wurtzbourg and Paderborn to the banks of the Weser. The disastrous state of the monarchy gave him too plausible a ground for assailing the fidelity of the besieged. "You are insulated," said he, "without hope of succour. Abandoned, and more than a hundred leagues in the rear of the victorious invaders, what can your efforts do to avert the fall of the Prussian monarchy?" These arguments, supported by the official intelligence of the fall of Magdebourg and the surrender of almost all the fragments of the army, produced the desired impression, and it was speedily agreed that the fortress should be evacuated, the private soldiers made prisoners, and the officers return on their parole to Prussia.

Nov. 20. A mutiny broke out among the soldiers upon learning the terms of this disgraceful capitulation, but it was speedily suppressed by Savary's dragoons, the men disarmed, and the fortress, in admirable condition, delivered over, with five thousand prisoners, to the French.

Nov. 25. Nieubourg speedily followed the same example, and, with its untouched fortifications and garrison of three thousand men, capitulated to the victors, and with it all the elements of resistance expired between the Elbe and the Weser.†

While the arms of Napoleon, guided by his penetrating eye, were reaping in this astonishing series of successes the fruits of the victories of Jena and Auerstadt, the emperor himself, occupied alike with military and diplomatic objects, was preparing the means of farther triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of the power which fortune and genius had thus combined to place at his disposal. His first care was to detach Saxony from the coalition; and after the defeat of its army in those disastrous days, and occupation of its territory by the conquerors, this was easily accomplished. The Saxons have an hereditary jealousy of the Prussians, by whom

they have a presentiment they are one day to be swallowed up. Necessity, not inclination, had brought them into the field with their ambitious neighbours, and they gladly availed themselves of the first opportunity to range their forces on the side to which their secret inclinations had long pointed, and which seemed to be recommended alike by prudence and necessity. Early in the campaign, Napoleon had addressed them, in a proclamation, in which he called on them to assert their national independence, and throw off that withering alliance with Prussia from which nothing but ultimate ruin was to be anticipated.* This address had already produced a great impression on the Saxon troops, when the victory of Jena seemed to dissolve at once the bonds which held the two nations together. Improving on these dispositions, Napoleon assembled the Saxon officers, three hundred in number, who had been made prisoners at Weimar, and strongly represented to them the impolicy of any longer uniting their arms to those of their natural enemies the Prussians, and offered, upon their subscribing the oath tendered to them of fidelity to its fortunes, to admit them into the Confederation of the Rhine. Gladly the officers, for themselves and the troops under their command, subscribed the conditions, and immediately they were all, with the private soldiers, six thousand in number, sent back to Dresden. The elector shortly after recalled the remainder of his forces from the Prussian standard: he accepted first neutrality, then an alliance with the conqueror, and before the war in Poland was concluded, his troops were to be seen actively engaged under the French eagles. Such was the origin of that intimate union which, down to the close of the war, subsisted between Napoleon and the Saxon government, and which, though in the end fraught with numberless calamities to that electorate, must ever command respect, from the fidelity with which its engagements were adhered to under adverse fortune.†

It was shortly after having detached Saxony from the Prussian and united it to his own alliance, that Napoleon received treat with an answer from the King of Prussia. Refuses to Prussia. to the elusory proposals of accommodation made by him before the battle of Jena, and which that unhappy monarch eagerly caught at after that disaster as the only light that seemed to break upon his sinking fortunes. The times, however, were not the same: there was no longer any need of dissembling; the Prussian army was routed,

* "Saxons! the Prussians have invaded your territory. I have come to deliver you. They have violently dissolved the bond which united your troops, and incorporated them with their own ranks. You must, forsooth, shed your blood, not merely for interests foreign, but adverse to those of your country! Saxons! your fate is now in your own hands. Will you float in uncertainty between those who impose and those who seek to liberate you from the yoke? My success will secure the independence of your country and your prince. The triumph of the Prussians would rivet on you eternal chains. To-morrow they will demand Lusatia; to-day after, the right bank of the Elbe. But what do I say? Have they not already done so! Have they not long endeavoured to force your sovereign to recognise a feudal supremacy which would soon sweep you from the rank of independent nations? Your independence, your Constitution, your liberty, would exist only in recollection, and the spirit of your ancestors, of the brave Saxons, would feel indignant at seeing you reduced, without resistance, by your rivals to a slavery long prepared by their councils, and your country reduced to the rank of a Prussian province." None could descant more fluently than Napoleon on the withering effect to inconsiderable states of an alliance with a greater power, for none put it in force so invariably towards his own tributary states.—DUMAS, xvi., 205.

† Dum., xvi., 204, 207. Bign., vi., 3, 4.

* Dum., xvi., 433, 437. Jom., ii., 319. Bign., vi., 26. Saalf., iii., 313. † Dum., xvi., 347, 351. Bign., vi., 27.

and he was not the man to let slip the opportunity of completing its destruction. He therefore coldly replied that it was premature to speak of peace when the campaign could hardly be said to have commenced, and that, having resolved to try the fate of arms, the king must abide by its issue.*

Following the march of his victorious armies, Napoleon continued his progress, by its Potsdam Weimar, Naumberg, Wittenberg, and the tomb and Potsdam, towards Berlin. On of Frederic. the march he passed the field of October 25. Rosbach, the well-known theatre of the Prussian victory over the French, and ordered the column erected in commemoration of that triumph, which had been thrown down by the soldiers of the army, to be preserved, and transported as a trophy to Paris. At Potsdam he visited, with eager haste, the palace of Sans Souci and the tomb of the Great Frederic. Everything in the apartments of the illustrious monarch remained as when he breathed his last: the book which he read shortly before his death remained on the table; the furniture was untouched; the writing materials still there: their simplicity surprised the conqueror, who was accustomed to the magnificence of St. Cloud. By a singular coincidence, but one of the many with which the history of Napoleon is full, he visited the sepulchre on the anniversary of the

Oct. 25. day on which Alexander, just a year before, on the same spot, had sworn fidelity to Frederic William. Such had been the confusion of the Prussian fight, that on the tomb there still remained the cordon of the black eagle, the scarf and sword of the hero, which he had worn in the Seven Years' War, as well as the standards of his guard. With generous emotion Napoleon approached the awful monument; but even at that solemn moment unworthy feelings gained the ascendancy. He himself seized the venerable relics, and sent them with indecent haste off to Paris. "I will make them a present," said he, "to the Hôtel des Invalides; the old veterans of the Hanoverian war will receive with religious respect all that once belonged to one of the greatest captains of whom history has made mention." Such an act could not injure the dead; his glory was enshrined in imperishable lustre in the page of history; but it lowered the living, and sullied the triumph of Jena by an unbecoming act of rapacity. Little did Napoleon at that moment anticipate the advent of times so soon approaching, when the Prussians, now so humbled, were to have the mastery of his proudest trophies, and naught was to remain but veneration for the remains of the dead to protect his own ashes in a foreign and far-distant land from the rude hand of the spoiler!†

* Dum., xvi., 236, 239. Jom., ii., 301.

† Bign., vi., 11, 12. Jom., ii., 302, 303. Dum., xvi., 249, 250.

‡ How much more honourable as well as magnanimous was the conduct of the Russian officer who, instead of destroying the monument erected at Cologne to commemorate the battle of Austerlitz, simply engraved below the inscription the words, "Seen and approved by the Russian governor of Cologne, May 8th, 1814." It is for the interest of all nations to preserve the trophies of their enemy's victory and the remains of the dead from insult, for it is impossible to foresee how soon they may themselves suffer from an opposite system. Nor is such forbearance without its reward. It obliterates the disgrace of defeat in the magnanimity of subsequent victory. The Pillar of Austerlitz, in the Place Vendôme, is now a monument not less to German generosity than French valour. It would be well for the memory of Napoleon if more instances of moderation in victory and regard for the vanquished were mingled with his military triumphs.

This interesting episode did not interrupt for a moment the military movements of the corps immediately around the person of the emperor. The same weakness and infatuation appeared there as elsewhere to have seized the Prussian authorities. On the same

day Marshal Davoust, agreeably to the promise of Napoleon, headed the splendid vanguard which, with all the pomp of war, entered Berlin. No words can describe the mingled feelings of rage, astonishment, and despair which animated the inhabitants at this heart-rending spectacle, occurring in less than a fortnight after hostilities had commenced. With speechless grief they gazed on the proud array which defiled through their gates, and drank deep, in the agony of that dreadful moment, of the punishment for the political sins of their government during the last ten years. On the same day the strong Oct. 26. fortress of Spandau, with its impregnable citadel and a garrison of twelve hundred men, surrendered, without firing a shot, to Marshal Lannes,* and Napoleon, after inspecting that stronghold on the day following, made Oct. 27. his triumphal entry into the capital. He had not the same delicacy towards the feelings of its inhabitants which he had previously evinced towards those of Vienna: the palace of Charlottenberg would have answered his purpose of a residence as well as that of Schoenbrunn had done; but he was anxious to lacerate the feelings of the Prussians as much as he had been to spare those of the Austrians, and punish ten years of subservience and ten days of warfare more than he had done the inveterate hostility of twelve years. Surrounded, therefore, by all the splendour of the Empire, in the midst of a brilliant staff, and preceded by his dragoon guards, he made his triumphal entry under the arch erected to the honour of the Great Frederic, and surrounded by an innumerable crowd, in whom passion, admiration, and wonder were mingled in some cases with joy,† he proceeded through the streets, and alighted at the gates of the old palace.

Prince Hatzfeld, one of the leaders of the war party, in the total absence of any Affair of Prince authority flowing from the king, had Hatzfeld, and been besought by the principal inhabitants to take an interim direction of affairs, and assume the command of the burgher guard. In doing so he had issued a proclamation, in which he said, "Nothing remains for us now but to assume a pacific attitude: our cares should not extend beyond what is within our own walls; that constitutes our sole interest, and as it is of the highest importance, we should bestow our exclusive attention upon it." This prince, as the chief of the pacific authorities, presented himself at the head of the magistrates before Napoleon at Potsdam, and

* Napoleon spoke thus of this fortress: "The citadel of Spandau, situated on the Spree, fully victualled for two months, is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of open trenches. But such was the general confusion that the batteries were not even armed."—19th Bulletin. It is evident that treachery, or selfishness equivalent to treachery, occasioned the sudden fall of so many of the Prussian fortresses at this period; and Bignon tells us that he became convinced of that when, on being sent by the emperor to superintend the capitulation of Spandau, he found the governor, Benckendorf, occupied with no other consideration but disputes with the French commander as to some wretched culinary articles which he alleged the capitulation authorized him to remove!—Bignon, vi., 13.

† Dum., xvi., 250, 252. Bign., vi., 13. Hard., ix., 313.

Berlin, Spandau, and Charlottenberg occupied by the French. October 25.

was well received. He again waited on him when he arrived at the palace; but the conqueror received him with a severe air, and averting his head, said, "Do not present yourself before me; I have no need of your services; retire to your estates." Shortly after the astonished nobleman withdrew he was ordered to be arrested by orders of Napoleon, who had commanded him to be seized and executed before six o'clock that evening. In fact, he had transmitted to Prince Hohenlohe a letter, containing military details in regard to what he had seen at Potsdam when waiting on Napoleon, which had been intercepted by Davoust and brought to the emperor. The imperious commands of the conqueror left his subordinate authorities no alternative but submission; although Berthier, shocked at the deed of violence which was in contemplation, did his utmost to avert the storm, and even refused to write out the warrant, which Rapp was called in to do. He could not, however, prevent Napoleon from ordering another murder as atrocious as that of the Duke d'Enghien, and the death-warrant was signed, and ordered to be sent by Rapp to Davoust for immediate execution. That brave and generous man, at his own imminent hazard, took upon himself to delay its transmission; and in the mean time the Princess of Hatzfeld, having arrived in the antechamber of the palace, was informed of the danger of her husband, and sunk in a swoon on the floor. Rapp advised her, after she recovered, to endeavour to throw herself in Napoleon's way at the hotel of Prince Ferdinand, where he was going in a short time; she did so, and fell at his feet in the extremity of despair. Her grief and beauty touched Napoleon, who, though subject to violent fits of passion, was not insensible to generous emotions. Rapp warmly seconded the return to feelings of humanity, and orders were despatched to Davoust to suspend the execution till farther directions. Meanwhile the princess was enjoined to repair to the palace, whither Napoleon soon after returned. He ordered her to be brought into the room which he occupied. "Your husband," said he, with a benign air, "has brought himself into a distressing situation; according to our laws he has incurred the penalty of death. General Rapp, give me the letter: take it, read it, madam. Is it your husband's writing?" She did so, trembling. "I cannot deny his subscription," she replied, almost fainting with emotion. Napoleon then took it from her, tore it, and threw it into the fire. "I have no longer any proof; your husband is pardoned." He then desired Rapp to bring him back immediately from Davoust's headquarters: that officer ventured to admit that he had not even sent him there; the emperor manifested no displeasure,* but, on the contrary, seemed gratified at the delay which had taken place in the execution of the order.†

* Rapp, 109, 110. Bign., vi., 14. Hard., ix., 315.

† It is always pleasing to record a generous action, and doubly so when it occurs in an enemy; but justice compels the admission that, by delaying the transmission of this order, Rapp conferred a greater favour on Napoleon than on the intended victim of his passion, for the one he saved only from death, the other from the guilt of murder. Rapp informs us that the Prince of Hatzfeld had come to Potsdam on the 25th, and it was for the account transmitted to Hohenlohe on that day of what he there saw that he was about to be condemned. The 25th was the day on which Davoust entered Berlin. The information objected to was collected, and the letter written, therefore, before the prince had come under the military government of the French emperor. There is no law against a private citizen, or a civic authori-

Shortly after his arrival at Berlin, Napoleon paid a visit of condolence to Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great King of Prussia, and father of Prince Louis who fell at Saalfeld, and manifested the most delicate attentions to the widow of Prince Henry, as well as the Princess Electoral of Hesse Cassel. At the same time, he addressed an animated proclamation to his troops, in which he recounted with just pride their astonishing exploits, and promised to lead them against the Russians, who, he foretold, would find another Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia.* Next day he reviewed the corps of Marshal Davoust on the road to Frankfurt, and, assembling the officers in a circle, assured them of the admiration which he felt for their achievements, and the grief which he had experienced at the numerous losses which had thinned their ranks. "Sir," answered the marshal, "the soldiers of the third corps will ever be to you what the tenth legion was to Cæ-

Napoleon's proclamation and addresses to his soldiers. October 30.

ty of one nation, transmitting to its military officers details which have come to his knowledge regarding an enemy, when not yet subject to their authority; Napoleon himself called on the French prefects and magistrates to do so a hundred times. If the circumstance of Hatzfeld having collected and transmitted this information, while on a civil mission to the emperor at Potsdam, exposed him to the penalty of death, what is to be said to Savary the year before, who, by orders of Napoleon, when conferring with the Emperor Alexander on the proposed terms of accommodation, obtained and brought to him military details of inestimable importance in regard to the temper and strength of the allied army on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz;* or to Napoleon himself, who, in 1797, transmitted orders to his brother Joseph, when holding the sacred office of ambassador at Rome, to do all in his power to revolutionize the Eternal City, and overturn the papal authority?† What the Prince of Hatzfeld did was no more than all ambassadors do, and which Napoleon invariably required from all his diplomatic agents. The character of the intended transaction may be judged of by what Berthier, with generous warmth, said on the occasion: "Your majesty will surely not shoot a man connected with the first families of Berlin for so trifling a thing: the supposition is impossible; you will not do so;" and from his positive refusal to write out the order, as well as Rapp's delay in its transmission. Had the prince been shot, it would have been, like the death of the Duke d'Enghien and the bookseller Palm, an act of deliberate murder. History, therefore, cannot award to Napoleon the praise of having pardoned, on this occasion, a criminal who had forfeited his life, either by the laws of war or the principles of justice; but it must not refuse the meed due to a conqueror who returns to generous feelings, after having been led, in a moment of irritation, to the command of an atrocious deed, and joyfully seizes on this incident as illustrative of that ascendancy which, in his cooler moments, humane feelings obtained over ruthless passion in the mind of this extraordinary man.—RAPP, 108.

* "Soldiers! you are worthy defenders of my crown, and of the great people. As long as you are animated with your present spirit nothing can resist you. Behold the result of your labours! One of the first powers in Europe, which recently had the audacity to propose to us a shameful capitulation, is annihilated. The forests and defiles of Franconia, the Saale, the Elbe, which our fathers would not have traversed in seven years, we have surmounted in seven days, besides, during the same period, fighting four combats and a great battle. We have arrived at Potsdam and Berlin sooner than the renown of our victories! We have made sixty thousand prisoners, taken sixty-five standards, including those of the royal guard, six hundred pieces of cannon, three fortresses, twenty generals, while half the army regret their not having had an opportunity of firing a shot. All the Prussian provinces, from the Elbe to the Oder, are in our hands.

"Soldiers! the Russians boast that they are advancing to meet us; let us march to encounter them; we will spare them the half of their journey; they will find an Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia. A nation which has so speedily forgot the generosity which we manifested towards it after the battle, when its emperor, its court, the wreck of its army owed its safety entirely to the capitulation which we granted to it, is a nation that will never be able to contend with us."—DUMAS, *vi.*, 259, 260.

* Sav., ii., 112, 113. Ante, ii., 368.

† Ante, i., 587, and Corresp. Confid. de Napoleon, iv., 199, 201.

sar." Already, in the emulation of the different corps, and the mutual knowledge and attachment of the officers and men, were to be found the happy effects of that permanent organization into separate armies and divisions which, first of the moderns, Napoleon had imitated from the ancient conquerors of the world.*

While Napoleon and his followers were thus indulging in an excusable pride at the retrospect of their wonderful achievements, the Prussian officers who had traversed the country, or reached the capital in virtue of the several capitulations which had been granted, were exposed to the most grievous humiliation. The officers of the guard, especially, who had escaped from the wreck of Hohenlohe's corps, were ostentatiously marched by the emperor through Berlin to Spandau. Words cannot describe the mortification of those high-spirited young men at the unparalleled calamities in which their inconsiderate passions had involved their country: wherever they went crowds beset their steps, some lamenting their sufferings, others reproaching them as the authors of all the public misfortunes. Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his achievements under the Great Frederic, and the honourable wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of Jena, recommending his states to his generosity, was in an especial manner the object of invective: his states were overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence inspired, that this wounded general was compelled, with great personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon after died.† The queen, whose spirit in prosperous and constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms, and an heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been an excess of patriotic ardour, compared to Helen, whose faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities consequent on the siege of Troy.‡

* Dum., xvi., 259, 261.

† "If the Duke of Brunswick," said the Bulletin, "has cruel expressions richly deserved the animadversion of the Prussian people: he has also incurred that of the Prussian army and people: of the latter, who reproach him as one of the authors of the war; of the former, who complain of his manoeuvres and military conduct. The false calculations of the young may be pardoned, but the conduct of that old prince, aged 72, is an excess of insanity, and his catastrophe can excite no regret. What can there be respectable in gray hairs, when to the faults of age it unites the inconsiderateness and folly of youth? For these extravagances he has justly incurred the forfeiture of all his dominions."—23d and 27th Bulletins, *Camp. de Saxe*, ii., 216, 293.

‡ "All the world accuses the queen as the author of all the calamities which have befallen the Prussian nation. The public indignation is at its height against the authors of the war, especially Gentz, a miserable scribbler who sells himself for money. After her ridiculous journey to Erfurt and Weimar, the queen entered Berlin a fugitive and alone. Among the standards we have taken are those embroidered by the hands of this princess, whose beauty has been as fatal to her people as that of Helen was to the citizens of Troy."—27th and

The whole dominions of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who had not even combated at Jena, but merely permitted, when he could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his possessions. Animosity to England was the secret motive for all those acts of robbery. So strongly was Napoleon influenced by these feelings, that he made no attempt to disguise that it was the ruling principle which governed all his measures towards the vanquished.* The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, in favour of whom the Prussian plenipotentiaries then at Berlin made the strongest representations, shared the same fate, while to the nobles of Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering to his own reputation than theirs, "I will render that noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their bread." When a conqueror, in the midst of his greatest triumphs, uses such insulting language to the vanquished, and makes such an atrocious use of his victory, it is impossible to sympathize with his fall, and Waterloo and St. Helena are felt to be a just measure of moral retribution.†

Meanwhile the French armies, without any farther resistance, took possession of the whole country between the Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the Revolutionary armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be its theatre, Napoleon had taken only twenty-four thousand francs in specie across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied.

Enormous contributions levied on Prussia and the north of Germany.

23d *Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe*, ii., 215. It is worthy of observation that M. Gentz, who is here stigmatized as a miserable hireling sold to England, was one of the most distinguished writers of the age, and with whom Sir James Mackintosh, the eloquent apologist of the French Revolution, maintained a constant and valued correspondence down to the time of his death. That distinguished author thus speaks of Gentz's pamphlet, to which Napoleon alluded, in a letter to the author: "I received by the mail your two precious fragments; I assent to all you say, sympathize with all you feel, and admire equally your reason and your eloquence throughout your masterly fragment. I have read your letter fifty times since I received it, with the same sentiment which a Roman in the extremity of Mauritania would have felt if he had received an account of the ruin of his country after the battle of Pharsalia, written the morning after that calamity, with the unconquerable spirit of Cato, and the terrible energy of Tacitus. He would have exulted that there was something which Cæsar could not subdue, and from which a deliverer and avenger might yet spring."—MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i., 304. Certainly, of all the unaccountable peculiarities in the mind of Napoleon, the most extraordinary is his total insensibility to the ultimate ascendancy of truth over falsehood, and the extent to which he calculated on palming off falsehood and defamation on the credulity or ignorance of mankind.

* M. Bignon, who was present on the occasion, gives the following curious account of the conversation which led to the dethronement of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel: "Duroc and I said everything we could during breakfast in favour of the elector. He only petitioned to be allowed to resume possession of his estates: his fortresses were all to be ceded to the French arms; his troops, twelve thousand strong, were to be joined to their forces, and a heavy contribution paid. These offers appeared to make a considerable impression on the emperor, especially the offer of so many troops; but, after musing a while, he said, abruptly, 'Bah! Brunswick, Nassau, Cassel, all these princes are essentially English; they will never be our friends,' and instantly set out for a review. Two days afterward appeared the 27th bulletin, containing the announcement of their dethronement."—See BIGNON, vi., 35.

† Bignon, vi., 15, 33, 34. 23d and 27th Bulletins, *Camp. de Saxe*, ii., 195, 295, 214.

On the day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation, directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of 159,000,000 francs (26,200,000) on the countries at war with France, of which one hundred millions was to be borne by the Prussian states on the west of the Vistula, twenty-five millions by the Elector of Saxony, and the remainder by the lesser states in the Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden, equivalent to at least twelve millions sterling, if the difference between the value of money in England and Germany is taken into account, was levied with unrelenting severity; and the rapacity and exactions of the French agents employed in its collection aggravated to a very great degree the weight and odious nature of the imposition. Saxony, in the scourging contributions with which she was overwhelmed, had soon abundant cause to regret the French alliance; while Berlin, as well as the Hanoverian and Prussian states which had been occupied, experienced, in the rapacity of General Clarke and his subordinate agents, all the bitterness as well as the humiliation of conquest. Nor was this all. The whole civil authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French emperor: * an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great nation, while General Clarke, governor of Berlin, acting towards the magistrates as if they were already its subjects, barbarously shot a burgomaster of the town of Kiritz, whose only fault was that he had, when destitute of any armed force, been unable to resist the abstraction of the arms of the burgher guard and local militia by Colonel Schill, who commanded a flying detachment that still, in the open country, preserved its fidelity to the colours of the monarchy.† Even the highest authorities gave way to the indiscriminate passion for pillage: "The name of General Clarke," says Bourrienne, "became justly odious from every species of exaction, and a servile execution of all the orders of Napoleon," while the great reputation of the conqueror of Auerstadt was disgraced by the pillage of the noble library at Tempelberg, the country seat of Baron Hardenberg,‡ minister of state, which took place, by his authority, while he was in person occupying the edifice.

These evils, great as they were, and disgraceful to the arms and generals of France, were, however, in the ordinary case, only transitory; but it soon appeared that in the case of Prussia and the adjoining states they were to be permanent, and that the iron grasp of the conqueror was to be not only laid, but retained on the north of Germany. Early in Nov. 3. November there appeared an elaborate ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organization and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to the Vistula.

* The oath was in these terms: "I swear to exercise with fidelity the authority which is committed to me by the Emperor of the French, and to act only for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and to concur with all my power in the execution of all the measures which may be ordered for the service of the French army, and to maintain no correspondence with its enemies."—BIGN., vi., 51.

† At a dinner given by Louis XVIII., in 1815, to the King of Prussia, this massacre became the subject of conversation. "Sire," said Clarke, then Duke of Feltra, "it was an unhappy error." "Say, rather, an unworthy crime," replied the indignant monarch.—HARD., ix., 318.

‡ Hard., ix., 317. Bign., vi., 51, 53. Dum., xvii., 40, 49. Bour., vii., 219.

By this decree the conquered states were divided into four departments, those of Berlin, of Magdebourg, of Stettin, and Custrin; the military and civil government of the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders of provinces, into which it was divided. Receivers-general were appointed in each province, charged with collecting its whole revenue and all the war contributions imposed on it, and their transmission to the French governors. Magistrates, police, gendarmes, all were nominated by the authorities of Napoleon; the whole civil and military government of the country was concentrated in his hands. Clarke was governor-general, aided in the details of government by Count Daru, whose great capacity soon appeared in the admirable order which he introduced into every branch of the administration, and which would have been worthy of the highest admiration if it had not been rendered instrumental to the most cruel and universal system of public extortion. The same system of government was extended to the Duchy of Brunswick, the states of Hesse and Hanover, the Duchy of Mecklenberg, and the Hanse Towns, including Hamburg, which were speedily oppressed by grievous contributions, in exacting which the Dutch generals and troops were peculiarly conspicuous. The emperor openly announced his determination to retain possession of all these states till England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty of the seas. Careful, at the same time, to mingle with these important civil changes such deeds as might captivate the imaginations of his subjects, he paraded before the deputation which came to Berlin from the Senate of Paris to congratulate him on his victories, three hundred and forty grenadiers of his Imperial Guard, each bearing a standard taken from the enemy in this short campaign—the most splendid display of military trophies seen in Europe since the triumphs of the Roman generals.*

Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed: the misfortunes of the king rendered it almost indispensable that a respite should be obtained on any terms, while it was not less advantageous for Napoleon to reap at once the fruits of his triumphs without undergoing the fatigues and dangers of a winter campaign in the frozen plains of Poland. Plenipotentiaries, accordingly, were appointed on both sides: on that of France, Duroc; on that of Prussia, M. Lucchesini and Rastrow. There was no need of lengthened conferences: the situation of the parties gave to the one the power of demanding whatever he pleased, to the other the power of withholding nothing which was required. Napoleon insisted that Prussia should renounce all the provinces she possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, pay a contribution of a hundred millions of francs for the expenses of the war, cease to take any concern in the affairs of Germany, and recognise in the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine whatever titles the conqueror chose to confer upon them. Not daring to refuse these conditions, and yet unwilling to take upon themselves the responsibility of making so great a sacrifice, the Prussian envoys referred the matter to the king or his cabinet.

Negotiations with Prussia, and armistice concluded.

* Dum., xvii., 54, 61. Bign., vi., 72. Bour., vii., 217, 219.

Oct. 27. They returned an answer agreeing to all the exactions which were required; but in the interval matters had essentially changed for the worse: the wreck of the Prussian armies had been almost totally destroyed, and the demands of Napoleon rose in proportion. Perpetually haunted by the idea that it was the influence of England which he required to combat, and that the northern powers were brought into the field only to maintain her cause,* he now insisted that the Prussian troops should retire entirely to Königsberg and the small portion of the monarchy which lies to the east of the Vistula; that Colberg, Dantzic, Graudentz, Thorn, Glogau, Breslau, Hameln, and Nieburg should be placed in the hands of the French; and that no foreign troops should be suffered to enter any part of the Prussian territory. In agreeing to terms so ruinous to the monarchy, the Prussian plenipotentiaries could hardly expect that the king would ratify them; but so desperate had his affairs now become, that it was of importance to obtain a delay even of a few days, in the departure of Napoleon for Posen, in order to gain time for the arrival of the Russian troops on the Vistula. They signed the convention at

Nov. 16. Charlottenberg, accordingly, stipulating only for its ratification by the King of Prussia. In fact, however, no hope remained to either side that it would lead to a permanent accommodation; for, a few days before the truce was concluded, Talleyrand openly announced to the Prussian plenipotentiaries that they must look for no restitution of his conquests by the Emperor Napoleon, and that the vast territory from the Rhine to the Vistula would be retained until a general peace, as a means of compelling England to surrender its maritime acquisitions, and Russia to evacuate the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which had recently been invaded by its arms. Thus the unhappy Prussian monarchy was made responsible for the ambition or successes of other powers over whose measures it had no sort of control; and the negotiations at Berlin, diverging from their original object, were degenerating into a mere manifesto of implacable hostility against the cabinets of London and St. Petersburg.†

The severity of the terms demanded, as well as their express assurances that no King of Prussia would lead to a separate accommodation, ratify as Napoleon was resolved to retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations. Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, what was to be gained by the cession of three fourths of its dominions, and its fortresses still unsubdued on the Vistula, to the French? Rest as he was of his kingdom and his army, the king still preserved his honour, and nobly resolved to continue faithful to his engagements. He declined, therefore, to ratify the armistice, which was presented to him at

Osterode for signature, on the part of France, by Duroc, and, at the same time, published a melancholy but noble proclamation, in which, without attempting to disguise his hopes or conceal the deplorable state of his affairs, he rose superior to the storms of fortune, and declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of Russia.†† This refusal was anticipated by Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.

To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree of the 21st of November, against the commerce of Great Britain. But that subject is too vast to be adequately touched on in the close of a chapter embracing such a variety of subjects as the present; and it will be fully enlarged on in a subsequent one, which will include also the Milan decree which followed, in 1807, the Continental system, and orders of council adopted as a measure of retaliation by the British government.

Napoleon set out from Berlin for the Vistula soon after he had fulminated this anathema against English commerce, and at Posen, in Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite hopes which his subsequent conduct never realized: "France," said he, "has never recognised the partitions of Poland; but, nevertheless, I cannot proclaim your independence until you are resolved to defend your rights as a nation at every sacrifice, even that of life itself. The world reproaches you with Nov. 29. having, in your continual civil dissensions, lost sight of the true interests and safety of your country. Taught by your misfortunes, now unite, and prove to the world that the same spirit animates the whole Polish nation." Universal acclamations attended his arrival at Posen: all the population advanced to meet his carriage; four magnificent triumphal arches were erected to the victor of Rivoli, Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. Count Palatine Radzimirski, at the head of the deputation from Great Poland, addressed him in terms of Eastern adulation, min-

Famous Berlin decree against English commerce.

Affairs of Poland. Napoleon's words to the Polish deputies.

* Dum., xvii., 69, 71. Lucches., ii., 223, 225. Bign., vi., 48, 49.

† Matters, said the proclamation, had arrived at that pass, that Prussia could no longer hope to obtain peace, even at the price of the greatest sacrifices. It was not in his power to make the Russian forces retrograde, since already their own frontiers were menaced. The Emperor of France has shown a determination, even when he acceded to the basis of a negotiation, not to suspend for one moment his military operations; and he has protracted the conferences till his successes enabled him to declare that the conquest of Prussia should afford him the means of dictating peace to England and Russia. Compelled thus to resume hostilities, the king is not without hopes of yet bringing them to a successful issue. He hopes that the governors of the fortresses on the Vistula will not imitate the weakness of those on the Oder and Elbe, and all the disposable forces of the monarchy will hasten to unite their colours on the Vistula and the Warta to the brave Russian battalions. Such a proof of courage and constancy is not new to the Prussian nation. In the Seven Years' War the capital and provinces were also occupied by the enemy, but the firmness and intrepidity of the nation brought it safe through all its perils, and excited alike the admiration and astonishment of posterity. Then Prussia combated alone the greatest powers of Europe: now the powerful and magnanimous Alexander is about to take his place by her side with all the forces of his vast empire. Their cause is the same: they will stand or fall together.—Dum., xvii., 70, 71.

* "He was persuaded," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "that it was the intrigues of England which had arrayed the northern courts against France, which had brought about the refusal of the Emperor Alexander to ratify the treaty of Paris, and pushed forward Prussia into the field of battle. It was England, therefore, which it had become necessary to strike in Prussia; and it was on the conduct of the Cabinet of London, in regard to the restitution of conquests, that the emperor announced he would measure his own steps for the future fate of the Prussian monarchy."—LUCCHESINI, ii., 176, 177. BIGN., vi., 44.

† Dum., xvii., 66, 67. Bign., vi., 48, 49. Lucches., ii., 182, 185, 186. Martens, xi., 380.

gled with strange expressions, which proved prophetic: "The universe knows your exploits and your triumphs; the West beheld the first development of your genius; the South was the recompense of your labours; the East became to you an object of admiration; the *North will be the term of your victories*. The Polish race, yet groaning under the yoke of Germanic nations, humbly implores your august highness to raise up its remnant from the dust." Napoleon replied, "That which has been destroyed by force cannot be restored but by force. I would with pleasure behold the independence of Poland restored, and a barrier formed by its strength against the unbounded ambition of Russia; but petitions and discourses will not achieve this work; and unless the whole nation, including nobles, priests, and burghers, does unite and embrace the firm resolution to conquer or die, success is hopeless. With such a determination it is certain, and you may always rely on my powerful protection."*

While the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the flanks of the invading force. To Jerome Bonaparte, who commanded the ninth corps, consisting of twenty-five thousand Bavarians and Wirtembergers, and who had Vandamme for his adviser, was intrusted the difficult task of reducing the six fortresses of Silesia, Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Neisse, Schweidnitz, and Glatz, containing, in all, a force nearly equal to his own. Glogau, however, with its surrounding garrison of three thousand men, made of Glogau. but a show of resistance, and, early December 3. in December, fell into the hands of the French. The other bulwarks of the province exhibited more determination, and operations in form were commenced against them.†

Mortier, on the extreme left, was intrusted with the subjugation of Hanover and the Hanse Towns, and the occupation of Hamburg, which was accomplished with hardly any resistance. Having done this, he advanced to observe Stralsund and the Swedes, while a fresh reserve was collecting on the Elbe, under the command of Louis, king of Holland. Thus, though the grand army was advancing by rapid strides to the shores of the Vistula, its flanks on either side were protected by subordinate corps; and fresh forces, stationed in echelon in their rear, overawed the intermediate states, and kept up the communication with the Rhine. The whole of the north of Germany was overrun by French troops, while a hundred thousand were assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such prodigious efforts over so great an extent of surface rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The Senate at Paris was ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the emperor, eighty thousand were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the military age in 1807. "In what more triumphant circumstances," said the emperor, "can we call on the youth of France to flock to our standards? They will

have to traverse, in joining their comrades, the capitals of their enemies, and fields of battle illustrated by immortal victories." It may easily be conceived with what transports this appeal was received by a nation so passionately attached to military glory as the French, and the emperor resolved to turn it to the best account. Not content with this great addition to his prospective resources, he instituted corps of volunteers to receive the numerous and enthusiastic youth, whom even the conscription could not drain off in sufficient numbers: additional battalions were added to the Imperial Guard, the troops of Hesse taken in a body into French pay, and the most energetic measures adopted to augment as much as possible the military resources of the Confederation of the Rhine. Detailed instructions were at the same time transmitted to Marmont in Illyria, and the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais, to have their forces disposed on the Austrian monarchy in the most advantageous position; the King of Bavaria was informed by the emperor himself of all that he should do for the defence of his dominions, and the activity displayed in the fortresses on the Adige, the Isonzo, and the Inn, looked as if he was making preparations rather for a defensive struggle in the plains of Bavaria or the fields of Italy than for a stroke at the vitals of Russia on the shores of the Vistula.*

A treaty, offensive and defensive, between Saxony and France was the natural result of these successes. This treaty, convention, arranged by Talleyrand, and Saxony. was signed at Posen on the 12th of December. It stipulated that the Elector of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king: he was admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his contingent fixed at twenty thousand men. By a separate article, it was provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign: a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military outpost of the great nation, while, by a subsidiary treaty, signed at Posen three days afterward, the whole minor princes of the house of Saxony were also admitted into the confederacy.†

Such was the astonishing campaign of Jena, the most marvellous of all the achievements of Napoleon; that in which the success the most unheard of attended his steps, and his force appeared most irresistible to the bewildered nations. Europe had hardly recovered the shock arising from the fall of Austria in three months, during the campaign of Austerlitz, when she beheld Prussia overthrown in as many weeks by the shock of Jena. Without halting one day before the forces of the enemy, without ever once pausing in the career of conquest, the French troops had marched from the Rhine to the Vistula; the fabric reared with so much care by the wisdom and valour of Frederick the Great had fallen by a single blow; and one of the chief powers of Christendom had disappeared at once from the theatre of Europe. Three hundred and fifty standards, four thousand pieces of cannon, six first-rate fortresses, eighty thousand prisoners, had been taken in less than seven weeks; of a noble array of a hundred and twenty thousand men, who had so lately crowded on the banks of the Saale, not more than fif-

* Dum., xvii., 69, 64.

† Jom., ii., 324, 325. Dum., xvii., 20.

* Bign., vi., 69, 71. Dum., xvii., 50, 55. See the orders in Dum., xvii. Pièces Just.

† Dum., xvii., 88, 89. Martens, Sup., iv., 384, 387.

teen thousand now followed the standards of the king to the shores of the Vistula.* Results so astonishing were altogether unprecedented in modern Europe; they recalled rather the classic exploits of Cæsar or Alexander, or the fierce inroads of Timour or Gengiskhan than anything yet experienced in Christendom; but they possessed this superiority above the achievements of antiquity or the sanguinary conquests of modern barbarism, that it was not over inexperienced tribes or enervated nations that the triumphs had been won, but the most warlike nation of the civilized world that had been overthrown, and the army which had recently withstood the banded strength of Europe which had been dissolved.

The talents displayed by Napoleon in this campaign, though of a very high order, were not equal to the transcendental abilities evinced at Ulm and Austerlitz. Doubtless the celerity with which the hazardous advance of the Duke of Brunswick across the Thuringian Forest to turn the French left and interpose between the Rhine and their army was turned to the best account, and the Prussians cut off from their magazines and communications at the very moment they were endeavouring to inflict that injury on the enemy, the vigour of the fight at Jena, and the incomparable energy with which the mighty host which there conquered was dispersed like a fan in pursuit of the broken remains of the enemy, and incessantly pressed on till they were totally destroyed, were worthy of the highest admiration. But in the very outset of the campaign he exposed himself to unnecessary hazard, and, but for a change of position on the part of the bulk of the Prussian army, of which he was ignorant, might have been involved in as great a catastrophe as the rout on the banks of the Inn had been to the Imperialists. To advance and attack the Prussian army, strongly posted at Jena, through the narrow and rugged defiles of the Landgrafenberg, was a greater error in military conduct than it was in the Archduke John to advance against Moreau through the pines of the Hohenlinden. Napoleon has told us this himself: "The first principle of the military art," says he, "is never to fight with a defile in your rear; for, if defeated in such a station, total ruin is hardly avoidable."† Had the whole Prussian army, a hundred thousand strong, been posted at the opening of the defiles instead of a rear-guard of forty thousand only, the French would probably have never been able to debouche, and a disastrous retreat have been experienced. There was little of the usual calculation of means to end in this great commander, when he himself, with eighty thousand men, was opposed only to Hohenlohe with forty thousand, while Davoust, with thirty thousand, was left to struggle with the king in person, at the head of sixty thousand. No man knew better than Napoleon that such combinations were against the first principles, not merely of the military art, but of common sense applied to such subjects; but the truth is, that the campaign of Austerlitz had given him an undue confidence in his destiny; he deemed himself invincible, because he had always hitherto proved so; and already were to be seen the signs of that fatal rashness which was to lead him to the Moscow retreat and the disasters of Leipzig.

After making every allowance for the magnitude of the defeat sustained by the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt, the sudden fall and the extraordinary circumstance of Prussia. of the fugitives from these two fields getting intermingled during their nocturnal flight, there is something extraordinary and almost unaccountable in the sudden prostration of the monarchy. Had the people been lukewarm or disaffected in the cause, it would have admitted of easy solution; but this was very far indeed from being the case; public spirit ran high, and unanimity unprecedented against Gallic aggression existed among all classes. Yet, in the midst of this ardent and enthusiastic feeling, pusillanimity the most disgraceful was generally evinced, and fortresses all but impregnable surrendered at the first summons of a contemptible enemy! Where were the soldiers of the Great Frederic, where the constancy of the Seven Years' War, when Magdebourg, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau lowered their colours without firing a shot, and the weakness of these garrisons permitted the army on the Vistula to be re-enforced at the decisive moment by forty thousand men, who otherwise would have been chained round their walls? These unprecedented capitulations demonstrate that, however high was the spirit of part of the nation, the same feelings were not universal, and that the kingdom of Prussia, newly cemented by the genius of Frederic, had not yet acquired that general patriotic spirit which can withstand the severer shocks of adversity, and constitutes the only secure basis of national independence. And the English historian who recollects how a similar catastrophe prostrated the energies of his own ancestors after the battle of Hastings, will probably feel charitably towards an infant nation placed in such trying circumstances; and feel a deeper thankfulness for that long career of national independence, that unbroken line of national glory, which has formed the indomitable public spirit of his own country, and constitutes the unseen chain which has so long held together the immense fabric of the British dominions.

In proportion to the unbounded enthusiasm which these wondrous events excited in France was the despondency which they diffused through the other states of Europe. Alarm now seized the most sanguine, despair took possession of the most resolute. The power which had risen up in Europe to vanquish and destroy seemed beyond the reach of attack. Every effort made against it, every coalition formed for its overthrow, had led only to fresh triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of its strength. The utmost efforts of Austria, supported by all the wealth of England and all the military strength of Russia, had sunk in the conflict; and now a few weeks had sufficed to dissipate that admirable army which the Great Frederic had bequeathed as the phalanx of independence to his country. The thoughtful and philanthropic, more even than the multitude, were penetrated with apprehensions at these portentous events. They looked back to ancient times, and read in the long degradation of Greece and the Byzantine Empire, the consequences of their subjugation from the military force of Rome, and could anticipate no brighter prospect for futurity than the ultimate resurrection of Europe after many ages of slavery and decline.* So

General despondency which it occasions in Europe.

* Jom., ii., 325.

† Nap. Mem., book ix., 124, 125, on Waterloo.

* See, in particular, Sir James Mackintosh's letter to Gentz on this subject, *Memoirs*, i., 364. It is curious, but not unnatural, to observe the earliest and warmest advo-

little can the greatest intellects anticipate the future course of events in a society so perpetually influenced by new moving powers as that of modern Europe; and so necessary is it, in forming a judgment on the ultimate consequences of existing changes, not merely to look back to the lessons of history, but to take into account also the hitherto inexperienced influence of fresh causes rising into action in the ever-varying scene of human affairs.

That bright dawn, however, which philanthropy looked for in vain, and philosophy was unable to anticipate in the dark gloom of the political horizon, the ardent mind of a hero had already begun to descry; and, what is very remarkable, he fixed on the precise circumstances in the temper of the times which were destined to make it ultimately expand to all the lustre of day. "I reckon much," said Blucher to Bourrienne at Hamburg, whither he had retired on his parole from Lubeck, "on the public spirit of Germany, on the enthusiasm which reigns in our universities. Success in war is ephemeral; but defeat itself contributes to nourish in a people the principles of honour and a passion for national glory. Be assured, when a whole people are resolved to emancipate themselves from foreign domination, they will never fail to succeed. I have no fears for the result. We shall end by having a Landwehr such as the slavish spirit of the French could never produce. England will yield us its subsidies; we will renew our alliances with Russia and Austria. I know well the principles of the coalition. The sole object which the allied sovereigns have in view is to put a limit to the system of aggression which Napoleon has adopted, and which he pursues with the most alarming rapidity. In our first wars against France, at the commencement of its Revolution, we fought for the rights of kings, in which, for my part, I felt very little interest; but now the case is totally changed; the population of Prussia makes common cause with its government, the safety of our hearths is at stake; and reverses, when such a spirit is abroad, destroy armies without breaking the spirit of a nation. I look forward without anxiety to the future, because I foresee that fortune will not always favour your emperor. The time may

come when Europe in a body, humiliated by his exactions, exhausted by his depredations, will rise up in arms against him. The more he enchains different nations, the more terrible will be the explosion when they burst their fetters. Who can now dispute the insatiable passion for aggrandizement with which he is animated? No sooner is Austria subjugated than Prussia is destroyed; and, though we have fallen, Russia remains to continue the strife. I cannot foresee the issue of this struggle; but, supposing it to be favourable to France, it will come to an end. You will speedily see new wars arise, and, if we hold firm, France, worn out with conquests, will at length succumb.*"

Blucher was right in these anticipations. It is not in the suffering, but the prosperity of nations that the seeds of ruin are in general to be found: the anguish and humiliation which are the consequences of weakness, disunion, or corruption, are often the severe school of ultimate improvement. If we would discern the true cause of the fall of Prussia, we must go back to the vacillation and selfishness which characterized its national councils during the ten prosperous years which succeeded the treaty of Bâle in 1795; which caused it to temporize when the moment for action had arrived, and brought it in heedless security to the very edge of perdition; which lowered the national feeling by sacrificing the national honour, and paralyzed the arms of its natural allies by inspiring distrust in the good faith of its government. In the misery and degradation consequent on the battle of Jena is to be found the commencement of the causes destined to produce the glorious resurrection of 1813. Periods of adversity are seldom lost in the end to nations any more than individuals: it is the flow of unbroken prosperity which, by promoting the growth of the selfish passions, is the real source, in most cases, of irremediable ruin. Those twin curses of humanity, despotism and Democracy, act in precisely the same way on the sources of public welfare, by poisoning the fountains of individual exertion, and inducing in the active members of society a slavish submission to the authority of the irresistible executive, or a selfish prosecution of their own interest, instead of a generous devotion to the public good. Till this last stage of national degradation has arrived, there is always a hope of revival to its fortunes: no misfortunes are irremediable as long as the spirit of the people is unbroken; no calamities irreparable but those which undermine their virtue.

ates of the French Revolution most gloomy in their anticipations of its ultimate effects. Ardour of imagination, the habit of looking before the multitude into the ultimate consequences of passing events, a sincere desire for the good of mankind, naturally in the same minds, in 1790 and 1806, produced these opposite results.

* Bour., vii., 205, 206.

CHAPTER XLIV.

CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU.

DEC., 1806—MARCH, 1807.

ARGUMENT.

Advance of the French and Russians to the Vistula.—Military Preparations of Russia.—Composition and Character of her Armies.—Imprudent Division of their Force by the Invasion of Turkey.—Embarrassment of Napoleon on the Polish Question.—Argument in favour of the Restoration of Poland.—Argument on the other Side against interfering in their Concerns.—Napoleon adopts a middle Course, and rouses only Prussian Poland.—His dubious Bulletins on the Subject.—He proposes to Austria to exchange Galicia for Silesia, which is refused.—His strong Declarations in favour of Turkey.—His Proclamation to his Soldiers on the Anniversary of Austerlitz.—Its great Effect.—Formation of the Temple of Glory at Paris.—Secret Designs of Napoleon in the Construction of this Edifice.—Vast Efforts of Napoleon to recruit his Army, and secure its Flanks and Rear.—Enormous Contributions levied on all the conquered States.—Positions of the French on the Vistula; and of the Russians.—Their Dispositions, and Evacuation of Warsaw.—They resume the Offensive.—Proclamation of Alexander to the Soldiers.—Application for Aid in Men and Money to England.—Its impolitic Refusal.—Advance of Napoleon to Warsaw.—General Enthusiasm there.—He resumes the Offensive against the Russians.—Forcing of the Passage of the Ukra by the French.—Kamenski loses his Presence of Mind, and orders the Sacrifice of his Artillery.—Object of Napoleon in these Movements.—Description of the Field at Pultusk, and of the Positions of the hostile Bodies there.—Battle of Pultusk, which turns out to the Disadvantage of the French.—Combat of Golymin.—Its doubtful Issue.—Napoleon stops his Advance, and puts his Army into Winter-quarters.—The Russians also go into Cantonments.—Results of the Winter Campaign, and Impression which it produces in Europe.—Positions of the French Army in its Winter-quarters.—Napoleon's Measures to provide Food and secure his Cantonments.—Successive Reduction of the Fortresses in Silesia.—Capture of Brieg and Schweidnitz, and total Conquest of Silesia.—Operations on the Left towards Pomerania and Dantzic, and of Marmont in Illyria.—Napoleon's Efforts to stimulate the Turks to vigorous Resistance.—Delightful Winter-quarters of the French at Warsaw.—Enthusiastic Reception which they there experienced from the Polish Women.—Kamenski goes Mad.—Benningssen assumes the Command of the Russian Army, and Advances against Bernadotte.—His rapid March towards Königsberg, and Surprise of Ney's Corps.—Bernadotte, attacked near Mohrungen, escapes with Difficulty.—Graudenz is relieved, and the French Left Wing driven back by the Russians.—Extraordinary Energy of Napoleon in reassembling his Army.—He marches to the Rear of Benningssen, who discovers his Design and falls back.—The French pursue the Russians, who at length resolve to give Battle.—Combat of Landsberg.—And of Leibstadt, and retreat of Lestocq.—Relative Forces on both Sides.—Bloody Combats around Eylau the Day before the Battle.—Anxious Situation of both Armies during their night Bivouac.—Description of the Field of Battle, and the Distribution of either Army.—Positions of the French Forces.—Battle of Eylau.—Defeat of Augereau.—Imminent Danger of Napoleon.—Grand Charge by the Cavalry and Imperial Guard on the Russian Centre.—Great Success of Davoust on the French Right.—Benningssen throws back his Left to arrest the Evil.—Lestocq at length appears on the Russian Right, and restores the Battle.—Schloditten is carried by Ney, and retaken by Benningssen, who, contrary to the Opinion of his Officers, resolves to retreat.—Results of the Battle.—Losses on both Sides.—Aspect of the Field of Battle on the following Day.—Inactivity and Losses of the French after the Battle.—Napoleon calls in all his Re-enforcements and proposes Peace to Prussia, which is refused by that Power.—Napoleon retreats, and goes into Cantonments on the Passage.—The Russians advance, and also go into Cantonments.—Both Parties claim the Victory at Eylau.—Operations of Essen against Savary.—Combat of Ostrolenka.—Immense Sensation excited by the Battle of Eylau over Europe.—Universal Consternation at Paris on the News being received of Eylau.—Napoleon demands a third Conscription since the 14th of October, 1806.—Great Activity of Napoleon to repair his Losses.—Extreme Danger of his Situation at this Juncture.—Ruinous Effect

of the Surrender of the Prussian Fortresses.—Observations on the Military Movements of both Parties.

The campaign of Jena had destroyed the powers of Prussia: inconsiderate valour Advance of the French and Russians to the Vistula. had yielded to overwhelming force and skilful combination; with more justice the king than the people could say with Francis I. at Pavia, *Tout est perdu fors l'Honneur*. But Russia was still untouched, and while her formidable legions remained unsubdued, the war, so far from being completed, could hardly be said to be seriously commenced. Napoleon felt this: on the Trebia, at Novi, at Diernstein, and Austerlitz, the French had experienced the stern valour of these Northern warriors; and he counted the hours, as the mortal conflict approached, which was to bring either universal empire or irreparable ruin in its train. Nor were the Russians less desirous to commence the struggle. Confident in the prowess of their arms, proud of the steady growth of an empire, whose frontiers have never yet receded, and which its meanest peasant believes is one day to subdue the world, they anticipated a glorious result from their exertions, and, without underrating the forces of their opponents, indulged a sanguine hope that the North would prove the limits of their power, and that, while they repelled them from their own frontiers, they would afford the means of liberation to oppressed Europe. The severity of a Polish winter could not deter these undaunted combatants: eager for the conflict, both their mighty hosts approached the Vistula; and at a period of the year when some respite is usually given in ordinary war to suffering humanity, commenced a new campaign, and advanced through a snowy wilderness to the bloody fields of Prussisch-Eylau.

Alexander had displayed the greatest activity in repairing the losses which his Military pre-army had sustained in the campaign arations of of Austerlitz. Thirty fresh squad- Russia. rons and fifty-one battalions had been added to its amount, all the chasms occasioned by the casualties of war supplied, and the new French organization into divisions universally adopted.*

* The Russian army was divided into eighteen divisions, each of which was composed of six regiments of infantry, ten squadrons of heavy cavalry, ten of light, two batteries of heavy cannon, three of light, or horse artillery, and a company of pioneers; in all for each, eighteen battalions, twenty squadrons, and seventy-two pieces of cannon: about 12,000 men. The army was thus divided:

	Battalions. Squadrons. Cannon.		
1. Guard under Grand-duke Constantine	33	35	84
2. Polish army, eight divisions under Osterman, Sacken, Galitzin, Tousskof, Barclay de Tolly, Doctoroff, Essen, Gortshakoff, afterward Kamenski	147	170	504.
3. Army of Moldavia, five divisions under Michelson as general-in-chief, commanded by Wolkonsky, Zacomilsky, Milaradowitch, Meindorf, and the			

Nor was this all: anxious to rouse the religious enthusiasm of his subjects, and deeply impressed with the magnitude of the struggle which was approaching, he had called out a defensive militia of six hundred thousand men, and excited their devout loyalty to the highest degree by a proclamation, in which Napoleon was represented as the relentless enemy of the Christian religion, and they were called on to shed their best blood in defence of the faith of their fathers.* This proclamation excited the ridicule of a large part of Europe, still tainted by infidel fanaticism, and not then awakened to the impossibility of combating Revolutionary energy with any other weapons but those of religious fervour; but it was admirably calculated for the simple-minded people to whom it was addressed, and excited such an enthusiasm, that not only was this immense armament without difficulty raised, but, contrary to usual custom, the peasants drawn for the regular army joyfully left their homes, and marched with songs of triumph, amid the blessings of their countrymen, towards the frontier, the anticipated scene of their glory or their martyrdom.†

The troops who were now pressing forward to defend the western frontiers of the Empire—were very different from those with whom the French had hitherto, for the most part, contended in the fields of Germany or the Italian plains. The forces of civilization, the resources of art, were exhausted; the legions of Napoleon had reached the old frontier of Europe; the energy of the Desert, the hosts of Asia were before them; passions hitherto, save in La Vendée, inexperienced in the contest, were now brought into action. Religious enthusiasm, patriotic ardour, the fervour of youthful civilization were arrayed against the power of knowledge, the discipline of art, and the resources of ancient opulence. There were to be seen the serf but recently emancipated from the servitude of his fathers, whose mother and sisters had checked the lamentations of nature when he assumed the military habit, and

Duke of Richelieu.....	90	160	306
4. Intermediate corps under the Count Apraxin, consisted of the divisions of General Ritschhoff, Prince Labanoff, and Gortchakoff	54	30	144
Total.....	324	335	1038

besides the local corps in Georgia, Finland, and garrison battalions. The whole regular force was about 360,000 men; but in no country is the difference between the numbers on paper and in the field so great as in Russia, and the troops in the campaign of Poland never exceeded 80,000 men.—See JOMINI, ii., 335, and WILSON, 4.

* “Bonaparte,” said this proclamation, which was read in all the Russian churches: “after having, by open force or secret intrigue, extended his power over the countries which he oppresses, menaces Russia, which Heaven protects. It is for you to prevent the destroyer of peace, of the faith, and of the happiness of mankind, from seducing the orthodox Christians. He has trampled under foot every principle of truth: in Egypt he preached the Koran of Mohammed, in France manifested his contempt for the religion of Jesus Christ by convoking Jewish synagogues. Do you, you fellow-creatures, fly the persecutor of Christians; do you desire to be saved, oppose an invincible barrier to his advances. He has dared to the combat God and Russia; prove that you are the defenders of the Most High and of your country. Chase far from your frontiers that monster; punish his barbarity to so many innocents, whose blood cries aloud to Heaven for vengeance; God will hear the prayer of the faithful; he will shield you with his power, he will cover you with his grace, your exploits will be celebrated by the Church and by your country; immortal crowns or abodes of eternal felicity await you.”—HARDENBERG, ix., 376.

† Jom., ii., 335. Hard., ix., 375, 376. Dum., xvii., 99. Wilson, Polish War, 10, 11.

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bade him go forth, the champion of Christendom, to present glory or future paradise; there the peasant, inured from infancy to hardy exercise, ignorant alike of the enjoyments and the corruptions of urban society, long accustomed to rural labour, and habituated equally to the glow of a Russian bath or the severity of a Scythian winter; there the Cossack, whose steed, nourished on the steppes of the Don, had never yet felt the curb, while his master, following his beloved Attaman to the theatre of action, bore his formidable lance in his hand, his pistols and sword by his side, and his whole effects, the fruit of years of warfare, in the folds of his saddle. Careless of the future, the children of the Desert joyfully took their way to the animating fields of plunder and triumph: mounted on small but swift and indefatigable horses, they were peculiarly adapted for a country where provisions were scanty, forage exhausted, and hardships universal; the heat of summer, the frost of winter, were alike unable to check the vigour of their desultory operations; but when the hosts on either side were arrayed in battle, and the charge of regular forces was requisite, they often appeared with decisive effect at the critical moment, and urging their blood horses to full speed, bore down, by the length of their spears and the vehemence of their onset, the most powerful cavalry of Western Europe.*†

If the whole disposable Russian forces had been united upon the Vistula, they would have presented an imposing mass of a hundred and fifty thousand warriors, against which all the efforts of Napoleon would, in all probability, have been exerted in vain. But, by a strange and unaccountable infatuation, at the very moment when this formidable contest awaited them on the Polish plains, a large portion of their disposable force was drawn off to the shores of the Danube, and a Turkish super-added to the already overwhelming weight of the French war. Of the causes which led to this unhappy diversion, and the grounds which the cabinet of St. Petersburg set forth in vindication of their aggression on the Ottoman dominions, a full account will be given in the sequel of this work; but, in the mean time, its effect in causing a most calamitous division of the Russian force is too obvious to require illustration. At Eylau the hostile forces on either side were nearly equal, and both retired without any decisive advantage from that scene of blood: ten thou-

* Wilson, viii., 28. Personal observation.

† “Mounted,” says Sir Robert Wilson, “on a little, ill-conditioned, but well-bred horse, which can walk with ease at the rate of five miles an hour, or dispute in his speed the race with the swiftest, with a short whip on his wrist, as he wears no spur, armed with the lance, a pistol in his girdle, and a sword, the Cossack never fears a competitor in single combat; but in the Polish war he irresistibly attacked every opposing squadron in the field. Terror preceded his charge, and in vain discipline endeavoured to present an impediment to the protruding pikes. The cuirassiers alone preserved some confidence, and appeared to baffle the arms and skill of the Cossack; but in the battle of Prussia, when the cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cossacks instantly bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them, and in a few moments five hundred and thirty Cossacks reappeared in the field, equipped with the spoils of the slain. But they did not permanently wear them: the steel trophies were conveyed by subscription to the Don and the Volga, where they are inspected as trophies of their prowess, and respect for the pride of their kindred and glory of their nation.”—WILSON, 27, 28. When the author saw the Cossacks of the Don and the guard at Paris in May, 1814, this description was still precisely applicable. † See chap. li., on the Turkish war.

and additional troops would there have overthrown Napoleon and driven him to a disastrous retreat, while fifty thousand of the best troops of the Empire were uselessly employed on the banks of the Danube. At the same time, it is evident that the war in Moldavia was resolved on, and the necessary orders transmitted before the disasters in Prussia were known, or the pressing necessity for succour on the Vistula could have been anticipated; the battle of Jena was fought on the 14th of October, and on the 23d of Nov. 23. November General Michelson entered Moldavia and commenced the Turkish campaign. But though the Russian cabinet is thus not answerable for having given orders to commence an additional war unnecessarily in the midst of the desperate struggle in the north of Germany, yet it cannot be relieved of the responsibility of having, without any adequate cause, provoked hostilities in the southern provinces of its empire, at a time when the contest in Saxony, if not commenced, might at least have been easily foreseen, when the resolution to annul the treaty, signed by D'Oubril at Paris, had been already taken, and all the strength of Europe was required to meet the encounter with the conqueror of Austerlitz on the banks of the Elbe.*†

While Russia, distracted by the varied interests of her mighty dominions, was thus running the hazard of destruction on the Polish question, her forces in presence of the enemy, Napoleon was extremely perplexed at Posen by the considerations of the Polish question. The destiny of this people, which enters so deeply into the consideration of every political combination of the nineteenth century, here stood in the very foremost rank, and called for immediate decision. The advance of the French armies through Prussian Poland towards Warsaw, the ambiguous, but still encouraging words of the emperor to the numerous deputations which had approached him, had awakened to the highest degree the hopes and expectations of that unfortunate, but impassioned race. A solemn deputation from Great Poland, headed by Count Dzadiniki, waited upon Napoleon, and announced an immediate insurrection of the Polish nation, headed by their nobles, palatines, and chiefs; a great ferment prevailed in Lithuania, and symptoms of alarming effervescence were visible even in Galicia. The crisis was of the most violent kind: an immediate decision was called for by imperative necessity; Napoleon was much at a loss how to act, and the question was warmly debated by the council assembled at his headquarters.

On the one hand, it was urged by the friends of Poland, "that the only ally in the east of Europe, on whom France could really and permanently depend, was now prepared to range itself by her side, and enter into a contest of life or death for her support. The alliances of cabinets may be dissolved, the friendships of kings may be extinguished, but the union of nations, founded on identity of interest and community

of feeling, may be calculated upon as of more lasting endurance. But what people was ever impelled towards another by such powerful motives, or animated in the alliance by such vehement passions as Poland now is towards France? Alone of all great nations, in ancient or modern times, she has been partitioned by her powerful and ambitious neighbours, struck down to the earth by hostile armies, and swept, by repeated spoiliations, from the book of existence. Her nationality is destroyed, her people scattered, her glories at an end. Is it possible that these injuries can be forgotten, that such unparalleled calamities leave no traces behind them, in the breasts of the descendants of the Sarmatian race? Is it not certain, on the contrary, that they have left there profound impressions, ineradicable passions, which are ready, on the first favourable opportunity, to raise throughout the whole scattered provinces of the old Republic an inextinguishable flame? Where has the emperor found such faithful followers, such devoted fidelity, as in the Polish legions of the Italian army, whom Moscovite barbarity drove to seek an asylum in foreign lands? Is it expedient to refuse the proffered aid of a hundred thousand such warriors, who are ready to fly to his standards from the whole wide-spread fields of Sarmatia? True, they are undisciplined—without arms, fortresses, magazines, or resources—but what does all that signify? Napoleon is in the midst of them: his invincible legions will precede them in the fight; from their enemies and their spoilers his victorious sword will wrest the implements of war; in their example they will see the model of military discipline. The Poles are by nature warriors; little discipline or organization is requisite to bring them into the field. When the regular forces of Germany had sunk in the conflict, their tumultuary array chased the infidels from the heart of Austria, and delivered Vienna from Mussulman bondage. Nor is it merely a temporary succour which may be anticipated from their exertions: lasting aid, a durable alliance, may with confidence be expected from their necessities. Surrounded by the partitioning powers, they have no chance of independence but in the French alliance; the moment they desert it, they will be again crushed by their ambition. Not only the nationality of Poland, but the individual safety of its whole inhabitants, must forever bind them to their deliverers; they well know what cruel punishments and confiscations await them if they again fall under the Moscovite yoke. In restoring the oldest of European commonwealths, therefore, not only will a memorable act of justice be done, a memorable punishment of iniquity inflicted, but a durable alliance on the frontier of civilization will be formed, and a barrier erected against the inroads of barbarism in the people who, in every age, have devoted their blood to combating its advances."*

Specious as these arguments were, and powerfully as they appealed to the generous feelings of our nature, it may be doubted whether they were not opposed by others of greater solidity. "It is in vain," it was urged, "to dwell on the misfortunes of Poland, or represent her partition as an unavoidable calamity for which her inhabitants are noways answerable. Such a misfortune may doubtless sometimes occur to a small state surrounded by larger ones;

Arguments on the other side against interfering with the Poles.

* *Jom.*, ii., 336, 337. *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 209. *Bign.*, vi., 57.

† The determination to refuse the ratification of the treaty signed at Paris by D'Oubril was taken at St. Petersburg on the 25th of August; the Dneister was passed on the 23d of November. The resolution to provoke a Turkish war, therefore, was taken after it was known that a continued struggle with the enemy, whose strength they had felt at Austerlitz, had become inevitable.—*Ann.*, ii., 429.

* *Jom.*, i., 328. *Oginski*, ii., 335, 336, 338.

* *Jom.*, ii., 328. *Oginski*, ii., 337.

but was that the case in the present instance? On the contrary, Poland was originally the most powerful nation in the north: her dominions extended from the Euxine to the Baltic, and from Swabia to Smolensko. All Prussia, great part of the Austrian dominions, and a large portion of Russia, have at different times been carved out of her wide-spread territories. So far from being weaker than Russia, she was originally much stronger; and the standards of the Jagellons and the Piasts have more than once been planted in triumph on the walls of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, her history for the last five hundred years has been nothing but a succession of disasters, illuminated at intervals by transient gleams of heroic achievement; and, notwithstanding the valour of her inhabitants, her frontiers have, from the earliest times, been constantly receding, until at length she became the prey of potentates who had risen to importance by acquisitions reft from herself. So uniform and undeviating a course of misfortune, in a nation so brave, so enthusiastic, and so numerous, as even, at the moment of its partition, to contain sixteen millions of inhabitants, argues some incurable vice in its domestic institutions. It is not difficult to see what this vice was, when we contemplate the uniform and fatal weakness of the executive, the disorders consequent on an elective monarchy, the inveterate and deadly animosity of faction, and the insane Democratic spirit of a plebeian noblesse, which made John Sobieski, a century before its final destruction, prophesy the approaching ruin of the commonwealth.

"Such being the character of Polish institutions, as they have been ascertained by experience, and proved by the ruin of the commonwealth, it becomes a most serious question whether it is for the interest of France, for the aid of such an ally, to incur the certain and inveterate hostility of the three northern powers. That Russia, Prussia, and Austria will thenceforth be combined in an indissoluble alliance against France, if Poland is restored, and the rich provinces now enjoyed by them from its partition wrested from their vast dominions, is evident; and, whatever may be thought of the strength of the Sarmatian levies, there can be but one opinion as to the military resources which they enjoy. What aid can Polish enthusiasm bring to the French standards to counterbalance this strong combination of the greatest military powers of Europe? A hundred thousand horsemen, brave, doubtless, and enthusiastic, but destitute of fortresses, magazines, and resources, and inhabiting a level plain, unprotected by mountains, rivers, or any natural frontier, and open on all sides to the incursions of their well-organized opponents—supposing that, by the aid of the vast army and still vaster reputation of Napoleon, they shall succeed at this time in bearing back the Russian hosts, and wresting Lithuania from their grasp, what may not be apprehended from the appearance of Austria on the theatre of conflict, and the debouching of a hundred and fifty thousand men in the rear of the grand army, when far advanced in the deserts of Moscow? That the cabinet of Vienna is preparing for the conflict is evident; that she is arming is well known; fear and uncertainty as to the future alone restrain her forces; but the stroke which, by restoring Poland, severs Galicia from her empire, will at once determine her policy, and bring the imperial legions in formidable strength to the banks of the Elbe. Even

supposing that, by an unprecedented series of victories, these dangers are averted for the moment, and the French battalions, loaded with honours, regain the Rhine, how is Poland, still torn by intestine faction, and destitute of any solid institutions, to withstand her formidable military neighbours; and how is France, at the distance of four hundred leagues, to protect a power whose internal weakness has always been such that it has never been able to protect itself against its own provinces? If a barrier is to be erected against Russian ambition, and a state formed dependant on the French alliance for its existence, far, better to look for it in Prussia, whose history exhibits as remarkable a rise as that of Poland does a decline, and the solidity of whose institutions, not less than the firmness of its national character, has been decisively exhibited in contending with all the military forces of Europe during the Seven Years' War.*

Pressed by so many difficulties, and struck in an especial manner by the danger of bringing the forces of Austria upon his rear, while engaged in the hardships of a winter campaign in Poland, Napoleon resolved upon a middle course.† Irrevocably fixed upon humbling Prussia to the dust, and entirely indifferent to the irritation which he excited among its people, he resolved to rouse to the uttermost the inhabitants of Prussian Poland, but at the same time sedulously abstain from any invitations to Galicia to revolt, and even held out no encouragement to the Russian provinces of Lithuania to join the standard of Polish independence. Kosciuszko, who, since his heroic achievements in 1794, had lived in retirement near Fontainebleau, was invited by Napoleon to join his countrymen, and a proclamation, drawn in his name, was even published in the French papers, in which he promised speedily to put himself at their head;‡ but the course of time soon dispelled the illusion, and it became painfully evident to the Poles that their illustrious hero, despairing of success, or having no confidence in their pretended allies, was resolved to bear the responsibility of no future insurrections under such auspices. In fact, he had been profoundly affected by the indifference manifested by all the European powers to the fate of Poland on occasion of the last partition, and thoroughly impressed with the idea that no efficacious co-operation could be expected from any of them; and, while he rendered full justice to the military talents of Napoleon, despaired of seeing the deliverance of Sarmatia in good faith attempted by his despotic arms.§ The task of rousing the

* Jom., ii., 329.

† "I love the Poles," said he to Rapp, after having received one of their deputations: "their ardour pleases me. I could wish to render them an independent people, but it is no easy undertaking. Too many nations are interested in their spoils—Austria, Russia, Prussia. If the match is once lighted there is no saying where it would stop. My first duty is towards France, and it is no part of it to sacrifice its interests to Poland; that would lead us too far. We must leave its destinies in the hands of the Supreme Disposer of all things—to Time. It will possibly teach us hereafter what course we ought to pursue."—Bour., vii., 250.

‡ "Kosciuszko," said this fabricated epistle, dated the 1st of November, "is about to place himself in the midst of you. He sees in your deliverers no ambitious conquerors; the great nation is before you; Napoleon expects you; Kosciuszko calls you. I fly to your succour, never more to leave your side. Worthy of the great man whose arm is stretched forth for your deliverance, I attach myself to your cause never again to leave. The bright days of Poland have returned: we are under the ægis of a monarch accustomed to overcome difficulties by miracles."—HARDENBERG, ix., 329.

§ Oginski, ii., 337.

Poles in the Prussian dominions was therefore committed to Dombrowski and Wybicki: the former of whom had acquired a deserved celebrity at the head of the Polish legion in Italy, while the latter possessed such influence with his countrymen as to promise great advantage to the cause of Napoleon.

At the same time, every care was taken to excite the feelings and diminish the apprehensions of the Poles of Prussia: heart-stirring proclamations in Kosciusko's name were addressed to them by the generals of their nation in the Italian army, but that brave man himself, faithful to the oath he had taken to the Emperor of Russia, and aware of the delusive nature of Napoleon's support, refused to take any part in these proceedings, resisted all the brilliant offers which he made to induce him to engage in his service, and even had the boldness, in foreign journals, to disavow the letter which the French government had published in his name. Notwithstanding this reserve, however, the advance of the French armies to Warsaw, and the sedulous care which they took to save the inhabitants from every species of insult or contribution, produced an extraordinary ferment in the Polish provinces: universally they were hailed as deliverers; the substantial benefits, the real protection, the fostering tranquillity of the Prussian administration were forgotten in the recollection of ancient achievements, and, incited by the heart-stirring prospect of coming independence, the nation was fast running into its ancient and ruinous anarchy. The public exultation was at its height when Napoleon arrived at Posen: several regiments were already formed in Prussian Poland, and the arrival of the French troops in Warsaw, which the Russians evacuated at their approach, was universally hailed as the first day of Polish Restoration.*

Napoleon was not insensible to the important effects of this national enthusiasm, both in augmenting the resources of his own army, and intercepting those of his opponents; but, at the same time, he felt the necessity of not rousing all Poland in a similar manner, or incurring the immediate hostility of Austria, by threatening the tenure by which she held her Polish acquisitions. He resolved, therefore, to moderate the general fervour, and confine it to the provinces of Prussia, where it was intended to excite a conflagration; and this was done by the bulletin which appeared on the 1st of December: "The love which the Poles entertain for their country, and the sentiment of nationality, is not only preserved entire in the heart of the people, but it has become more profound from misfortune. Their first passion, the universal wish, is to become again a nation. The rich issue from their chateaus to demand with loud cries the re-establishment of the nation, and to offer their children, their fortune, their influence in the cause. That spectacle is truly touching. Already they have everywhere resumed their ancient costumes, their ancient customs: is, then, the throne of Poland about to be restored, and is the nation destined to resume its existence and independence? From the depth of the tomb is it destined to start into life? God alone, who holds in his hand the combination of great events, is the arbiter of that great political problem, but

certainly never was an event more memorable or worthy of interest." Situated as Napoleon was, the reserve of this language was an act of humanity as well as justice to the unhappy race whose destiny it still held in suspense; but it contributed powerfully to allay the rising enthusiasm of the Russian and Austrian provinces of the ancient commonwealth, and the prudent, despairing of any national resurrection from such an ally, began to ask "if the Restoration of the Republic of Poland could in good faith be expected from the man who had extinguished the liberty of his own country?"†

One chance, and only one, remained to Napoleon of smoothing away the difficulties which surrounded the restoration of Poland, and that consisted in the proposal, which at this time he made to Austria, to exchange its share of Poland for its old province of Silesia. During the negotiation with Prussia for a separate peace, he only held out the prospect of this exchange in a doubtful manner to the cabinet of Vienna; but no sooner had the King of Prussia refused to ratify the armistice of Charlottenberg, than General Anderossey was authorized to propose it formally to that power. Count Stadion replied, that the good faith of the imperial government would not permit them to accept a possession which was not assented to by Prussia; and it would, indeed, have been an extraordinary fault in policy, as well as breach of morality, to have thus despoiled a friendly power and reopened an ancient wound, at the very moment when a concentration of all energies was required to resist the enemy who threatened to destroy all the European states. In consequence of this refusal, the conduct of Napoleon in regard to Poland became still more guarded, and although a provisional government and local administration were formed at Warsaw, yet none but natives of Prussian Poland were admitted to any share in the direction of affairs.‡

While this great political question was under

* Oginski, ii., 339. Bign., vi., 80, 81. Lucches., ii., 226.

† Bign., vi., 90, 91. Hard., ix., 349, 350.

‡ During his stay at Posen the French emperor made, on repeated occasions, the strongest professions Napoleon's strong of his resolution to support the Turks against declaration in fa- the invasion of the Russians. To the Prus- vor of Turkey. sian plenipotentiaries at Charlottenberg he declared, "that the greatest of all the evils which Prussia has occasioned to France by the late war, is the shock they have given to the independence of the Ottoman Porte: as the imperious commands of the Emperor of Russia have brought back to the government of Wallachia and Moldavia the hospodars justly banished from their administration, which, in effect, reduces their principalities to the rank of Russian provinces. But the full and complete independence of the Ottoman Empire will ever be the object most at heart with the emperor, as it is indispensable for the security of France and Italy. He would esteem the successes of the present war of little value if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete independence. In conformity with these principles, the emperor is determined that, until the sultan shall have recovered the full and entire command both of Moldavia and Wallachia, and is completely secured in his own independence, the French troops will not evacuate any part of the countries they have conquered, or which may hereafter fall into their power!" The same resolution was publicly announced in the bulletins, when intelligence of the ill-judged invasion of the principalities arrived; and yet, within six months afterward, Napoleon, though Turkey had faithfully and gallantly stood to the French alliance, under circumstances of extreme peril, as will shortly appear, signed a treaty at Tilsit, by which not only were Wallachia and Moldavia ceded to Russia, but provision was made for the partition of the whole Turkish dominions in Europe!

* Oginski, ii., 337, 338. Hard., ix., 344, 347. Bign., vi., 79, 81.

* Lucches., ii., 186, 187.

His proclamation to his soldiers on the anniversary of Austerlitz.

discussion, during the fortnight that the emperor's stay continued at Posen, the army in great force approached the Vistula; but the severity of the weather, and the incessant fatigue of the troops in the long and dreary marches through that monotonous country at so inclement a season, produced a general feeling of despondency among the soldiers, and gave rise to a fermentation which even Napoleon deemed alarming. To the intoxication consequent on the victory of Jena had succeeded a mortal disquietude, when, immediately after such glorious successes, instead of the cantonments and repose which they expected, they found themselves dragged on in the depth of winter to begin a new campaign, amid pathless snows and gloomy forests. In order to dispel these sinister presentiments, Napoleon took advantage of the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz to address an animating proclamation to his army: "Soldiers!

Dec. 2. you were on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russian battalion fled in terror before you, or, surrounded on all sides, laid down their arms to their conquerors. On the day following they read the words of peace, but they were deceitful. Hardly had they escaped, by the effects of a generosity, perhaps blameable, from the disasters of the third coalition, than they set on foot a fourth; but the new ally on whose skilful tactics they placed all their hopes is already destroyed. His strongholds, his capital, his magazines, two hundred and eighty standards, seven hundred fieldpieces, five first-rate fortresses, are in our power. The Oder, the Warta, the deserts of Poland, have been alike unable to restrain your steps. Even the storms of winter have not arrested you an instant: you have braved all—surmounted all. Everything has flown at your approach. In vain have the Russians endeavoured to defend the capital of the ancient and illustrious Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula; the brave and unfortunate Poles, when they behold you, imagine that they see the soldiers of Sobieski returning from his memorable expedition. Soldiers! we shall not again lay down our arms till a general peace has secured the power of our allies, and restored to our commerce liberty and its colonies. We have conquered on the Elbe and the Oder, Pondicherry, our establishments in the Eastern Seas, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish colonies. Who has given the Russians right to hope that they can balance the weight of destiny? Who has authorized them to overturn such great designs? Are not they and we the soldiers of Austerlitz?"* Even in the forests of Poland, and amid ice and snow, the thoughts of Napoleon were incessantly fixed on England and the East; and it was to overthrow her maritime powers on the banks of the Ganges that a campaign was undertaken in the depth of winter on the shores of the Vistula.

This proclamation, dictated by a profound knowledge of the French character, produced an extraordinary effect upon the soldiers. It was distributed with profusion over all Germany, and none but an eyewitness could credit the influence which it had in restoring the spirit of the men. The veterans in the front line forgot their fatigues and privations, and thought only

of soon terminating the war by a second Austerlitz on the banks of the Vistula: those who were approaching by forced marches in the rear redoubled their exertions to join their comrades in the more forward stations, and counted the days till they gained sight of the eagles which appeared to be advancing to immortal renown. The better to improve upon these dispositions, and at the same time establish a durable record of the glorious achievements of his troops, Napoleon, by a decree published on the same day, gave orders for the erection of a splendid edifice on the site of the convent of the Madeleine, at the end of the Boulevards Italiennes at Paris, with the inscription, "The Emperor Napoleon to the Soldiers of the Grand Army." In the interior were to be inscribed, on tablets of marble, the names of all those who had been present in the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena; on tablets of massy gold, the names of all those who had fallen in those memorable conflicts. There also were to be deposited the arms, statues, standards, colours, and monuments of every description taken during the two campaigns by the grand army. Every year a great solemnity was to commemorate the glory of these memorable days; but, in the discourses or odes made on the occasion, no mention was ever to be made of the emperor: like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, his exploits, it was well known, would only be the more present to the mind from being withdrawn from the sight. This project took a strong hold of the imagination of Napoleon: he gave immediate orders for the formation of plans for the edifice, and the purchase of all the buildings in the vicinity, in order to form a vast circular place of uniform buildings around it; and, as a previous decree had directed the construction of the Bourse or public exchange on that situation, he shortly after directed the minister of the interior to look out for another isolated situation for that structure, "worthy of the grandeur of the capital, and the greatness of the business which will one day be transacted within its walls." Such was the origin of those beautiful edifices, the Church of the Madeleine and the Exchange at Paris; and which, carried on through other reigns and completed under another dynasty with that grandeur of conception and perseverance in execution by which all their public edifices are distinguished, will for centuries attract the world to Paris, as the centre of modern architectural beauty. To the world at that time Napoleon revealed no other design in the structure of the Madeleine than that of a monument to the grand army; but, penetrated with the magnitude of the mission with which he was persuaded he was intrusted of closing the wounds of the Revolution, he in his secret heart destined for it another and a greater object. He intended to have made it an expiatory monument to Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution: a design which he did not propose to declare for ten years, when the fever of Revolutionary ideas was in a great measure exhausted; and therefore it was that he directed its front to face the centre of the Place Louis XV., where those august martyrs had perished, and constructed it on the site of the Madeleine, where their uncoffined remains still lay in an undistinguished grave.*†

Letter, 7th of March, 1807.

* Bour., vii., 254, 255. Bign., vi., 77, 78. Las Cas., i., 370, 371.

† "No one but myself," said he, "could restore the mem-

* Bign., vi., 75, 76. Bour., vii., 251, 252.

The commencement of a winter campaign which would obviously be attended with no ordinary bloodshed, required unusual precautions for the protection of the long line of communication of the grand army, and the efforts of Napoleon were incessant to effect this object. The march of troops through Germany was urged forward with all possible rapidity: some attempts at insurrection in Hesse were crushed with great severity; the conscripts, as they arrived from the Rhine or Italy at the different stations in the Prussian States, organized and sent into the field almost before they had acquired the rudiments of the military art; and the subsidiary contingent of Saxony, Hesse Cassel, and the states of the Rhenish confederacy raised to double their fixed amount. By these means not only were the rear and communications of the grand army preserved from danger, but successive additions to its active force constantly obtained; while at the same time Austria was overawed, whose formidable armaments on the Bohemian frontier already excited the attention of the emperor,* and had given rise to pointed and acrimonious remonstrances from his military envoy, General Anderossey, to the cabinet of Vienna.†

How to maintain these vast and hourly increasing armaments was a more difficult question; but here, too, the indefatigable activity of the emperor, and his grinding system of making war support war, contrived to find

Enormous contributions levied on all the conquered states.

Napoleon's secret design in this edifice. The Bourbons being of his family, and resting on external succour, in striving to do so, would have been considered as only avenging their own cause and increasing the public animosity. I, on the contrary, sprung from the people, would have purified their glory by expelling from their ranks those who had disgraced them; and such was my intention; but it was necessary to proceed with caution; the three expiatory altars at St. Denis were only the commencement; the Temple of Glory, on the foundation of the Madeleine, was destined to be consecrated to this purpose with a far greater eclat. It was there that near their tomb, above their very bones, the monuments of men and the ceremonies of religion would have raised a memorial to the memory of the political victims of the Revolution. This was a secret which was not communicated to above ten persons; but it was necessary to allow it to transpire in some degree to those who were intrusted with the preparation of designs for the edifice. I would not have revealed the design for ten years, and even then I would have employed every imaginable precaution, and taken care to avoid every possibility of offence. All would have applauded it, and no one could have suffered from its effects. Everything, in such cases, depends on the mode and time of execution. Carnot would never have ventured, under my government, to write an apology for the death of the king, but he did so under the Bourbons. The difference lay here, that I would have marched with public opinion to punish it, while public opinion marched with him so as to render him unassailable."—LAS CASAS, i., 370, 371.

* Jom., ii., 332, 333. Bign., vi., 94, 95.

† In an audience of the Emperor of Austria, which that general obtained, he said, with more of military frankness than diplomatic ambiguity, "The Emperor Napoleon fears neither his avowed nor his secret enemies. Judging of intentions by public acts, he is too clear-sighted not to dive into hidden dispositions; and in this view he would infinitely regret if he were compelled to arrive at the conclusion that the considerable armaments which your majesty has had on foot since the commencement of hostilities, were intended to be directed, in certain events, against himself. Your majesty appears to have assembled on the flank of the French army all your disposable forces, with magazines beyond all proportion to their amount. The emperor asks what is the intention of this army while he is engaged with Russia on the banks of the Vistula? Ostensibly intended for the preservation of neutrality, how can such an object be its real destination, when there is not the slightest chance of its being threatened?"—BIGNON, vi., 88

resources. Requisitions of enormous magnitude were made from all the cities in his rear, especially those which had been enriched by the commerce of England: Napoleon seemed resolved that their ill-gotten wealth should, in the first instance, be devoted to the necessities of his troops. The decrees against English commerce were everywhere made a pretext for subjecting the mercantile cities to contributions of astounding amount. Fifty millions of francs (£2,000,000) was in the first instance demanded from Hamburg as a ransom for its English merchandise, seized in virtue of the decree of the 21st of November, and it only escaped by the immediate payment of sixteen millions. In addition to this, that unhappy city, which had taken no part in hostilities against France, was ordered to furnish at once fifty thousand greatcoats for the use of the troops, while Lubeck, which had been successively pillaged by the troops of Blucher and Bernadotte, was compelled to yield up four hundred thousand lasts of corn,* and wood to the value of sixty thousand pounds; Leipsic re-deemed its English merchandise, seized for ten millions of francs (£400,000), while all the other Hanse Towns were subjected to equally severe requisitions; and the great impost of one hundred and sixty-nine millions of francs (£6,200,000), imposed after the battle of Jena, was everywhere collected from the Prussian territories with a rigour which greatly added to its nominal amount. Under pretext of executing the decree against English commerce, pillage was exercised in so undisguised a manner by the French inferior agents, that it attracted in many places the severe animadversion of the chiefs of the army. Thus, while the decrees of the emperor professed to be grounded on the great principle of compelling the English government, by the pressure of mercantile embarrassment, to accede to the liberty of the seas, in their execution they had already departed from their ostensible object; and, while the merchandise seized was allowed to remain in the emporium of British commerce, its confiscation was made a pretext for subjecting their neutral inhabitants to inordinate requisitions for the support of the grand army.†

By these different means Napoleon was enabled, before the middle of December, not only to bring a very great force of the force to bear upon the Vistula, but French on the to have the magazines and equipment necessary for qualifying it to undergo and keep the field during the rigours of a Polish winter in a complete state of preparation. Davoust and Murat had entered Warsaw at the end of November, which was abandoned Nov. 30. by the Prussians at their approach, and two days afterward they crossed the Vistula and occupied the important tête du pont of Dec. 2. Prague on its right bank, which was in like manner evacuated without a struggle; on the

* Each last weighs 2000 kilograms, or about half a ton.—BOUR., vii., 249.

† Bour., vii., 247, 248. Bign., vi., 98, 99. Hard., ix., 371, 372.

‡ As an example at once of the enormous magnitude of these contributions, and the provident care of the emperor for the health and comfort of his troops, reference may be made to his letter to the French governor of Stettin, from whom contributions to the amount of twenty millions (£800,000) was demanded, though the city only contained 32,000 inhabitants. "You must seize goods to the amount of twenty millions, but do it by rule, and give receipts. Take payment as much as possible in kind; the great stores of wine which its cellars contain would be of inestimable importance: it is wine which in winter can alone give the victory."—BIGNON, vi., 99.

right Lannes supported them and spread himself as far as the Bug; while on the left, Ney had already made himself master of Thorn, and marched out of that fortress, supported by the cavalry of Bessières and followed by the corps of Bernadotte; in the centre, Soult and Augereau were preparing with the utmost activity to surmount the difficulties of the passage of the Vistula between Modlin and Wyssogrod; thus, eight corps were assembled ready for active service on the Vistula, which, even after taking into view all the losses of the campaign, and the numerous detachments requisite to keep up the communications in the rear, could in all bring a hundred thousand men into the field, while the powerful re-enforcements on their march through Prussia and Poland promised to enable the emperor to keep up the active force in front at that great numerical amount.*

The Emperor Alexander was far from having an equal force at his disposal. The first army, under Benningsen, consisting of 68 battalions and 125 squadrons, could muster forty-five thousand men, divided into four divisions,* under Osterman Tolstoy, Sacken, Prince Gallitzin, and Sidmaratzki. It arrived on the Vistula in the middle of November: the second, consisting also of 68 battalions and 100 squadrons, arranged in the divisions of Tutschakoff, Doctoroff, Essen, and Aurepp, was about thirty thousand strong, its regiments having not yet recovered the chasms made by the rout of Austerlitz. The wreck of the Prussian forces, reorganized and directed under the able management of General Lestocq, was not more than fifteen thousand men, when the numerous garrisons of Dantzic and Graudentz were completed from its shattered ranks: thus the total allied force was not above ninety thousand strong, and for the actual shock of war in the field not more than seventy-five thousand men could be relied on. This imposing array was under the command of Field-marshal Kamen-skoi, a veteran of the school of Suwarow, nearly eighty years of age, and little qualified to measure swords with the Conqueror of Western Europe; but the known abilities of Benningsen and Buxhowden, the two next in command, would, it was hoped, compensate for his want of experience in the novel art of warfare which Napoleon had introduced. Headquarters had been established at Pultusk since the 12th of November: Warsaw, all the bridges of the Vistula were in the hands of the allies, and the firmness of their countenance gave rise to a belief that they were disposed to dispute the passage of that river with the invaders. Until the arrival of the second army, under Buxhowden, however, which was advancing by forced marches from the Niemen, they were in no condition to keep their ground against the French; and it was deemed better to give them the moral advantage arising from the occupation of the Polish capital, than hazard a general engagement with so decided an inferiority of force. After some

Nov. 12. Nov. 30. inconsiderable skirmishes, therefore, the Russians fell back at all points, their advanced posts were all withdrawn across the Vistula, and Warsaw, evacuated on the 28th, was occupied by Davoust on the 30th of November.†

Sensible of the inferiority of its forces to those which Napoleon had assembled on the Vistula from all the states of Western Europe, the Russian cabinet made an application to the British government for a portion of those subsidies which she had so liberally granted on all former occasions to the powers who combated the common enemy of European independence; and, considering that the whole weight of the contest had now fallen on Russia, and the danger had now approached her own frontiers, they demanded, not without reason, a loan of six millions sterling, of which one was to be paid down immediately for the indispensable expenses connected with the opening of the campaign. It was easy to see, from the answer to this demand now, however, that the spirit of Pitt no longer directed the British councils: the request was refused by the ministry on the part of government, but it was proposed that a loan should be contracted for in England for the service of Russia, and that, for the security of the lenders, the duties on English merchandise, at present levied in the Russian harbours, should be repealed, and in lieu thereof, the same duties should be levied at once in the British harbours, and applied to the payment of the interest of the loan to the British capitalists. This strange proposition, which amounted to a declaration of want of confidence, both in the integrity of the Russian government and the solvency of the Russian finances, was of course rejected, and the result was that no assistance, either in men or money, was afforded by England to her gallant ally in this vital struggle: an instance of parsimony beyond all example calamitous and discreditable, when it is considered that Russia was at that moment bearing the whole weight of France on the Vistula, and that England had at her disposal twenty millions in subsidies, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers in Europe.*

No sooner had the heads of Buxhowden's column began to arrive in the neighbourhood of Pultusk, than Kamen-skoi, whose great age had by no means extinguished the vigour by which he was formerly distinguished, made a forward movement; headquarters were advanced to Nasielsk, and the four divisions of Benningsen's army cantoned between the Ukra, the Bug, and the Narew; while Buxhowden's divisions, as they successively arrived, were stationed be-

under addressed the following proclamation to his soldiers: "Prussia formerly was the barrier between France and Russia, when soldiers.

Napoleon's tyranny extended over all Germany. But now the flame of war has burst out also in the Prussian States, and, after great misfortunes, that monarchy has been struck down, and the conflagration now menaces the frontiers of our territory. It would be useless to prove to the Russians, who love the glory of their country and are ready to undergo every sacrifice to maintain it, how such events have contributed to render our present efforts inevitable. If honour alone compelled us to draw our sword for the protection of our allies, how much more are we now called upon to combat for our own safety? We have, in consequence, taken all the measures which the national security requires: our army has received orders to advance beyond the frontier; Field-marshal Kamen-skoi has been appointed to the command, with instructions to march vigorously against the enemy; all our faithful subjects will unite their prayers to ours to the Most High, who disposes of the fate of empires and battles, that he will protect our just cause, and that his victorious arm and blessing may direct the Russian army employed in the defence of European freedom."—DUMAS, xvii., 94.

* Hard., ix., 399, 400. Bign., vi., 107, 108. Letter to Marquis Douglas, Jan. 13, 1807.

Application for assistance in men and money to England. Its impolitic refusal.

* Dum., xvii., 106, 116. Jom., ii., 337, 338.

† Dum., xvii., 99, 110. Jom., ii., 338, 339. Bign., vi., 109, 110.

‡ Previous to the opening of the winter campaign, Alex-

tween Golymin and Makow; and Lestocq, on the extreme right of the allies, encamped on the banks of the Drewentz, on the great road leading to Thorn, was advanced almost up to the walls of that fortress. The object of this general advance was to circumscribe the French quarters on the right bank of the Vistula; and, as it was known that Napoleon with his Guards was still at Posen, hopes were entertained that his troops would be entirely drawn from the right bank before his arrival, and the river interposed between the winter-quarters of the two armies.*

No sooner did Napoleon hear of this forward movement of the Russians than he broke up from his quarters at Posen, and arrived at Warsaw two days afterward. No words can do justice to the warlike and patriotic enthusiasm which burst forth in that capital when they beheld the hero, whom they hailed as their deliverer, actually within their walls, and saw the ancient arms of Poland affixed to the door of the hotel where the provisional government of Prussian Poland was established. The nobility flocked into the capital from all quarters: the peasantry everywhere assembled in the cities, demanding arms; the national dress was generally resumed; national airs universally heard; several regiments of horse were speedily raised, and, before the conclusion of the campaign, thirty thousand men were enrolled in disciplined regiments from the Prussian provinces alone of the ancient monarchy. Still the general enthusiasm did not make Napoleon forget his policy: the provisional government was established by a decree of the emperor, only "until

the fate of Prussian Poland was determined by a general peace;" and the prudent began to entertain melancholy presages in regard to the future destiny of a monarchy thus agitated by the passion of independence and the generous sentiments of patriotic ardour, with only a quarter of its former inhabitants to maintain the struggle against its numerous and formidable enemies.†

Having taken the precaution to establish strong *têtes du pont* at Prague, Modlin, Thorn, and all the bridges which he held over the Vistula, Napoleon lost not an instant in resuming the offensive, in order to repel this dangerous incursion of the enemy. Davoust, who formed the advanced guard of the army, was pushed forward from Prague on the road towards Pultusk, and soon arrived on the Bug; and, after having reconnoitred the whole left bank of that river, from its confluence with the Narew to its junction with the Vistula, made preparations for effecting the passage at Okernin, a little below the junction with the Ukra. The Cossacks and Russian outposts lined the opposite bank, and the difficulties of the passage were considerable; but the Russians were not in sufficient force to dispute it in a serious manner; and, after some sharp skirmishing, the experienced talents of General Gauthier, who was intrusted with the enterprise, established the French on the right bank, where they soon after sustained a severe action with the Russian advanced guard at Czarnowo. The Russians, however, returned in greater force; and

the result was, that all the French advanced guards which had been passed over were cut off, and their detachment fell back to the *tête du pont* established at the river. Meanwhile Soult advanced on the left to Ploussk, and Ney and Bernadotte, with a portion of Murat's cavalry, moved forward to Soldan and Biezun from Thorn, in such a manner as to threaten to interpose between the detached corps under Lestocq and Benningesen's main body, which was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Pultusk.*

This partisan warfare continued for ten days without any decisive result on either side; but the arrival of Napoleon at Warsaw was the signal for the commencement of more important operations. On the 23d of December, at day-break, he set out from that capital for the army, with the guards and Lannes' corps, and no sooner arrived at the advanced posts of Davoust than he dictated on the spot directions for the forcing the passage of the Ukra, which had hitherto bounded all their incursions.† The operation was carried into effect with the happiest success at Czarnowo, and that ardour with which the presence of the emperor never failed to animate the troops. After a severe action of fourteen hours the passage was forced, and Count Osterman, who commanded the Russian rear-guard, retreated upon Nasielsk. In this well-contested affair each party had to lament the loss of about a thousand men. Kamenskoï, finding the barrier which covered the front of his position forced, gave orders for concentrating his forces towards Pultusk, and the allies accordingly fell back at all points. They were vigorously pursued by the French, and another desperate conflict took place in front of Nasielsk between General Rapp and the Russians under Count Osterman Tolstoy, in which the latter were worsted, but not without a severe loss to the enemy; and the opposite bodies had become so intermingled that Colonel Ouwaroff, an aid-de-camp of Alexander, was made prisoner by the French, while Count Philippe de Ségur, destined for future celebrity as the historian of the still more memorable campaign of 1812, and attached to Napoleon's household, fell into the hands of the Russians. On the same day, Augereau fought from daybreak till sunset at Lochoczyn with the divisions opposed to him, which at length began to retire. Thus the Russians, pierced in the centre by the passage of the Ukra at Czarnowo and the combat at Nasielsk, were everywhere in full retreat. No decisive advantage had been gained, but the initiative had been taken from the enemy, and his divisions, separated from each other, were thrown into eccentric lines of retreat, which promised every moment to separate them more widely from each other.‡

* *Jom.*, ii., 339. *Dum.*, xvii., 126, 132. *Wilson*, 73, 74.

† Napoleon, says Rapp, no sooner arrived in sight of Okernin than he reconnoitred the position of the Russians, and the plain which it was necessary to pass before arriving at the river. Covered with woods, intersected by marshes, it was almost as difficult to traverse as the fieldworks, which were bristling with Cossacks, were to carry on the opposite bank. The emperor surveyed them long and with close attention; but, as the thickets of wood in some places intercepted his view, he caused a ladder to be brought, and ascended to the roof of a cottage, where he completed his observations. He then said, "It will do—send an officer;" and, when he arrived, dictated on the spot the minute directions for the movement of all the corps during the operation, which are preserved in *Dumas*, xvii., 137.—*Vide RAPP*, 125.

‡ *Wilson*, 75, 76. *Jom.*, ii., 340. *Dum.*, xvii., 140, 153.

* *Dum.*, xvii., 121, 125. *Jom.*, ii., 339. *Bign.*, vi., 110.

† *Bign.*, vi., 92. *Camp. de Saxe*, iii., 178, 179.

Kamenskoi, though a gallant veteran, was altogether unequal to the perilous crisis which had now arrived. The army, separated into two parts, of which one was moving upon Golymin, the other falling back towards Pultusk, was traversing a continual forest, through roads almost impassable from the mud occasioned by a long-continued thaw, and the passage of innumerable carriages, which had broken it up in all parts. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, he issued orders to sacrifice the artillery, which impeded the retreat, gave directions to stop the supplies destined for the army at Grodno, and himself took the road of Lomza.

Deeming such an order wholly unnecessary, and the result of that approaching insanity which soon after entirely overset the mind of the veteran marshal, Benningsen took upon himself the bold step of disobeying it; and, in order to gain time for the artillery and equipages to defile in his rear, resolved to hold fast in the position of PULTUSK, with all the troops which he had at his disposal. Nothing could be more acceptable to the Russians, to whom the fatigues and privations of a retreat, at a season when sixteen hours out of the twenty-four were involved in total darkness, and the roads, bad at all times, were in many places several feet deep of mud, had been the severest trial of discipline and courage. No sooner, however, was it known that they were marching towards a chosen field of battle than their hardships and difficulties were all forgotten, and the troops which, from midday on the 25th, successively arrived at Pultusk, took up their ground in parade order, full of enthusiasm for the battle on the morrow. Before it was dark, sixty battalions and fifty-five squadrons, with one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, in all about forty thousand men, were here assembled, while the divisions of Doctoroff, Sacken, and Gallitzin were opposed at GOLYMIN to Augereau's corps, two divisions of Davoust's, and part of Murat's cavalry. Three Russian divisions, viz., those of Essen, Aurepp, and Tutschakoff, were at such a distance in the rear both of Pultusk and Golymin, that they could not be expected to take any part in the actions which were approaching.*

The object of Napoleon in these complicated operations was in the highest degree important; and the vigour of movements. Benningsen and Prince Gallitzin, joined to the extreme shortness of the days and the horrible state of the roads, alone saved the allies from a repetition of the disasters of Auerstadt and Jena. His right wing, under Lannes, was intended to cut Benningsen's army off from the great road through Pultusk; his centre, under Davoust, Augereau, Soult, and Murat, was destined to penetrate by Golymin and Makow to Ostrolenka, directly in the rear of that town and two marches between Benningsen and the Russian frontier; while the left wing, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, interposed between Lestocq and the Russian centre, and threw him back into Eastern Prussia, where, driven up to the sea, he would soon, if the Russians were disposed of, be compelled, like Blücher, to surrender. A more masterly project never was conceived: it was precisely a repetition of the semicircular route of his left wing under Bernadotte, round Mack at Ulm; and the hesitation of Ka-

menskoi between an advance and a retrograde movement served to offer every facility for the success of the enterprise. The celerity of the Russian retreat, the sacrifice of seventy pieces of their heavy artillery, and the dreadful state of the roads, which impeded the French advance, and the impervious intervening country, which separated their numerous corps from each other, alone defeated this profound combination, and brought their corps to Pultusk and Golymin a few hours before the enemy, who were there destined to fall upon their retreating columns, or bar the road to the frontiers of Russia.*

The position of Pultusk is the only one in that country where the ground is so far cleared of wood as to permit of any considerable armies combating each other in a proper field of battle: an open and cultivated plain on this side of the River Narew there stretches out to the south and east of that town, which lies on the banks of its meandering stream—a succession of thickets surround this open space in all directions, excepting that on which the town lies; and on the inside of them the ground rises to a semicircular ridge, from whence it gradually slopes down towards the town on one side, and the forest on the other; so that it is impossible, till this barrier is surmounted, to get a glimpse even of the buildings. There the Russians were drawn up in admirable order in two lines: their left resting on the town of Pultusk, their right on the wood of Moszyn, which skirted the little plain, the artillery in advance; but a cloud of Cossacks swarmed in front of the array, and prevented either the force or composition of the enemy from being seen by the French as they advanced to the attack. Sacken had the command of the left; Count Osterman Tolstoy of the right; Barclay de Tolly, with twelve battalions and ten squadrons, occupied a copse-wood in front of the right; Benningsen was stationed in the centre—names destined to immortal celebrity in future wars, and which, even at this distant period, the historian can hardly enumerate without a feeling of exultation and the thrilling interest of former days.†

Lannes, with his own corps, and the division Gudin from that of Davoust—in all about thirty-five thousand men—resolved to force the enemy in this position, and for this purpose he, early on the morning of the 26th, advanced to the attack. The woods which skirted the little plain occupied by the Russian light troops in front of their position were forced by the French voltigeurs, after an obstinate resistance, and a battery which galled their advance, and which could not be withdrawn, carried by assault; but no sooner had Lannes, encouraged by this success, surmounted the crest of the ridge, and advanced into the open plain, than the cloud of Cossacks dispersed to the right and left, and exposed to view the Russian army in two lines, in admirable order, with a hundred and twenty guns disposed along its front. Astonished, but not panic-struck by so formidable an opposition, Lannes still continued to press forward, and as his divisions successively cleared the thickets and advanced to the crest of the hill, they deployed into line. This operation, performed under the fire of all the Russian cannon, to which the French had as

Description of the field at Pultusk, and of the positions of the two hostile bodies.

Battle of Pultusk.

Dec. 26.

* Wilson, 77, 80. Jom., ii., 341. Dum., xvii., 159, 162. Vol. II.—O o o

* Jom., ii., 340, 341. Dum., xvii., 162, 164.

† Wilson, 77, 78. Jom., ii., 341. Dum., xvii., 162, 165.

yet none of equal number to oppose, was executed with admirable discipline, but attended with a very heavy loss, and the ground was already strewn with dead bodies when the line was so far formed as to enable a general charge to take place. It was attended, however, with very little success: the soil, cut up by the passage of so many horses and carriages, was in many places knee deep of mud; heavy snow showers at intervals obscured the heavens and deprived the French gunners of the sight of the enemy, while the Russian batteries, in position and served with admirable skill, alike in light and darkness sent their fatal storm of grape and round-shot through the ranks of the assailants. Notwithstanding these obstacles, however, the French advanced with their wonted intrepidity to the attack, and gradually the arrival of their successive batteries rendered the fire of cannon on the opposite sides more equal. Suchet, who commanded the first line, insensibly gained ground, especially on the right, where the division of Barclay was stationed; but Benningsen, seeing the danger, re-enforced that gallant officer with fresh troops; a battalion of the French infantry was broken and cut to pieces by the Russian horse, and the rout in that quarter became so serious that Lannes was compelled to advance in person with his reserve to repair the disorder. By these efforts the forward movement of the Russians in that direction was arrested, and their victorious columns, charged in flank, while disordered by the rapidity of their advance, were forced to give ground, and resume their former position in front of Pultusk.*

Meanwhile Suchet, on the left of the French, had commenced a furious attack on the advanced post in the wood on the right of the Russians, occupied by Barclay de Tolly. After a violent struggle the Russians were driven back; re-enforced from the town, they again regained their ground and drove the French out of the wood in disorder. Lannes, at the head of the 34th regiment, flew to the menaced point, and again, in some degree, restored the combat; but Barclay had regained his lost position, and menaced the French extreme left. Osterman Tolstoy brought up the Russian reserve, and after a murderous conflict, which lasted long after it was dark, a frightful storm separated the combatants. Neither party could boast of decided success; but the Russians remained masters of the field of battle till midnight, when they crossed the Narew by the bridge of Pultusk, and resumed their retreat in the most orderly manner, while the French also retreated to such a distance that next day the Cossacks, who patrolled eight miles from the field of battle towards Warsaw, could discover no traces of the enemy. The losses were severe on both sides: on that of the French they amounted to six thousand men; on that of the Russians nearly five thousand; and the twelve guns which they lost in the morning were never regained.†

On the same day on which this bloody battle took place at Pultusk a serious conflict also occurred at Golymin, about thirty miles from the former field of battle. Davoust and Augereau, supported by a large party of Murat's cavalry, there attacked

Prince Gallitzin, who, with fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons, had taken post at the entrance of the town to gain time for his artillery and carriages to defile through the forest in his rear. His force was successively augmented, however, in the course of the day by the arrival of other troops from Sacken and Doctoroff's corps, and before nightfall twenty-eight battalions and forty squadrons were assembled in line. Operations in that quarter began at daylight Dec. 24. on the 24th, which in that inclement season was at eight in the morning; the bridge of Kollosump, over the Ukra, was carried by a brilliant charge by Colonel Savary; but that of Choczyn resisted all their efforts, and it was only when it became no longer tenable, from the number who had crossed at Kollosump, that orders for the evacuation of the post were given. Continuing his march all the succeeding day, Augereau found himself, on the morning of the 26th, in presence of Prince Dec. 26. Gallitzin, who was advantageously posted on the right of Golymin. As the French battalions and squadrons successively arrived on the ground, and deployed to the right or left, they were severely galled by the Russian artillery stationed in front of their positions; but they bravely formed line, and advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the attack, though few of their guns could as yet be brought up to reply to the enemy. The resistance, however, was as obstinate as the assault was impetuous, and, despite all their efforts, the French, after several hours' hard fighting, had not gained any ground from the enemy. But, while this severe conflict was going on in front, a division of Murat's cavalry, advancing on the road from Czarnowo, was discerned driving before it a body of Cossacks who had been stationed in that village, while a powerful mass of Davoust's infantry, which had broken up that morning from Stretzegoczin, joined the horse in front of Czarnowo, and their united mass, above fifteen thousand strong, bore down upon the troops of Gallitzin, already wearied by a severe combat of several hours' duration.*

This great addition to the attacking force must have proved altogether fatal to the Russian troops had they not shortly ^{its doubtful issue.} after received considerable re-enforcements from the corps of Doctoroff and Tutschakoff, which in some degree restored the equality of the combat. Davoust, with the divisions of Morand and Friant, so well known from their heroic conduct on the plateau of Auerstadt, charged vehemently through the woods which skirted the open space in front of Golymin: throwing off their haversacks, the Russian infantry met them with the bayonet, but, after repulsing the French advance, they were themselves arrested by the murderous fire of the tirailleurs in the wood. Nearly encircled, however, by hourly increasing enemies, Prince Gallitzin withdrew his troops towards evening into the village, but there maintained himself with heroic constancy till nightfall, vigorously repulsing the repeated attacks of the conquerors of Jena and Auerstadt. Davoust, after occupying all the woods round the town, detached a brigade of horse to cut off the communication by the great road with Pultusk; and they succeeded in clearing the causeway of the Cossacks and light horse

* Dum., xvii., 164, 168. Jom., ii., 342. Wilson, 79, 80. Rapp, 127.

† Wilson, 79, 80. Jom., ii., 341, 342. Dum., xvii., 168, 174.

* Dum., xvii., 176, 182. Wilson, 82. Jom., ii., 342. Rapp, 127.

who were posted on it. But the French dragons, following up their success, were assailed by so murderous a fire from the Russian voltigeurs stationed in the marshes on either side of the road, that half their number were slain: General Rapp, while bravely heading the column, had his left arm broken, and the discomfited remnant sought refuge behind the ranks of their infantry. When night closed on this scene of blood, neither party had gained any decisive advantage; for if the French had taken twenty-six pieces of cannon and a large train of carriages which had stuck fast in the mud, the Russians still held the town of Golymin, and had inflicted upon them a loss of above four thousand men,* while they had not to lament the destruction of more than half the number, in consequence, chiefly, of their great superiority in artillery to their assailants. As the order for retreat still held good, Prince Gallitzin at midnight resumed his march for Ostrolenka.†

Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance thus experienced by his lieutenants on both the roads on which his corps were advancing, and the unsatisfactory issue of the combats in which they had been engaged, Napoleon was still not without hopes of effecting the grand object of his designs, the isolating and surrounding the enemy's centre or left wing. On the extreme left of the French, Bernadotte and Ney had succeeded, after several

severe actions, particularly one at Soldan, which was taken and retaken several times, and where the Prussians behaved with the most heroic resolution, in interposing between Lestocq and the Russian forces on the Ukra, and throwing the Prussian general back towards Königsberg; and if Soult could have effected the movement on Makow which was prescribed to him, he would have been directly in the rear of the troops who had combated at Pultusk and Golymin, who must have been reduced to the necessity of laying down their arms, or cutting their way through against great odds. But the frightful state of the roads, which in many places were three feet deep of mud, and the rudeness of the season, which alternately deluged the marching columns with drenching rain, driving sleet, and melting snow, rendered it totally impossible for that enterprising officer to effect the forced marches necessary to outstrip and get into the rear of the enemy; and the Russians, retiring to Ostrolenka and Hohenstein, still found the line of their retreat open. On the 28th, Napoleon advanced his headquarters to Golymin, but having received there certain intelligence that the Russians must arrive at Makow before Soult could possibly get there, he saw the object of the campaign was frustrated, and resolved to put his troops into winter-quarters: on that day, accordingly, he issued orders to stop the advance of the troops at all points: they were put into cantonments between the Narew and the Ukra, and the emperor himself returned with the guards to Warsaw.‡

On the side of the Russians repose had become

nearly as necessary: the weather was as unfavourable to them as to the French; their infantry, equally with the enemy's, had shivered up to the knees in mud at Pultusk; their cavalry, equally with his, sunk in the marshes of Golymin; the breaking up of the roads was more fatal to them than their opponents, as the guns or chariots which were left necessarily fell into hostile hands, and experience had already begun to evince,* what more extended observation has since abundantly confirmed, that exposure to an inclement season was more fatal to the troops of the north than the south of Europe. In these circumstances, it was with the most lively satisfaction that they perceived that Napoleon was disposed to discontinue the contest during the remainder of the rigorous season; and their troops, retiring from the theatre of this bloody strife, were put into cantonments on the left bank of the Narew, after having evacuated the town and burned the bridge of Ostrolenka.†

This desperate struggle in the forests of Poland in the depth of winter made the most lively impression in Europe. Independent of the interest excited by the extraordinary spectacle of two vast armies, numbering between them a hundred and fifty thousand combatants, prolonging their hostility in the most inclement season, and engaging in deperate conflicts amid storms of snow, and when the soldiers on both sides were often sunk up to the middle in morasses, bivouacking for sixteen hours together without covering on the cold, damp ground, or plunging fearlessly into streams swollen by the rains and charged with the ice of a Polish winter, there was something singularly calculated to awaken the passions in the result of this fearful contest. Both parties loudly claimed the victory: *Te Deum* was sung at St. Petersburg; the cannon of the Invalides roared at Paris; and Benningsen, imitating in his official despatches the exaggerated accounts of the bulletins, asserted a complete victory at Pultusk, under circumstances where a more faithful chronicler would only have laid claim to the honour of a divided combat. The French indignantly repelled the aspersion on their arms, and pointed with decisive effect to the cantonments of their troops for evidence that the general result of the struggle had been favourable to their arms. But though there was no denying this, when the Russian troops, instead of having their advanced posts between the Bug and the Vistula, had now retired behind the Narew at Ostrolenka, still enough was apparent on the face of the campaign to excite the most vivid hopes on the one side, and serious apprehensions on the other throughout Europe. It was not to win merely eighty miles of forest, interspersed with the wretched hamlets or squalid towns of Poland, that the emperor had left Warsaw at the dead of winter and put so vast an army in motion over a line thirty leagues in length: there was no claiming of the victory on both sides at Austerlitz or Jena; the divided trophies of the late engagements indicated a struggle of a very different character from those which had preceded them; it was evident that the torrent of French conquest, if not averted, had been at least stemmed. The interest excited by these

The Russians also go into winter-quarters.

Results of this winter-campaign, and impression which it produces in Europe.

* The 47th Bulletin admits a loss of 800 killed and 2000 wounded on the part of the French at Golymin and Pultusk; and as their usual practice was to allow only a loss of a third to a fourth of its real amount, this would seem to imply that they lost on these occasions at least 10,000 or 12,000 men.—See 47th Bulletin in *Camp, en Prusse*, iii., 222.

† Rapp, 127, 128. Dum., xvii., 183, 185.
‡ Dum., xvii., 185, 191. Jom., ii., 342, 343. Wilson, 82, 83.

* Larrey's *Surgical Campaign*.

† Dum., xvii., 191, 194. Jom., ii., 344.

events, accordingly, was intense over all Europe, but especially in England and Germany, and hopes began to be entertained that the obstinate valour of the North would at length put a stop to the calamities which had so long desolated Europe. Happy would it have been if the cabinet either of Vienna or St. James's had improved on these dispositions, and taken advantage of the pause in the career of universal conquest to render effectual aid to the powers who now threw the last die for the independence of Europe on the shores of the Vistula.*

The French army, which was now put into positions of the winter-quarters, amounted to one French army hundred and sixty thousand men, in winter-quarters, and was accompanied by forty thousand horse: so wonderfully had the levies in France and the allied states compensated the prodigious consumption of human life during the bloody battles and wasteful marches which had occurred since they arrived on the banks of the Saale. The cantonments, from the extreme right to left, extended over a space of fifty leagues, forming beyond the Vistula the chord of the arc which that river describes in its course from Warsaw to Dantzic. The left wing, under Bernadotte, was, from its position, most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; but no apprehensions were entertained of its being disquieted, as that marshal had fifty-five thousand men under his command, and could speedily receive succour, in case of need, from Marshal Ney, whose rallying-point was Osterode, and who lay next to his right. The centre and right wing, nearly a hundred thousand strong, were almost detached from the left wing, and lay more closely together on either side of Warsaw.†

How to provide subsistence for so great a multitude amid the forests and marshes of Poland was no easy matter; for its fertile plains, though the granary of Western Europe, raise their admirable wheat crops only for exportation, and present, in proportion to their extent of level surface, fewer resources for an army than any country in Europe. But it was in such subordinate, though necessary cares, that the admirable organization and indefatigable activity of the emperor shone most conspicuous. Innumerable orders, which for a long time back had periodically issued from headquarters, had brought all the resources of Germany to the supply of the army in Poland. Convoys from all quarters were incessantly converging towards the Vistula, and supplies of every sort, not only for the maintenance of the soldiers, but for the sick and the wounded, as well as the munitions of war, transported in many thousand carriages, were, from the Rhine and the Danube, to be had in abundance. So great was the activity in the rear of the army, that the roads through Prussia bore rather the appearance of a country enriched by the extended commerce of profound peace than of a district lately ravaged by the scourge of war. Great hospitals were established at Thorn, Posen, and Warsaw; thirty thousand tents, taken from the Prussians, cut down into bandages for the use of the wounded; immense magazines formed all along the Vistula, and formidable intrenchments erected to protect the *têtes du pont* of Prague, Thorn, and Modlin on the Vistula, and Sierock on the Narew. Though the blockade

of Dantzic was not yet formally commenced, yet it was necessary to neutralize the advantages which the enemy derived from the possession of so important a fortress on the right of their line; and for this purpose a French division, united to the contingent of Baden and the Polish levies, was formed into the tenth corps, and placed under the command of Marshal Lefebvre. It soon amounted to 27,000 men, and began to observe the fortresses of Dantzic and Colberg;* while Napoleon evinced his sense of the dubious nature of the struggle in which he was engaged, by sending for his experienced lieutenant, Massena, from the scene of his easy triumphs amid the sunny hills of Calabria, to a sterner conflict on the frozen fields of Poland.

The repose of the army at Warsaw was no period of rest to the emperor. Great successive re-care was taken to keep alive the duction of the spirits of the Poles, and conceal fortresses in Silesia. from them the dubious issue of the late conflict; and for this purpose it was announced that almost all the prisoners taken from the Russians had either been marched off for France, or already entered the ranks of the grand army, while the eighty pieces of cannon, which they had been forced to leave behind them in their retreat, were ostentatiously placed before the palace of the Republic. Orders were at the same time sent to Jerome to press the siege of the fortresses in Silesia which still remained in the hands of the Prussians. The pusillanimous and unaccountable surrender of Stettin, Custring, and Glogau has already been mentioned;† and in the consequences which immediately flowed from these disgraceful derelictions Dec. 2. of duty was soon made manifest of what vast importance it is that all officers, even in commands apparently not very considerable, should, under all circumstances, adhere to the simple line of duty, instead of entering into capitulations from the supposed pressure of political considerations. The transport of artillery and a siege equipage from the Rhine or the Elbe to the Oder would have taken a very long period, and prolonged the reduction of the interior line of the Prussian fortresses; but the surrender of Custring to the summons of a regiment of infantry and two pieces of cannon, enabled Vandamme speedily to surround Glogau with a formidable battering-train, which, before the first parallel was completed, induced its feeble governor to lower his colours. From the vast military stores captured in that town a battering-train for the reduction of Breslaw was immediately obtained, and forwarded along the Oder with such rapidity that on the 15th of December Dec. 15. the trenches before that place, the capital of Silesia, *à cheval* on the Oder, and a fortress of the first order, were opened, and a heavy bombardment kept up upon the town. The defence, however, was much more creditable to the Prussian character, and proved of what inestimable importance it would have been to the monarchy had the French arms been in like manner delayed before the walls of the other fortresses. Twice during its continuance Prince Anhalt, who, with a few battalions and a levy of peasants, still maintained himself in Upper Silesia, approached the besiegers' lines, and endeavoured to throw succours into the town; but on the first occasion his efforts were frustrated by the vigilance of the

* Wilson, 82, 83. Dum., xvii., 206.

† Dum. xvii., 198, 208. Jom., ii., 344.

* Jom., ii., 345. Dum., xvii., 205, 208. Ann. Reg., 1807, 3.

† Ante, ii., 452.

French and Bavarians, who formed the covering force; and in the last attack he was totally defeated, with the loss of two thousand men. Dec. 31. Soon after, a severe frost deprived him of the protections of the wet ditches, and the governor, despairing of being relieved, and seeing the besiegers' succours rapidly and hourly augmenting by the arrival of military stores from Glogau, surrendered, with the garrison of six thousand men: the private men being prisoners of war, the officers dismissed on their parole, not to serve against France till exchanged. By this acquisition, 300 pieces of cannon and immense military stores of all sorts fell into the hands of the conquerors.*

This great achievement made the reduction of the other fortresses in Silesia a matter of comparative ease, by furnishing, close at hand, all the resources necessary for their reduction. They were almost forgotten, accordingly, and fell, without being observed, into the hands of the invaders. Brieg surrendered almost as soon as it was invested. Kosel

Jan. 17. fell in silence, after a siege of a few days! Napoleon, delighted with these acquisitions, which entirely secured the right flank of his army, and were of the greater importance from the menacing aspect of the force which Austria was collecting on the Bohemian frontier, named Jerome Bonaparte governor of the province of Silesia; and, after having drawn all the resources out of its rich cities and powerful fortresses which they were capable of yielding, for the prosecution of operations against Dantzic and the strongholds on the Lower Vistula, despatched Vandamme, with twelve thousand men, to besiege Schweidnitz, Neiss, and Glatz, the only remaining towns in the upper province which still hoisted the Prussian colours. The reduction of these strong fortresses, which had been the object of several campaigns to the Great Frederic, did not take place for some months afterward, and was hardly noticed by Europe amid the whirl of more important events on the Lower Vistula.†

The task of reducing the fortified towns on the Lower Oder, and between that and the Vistula, was allotted to Marshal Mortier. He took a position, in the middle of December, at Anclam; and, upon his approach, the Swedish forces retired to Stralsund. While in this station he drew his posts round Colberg, and several skirmishes occurred with the Prussian garrisons of that place. Matters remained in that situation till the end of January, when the blockade of Stralsund was more closely established, which continued till the conclusion of the campaign. More important operations took

place at Dantzic and Graudentz, the siege of both which places was much facilitated by the great military stores taken in the towns of Silesia. They were brought down the Oder to near its mouth, and then transported by land to the neighbourhood of these fortresses; and with such vigour did Marshal Lefebvre push forward the operations, especially against the former of these towns, that before the end of January considerable progress had been made in the works.*

On the return of Napoleon to Warsaw, he received detailed accounts of the operations of Marmont in Illyria since the commencement of hostilities in Illyria.

October. For a long period, and during the time when it was understood that a negotiation was on foot between the two governments, a sort of tacit suspension of arms existed between the French marshal and the Russians; but when it was distinctly ascertained that hostilities had been resumed, the flames of war extended to the smiling shores of the Adriatic Sea. The Russians, strengthened by the arrival of Admiral Siniavin with a powerful squadron, resumed the offensive, and compelled Marmont to abandon the point of Ostro, and fall back on Old Ragusa, where he fortified himself in a strong position in front of the town, and resolved to await the arrival of his flotilla and re-enforcements. Encouraged by this retrograde movement, the Russians, six thousand strong, supported by some thousand Montenegrs, Sept. 29. advanced to the attack; but they were anticipated by the French general, and after a sharp action the new levies were dispersed, and the regular troops compelled to take refuge within the walls of Castelnuovo, after sustaining a loss of six hundred men.†

At the same period, a courier from Constantinople brought intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte against Russia. This was an event of the very highest importance, promising, as it did, to effect so powerful a diversion in the Russian forces; and Napoleon therefore resolved to improve to the uttermost so auspicious a change by contracting the closest alliance with the Turkish government. Though General Michelson had early gained considerable advantage, and was advancing towards Belgrade, which had fallen into the hands of Czerny George and the insurgent Georgians, yet the disasters of the Prussian war had opened the eyes of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, when it was too late, to the imprudence of which they had been guilty in engaging at once in two such formidable contests; and thirty-six battalions and forty squadrons (about twenty-five thousand men) were ordered to advance with all possible rapidity from the plains of Moldavia to the banks of the Bug. Desirous to derive every possible advantage from this great diversion, Napoleon sent instructions to his ambassador at Constantinople, General Sebastiani, to use the greatest efforts to induce the Turkish government to enter vigorously into the contest; while to Marshal Marmont he gave orders to send French officers into all the Ottoman provinces, with orders to do their utmost everywhere to rouse the Mussulman population against the Moscovite invaders;‡ while the relations of France with Persia

Napoleon's efforts to stimulate the Turks to vigorous resistance.

* Dum., xvii., 214, 223. Jom., ii., 250. Ann. Reg., 1807, 22. Dum., xvii., 95, 101. Jom., ii., 251.

† As fast as these fortresses in Silesia fell into the hands of Napoleon, they were, by his orders, totally dismantled and their fortifications razed to the ground. Their inhabitants were seized with consternation when they beheld these rigorous orders carried into full execution, and anticipated a total separation from the Prussian monarchy, to which they were much attached, from so complete a destruction of the barrier raised with so much care, both against Austria and Russia. Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the determination of the French emperor to reduce Prussia to the rank of a third-rate power; but the policy, with reference to the future interests both of France and Germany, of destroying the chief barrier of both against Moscovite aggression, was extremely doubtful.—See MONTVERAN, *Hist. Const. de la Situation de l'Angleterre en 1816*, 147, and DUM., xvii., 99, 100.

* Dum., xvii., 223, 237. Jom., ii., 387.

† Dum., xvii., 240, 256.

‡ These instructions to Marmont are well worthy of attention, both as evincing the views Napoleon already enter-

and Turkey were considered of such paramount importance that they were made the subject of a special message to the Senate, which declared "the Emperor of Persia, tormented, as Poland was for sixty years, by the intrigues of Russia, is animated by the same sentiments as the Turks. He has resolved to march upon the Caucasus to defend his dominions. Who could number the duration of the wars, the number of campaigns, which would be required one day to repair the calamities consequent upon the Russians obtaining possession of Constantinople? Were the tiara of the Greek faith raised again, and extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we should see in our own days our provinces attacked by clouds of barbarians; and if, in that tardy struggle, civilized Europe should happen to fall, our culpable indifference would justly excite the reproaches of posterity, and would become a subject of opprobrium in history." Memorable words! when the events which subsequent times have brought about, and the objects of political apprehensions in our own time, are taken into view.*

The residence of the French generals and officers at Warsaw appeared a perfect Delightful residence of Elysium after the fatigues and privations to which they had been exposed. The society of that capital is well known to be one of the most agreeable in Europe, from the extraordinary talents and accomplishments of the women of rank of which it is composed. No person can have mingled in those delightful circles without perceiving that the Polish women are the most fascinating in Europe. Endowed by nature with an ardent temperament, an affectionate disposition, and an exalted imagination, they have, at the same

tained in regard to the Ottoman Empire, and setting in a clear light his subsequent perfidious conduct in abandoning that power to the ambition of Russia, by the treaty of Til-
Jan. 2, 1807. sit. "A courier, just arrived from Constantinople, has announced that war against Russia is declared: great enthusiasm prevails at that capital; twenty regiments of janizaries have just set out from its walls for the Danube, and twenty more will speedily follow from Asia. Sixty thousand men are at Hersova, Paswan Oglou has assembled twenty thousand at Widdin. Send immediately five engineer officers and as many of artillery to Constantinople: aid the pachas in every possible way with counsel, provision, and ammunition. It is not unlikely that I may send you with 25,000 men to Widdin, and there you will enter into the system of the grand army, of which you would form the extreme right. Twenty-five thousand French, supported by sixty thousand Turks, would soon force the Russians not to leave 30,000 men on the Danube, as they have done, but to forward twice that number to defend their own frontiers in that quarter. Send twenty or thirty officers to the pachas, if they demand so many; but the period for the employment of troops is not yet arrived. The Turks may be relied on as faithful allies, because they hate the Russians: therefore be not sparing in your supplies of all sorts to them. An ambassador from Persia as well as Turkey has just been at Warsaw; the court of Ispahan also, as the sworn enemy of Russia, may be relied on as our friend. Our relations with the Eastern powers are now such that we may look forward shortly to transporting 40,000 men to the gates of Ispahan, and from thence to the shores of the Indus: projects which formerly appeared chimerical are now no longer so, when I receive ambassadors from the sultan, testifying a serious alarm at the progress of Russia, and the strongest confidence in the protection of France. In these circumstances, send your officers over all the Turkish provinces: they will make known my disposition towards the grand seignor, and that will exalt the general enthusiasm, while, at the same time, you will be able to acquire for me information which may prove in the highest degree useful. In a word, general, I am the sincere friend of Turkey, and wish to do it all the good in my power; let that principle regulate all your actions. I consider the Turkish declaration of war against Russia as the most fortunate circumstance which could possibly have occurred in my present situation."—JOMINI, ii., 347-349.

* Jom., ii., 345, 349. Bign., vi., 121.

time, all the grace and coquetry which constitute the charm of Parisian beauty, and yet retain, in most cases, the domestic virtues and simplicity of manner which nurse in infancy the national character of the English people.* Speaking every language in Europe with incomparable facility; conversing alternately in French, German, Italian, Russian, and sometimes English, with the accent of a native; versed in the literature and history of all these countries, and yet preferring to them all the ruins of their own wasted land; enthusiastic in their patriotism, and yet extended in their views; with hearts formed in the simplicity of domestic life, minds cultivated during the solitude of rural habitation, and manners polished by the elegance of metropolitan society, they approach as near as imagination can figure to that imaginary standard of perfection which constitutes the object of chivalrous devotion. Melancholy reflection! that the greatest charms of society should be coexistent with the most vicious and destructive national institutions; and that its principal excellences should have been called forth by the miserable and distracted customs which had brought the Polish nation to a premature dissolution!†

If such are the attractions of Warsaw, even to a passing traveller, it may easily be believed what it appeared to the French officers after the storms of Pultusk and Golymin. From all parts of Prussian Poland the great families flocked to her capital, and soon formed a society in the midst of the horrors of war which rivalled any in Europe in splendour and attractions. Abandoning themselves without reserve to the delightful prospects which seemed to be opening on their country, the Polish women saw in the French officers the deliverers of Sarmatia, the invincible allies who were to restore the glories of the Piasts and the Jagellons. A universal enthusiasm prevailed: fêtes and theatrical amusements succeeded each other in varying magnificence; and, following the general bent, even the intellectual breast of Napoleon caught the flame, and did homage to charms which, attractive at all times, were, in that moment of exultation, irresistible. But these fairy scenes were of short duration, and war, in its most terrible form, was destined soon to rouse them from this transient period of enchantment.‡

When the French were put into cantonments on the right bank of the Vistula, the situation of the Russian army was such that it could hard-

* This observation applies to the character of the female part of the Polish rural nobility. Those who have made Warsaw or other great capitals their habitual residence, have too often contracted the vices incident to a polished and corrupted society.

† Personal observation. Savary, iii., 17.

‡ "It may with truth be said," says Savary, "that the Polish women are fitted to inspire jealousy to the most accomplished ladies in the civilized world: they unite, for the most part, to the manners of the great world a depth of information which is rarely to be seen even among the French women, and which is infinitely superior to what is usually to be met with in the most accomplished urban society. It would appear that, being obliged to pass more than half the year on their estates, they devote themselves to reading and mental cultivation; and thence in the capitals, where they go to pass the winter, they so frequently appear superior to all their rivals."—SAVARY, iii., 17.

"I did not require to learn," says Duroc, "that the Polish women are the most agreeable in Europe; but it was not till I arrived in Poland that I became acquainted with the full extent of their charms. The attractions of Warsaw are indescribable. It contains several agreeable circles—one charming."—Letter of Duroc to Junot, Dec. 17, 1806; D'ABRANTES, ix., 350. § Sav., iii., 17.

ly be said to have a commander. Kamenskoi retired far to the rear to Grodno, where he went out in his shirt to the streets, and gave unequivocal proofs of mental derangement. Buxhowden commanded his own corps, while Benningsen did the same with his, and the jealousy of each of these officers for a time prevented the one from obeying the commands of the other; but at length the appointment of the latter to the supreme command restored unity to the operations of the army. Fortunately for the Russians, the suspension of hostilities, and the interval of fifteen leagues which separated them from the enemy, prevented them from suffering under this division of council; and when Benningsen assumed the command, he resolved to continue the design of Buxhowden, and, instead of allowing the army to repose in its cantonments, commence an offensive movement with the whole army against the French left under Bernadotte and Ney, which had extended itself so far as to menace Königsberg, the second city of the Prussian dominions, and the capital of the old part of the monarchy. Many reasons recommended this course. It was evident that Napoleon would turn to the best account the breathing-time afforded him in winter-quarters. His army would be recruited and strengthened, his cavalry remounted, his magazines replenished on the Vistula; the fortresses at its mouth were already observed; and when the mild season returned in May, there was every reason to fear that it would be as solidly established on the line of that river by the capture of Colberg, Graudentz, and Dantzic, as it was now on the Oder and in Silesia by the reduction of the fortresses of that province. And the situation of Bernadotte and Ney, who had extended their cantonments beyond what was either necessary or prudent, and such as almost to indicate an offensive intention, suggested a hope that, by a rapid movement, their corps might be isolated and destroyed before the bulk of the grand army, grouped round Warsaw, could advance to their relief.*

Impressed with these ideas, the Russian army, seventy-five thousand strong, with five hundred pieces of cannon, was everywhere put in motion, crossed the Narew, and marched upon the Bobr. The corps of Benningsen and Buxhowden, so long separated, effected a junction at Biala on the 14th of January, and on the 15th headquarters were established at that place. Essen was left with one division on the Narew to mark this forward movement; and there he was soon after joined by the divisions from Moldavia. This great assemblage of force was the more formidable that it was entirely unknown to the enemy, being completely concealed by the great Forest of Johansberg, and the numerous chain of lakes, intersected by woods, which lie between Arys, in East Prussia, and the shores of the Vistula. Rapidly advancing after its columns were united, the Russian army moved forward between the lakes of Sperding and Lowenthin; and on the 17th headquarters were established at Rhein in East Prussia. Meanwhile the cavalry, consisting of forty squadrons under Prince Gallitzin, pushed on for the Alle, on the roads leading to

Königsberg and Bischofstein; and on the other side of that river surprised and defeated the light horse of Marshal Ney, which had advanced in pursuit of Lestocq to Schippenhal, within ten leagues of Königsberg. Thus, on the 20th of January, the Russian army, perfectly concentrated and in admirable order, was grouped in the middle of East Prussia, and was within six marches of the Lower Vistula, where it might either raise the blockade of Dantzic and Graudentz, or fall with a vast superiority of force upon Bernadotte or Ney, still slumbering in undisturbed security in their cantonments.*

Had Benningsen been aware of the scattered condition of Marshal Ney's corps he might, by the admission of the French military historians, have destroyed the whole before it could by possibility have been united and put in a condition to give battle. As it was, great numbers of his detached bodies were made prisoners, and the conduct of the marshal in first, by his senseless incursions, attracting the enemy, and then, by his undue dispersion, exposing himself to their attacks, drew down a severe reproof from Napoleon.† But a glance at the map must be sufficient to show that great and decisive success was at this moment within the grasp of the Russian general; and that if, instead of making a long circuit to reach the head of Marshal Ney's corps, scattered over a space of eighteen leagues, and drive it back upon its line of retreat towards Warsaw, he had boldly thrown himself, three days earlier, upon its flank, he would have separated it from the centre of the army, and driven both it and Bernadotte to a disastrous retreat into the angle formed by the Vistula and the Baltic Sea. The movement of Benningsen to the head of Ney's column, however, having prevented this, he turned his attention to Bernadotte, who had received intelligence of his approach, and had rapidly concentrated his corps from the neighbourhood of Elbing at Mohrungen. Meanwhile the Russian army continued its advance: on the 22d headquarters were established at Bischofstein, and the Cossacks pushed on to Heilberg; and on the same day a severe action took place at Lecberg, from whence the French cavalry, under Colbert, were driven in the direction of Allenstein. Ney, now seriously alarmed, despatched couriers in all directions to collect his scattered divisions, and on the 23d resumed his headquarters at Neidenberg, extending his troops by the left towards Gilgenberg to lend assistance to Bernadotte.‡

Bernadotte, informed by despatches from all quarters of this formidable irruption into his cantonments, was rapidly concentrating his troops at Mohrungen, when Benningsen, with greatly superior forces, fell upon him. The French troops, eighteen thousand strong, were posted in rugged ground at Georgenthal, two miles in front of that town. General Makow attacked them with the advanced guard of the

* Wilson, 83, 85. Dum., xvii., 295, 302. Jom., ii., 352.

† He severely blamed the marshal "for having, by an inconsiderate movement, attracted the enemy, and even endeavoured to engage Marshal Soult, who declined to follow him, in the same expedition. You will immediately resume the winter-quarters prescribed for your corps, and take advantage of them to give rest to your cavalry, and repair the best way you can, the fault you have committed."—Dum., xvii., 303.

‡ Dum., xvii., 297, 307. Jom., ii., 353. Wilson, 84, 85.

* Wilson, 83, 84. Dum., xvii., 295, 297. Jom., ii., 351. Sav., iii., 26, 27.

Rapid advance of Benningsen towards Königsberg.

Jan. 15.

Bernadotte, attacked near Mohrungen, escapes with difficulty.

Russians before sufficient forces had come up, and after a sanguinary conflict, in which the eagle of the 9th French regiment was taken and retaken several times, and finally remained in the hands of the Russians, suffered the penalty of his rashness by being repulsed towards Leibstadt. In this bloody affair both parties had to lament the loss of two thousand men, and the Russian General Aurepp was killed. It was the more to be regretted that this premature attack had been made, as Lestocq was at the moment at Wormditt, or five leagues distant on the right; Gallitzin, with five thousand horse, at All-Reichau, at the same distance on the left; Osterman Tolstoy at Heilighenthal, and Sacken at Elditten, all in the immediate neighbourhood, so that, by a concentration of these forces, the whole French corps might with ease have been made prisoners. As it was, Prince Michael Dolgoroucki, who had been detached by Prince Gallitzin towards Mohrungen in consequence of the violent fire heard in that direction, fell upon the rear of Bernadotte's corps, penetrated into the town, made several hundred prisoners, and captured all his private baggage, among which, to his eternal disgrace, were found, as in the den of a common freebooter, silver plate, bearing the arms of almost all the states in Germany, 10,000 ducats, recently levied for his own private use, and 2500 for that of his staff, from the town of Elbing.*

The narrow escape, both of Ney and Bernadotte, from total destruction in consequence of this bold and vigorous enterprise, excited the utmost alarm in the French army. The latter fell back rapidly towards Thorn, on the Lower Vistula, by Deutch-Eylau, severely pressed by the Cossacks, who almost totally destroyed his rear-guard, and made many thousand prisoners. Headquarters were advanced by Benningsen, on the 26th, to Mohrungen, where they remained, from the exhaustion of the troops, till the 2d of

February. Taking advantage of the aid thus obtained, the brave and active Lestocq succeeded in raising the blockade of Graudentz, the key to the Lower Vistula, and throwing in supplies of ammunition and provisions, which enabled that important fortress to hold out through all the succeeding campaign. The whole French left wing raised their cantonments, and fell back in haste, and with great loss, towards the Lower Vistula; and the alarm, spread as far as Warsaw, gave the most effectual refutation of the false accounts published in the bulletins of the successive defeats of the Russian army.† At the same time intelligence was received of the arrival of the Russian divisions from the army of Moldavia, on the Narew and the Bug, where they formed a junction with General Essen, and raised the enemy's force in that quarter to thirty thousand men.‡

* Bign., vi., 115. Wilson, 85. Dum., xvii., 307, 319. Jom., ii., 353.

† "In Bernadotte's baggage, taken at Mohrungen, were found curious proofs of the arrangements for stage effect and false intelligence, made by all the officers of the French army, from the emperor downward. An order was there found, giving the most minute directions for the reception of Napoleon at Warsaw, with all the stations and crossings where 'Vive l'Empereur' was to be shouted; and official despatches of all the actions of the campaign in which Bernadotte had been engaged, for publication, and private despatches giving the facts, as they really occurred, for the emperor's secret perusal. These papers are still in the possession of General Benningsen's family."—WILSON'S *Polish Campaign*, 86, note.

‡ Wilson, 86, 87. Dum., xvii., 307, 332. Bign., vi., 115, 116.

These untoward events made a great impression on the mind of Napoleon, who had never contemplated a renewal of active operations till his reinforcements from the Rhine had arrived at headquarters, and the return of the mild season had enabled him to resume hostilities without the excessive hardships to which his troops, during the later stages of the campaign, had been exposed. The cold was still extreme: the Vistula and the Narew were charged with enormous blocks of floating ice, which daily threatened to break down the bridges over them; the earth was covered with snow, the heavens exhibited that serene, deep blue aspect which indicated a long continuance of intense frost; magazines there were none in the country which was likely to become the theatre of war, and though the highly-cultivated territory of Old Prussia offered as great resources as any of its extent in Europe for an invading army, yet it was impossible to expect that it could maintain, for any length of time, the enormous masses who would speedily be assembled on its surface. But there was no time for deliberation: matters were pressing, the right of Benningsen was now approaching the Lower Vistula, and in a few days the Russian army would raise the blockade of Dantzic, and, resting on that fortress as a base from whence inexhaustible supplies of all sorts might be obtained by sea, would bid defiance to all his efforts. It was in such a crisis that the extraordinary activity and indefatigable perseverance of Napoleon appeared most conspicuous. Instantly perceiving that active operations must be resumed even at that rude season, he despatched orders from the 23d Jan. 23. to the 27th of January, for the assembling of all his army; and as, with the exception of Bernadotte and Ney, they all lay in cantonments not extending over more than twenty leagues, this was neither a tedious nor a difficult operation. Bernadotte was enjoined to assemble around Osterode, Lefebvre at Thorn to observe Dantzic, Soult at Pragnitz, Davoust at Pultusk, Ney at Nudenberg, Bessières and Murat at Warsaw, with the Imperial Guard and cavalry: though breathing only victory in his proclamations to his troops, he in reality was making every preparation for defeat; Lefebvre received orders to collect all the forces at his disposal, without any regard to the blockade of Dantzic, in order to secure the fortress and bridge of Thorn, the direct line of retreat across the Vistula from the theatre of war, while Lannes was disposed as a reserve on the right, and Augereau on the left bank of that river. On the 27th orders were given to all the columns to march, and early on the morning of the 30th the emperor set out from Warsaw.†

* The territory of Old Prussia is not naturally more fertile than the adjoining provinces of Poland, but, nevertheless, it is as rich and cultivated as they are sterile and neglected. On one side of the frontier line is to be seen numerous and opulent cities, smiling, well-cultivated fields, comfortable hamlets, and an industrious and contented population; on the other, endless forests of pine, wretched villages, a deplorable agriculture; squalid huts beside a few gorgeous palaces. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the vicious and ruinous political institutions which have prevailed amid the mingled anarchy, tyranny, and Democracy of Old Poland. This difference, so well known to travellers, repeatedly attracted the attention even of the military followers of the French army.—See SEGUIER, *Camp de Russie*, i., 127; and JOMINI, ii., 354.

† Dum., xvii., 322, 325. Jom., ii., 354, 355.

‡ The orders given by Napoleon to all the marshals and chief officers of his army on this trying emergency may be considered as a masterpiece of military skill and foresight;

Extraordinary energy of Napoleon in re-assembling his army.

Following his usual plan of marching with the bulk of his forces, so as to get in the rear of the enemy during his advance, Napoleon marched towards Allenstein, where he arrived on the 2d of February with the corps of Soult, Augereau, and Ney, while Davoust was, at a short distance still farther on his right, at Wartenberg. Already he had interposed between Benningsen and Russia: the only line of retreat which lay open to that officer was to the northeast, in the direction of Königsberg and the Niemen. The Russian army was stationed between the Passarge and the Alle, from Guffstadt and Heilsberg on the latter river, to Leibstadt and Wormditt in the neighbourhood of the former; but these movements of Napoleon induced Benningsen to concentrate his divisions and move them to the eastward, in the direction of Spiegelberg and the Alle, on the 1st and 2d of February, in order to preserve his communications with the Russian frontier. The whole army assembled in order of battle on the following day, in a strong position on the heights of Jonkowo, covering the great road from Allenstein to Leibstadt, its right resting on the village of Mondtken. Napoleon instantly directed Davoust to march from Wartenberg to Spiegelberg with his whole corps, in order to get entirely round the left flank of the Russians in this position and attack them in rear, while Soult received orders to force the bridge of Bergfried, by which their retreat and communications lay across the Alle. It was all over with the Russians if these orders had been carried into full execution without their being aware how completely they were in course of being encircled; but, by a fortunate accident, the despatches to Bernadotte, announcing the design, and enjoining him to draw Benningsen on towards the Lower Vistula, had previously fallen into the hands of the Cossacks, and made that general aware of his danger; he immediately despatched orders to the officer at Bergfried to hold the bridge to the last extremity, which was so gallantly obeyed that, though Soult assailed it with all his corps, and it was taken and retaken several times, yet it finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The situation of Benningsen, however, was now very critical: he was compelled to fall back to avoid being turned in presence of very superior forces, and by his lateral movement from Mohrungen he had become entirely separated from Lestock, who saw the most imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed by the superior forces of Bernadotte. Fortunately, however, from the despatches being intercepted, that marshal remained entirely ignorant both of what was expected from him, and of the great advantages which remained in his power; and Lestock, without being disquieted, was enabled to check his advance and make preparations for a retreat, which was presented to him from Freystadt, where he had been covering the revictualling of Graudentz, by Deutch-Eylau, Osterode, Mohrungen to Leibstadt, while Benningsen himself, on the night of the 3d, broke up from Junkowo, and retired in the same direction.*

and deserve especial attention from all who desire to make themselves acquainted either with his extraordinary activity and resources, or the multiplied cares which, on such an occasion, devolve on a commander-in-chief.—See the whole in DUMAS, xvii., 330–374; *Pièces Just.*

* Wilson, 89, 92. Jom., ii., 355, 356. Dum., xvii., 330, 349.

By daybreak the French army, headed by Murat, with his numerous and terrible dragoons, were in motion to pursue the enemy; and as the Russians had been much retarded during the night by the passage of so many pieces of cannon and wagons through the narrow streets of Junkowo, they soon came up with their rear-guard. By overwhelming numbers, the Russians were forced from the bridge of Bergfried; but they rallied in the village, and forming barricades with tumbrils, wagons, and chariots, effectually checked the advance of the enemy, until the carriages in the rear had got clear through, when they retired, obstinately contesting every inch of ground, which they did with such effect that the French lost fifteen hundred men in the pursuit, without inflicting a greater loss on their adversaries. Nor were any cannon or chariots taken: a striking proof of the orderly nature of the retreat, and the heroism with which the rear-guard performed its duty, when it is recollected that Napoleon, with eighty thousand men, thundered in close pursuit, and that, from the state of the roads, the march which had been ordered upon three lines could take place on two only. Soult and Davoust continued to manoeuvre, in order to turn the Russian left, while Murat and Ney pressed their rear-guard. On the night of the 4th the Russians retired to Frauendorf, where they stood firm next day. But this continued retreat in presence of the enemy was now beginning to be attended with bad effects, both upon the health and spirits of the soldiers. The Russian commissariat was then wretched: magazines there were none in the country which was now the theatre of war; and the soldiers, when worn out with a night march over frozen snow, had no means of obtaining subsistence but by prowling about to discover and dig up the little stores which the peasants had buried for the use of their families. The men everywhere lay on the bare ground in intense frost, with no other bed but the snow, and no covering but their great-coats, which were now little better than rags. They were not as yet inured to retire before the enemy, and the murmur against any farther retreat was so loud that Benningsen resolved to fall back only to a chosen field of battle; and, upon examining the map, that of PRUSSICH-EYLAU was selected for this purpose. No sooner was this announced to the troops than their discontents were appeased, the hardships of the night marches were forgotten, and from the joyful looks of the men it would rather have been supposed they were marching to tranquil winter-quarters than the most desperate struggle which had occurred in modern times.*

Severe actions, however, awaited these brave men ere they reached the theatre of final conflict. On the night of the 5th the army moved to Landsberg, where the troops from Heilsberg joined them, notwithstanding a bloody combat with Marshal Davoust. On the following day the rear-guard, under Bagrathion, posted between Hoff and that town, was assailed with the utmost vehemence by Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the principal part of the corps of Soult and Augereau.* The approach of these formidable masses, and the imposing appearance of their cavalry, as well as the balls which began to fall from the

Combat of Landsberg.

Feb. 6:

* Wilson, 92, 94. Jom., ii., 356. Dum., xvii., 349, 352.

French batteries, occasioned great confusion among the cannon and carriages in the streets of the town. But with such resolution did the rear-guard maintain their position that, though they sustained a heavy loss, the enemy were kept at bay till night closed the carnage, and relieved the Russian general from the anxieties consequent on so critical a situation in presence of such enormous forces of the enemy. Two battalions of Russians were trampled under foot in the course of the day or cut down, chiefly by one of their own regiments of horse dashing over them, when broken and flying from Murat's dragoons. Benningsen, upon this, supported the rear-guard by several brigades of fresh troops, and the combat continued with various success till night, when both armies bivouacked in presence of each other: that of the French on the heights of Hoff, that of the Russians on those which lie in front of Landsberg, and the little stream of the Stein separating their outposts from each other. In this untoward affair the Russians sustained a loss of 2500 men, among whom was Prince Gallitzin, whose chivalrous courage had already endeared him to the army; but the French were weakened by nearly as great a number. During the night the whole army again broke up, and, without farther molestation, reached Prussich-
Feb. 7. Eylau at seven the next morning, when they passed through the town, and moved quietly to the appointed ground for the battle on the other side, where it arrived by noonday.*

This rapid concentration and retreat of the Russians isolated the Prussian corps of Lestocq, and gave too much reason to fear that it might be cut off by the superior forces of Bernadotte or Ney, who were now pressing on it on all sides. But the skilful movements of the Prussian general extricated him from a most perilous situation.
Feb. 5. On the 5th he set out from Mohrungen, and his horse encountered the cavalry of Murat near Deppen, while the head of the column of infantry was at the same time charged by Ney, who had crossed the Passage to intercept his progress near Waltersdorf. The heroic resistance of the advanced guard, only three thousand strong, gave time for the main body to change the line of its march, and escape in the direction of Schlodein; but it proved fatal to itself, as almost the whole were slain or made prisoners, with twelve pieces of cannon. The firm countenance of the cavalry, however, defeated all the efforts of Murat, who in vain charged them repeatedly with six thousand horse, and, after baffling all his attacks, they retired leisurely and in the best order, covering the march of the infantry all the way; crossed the Passage
Feb. 7. at Spandau, and arrived on the 7th in safety at Hussehn in the neighbourhood of Prussich-Eylau.†

Thus, after sustaining incredible hardships, and undergoing serious dangers, the whole Russian army was at length concentrated in one field of battle, and about to measure its strength with the enemy. It was reduced, by the fatigues and losses of this winter campaign, to sixty-five thousand men, assembled around Eylau, to which, if ten thousand be added as Lestocq's division, which might be expected to co-operate in the approaching action, the whole amount that could be relied on for the

shock was seventy-five thousand, with 460 pieces of cannon. The French, after deducting the losses of this dreadful warfare, exclusive of Bernadotte, who did not arrive on the ground for two days after, could still bring eighty-five thousand men into the field, including nearly sixteen thousand horse; but they had not above three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery.* Thus the two armies were nearly equal—the French superiority in numbers, and especially in cavalry, being counterbalanced by the advantage which the Russians had in that important arm, the artillery. Their spirit and courage were at the same level; for if the French could recall with deserved pride the glorious achievements of the campaign, and a long course of almost unbroken victories, the Russians, on their side, had the triumphs of Suwarrow in Turkey, Poland, and the Italian plains, to commemorate; and if the former were impelled by the ardour of a revolution, converted by consummate genius into that of military conquest, the latter were buoyant with the rising energy of an empire, whose frontiers had never yet receded before the standards of an enemy.†

The Russian rear-guard, ten thousand strong, under Bagration, was leisurely retiring towards Eylau, and at the distance of about two miles from that village, when it was attacked by the French infantry. The Russians were at first compelled to give way, but the St. Petersburg dragoons, whose rout had occasioned such damage to their own comrades on the preceding day, emulous to wipe away their disgrace, assailed the enemy so opportunely in flank, when emerging from the tumult of the charge, that they instantly cut to pieces two battalions, and made prize of their eagles. Disconcerted by this check, the French gave no farther molestation to the Russian rear-guard, which retired into Eylau. By a mistake, however, the division destined to occupy that important station evacuated it, along with the rest of the army; and though Benningsen instantly ordered it to be reoccupied by fresh troops, the French had meanwhile entered in great numbers, and the assailing division, under Barclay de Tolly, had a rude contest to encounter in endeavouring to regain the lost ground. By vast exertions, however, they at length succeeded in expelling the enemy: the French again returned in greater force; the combat continued with the utmost fury till long

Bloody combats around Eylau the day before the battle.

* The following is the account given by Dumas of the troops present under arms, in January, 1807, under Napoleon on the Vistula:

	Infantry and Artillery.	Cavalry.
Imperial Guard under Bessières.....	9,199	3,889
“ Oudinot.....	6,046	
First corps, Bernadotte.....	18,073	950
Third do., Davoust.....	19,000	757
Fourth do., Soult.....	26,329	1,495
Fifth do., Lannes.....	16,720	1,399
Sixth do., Ney.....	15,158	881
Cavalry do., Murat.....	753	14,868
Total on the Vistula.....	109,238	20,350
Detached, viz., Mortier, in Pomerania.....	15,866	1,254
“ Jerome and Vandamme, in Silesia.....	18,232	2,207
“ Lefebvre, Dantzic.....	23,248	547
“ Hanover, Dumonceau.....	6,898	689
Total.....	173,464	25,047

If from this mass of 109,238 infantry and 20,000 cavalry there be deducted 18,000 absent under Bernadotte, 16,000 under Lannes, and 10,000 lost or left behind during the march from Warsaw, there will remain, on their own showing, 85,000 in line at Eylau, and that agrees nearly with Sir Robert Wilson's estimate.—DUMAS, vol. xviii., 592; WILSON, 99. † DUMAS, xviii., 1, 10. WILSON, 98, 99.

* DUMAS, xviii., 354, 365. WILSON, 94, 95. JOM., ii., 356.

† JOM., ii., 356, 357. DUMAS, xviii., 352, 356.

after sunset; fresh re-enforcements came up to the Russians; twice Barclay carried the village after dark, by the light of the burning houses; and when, at length, driven out of the town, which, from lying in a hollow and being commanded on all sides, was no longer tenable after the enemy had brought up their heavy artillery, that gallant commander, with this heroic rear-guard, intrenched himself in the church and churchyard, which stands on an eminence by the road on issuing from the town on the other side, and there maintained a sanguinary resistance till past ten at night, when he was severely wounded. Then the object of the strife having been gained by the heavy artillery having all arrived by the road of Schloditten and taken up its position on the field of battle behind the village, the unconquered Russians were withdrawn from the churchyard, which, with its bloodstained graves and corpse-cased slopes, remained in the hands of Napoleon.*

Never in the history of war did two armies pass a night under more awful and impressive circumstances than the rival hosts who now lay, without tent or covering, on the snowy expanse of the field of Eylau. The close vicinity of the two armies; the vast multitude assembled in so narrow a space, intent only on mutual destruction; the vital interests to the lives and fortunes of all which were at stake; the wintry wildness of the scene, cheered only by the watch-fires, which threw a partial glow on the snow-clad heights around; the shivering groups who in either army lay round the blazing fires, chilled by girdles of impenetrable ice; the stern resolution of the soldiers in the one array, and the enthusiastic ardour of those in the other; the liberty of Europe now brought to the issue of one dread combat; the glory of Russia and France dependant on the efforts of the mightiest armament that either had yet sent forth—all contributed to impress a feeling of extraordinary solemnity, which reached the most inconsiderate breast, oppressed the mind with a feeling of anxious thought, and kept unclosed many a wearied eyelid in both camps, notwithstanding the extraordinary fatigues of the preceding days. But no sooner did the dawn break, and the quick rattle of musketry from the outposts commence, than these gloomy presentiments were dispelled, and all arose from their icy beds with no other feelings but those of joyous confidence and military ardour.†

The evacuation of Eylau on the preceding night had led Napoleon to suppose that the enemy were not to give battle on the succeeding day; and, overwhelmed with the extraordinary fatigues he had undergone since leaving Warsaw, during which time he had been occupied in business or marching twenty hours out of the twenty-four, he retired to a house in the town, and there, amid all the horrors of a place carried by assault, fell into a profound sleep. The two armies were within half cannon-shot of each other, and their immense masses disposed in close array on a space not exceeding a league in breadth. The field of battle was an open expanse of unenclosed ground, rising into swells, or small hills, interspersed with many lakes; but as the whole surface was cov-

ered with snow, and the lakes so thoroughly frozen as to bear any weight either of cavalry or artillery, the whole surface was accessible to military operations. The Russian right, under Tutschakoff, lay on either side of Schloditten; the centre, under Sacken, occupied a cluster of little open hills, intercepted by lakes, in front of Kuschniten; the left, under Osterman Tolstoy, rested on Klein-Saussgarten; the advanced guard, ten thousand strong, with its outposts extending almost to the houses of Eylau, was under the command of Bagrathion; the reserve, in two divisions, was led by Doctoroff. The whole army in front was drawn up in two lines with admirable precision: the reserve, in two close columns behind the centre; the foot artillery, consisting of 400 pieces, was disposed along the front of the lines; the horse artillery, carrying sixty guns; cavalry and Cossacks, under Platoff, in reserve behind the centre and wings, in order to support any point which might appear to require assistance. Lestocq, with his division, was not yet in line, but he had lain at Hussehn the preceding night, which was only three leagues off, and might be expected to join before the battle was far advanced.*

The French position, generally speaking, was more elevated than that of the Russians, with the exception of the Distribution of the French right, where it was commanded by forees. the heights of Klein-Saussgarten. The town of Eylau, however, occupied in force by their troops, was situated in a hollow, so low that the roofs of the houses were below the range of the cannon-shot, and the summit of the church steeple, which stands on an eminence, alone was exposed to the destructive storm. Davoust was on the right, and received orders to attack the villages of Klein-Saussgarten and Serpallen, occupied by the enemy. Soult, in the centre, was destined to advance against the Russian main body and the strong batteries placed opposite to Eylau; Augereau was on the left, to support his attack; the Imperial Guard and cavalry of Murat in reserve behind the centre, ready to support any attack which might appear likely to prove unsuccessful. Orders had been despatched to Ney to attack the Russian right as soon as the action was warmly engaged; and it was hoped he would arrive on the field at least as soon as Lestocq on the other side, upon whose traces he had so long been following. Lannes had been detained by sickness at Pultusk, and his corps, placed under the orders of Savary, afterward Duke of Rovigo, was observing the Russian forces left on the Bug and the Narrew.†

Napoleon's design, when he saw that the Russians stood firm, and were resolved Battle of Eylau. Defeat by the corps of Marshal Davoust, of Augereau. and throw it back, as at Austerlitz, on the middle of the army; but, the better to conceal this object, he commenced the action soon after daylight by a violent attack on their right Feb. 8. and centre. The Russian cannon played heavily, but rather at hazard, on the hostile masses in front of Eylau, while the French guns replied with fatal effect from their elevated position down upon the enemy, whose lines were exposed from head to foot to the range of their shot. Presently the left, under Augereau, ad-

* Wilson, 97, 98, 100. Jom., ii., 357, 358. Dum., xviii., 46, 8. Bign., vi., 126. † Wilson, 101. Jom., ii., 358.

* Dum., xvii., 12, 13. Jom., ii., 359, 360. Wilson, 101. † Wilson, 101. Jom., ii., 360, 361. Dum., xviii., 9, 15.

vanced in massy columns towards Schloditten, while Soult's corps, preceded by a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, marched with an intrepid step against the Russian centre, and forty guns of the Imperial Guard, posted on an eminence near the church of Eylau, opened a heavy fire on the great central Russian battery. These troops had not advanced above three hundred yards, driving the Russian tirailleurs before them, when the Russian cannon-shot from two hundred pieces, admirably directed, ploughed through the mass, and so shattered it that the whole body inclined to the left, to get under the shelter of a detached house which stood in the way. A snowstorm at the same time set in, and darkened the atmosphere, so that neither army could see its opponent; but, nevertheless, the deadly storm of bullets continued to tear the massy columns of Augereau, and the fire was so violent as to prevent Soult from rendering him any effectual support. Augereau's divisions were already severely shaken by this murderous fire, when they were suddenly assailed on one side by the right wing of the Russians, under Tutschakoff, and on the other by their reserve and a powerful cavalry under Doctoroff. So thick was the snowstorm, so unexpected the onset, that the assailants were only a few yards distant, and the long lances of the Cossacks almost touching the French infantry when they were first discerned. The combat was not of more than a few minutes' duration: the corps, charged at once by foot and horse with the utmost vigour, broke and fled in the wildest disorder back into Eylau, closely pursued by the Russian cavalry and Cossacks, who made such havoc that the whole, above sixteen thousand strong, were, with the exception of fifteen hundred men, taken or destroyed; and Augereau himself, with his two generals of divisions, Desgardens and Heudelet, desperately wounded.*

Napoleon was apprized of this disaster by the imminent torrent of fugitives which rushed into danger of Eylau; and the snowstorm clearing Napoleon away at the same time, showed him the Russian right and centre far advanced, with their light troops almost at the edge of the town. He himself was stationed at the churchyard on its eastern side, which had been the scene of such a sanguinary conflict on the preceding night; and already the crash of the enemy's balls on the steeple and walls of the church showed how nearly danger was approaching. Presently one of the Russian divisions, following rapidly after the fugitives, entered Eylau by the western street, and charged, with loud hurrahs, to the foot of the mound where the emperor was placed with a battery of the Imperial Guard and his personal escort of a hundred men. Had a regiment of horse been at hand to support the attack, Napoleon must have been made prisoner; for, though the last reserve, consisting of six battalions of the Old Guard, were at a short distance, he might have been enveloped before they could get up to his rescue. The fate of Europe then hung by a thread, but in that terrible moment the emperor's presence of mind did not forsake him: he instantly ordered his little body-guard, hardly more than a company, to form line, in order to check the enemy's advance, and despatched orders to the Old Guard to attack the column on one flank, while a brigade of Murat's horse charged it on

the other. The Russians, disordered by success, and ignorant of the inestimable prize which was almost within their grasp, were arrested by the firm countenance of the little band of heroes who formed Napoleon's last resource; and before they could re-form their ranks for a regular conflict, the enemy were upon them on either flank, and almost the whole division was cut to pieces on the spot.**

The disorder produced by the repulse of Soult and the almost total destruction of Augereau's corps, however, was such that the French emperor was compelled to strain every nerve to repair it. For this purpose he prepared a grand charge by the whole cavalry and Imperial Guard, supported by the divisions of Soult, which were again formed and led back to the attack. The onset of this enormous mass, consisting of fourteen thousand cavalry and twenty-five thousand foot-soldiers, supported by two hundred pieces of cannon, was the more formidable that the thick storm of snow prevented them from being perceived till they were close upon the first line. The shock was irresistible: the front line of the Russians was forced to give ground, and in some places thrown into disorder; their cavalry crushed by the enormous weight of the seventy squadrons which followed the white plume of Murat; and a desperate *mêlée* ensued, in which prodigious losses were sustained on both sides; for the Russian battalions, though broken, did not lay down their arms or fly, but falling back on such as yet stood firm, or uniting in little knots together, still maintained the combat with the most dogged resolution. Instantly perceiving the extent of the danger, Benningsen, with his whole staff, galloped forward from his station in the rear to the front, and at the same time despatched orders to the whole infantry of the reserve to close their ranks and advance to the support of their comrades engaged. These brave men inclining inward, pressed eagerly on, regardless of the shower of grape and musketry which fell in their advancing ranks, and, uniting with the first line, charged home with loud hurrahs upon the enemy. In the shock, Essen's Russian division was broken, and the French horse, pursuing their advantage, swept through several openings and got as far as the reserve cavalry of Benningsen; but no sooner did Platoff see them approaching with loud cries, and in all the tumult of victory, than he gave orders to the Cossacks of the Don to advance. Regardless of danger, the children of the desert joyfully galloped forward to the charge: their long lances are in rest, their blood-horses are at speed; in an instant the French cuirassiers are broken, pierced through, and scattered. Retreat was impossible through the again-closed ranks of the enemy, and eighteen only of

Grand charge by the cavalry and Imperial Guard on the Russian centre.

* Bign., vi., 130. Dum., xviii., 19, 20. Jom., ii., 362, 363. Wilson, 101, 102.

** "I never was so much struck with anything in my life," said General Bertrand at St. Helena, "as by the emperor at Eylau at the moment when, alone with some officers of his staff, he was almost trodden under foot by a column of four or five thousand Russians. The emperor was on foot, and Berthier gave orders instantly for the horses to be brought forward; the emperor gave him a reproachful look, and, instead, ordered a battalion of his guard, which was at a little distance, to advance. He himself kept his ground as the Russians approached, repeating frequently the words, 'What boldness! what boldness!' At the sight of the grenadiers of his guard the Russians made a dead pause; the emperor did not stir, but all around him trembled."—LAS CASAS, ii., 151. See also *Relation de la Bataille d'Eylau, par un Témoin Oculaire. Camp. en Prusse et Pol.*, iv., 45.

* Wilson, 101, 102. Jom., ii., 361. Dum., xviii., 17, 18. Bign., vi., 129, 130.

the whole body regained their own lines by a long circuit, while five hundred and thirty Cosacks returned, each cased in the shining armour which they had stripped from the dead bodies of their opponents. At all other points the enemy were, after a desperate struggle, driven back; and several eagles, with fourteen pieces of cannon, remained in the hands of the victors.*

The battle appeared gained: the French left and centre had been defeated with ^{Great success of Davoust on the French right.} extraordinary loss; their last reserves, with the exception of part of the guard, had been engaged without success; to the cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" and the shouts of enthusiasm with which they commenced the combat, had succeeded a sullen silence along the whole line in front of Eylau; the Russians were several hundred paces in advance of the ground which they occupied in the morning; and a distant cannonade on both sides evinced the exhaustion and fatigue which was mutually felt. Lestocq had not yet arrived, but he was hourly and anxiously expected, and the addition of his fresh and gallant corps would, it was hoped, enable Benningsen to complete the victory. But while all eyes were eagerly turned to the right, where it was expected his standards would first appear, a terrible disaster, wellnigh attended with fatal consequences, took place on the left. Davoust, who was intrusted with the attack which was intended to be the decisive one in that quarter, had long been delayed by the firm countenance of Bagavout and Osterman Tolstoy; but at length the increasing numbers and vigorous attacks of the French prevailed, and the village of Klein-Saussgarten fell into their hands. It was again reconquered by the Russians, but finally remained in the possession of their antagonists. Nor was the action less warmly contested at Serpallen. Supported by a battery of thirty pieces of artillery, Bagavout there for three hours made head against the superior forces of St. Hilaire and Morand; at length the two lines advanced to within pistol-shot, when the Russians gave way; the cannoniers, bravely resisting, were bayoneted at their guns, and the pieces were on the point of being taken, when they were re-enforced by two regiments which Benningsen sent to their support, and the French, in their turn, were charged in flank by cavalry, broken and driven back upward of three hundred yards. But, notwithstanding this success at Serpallen, the progress of the enemy at Klein-Saussgarten was so alarming that the Russians were unable to maintain themselves on the ground they had so gallantly regained. Friant debouched in their rear in great strength, and rapidly continuing his advance from left to right of the Russian position, he had soon passed, driving everything before him, the whole ground occupied by their left wing; and continuing his triumphant course in their rear, carried by assault the hamlet of Anklappen, and was making dispositions for the attack of Kuschnitten, which had been the headquarters of Benningsen during the preceding night, and lay directly behind the Russian centre. Never was change more sudden: the victorious centre, turned and attacked both in flank and rear, seemed on the point of being driven off the field of battle; already the shouts of victory were heard from Davoust's divisions, and vast volumes of black smoke, blown along the whole Russian centre and right from the flames of Ser-

pallen, evinced in frightful colours the progress of the enemy on their left.*

The firmness of Benningsen, however, was equal to the emergency. Orders were despatched to the whole left wing to fall back, so as to come nearly at right angles to the centre and right; and although this retrograde movement, performed in presence of a victorious enemy, was necessarily attended with some disorder, yet it was successfully accomplished; and, after sustaining considerable loss, the Russian left wing was drawn up, facing outward, nearly at right angles to the centre, which still retained its advanced position, midway between the ground occupied by the two armies where the fight began in the morning. As the Russian left fell back to the neighbourhood of the centre, it received the support of the reserves, while Benningsen wheeled about to the assistance of the discomfited wing;† and although St. Hilaire carried Kuschnitten, this was the last of his advantages in that quarter, and the victorious Davoust was at length arrested.

The battle was in this critical state, with the French victorious on one wing and the Russians on the centre and the other, but without any decisive advantage to either side, when the corps of Lestocq, so long expected, at length appeared on the extreme Russian right, driving before him the French battalions which were stationed near the village of Althof. Orders were immediately despatched to him to defile as quickly as possible in the rear of the Russian right, so as to assist in the recapture of Kuschnitten behind their centre, where St. Hilaire had established himself in so threatening a manner. These directions were rapidly and ably performed: moving swiftly over the open ground in the rear of the Russian right in three columns, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Kuschnitten an hour before it was dark, with seven thousand men, having left two thousand to occupy Althof, and lost nearly a thousand in the course of the march that morning, which had been a constant fight with Marshal Ney's corps. Dispositions for attacking the village and cutting off the retreat of the enemy were instantly made: a terrible cannonade was kept up on its houses, and the Prussians, under cover of the guns, charging in three columns, carried it with irresistible force, destroying or making prisoners the 51st and one battalion of the 108th regiments stationed there, with an eagle, and recovering the Russian guns which had been abandoned on the retreat from Serpallen. Not content with this great success, Lestocq immediately re-formed his divisions in line, with the cavalry and Cosacks in rear, and advanced against the hamlet of Anklappen and the wood adjoining. The division of Friant, wearied by eight hours' fighting, was little in a condition to withstand these fresh troops, flushed by so important an advantage. The combat, however, was terrible: Davoust was there, and his troops, though exhausted, were more than double the numbers of the enemy, and he made the utmost efforts to maintain his ground. "Here," said the marshal, "is the place where the brave should find a glorious death; the cowards will perish in the deserts of

* Wilson, 104, 105. Dum., xviii., 21, 29. Jom., ii., 363, 364.

† Wilson, 104, 105. Jom., ii., 363, 364. Dum., xviii., 21, 29.

* Dum., xviii., 19, 20. Jom., ii., 362. Wilson, 103, 104.

Siberia." Notwithstanding all his exertions, however, Friant was driven out of the wood, after an hour's combat, with the loss of three thousand men; the Russians, by a bold attack of cavalry, regained the smoking walls of Anklappen, and the whole allied line was pressing on in proud array, driving the enemy before them over the open ground between that ruin and Saussgarten, when night drew her sable mantle over this scene of blood.*

The battle was over on the centre and left, and Schloditten is already the French lines were illuminated by the fire of innumerable muskets, and retaken by bivouacs, when both armies were startled by a sharp fire succeeded by loud shouts on the extreme right of the Russians, towards Schloditten: it was occasioned by Marshal Ney's corps, which, following fast on the traces of Lestocq, had at nightfall entered Althof, driving the Prussian detachment which occupied it before him, and had now carried Schloditten, so as to interrupt the Russian communication with Königsberg. Benningsen immediately ordered the Russian division of Kamenskoi, which had suffered least in the preceding action, to storm the village, which was executed at ten at night in the most gallant style. The loud cheers of their victorious troops were heard at Preussich-Eylau; and Napoleon, supposing that a general attack was commencing, for which he was little prepared, gave orders for his heavy artillery and baggage to defile towards Landsberg, and ordered Davoust to draw back to the position which he had occupied in front of the wood when the action commenced in the morning, and this terminated the changes of this eventful day.†

From the mortification, however, of retiring for the first time in his life from before an enemy in an open field, Napoleon was relieved by the measures adopted by the Russian general. At 11 at night, a council of war was held by the generals on horseback as to the course which the army should pursue. It was strongly represented by Osterman Tolstoy, the second in command, and Generals Knoring and Lestocq, that at last Bonaparte had now been defeated in a pitched battle, and that it would be to the last degree impolitic to destroy the moral effect of such an advantage by retreating before him, and thus giving him a fair pretext for representing it as a victory; that they were ready instantly or next day to follow up their success, and attack the enemy wherever they could find him; and that, at all events, they would pledge their heads that, if he would only stand firm, Napoleon would be driven to a disastrous retreat. Strong as these considerations were, they were overbalanced, in Benningsen's estimation, by still stronger. He knew that his own loss was not less than twenty thousand men, and though he had every reason to believe that the enemy's was still heavier, yet the means of repairing the chasm existed to a greater degree in the hands of Napoleon than his own: Ney, whose corps had comparatively suffered little, had just joined him; Bernadotte, it was to be presumed, would instantly be summoned to headquarters, and these fresh troops might give the enemy the means of cutting them off from Kön-

igsberg, in which case, in the total destitution for provisions which prevailed, the most dreadful calamities might be apprehended. Influenced by these considerations, Benningsen, who was ignorant of the enormous magnitude of the losses which the French had sustained, and who, though a gallant veteran, had lost somewhat of the vigour of youth, and had been thirty-six hours on horseback with hardly any nourishment, persevered in his opinion, and directed the order of march, which began at midnight, through Schloditten towards Königsberg, without any molestation from the enemy. They took post at Wotenberg, three leagues in front of that town, where the wearied soldiers, after a struggle of unexampled severity, were at length enabled to taste a few hours of repose.*

Such was the terrible battle of Eylau, fought in the depth of winter, amid ice and snow, under circumstances of unexampled horror; the most bloody and obstinately-contested that had yet occurred during the war; and in which, if Napoleon did not sustain a positive defeat, he underwent a disaster which had wellnigh proved his ruin. The loss on both sides was immense, and never, in modern times, had a field of battle been strewn with such a multitude of slain. On the side of the Russians twenty-five thousand had fallen, of whom above seven thousand were already no more: on that of the French, upward of thirty thousand were killed or wounded, and nearly ten thousand had left their colours, under pretence of attending to the wounded, and did not make their appearance for several days afterward. The other trophies of victory were nearly equally balanced: the Russians had to boast of the unusual spectacle of twelve eagles taken from their antagonists, while they had made spoil of sixteen of the Russian guns, and fourteen standards. Hardly any prisoners were made on either side during the action; but six thousand of the wounded, most of them in a hopeless state, were left on the field of battle, and fell into the hands of the French.†

Never was spectacle so dreadful as the field of battle presented on the following morning. Above fifty thousand men lay in the space of two leagues, weltering in blood. The wounds were, for the most part, of the severest kind, from the

* Wilson, 108, 109. *Jom.*, ii., 365, 366. *Dum.*, xviii., 37, 39.

† *Jom.*, ii., 365. *Dum.*, xviii., 39, 40. Wilson, 108, 109, 111.

‡ The official accounts of this great battle on both sides are so much interwoven with falsehood as to furnish no clew whatever to the truth. That of Napoleon is distinguished by more than his usual misrepresentation. He states his loss at 1900 killed and 5700 wounded, in all 7600. Judging by his usual practice, which was to avow a loss about a fourth of its real amount, this would imply a loss of 30,000 men. At St. Helena he admitted that he lost 18,000; and considering that the Russians admit a loss of above 20,000, that their artillery throughout the day was greatly superior to that of the French, and that they sustained no loss in any quarter comparable to that of Augereau's corps, which was so completely destroyed that its remains were immediately incorporated with the other corps, and the corps itself disappeared entirely from the Grand Army, it may safely be concluded that this estimate is not exaggerated. "Our loss," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "at Eylau was enormous—why conceal the truth? The emperor avowing the truth at Eylau would have appeared to me more truly great than putting forth an official falsehood which no child could believe, more especially if he was nephew or son of Colonel Semelé of the 24th regiment of the line, one of the finest in the army, and itself equal almost to a brigade, which was to a man destroyed."—D'ABRANTES, ix., 367.

* *Dum.*, xviii., 30, 35. Wilson, 105, 106. *Jom.*, ii., 364, 365.

† Wilson, 106, 107. *Dum.*, xviii., 35, 37. *Jom.*, ii., 365. Bign., vi., 133, 134.

* 58th Bulletin.

† Monte Melange 268.

extraordinary quantity of cannon-balls which had been discharged during the action, and the close proximity of the contending masses to the deadly batteries, which spread grape at half-musket-shot through their ranks. Though stretched on the cold snow, and exposed to the severity of an arctic winter, they were burning with thirst, and piteous cries were heard on all sides for water, or assistance to extricate the wounded men from beneath the heaps of slain, or load of horses by which they were crushed. Six thousand of these noble animals encumbered the field, or, maddened with pain, were shrieking aloud amid the stifled groans of the wounded. Subdued by loss of blood, tamed by cold, exhausted by hunger, the foemen lay side by side amid the general wreck. The Cossack was to be seen beside the Italian; the gay vinedresser, from the smiling banks of the Garonne, lay athwart the stern peasant from the plains of the Ukraine. The extremity of suffering had extinguished alike the fiercest and the most generous passions. After his usual custom, Napoleon in the afternoon rode through this dreadful field, accompanied by his generals and staff, while the still burning piles of Serpallen and Saussgarten sent volumes of black smoke over the scene of death; but the men exhibited none of their wonted enthusiasm; no cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" were heard; the bloody surface echoed only with the cries of suffering, or the groans of woe. It is this moment which the genius of Le Gros has selected for the finest and most inspired painting that exists of the emperor, in that immortal work which, amid the false taste and artificial sentiment of Parisian society, has revived the severe simplicity and chastened feeling of ancient art.*

For nine days after the battle the French remained at Eylau, unable to advance, unwilling to retreat, and apparently awaiting some pacific overture from the enemy. The only movement of any consequence which was attempted was by Murat, with twelve regiments of cuirassiers, who approached the Russian position in front of Königsberg; but they were defeated by the allied horse, with the loss of four hundred killed and three hundred prisoners. Elated with this success, the Cossacks became daily more enterprising in their incursions: night and day they gave the enemy no rest in their position; their foraging parties were all cut off; and to such a length was this partisan warfare carried, and so completely did the superiority of the Cossacks in its conduct appear, that, during the ten days the French remained at Eylau, upward of fifteen hundred of their cavalry were made prisoners, and brought into Königsberg. Meanwhile the relative situation of the two armies was rapidly changing: the Russians, with the great seaport of Königsberg in their rear, were amply supplied with everything, and their wounded carefully nursed in the great hospitals of that city; while the French, still starving on the snows of Eylau, and unable, from the superiority of the Russian horse, to levy requisitions in the surrounding country, were daily reduced to great-

er straits from want of provisions, and totally destitute of all the accommodations requisite to withstand the rigour of the season.*

Meanwhile Napoleon, however, was not idle.

The day after the battle he issued orders for all the troops in his rear to advance by forced marches to the scene of action. The cuirassiers of Nansouty, which had not been engaged, arrived, in consequence, two days after. Lefebvre received orders to suspend the blockade of Dantzic and concentrate his corps at Osterode, in order to form a reserve to the army and co-operate with Savary, who had the command of Lannes' corps on the Narew. All the bridges on the Lower Vistula were put in a posture of defence, and Bernadotte was brought up to Eylau. Such, however, had been the havoc in the army, that the emperor, notwithstanding these great re-enforcements, did not venture to renew hostilities, or advance against Königsberg, the prize of victory, where he would have found the best possible winter-quarters, and the steeples of which were visible from the heights occupied by his army.† Even the critical position of the Russian army, with its back to the sea and the River Pregel, where defeat would necessarily prove ruin, could not induce Napoleon to hazard another encounter; and, finding that the Russians were not disposed to propose an armistice, he determined himself to take that step. For this purpose General Bertram Feb. 15. was sent to Benningsen's outposts with proposals of peace both to the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. The Russian general sent him on to Memel, where the latter was, with a letter strongly advising him not to treat, and representing that the fact of Napoleon proposing an armistice after so doubtful a battle was the best evidence that it was not for the interest of the allies to grant it. The terms proposed were very different from those offered after the triumph of Jena: there Feb. 17. were no more declarations that the house of Brandenburg must resign half its dominions;‡ or that he would make the Prussian nobles so poor that they should be reduced to beg their bread.§

Frederic William, however, was not led to

* Wils., 109, 111. Dum., xviii., 49, 51.

† When Napoleon began the battle of Eylau he never doubted he would be in Königsberg next day. In his proclamation to his soldiers, before the action commenced, he said, "In two days the enemy will cease to exist, and your fatigues will be compensated by a luxurious and honourable repose." And on the same day Bernier wrote to Josephine, "The Russians have fled to Gumbinnen on the road to Russia; to-morrow Königsberg will receive the emperor."—WILSON, 113.

‡ Hard., ix., 395, 399. Lucches. Bign., vi., 154, 155.

§ Napoleon's letter to the King of Prussia was in these terms: "I desire to put a period to the misfortunes of your family, and organize as speedily as possible the Prussian monarchy, whose intermediate power is necessary for the tranquillity of Europe. I desire peace with Russia; and, provided the cabinet of St. Petersburg has no designs on the Turkish Empire, I see no difficulty in obtaining it. Peace with England is not less essential to all nations; and I shall have no hesitation in sending a minister to Memel to take part in a congress of France, Sweden, England, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey. But as such a congress may last many years, which would not suit the present condition of Prussia, your majesty therefore will, I am persuaded, be of opinion that I have taken the simplest method, and which is most likely to secure the prosperity of your subjects. At all events, I entreat your majesty to believe in my sincere desire to re-establish amicable relations with so friendly a power as Prussia, and that I wish to do the same with Russia and England."—HARD., ix., 396; SCHOEL, viii., 37-405.

* Dum., xviii., 40, 41. Wilson, 109. Ann. Reg., 1807, 14, 15.

† This admirable painting, the master-piece of modern French art, is to be seen in the Luxembourg, at Paris, standing forth in dark simplicity amid its meretricious competitors: it is worthy to be placed beside the finest battle-pieces of Le Brun or Tempesta, and in grandeur of thought and of effect greatly excels any British work of art since the days of Reynolds.

Which are re- sswered from the path of honour even
fused by Prus- by this tempting offer. Widely as
sia. the language of the French emperor
differed from that which he had formerly employ-
ed, and clearly as his present moderation evinced
the extent of the losses he had sustained at Eylau,
still the existing situation and recent engage-
ments of the Prussian monarch precluded his
entering, consistently with national faith, into a
separate negotiation. The Emperor of Russia
had just given the clearest indication of the he-
roic firmness with which he was disposed to
maintain the contest, by the vigorous campaign
which he had commenced in the depth of winter,
and the resolution with which he had sustained
a sanguinary battle of unexampled severity.
The conduct of England, it is true, had been
very different from what it had hitherto been dur-
ing the Revolutionary war, and hardly any as-
sistance had been received either from its arms
or its treasures by the allies engaged in a contest
of life or death on the shores of the Vistula; but
this parsimonious disposition had recently re-
lented, and some trifling succours had just been
obtained from the British government, which, al-
though unworthy for England to offer, were yet
gratefully received, as indicating a disposition
on the part of its cabinet to take a more active part
in the future stages of the struggle.* Under the in-
fluence of these feelings and expectations, the
Prussian government, notwithstanding the almost
desperate situation of their affairs, and the occu-
pation of nine tenths of their territories by the
enemy's forces, refused to engage in any separate
negotiation: an instance of magnanimous
firmness in the extremity of danger which is
worthy of the highest admiration, and went far
to wipe away the stain which their former vacil-
lating conduct towards Napoleon had affixed to
the Prussian annals.†

Foiled in his endeavours to seduce Prussia into
a separate accommodation, Napo-
leon was driven to the painful alter-
native of a retreat. Orders were
given on the 17th for all the corps to
fall back, the advanced posts being
strengthened, in order to prevent the enemy from
becoming aware of what was going forward, or
commencing a pursuit. Eylau was evacuated,
and six hundred wounded abandoned to the hu-
manity of the enemy, and the army, retiring by
the great road through Landsberg, spread itself
into cantonments on the banks of the Passarge
from Hohenstein, where it takes its rise, to
Braunsberg, where it falls into the Baltic Sea.
Headquarters were established at Osterode, in
the rear of the centre of the line; the bulk of the
army was quartered between that place and
Wormditt. Lefebvre received orders to return
to Thorn, unite with the Polish and Saxon con-
tingents, and resume the siege of Dantzic, the
preparations for which had been entirely sus-
pended since the general consternation which
followed the battle of Eylau.‡

Benningen hastened to occupy the country
which the enemy had evacuated, and on the 25th

of February his headquarters were The Russians.
advanced to Landsberg. As the advance, and
sian army passed over the bloody also go into
fields of Preussich-Eylau and Hoff, cantonments.
still encumbered with dead, and strewed with
the remains of the desperate contest of which
they had recently been the theatre, they felt
that they had some reason to claim the advan-
tage in those well-fought fields; and Benning-
sen issued a proclamation to his troops, in which
he now openly claimed the victory.* Both parties
Napoleon also addressed his sol- claim the vic-
diers; but though it was with his tory at Eylau.
usual confidence, yet it was impossible to con-
ceal from the men or from Europe that the Grand
Army had now for the first time retreated, and
that the remains of their comrades on the field
of battle had to trust to the humanity of an en-
emy for their sepulture.† In truth, however, not
only the battle, but the objects of the winter cam-
paign had been equally divided. It was not to
draw the French army from the Vistula to the
Passarge, a distance of above a hundred miles,
that Benningen had concentrated his troops and
resumed offensive operations in the depth of win-
ter; and it was not to retire from within sight of
the steeples of Königsberg to the wretched villa-
ges on the latter stream that Napoleon had fought
so desperate a battle at Eylau. The one struck
for Dantzic, the other for Königsberg, and both
were foiled in their respective objects: fifty thou-
sand men had perished without giving a decisive
advantage to either of the combatants.‡

To this period of the Polish war belong the
operations of Essen and Savary on the
Narew and the neighbourhood
of Ostrolenka. Savary had occu-
pied that town with a large part
of Lannes' corps, who, as already men-
tioned, was sick; and Essen having received con-
siderable accessions of force from the army of
Moldavia, which raised his disposable numbers
to twenty thousand men, received orders, early in
February, to attack the French in that quarter,
and engage their attention, in order to prevent
any re-enforcements being drawn from that corps
to the main army, then advancing to the decisive

Operations of
Essen against
Savary. Com-
bat of Ostro-
lenka.

* Benningen said, "Soldiers! as the enemy was man-
oeuvring to cut us off from our frontiers, I made my army
change its position, in order to defeat his projects. The
French, deceived by that movement, have fallen into the
snare laid for them. The roads by which they followed us
are strewn with their dead. They have been led on to the
field of Eylau, where your incomparable valour has shown
of what the Russian heroism is capable. In that battle
more than thirty thousand French have found their graves.
They have been forced to retire at all points, and to aban-
don to us their wounded, their standards, and their baggage.
Warriors! you have now reposed from your fatigues: for-
ward, let us pursue the enemy, put the finishing stroke to
our glorious deeds, and after having, by fresh victories, given
peace to the world, we will re-enter our beloved country."
—DUMAS, xviii., 67.

† Napoleon's address was as follows: "Soldiers! we
were beginning to taste the sweets of repose in our winter-
quarters when the enemy attacked the first corps on the
Lower Vistula: we flew to meet him; pursued him, sword
in hand, for eighty leagues; he was driven for shelter be-
neath the cannons of his fortresses, and beyond the Pregel.
In the combats of Bergfried, Dippen, Hoff, and the battle
of Eylau, we have taken sixty pieces of cannon, sixteen
standards, killed, wounded, or taken more than 40,000 Rus-
sians; the brave who have fallen on our side have fallen
nobly, like soldiers. Their families shall receive our pro-
tection. Having thus defeated the whole projects of the
enemy, we will draw near to the Vistula, and re-enter our
winter-quarters: whoever ventures to disturb our repose
shall repent of it—for beyond the Vistula, as beyond the
Danube, in the depth of winter as in the heat of summer,
we shall always be the soldiers of the Grand Army." —
DUMAS, xviii., 63.

‡ Dum., xviii., 64, 67. Wilson, 116.

* They consisted only of £80,000 in money. A farther
subsidy of £100,000 and £200,000 worth of arms and amu-
nition, which, with the promise of future succours, were
furnished by the British government in May following, in
return for a solemn renunciation, on the part of the cabinet
of Berlin, to all claim to the Electorate of Hanover.—HARD,
ix., 397; *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 23; *Parl. Deb.*, ix., 987.

† Bign., vi., 158. *Parl. Deb.*, ix., 987. *Hard.*, ix., 398.
Luchhes., i., 290, 291.

‡ Wilson, 115-116. *Dum.*, xviii., 56, 64.

battle of Eylau. Essen advanced with his corps on each side of the River Narew. That commanded by the Russian general in person on the right bank encountered Savary, who was supported by Suchet with his brilliant division: a rude conflict ensued, in which the Russians were finally worsted. Greater success, however, attended their efforts on the left bank: supported by the fire of fifty pieces of artillery, they drove back the French to the walls of Ostrolenka, and, entering pellmell with the fugitives, penetrated into the principal square, and were on the point of obtaining decisive success, when Oudinot, who was marching with 6000 of the Guard to join the Grand Army from Warsaw, arrived with his division of fresh troops, and uniting with Suchet, who halted in the midst of his pursuit on the right bank to fly to the scene of danger, succeeded, after a bloody encounter in the streets, in driving them into the sandhills behind the town, where a destructive cannonade was kept up till nightfall. In this affair the Russians lost seven guns and fifteen hundred men, and the French as many; but having succeeded in their object in defending the town, and keeping the communication of the Grand Army open with Warsaw, they with reason claimed the victory.*

The battle of Eylau excited a prodigious sensation in Europe, and brought Napoleon to the very verge of destruction. Had a ministry of more capacity in military combination been then at the head of affairs in England, there cannot be the smallest doubt that the triumphs of 1813 might have been anticipated by seven years, and the calamities of Europe at once arrested. The first accounts of the battle received through the French bulletins rendered it evident that some disaster had been incurred, and the anxious expectation everywhere excited by this unsatisfactory communication was increased to the highest pitch of transport when, from Benningsen's report, it appeared that he claimed the victory, and, from the stationary condition of the Russian army in front of Königsberg, and the ultimate retreat of the French to the banks of the Passarge, that these pretensions were not devoid of foundation. It was confidently expected that, now that Napoleon had for once been decisively foiled, the Austrians would instantly declare themselves, and their forty thousand men in observation in Bohemia be converted into a hundred thousand in activity on the Elbe.† To stimulate and support such a combination, the public voice in England loudly demanded the immediate despatch of a powerful British force to the mouth of the Elbe; and recollecting the universal exasperation which prevailed in the north of Germany at the French, in consequence of the enormous requisitions which they had everywhere levied from the inhabitants, whether warlike or neutral, there cannot be a

doubt that the appearance of fifty thousand English soldiers would have been attended with decisive effects both upon the conduct of Austria and the future issue of the war. Nothing, however, was done: the English ministry, under the direction of Lord Howick, notwithstanding the most urgent entreaties from Russia and Prussia, sent no succours in men or money. The decisive period was allowed to pass by without anything being attempted in support of the common cause, and the British nation, in consequence, had the Peninsular war to go through to regain the vantage-ground which was then within their grasp.*

In proportion to the sanguine hopes which this bloody contest excited in Germany and England was the gloom and depression which it diffused through all ranks in France. The Parisians were engaged in a vortex of unusual gayety: balls, theatres, and parties succeeded one another in endless succession, when the news of the battle of Eylau fell at once on their festivity like a thunderbolt. They had learned to distrust the bulletins: they saw clearly that Augereau's divergence had been occasioned by something more than the snowstorm. The funds rapidly fell, and private letters soon circulated and were eagerly sought after, which rendered a true and even exaggerated account of the calamity. Hardly a family in Paris but had to mourn the loss of some near relation: the multitude of mourners cast a gloom over the streets, the general consternation suspended all the amusements of the capital. The most exaggerated reports were spread, and found a ready entrance in the excited population: one day it was generally credited that Napoleon had fallen back behind the Vistula; the next, that a dreadful engagement had taken place, in which he himself, with half his army, had fallen. So far did the universal consternation proceed, that the members of the government began to look out for their own interests in the approaching shipwreck; and even the imperial family itself was divided into factions, Josephine openly supporting the pretensions of her son, Eugene, to succeed to the throne, and the Princess Caroline employing all the influence of her charms to secure Junot, governor of Paris, in the interest of her husband, Murat.†

The general gloom was sensibly increased when the message of Napoleon, dated March 26, to the Conservative Senate, announced that a fresh conscription was to be raised of eighty thousand men, in March, 1807, for September, 1808. This was the third levy which had been called for since the Prussian war began: the first when the contest commenced, the second during the triumph and exultation which followed the victory of Jena, the third amid the gloom and despondency which succeeded the

Universal consternation at Paris on news being received of Eylau.

Napoleon demands a third conscription from the 14th of October.

* Sav., iii., 36, 39. Wilson, 119. Jom., ii., 367, 368. Dum., xviii., 69, 75.

† "I trembled," says Jomini, speaking in the person of Napoleon, "lest 150,000 of those mediators had appeared on the Elbe, which would have plunged me in the greatest difficulties. I there saw that I had placed myself at the mercy of my enemies. More than once I then regretted having suffered myself to be drawn on into those remote and inhospitable countries, and received with so much asperity all who sought to portray its danger. The cabinet of Vienna had then a safer and more honourable opportunity of re-establishing its preponderance than that which it chose, in 1813, but it had not resolution enough to profit by it, and my firm countenance proved my salvation."—JOMINI, ii., 369.

* "Repeated and urgent applications were made in February and March, 1807, for an English army, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to co-operate with the Swedish forces in Pomerania, but in vain. Some subsidies were granted in April, but no troops sailed from England till July, when they consisted only of 8000 men, who were sent to the Island of Ruügen." To the earnest request for an auxiliary force, Lord Howick replied, on March 10, "Doubtless the spring is the most favourable period for military operations, but at the present juncture the allies must not look for any considerable land-force from Great Britain." This was after the battle of Eylau was known by the cabinet of London.—See *Annual Register*, 1807, 23; and *Luccchesini*, ii., 295, 296. † Sav., iii., 42, 43. D'Abr., ix., 356, 364.

carnage of Eylau. No words can do justice to the consternation which this third requisition excited among all classes, especially those whose children were likely to be reached by the destructive scourge. In vain the bulletins announced that victories were gained with hardly any loss. The terrific demand of three different conscriptions, amounting to no less than two hundred and forty thousand men in seven months, too clearly demonstrated the fearful chasms which sickness and the sword of the enemy had made in their ranks. The number of young men who annually attained the age of eighteen in France, which was the period selected for the conscription, was about two hundred thousand. Thus, in half a year, more than a whole annual generation had been required for a service which experience had now proved to be almost certain destruction. So great was the general apprehension, that the government did not venture to promulgate the order until, by emissaries and articles in the public journals, the public mind had been in some degree prepared for the shock; and when it was announced, Regnaud St. Angely, the orator intrusted with the task, shed tears, and even the obsequious Senate could not express their acquiescence by any of the acclamations with which they usually received the imperial mandates. So powerful was the public feeling, so visible and universal the expression of terror in the capital, that it was found necessary to assuage the general grief by a clause, declaring that the new levy was at first to be merely organized as an army of reserve for the defence of the frontier, under veteran generals, members of the Conservative Senate. These promises, however, proved entirely elusory. The victory of Friedland saved the new conscripts from the slaughter of the Russian bayonets, only to reserve them for the Caudine Forks, or the murder of the Guerillas in the fields of Spain.*

Meanwhile the prodigious activity of the emperor was employed, during the cessation of hostilities in Poland, in the most active measures to repair his losses, organize the new levies, wring the sinews of war out of the conquered provinces, and hasten forward the conscripts as fast as they joined their depôts on all the roads leading to the theatre of war. All the highways converging from France and Italy to the Vistula were covered with troops, artillery, ammunition, and stores of all sorts for the use of the army. Extensive purchases of horses in Holstein, Flanders, and Saxony provided for the remounting of the cavalry and artillery-drivers; while enormous requisitions everywhere in Germany† fur-

nished the means of subsistence to the unwieldy multitude who were now assembled on the shores of the Vistula. Nay, so far did the provident care of the emperor go, and so strongly did he feel the imminent danger of his present situation, that, while his proclamations breathed only the language of confidence, and spoke of carrying the French standards across the Niemen, he was, in fact, making the most extensive preparations for a defensive warfare, and anticipating a struggle for life or death on the banks of the Rhine. All the fortresses on that river and on the Flemish frontier were armed and put in a posture of defence, and the new levy directed to be placed in five camps, to cover the most unprotected points of the territory of the empire; while the whole veterans in the interior were called out and organized into battalions with the coast-guard, to protect the coasts of Flanders and the Channel, and overawe the discontented in Brittany and La Vendée. "It is necessary," said he, "that, at the sight of the triple barrier of camps which surround our territory, as at the aspect of the triple line of fortresses which cover our frontier, the enemy should be undeceived in their extravagant expectations, and see the necessity of returning, from the impossibility of success, to sentiments of moderation."^a

Neither Napoleon nor his enemies were mistaken in the estimate which they formed of the perilous nature of the crisis which succeeded the battle of Eylau: nothing can be more certain than that a second dubious encounter on the Vistula would have been immediately followed by a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine. Metternich afterward said to the ministers of the French emperor, "We can afford to lose many battles, but a single defeat will destroy your master;" and such, in truth, was the situation of France during the whole reign of Napoleon. It is the precarious tenure by which power is held by all those who rest for their support upon the privilege of opinion or popular passion, whether Democratic or military, which is the secret cause of their ultimate fall. Constant success, fresh victories, an unbroken series of triumphs, are indispensable to the existence of such an authority: it has no middle ground to retire to, no durable interests to rouse for its support; it has perilled all upon a single throw; the alternative is always universal empire or total ruin. This was not the case in a greater degree with Napoleon than any other conqueror in similar circumstances: it obtained equally with Cæsar, Alexander, and Tamerlane; it is to be seen in the British empire in India; it is the invariable attendant of power in all ages, founded on the triumphs of passion over the durable and persevering exertions of reason and interest. It is a constant sense of this truth which is the true key to the character of Napoleon, which explains alike what the world erroneously called his insatiable ambition and his obstinate retention of the vantage-ground which he had gained, which was the secret reason of his advance to the Kremlin, and of his otherwise inexplicable stay at Moscow and Dresden. He

Extreme danger of Napoleon's situation at this juncture.

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 167, 169. Bign., vi., 239.

† The requisitions from the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns will give an idea of the almost incredible extent to which these exactions were carried by Napoleon at this time, and of the blind violence with which he pursued the English commerce at the very time that it had become, from his own acts, indispensable for the equipment of his own troops. By an imperial decree, in March, 1807, Hamburg was ordered to furnish

200,000 pairs of shoes,
50,000 greatcoats,
16,000 coats,
37,000 waistcoats.

M. Bourrienne, the resident at Hamburg, who was charged with the execution of this order, had no alternative but to contract with English houses for these enormous supplies, which all the industry of the north of Germany could not furnish within the prescribed time; and as the same necessity was felt universally, the result was, that when the Grand Army took the field in June, it was almost all equipped in the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and that, too, at a

time when the penalty of death was affixed to the importation of English manufactures of any sort. A full enumeration of all the contributions levied on Germany during the war of 1807 will be given in a succeeding chapter, drawn from official sources, the magnitude of which almost exceeds belief.—See BOURRIENNE, vii., 293, 294.

* Bign., vi., 238, 239. Ann. Reg., 1807, 3.

knew that, throughout his whole career, he could not retain but by constantly advancing, and that the first step in retreat was the commencement of ruin.

The Polish winter campaign demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the ruinous effect of the surrender of the Prussian fortresses on the most striking manner, the ruinous effects to the common cause, and in an especial manner the interests of their own monarchy, which resulted from the disgraceful capitulations of the Prussian fortresses in the preceding autumn. When the balance quivered at Eylau, the arrival of Lestocq would have given the Russians a decisive victory, had it not been for the great successes of Davoust on the left and the tardy appearance of Ney on the right; yet, if the governors of the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder had done their duty, these two corps would have been engaged far in the rear, Ney around the walls of Magdebourg, Davoust before Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. Saragossa, with no defence but an old wall and the heroism of its inhabitants, held out after fifty days of open trenches; Tarragona fell after as many. If the French marshals had, in like manner, been detained two months, or even six weeks, before each of the great fortresses of Prussia, time would have been gained to organize the resources of the eastern provinces of the monarchy, and Russia would have gained a decisive victory at Eylau, or driven Napoleon to a disastrous retreat from the Vistula: a striking proof of the danger of military men mingling political with warlike considerations, or adopting any other line, when charged with the interests of their country, than the simple course of military duty.

Benning's assembling of his army in silence behind the dark screen of the Johannesberg forest; the hardihood and resolution of his winter march across Poland, and his bold stroke at the left wing of the French army when reposing in its cantonments, were entitled to the very highest praise, and, if executed with more vigour at the moment of attack, would have led to the most important results; his subsequent retreat in presence of the Grand Army without any serious loss, and the desperate stand he made at Eylau, as well as the skill with which the attacks of Napoleon were baffled on that memorable field, deservedly place him in a very high rank among the commanders of that age of glory. Napoleon's advance to Pultusk and Golymin, and subsequently his march from Warsaw towards Königsberg, in the depth of winter, were distinguished by all his usual skill in combination and vigour in execution; but the results were very different from what had attended the turning of the Austrian and Prussian armies at Ulm and Jena: columns were here cut off, communications threatened, corps planted in the rear, but no serious disasters followed; the Russians fronted boldly and fought desperately on every side, and from the hazardous game the assailant suffered nearly as much as the retreating party: a striking proof of what so many other events during the war conspired to demonstrate, that a certain degree of native resolution will often succeed in foiling the greatest military genius, and that it was as much to the want of that essential quality in his opponents as his own talents that the previous triumphs of Napoleon had been owing.

Observations on the military movements of both parties.

CHAPTER XLV.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEASURES OF MR. FOX'S ADMINISTRATION.

FEB., 1806—MARCH, 1807.

ARGUMENT.

Important Civil Changes which originated during the War.—Effects of the Accession of the Whigs to Power.—Their Plan for a new System for the recruiting of the Army.—Great Changes introduced in this Particular.—Argument in support of it by Mr. Windham.—Reply of the former Ministers on the Subject.—The Bill passes.—Reflections on this Subject.—Error of the ministerial Measure as far as regards the Volunteers.—Temporary Service now in a great Degree abandoned.—Abolition of the Slave-trade.—Argument against the Change by the West India Planters.—Argument of Mr. Wilberforce and others for the Abolition.—The Abolition is carried.—Deplorable Effects of the Change hitherto on the Negro Race; but they are not chargeable on its Authors, but on subsequent Alterations.—Lord Henry Petty's Plan of Finance.—Argument in favour of it.—Argument against it by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Perceval.—Counter Plan proposed by them.—Reflections on this Subject.—Prejudicial Effect in the End of these Discussions.—General Character of the Whig Measures at this Period.—Their combined Humanity and Wisdom.—Foreign Transactions.—First Expedition to South America.—Capture of Monte Video.—A second Expedition against Buenos Ayres is resolved on.—Its Failure.—Court-martial on General Whitelocke, the Commander, who is cashiered.—Capture of Curaçoa, and establishment of the Republic of Hayti.—State of Affairs in Turkey.—Dismissal of the Waywodes of Wallachia and Moldavia by Sultan Selim.—Violent Remonstrances of Russia and England, which produce the Repeal of the Measure.—Meanwhile the Russian Armies invade the Principalities, and War is declared.—Rapid Progress of their Troops in these Provinces.—They require the Aid of a naval Attack by England on Constantinople, which is agreed to.—Description

of the Dardanelles.—Ultimatum of Great Britain, and Declaration of War by Turkey.—Sir John Duckworth passes the Dardanelles.—The Divan resolve on Submission, but are roused to exertion by General Sebastiani.—The Turks negotiate to gain Time and complete their Preparations.—The English renounce the Enterprise, and with Difficulty repossess the Dardanelles.—Blockade of those Straits, and naval Action off Tenedos.—Descent by the British on the Coast of Egypt, which is defeated.—Great Discontents at these repeated Disasters throughout Great Britain.—Bill for introducing the Catholics into the Army and Navy brought in by Lord Howick.—Argument in favour of it by Lord Howick.—Argument against it by Mr. Perceval.—Change of Ministry.—Cause which led to it.—Composition of the new Cabinet.—Arguments in Parliament against the King's Conduct, and in support of it by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning.—Dissolution of Parliament.—General Election, and great Majority in favour of the new Ministry.—Character of the Whig Ministry, and Effects of their Fall.—Reflections on their foreign Measures.—Violent Irritation arising from them in Russia.—Repeated and ineffectual Applications which Alexander had made for Aid from England during the Polish War.—The Dardanelles Expedition is an Exception to the general Inexperience of their foreign Policy.—The Defeats of England during their Administration were ultimately beneficial.

If history were composed merely of the narrative of wars and campaigns, it would, how interesting soever to the lovers of adventure, or important to those intrusted with the national defence, be justly subject to the reproach of being occupied only with the passions and ca-

Important civil changes which originated during the war.

lamities of mankind. But even in the periods when military adventure appears to be most conspicuous, and battles and sieges seem to occupy exclusively the attention of the historian, great and important civil changes are going forward; and the activity of the human mind, aroused by the perils which prevail, and the forcible collision of interests and passions which is induced, is driven into new channels, and turned to the investigation of fresh objects of thought. It is the tendency of those periods of tranquillity, when no serious concerns, whether of nations or individuals, are at stake, to induce a state of torpor and inactivity in the national mind: mankind repose after their struggles and their dangers; the arts of peace, the social dispositions, the abstract sciences are cultivated; the violent passions, the warm enthusiasm, the enduring fortitude of former days, pass into the page of history, and excite the astonishment or provoke the ridicule of their pacific successors. Such a period is, of all others, the most conducive to general happiness, but it is far from being that in which the greatest and most original efforts of human thought are made. The age of the Antonines in ancient, the era of the Georges in modern times, were unquestionably those when the greatest sum of general happiness prevailed in the Roman and British empires; but we shall look in vain in the authors or statesmen of either for the original thought and vigorous expressions which characterized the stormy periods of Cæsar and Pompey, of Cromwell and Napoleon.

The accession of the Whig ministry to the direction of affairs was an event eminently calculated to afford full scope to the practical application, to the measures of the Legislature, of those ideas of social improvement which the agitation and excitement of the preceding fifteen years had caused to take deep root among a large proportion of the thinking part of the people. The men who had now succeeded to the helm embraced a considerable part of the aristocracy, much of the talent, and still more of the philanthropy of the state. For a long course of years they had been excluded from power, and during that time they had been led, both by principle and interest, to turn their attention to those projects of social amelioration which the French Revolution had rendered generally prevalent among the Democratic classes, and which were in an eminent degree calculated to win the affections of the popular party throughout the kingdom. The period, therefore, when their leaders, by their installation in power, obtained the means of carrying their projected changes into effect, is of importance, not merely as evincing the character and objects of a party justly celebrated in English history both for their talents and achievements, but as illustrating the modification which Revolutionary principles receive by falling upon the highest class of persons, long trained to the habits and speculations of a free country.

The composition of the army was the first matter which underwent a thorough discussion, and was subjected to a different system in consequence of the accession of the new administration. Notwithstanding the uniform opposition which the Whigs had offered to the war, and the censures which they had in general bestowed upon all Mr. Pitt's measures for increasing the naval and military establishments of the country, it had now become painfully evi-

dent, even to themselves, that the nation was involved in a contest, which might be of very long duration, with a gigantic foe, and that the whole resources of the country might be speedily required to combat for the national existence with the veteran legions of Napoleon on the shores of Britain. The means of recruiting which can ever exist in a free country are altogether unequal to those which are at the command of despotism, whether monarchical or Democratic, unless in those rare periods of public excitement when the intensity of patriotic feeling supplies the want of powers of compulsion on the part of the executive; and, accordingly, throughout the whole war, great difficulty had been experienced by the British government in providing a proper supply of soldiers for the regular army. The only method pursued was voluntary enlistment; the jealousy of a free Constitution not permitting a conscription, except for the militia, which could not legally be sent out of the kingdom; and the success of the attempt to extend this system to the raising of troops of the line by balloting for fifty thousand men to compose the army of reserve in 1803, had not been such as to hold out any inducements for a repetition of the attempt. Enlistment for life was the system universally pursued, it being thought that in a country where the pay of the soldier was necessarily, from the expense of the establishment, less than the wages of ordinary workmen, to allow a power of retiring after a stated period of service was over, might endanger the state by thinning the ranks of the army at the most critical periods. To this point the attention of former administrations had frequently been directed, and a recent change had been made by Mr. Pitt, which had considerably increased the annual supply of recruits by enlistment; but the new ministry introduced at once a total change of system by the introduction of enlistments for a limited period of service.*

* It was argued in Parliament by the supporters of this change, and especially Mr. Windham, "The fate of nations at all times, when contending with one another, has been determined chiefly by the composition of their armies. The times are past, if they ever existed, when one country contended against another by the general strength of its population, when the strength of the army was the mere amount of the physical force and courage of the individuals who composed it. Armies are now the champions on either side to which the countries engaged commit their quarrel, and when the champion falls the cause is lost. The notion of a *levy en masse* or voluntary force, therefore, would seem to be one to which it would be wholly unsafe to trust. In how many instances has it ever happened, that when the army was defeated the contest has been restored by a contest of the people at large? The people in mass are like metal in the ore; and as all the iron that ever came from a Swedish mine would never hew a block or divide a plank till it was wrought and fashioned into the shape of a hatchet or a saw, so the strength of a people can never, perhaps, be made capable of producing much effect in war till it is extracted partially, and moulded into that facitious and highly-polished instrument called an army. What are the two events which, more than any other two, have decided the fate of the present world? The battles of Marengo and Austerlitz. Yet what were the numbers there employed, the space occupied, or the lives lost, compared to the states and kingdoms whose fate was then decided? Yet such was the fact; millions hung upon thousands; the battles were lost, and Europe submitted to the conqueror. It was not because there did not exist in those countries a brave and warlike people, animated by the strongest feelings of devotion to their sovereign, and abhorring the idea of a foreign yoke. All these were there; twenty-five millions of men burning with patriotic ardour were around the emperor; but the regular armies were defeated, and submission was a matter of necessity.

"Assuming, then, the importance of regular armies, which no one denies, but every one seems disposed to forget, the question is, How are they to be obtained? above

Great change in the composition of the army. Arguments in support of it by Mr. Windham.

The bill met with a most strenuous opposition, although the early divisions which took

place upon it evinced a clear preponderance in favour of the ministers;* but it passes.

all, how are we to ensure to this country, what unquestionably it has never had, a never-failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers? The nature of things here yields us but the option of two things, choice or force. In the Continental monarchies recourse is usually had to the latter of these modes, and undoubtedly, wherever the power of government is such that it has nothing to do but send its officers forth to seize the peasantry and force them to become soldiers, there can be no process so easy, effectual, and certain. But every one must be conscious that this is a mode of proceeding impracticable, except in extreme emergencies, in this country; not that the power is wanting in government of ordering such a levy, but that the measures of force we can employ are so abhorrent to public feeling, so restricted and confined by legal forms, that their effect is almost reduced to nothing. Even if it could be enforced, the real character of such a compulsory service is only that of a tax, and of the worst of all taxes, a tax by lot. We hear every day that half measures will no longer do—that something effectual must be done; but if from these generalities you descend to particulars, and propose to renew the act for the army of reserve, the feeling is immediately changed, and all declare they are decidedly against any measure of the sort. It is impossible to say to what the exigencies and necessities of the times may drive us; but, unless a more urgent necessity is generally felt than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects, so injurious in their ultimate results, should not be resorted to till it is proved by experience that all others have failed.

"Voluntary enlistment, therefore, is the only resource which remains to us, and yet the experience of thirteen years' warfare has now sufficiently demonstrated that from this source, in the present state and habits of our population, it is in vain to expect a sufficient supply of soldiers. If, however, you cannot change the habits or occupations of your people, what remains to be done but to increase the inducements to enter the army? Without this, our means of recruiting must be little better than deception and artifice. We are in the state of men selling wares inferior in value to the price they ask for them, and, accordingly, none but the ignorant and thoughtless will ever be tempted to become buyers. To such a height has this arisen, that of late years our only resource has been recruiting boys; men grown up, even with all the grossness, ignorance, and improvidence incident to the lower orders, are too wary to accept our offers; we must add to the thoughtlessness arising from situation the weakness and improvidence of youth. The practice of giving bounties is decisive proof of this; whatever is bestowed in that way, shows that the service does not stand upon its true footing. Men require no temptation to engage in a profession which has sufficient inducements of its own. Never can the system of supplying the army be considered as resting upon its proper basis, till the necessity of bounties shall have ceased, and the calling of a soldier shall be brought to the level with other trades and professions, for entering into which no man receives a premium, but where, on the contrary, a premium is frequently paid for permission to enter.

"The great change by which this might, at first sight, appear to be effected, is by raising the pay. But, independently of the financial embarrassments which any considerable alteration in that respect would produce, there is an invincible objection to such a change in the licentious habits, inconsistent with military discipline, which an undue command of money would generate among the soldiers. Provisions in sickness and old age; pensions for the wounded; honorary distinctions suited to the rank, situation, and condition of the party, are much safer recommendations; but, above all, a change in the service of enlistment from life to a limited period is the great alteration to which we must look for elevating the attractions of the army. This is the system of service in all the states of Europe except our own, and it is the condition of entering that large and efficient part of our own forces, now 100,000 strong, which is composed of the regular militia. That this system will have the effect of inducing men to enter is so clear, so certain, so totally incontrovertible, that it is unnecessary to urge it. There is no man who would not prefer having an option to having none. Our immense armies in India are all raised, and that, too, without the slightest difficulty, for limited service. A system of rewards for the regular and faithful soldier should also be established; and that severity of discipline, which is at present so much an object of terror to all persons of regular habits, should be materially softened; not that it will, in all probability, ever be possible to dispense entirely with corporeal punishment in the army, for there are some turbulent spirits who can only be repressed by the fear of it, but the discipline may be rendered infinitely less rigorous. By this means a better description of men will be induced to enter the army; and the better

men you get, the less necessity will there be for severe punishment. By these changes, also, the temptation to desertions will be greatly diminished, the great and alarming frequency of which, of late years, has been mainly owing to high bounties and bad regulations; and in legislating for this matter, it is material to invest courts-martial with a discretionary power to modify the penalty of desertion most materially, or take it away altogether, if it has been committed only in a moment of intoxication, or from the influence of bad example, or the soldier has made amends by returning to his colours.

"It is a mistake to argue that the benefits I have proposed to introduce, being for the most part prospective, and to be reaped only at the end of seven or fourteen years, will not influence the inconsiderate description of men who form the great bulk of our common soldiers. That may be true as it relates to the description of men who, under the combined influence of bounties and intoxication on the one hand, and service for life and flogging on the other, almost exclusively enter our service. But the great benefit which may fairly be expected to result from a measure of the sort now proposed is, that it will introduce a new and better description of persons into the army, not altogether so thoughtless or inconsiderate, but who are attracted by the advantages which the military service holds out. Such considerations may frequently, indeed, have little weight with the young man himself, but will they prove equally unavailing with his relations, arrived at a more advanced period of life, and familiar, from experience, with the difficulty of getting on in every profession? What attracts young men of family into the East India Company's service, notwithstanding all the disadvantages of a lifetime spent in exile, and a climate so deadly that not one in ten ever survives it? Not present advantage, for the pay, for the first ten years, barely equals the young man's expenses. It is ultimate benefits; the spectacle of nabobs frequently returning with fortunes; the certainty that all who survive will become entitled, after a specific period of service, to pensions considerable, with reference to the rank of life to which they belong. Such considerations may not be so decisive with the lower orders as the higher, but there is no rank to whom the sight of the actual enjoyment of the advantages of a particular profession will not speedily prove an attraction.

"To effect these objects, I propose that the term of military service should be divided into three periods, viz., for 7, 14, and 21 years for the infantry, but for 10, 6, and 3 for the artillery and cavalry, in consideration of the additional time requisite to render men efficient in those branches of service. At the end of each of those periods, the soldier is to have right to his discharge. If discharged at the close of the first, he is to have right to exercise his trade or calling in any town of the kingdom; at the end of the second, besides that advantage, to a pension for life; at the end of the third, to the full allowance of Chelsea, which should be raised to 9d., and in some cases 1s. a day. If wounded or disabled in the service, to receive the same pension as if he had served out his full time. Desertion to be punished, in the first instance, by the loss of so many years' service; in very aggravated cases only by corporeal infliction.

"Great exaggeration appears to have prevailed as to the benefits to be derived from the volunteer system. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that such a force can be brought to such a state of efficiency as to be able to cope with regular forces. Essential service may be derived from such a force, but not in the line to which they have at present been directed. With a view to bring them back to their proper sphere, as they were originally constituted in 1798, it would be advisable to reduce their allowances and relax their discipline. Those corps only which are in a rank of life to equip themselves, and are willing to serve without pay, should be retained; the remainder of the population should be loosely trained, under regular officers, to act as irregular troops. It is not by vainly imitating the dress, air, and movements of regular troops, that a voluntary force can ever be brought to render effectual service. These are my fixed ideas; but as I find a volunteer force already existing, it would not be politic at once to reduce it. All I propose, in the mean time, is to reduce the period of drilling from 85 days to 26, and make other reductions which will save the nation £857,000 a year; all future volunteers to receive their pay only, and the trained bands to receive a shilling a day for 14 days a year, but not to be dressed as soldiers, and not drilled or exercised as such. Rank should be taken from the volunteer officers; their holding it is a monstrous injustice to the regular army."*

* The division which decided the principle of the bill took place on March 14, 1806, when the numbers were, Ayes, 235; Noes, 119; Majority, 116.—*Ann. Reg.*, 1806, p. 54.

at length passed both houses by a decided majority, the number in the Peers being 97 to

To these admirable arguments it was answered by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, "At no period of our history has the science, uniformity, and discipline of the army been comparable to what it is at this moment; and for these

immense benefits, the profession at large are aware we are more indebted to the improvements of the present commander-in-chief (the Duke of York) than of any other individual in existence. Under his able administration, the army is considerably superior in number to what it ever was at any former period.* The recruiting, as it now exists, is steadily producing 16,000 soldiers a year; and when the act for its future regulation is generally enforced, which is not yet the case, this number may be expected to be greatly increased. Is this a crisis to break up a system producing, and likely to produce, such results? The average wear and tear of the army is about 15,000 a year; so that the present system is not only adequate to the maintenance of its numbers, but likely to lead to its increase. The proposed alteration on the term of service in the army is one of the most momentous that Parliament can be called on to discuss; and for this, above all other reasons, that the change once introduced is irreparable: be it good or be it bad in its results, it cannot be departed from; for when the soldiers have once tasted the sweets of limited, they never submit to the restraint of unlimited service. Surely, on so vital a subject, and where a false step once taken is irretrievable, it is expedient to proceed with caution, and make the experiment on a small scale before we organize all our defenders on the new system.

"The system of enlisting for a limited period is no novelty; its application on a great and universal scale alone is so. For the last three years, our endeavours have been directed, while a superior encouragement was held out to persons entering for general service, to obtain, at the same time, the utmost possible number of men for limited service in the army—both in the army of reserve, and latterly under the additional force act. If, then, we have failed in obtaining an adequate supply of men, even under a limited scale, both in time and space, how can we expect to obtain that advantage by taking away one of these limitations? If, indeed, we could not, under the present system, obtain an adequate force liable to be detached abroad, there might be a necessity for some change in our system; but when we have 165,000 liable to be sent abroad, and the only check upon so employing them is the necessity of not weakening ourselves too much at home, why should we preclude ourselves from raising, by the present method, such a description of force as experience has proved, in this country at least, is most easily obtained? The expiry of the soldier's term of service must, independent of any casualties, produce a large chasm in the army; and what security have we, that, if the whole or the greater part of the army is raised in that way, a great, it may be a fatal, breach may not at some future period occur in our ranks at the very time when their service is most required? What the inconvenience of the soldiers being entitled to their discharge at the end of each period during a war is likely to prove upon experience, may be judged of by recollecting how embarrassing this system, some years back, was found to be in the militia, notwithstanding the great comparative facility of replacing men when serving at home—an embarrassment so great, that it led, as a matter of necessity, to the extension of the service in that branch of our military system. What reason is there to suppose that the soldiers in the regular army will not be as prone as their brethren in the militia to take advantage of the option of a discharge when their title to demand it arrives? And if so, and this heavy periodical drain be added to the existing casualties of the troops, what chance have we of keeping up a force which even now wants 25,000 men to complete its ranks?

"It is in vain to refer to foreign states as affording precedents in point; their situation is totally different from ours. In Russia unlimited service prevails, and the same was the case in Austria during the best days of the monarchy. In 1797, a similar regulation to the one under discussion was passed prospectively for the future, to take effect at the expiration of a certain number of years, but it has not yet, I believe, been acted upon; and if it has, the disasters of Ulm and Hohenlinden afford but little reason to recommend its adoption. Napoleon's soldiers are all raised by the conscription for unlimited service; and although, in the old French monarchy, troops in sufficient numbers were certainly obtained by voluntary enlistment for limited periods, yet the period of service was more extended than that now proposed; and the circumstances of that country abounding in men, with few colonies to protect, and still fewer manufactures to draw off its superfluous hands, and

40, giving a majority to ministers of 57. The clauses regarding the volunteer force, however, were abandoned or modified in the ultimate stages of the discussion, the effect of the bill as to them being limited to a proper restriction of the period of permanent duty. But the great principle of enlisting for a limited service was by its passing introduced into the British army, and has never since been totally abandoned; and considering the great achievements which it subsequently wrought, and the vast consumption of life which the new system adequately supplied,

a strong military spirit in all classes, can afford no precedent for this country, where employment from the prevalence of manufactures is so much more frequent; whose population is by nearly a half less, which is burdened with a vast colonial empire, all parts of which require defence, and where the natural bent of the people is rather to the sea than the land service. Nor is the reference to our East India possessions more fortunate; for the enlistment for a limited period prevailed in the Company's European regiments for a number of years, yet their battalions raised in this way were always weak in numbers and inefficient, and were all reduced on that very account during Lord Cornwallis's first government of India. All the prepossessions of Mr. Pitt were in favour of limited service: his opinions on this subject were repeatedly stated to the House. "The opinions of a great variety of military men were taken on the subject; but these opinions were so much divided, that he arrived at the conclusion that the inconveniences and risks with which the change would be attended more than counterbalanced its probable advantages.

"The proposed changes on the volunteer force appear to be still more objectionable. Admitting that it is desirable to diminish the great expense of that part of our establishment; allowing that, now that the corps have attained a considerable degree of efficiency, it may be advisable to diminish considerably the number of days in which they are to serve at the public expense, is that any reason for substituting a tumultuary array, without the dress, discipline, or habits of soldiers, for a body of men qualified not only to act together, but capable, if draughted into the militia or the line, of at once acting with regular soldiers? Will the volunteer corps exist for any length of time under so marked a system of discouragement as it is proposed to impose upon them, without pay, without rank, without public favour? And is this the moment, when the whole military force of the Continent, with the exception of Russia, is in the hands of our enemies, to incur the hazard of substituting, for a voluntary disciplined, a motley array of undisciplined forces, and run the risk of exciting the disaffection of the powerful bands who, at the call of their sovereign, have so nobly come forward in the public defence?"

"At the commencement of the present war we raised 80,000 men by the operation of the ballot. That system has its evils; but when it is indispensable, in a given time, to raise a large force for the public service, there is no alternative. In recognising this right, however, which flows necessarily from the acknowledged title of the sovereign power to call for the assistance, in times of public danger, of all its subjects, Parliament has been careful to fence it round with all the safeguards which the exercise of a prerogative so liable to abuse will admit of: it is determined by lot; the person drawn has the option to provide a substitute; and this is the footing upon which the militia stands. A still farther limitation exists where the call is made, not upon the individual, but the district; and the district is allowed the option, instead of providing the man, to pay a fine; and this is the principle on which the additional force bill, at present in operation, which we are now called on to repeal, is founded. But the ballot for the militia is, by the proposed change, to cease on the termination of the war; if then ceases to be a militia, and becomes a part of the regular force raised by the crown. The act proposed to be repealed is producing at the rate of 18,000 recruits a year, besides the men raised by ballot for the militia. Proposing, as the ministers now do, to abandon at once both these resources, are they prepared to show that the new measures will supply this great deficiency? Would it not be expedient first to try the experiment on a small scale, to be assured of its success before we commit the fortunes of the state to the result of the experiment? It is an old military maxim not to manoeuvre in presence of an enemy; but the measures now in agitation do a great deal worse, for they not only change the composition of your force, but shake the loyalty and submission of the soldiers, in presence of the most formidable military power Europe has ever witnessed."

* Regulars and Militia, 1st January, 1802 . . .	242,440
" " " 1st January, 1804 . . .	234,005
" " " 1st March, 1808 . . .	267,554

* Parl. Deb., vi., 652, 706.

† Parl. Deb., vi., 967, 990.

its introduction is to be regarded as a memorable era in the history of the war.*

If called upon to decide in favour of one or other of the able arguments urged on the opposite sides of this important question, it might, perhaps, be no easy matter to say on which the weight of authority and reason preponderated. But experience, the great resolver of political difficulties, has now settled the matter, and proved that Mr. Windham rightly appreciated the principles of human nature on this subject, and was warranted in his belief that, without any increase of pay, limited service, with additional encouragements in the way of retiring allowances and privileges, would provide a force perfectly adequate even to the most extensive military operations of Great Britain. From the official returns it appears that the rate of recruiting rose in a rapid and striking manner after the system of limited service was adopted, and before the expiration of a year from the time it was first put in force, had more than doubled the annual supply of soldiers for the army.† Though variously modified, the same system has ever since prevailed with perfect success in every branch of the service, and to its influence, combined with the improved regulations for its discipline, pay, and retired allowances, great part of the glories of the Peninsular campaigns is to be ascribed. On examining the confident opinions expressed by many eminent and respectable military men on the impossibility of providing a supply of adequate force for the English army by such a method, it is difficult to avoid the inference, that implicit reliance is not always to be placed on the views of practical men in legislative improvements; that their tenacity to existing institutions is often as great as the proneness of theoretical innovators to perilous change; that little credit is to be given to the most eminent professional persons when they claim for the people of a particular country an exemption from the ordinary principles of human nature; and that true political wisdom is to be gathered, not by discarding the lessons of experience, but extending the basis on which they are founded, and drawing conclusions rather from a general deduction of the history of mankind than the limited views, however respectably supported, of particular individuals.

To these observations on Mr. Windham's military system, however, one exception must be made in regard to that part of his plan which related to the volunteers. There can be no doubt that in this particular he did not display the same knowledge of human nature which was elsewhere conspicuous. Admitting that the volunteers were very far indeed from being equal to the regular forces; that their cost was exceedingly burdensome, and that they could not be relied on as more than auxiliaries to the

army; still in that capacity they were most valuable, and not only qualified to render some service by themselves, but as forming a reserve to replenish the ranks of the regular forces of incalculable importance. The campaigns of 1812 and 1813 demonstrate of what vast service such a force, progressively incorporated with the battalions of the regular army, comes to be when their ranks are thinned in real warfare, and how rapidly they acquire the discipline and efficiency of veteran troops; and in this view the tumultuary array of Mr. Windham, without the clothing, discipline, or organization of soldiers, could have been of little or no utility. Nor is it of less moment that the volunteer corps, by interesting vast multitudes in the occupations, feelings, and honour of soldiers, powerfully contribute to nourish and expand that military ardour in all ranks which is indispensable to great martial achievements. Veteran troops, indeed, may smile when they behold novices in the military art imitating the dress, manners, and habits of soldiers; but the experienced commander, versed in the regulating principles of human exertion, will not deem such aids to patriotic ardour of little importance, and willingly fan the harmless vanity which makes the young aspirant imagine that his corps has in a few weeks acquired the efficiency of regular forces. Imitation even of the uniform, air, and habits of soldiers is a powerful principle in transferring the military ardour to the breasts of civilians. Philopomen judged wisely when he recommended his officers to be sedulously elegant in their dress, arms, and appointments. He was well acquainted with human nature who said that to women and soldiers dress is a matter of no ordinary importance. Many nations have been saved from slavery by the passion for what an inexperienced observer would call mere foppery.

In later times the system of temporary service has been in some degree superseded in the British army, and the majority of recruits are now enlisted for life. And in weighing the comparative merit of these two opposite systems, it will probably be found that the plan of enlisting men for limited periods is the most advisable in nations in whom the military spirit runs high, or the advantages of the military service are such as to secure at all times an ample supply of young men for the army, and where it is of importance to train as large a portion as possible of the population to the skilful use of arms, in order to form a reserve for the regular force in periods of danger; and that enlistment for life is more applicable to those nations or situations where no national danger is apprehended, and it is the object of government to secure rather a permanent body of disciplined men, subject to no causes of decrease but the ordinary casualties of the service, for the ordinary pacific duties, rather than spread far and wide through the nation the passion for glory or the use of arms. A provident administration will always have a system established, capable either of contraction or expansion, which embraces both methods of raising soldiers; and this, for nearly thirty years, has been the case with the British army.

Important as the matter thus submitted to Parliament in its ultimate consequences undoubtedly was, when it is recollected what a great and glorious part the British army bore in the close of the struggle, it yet yielded in magnitude to the next great

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 62.

† OLD SYSTEM.

	Recruits.
January 1 to July 1, 1805.....	10,923
January 1 to July 1, 1806.....	9,042
January 1 to July 1, 1806.....	10,783
July 1 to January 1, 1807.....	6,276
(New system in operation since January 1, 1807.)	

NEW SYSTEM.

	Recruits.
January 1 to July 1, 1807.....	11,412
July 1 to January 1, 1808.....	7,734
Rate of recruiting from January 1 to April 1	21,000
Ditto from April 1 to July 1.....	24,000

—Ann. Reg., 1806, 40, 41.

subject which the new ministers brought forward for consideration. This was the ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE-TRADE: a measure which, in its remote effects, appears to affect the fortunes of half the human race. This great change was not finally completed till the following session of Parliament; but the preparatory steps were taken in this, and it belongs properly to the present period of English history, which treats of the measures of the Whig administration.

It was urged by Mr. Hibbert and the advocates of the West India interest, both in and out of Parliament, "That the British West India islands were settled, and have ever been cultivated under the solemn faith of those charters and proclamations, and those acts of Parliament which have confirmed the West India islands in the most perfect assurance that they should continue to receive supplies of negroes from Africa; that the cultivation of these colonies cannot be carried on but by means of slave labour; and the cultivation of their interior, which is indispensable to their security, cannot be promoted if the slave-trade be abolished. If this bill shall pass into a law, the very worst effects may be anticipated from the change, not only to the colonies themselves, but the general interests of the empire. The commerce which the West Indies maintain is the most important of the whole British dominions. It pays annually in duties to the public treasury upward of £3,000,000; employs more than 16,000 seamen; contributes one third to the whole exports, and one third to the imports; takes off £6,000,000 a year worth of domestic manufactures, and is pre-eminently distinguished above all others by this important feature, that it is all within ourselves, and not liable, like other foreign trade, to be turned to our disadvantage on a rupture with the power with whom it is conducted. This measure, however, if carried into effect, must in a few years diminish the property vested in the British West India islands, and open the means of hastening the progress of rival colonies, to whom the advantages of a full supply of negroes will still remain open. It must forbid the supply of losses to the negro population, which originate in accident or diseases peculiar to the climate, and which the most humane and provident management is unable altogether to prevent, stop the completion of establishments already begun, and altogether prevent the extension of cultivation into the interior of the islands, without which they can never either attain a state of security or reach the degree of wealth and splendour of which they are susceptible.

"The most disastrous effects, both to individuals and the public, may be anticipated from the ultimate consequences of the measure under consideration, not to mention the confusion and ruin which it must occasion to families: the capital now sunk in cultivation which it must destroy; the calamities attendant on revolt and insurrection which it must occasion; the emigration it will induce in all who have the means of extricating themselves or their capital from so precarious a situation; the despair and apathy which it must spread through those who have not the means of escape; what incalculable evils must it produce among the black population? The abolition of the slave-trade is a question which it is at all times perilous to agitate, from the intimate connexion which it has in the minds of the negroes with the abolition of slavery itself,

and the necessary effect which it must have in perpetuating the discussion of that subject in the mother-country, to the total destruction of all security in the planters, or repose in the minds of the slave population. From the moment that this bill passes, every white man in the West Indies is sleeping on the edge of a volcano, which may at any moment explode and shiver him to atoms. Throwing out of view altogether all considerations of interest, and viewing this merely as a question of humanity, it is impossible to contemplate without the utmost alarm the perils with which it is fraught. The existence of a black power in the neighbourhood of the most important island of the British West Indies affords a memorable and dreadful lesson, recorded in characters of blood, of the issue of doctrines intimately, constantly, and inseparably connected with the abolition of the slave-trade. It is impossible to contemplate that volcano without the deepest alarm, nor forget that its horrors were produced by well-meant but ill-judged philanthropy, similar to that which is the prime mover in the present question.*

"It is a total mistake to suppose that the evils, enormous and deplorable as they are, of Central Africa, arise from the slave-trade. These evils are the consequence of the cruel habits and barbarous manners of its inhabitants: they existed for thousands of years before the slave-trade was heard of, and will continue for thousands of years after it is extinct. Civilize the interior of that vast continent—humanize their manners—abolish the savage practice of selling or putting to death captives made in war, and you indeed make a mighty step in extirpating the evils which we all lament. But as long as these savage customs prevail; as long as the torrid zone is inhabited by a thousand tribes all engaged in contests with each other, and with all of whom slavery to prisoners made in war is the only alternative for death, it is hopeless to expect that the stoppage even of the whole vent which the purchase of negroes by Europeans affords, would sensibly affect the general prevalence of the slave-traffic. What are the 50,000 whom they annually transport across the Atlantic, to the innumerable multitudes who are driven across the Sahara Desert, or descend to Egypt for the vast markets of the Mussulman world? But to suppose that the partial stoppage of it in the British dominions, that the prohibition to transport the fifteen thousand negroes who are annually brought to our shores, could have a beneficial effect, is ridiculous. So far from producing such a result, its tendency will be diametrically the reverse: it will drive the slave-trade from the superior to the inferior channel; from the great merchants of Liverpool, who have done so much, for their own interests, perhaps, but still done so much to diminish its horrors, to the Spaniards and Portuguese, who are as yet totally unskilled in its management, and treat the captives with the utmost barbarity: as our own colonies decline from the stoppage of this supply of labourers, those of the other nations who have not fettered themselves in the same way will augment; the cultivation of sugar for the European market will ultimately pass into other hands, and we shall, in the end, find that we have cut off the right arm of our commerce and naval strength, only to augment the extent and increase the horrors of the slave-trade throughout the world."†

* Parl. Deb., vi., 681.

† Parl. Deb., vi., 979, 993.

Arguments of
Mr. Wilber-
force and
others for the
abolition.

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Wilberforce, Lord Howick, and Lord Grenville: "A higher principle than considerations of mere expedience, the dictates of justice, require that this infamous traffic should be abolished. Were it merely a question of humanity, we might consider how far we should carry our interference; were the interests of the British Empire alone involved, it might possibly be a matter of expedience to stop a little short of total abolition. But in this instance, imperious justice calls upon us to abolish the slave-trade. Is it to be endured that robbery is to be permitted on account of its profits? Justice is still the same; and you are called upon in this measure, not only to do justice to the oppressed and injured natives of Africa, but to your own planters; to interfere between them and their otherwise certain destruction, and, despite their fears, despite their passions, despite their prejudices, rescue them from impending ruin. This trade is the most criminal that any country can be engaged in: when it is recollected what guilt has been incurred in tearing the Africans, by thousands and tens of thousands, from their families, their friends, their social ties, their country, and dooming them to a life of slavery and misery; when it is considered, also, that the continuance of this atrocious traffic must inevitably terminate in the ruin of the planters engaged in it, surely no doubt can remain that its instant abolition is called for by every motive of justice and expedience.

"Much is said of the impossibility of maintaining the supply of negroes in the West Indies if the slave-trade is abolished. Are we, then, to believe that the Divine precept, 'Increase and multiply,' does not extend to those islands; that the fires of youth, adequate to the maintenance and growth of the human species in all other countries and ages of the world, are there alone, in the midst of plenty, unequal to their destined end? But the fact is adverse to this monstrous supposition, and it is now distinctly proved that the slave colonies are perfectly adequate to maintain their own numbers.* The excess of deaths above births in Jamaica is now only 1-24th *per cent.*; and when it is recollected that the registers of mortality include the deaths among the negroes who are newly arrived and set to work, which always amounts, between those who perish in the harbours and shortly after being set to work, to at least 10 *per cent.*, it is evident that the numbers of the settled Africans are more than maintained by their own increase. Nor is the argument that the importation of negroes is requisite to cultivate the waste lands in the interior of the islands, better founded. If the numbers of the Africans increase, it is altogether incredible that their labours should not be adequate to clear the wastes of those diminutive islands. According to the most moderate computation, it would require the slave-trade to be continued for two centuries to cultivate the whole interior of Jamaica and Trinidad; and can it be endured that so frightful a traffic as this, fraught as it must be with the tearing of above two millions of Africans from their families and country,

should be endured for such a period, for an object which, in one fourth of the time, might by the native increase of their numbers in those islands be attained?*

"Let us, then, instantly abolish this infamous traffic, and we may then with confidence look forward to the period when the slaves, become in a great degree the natives of the islands, will feel the benefits of the protection afforded them; and they may gradually be prepared for that character, when the blessings of freedom may be securely extended to them. Throughout all history we shall find that slavery has been eradicated by means of the captives being first transformed into predial labourers, attached to the soil, and from that gradually ascending to real freedom. We look forward to the period when the negroes of the West India islands, become labourers rather than slaves, will feel an interest in the welfare and prosperity of the country which has extended to them these benefits, and when they may be securely called on to share largely in the defence of those islands, in which at present they are only a source of weakness. The grand, the decisive advantage which recommends the abolition of the slave-trade is, that, by closing that supply of foreign negroes to which the planters have hitherto been accustomed to trust for all their undertakings, we will compel them to promote the multiplication of the slaves on their own estates; and it is obvious that this cannot be done without improving their physical and moral condition. Thus, not only will the inhuman traffic itself be prevented, in so far, at least, as the inhabitants of this country are concerned, but a provision will be made for the progressive amelioration of the black population in the West Indies, and that, too, on the securest of all foundations, the interests and selfish desires of the masters in whose hands they are placed.

"It is in vain to argue that, according to the barbarous customs of Africa, captives made in war are put to death, and that, if the outlet of the slave-trade is closed, the reproach to humanity arising from the sale of captives will be prevented from taking place. The most recent and intelligent travellers, on the contrary, have informed us, what every consideration on the subject *a priori* would lead us to expect, that the existence of the slave-trade is itself, and ever has been, the great bar to the civilization of the interior of Africa, by the temptation held out to the chiefs on the coast to engage in the traffic of negroes, and the continual encouragement thus afforded to the princes in the interior to carry on constant wars, from the vast profit with which the sale of their captives is attended. It forms, in fact, with a great many of those robber chieftains, a chief branch of revenue. If we would promote, therefore, the great and truly Christian work of civilizing Central Africa, we must first commence with abolishing the slave-trade; for as long as it continues, the selfishness and rapacity of the native chiefs will never cease to chain its unhappy inhabitants to a life of violence and rapacity in the powerful, of misery and degradation in the poor.

* It is now completely demonstrated, by an experiment on the greatest scale, that the African race, even when in a state of slavery, is not only able to maintain its own numbers, but rapidly increase them. In the slave states of America there are 2,200,000 negroes; and from 1790 to 1830, the whites have augmented in proportion of 80 to 100; but the blacks in that of 112 to 100.—TOCQUEVILLE'S *Democracy in America*, ii., 345, 346, note.

* Excess of deaths above births in Jamaica
from 1698 to 1730, 34 *per cent.*
" " 1730 to 1755, 24 *per cent.*
" " 1755 to 1769, 18 *per cent.*
" " 1769 to 1780, 3-5ths *per cent.*
" " 1780 to 1800, 1-24th *per cent.*

"The argument that, if we do not carry on the slave-trade, some other nations will, possibly with less commiseration for the sufferings of the captives, if admitted, would shake to their foundation every principle of public and private morality. At that rate, every band of robbers might plead in their justification that, if they did not knock down and plunder travellers, other banditti might do the same, and possibly superadd murder to their other atrocities, and therefore the lucrative rapine should not be discontinued. This argument, however, bad as it is, has not even the merit of being founded on fact. If we abolish the slave-trade, who is to take it up? The Americans have already preceded us in the race of humanity, and fixed a period, in 1808, when the traffic is immediately to cease; and a bill is at present in progress through their Legislature to affix the penalty of death to a violation of this enactment. How are France and Spain to carry it on, when they have hardly a ship on the ocean? Sweden never engaged in it. There remains only Portugal, and where is she to get capital to carry it on?"

"The dangers, so powerfully drawn, as likely to result from this measure, are really to be apprehended, not from it, but from another with which it has no connexion, viz., the immediate emancipation of the negroes. This, it is said, flows necessarily from the step now about to be taken; if you do not follow it up in this manner, you stop short half way in your own principles; in fact, the ulterior measure, if the first be adopted, cannot be averted. It is to be hoped, indeed, that this great step will, in the end, lead to the abolition of slavery in all our colonies, but not in the way or with the dangers which are anticipated. On the contrary, it is here that another of the great benefits of the measure under consideration is to be found. By the effects of this measure it is to be hoped slavery will gradually wear out without the intervention of any positive law, in like manner as it did in a certain degree in the states of Greece and Rome, and some parts of the states of modern Europe, where slaves have been permitted to work out and purchase their own freedom; and as has been permitted with the happiest effects in the colonies of Spain and Portugal. In America, measures for the gradual emancipation of the negroes have been adopted, and nothing could conduce more powerfully to insubordination than if, by the continuance of the slaves, similar steps were not to be induced in the West India islands, and the slaves there were perpetually tantalized by the sight of the superior comforts of their brethren on the mainland. The dangers apprehended would, indeed, be real, if immediate emancipation were to be proposed, for that would produce horrors similar to those which have happened in St. Domingo; but nothing of that kind is in contemplation; on the contrary, it is expressly to exclude them, and induce that gradual emancipation which is called for, alike by justice to the planters and the interests of the slaves themselves, that the measure under discussion is proposed."[†]

* Parl. Deb., 652, 666, 947, 955.

† Lord Grenville concluded his speech with these eloquent words: "I cannot conceive any consciousness more truly gratifying than must be enjoyed by that eminent person (Mr. Wilberforce), on finding a measure to which he has devoted the labour of his life carried into effect: a measure so truly benevolent, so admirably conducive to the virtuous prosperity of his country, and the welfare of mankind; a measure which will diffuse happiness among mill-

The latter arguments, enforced with much eloquence, and supported by the great principles of Christian charity, prevailed with the Legislature. By a series of enactments, passed in the course of the sessions of 1806, the slave-trade was restrained within very narrow limits; and at length, in the succeeding session, it was entirely abolished, and the penalty of transportation affixed to every British subject engaged in it; the numbers were, in the Commons, 283 to 16, majority 267; in the Peers, 100 to 36, majority 64; and thus was the stain of trafficking in human flesh forever torn from the British name.*

There can be no question that this great step was recommended by every consideration of justice and humanity; nevertheless, its effects hitherto have been in the highest degree deplorable. Never was a more striking example than this subject has afforded in its later stages, of the important truth that mere purity of intention is not sufficient in legislative measures, and that, unless human designs are carried into execution with the requisite degree of foresight and wisdom, they often become the sources of the most heart-rending and irremediable calamities. The prophecy of Mr. Hibbert and the opponents of the abolition, that the slave-trade, instead of ceasing, would only change hands, and at length fall into the management of desperate wretches, who would double its horrors, has been too fatally verified, and to an extent even greater than they anticipated. From the returns laid before Parliament, it appears that the slave-trade is now four times as extensive as it was in 1789, when European philanthropy first interfered in St. Domingo in favour of the African race, and twice as great as it was when the efforts of Mr. Wilberforce procured its abolition in the British dominions. Great and deplorable as were the sufferings of the captives in crossing the Atlantic, in the large and capacious Liverpool slave-ships, they are as nothing compared to those which have since, and are still endured by the negroes in the hands of the Spanish and Portuguese traders, where several hundred wretches are stowed between decks in a space not three feet high; and, in addition to the anguish inseparable from a state of captivity, they are made to endure, for weeks together, the horrors of the Black Hole of Calcutta. Nearly two hundred thousand captives, chained together in this frightful manner, now annually cross the Atlantic; and they are brought, not to the comparatively easy life of the British West India islands, but to the desperate servitude of Cuba or Brazil; in the latter of which several hundred negroes are worked, like animals, in droves together, without a single female among them, and without any attempt to perpetuate their race,† they are worn down by their cruel taskmasters to the grave by a lingering process, which on an average terminates their existence in seven years!‡

ions now in existence, and for which his memory will be blessed by millions yet unborn."—*Parl. Deb.*, viii., 664.

* *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 672, 995.

† *Walsh's Brazil*, ii., 474, 485.

‡ The number of slaves annually imported into the slave countries of the world from Africa in 1789 was somewhat under 50,000, of which about 15,000 crossed in English vessels; now the number is at least 200,000. It appears from the Consular Returns to Parliament, that in 1829, 74,653 slaves were em-

This lamentable and heart-rending result of such persevering and enlightened benevolence, however, must not lead us to doubt the soundness as well as humanity of the principles which Mr. Wilberforce so eloquently advocated, or to imagine that the general rules of morality are inapplicable to this question, and that here alone in human affairs it is lawful to do evil that good may come of it. The observation that it was our duty to clear our own hands of the iniquity, leaving it to Providence to eradicate the evil in others at the appointed time, was decisive of the justice of the measure; the evident necessity which it imposed on the planters of attending, for their own sakes, to the comfort of the negroes, and providing means for the multiplication of their numbers, conclusive as to its expedience. It is not the abolition of the slave-trade, but the subsequent continuance of ruinous fiscal exactions, and, at last, the irretrievable step of unqualified emancipation, which have given this deplorable activity to the foreign slave-trade. The increase in the foreign slave colonies for the last twenty years, at a time when the British West India islands were comparatively stationary, has been so rapid, that it is evident some powerful and lasting causes have been at work to occasion the difference.* These causes are to

barked for Brazil alone from the African coast, of whom 4579 died in the short passage of one month; and in the first half of 1830 the numbers were no less than 47,258, of whom eight per cent. died on the passage. At the same period 13,000 were annually imported into the Havana, and at least an equal number into the other slave colonies, making in the year 1830 about 130,000.* But these numbers, great as they are, have now received a vast increase from the effects of the British Slave Emancipation Act, passed in 1833. In fifteen months, ending January, 1835, there sailed from the single port of Havana 170 slave-ships, capable of containing, on an average, each at least 400 persons; the importation of slaves into Cuba is now above 55,000 a year, while the numbers imported into Brazil, from the stimulus given to slave labour by the anticipated decline of produce in the British islands consequent on that measure, have increased in nearly the same proportion. Nor is it surprising that, in spite of all the efforts of the British government, and all the vigilance of the British cruisers, this infernal traffic should now advance at this accelerated pace: for such is the demand for slaves, occasioned by the continual decline in the cultivation of sugar in the British West India islands, under the combined influence of heavy taxation and the Emancipation Act, that the profit on a single cargo of slaves imported into the Havana is 150 per cent., and the adventurers cannot be considered as losers if one vessel arrives safe out of three despatched from the coast of Africa.—*Parl. Pap.*, 1830, A., 115, 116.

* Twelve years ago, the only exports of Puerto Rico were cattle and coffee, and the only sugar she received was from importation. In 1833 she exported 33,750 tons, more than a sixth of the whole British consumption. The export of sugar from Cuba was, on an average of 1814, 1815, and 1816, 51,000 tons; in 1833 it had risen to 120,000 tons. In 1814, 1815, and 1816, the average exports of sugar from Brazil was 26,250 tons; in 1833, though a bad year, the exports were 70,970 tons. The increase since the Emancipation Act passed has been still greater; but no official accounts of these years have yet been made public.—See *Parl. Report* “On the Commercial State of the West Indies,” p. 288.

On the other hand, the produce of the British West India islands during the same period has been comparatively stationary. The colonial produce exported from those islands to Great Britain in the year 1812 was 154,200 tons of sugar, and 6,290,000 gallons of rum; in 1830, 185,000 tons of sugar, and 7,892,000 gallons of rum; the shipping in the former period was 180,000, in the latter 203,338 tons. The total value of the produce of the islands in the former period was £18,516,000; in the latter, including all the colonies gained by the Peace of Paris in 1814, only £22,496,000.—*PEPPER*, 399. COLQUHOUN, 378-341. *PORTER'S Parl. Tables*, 1-124, 126.

* *Parl. Pap.*, 1830, B., 52, 89, 138.

be found, in a great measure, in the heavy duties on British colonial produce, amounting at first to 30s., then to 27s., and latterly to 24s. on each hundred weight of sugar, from which the foreign growers were exempted in the supply of foreign markets. This enormous burden, which, on an average of prices since 1820, has been nearly 75 per cent. on that species of produce, has, notwithstanding all their efforts, for the most part, if not entirely, fallen on the producers.*

Nor is this all: the precipitate and irretrievable step of emancipation, forced on the Legislature by benevolent but incautious, and, perhaps, mistaken feeling, has already occasioned so great a decline in the produce of the British West Indies, and excited such general expectations of a still greater and increasing deficiency, that the impulse thereby given to the foreign slave-trade to fill up the gap has been unbounded, and, it is to be feared, almost irremediable.†

* There is no opinion more erroneous than that commonly entertained, that the import duties on Enormous fiscal sugar, like other taxes on consumption, fall injustice to which on the purchaser. There is always, indeed, they have been ex- posed. a struggle between the producer and consumer as to who should bear the burden; but it is not always in the power of the former to throw it on the latter. In this instance the attempt has almost totally failed. It appears, from the curious table of prices compiled by Mr. Colquhoun, that even during the high prices of the years from 1807 to 1812, the West India proprietors paid from a third to a half of the duties on sugar, without being able to lay it on the consumers: the average of what they paid for those years being £1,115,251 per annum. The estimated revenue of these proprietors, during these years, was under £4,000,000; so that at that period they paid 20 per cent. on their incomes to government. In addition to this, it was proved by the documents laid before the committee of the House of Commons in February, 1831, that an annual burden of £1,023,299 was laid on the British West India islands, in consequence of the enhancement of the price of necessary articles to which they were exposed under the restrictive system. In this way, even under the high prices from 1807 to 1812, they were paying at least 50 per cent. on their incomes in taxation; and as the price, since that time, of their produce has fallen at least two thirds, with a reduction of only a ninth (3s.) on the import duty, it may be safely concluded that, since 1820, the West India proprietors have paid, directly and indirectly, at least seventy-five per cent. on their income to government, and in the years when prices were low at least a hundred per cent. Nothing more is required to explain the distressed condition of these colonies, even before the Emancipation Bill was passed, which at once, without any equivalent, confiscated at least 60 per cent. on their remaining property. The value of slaves was estimated by Colquhoun in 1812 at £55 a head; but in 1833, when the act passed, it had risen to at least £75 over head, notwithstanding the change in the value of money; and the compensation money (£20,000,000 on 634,000 slaves) will not, after all deductions are made, yield £25 a head, or more than 33 per cent. to the proprietors. Few such instances of the destruction of property by fiscal and legislative enactments are to be found in the history of mankind.—See *PEPPER*, 394 and 397. COLQUHOUN, 59, 325; and *Report on West India Affairs*, Commons, February 7, 1831.

It is frequently said that the increase in the produce of these colonies since the peace is a proof that their alleged distresses are either unfounded or exaggerated. This is a complete mistake: the planters had no other way to meet the enormous fiscal burdens laid upon them, since a diminution in the cost of production was out of the question, after the abolition of the slave-trade, but by making the utmost exertions to augment its quantity, and thence the increase of colonial produce, which, by perpetuating the lowness of price, rendered it totally impossible for them to lay the enormous import duty, now 100 per cent., on the consumers. Like a man sunk in a bottomless bog, all the efforts they could make for their extrication tended only to land them deeper and more irretrievably in the mire.

† The following table shows the decline of colonial produce exported from Jamaica under the first year of the Emancipation Act:

Sugar.			Rum.		Coffee.	
Years.	Cwts.	Hogsheads.	Punch.	Galls.	Casks.	lbs.
1834	1,525,154	79,465	30,676	3,189,949	22,384	17,559,277
1835	1,319,023	68,087	27,038	2,660,687	13,495	10,489,292
Decrease	206,131	11,378	3,638	529,262	8,889	7,369,985

It is in these measures that the real cause of the lamentable increase in the foreign slave-trade is to be found: it is the multitude who forced on these measures, who frustrated all the benevolent efforts of Mr. Wilberforce and Mr. Fox, and rendered the abolition of the slave-trade in the British dominions the remote and innocent cause of boundless misfortunes to the negro race. The British slaves, since the slave-trade was abolished, had become fully equal to the wants of the colonies: their numbers, without any extraneous addition, were on the increase; their condition was comfortable and prosperous beyond that of any peasantry in Europe; and large numbers were annually purchasing their freedom from the produce of their own industry. Here, then, was a *stationary* negro population, rapidly approaching the condition of the most opulent feudal serfs of Europe, and from which they might, in like manner, have been emancipated singly, as they acquired property, which all had the means of earning, without either risk to themselves, injury to their masters, or increase to the demand for foreign slave labour. But now all these admirable effects of the abolition of the slave-trade have been completely frustrated, and the humane but deluded inhabitants of Great Britain are burdened with twenty millions, to ruin, in the end, their own planters, consign to barbarism their own negroes, cut off a principal branch of their naval strength, and double the slave-trade in extent, and quadruple it in horrors throughout the world. A more striking instance never was exhibited of the necessity of attending, in political changes, not only to benevolent intentions, but prudent conduct; and of the fatal effect of those institutions which, by giving the inhabitants of a particular part of the Empire an undue share in the general administration, or admitting the torrent of public feeling to sway directly the measures of government, too often destroy prosperity the most extensive, and occasion calamities the most unbounded.*

Taking an average of these various sorts of produce, it is evident that, notwithstanding an uncommonly fine season, and the vigorous exertions of the stipendiary magistrates, the produce of the island has fallen off in one year nearly a fourth of its total amount! The Parliament of Jamaica, in their address to the governor of the island on August 10, 1835, observed, "There never was a finer season or more promising appearance of canes; but, nevertheless, the crop is greatly deficient, and many British ships have, in consequence, returned with half cargoes, some with none at all. Our decided opinion is, that each succeeding crop will progressively become worse. In a few cases the apprentices do work for wages; but the opposite disposition so immeasurably preponderates, that no confidence whatever can be placed on voluntary labour. Knowing, as we do, the prevailing reluctance of the negroes to work of any kind, the thefts, negligences, and outrages of every sort which are becoming of frequent occurrence; seeing large portions of our neglected cane-fields overrun with weeds, and a still larger extent of our pasture-lands returning to a state of nature; seeing, in fact, desolation already overspreading the very face of the land, it is impossible for us, without abandoning the evidence of our senses, to entertain favourable anticipations, or divest ourselves of the painful conviction that the progressive and rapid deterioration of property will continue to keep pace with the apprenticeship, and that the termination thereof must, unless strong preventive measures are applied, complete the ruin of the colony." Making every allowance for the passions and exaggerations of a tropical climate, the statement here made is too strongly borne out by the decrease in the official returns, and example of corresponding measures in St. Domingo, to leave a doubt that they are, in the main at least, founded in truth.—See *Custom Return, Kingston, Jamaica, August 29, 1835; and Address of Assembly, August 10, 1835.*

* The British ministry who, in 1834, passed the measure of Slave Emancipation, are noways answerable for these consequences; on the contrary, they deserve the highest

An important change in the British system of finance was also made by the same administration, which, although not brought forward till the spring of 1807, may be fitly considered now, in order not to interrupt the narrative of the important military events which at that period occurred on the Continent of Europe.

The foundation of this plan, which was brought forward by Lord Henry Petty on the 29th of January, 1807, was, that the time had now arrived when it had become expedient to make a provision for a permanent state of warfare; that the bad success of all former coalitions had demonstrated the slender foundation on which any hopes of overthrowing the military power of France on the Continent of Europe must rest, while the hostile disposition and immense power of Napoleon gave little hope that any durable accommodation could be entered into with him. "All nations," said his lordship, "that still preserve the shadow even of their independence, have their eyes fixed on us as the only means of regaining the freedom they have lost. It becomes the government of Great Britain, seeing the proud eminence on which they are placed, to take an enlarged view of their whole situation, and to direct their attention to that future which, notwithstanding the signal deliverance they have hitherto obtained, seems still pregnant with evil. Our present permanent revenue is above £32,000,000 a year, being more than three times what it was at the close of the American war; and there can be no doubt that means might be found in additional taxes to pay the interest of loans for several years to come. But looking, as it is now our duty to do, to a protracted contest, it has become indispensable to combine present measures with such a regard for the future as may give us a reasonable prospect of being enabled to maintain it for a very long period."

"In considering our resources, the two great objects of attention are the sinking fund and the system of raising the supplies as much as possible within the year, which has given rise to the present amount of war taxes. The first of these is a durable monument to Mr. Pitt's wisdom; it had the support of his illustrious political opponent, Mr. Fox; and, however widely these two great men were divided on most other subjects, it at last received that weight of authority which arises from their entire coincidence of approbation. When this system was commenced in 1786, the sinking fund was only 1-238th part of the debt; whereas it is now 1-63d of the whole debt, and only 1-42d of the unredeemed portion: a result at once striking and satisfactory, more especially when it is recollected that it has been obtained in twenty years, whereof fourteen have been

Argument in favour of it.

credit for the courage they displayed, in opposition to the wishes of many of their supporters, in carrying through the great grant of twenty millions to the planters: a relief so seasonable and extensive, that hitherto, at least, it has, almost entirely to the persons who received it, prevented the natural consequences of the emancipation from being felt. The torrent of public feeling was irresistible: all they could do was to moderate its effects, which, by the protracted period of apprenticeship, and the grant to the slave-owners, was done to a very great degree. The English people must answer for the measure, be its ultimate effects on themselves and the negro race good or bad. The reflection suggested is, What is the character of national institutions which permit a measure, likely to be attended with such cruel and disastrous consequences, to be forced against their will on a reluctant government?

years of war. The war-taxes, which have been raised to their present amount chiefly by the operation of the heavy direct taxes, are, first, the treble-assessed taxes introduced by Mr. Pitt, and more lately the property-tax, which has been substituted in its room. The experience of the last year has amply demonstrated the expedience of the augmentation of that impost to ten per cent., which it was our painful duty to propose last year; for under its operation the war-taxes have now reached £21,000,000 a year, and the sinking fund amounts to £8,300,000 annually.

"In the present state of the country our war expenses cannot be calculated at less than thirty-two millions annually. To provide for this, independent of additional war-taxes, which are now so heavy that we are not warranted in calculating on any considerable addition to their amount as likely to prove permanently productive, is the problem we have now to solve. To effect this, it is proposed in this and the three following years to raise a loan of £12,000,000; for the fourth year, or 1810, £14,000,000; and for the ten succeeding years, if the war should last so long, £16,000,000 annually. In each successive year in which these loans shall be raised, it is proposed to appropriate so much of the war-taxes as will amount to ten per cent. on the sum so raised. Out of this ten per cent. the interest and charges of management are first to be defrayed, and the remainder is to constitute a sinking fund to provide for the redemption of the capital. When the funds are at 60, or interest at five per cent., such a system will extinguish each loan in fourteen years after it was contracted. The moment this is done, the war-taxes impledged for the redemption of that loan should be repealed. Thus, as the loan of £12,000,000 will, on this supposition, be paid off by 1821, the £1,200,000 a year of war-taxes now pledged to its redemption will in that year be remitted. Upon examining this system, it will be found that it may be carried on for seven years, viz., from 1807 to 1814, without impledging any part of the income-tax; so that, if peace is thus concluded, the whole income-tax may, without violating any part of the present system, be at once remitted: a most desirable object, as that is a burden which nothing but the last necessity should induce us to perpetuate beyond the continuance of hostilities.

"As, however, the ten per cent. on the loan annually contracted is in this manner to be taken from the war-taxes, means must be provided to supply that deficiency, which, if the war continues for a long tract of years, will, from the progressive growth of those burdens on the war-taxes, become very considerable. To provide for this deficiency, it is proposed to raise in each year a small supplementary loan, intended to meet the sum abstracted for the charges of the principal loan from the public treasury, and this supplementary loan is to be borrowed on Mr. Pitt's principle of providing by fresh taxes, laid on in the indirect form, or by the falling in of annuities for the interest of the debt, and one per cent. more to create a fund for its redemption. The loan so required this year will, from the excess of the war-taxes above the war expenditure, be only £200,000; the annual charges of which, on this principle, will be only £13,333; and as annuities to the amount of £15,000 will fall in this year, it will not be necessary, either for the principal or supplementary loan, to lay on any new taxes this year. Taking an average so as to diffuse

the burden created by these supplementary loans as equally as possible over future years, and setting off against them the sums which will be gained annually by the falling in of annuities, the result is, that it will only be necessary to raise in seven years immediately subsequent to 1810, £293,000 annually by new taxes: a sum incredibly small, when it is recollected that we are now in the fifth year of a renewed war, the most costly and momentous in which the country ever was engaged.

"Under the present system, with regard to the public debt, framed upon the acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, no relief whatever will be experienced from the public burdens till a very distant period, probably from 1834 to 1844; and during the latter years of the operation of the sinking fund it will throw immense sums, not less than forty millions annually, loose upon the country, as cannot fail to produce a most prejudicial effect upon the money market, while the sudden remission of taxes to the amount of £30,000,000 a year would produce effects upon artisans, manufacturers, and holders of property of every description, which it is impossible to contemplate without the most serious alarm. In every point of view, therefore, it seems to be highly desirable to render the sinking fund more equal in its progress, by increasing its present power, and diffusing over a greater number of years those extensive effects which would, according to the present system, be confined to the very last year of its operation. The arrangements prepared with this view are founded on the superior advantage of applying to the redemption of debt a sinking fund of five per cent. on the actual money capital, instead of one per cent. on the nominal capital or amount of stock. This is to be the system applied to the loans of the first ten years; and in return for this advantage, it is proposed that, when the present sinking fund shall have so far increased as to exceed in its amount the interest of the debt then unredeemed, such surplus shall be at the disposal of Parliament. By this means a larger sum will be annually applied to the sinking fund from henceforward than could have been obtained under the old system: the whole loans contracted in future during the war will be redeemed within forty-five years from the date of their creation, and without violating any of the provisions of the act of 1792 establishing the present sinking fund. Parliament, during the years of its final and greatest operation, will be enabled to administer a very great relief to the public necessities, and obviate all the dangers with which an undue rapidity in the contraction of debt would otherwise be attended.*†

In opposition to these able arguments, it was urged by Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Perceval, "That the proposed plan of finance proposes gradually to mortgage for fourteen years the whole of the war-taxes for the interest of loans in war, a decided departure from all our former principles, which were to preserve religiously the distinction between war and permanent taxes, and would, if carried into effect for any considerable time, de-

* Parl. Deb., viii., 566, 594.

† The speech of Lord Henry Petty on this occasion is well worthy of the attention of all who wish to make themselves masters of the British finances during the Revolutionary war. It is the most distinct, luminous, and statesmanlike exposition on the subject which is to be found in the whole range of the Parliamentary debates after the death of Mr. Pitt.

prive the nation of almost all the benefit to which it is entitled to look upon the termination of hostilities. The new plan, moreover, will require loans to a greater amount to be raised in each year than would be required if the usual system of borrowing were adhered to. At the end of twenty years it appears, from the calculations laid before Parliament, that this excess will amount to the enormous sum of £193,000,000. The whole machinery of the new plan is cumbersome and complicated; the additional charges arising from that circumstance will amount to a very considerable sum. The ways and means intended to prevent the imposition of new taxes in future, viz., the expired annuities, together with the excess of the sinking fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, are equally applicable *pro tanto* to mitigate their increase under any other mode of raising loans that may be decided on; and their application in this way would be more advantageous than in the other, inasmuch as it is better to avoid contracting debt than gain relief by a remission of taxation.

"It is futile to say that the public necessities compel us to have recourse to the dangerous system of mortgaging the war-taxes for the interest of future loans. It is here that the great danger of the new system is to be found: it is in breaking down the old and sacred barrier between the war and peace expenses that the seeds of inextricable confusion to our finances in future are to be found. It is quite possible, as appears from the authentic calculations before Parliament, to obtain the eleven millions a year required for the deficiency of the war-taxes below the war charges, without mortgaging the war-taxes, without the immense loans required under the new system, and without any material or unbearable addition to the public burdens. The mode in which this great object is to be attained is by resolving that, when the loan of the year in war does not exceed the amount of the sinking fund in such year, instead of making provision for the interest of such loan in the taxes, the same shall be provided for out of the interest receivable on the amount of stock redeemed by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in that year. Any excess of national expenditure above the thirty-two millions to be fixed as the average amount of war expenditure, to be provided for in the usual manner. The data laid before Parliament prove that, under this plan, in fourteen years of war, one hundred and ten millions less will be borrowed than under that proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and though, doubtless, the sinking fund will be greatly impaired, yet, after making allowance for its restricted operation from the charge of future loans on its amount, yet the total debt at the expiration of that period will be upward of forty millions above that now proposed.* Great evils, both to

the stockholders and the country, must arise from the adoption of the new plan, in consequence of the enormous and inordinate loans, amounting, before the close of the new plan, to not less than forty or fifty millions of stock annually, which must be contracted. Such immense loans must tend powerfully to lower the value of the public securities, lead to an extensive and undue increase of the circulating medium, and a rapid depreciation in the value of money, attended with the most prejudicial effects upon many branches of industry, and a general insecurity on the part of the holders of property. Above all, the principle of placing at the disposal of Parliament the excess of the sinking fund above the interest of the debt unredeemed, is calculated to lead to a much more extensive diversion of that fund from its destined purpose than the system which Mr. Pitt had established: inasmuch as the latter only proposed to derive aid from the sinking fund during war, and only to the precise extent of the interest of the sum redeemed within the year, leaving the fund in undiminished extent to operate upon the public debt on the return of peace; whereas the former places the surplus of the sinking fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, absolutely and unreservedly at the disposal of Parliament, in peace as in war, without any other limitation than that a sum equal to the debt subsisting in 1802 shall be redeemed within forty-five years from that period. It is easy to foresee that such a power of appropriating a large part of the sinking fund will be too powerful a temptation for the virtue of future governments; and that the practical result will be, that that noble institution will be irretrievably mutilated, and the nation lose the whole benefit of the immense sacrifices for the benefit of posterity which it has made during the whole continuance of the present contest. The equivalent proposed to the fundholders of an additional five per cent. sinking fund on the war loans is entirely deceptive; inasmuch as the depreciation of his property which must ensue from the improvident accumulation of loans in the market, with their necessary concomitant, an extensive and undue paper currency, must much more than compensate any additional value which it might acquire from this augmentation of the means of its liquidation."*

The budget for the year 1807 was based on the new plan of finance: it included a loan of only £12,000,000, Budget for 1807, March 4. which was contracted on very advantageous terms, and the whole expenditure was calculated on that system of making preparations for a long and protracted struggle,† which the disastrous issue of the Prussian war gave too much reason to apprehend awaited the country.†

The debates on Lord Henry Petty's able plan

* Lord H. Petty's plan:

War loans for 14 years	£210,000,000
Supplementary loans for do.	94,200,000
.....	314,200,000
War-taxes rendered permanent	401,231,000
Unredeemed debt in 1820, at the end of the same time	9,150,000
New taxes imposed	2,051,000
New loans in 1820	32,000,000
Sinking fund in 1820	17,744,021

Lord Castlereagh's plan:

War loans, 11 millions a year for 14 years	154,000,000
Debt unredeemed at the end of 1820	358,000,000

War-taxes rendered permanent	none.
New taxes imposed	2,547,000
New loan in 1820	11,000,000
Sinking fund in 1820	9,180,896

—*Parl. Deb.*, viii., 1014.

* *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 1004, 1018.

† *Ib.*, viii., 1075.

† The budget for 1807 was stated by Lord Henry Petty as follows:

Supply.	
Navy	£16,997,637
Army, ordinary	15,456,311
Extraordinaries arising	4,233,710
Ordnance	3,743,715
Miscellaneous	1,860,000
Vote of credit	3,000,000
Interest of Exchequer bills	1,200,000
Carried forward	£46,591,573

Reflections on
this subject.

of finance are of little moment at this time, abandoned as his system soon was amid the necessities and changes of future years; but the views brought forward on both sides were an essential deviation from the great principle of Mr. Pitt's financial policy, and presaged the approach of times when the provident policy so long upheld by his unshaken foresight was to be abandoned, with the common consent of both the great parties alternately intrusted with the administration of affairs. Mr. Pitt's principle was, to provide the interest of each loan annually contracted, and the one per cent. destined for the extinction of its principal, by means of indirect taxes, which thereafter formed part of the permanent revenue of the country till the debt was extinguished; out both Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh seem to have imagined that the time had now arrived when it would be difficult, if not impossible, to raise any increased revenue in this form; and, accordingly, the plans of both were characterized by the great and decisive step of providing for the charges of future debt, not by future and permanent taxes, but by other means imposing no additional present burden on the country, but, of course, for that very reason trenching on its ultimate resources. The former proposed to do this by mortgaging the war-taxes for the charges of all the debt which might hereafter be contracted, and rendering the amount of those taxes thus mortgaged a permanent part of the peace revenue: the latter, by leaving untouched the war-taxes, but appropriating to the interest of future loans part of the present sinking fund, and thereby impairing to a proportionate extent its efficiency on the return of peace. Both implied a deviation from the cardinal point of Mr. Pitt's system, the providing for the discharge of the interest of all debts out of *indirect taxes religiously set apart for that purpose*; and it is remarkable, as an example how much the fortunes and destinies of a state are often determined by the character and life of a single master-spirit, that this vast change, fraught, as experience has since proved it to have been, with the ruin of our financial prospects and probable ultimate subjugation as an independent state, was simultaneously proposed by the leaders of both Whigs and Tories, the moment that great statesman and his illustrious rival were mouldering in their graves.

Had the period arrived when it was totally impossible to provide for the charges of additional loans by progressive additions to the peace revenue, this change, however prejudicial, would not have been a matter of regret more than any other unavoidable calamity. But experience has now sufficiently demonstrated that

this was very far indeed from being the case, for down to the very end of the war, new taxes were imposed to an extent that, *a priori*, would have been thought impossible. As it was, therefore, the discussions which ensued on the rival finance projects of Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh unnecessarily gave the first rude shock to the firm and provident system of Mr. Pitt's finance, by breaking down the barrier which had hitherto kept the funds destined for the discharge of the debt sacred from the avidity and shortsighted desires of the people, and accustoming them to regard both the revenue set apart for that purpose and the war-taxes during peace as a fund to which they might have recourse to relieve the war pressure of the moment. Of the two, if it had become necessary to make choice of one or other, the system of Lord Henry Petty was the most manly and statesmanlike with reference to domestic administration; inasmuch as it was not calculated to trench upon the sinking fund until it had become equal to the loans annually contracted, by which means the increase of the amount of the whole debt, after that period, would have been rendered impossible, and, in the mean time, to pledge the war-taxes for the interest and charges of the sums borrowed; whereas that of Lord Castlereagh proposed at once to lay violent hands upon the sinking funds for the charges of all future loans, and yet give the nation the full benefit of the remission of all the war-taxes on the return of peace. The former system, however, though well adapted for a state of uniform and long-continued hostility, was totally unsuitable to the varying circumstances and fleeting changes which were likely to ensue in the course of the contest in which the nation was actually engaged; and by encouraging a morbid sensitiveness to any extraordinary advances at a particular time, beyond what the general system warranted, was too likely to occasion the loss of the fairest opportunities of bringing it to a successful issue. Of this unhappy tendency the issue of the war in Poland, starved out, as we shall presently see it was, by an ill-judged economy on the part of Great Britain, afforded a memorable example. And in the habit acquired by the nation in these discussions to regard the sinking fund, not as a sacred deposit set apart, like the life insurance of an individual, for the benefit of posterity, but as a resource which might be instantly rendered available to present necessities, is to be found the remote cause of the great change of 1813 in our financial policy, and the total departure from any regular system for the redemption of the public debt: a change which is, perhaps, to be regarded as the greatest evil entailed upon the nation by the moneyed embarrassments and Democratic ascendancy in later times.

Long as the preceding summary of the principal domestic measures of the Whig administration has been, it will not, in all probability, be regretted by the reflecting reader. It is not as the record of mere events, but of thoughts and the progress of opinion, that history is valuable; and independent of the importance of the changes which have been discussed upon the future history of the Empire, they are in an especial manner worthy of attention, as embodying the principal domestic designs of the great party which, after so long a seclusion from office, at that period held the reins of power, and which, besides the acknowledged

Brought forward	£46,591,573
Loyalty loan	350,000
Deficiency of malt-tax, 1805	200,000
For Great Britain and Ireland	47,150,573
Deduct 2-17ths for Ireland	5,545,677
Expenditure of Great Britain	£41,604,896

Ways and Means.

Land and malt	£2,750,000
Surplus of consolidating fund	3,500,000
War-taxes	19,800,000
Lottery	320,000
Vote of credit	3,000,000
Loans	12,000,000
Surplus of 1805	171,000
	£41,541,000

ability of its leaders, embraced a large portion of the thought and learning of the state. And upon an attentive consideration of these measures, it must be obvious to the candid reader that they were founded on just principles, and directed to important ends; that humanity and benevolence breathed in their spirit, and wisdom and foresight regulated their execution. Above all, they were characterized, equally with the measures of Mr. Pitt, by that regard for the future, and resolution to submit to present evils for the sake of ultimate advantage, which is the mainspring of all that is really great or good, both in individuals and nations. On comparing the statesmanlike measures of the Whigs at that period in England with the frantic innovations which tore society in pieces in France on the commencement of their Revolution, the difference appears prodigious, and is highly deserving of attention. Thence may be learned both the important tendency of free institutions to modify those ardent aspirations after equality, which, when generally diffused, are, of all other political passions, the most fatal to the cause of freedom, and the wide difference between the chastened efforts of a liberal spirit, when guided by aristocratic power, and modifying, not governing, the measures of government, and the wild excesses or atrocious crimes, destructive at once to the present and future generations, which spring from the surrender of the actual direction of affairs to the immediate control or the passions of the people.

It remains to detail, with a very different measure of encomium, the principal foreign policy of the Whig administration, from the period when the Prussian war commenced on the Continent of Europe.

It has been already mentioned how Sir Home Popham, without authority from the British government, proceeded from the Cape of Good Hope to Buenos Ayres with a small military force, and the disastrous issue of that expedition.* But the general transports of joy at the brilliant prospects which this acquisition was supposed to open to British commerce were so excessive that government, while they very properly brought Sir Home to a court-martial for this unauthorized proceeding, which, in March, 1807, reprimanded him for his conduct, had not firmness enough to withstand the general wish that an expedition should be sent to the river La Plata, to wipe away the disgrace which had there been incurred from the British arms, and annex such lucrative dependances to the British crown. No sooner, accordingly, had it become evident, from the failure of the negotiations for peace at Paris, that a protracted struggle was to be apprehended, than a re-enforcement of 3000 men was sent to the British troops in that quarter, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. On arriving at the Rio de la Plata, he found the remnant of the English force cooped up in Maldonado, with hardly any provisions, and daily exposed to the insults of the accomplished horsemen of that country. Deeming that town unfit for being rendered a dépôt and place of security for the army, Sir Samuel resolved to direct his forces against Monte Video, a fortified sea-port, admirably calculated for all these purposes. After great diffi-

culties, the troops were transported to that neighbourhood, but, on commencing the siege, great and apparently insurmountable difficulties were encountered. The defences of the place were found to be much stronger than had been expected: the whole powder in the fleet was almost blown away in the first five days' firing; intrenching tools were wanting to make the breaches, and four thousand regular troops, with twenty pieces of cannon, a force fully equal to the besiegers', was rapidly approaching to raise the siege. In these critical circumstances, he resolved to hazard an assault, though the breach could as yet scarcely be called practicable, and orders were issued for the attack an hour before daybreak. ^{Feb. 2, 1807.} Owing to the darkness of the night the head of the column missed the breach, and remained under the ramparts for twenty minutes exposed to a heavy fire, every shot of which told in their dense ranks; but as the day dawned, it was discerned by Captain Renny, of the 40th regiment, who gloriously fell as he mounted it; the troops emulated his bright example, rushed in with irresistible violence, cleared the streets of all the cannon which had been placed to enfilade them, and made prisoners all the enemy who attempted any resistance. In this glorious storm the loss of the British was about six hundred, but twice that number of the enemy fell, and two thousand were made prisoners, besides a thousand who escaped in boats, so that the numbers of the garrison at first had been greater than that of the besieging force.*

It would have been well for the British arms if their attempts on South America ^{A second expedition against Buenos Ayres is resolved on.} had terminated here; but the discomfiture of Sir Home Popham's expedition to the Rio de la Plata unhappily led both the government and the nation to conceive that the honour of the British arms was implicated in regaining the ground they had lost in that quarter. With this view, an additional expedition, under the command of General Craufurd, consisting of 4200 men, which had been sent out in the end of October, 1806, destined originally to effect the conquest of Chili, on the other side of Cape Horn, was, when news arrived of the expulsion of the English from Buenos Ayres, ordered to stop short, and attempt the reconquest of that important city. General Craufurd, agreeably to these orders, made sail for the Rio de la Plata, and effected a junction with Sir Samuel Auchmuty at Monte Video in the beginning of June. ^{June 2, 1807.} As the united force now amounted to above nine thousand men, it was deemed advisable to make an immediate attempt on Buenos Ayres, and, in pursuance of express directions from government,† the command of the force for this purpose was given to General Whitelocke. That officer arrived at Monte Video on the 9th of May, and preparations were immediately made for the proposed enterprise.‡

The force which set out on this expedition consisted of 7800 men, including eighteen pieces of field artillery. After sev- ^{Its failure.}

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 213, 214. See S. Auchmuty's Despatch, 652.

† "As it has been thought advisable," said Mr. Windham, in his official orders, "that an officer of high rank, as well as talent and judgment, should be sent to take the command of his majesty's forces in South America, it was his majesty's pleasure to make choice for that purpose of General Whitelocke."—*Mr. Windham's Instructions to General Whitelocke, 5th March, 1807.* Ann. Reg., 1807, 216.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1807, 214, 217.

* Ante, ii., 422.

Foreign transactions.

Fresh expedition to South America.

March 7, 1807.

Oct., 1806.

Capture of Monte Video.

eral fatiguing marches the whole reached Reduccion, a village about nine miles from Buenos Ayres, and, having manœuvred so as to deceive the enemy as to the real point of passage, succeeded in crossing the river, with very little loss, at the ford of Passo Chico. The army having been assembled on the right bank, orders were given for a general attack on the town. Great preparations for defence had been made by the inhabitants: above two hundred pieces of cannon were disposed, in advantageous situations, in the principal streets, and fifteen thousand armed men were stationed on the flat roofs of the houses to pour their destructive volleys on the columns who might advance to the attack. The measures of the English general, so far from being calculated to meet this danger, the magnitude of which is well known to all experienced military men, betrayed a fatal and overweening contempt for his opponents. The different columns of attack were directed to advance by the principal streets to the great square near the River Plata; but, by an inconceivable oversight, they were not allowed to load their pieces, and no firing was permitted till they had reached the final place of their destination. The consequence was, that those brave men were exposed, as they advanced through the long streets leading to the great square, without the possibility of returning it, to a destructive shower of musketry, hand-grenades, and stones from the tops of the houses, all of which were flat and covered with an armed and enthusiastic population; while

strong barricades were drawn at intervals across the streets, mounted by a plentiful array of heavy artillery. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, however, the formidable nature of which were so fatally experienced by Charles X. in the streets of Paris in 1830, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, by a vigorous attack on the right, made himself master of the Plaza de Toros, took eighty-two pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and six hundred prisoners. General Whitelocke himself had gained possession of an advanced post in the centre, and the Residencia, a commanding station on the left, had also fallen into the hands of the British. But these advantages were dearly purchased, and in other quarters the plunging fire to which the troops had been exposed, without the possibility of returning it, had proved so destructive that three regiments were compelled to lay down their arms, and the attacking force was weakened by the loss of 2500 men. On the following morning the Spanish general, Linieres, offered to restore all the prisoners which had been taken, on condition that the British forces should withdraw altogether from Monte Video, and all the settlements which they held on the Rio de la Plata. Such was the consternation produced by the disasters of the preceding day, and such the difficulties with which the farther prosecution of the enterprise appeared to be attended, that, notwithstanding the brilliant success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the capture of so large a portion

of the enemy's artillery, these terms were agreed to, and a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole British troops were withdrawn from the River Plata, was signed on the following day.*

The public indignation knew no bounds when the calamitous issue of this expedition was made known in Great Britain; and the outcry was

the more vehement from the glorious success at Monte Video having inspired the people with an unreasonably low estimate of the South American forces. So violent was the clamour that government, in order to appease it, were compelled to bring General Whitelocke to trial, and the court-martial which investigated the charges brought against him, in January, 1809, sentenced him to be cashiered and dismissed from his majesty's service. No opinion, however, can be formed of the real merits of the case from this decision, whatever may have been the respectability of the officers composing it; for such was the happy ignorance which then generally prevailed in Great Britain on military subjects, that the members of the court-martial required to be told what the right bank of a river, in military language, means;† and such is frequently the vehemence and unreasonableness of the public mind in England on such occasions, that the strength of scarcely any intellect is equal to withstanding the torrent. The examples of Saragossa, Gerona, and Paris also, have, since that time, abundantly demonstrated that the resistance of an insurgent population in barricaded streets and on the roofs of stone houses is often extremely formidable, even to powerful bodies of disciplined troops. But on a calm retrospect of the transactions, at this distance of time, it cannot be denied that an energetic and skilful general might, in all probability, have extricated the British army, if not with honour, at least without disgrace, from this ill-concerted enterprise. The orders to traverse the streets with muskets unloaded, after a desperate resistance was prepared and foreseen, though expressly approved of by the court-martial, seems hardly reconcilable to any rule of military policy or common sense; and, above all, the omission to take advantage of the great success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the powerful train of artillery which he had captured, if not to achieve success, at least to avert dishonour, must justly be considered as a matter of reproach to the British general. Much allowance must, however, be made for the critical situation of an inexperienced officer plunged, in his first essay in a separate command, in difficulties, under which the intellects of Marmont and Lefebvre subsequently reeled; but the same excuse cannot be made for the government, which selected an officer unknown to fame for so important a service, where many others had proved their capacity even in the comparatively inconsiderable military operations in which England had hitherto been engaged.‡ But this weight of secret Parliamentary influence is the inherent bane of a free constitution: it appeared afterward, on a still greater scale, on occasion of the Walcheren expedition, and continued to paralyze all the military operations of England, till the commanding genius of Wellington burst through the trammels, and fixed the flickering light of its glory in a star of unquenchable lustre.†

Court-martial on General Whitelocke, who is cashiered.

* South., Pen. War, i., 73.

† The appointment of General Whitelocke over the head of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the hero of Monte Video, appears the strongest confirmation of these remarks, but in reality it is not so; for that town was stormed on Feb. 2, and General Whitelocke's appointment is dated March 3, in the same year; so that the one was not known till the other took place. It is the overlooking the many officers who had distinguished themselves in Egypt, Maida, and India, which forms the real reproach to the British government on this occasion.

‡ Ann Reg. 1807, 219, 224. Dum., xv., 82, 83.

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 219, 221.

In other colonial transactions the British arms during this administration were more prosperous. Curaçoa, early in the year, was taken, with hardly any resistance, by a squadron of frigates, under the command of Captain Brisbane: the advantages of sharing in British commerce, and obtaining the protection of the British flag, having now disposed the planters in all the colonial possessions of other states to range themselves under its banners. Soon after, a regular Constitution was proclaimed in Hayti, by which slavery was forever abolished; property and persons placed under the safeguard of the law; the first magistrate of the Republic declared the generalissimo of its forces by sea and land; and a code established breathing a spirit of wisdom, philanthropy, and moderation. The establishment of such a Republican government, coming so soon after the heroic resistance which the negroes had opposed to the attempt at their subjugation by Napoleon, would have been a subject of the highest interest, and deserving of the warmest sympathy of every friend to humanity, were it not that experience has since abundantly proved, what historical information might even then have too clearly led the well informed to anticipate, that all such attempts at the regeneration of mankind, by immediate changes, are not only delusive, but pernicious; that to give to savages the liberty and institutions of civilization, is to consign them to immediate suffering and ultimate slavery; and that every attempt to transfer suddenly into one age or nation the institutions of another, is as hopeless a task as to expect in the nursery seedling the strength and solidity of the aged oak, or in the buoyancy and irreflexion of childhood the maturity and perseverance of maturer years.

This untoward expedition to the shores of the La Plata was not the only one which brought disgrace upon the arms of England at this period: enterprises equally unfortunate took place both on the shores of the Bosphorus and the banks of the Nile.

It has been already mentioned* that Russia had, unhappily, selected the moment when the Prussian war, if not actually commenced, was at least obviously approaching, to invade the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia by the army of General Michelson, and we have noticed the disastrous effect which that distraction of force had upon the issue of the contest on the Vistula. This irruption, however ill-timed or imprudent, when so serious a war nearer home awaited the Russian forces, was not, however, unjustifiable; on the contrary, it was provoked by the ambition of the French government, and the intrigues of their ambassador at Constantinople, which, by precipitating the Divan into a breach of the existing treaty with the court of Russia, gave to that power too plausible a ground for resuming its long-established schemes of ambition on the banks of the Danube.

By the treaty of Jassy, which terminated the bloody and disastrous war which the Turks had long waged with the might of Moscow and the genius of Suwarrow, it had been covenanted that the hospodars, or governors of Wallachia and Moldavia, should not be dismissed from their high functions for the space of seven years; and

by the supplementary treaty of the 24th of September, 1802, it had been expressly stipulated that they should not be removed without the consent of Russia.* No sooner, however, had it become evident to Napoleon that a war was impending with Prussia and Russia than he despatched a firm and skilful ambassador to Constantinople, with instructions to do everything in his power to produce a rupture between the Turks and Russians, and in this manner effect a powerful diversion to the Moscovite forces on the banks of the Danube.† This diplomatic agent was General Sebastiani, a military officer of great experience, and whose subtle and penetrating genius, formerly nourished in a cloister, and since matured by the experience of camps, was admirably adapted for the mingled acuteness and resolution required in the mission with which he was now intrusted. His secret instructions were, in the first instance, to endeavour to procure the dismissal of the Princes Ipsilanti and Morusi from the government of these provinces, who were in the interest of Russia, and place in their stead princes of the rival families of Suzzo and Callimachi, who, it was known, would incline to the French alliance.‡

When Sebastiani arrived at the Turkish capital in August, 1806, he found matters in a situation extremely favourable to the attainment of these objects. Sultan Selim, in his attempts to introduce the European tactics and discipline into his armies, of the need of which the recent wars with Russia had given repeated and fatal experience, of which a detailed account will be given in a future chapter,‡ had become embarrassed with very serious difficulties, and found himself obstinately resisted not only by the proud and disorderly bands of the janizaries, but that powerful party in all the Ottoman provinces who were attached to their national and religious institutions, and regarded the introduction of European customs, whether into the army or the state, as the first step in their national ruin. In this extremity he gladly embraced the proffered counsel and assistance of the French ambassador, who represented a power which naturally connected itself with the innovating party in every other state, and whose powerful armaments, already stationed in Dalmatia, promised the only effectual aid which could be looked for from the European nations against the Turkish malecontents, whom it was well known Russia was disposed to support. The difficulty arising from the necessity, in terms of the treaty, of consulting Russia in regard to the removal of the obnoxious hospodars, was strongly felt; but the art of Sebastiani prevailed over every difficulty. At a private conference with the sultan in person, he succeeded in persuading that unsuspecting sovereign that the clause in the convention of 1802 applied only to the removal of the waiwodes on the ground of maladministration in their respective provinces, but could not extend to a case where it was called for by the general interests of the Empire; that the present was an instance of the latter description, from the notorious intrigues of those princes with the hereditary enemies of the Ottoman faith; and, in pursuance of these representations, a hatti-scheriff appeared on the 30th of August, dismissing the reigning

Dismissal of the Waiwodes of Wallachia and Moldavia by Sultan Selim.

Aug. 30, 1806.

* Martens, v., 67. Ann. Reg., 1806, 208.

† Bign., vi., 177, 178. Dum., xvii., 257, 259. Hard., ix., 366. Ann. Reg., 1807, 193, 195.

‡ See below, chap. lii.

* Ante, xliv., ii., 465.

waiwodes, and appointing Princes Suzzo and Callimachi in their room.*

This decisive step was taken by the Sublime

Porte not only without the concurrence of Russia, but without the knowledge of any members of the diplomatic body at Constantinople, and as its immediate effect in producing a rupture between the Divan and the court of St. Petersburg was distinctly foreseen, the effect produced by its promulgation was very great. The Russian ambassador, M. Italinski, loudly complained of the infraction of the treaty, in which he was powerfully supported by Mr. Arbuthnot, the minister of Great Britain, who openly threatened an immediate attack on the Turkish capital from the fleets of their respective sovereigns. Sebastiani, however, skilfully availed himself of the advantages which the course of events gave him to secure and increase the French influence with the Divan. No sooner, therefore, did intelligence arrive of the refusal of the Russian government to ratify the treaty concluded by D'Oubril at Paris, than he renewed his efforts, and representing the cause of France as now identified with that of the Sublime Porte, loudly demanded that the Bosphorus should be closed to Russian vessels of war or transports, and announced that any continuation or renewal of alliance with England or Russia would be considered as a declaration of war against the French emperor.† These remonstrances proved successful, and a few days afterward a Russian brig, which presented itself at the mouth of the Bosphorus, was denied admission. These measures irritated so violently the Russian ambassador, that he embarked on board the English frigate Canopus, and threatened instantly to leave the harbour if the dismissed waiwodes were not forthwith reinstated in their possessions. In these efforts he was powerfully seconded by Mr. Wellesley Pole, who, in the absence of Mr. Arbuthnot, who was detained by fever at Bujuchdere, presented himself before the Divan in his riding-dress, with a whip in his hand, and peremptorily announced that, if the demands of Russia were not instantly acceded to, a British fleet would enter the Dardanelles and lay the capital in ashes. Intimidated by this bold language, and the haughty air of the person who used measure, it, and secretly aware of the weakness of the defences of the capital on that side, the counsellors of Selim recommended a temporary concession to the demands of the allied powers: the waiwodes were reinstated in their governments, and ample promises made to the Russian ambassador of satisfaction for all his demands. But these conciliatory measures were only intended to gain time; and in a secret conference with Sebastiani, the sultan informed that minister that he had only yielded to the storm till he was in a condition to brave it, and that his policy, as well as his inclinations, were inseparably united with the Emperor Napoleon.‡

Matters were now, to all appearance, accommodated between the Divan and the cabinet of St. Petersburg; but the great distance between the two capitals brought on a rupture when all causes of irritation had ceased, at the point

Meanwhile the Russian armies invaded the principalities.

* Dum., xvii., 257, 264. Bign., vi., 177, 179. Hard., ix., 364, 365. † Note of 16th Sept., 1806. ‡ Ann. Reg., 1806, p. 208, 209. Bign., vi., 182, 184. Hard., ix., 364, 365.

where their interests came into collision. As soon as intelligence of the dismissal of the waiwodes reached the Russian cabinet, they despatched orders to General Michelson, as soon as he could get his preparations ready, to enter the Turkish territory; and when intelligence was received of their being reinstated on the 15th of October, which did not arrive at the Russian capital till the beginning of November, it was too late to prevent the operations of the previous orders and the commencement of hostilities. Michelson, accordingly, entered Moldavia on the 23d of November, and, having once drawn the sword, the cabinet of St. Petersburg had not sufficient confidence in the sincerity of this forced submission on the part of the Sublime Porte to restore it to its sheath, or, possibly, they were not sorry of an opportunity of extending themselves towards the Danube, and advancing their permanent schemes of conquest towards Constantinople. Notwithstanding the restoration of the hospodars, therefore, their armies continued to advance, driving the Turks before them, to the no small confusion of M. Italinski, who had uniformly declared, both in public and private, that, as soon as that event was known at St. Petersburg, their march would be countermanded. Sebastiani, meanwhile, made the best use of this now unjustifiable invasion, as well as of the consternation produced by the victories of Napoleon in Prussia, to increase the French influence at the Divan; and strongly represented that now was the time, when Russia was already hard pressed by the victorious arms of the French emperor on the Vistula, to throw their weight into the scale, and regain, in a single successful campaign, the influence and possessions which had been wrested from them by their inveterate enemies during more than a century of previous misfortunes. Persuaded by such plausible arguments, and irritated at the continued stay of the Russian troops in the principalities after the causes which had justified their entrance into them had ceased, the hesitations of the Divan were at length overcome, and war was formally declared against Russia in the end of the year. To protect the Russian ambassador from the fury of the Mussulmans, which was now fully aroused, the sultan stationed a guard of janizaries over his palace. Mr. Arbuthnot strongly remonstrated against his being sent, according to previous custom, to the Seven Towers. General Sebastiani had the generosity to employ his powerful influence for the same purpose, and by their united influence this barbarous practice was discontinued, and M. Italinski was permitted to embark on board the English frigate Canopus, by which he was soon after conveyed into Italy. Less humane, however, towards his own satraps than the ambassadors of his enemies, the sultan despatched his messengers with the bowstring to Prince Ipsilanti; but that nobleman, in whom energy of mind supplied the want of bodily strength, succeeded in throwing down the executioners after they had got hold of his person, and had the good fortune to escape into Russia.*

Though war was thus resolved on, the Porte was far from being in a condition at the moment to oppose any effectual resistance to the powerful army of General Michelson, which

Rapid progress of the Russians in the principalities.

* Hard., ix., 365. Bign., vi., 184, 189. Ann. Reg., 1806, 208, 211.

had entered the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia: forty thousand Russian troops, amply provided with every necessary, were irresistible. Moldavia was speedily overrun: the victorious bands, following up their success, entered Wallachia; a tumultuary force which the Pacha of Rudchuck had raised to arrest their progress was defeated; and Bucharest, the capital of the latter province, and a city containing Dec. 27. eighty thousand inhabitants, fell into their hands. Before the end of the year, and before war had been formally declared on either side, they were already masters of all the Danube; and their outposts, preparing to cross that river, were already in communication with Czerni George, the chief of Servia, who had revolted from the grand signior, defeated his forces in several encounters, and was at this time engaged in the siege of the important fortress of Belgrade.*

The rapidity and magnitude of these successes, however, was the occasion of no small disquietude to the court of St. Petersburg: they had now felt the weight of the French troops on the Vistula; their arms had retired from doubtful and well-debated fields at Golymin and Pultusk; and they were fully sensible of the imprudence of engaging at the same time in another contest, and dispersing the troops so imperiously required for the defence of their own frontier on the banks of the Danube. Already an order had been despatched to recall four divisions to support the extreme left of the army in Poland, whose arrival and operations under Essen, against Bernadotte at Ostrolenka, have already been noticed.†

But this was not sufficient: their diminished forces on the Danube might be exposed to serious danger from the efforts, and now fully aroused national spirit, of the Turks; and as the duration of the contest with France could not be foreseen, it was of the utmost moment to deprive the Emperor Napoleon of that powerful co-operation which he was likely to derive from the war so imprudently lighted up on the southern frontier of the empire. The naval forces of England appeared to be precisely calculated to effect this object; and, as they were cruising at no great distance in the *Ægean* Sea, it was hoped that a vigorous demonstration against Constantinople might at once terminate the contest in that quarter. Application was made to the British government for this purpose, and the cabinet of St. James's, however unwilling, under the direction of Mr. Fox's successors, to engage in any military enterprises in conjunction with the Continental powers, was not averse to the employment of its naval forces in the support of the common cause, and felt the necessity of doing something, after the refusal of both subsidies and land-forces to Russia, to convince that power of the sincerity of its desire, with its appropriate weapons, to maintain the contest. Orders, therefore, were given to Sir John Duckworth, who, at the close of the year, was cruising off Ferrol with four ships of the line, to proceed forthwith to the mouth of the Dardanelles, where Admiral Louis was already stationed with three line-of-battle ships and four frigates; and his orders were to force the passage of these celebrated straits, and compel the Turks, by the threat of an immediate bombardment, into a relinquishment of the

French and adoption of the Russian and English alliance.*

The Hellespont, which, from the days of Homer and the war of Troy to these times, Description has been the theatre of the most important operations in which the fate of *Danellies*. Europe and Asia was concerned, is formed by the narrow strait through which the waters of the Black Sea discharge themselves from the lesser expanse of Marmora into the Mediterranean. Its breadth varies from one to three miles; but its course, which is very winding, amounts to nearly thirty; and the many projecting headlands which advance into the stream afford the most favourable stations for the erection of batteries. Its banks are less precipitous and beautiful than those of the Bosphorus, which is the appellation bestowed on the still more bold and romantic channel which unites the Sea of Marmora to the Euxine; but they possess, both from historical association and natural variety, the highest interest; and few persons possessed even of the rudiments of education can thread the devious way through the winding channel and smiling steeps, which resemble the shores of an inland lake, rather than the boundary of two hemispheres, without recurring in imagination to the exploits of Ajax and Achilles, whose tombs still stand at the entrance of the strait, the loves of Hero and Leander, the memorable contests of which it was the theatre during the Byzantine Empire, the glowing picture by Gibbon of the Latin crusade, and the thrilling verses of Lord Byron on its classic shores.

The fortifications of these important straits, the real gates of Constantinople, had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, still stood in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside. The efforts of Sebastiani, seconded by the spirit of the Turks, whose religious enthusiasm was now fully awakened, had endeavoured in vain to attract the attention of the Divan to the danger which threatened them in this quarter. True to the Mussulman principle of foreseeing nothing, and judging only of the future by the past, they bent their whole attention to the war on the Danube, and despatched all their disposable forces to arrest the progress of the Servians and Czerni George, when a redoubtable enemy threatened them with destruction at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Duly informed of these circumstances, Mr. Arbuthnot was no sooner apprized of the arrival of Sir John Duckworth off Tenedos, than he delivered the ultimatum of Great Britain, which was Jan. 26, 1807. the immediate dismissal of M. Sebastiani; the entrance of Turkey into the alliance of Russia and Great Britain, and the opening of the Dardanelles to the vessels of Russia. These offers were peremptorily declined, and their refusal accompanied by a significant hint from General Sebastiani, that the Berlin decree, recently received at the Turkish capital, required the immediate arrest of all British subjects in all the territories of the allies of France, and that Turkey

* Ann. Reg., 1806, 211.

† Ante, ii., p. 488.

* Bign., vi., 189, 190. Jom., ii., 372. Ann. Reg., 1807, 195.

was one of these allies. Deeming his stay at Constantinople no longer secure, Mr. Arbuthnot, under colour of going to dine with Admiral Jan. 29. Louis, who in the *Endymion* frigate lay off Seraglio Point, withdrew from Constantinople, having first recommended his family to the care of General Sebastiani. That general honourably discharged the trust, but he was too skillful not to turn to the best advantage so unexpected an occurrence in his favour, and war was immediately declared by the Divan against Great Britain.*

Hitherto everything had seconded beyond his Sir John Duckworth's most sanguine expectations the effort passes the forts of the French ambassador, Dardanelles, but he was unable to persuade the Turkish government to take the requisite measures of precaution against this new enemy who had arisen. In vain he urged them instantly to put in repair the fortifications of the Dardanelles; in vain he predicted a formidable immediate attack from the fleet of England; nothing was done to give additional security to the strait, and the Divan, persuaded that the only serious danger lay on the side of the Danube, continued to send all their disposable forces in that direction. Meanwhile the squadrons of Sir John Duckworth and Admiral Louis having effected a junction off Tenedos, their united forces amounted to eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two bomb-vessels; but the *Ajax* of 74 guns having, unfortunately, been destroyed by fire at this critical moment, the squadron was reduced to seven line-of-battle ships. With these, however, the British admiral resolved to force the passage. Having taken his measures with much skill, he advanced with his ships in single file at moderate intervals, and with a fair wind, on the morning of the 19th Feb. 19. of February, entered the straits. So completely were the Turks taken by surprise, that a feeble desultory fire alone was opened upon their ships as they passed the first batteries, to which the English did not deign to reply; but when they reached the castles of Europe and Asia, where the straits are little more than a mile broad, a tremendous cannonade assailed them on both sides, and enormous balls, weighing seven and eight hundred weight, began to pass through their rigging; but the British sailors, meanwhile, were not idle; deliberately aiming their guns, as the ships slowly and majestically moved through the narrow channel, they kept up an incessant discharge to the right and left, with such effect that the Turkish cannoniers, little accustomed to the rapid fire of modern times, and terrified at the crash of the shot on the battlements around them, took to flight. Following up his triumphant course, the English admiral attacked and burned the vessel of the capitan pacha lying at anchor in the straits; Sir Sydney Smith, the second in command, compelled four frigates to surrender, which were immediately after committed to the flames; a fifth, after an obstinate resistance, shared the same fate; and a brig, which with difficulty escaped from the conflagration, had scarcely announced the alarming tidings at Constantinople, when the British fleet, with all sails set, was seen proudly advancing, and cast anchor off the Isle of Princes, within three leagues of Seraglio Point.†

No words can adequately paint the terror

which prevailed in Constantinople when the increasing sound of the approaching cannonade too surely announced that the defences of the straits had been forced; and shortly after, the distant light of the conflagration gave token of the rapid destruction of the fleet. This was much increased when a message was received from Admiral Duckworth, half an hour after his arrival, which, after recapitulating all the instances of fidelity to the Turkish alliance which England had so long afforded, concluded by the declaration that if, in twenty-four hours, the demands of Great Britain were not acceded to, he would be reduced to the painful necessity of commencing hostilities. The capital was totally defenceless: not ten guns were mounted on the sea batteries, and a furious crowd was already assembled in the streets, demanding the head of the reis effendi and General Sebastiani, the authors of all the public calamities. The consternation was universal: the danger, from having been never anticipated, was now felt with stunning force; and the Divan having been assembled in the first moments of alarm, sent an intimation to General Sebastiani that no defence remained to the capital; that submission was a matter of necessity; and that, as the people regarded him as the author of all their misfortunes, his life was no longer in safety, and he would do well instantly to leave the capital.* But his answer was worthy the great and gallant nation which he represented. Receiving the messenger of the sultan in full dress, surrounded by all his suite, he immediately replied, "My personal danger cannot for an instant occupy my attention, when the maintenance of the French alliance and the independence of the Ottoman Empire are at stake. I will not quit Constantinople, and I confidently expect a new decision more worthy of Sultan Selim and the Turkish nation. Tell your powerful monarch that he should not for a moment think of descending from the high rank where the glorious deeds of his ancestors have placed him, by surrendering to a few English vessels a city containing nine hundred thousand souls, and abundantly provided with magazines and ammunition. Your ramparts are not yet armed, but that may soon be done: you have weapons enough; use them but with courage, and victory is secure. The cannon of the English fleet may set fire to part of the town—granted; but without the assistance of a land army it could not take possession of the capital, even if you were to open your gates. You sustain every year the ravages of accidental conflagration and the more serious calamities of the plague, and do you now scruple at incurring the risk of inferior losses in defence of your capital, your country, your holy religion?"†

This noble reply produced a great effect upon the Divan, and it was resolved that, before submitting, they should at least try whether, by gaining time in parleying, they could not, in some degree, complete their preparations. Sebastiani accordingly dictated a note in answer

The Divan resolves on submission, but are roused to exertion by General Sebastiani.

* I have been informed by Sir Stratford Canning, the well-known and able British diplomatist at Constantinople, that a tradition prevails in the East that Sebastiani was at first disposed to submit, and that it was the Spanish ambassador's remonstrances which awakened him to the energetic conduct which has shed such a lustre around his name.

† *Dum.*, xvii., 278, 280. *Bign.*, vi., 197, 198. *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 196, 197.

* *Bign.*, vi., 191, 192. *Dum.*, xvii., 271, 273. *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 195.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 196. *Dum.*, xvii., 275, 278. *Bign.*, vi., 194, 195. *Jom.*, ii., 374.

to the communication from the English admiral, in which the sultan professed an anxious desire to re-establish amicable relations with the British government, and announced his appointment of Allet-Effendi for the purpose of conducting the negotiation. The unsuspecting English admiral, who, from the illness of Mr. Arbuthnot, was intrusted with the negotiation, was no match for the wily French general in the arts of diplomacy, fell into the snare. The British ultimatum

Feb. 21. was sent ashore the following morning, which consisted in the provisional cession of their fleet to England, the dismissal of Sebastiani, and the re-establishment of amicable relations with Russia and the British government. Half an hour only was allowed to the Divan, after the receipt and translation of this note, to deliberate and reply. Had this vigorous resolution been acted upon, it must have led to immediate submission: for the batteries were not yet armed; the fleet, the arsenals, the seraglio, and great part of the town lay exposed to the fire of the English squadron, and during the terror produced by a bombardment, the greater part of the capital, which is chiefly built of wood, must have been reduced to ashes.*

Unfortunately, instead of doing this, Sir John Duckworth, possessed with the belief that the sultan was sincerely desirous of an accommodation, and that the desired objects might be obtained without the horrors of a conflagration, or an irreparable breach with the Ottoman Empire, imprudently gave time, and suffered himself to be drawn into a negotiation. Day after day elapsed in the mere exchange of notes and diplomatic communications; and meanwhile the spirit of the Mussulmans, now raised to the highest pitch, was indefatigably employed in organizing the means of defence. The direction of the whole was intrusted to General Sebastiani, for whom a magnificent tent was erected in the gardens of the seraglio, and who communicated to the ardent multitude the organization and arrangement which long warlike experience had given to the officers of Napoleon. Men and women, gray hairs and infant hands, the Turks, the Greeks, the Armenians, were to be seen promiscuously labouring together at the fortifications. Forgetting, in the general transports, the time-worn lines of religious distinction, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs set the first example of a cordial acquiescence in the orders of government: Selim himself repeatedly visited the works; his commands were obeyed by two hundred thousand men, animated by religious and patriotic ardour to the greatest degree; while the French engineers, who had been sent by Marmont to aid in the war with the Russians, communicated to the busy multitude the inestimable advantages of scientific direction and experienced skill. Under such auspices, the defences of the harbour were speedily armed and strengthened: the naval arsenal furnished inexhaustible resources; in three days three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the batteries; at the end of a week their number was increased to a thousand; temporary parapets were everywhere formed with gabions and fascines, where regular defences were wanting; the tower of Leander was armed with heavy artillery; a hundred gunboats were drawn across the

mouth of the Golden Horn; twelve line-of-battle ships within stood apparently ready for action; * fireships were prepared, and numerous furnaces with red-hot shot kept constantly heated to carry into the British fleet the conflagration with which they menaced the Turkish capital.†

Although the English officers perceived, by means of their telescopes, the preparations which were going forward, and though the peril to the fleet was hourly increasing, from the long continuance of a southwest wind, which rendered it impossible to re-pass the straits, yet nothing was done adequate to the emergency. The fleet, indeed, was brought nearer to the seraglio, and every effort made to bring the enemy, by negotiation, to an accommodation; but the pride of the Mussulmans, now fully aroused, would not have permitted the government to come to terms, even if they had been so inclined; and the influence of Sebastiani was successfully exerted to protract the conferences till the preparations were so far completed as to enable them to bid defiance to the enemy. Four days after the English fleet appeared off Constantinople, the coasts were so completely armed with artillery as to render an attack eminently hazardous; in a week it was totally hopeless. The object of the expedition having failed, nothing remained but to provide for the safety of the fleet; but this was now no easy matter, for during the week lost in negotiation the batteries of the Dardanelles had all been armed, and the castles of Europe and Asia so strengthened as to render it an extremely hazardous matter to attempt the passage. To complete the difficulties of the English admiral, the wind, which generally blows at Constantinople from the northeast, continued, ever after his arrival, fixed in the southwest, so as to render it totally impossible for him to retrace his steps. At length, on the 1st of March, a breeze having sprung up from the Black Sea, all sails were spread, and the fleet re-entered the perilous straits. But it was not without difficulty, and with considerable hazard, that the passage was effected. A heavy fire was kept up from all the batteries; the headlands on either side presented a continued line of smoke; the roar of artillery was incessant; and enormous stone balls, some of them weighing seven or eight hundred pounds, threatened at one stroke to sink the largest ships. One of these massy projectiles carried away the mainmast of the Windsor Castle, which bore the admiral's flag; another penetrated the poop of the Standard, and killed and wounded sixty men. At length the fleet cleared the straits and cast anchor off Tenedos, in such a situation as to blockade the Dardanelles, having sustained a loss of 250 men in this audacious expedition, which, though it proved unsuccessful from the errors attending its execution, was both boldly and ably conceived, and produced a very great impression in Europe by revealing the secret weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and demonstrating how easily an adequate maritime force, by thus bursting through its defences, and aiming a stroke at once at the

The English renounce the enterprise, and with difficulty re-pass the Dardanelles.

March 1.

March 2.

* *Jörn.* ii., 375, 377. *Dum.* xvii., 284, 286. *Bign.* vi., 200, 204. *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 198, 199.

† The number of guns mounted on the batteries in six days was 917 pieces of cannon and 200 mortars: an instance of vigour and rapidity in preparing the means of defence perhaps unparalleled in the history of the world.—*See HARD.* xi., 486. *Pièces Just.*

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 198, 199. *Dum.* xvii., 280, 282. *Bign.* vi., 198, 200.

rytals of the state, could subdue all the strength of Islamism, and at once compel the submission of a power before which, in former times, all the monarchies of Europe had trembled.*

After the departure of the English fleet all amicable relations were, of course, suspended by the Turkish government; the preparations of the naval action off Tenedos, July 1. sultan to strengthen the batteries both of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles continued with undiminished activity, and the influence of General Sebastiani with the Divan became unbounded. The ease, however, with which the British fleet had surmounted all the defences of Constantinople, and the imminent risk which he had run of being deprived, by one blow, of the powerful auxiliary aid of Turkey, gave the utmost uneasiness to Napoleon; and he despatched, without delay, orders both to Marmont in Illyria, and Eugene in Italy, to forward instantly a number of able officers, among whom were Colonel Haco of the engineers, and Colonel Foy of the artillery, to co-operate in the strengthening of the defences of Constantinople; while six hundred men were directed to be forthwith put at the disposal of the grand signior, and authority given for the transmission of five thousand, with abundant supplies in money and ammunition, if required. These re-enforcements, however, were not required; for though the English fleet was shortly after joined by the Russian squadron, under Admiral Siniavin, yet they had too recently experienced the dangers of the straits to venture a second time into them, after their defences had been so materially strengthened, as they soon were by the operations of the French engineers. Contenting themselves, therefore, with taking possession of Lemnos and Tenedos for the service of their fleet, they established a close blockade of the entrance to the straits from the Archipelago; and as a similar precaution was adopted at the mouth of the Bosphorus, the supply of the capital by water-carriage on both sides was interrupted, and before long a very great dearth of provisions was experienced. The Turkish government made the utmost efforts to man their squadron, but this was no easy matter, as the blockade by the Russians deprived them of all intercourse with the Greeks, who constituted almost exclusively the nautical portion of their population. At length, however, the scarcity became so great that serious commotions took place in the capital; and the government having at length forced an adequate number of hands on board the fleet, the capitan pacha ventured to leave the protection of the forts in the Dardanelles, and give battle to the Russian fleet. But the result was what might have been expected from a contest between an inexperienced body of men, for the most part unacquainted with naval affairs, and a squadron manned by seamen who yield to none in Europe in the resolution with which they stand to their guns.† Though the Turks fought with great gallantry, they could not withstand the superior skill and more rapid fire of their antagonists: four of their ships were early in the day drifted out of the line, and their unskilful crews were unable to bring them again into fire; the remainder, after this great loss, were sur-

rounded, and in great part destroyed. Four ships of the line were taken with the vice-admiral, three were burned, and the remainder driven for shelter under the cannon of the Dardanelles. So overbearing did the pressure of the Russians at sea now become, that it threatened the utmost dangers to the Ottoman government; when the blockade of the capital was raised, and a temporary respite obtained by the treaty of Tilsit, which, as will immediately appear, established a short and fallacious truce between these irreconcilable enemies.*

Not content with this attack on the Turkish capital, the British government, at the same time, effected a descent on the coasts of Egypt. Deeming the opportunity favourable for regaining possession of that important country, which was still warmly coveted by Napoleon, and the cession of which into the feeble hands of the Mussulmans had been long a subject of regret, the British government resolved to send an expedition to the shores of the Nile, at the same time that it threatened with bombardment the Turkish capital. The land-troops, under General Mackenzie, set sail from Messina on the 6th of March, and landed near Rosetta on the 18th. Alexandria speedily capitulated; Damieta was also occupied without resistance, and General Fraser detached with two thousand five hundred men to effect the reduction of Rosetta, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile, and the possession of which was deemed essential to the regular supply of Alexandria with provisions. This place, however, held out; and, as immediate succour was expected April 22. from the Mamelukes, Colonel Macleod was stationed with seven hundred men at El Hammeh, in order to facilitate their junction with the besieging force. This detachment was speedily surrounded by an overwhelming body of Turkish horse, and, after a gallant resistance, which repelled the attacks of their numerous squadrons till the whole ammunition was exhausted, entirely cut off; the promised Mamelukes never made their appearance; and General Stewart, severely weakened by so great a loss, with difficulty made good his retreat, fighting all the way, to Alexandria, where he arrived with a thousand fewer men than he had set out. The fortifications of that place, however, enabled the British to bid defiance to their desultory opponents; and it was soon found that the apprehensions of scarcity which had prompted this ill-fated expedition to Rosetta were entirely chimerical, as provisions speedily became more abundant than ever. But the British government, in whom an important change at this time Which is defeated. took place, became sensible of the impolicy of longer retaining this acquisition at a crisis when every nerve required to be exerted to protect their shores from the forces of Napoleon. It was with lively satisfaction, therefore, that they heard of the conclusion of a convention in autumn, by which it was stipulated that all the British prisoners in the hands of the Turks should be released, and Alexandria surrendered to their arms; in virtue of which the English troops set sail from the mouth of the Nile in the end of September, and were brought to Sept. 23. Gibraltar, where they were stationed, to co-operate in the retreat of the royal family of

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 200. Sir J. Duckworth's Despatch, *ib.*, 664. *Jom.*, ii., 376, 377. *Dum.*, xvii., 281, 293. *Bign.*, vi., 204, 207.

† "Lay your ship alongside a Frenchman," said Nelson, "but try to out-manœuvre a Russian."

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 201, 202. *Dum.*, xvii., 292, 293. *Jom.*, ii., 376, 379.

Portugal from the Tagus, and ultimately took a share in the glories of the Peninsular campaigns.*

The public dissatisfaction arising from these repeated defeats was so strong that it seriously shook the stability of ministers, and produced a very general impression even among that portion of the community who had hitherto supported them, that, however well qualified to direct the state during a period of profound peace, and when ample leisure was to be had for carrying into effect their projected reforms, they were not calculated for the existing crisis, in which these pacific ameliorations were of comparatively little consequence, and what was imperatively called for was the capacity of warlike combination. But room was not afforded for this growing discontent to manifest itself in the usual way, so as to affect the fortunes of the administration, from another event at this time, which brought them into collision with the religious feelings of the sovereign, and ultimately led to their retirement from office.

Measures for introducing the Catholics into the army and navy brought in by Lord Howick.

It has been already mentioned that the general question of Catholic Emancipation was brought forward in the session of 1805, and supported with all the weight and eloquence of the Whig party. The ministerial leaders felt the necessity of making some effort, when in power, to redeem the pledges which they had so freely given when on the opposition benches. Lord Grenville, in particular, who had formed part of the administration which resigned in 1801 in consequence of the declared repugnance of the sovereign to those concessions to the Catholics which Mr. Pitt then deemed essential to the security of the country, considered himself called upon by every consideration, both of public policy and private honour, again to press them upon the Legislature. In consequence of these impressions, Lord Howick (afterward Earl Grey) moved, on the 5th of March, for leave to bring in a bill which should enable persons of every religious persuasion to serve in the army and navy, without any other condition but that of taking an oath specified in the bill, which was repugnant to no religious opinions. By the existing law, a Catholic in Great Britain could not rise to the rank even of a subaltern, in consequence of the necessity of officers of every grade taking the test oath; while in Ireland, under an act passed in the Irish Parliament in 1793, persons of that religious persuasion were permitted to rise to any situation in the army, excepting commanders-in-chief of the forces, master-general of the ordnance, or general on the staff.

Arguments in favour of it by Lord Howick. "Was it prudent," said Lord Howick, "when we were contending with so powerful an enemy, to prevent, in this manner, a large portion of the population of the country from concurring in the common defence? What can be more anomalous than that in one united empire so great a discrepancy should prevail as that on one side of St. George's Channel a Catholic may rise to the highest rank in the army, but on the other he cannot hold even an ensign's commission? It was declared in 1793, when this restriction was removed by the Irish Parliament, by his majesty's ministers in both houses, that in two months

they would grant a similar indulgence to persons of the Romish persuasion in Great Britain; but this had never yet been done, and this monstrous inconsistency continued to disgrace the laws of the United Kingdom. It may fairly be admitted that the principle of this relaxation applies equally to dissenters of every description, and that it must lead to a general admission of persons of every religious persuasion to the army and navy; but where is the danger of such liberality? The proposed measure only enables the sovereign to appoint such persons to offices of high importance. It does not compel him to do so: their appointment would still depend on the executive government, who would, of course, avoid any dangerous or improper use of their authority; and would, on the contrary, be enabled to take advantage in the common defence of the whole population of the country, without any of those restrictions which now, with a large proportion, damped the spirit or soured the affections."*

On the other hand, it was strongly contended by Mr. Perceval, "The objections Arguments to this measure, strong as they are, against it by Mr. Perceval. are not so insuperable as to the system of which it forms a part, which originates in a laxity of principle on matters of religion, which is daily increasing, and threatens in its ultimate results to involve all our institutions in destruction. If it is desirable to preserve anything in our ancient and venerable establishments, it is indispensable to make a stand at the outset against any innovations in so essential a particular. This measure is, in truth, a partial repeal of the Test Act; if passed, it must at no distant period lead to the total repeal of that act, and with it the downfall of the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. The advocates of the Catholics argue as if their measures were calculated to support toleration, whereas, in reality and in their ultimate effects, they are calculated to destroy that great national blessing, by subverting the Protestant establishment, by whom toleration has been always both professed and practised, and reinstating the Romish, by whom it has been as uniformly repudiated. From the arguments that are advanced at the present day, one would be inclined to imagine that there was no such thing as truth or falsehood in religion; that all creeds were equally conducive to the temporal and eternal interests of mankind; and that, provided only the existing heats and dissensions on the subject could be allayed, it mattered not to what religious tenets either a government or a people inclined. True toleration is, indeed, an inestimable blessing, but it consists in permitting to every man the free exercise of his religion, not in putting into the hands of the professors of a hostile creed the means of overturning what they will never cease to regard as a pestilent heresy, and resuming from its present Protestant possessors the lost patrimony of St. Peter in these islands. In point of law, it is incorrect to say that a Catholic who has obtained a commission in Ireland is liable to any penalties; the Mutiny Act authorizes the king to require in any part of his dominions the services of every man in his army, and this is of itself a practical repeal of the disability affecting Catholics; for no man can be compelled to do what would subject him to a penalty. The argument that all offices should be thrown open to persons of all religious persua-

* Ann. Reg., 1807 203, 205. Bign., vi., 215, 219.

* Parl. Deb., ix., 1, 7.

sions is inconsistent with the British Constitution as settled in 1688, which is root and branch a Protestant establishment. If pushed to its legitimate length, it would throw open all offices, even the crown itself, to Catholic aspirants. What, then, becomes of the Act of Settlement, or the right of the house of Hanover to the throne? If this is to be the policy of their country, there is but one thing to be done, to do everything to transfer the church lands in Ireland to the Catholics, re-establish the Catholic faith, and call over the pretender to the throne of these realms. These are the great and dazzling objects which the Romish party have in view: it was to exclude them that all the restrictions were imposed by our ancestors on the persons professing that faith; it is to gain them that all these minor concessions are demanded by their adherents; their advances are only the more dangerous that they are gradual, unperceived, and veiled under the colour of philanthropy. The Catholics already enjoy everything which toleration can demand; to ask more is to demand weapons to be used against ourselves. The consequences of a storm are little to be apprehended; it is the gradual approaches which are really dangerous. If Parliament goes on allowing this accumulation, it will ultimately have that extorted from its weakness which its wisdom would be desirous to withhold.*†

The second reading of this interesting bill was adjourned from time to time without the nation being either alive to its importance or aware of the quarter in which obstacles to its progress existed. But on the 24th of March it was suddenly announced in the newspapers that ministers had been dismissed, and two nights after, Lord Grenville, in the House of Lords, and Lord Howick, in the House of Commons, gave a full statement of the circumstances which led to so unlooked-for a change. The draught of the bill, as usual in all matters of importance, had been submitted to his majesty for his consideration, and it contained a recital of the Irish Act which opened the army to Catholics for every grade, with the restriction of the master-general of the ordnance, commander-in-chief of the forces, and general of the staff; and then provided that the services of the Catholics should be received without any restriction, and the condition only of taking the oath of allegiance. On this bill being proposed, the king manifested considerable objections, but these were at length so far overcome that ministers were authorized to bring in the bill, and communications were made to the heads of the Catholics in Ireland, that they were to be admitted to every situation in the army without exception. The king, however, had laboured under some misapprehension as to the extent and tendency of the measure which was to be brought forward, and believed that it was not intended to enlarge the facilities of admission created by the act of 1793 for Ireland, but only to make that act the general law of the Empire; for no sooner was its import explained in the de-

bate which occurred on the first reading in the House of Commons, of which an abstract has already been given, than he intimated to the government that he had invincible objections to the proposed change. After some ineffectual attempts at a compromise, ministers, finding the king resolute, determined to withdraw the bill altogether, and intimated this decision to his majesty, accompanied, however, with the conditions that they should not be precluded from stating their opinions on the general policy of the measure in Parliament, and that they should be at liberty, from time to time, to bring the matter again under his majesty's consideration. The answer of the king, after expressing regret at the difference of opinion which had arisen, rejected these conditions as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the Constitution, that the acts of government are to be held as those of the responsible ministers, and that the adoption or rejection of no measure is to be laid upon his majesty; and not less at variance with the fundamental basis of the Act of Settlement, which is rested on the exclusion of Catholics from the highest office in the realm; and it therefore required a written pledge from ministers that they would propose no farther concessions to the Catholics. This pledge, ministers, on their side, considered as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of a free constitution, which is that the king can do no wrong, and that the responsibility of all public measures must rest with his advisers, and equally repugnant to that progressive change in human affairs which might, at no distant period, render a repetition of the proposal a matter of necessity. They therefore declined, though in the most respectful terms,* to give the proposed pledge, and the consequence was that the king, in gracious terms, sent them an intimation that their services were no longer required; and on the same day the Duke of Portland, Lord Hawkesbury, and Mr. Perceval received the royal commands to form a new administration.

Parliament, after this unexpected event, was adjourned till the 8th of April, and on that day the new ministers took their seats.† The change of administration, of course, formed the first and most anxious subject of debate, and the interest of the country was excited to the highest degree by the arguments which were urged for and against that important and unwonted exercise of the royal prerogative. On the side of the former ministers, it was urged by Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Howick: "The true question at issue is, whether or not it would have been

* Lord Grenville's, Howick's, Hawkesbury's, and Mr. Perceval's Speeches. *Parl. Deb.*, ix., 247, 258, 261, 278.

† The new cabinet stood thus:

Earl Camden, President of the Council.
Lord Eldon, Chancellor.
Earl of Westmoreland, Lord Privy Seal.
Duke of Portland, First Lord of the Treasury.
Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty.
Earl of Chatham, Master-general of the Ordnance.
Earl Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade.
Lord Hawkesbury, Home Secretary.
Mr. Canning, Foreign Secretary.
Lord Castlereagh, War and Colonial Secretary.
Mr. Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Duchy of Lancaster.

Not in the cabinet.

Mr. Robert Dundas, President of the Board of Control.
George Rose, President of the Board of Trade.
Sir James Pultney, Secretary at War.
Sir Vicary Gibbs, Attorney-general.
Sir Thomas Plummer, Solicitor-general.
Duke of Richmond, Lord-lieutenant of Ireland.—See *Parl. Deb.*, ix., xii.

* *Parl. Deb.*, ix., 9, 11.

† Subsequent events have rendered these early debates and predictions on the effects of concession to the Catholics in the highest degree curious and interesting. Without pronouncing any decided opinion on a subject on which the light of experience is only now beginning to shine upon the world, it is the duty of the historian to point out the discussions on this subject to the attentive consideration of every candid inquirer either into political wisdom or historic truth.

constitutionally justifiable, or, rather, would not have been a high crime and misdemeanour for any minister to subscribe a written pledge that he would never in future bring a particular measure or set of measures under his majesty's consideration. If any statesman could be found base enough to give such a pledge, he would deserve impeachment, and the house would be guilty of a dereliction of its duty if it did not impeach a minister who so far forgot his duty to the country. This is a matter in which the interests of the crown were more at stake than even those of the people; for, if the precedent is once to be allowed that a minister is at liberty to surrender his own private judgment to the will of the reigning sovereign, it is impossible that the legal fiction that the king can do no wrong can any longer be maintained, and the great constitutional principle that the acts of the king are those of his responsible advisers would be at an end. Who could, in such a view, set bounds to the dangerous encroachments of unknown and irresponsible advisers upon the deliberation of government, or say how far the ostensible ministers might be thwarted and overruled by unknown and secret influence, which might totally stop the action of a constitutional government? The danger of the measure which has been adopted is only rendered the greater by the announcement now openly made, that in this, the most important step, perhaps, taken in his whole reign, his majesty had no advisers. The Constitution recognises no such doctrine: the advisers of the king throughout must be held to be those who have succeeded to his councils. There is no desire to bring the sovereign to the bar of the House of Commons: it is the new ministers who are really the objects of deliberation. The late administration was dismissed because they refused to bind themselves by a specific pledge never to renew the subject of Catholic concession: a new ministry have succeeded them; they must be held, therefore, to have given that pledge, and it is for the house to say whether such a dereliction of public duty is not utterly at variance with every principle of constitutional freedom.*

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning: "The question, on which the imprudent zeal of the late administration has brought them into collision with the religious scruples and political wisdom of the sovereign, is not one of trivial moment, in which the monarch may be expected to abide by the judgment of his constitutional advisers. It lies, on the contrary, at the foot of the whole Constitution: it constitutes one of the foundations *non tangenda non movenda*, on which the entire fabric of our Protestant liberties has been reared. The present question regards the transference of the sword to Catholic hands; the same question on which Charles I. erected his standard at Northampton—the intrusting the direction of the military force to a party necessarily and permanently inimical to our Protestant constitution, both in church and state. It is absurd to suppose this concession would do anything towards satisfying the Catholics: it would only lead them to make fresh demands, and empower them to urge them with additional weight; and the consequence of the measure could be nothing else, in the end, but to bring Catholic bishops into the House of Lords. Was it surprising that the king paused

on the threshold of such a question, striking, as it evidently did, at the root of the tenure by which his own family held their right to the throne? In demanding a pledge that such a proposal should not be renewed, he acted without any adviser, upon the unaided dictates of his own masculine understanding, aided by the conscientious scruples of his unsophisticated heart. All the talent of the cabinet could not blind him to the evident and inevitable, though possibly remote, consequences of such a fatal precedent as was now sought to be forced upon him. It is a palpable mistake to say he drew back in the later stages of the negotiation from what he had previously agreed to: he first gave a reluctant consent to the extension of the Irish Act of 1793 to Great Britain, in the firm belief that this was all that was required of him; so the proposed measure was explained to and understood by him, and that he was not singular in that belief is proved by the fact that the Irish secretary had his doubts upon it, and that the Irish chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question as to the second reading of the bill, said there was no particular reason for the Irish members being present on that occasion, as they were already acquainted with the measure. Three cabinet ministers, viz., the lord-chancellor, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Ellenborough, refused to concur in the measure, when they understood how far it was to be carried: the chancellor was not even summoned to the council at which it was to be discussed, though he was in a peculiar manner the keeper of the king's conscience; and even the person who was commissioned to procure the king's consent to the measure did not understand the extent to which it was to be carried. Having thus been misled, whether designedly or inadvertently it mattered not, in so vital a particular by his ministers, was it surprising that the king should have required from them a pledge that they would not again harass him on the same subject? Undoubtedly no minister should give a pledge to fetter the exercise of his own judgment on future occasions; but that was not required; for, if circumstances in future might render a renewal of the measure necessary, they might at once resign. The king regarded this measure as a violation of his coronation oath, as destructive to the Protestant Church in Ireland, and in its ultimate effects likely to endanger our whole Protestant constitution. Unquestionably it was to be regretted that on any occasion the private opinion of the sovereign should be brought forward apart from that of his constitutional advisers; but for this evil those must answer who, by forcing on a rash and unnecessary measure, compelled him to rely on his own judgment alone; and it is some consolation to reflect that, in proportion as the sovereign has been made more unconstitutionally responsible in his own person, he must become better known to his people; and the soundness of judgment, promptness, and vivacity of intellect which have enabled him to bear up alone against the united weight of the cabinet, have only evinced, in the more striking manner, how worthy he is to fill the throne which his family attained by the principle he has now so manfully defended.*

Upon a division, there appeared 258 for the new ministers and 226 for the old, leaving a majority of thirty-two for the existing government.†

* Parl. Deb., ix., 327, 330, 338, 341.

* Parl. Deb., ix., 314, 321, 342, 346. † Ib., ix., 348.

This majority, though sufficient to enable ministers to conduct the public business during the remainder of that session, was not adequate to carry on the government during the arduous crisis which awaited them in the administration of foreign affairs. They resolved, therefore, to strengthen themselves by a dissolution of Parliament; and the event decisively proved that the king had not miscalculated the loyalty and religious feeling of the English people on this trying emergency. Parliament was prorogued on the 27th of April, and soon after dissolved by royal proclamation. The utmost efforts were made by both parties on this occasion to augment their respective forces: to the usual heats and excitement of a general election being superadded the extraordinary passions arising from the recent dismissal of an administration from office, and consequent elevation of another in their stead. All the usual means of exciting popular enthusiasm were resorted to without scruple on both sides: the venality and corruption of the Tories, so strikingly evinced in their recent elevation of Lord Melville, after the stain consequent on the Tenth Report of the Commissioners, were the subject of loud declamation from the Whigs; the scandalous attempt to force the king's conscience, and induce a popish tyranny on the land, yet wet with the blood of the Protestant martyrs, was as vehemently re-echoed from the other: "No Popery," "No Popery," were the war-cries of the respective parties; and amid banners, shouts, and universal excitement, the people were called on to exercise the most important rights of free citizens. To the honour of the Empire, however, this great contest was conducted without bloodshed or disorder in any quarter; and the result decisively proved that, in taking his stand upon the inviolable maintenance of the Protestant constitution, the king had a great majority of all classes throughout the Empire on his side. Almost all the counties and chief cities of Great Britain returned members in the interest of the new ministry: defeat after defeat in every quarter told the Whigs how far they had miscalculated the spirit of the age; and on the first division in the ensuing Parliament they were defeated by a great majority in both houses, that in the Peers being 97, in the Commons no less than 195.*†

On reviewing the external measures of the Whig administration, it is impossible to deny that their removal from office at that period was a fortunate event for the British Empire in its ultimate results, and proved eminently favourable to the cause of freedom throughout the world. Notwithstanding all their talent—and they had a splendid array of it in their ranks—notwithstanding all their philanthropy—and their domestic measures were generally dictated by its spirit—they could not at that period have long maintained the confidence of the English people; and their unfortunate shipwreck on the Catholic Question only accelerated a catastrophe already prepared by many concur-

rent causes. External disaster, the reproaches of our allies, the unbroken progress of our enemies, must ere long have occasioned their fall. The time was not suited, the national temper not then adapted for those domestic reforms on which the wishes of their partisans had long been set, and which in pacific times were calculated to have excited so powerful a popular feeling in their favour. The active and ruling portion of the nation had grown up to manhood during the war with France: the perils, the glories, the necessities of that struggle were universally felt; the military spirit had spread with the general arming of the people to a degree unparalleled in the British islands. Vigour in the prosecution of the contest was then indispensably necessary for general support; capacity for warlike combination the one thing needful for lasting popularity. In these particulars the Whig ministry, notwithstanding all their talents, were eminently deficient; and the part they had taken throughout the contest disqualified them from conducting it to a successful issue. They had so uniformly opposed the war with France, that they were by no means equally impressed with the nation either with its dangers or its inevitable character: they had so strenuously on every occasion deprecated the system of coalitions, that they could hardly, in consistency with their former principles, take a suitable part in that great confederacy by which alone its overgrown strength could be reduced. Their system of warfare, accordingly, was in every respect adverse to that which the nation then desired: founded upon a secession from all alliances, when the people passionately desired to share in the dangers and glories of a Continental struggle; calculated upon a defensive system for a long course of years, when the now aroused spirit of the Empire deemed it practicable, by a vigorous and concentric effort, to bring the contest at once to a successful termination.

The foreign disasters which attended their military and naval enterprises in all parts of the world profoundly affected the British people, more impatient than any in Europe of defeat in warlike adventure. The capitulation at Buenos Ayres, the flight from the Dardanelles, the defeat in Egypt, succeeding one another in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly that they occurred on the theatres of our greatest triumphs by land and sea, or blasted hopes the most extravagant of commercial advantage. And yet it is now abundantly evident that defeat on the shores of the La Plata and the banks of the Nile was more to be desired than victory; and that no calamity could have been so great as the successful issue of these expeditions. They were framed in the most inconsiderate manner, and aimed at objects which, if gained, would have paralyzed the strength of the Empire. At the moment when the armies of Napoleon were crossing the Thuringian forests, ten thousand English soldiers embarked for South America: when the scales of war hung even on the fields of Poland, five thousand men were sent to certain destruction amid the cavalry of Egypt. Their united force, if thrown into the scale at Eylau, would have driven the French emperor to a disastrous retreat across the Rhine, and induced, seven years before they occurred, the glories of Leipzig and Waterloo. What could be more impolitic than, after Russia had given such decisive proof of its extraordinary resolution and devotion to the

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 238, 239.

† The numbers were,

In the Peers, for the Whigs, 67 In the Commons, Whigs, 155
For the Tories, 164 In the Commons, Tories, 350

Majority 97

—Ann. Reg., 1807, 238, 239.

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cause of Europe, in February, 1807, to send out a miserable little expedition to Alexandria in March following, too large for piracy, too small for conquest, and the success of which could have no other effect but that of riveting the hostility of Turkey to Russia and its allies, and thereby securing to Napoleon the inestimable advantage of a powerful diversion on the side of the Danube? What more impolitic than, when the finances of that great power were exhausted by the extraordinary expenses of the contest, to refuse to the emperor not only a subsidy, but even the British guarantee to a loan which he was desirous of contracting in the British dominions, unless accompanied by the cession of custom-house duties in Russia in security; dealing thus with the greatest potentate in Europe, at the very moment when he was perilling his very crown in our cause, as well as his own, in the same manner as a Jewish pawnbroker does with a suspicious applicant for relief? The battle of Eylau should have been the signal for the contracting the closest alliance with the Russian government; the instant advance of loans to any amount; the marching of sixty thousand English soldiers to the nearest points of embarkation. This was the crisis of the war: the imprudent confidence of Napoleon had drawn him into a situation full of peril; for the first time in his life he had been overmatched in a pitched battle, and hostile nations, besetting three hundred leagues of communication in his rear, were ready to intercept his retreat. No effort on the part of England could have been too great in order to turn to the best account so extraordinary a combination of favourable circumstances; no demonstration of confidence too unreserved to an ally capable of such sacrifices. Can there be a doubt that such a vigorous demonstration would at once have terminated the hesitations of Austria, revived the spirit of Prussia, and, by throwing a hundred thousand men on each flank of his line of communication, driven the French emperor to a ruinous retreat? Is it surprising that when, instead of such co-operation, Alexander, after the sacrifices he had made, met with nothing but refusals in his applications for assistance, and saw the land-force of England wasted on useless distant expeditions, when every bayonet and sabre was of value on the banks of the Alle, he should have conceived a distrust of the English alliance, and formed the resolution of extricating himself as soon as possible from the hazardous conflict in which he was now exclusively engaged?*

* "In the Foreign Office," said Mr. Canning, when minister of foreign affairs in 1807, "are to be found not one, but twenty letters from the Marquis of Douglas, ambassador to the Whigs at St. Petersburg, intimating, in the strongest terms, that, unless effectual aid was sent to the Emperor of Russia, he would abandon the contest." Ample proof of this exists in the correspondence relating to that subject which was laid before Parliament. On the 28th of November, 1806, the marquis wrote to Lord Howick, afterward Earl Grey, from St. Petersburg, "General Budberg lately told me that his imperial majesty had expressly directed him to urge the expedience of partial expeditions on the coast of France and Holland, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy and impeding the march of the French reserves. The extraordinary expenses arising from the disasters of Prussia have rendered a loan of six millions sterling indispensable, which his imperial majesty is exceedingly desirous should be negotiated in England." On the 18th of December, 1806, he again wrote: "At court this morning his imperial majesty again urged, in the strongest terms, the expedience of a diversion on the enemy in the north of Eu-

To these general censures on the foreign policy of England at this juncture, an exception must be made in the case of the expedition to the Dardanelles. It was ably conceived and vigorously entered upon. The stroke there aimed by England was truly at the heart of her adversary: the fire of Duckworth's broadsides was concentric with that of the batteries of Eylau; if successful, they would have added forty thousand men to the Russian standards. This object was so important that it completely vindicates the expedition: the only thing to be regretted is, that the force put at the disposal of the British admiral was not such as to have rendered victory a matter of certainty. As it was, however, it was adequate to the object; and this bold and well-conceived enterprise would certainly have been crowned with deserved success, but for the extraordinary talents and energy of General Sebastiani, and the unfortunate illness of Mr. Arbuthnot, which threw the conduct of the negotiation into the hands of the British admiral, who, however gal-

The Dardanelles expedition is an exception to the general inexpedience of their foreign policy.

lope by a powerful expedition to the coasts of France or Holland." On the 2d of January, 1807: "I have again heard the strongest complaints that the whole of the enemy's forces are directed against Russia, at a moment when Great Britain does not show any disposition to diminish the danger by a diversion against France and Holland." On January the 14th: "I must not conceal from your lordships that the silence of his majesty's government, respecting a military diversion on the coast of France, has not produced a favourable impression either on the ministry or people of this country." January the 26th: "Baron Budberg has again complained of the situation in which Russia has now been placed, having been left alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other." On February the 4th: "During this interview, General Budberg seized every opportunity of complaining that the Russians were left without any military assistance on the part of Great Britain." On February the 15th: "I cannot sufficiently express the extreme anxiety felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by Great Britain to divert the general concentration of the enemy's forces on the banks of the Vistula." "Notwithstanding these and numberless similar remonstrances and urgent calls for aid, the British government did nothing: they declined to guaranty the loan of six millions which was indispensable to the equipment of the Russian militia and reserves; they sent neither succours in men, money, nor arms, grounding their refusal on the necessity of husbanding their resources for a protracted contest, or a struggle on their own shores. On January the 13th Lord Howick wrote: "In looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes and inveterate hostility of the enemy must oblige this country to provide, his majesty feels it to be his duty to preserve, as much as possible, the resources to be derived from the affections of his people." It is difficult to find in history an example of a more ill-judged and discreditable parsimony: "husbanding," as Mr. Canning afterward said, "your muscles till you lose the use of them."

The infatuation of this conduct appears in still more striking colours, when the vast amount of disposable force then lying dormant in the British islands is taken into account. Notwithstanding the useless or pernicious expeditions to Buenos Ayres and Alexandria, England had still a disposable regular force of eighty thousand men in the British islands. Her military force, January, 1807, was as follows:

Regulars.		Militia.		Volunteers.
Cavalry at home,	20,041	In Great Britain,	53,810	Infantry, 254,544
Infantry ditto,	61,447	In Ireland,	24,180	Cavalry, 25,342
				Artillery, 9,420
Total ditto,	81,488		77,990	
Infantry abroad,	98,114			258,306
Cavalry ditto,	6,274			

Total, 180,876
Total in arms in the British Isles, of whom 81,488 were regulars, 448,784.

But of this immense force, lying within a day's sail of France and Holland, and including eighty thousand regulars, certainly seventy or eighty thousand might without difficulty have been sent to the Continent. In fact, in 1809, England had above seventy thousand regular soldiers at one time in Spain and Holland. Little more than half this force conquered Napoleon at Waterloo. Thrown into the scale in March or April, 1807, it would at once have decided the contest.—See *Parl. Papers*, July 18, 1807. *Parl. Deb.*, ix., 111. Appendix.

stant in action, was no match for his adversary in that species of contest, and wasted in fruitless efforts for an accommodation those precious moments which should have been devoted to the most vigorous warlike demonstrations.

After all, the unsuccessful issue of these expeditions, and the severe mortification which their failure occasioned to the British people, had a favourable effect on the future stages of the contest. It is by experience only that truth is brought home to the masses of mankind. Mr. Pitt's external policy had been distracted by the number and eccentric character of his maritime expeditions; but they were important in some degree, as wresting their colonial possessions from the enemy, and overshadowed by the grandeur and extent of his Continental confederacies. Now, however, the same system was pursued when hardly any colonies remained to be conquered, and Continental combination was abandoned at the very time when sound policy counselled the

vigorous and simultaneous direction of all the national and European resources to the heart of the enemy's power. The absurdity and impolicy of this system, glaring as they were, might have long failed in bringing it into general discredit; but this was at once effected by the disasters and disgrace with which its last exertions were attended. The opinion, in consequence, became universal, that it was impolitic as well as unworthy of its resources for so great a nation to waste its strength in subordinate and detached operations: England, it was felt, must be brought to wrestle hand to hand with France before the struggle could be brought to a successful issue; the conquerors of Alexandria and Maida had no reason to fear a more extended conflict with land-forces; greater and more glorious fields of fame were passionately desired, and that general longing after military glory was felt which prepared the nation to support the burdens of the Peninsular war, and share in the glories of Wellington's campaigns.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CAMPAIGN OF FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT.

ARGUMENT.

Negotiations and Treaties between the Allies for the vigorous Prosecution of the War.—Treaties between Prussia and Russia at Bartenstein, to which England accedes, but too late to prevent the Irritations of Russia.—Unwise Refusal of military Succour by England.—Violent Irritation which it occasioned in the Breast of Alexander.—Negotiations of Napoleon during the same Period.—Auxiliary Force obtained under Romana from Spain.—Operations in Pomerania, and Views of Napoleon regarding Sweden.—Armistice between the Swedes and French.—Sweden again reverts to the Alliance.—Formation of an Army of Reserve on the Elbe.—Negotiation with Turkey and Persia by Napoleon.—Jealousy excited in the Divan by the Summoning of Parga.—Measures taken to Organize the military Strength of Poland.—Winter-quarters of the French Army.—Cantonments of the Russians.—Combat of Guttstadt.—Great Views of Napoleon at this Period for the Interior of his Empire.—He fixes on a Design for the Madeleine at Paris.—Finances of France during this Period.—Receipts and Expenditure of the Year.—Statutes of the Grand Sanhedrim of the Jews at Paris.—Progress of the Sieges in Silesia during the Interval of Hostilities.—Fall of Schweidnitz; and of Neiss, and Glatz.—Siege of Dantzic.—Description of that Fortress.—First Operation of the besieging Force.—Capture of the Isle of Nehrung.—Progress of the Siege.—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Allies to raise it.—Growing Difficulties of the Besieged, and Fall of the Place.—Re-enforcements which arrived to the Russian main Army.—Its Strength and Position.—Strength and Distribution of the French Army.—Defensive Measures previously adopted by the Russians.—Design on Ney's Corps, and Plan of Operations.—Feigned Assault on the Bridge of the Passage, and real Attack on Marshal Ney.—Napoleon concentrates his Army, and the Russians fall back; and, pursued by the French, retire to Heilsberg.—Different Plans of Operations which present themselves to Napoleon.—His Advance upon Heilsberg.—Description of the Position and entrenched Camp of the Russians.—Battle of Heilsberg, which is unsuccessful to the French.—Fresh Attack by Lannes, which is also repulsed.—Violent Explosion between Lannes, Murat, and Napoleon in Consequence.—Frightful Appearance of the Slain after the Battle.—Napoleon turns the Russian Flank, and compels them to evacuate Heilsberg.—Movements of the two Armies before the Battle of Friedland.—Description of the Field of Battle.—Benningesen resolves to attack Lannes' Corps.—Its Situation.—He crosses the Alle and attacks the French Marshal.—No decisive Success is gained on either Side, before the Arrival of the other French Corps.—Preparatory Disposition of Forces by Napoleon.—Battle of Friedland.—Splendid Attack by Ney's Corps.—Gallant Charge of the Russian Guard nearly regains the Day.—Progress of the Action on the Russian Centre and Right.—Measures of Benningesen to secure a Retreat.—Immense Re-

sults of the Battle.—The Russians retire without Molestation to Allenberg and Wehlaw.—Capture of Königsberg.—Movements of Napoleon, and Retreat of the Russians to the Niemen.—The Emperor Alexander proposes an Armistice.—Reasons which made Napoleon rejoice at that Step.—Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an Accommodation.—Conclusion of an Armistice.—Napoleon's Proclamation thereon to his Troops.—Interview on the Raft at Tilsit between the two Emperors.—Commencement of the Negotiations at that Town.—Napoleon's Interviews with the Queen of Prussia.—Napoleon's Character of the Queen of Prussia.—Convivialities between the Russian and French Officers.—Napoleon's Admiration of the Russian Imperial Guard.—Treaty of Tilsit.—Its leading Provisions.—Crenation of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw and Kingdom of Westphalia.—Treaty with Prussia.—Immense Losses of that Power by this Treaty.—Secret Treaty for the Partition of Turkey, and regarding England and all neutral Fleets; and the Dethronement of the Princes of the Spanish Peninsula.—Decisive Evidence of these Projects of Spoliation which exists both from the Testimony of the French and Russian Emperors.—Measures of Napoleon to follow up his anticipated Turkish Acquisitions.—Convention regarding the Payment of the French Contribution in Prussia.—Noble Proclamation of the King of Prussia to his lost Subjects.—Enormous Losses sustained by the French during these Campaigns.—Memorable Retribution for the Partition of Poland, which was now brought on the partitioning Powers.—Terrible Punishment that was approaching to France.—Evil Consequences of the Treaty of Tilsit in the End to Napoleon.—His disgraceful Forfeiture towards the Turks.—No Defence can be made for it, in consequence of the Revolution at Constantinople.—Mutual Projects of the two Emperors for the Spoliation of the other European Powers.—Napoleon's leading Object in the Treaty was the humbling of Great Britain, but England could not complain of its Conditions.—It was ultimately Fortunate for Europe that the War was prolonged.

The change of ministry in England was attended with an immediate alteration in the policy pursued by that power with respect to Continental affairs. The men who now succeeded to the direction of its foreign relations had been educated in the school of Mr. Pitt, and had early imbibed the ardent feelings of hostility with which he was animated towards the French Revolution, and the insatiable spirit of foreign aggrandizement to which the passions springing from its convulsions had led. Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh were strongly

Negotiations and treaties between the allies for the vigorous prosecution of the war.

impressed with the disastrous effects which had resulted from the economical system of their predecessors, and the ill-judged economy which had led them to starve the war at the decisive moment, and hold back at a time when, by a vigorous application of their resources, it might at once have been brought to a triumphant conclusion. No sooner, therefore, were they in possession of the reins of power than they hastened to supply the defect, and take measures for bringing the might of England to bear on the contest in a manner worthy of its present greatness and ancient renown. An immediate advance of £100,000 was made to the King of Prussia; arms and military stores were furnished for the use of his troops to the amount of £200,000; and negotiations set on foot for concluding with the cabinets of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Stockholm, conventions for concerted operations and a vigorous prosecution of the war. In April, the cabinet of Vienna interposed its good offices to effect an adjustment of the differences of the allied powers; but Mr. Canning, while he accepted the offer of a mediation, did so under the express condition of its being communicated to the other belligerent powers, and their accession to its condition. But, as they had already concluded engagements for the active prosecution of the contest, the proposed negotiation never took place, and England, under the guidance of its new administration, instead of entering into terms with France, reverted, in the most decided manner, to Mr. Pitt's system of uncompromising hostility to its ambition. A treaty was signed at Bartenstein, in East Prussia, in the end of the same month, between Russia and Prussia, for the future prosecution of the war. By this convention it was stipulated that neither of the contracting powers should make peace without the concurrence of the other; that the Confederation of the Rhine, which had proved so fatal to the liberties of Germany, should be dissolved, and a new confederacy, for the protection of its interests, formed, under the auspices of its natural protectors, Austria and Prussia; that the latter power should recover the dominions which it had held in September, 1805, and that Austria should be requested to accede to it, in order to recover its possessions in Tyrol and the Venetian provinces, and extend its frontier to the Mincio. Finally, Great Britain was formally invited to accede to this convention by furnishing succours in arms, ammunition, and money to the belligerent powers, and the debarcation of a strong auxiliary force at the mouth of the Elbe, to co-operate with the Swedes in the rear of the enemy, while Austria should menace his communications, and the combined Russian and Prussian armies should attack him in front.*

April 2, 1807.

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April 3, 1807.

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April 25.

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To this convention Sweden had already given its adherence by the signature of a treaty, six days before, for the employment of an auxiliary force of twelve thousand men in Pomerania, and England hastened to unite itself to the same confederacy. By a convention signed at London on the 17th of June, England gave its accession to the treaty of Bartenstein, and engaged to support the Swedish force in Pomerania by a corps of twenty thousand British soldiers to act against the rear and left flank of the French army, while,

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June 17. Treaties between Prussia and Russia at Bartenstein, to which England accedes.

* Lucches, ii., 297, 300. Parl. Deb., x., 103, 104. Hard., ix., 401, 402. Bign., vi., 234.

by a relative agreement on the 23d, the Swedish auxiliary force in British pay was to be raised to eighteen thousand men, and the provisions of the fundamental treaty of alliance in April, 1805, were again declared in force against the common enemy. Shortly after a treaty was signed at London, between Great Britain and Prussia, by which a subsidy of a million sterling was promised to the latter power for the campaign of 1807, and a secret article stipulated for succours yet more considerable, if necessary, to carry into full effect the purposes of the convention of Bartenstein. Thus, by the return of England to the principles of Mr. Pitt's foreign policy, were the provisions of the great confederacy of 1805 again revived in favour of the Northern powers; and it is not the least honourable part, as Mr. Canning justly observed, of these transactions to Great Britain, that the treaty with Prussia was signed when that power was almost entirely bereft of its possessions, and agreed to by Frederic William in the only town that remained to him of his once extensive dominions.*

But it was too late: the succours of England came too late to counterbalance the disasters which had been incurred, the change of system too tardy to assuage the irritation which had been produced. By withholding these at an earlier period, the former ministry had not only seriously weakened the strength of the Russian forces by preventing the arming of the numerous militia corps which were crowding to the imperial standards, but left the seeds of irreconcilable dissatisfaction in the breast of the Czar, who, not aware of the total change of policy which the accession of the Whig ministry had produced in the cabinet of St. James, and the complete revolution in that policy which had resulted from their dismissal, was actuated by the strongest resentment against the British government, and loudly complained that he was deserted by the ancient ally of Russia at the very moment when, for its interests even more than her own, he was risking his empire in a mortal struggle with the French emperor.† Such was the state of destitution to which the ill-judged parsimony of the

* Schoell, ix., 141. Lucches, ii., 302, 303. Bign., vi., 234. Dum., xviii., 216, 217. Hard., ix., 402, 405. Parl. Deb., ix., 974, and x., 102, 103.

† It is the most signal proof of the obstinacy with which the British government, under the direction of Lord Howick, adhered to their ill-timed military system of withdrawing altogether from Continental affairs, that they clung to it even after the account of the battle of Eylau had arrived in London, and it was universally seen over Europe that a crisis in Napoleon's fate was at hand. In the end of February, 1807, earnest applications were made by the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Berlin for the aid of a British auxiliary force to menace the coasts of France and Holland, and land on the coast of Pomerania. The advantage was pointed out of "despatching, without a moment's delay, on board the swiftest ships of Great Britain, a strong British auxiliary land-force to co-operate with the army of Gustavus Adolphus, and thereby compel the French to retreat. They were engaged in the siege of Stralsund, and in laying waste that province, and if the British force did not arrive in sufficient time to dislodge them, they might steer for some harbour in the Baltic, from whence their junction with the allied armies could certainly be effected." Lord Howick replied on the 10th of March: "The approach of spring is doubtless the most favourable period for military operations; but in the present juncture the allies must not look for any considerable aid from the land-force of Great Britain." — See LUCCHES, ii., 295, 296, and Despatches between England and Russia in 1806 and 1807, London, 1808, p. 130. ‡ Hard., ix., 417.

§ These angry feelings are very clearly evinced in General Budberg's answer to Lord Leveson Gower's (the British ambassador at St. Petersburg) remonstrance on the con-

late administration had reduced the British arsenals, and such the effect of their total dismissal of transports in the royal service, that it was found impossible by their successors to fit out an expedition for the shores of the Baltic for several months after their accession to office; and, in consequence, the formidable armament under Lord Cathcart, which afterward achieved the conquest of Copenhagen, and might have appeared with decisive effect on the shores of the Elbe or the Vistula at the opening of the campaign, was not able to leave the shores of Britain till the end of July, a fortnight after the treaty of Tilsit had been signed, and the subjugation of the Continent, to all appearance, irrevocably effected.*†

While the allies were thus drawing closer the

clusion at Tilsit of a separate peace with Russia with France. "The firmness and perseverance with which his majesty, during eight months, maintained and defended a cause common to all sovereigns, are the most certain pledges of the intentions which animated him, as well as of the loyalty and purity of his principles. Never would his imperial majesty have thought of deviating from that system which he has hitherto pursued, if he had been supplied by real assistance on the part of his allies. But having, from the separation of Austria and England, found himself reduced to his own resources; having to combat with his own means the immense military forces which France had at her disposal, he was authorized in believing that, in continuing to sacrifice himself for others, he might ultimately come to compromise the fate of his own empire. The conduct of the British government in later times has been of a kind completely to justify the determination which his majesty has now taken. The diversion on the Continent which England so long promised, has not to this day taken place; and even if, as the latest advices from London show, the British government has at length resolved on sending 10,000 men to Pomerania, that succour is noways proportioned to the hopes we were authorized to entertain, or the importance of the object to which these troops were destined. Pecuniary succours might, in some degree, have compensated the want of English troops; but not only did the British government decline facilitating the loan the imperial court had intended to negotiate in London, but when it did, at length, resolve upon making some advances, it appeared that the sum destined for this purpose, so far from meeting the exigencies of the allies, would not even have covered the indispensable expenses of Prussia. In fine, the use which, instead of co-operating in the common cause, the British government, during this period, has made of its forces in South America and in Egypt, the latter of which was not even communicated to the imperial cabinet, and was entirely at variance with its interests, at a time when, by giving them a different destination, the necessity of maintaining a Russian army on the Danube might have been prevented, and the disposable force on the Vistula proportionally increased, sufficiently demonstrates that the Emperor of Russia was virtually released from his engagements, and had no course left but to attend to the security of his own dominions." It is impossible to dispute the justice of these observations.—*Note, General BERNARD to Lord LEVISON GOWER, Tilsit, 30th of June, 1807. Parl. Deb., x., 111, 112.*
* *Parl. Deb., ix., 1035, 1036. Hard., ix., 425. Ann. Reg., 1807, 22, 23.*

† "When the present ministers came into office," said Mr. Canning, then foreign minister, on July 31st, 1807, "they found the transport department totally dismantled. This originated in the economical system of Lord H. Petty; but it was a false parsimony, evidently calculated, at no distant period, to render necessary a profuse expenditure. The mandate of dismissal came from the treasury, and was applicable to all transports but those necessary to maintain the communication with Ireland, Jersey, and Guernsey. The saving produced by this order did not amount to more than £4000 a month, and it dispersed 60,000 tons of shipping which was left to the late ministry by their predecessors. Ministers thus, in the beginning of April last, had not a transport at their disposal; and, from the active state of trade at the same time, it required several months before they could be collected. If they had existed, a military force would in that very month have been sent out, and twenty thousand British troops would have turned the scale at Friedland. This ill-judged economy was the more criminal, that, by having a fleet of transports constantly at command, and threatening various points, 20,000 men could easily paralyze three times that force on the part of the enemy. The Whigs had apparently parted with this transport force for no other purpose but that of registering their aban-

bonds which united their confederacy, and England, rousing from its unworthy slumber, was preparing to resume its place at the head of the alliance, Napoleon on his side was not idle, and, from his camp at Finkensteen, carried on an active negotiation with all the powers in Europe. In his addresses to the French Senate, calling out the additional conscription of 80,000 men, which has been already mentioned, he publicly held out the olive branch: the surest proof of the magnitude of the disaster sustained at Eylau, and the critical situation in which he felt himself placed, with Austria hanging in dubious strength in his rear on one side, and Great Britain preparing to organize a formidable force on the other. "Our policy is fixed," said he: "we have offered to England peace before the fourth coalition; we repeat the offer; we are ready to conclude a treaty with Russia on the terms which her ambassador subscribed at Paris; we are prepared to restore its eight millions of inhabitants and capital conquered by our arms to Prussia." There was nothing said now about making the Prussian nobility so poor that they should have to beg their bread; nor of the queen, like another Helen, having lighted the fires of Troy. But, amid these tardy and extorted expressions of moderation, the emperor had nothing less at his heart than to come to an accommodation; and his indefatigable activity was incessantly engaged in strengthening his hands by fresh alliances, and collecting from all quarters additional troops to overwhelm his enemies. The imprudent and premature proclamation has been already mentioned, by which the Prince of Peace* announced, on the eve of the battle of Jena, his preparations to combat an enemy which no one could doubt was France. Napoleon dissembled for a while his resentment, but resolved to make this hostile demonstration the ground for demanding fresh supplies from Spain; and, accordingly, great numbers of the Prussian prisoners were sent into the Peninsula to be fed and clothed at the expense of the court of Madrid, while an auxiliary force was peremptorily demanded from that power to co-operate in the contest in the north of Europe. Trembling for its existence, the Spanish government had no alternative but submission; and, accordingly, sixteen thousand of the best troops of the monarchy, under a leader destined to future celebrity, the MARQUIS DE ROMANA, crossed the Pyrenees early in March, and arrived on the banks of the Elbe in the middle of May. Thus was the double object gained of obtaining an important auxiliary force for the grand army,† and of securing, as hostages for the fidelity of the court of Madrid, the flower of its troops in a remote situation, entirely at the mercy of his forces.

Sweden was another power which Napoleon was not without hopes, notwithstanding the hostile disposition of its sovereign, of detaching, through dread of Russia, from the coalition. Immediately after the battle of Eylau he began to take measures to excite

Negotiations of Napoleon during the same period. Auxiliary forces obtained under Romana from Spain.

Operations in Pomerania, and views of Napoleon regarding Sweden.

donment of the Continent." The facts here alleged Mr. Windham, on the part of the late government, did not deny, alleging only "the absurdity of sending British forces to the Continent, which required no reply;" a curious argument from so able a man, when it is recollected that the nation was on the verge of Wellington's career.—*See Parl. Deb., ix., 1035-1038.*

* *Ante, ii., 438.*

† *Bign., vi., 239, 242.*

the court of Stockholm against the alliance.* "Should Swedish blood," said he, in the bulletin on the 23d of April, "flow for the defence of the Ottoman Empire, or its ruin; should it be shed to establish the freedom of the seas, or to subvert it? What has Sweden to fear from France? Nothing. What from Russia? Everything. A peace, or even a truce with Sweden, would accomplish the dearest wish of his majesty's heart, who has always beheld with pain the hostilities in which he was engaged with a nation generous and brave, linked alike by its historic recollections and geographical position to the alliance with France."† In pursuance of these instructions, Mortier inclined with the bulk of his forces towards Colberg, to prosecute the siege of that town, leaving only General Grandjean with a weak division before Stralsund. Informed of that circumstance, General Essen, the governor of the fortress, conceived hopes of capturing or destroying the presumptuous commander who maintained a sort of blockade with a force so much inferior to that which was assembled within its walls. Early in April, accordingly, he issued from the fortress, and attacked the French with such superior numbers that they were compelled to retire, first to Anklam, where they sustained a severe defeat, and ultimately to Stettin, with the loss of above two thousand men. No sooner did he hear of this check, than Mortier assembled the bulk of his troops, about fourteen thousand strong, under the cannon of that fortress, and prepared for a serious attack upon the enemy. The Swedes, though nearly equal in number, were not prepared for a conflict with forces so formidable, and retired to Stralsund with the loss of above a thousand prisoners, and three hundred killed and wounded; among the latter of whom was General Arnfeld, the most uncompromising enemy of France in their councils.†

After this repulse Mortier renewed his secret proposals of a separate accommodation to the Swedish generals, and on this occasion he found them more inclined to enter into his views. The Swedish government at this period was actuated by a strong feeling of irritation towards Great Britain for the long delay which had occurred in the remittance of the stipulated subsidies; and its generals at Stralsund were ignorant of the steps which were in progress, since the change of ministry in England, to remedy the defect. Deeming themselves, therefore, deserted by their natural allies, and left alone to sustain a contest in which they had only a subordinate interest, they lent a willing ear to Mortier's proposals, and concluded an armistice, by which it was stipulated that hostilities should cease between the two armies; that the islands of Usedom and Wollin should be occupied by the

French troops; the lines of the Peene and the Trebel separate the two armies; no succours, direct or indirect, should be forwarded through the Swedish lines either to Dantzic or Colberg; and no debarkation of troops hostile to France take place at Stralsund.* The armistice was not to be broken without ten days' previous notice, which period was, by a supplementary convention on the 29th of April, extended to a month. No sooner was this last agreement signed than Mortier in person resumed the blockade of Colberg, while a large part of his forces was despatched to aid Lefebvre in the operations against Dantzic, and took an important part in the siege of that fortress, and the brief but decisive campaign which immediately ensued. The conditions of the new treaty between England and Sweden, signed at London on the 17th of June, came too late to remedy these serious evils; and thus, while the previous ill-timed defection of the cabinet of London from the great confederacy for the deliverance of Europe had sown the seeds of irreconcilable enmity in the breast of the Emperor Alexander, it entirely paralyzed the valuable force in the rear of Napoleon, which, if thrown into the scale at the decisive moment, and with the support of a powerful British auxiliary force, could not have failed to have had the most important effects, both upon the movements of Austria and the general issue of the campaign.†

In justice to the Swedish monarch, however, who, though eccentric and rash, was Sweden again animated with the highest and most reverent to the romantic principles of honour, it alliance. must be noticed that, no sooner was he informed of the change of policy on the part of the cabinet of London, consequent on the accession of the new administration, and even before the conclusion of the treaty of the 17th of June, by which efficacious succours were at length promised on the part of Great Britain, than he had manifested the firm resolution to abide by the confederacy, and even pointed to the restoration of the Bourbons as the condition on which alone peace appeared practicable to Europe, or a curb could be imposed on the ambition of France. Early in June he wrote to the King of Prussia with these views, and soon after refused to ratify the convention of the 29th of April for the extension of the period allowed for the denouncing the armistice with France, in a conversation with Marshal Brune, successor to Mortier, so

* In fartherance of this design, early in March he explained to Marshal Mortier, who was intrusted with the prosecution of the war in Pomerania, that the real object of hostilities in that quarter was not to take Stralsund, nor inflict any serious injury on Sweden, but to observe Hamburg and Berlin, and defend the mouths of the Oder. "I regret much what has already happened," said he, "and, most of all, that the fine suburbs of Stralsund have been burned. It is not our interest to inflict injury on Sweden, but to protect that power from it. Hasten to propose an armistice to the governor of Stralsund, or even a suspension of arms, in order to lighten the sufferings of a war which I regard as criminal, because it is contrary to the real interests of that monarchy."—72d Bulletin, *Camp. en Saxe et Pologne*, iv., 243-246.

† Dum., xviii., 108, 117. Bign., vi., 244, 245.

* In the letter of Napoleon, which Mortier despatched to Essen on that occasion, he said, "I have nothing more at heart than to re-establish peace with Sweden. Political passion may have divided us, but state interest, which ought to rule the determinations of sovereigns, should reunite our policy. Sweden cannot be ignorant that, in the present contest, she is as much interested in the success of our arms as France itself. She will speedily feel the consequence of Russian aggrandizement. Is it for the destruction of the Empire of Constantinople that the Swedes are fighting? Sweden is not less interested than France in the diminution of the enormous maritime power of England. Accustomed by the traditions of our fathers to regard each other as friends, our bonds are drawn closer together by the partition of Poland and the dangers of the Ottoman Empire; our political interests are the same: why, then, are we at variance?" And, in the event of the Swedish general acceding to these propositions, the instructions of Mortier were, "instantly to send to Dantzic and Thorn all the regiments of foot and horse which can be spared; to resume without delay the siege of Colberg, and at the same time hold himself in readiness to start with the whole blockading force, at a moment's warning, either for the Vistula or the Elbe."—JOMINI, ii., 389, 391.

† Dum., xviii., 118, 121. Bign., vi., 245, 246. Jom., ii., 388, 392.

curious and characteristic as to deserve a place in general history.*

Not content with thus drawing to the northern contest the force of the monarchy of Charles V., and neutralizing the whole forces of Sweden with the important *point d'appui* for British co-operation in his rear, Napoleon, at the same time, directed the formation of a new and respectable army on the banks of the Elbe. The change of ministry in England had led him to expect a much more vigorous prosecution of the war by that power: the descent of a large body of English troops in the north of Germany was known to be in contemplation, and with his advanced and critical position in Poland, the preservation of his long line of communication with France was an object of vital importance. To counteract any such attempt as might threaten it, two French divisions, under Boudet and Molitor, were summoned from Italy, and, united with Romana's corps of Spaniards and the Dutch troops with which Louis Bonaparte had effected the reduction of the fortresses of Hanover, formed an army of observation on the Elbe, which it was hoped would be sufficient at once to avert any danger in that quarter, hold in respect Hamburg and Berlin, and keep up the important communications of the Grand Army with the banks of the Rhine.†

With a view still farther to strengthen himself in the formidable contest which he foresaw was approaching, Napoleon, from his headquarters at Finckenstein, opened negotiations both with Turkey and Persia, in the hope of rousing those irreconcilable enemies of the Moscovite Empire to a powerful diversion in his favour on the Danube and the Caucasus. Early in March a magnificent embassy was received by the emperor at Warsaw, both from the Sublime Porte and the King of Persia. A treaty, offensive and defensive, was speedily concluded between the courts of Paris and Teheran, by which mutual aid and succour was stipulated by the two contracting parties; and, the better to consolidate their relations, and turn to useful account the military resources of the Persian monarchy, it was agreed that a Persian legation should reside at Paris, and General Gardanne, accompanied by a skilful body of engineers, set out for the distant capital of Persia. Napoleon received the Turkish ambassador, who repre-

sented a power whose forces might more immediately affect the issue of the combat, with the utmost distinction, and lavished on him the most flattering expressions of regard. In a public audience given to that functionary at Warsaw on the 28th of May, he said, "That his right hand was not more inseparable from his left than the Sultan Selim should ever be to him." Memorable words! and highly characteristic of the emperor, when his total desertion of that potentate in two months afterward, by the treaty of Tilsit, is taken into consideration. In pursuance, however, of this design, at that time at least sincerely conceived, of engaging Turkey and Persia in active hostilities with Russia, he wrote to the minister of marine: "The Emperor of Persia has requested four thousand men, ten thousand muskets, and fifty pieces of cannon; when can they be embarked, and from whence? They would form a rallying-point, give consistency to eighty thousand horse, and would force the Russians to a considerable diversion. Send me without delay a memoir on the best means of fitting out an expedition to Persia." At the same time he conceived the idea of maritime operations in the Black Sea, in conjunction with the Ottoman fleet; and, in a long letter to the minister of marine, enumerated all the naval forces at his disposal and on the stocks, in order to impress him with the facility with which a powerful squadron might be sent to the Bosphorus, in order to co-operate in an attack upon Sebastopol.*

Still more extensive operations were in contemplation with land-forces: orders were sent to Marmont to prepare for the transmission of twenty-five thousand men across the northern provinces of Turkey to the Danube, and a formal application was made at Constantinople for liberty to march them through Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. In these great designs, especially the missions of General Gardanne to Persia, more important objects than even a diversion to the war in Poland, vital as it was to his interests, were in the contemplation of the emperor; the appearance of the ambassadors of Turkey and Persia at his headquarters when five hundred leagues from Paris, on the road to Asia, had strongly excited his imagination; his early visions of Oriental conquest were revived, and the project was already far advanced to maturity of striking, through Persia, a mortal stroke at England in her Indian possessions.

These extensive projects, however, which the rapid succession of events on the Vistula prevented from being carried into execution, were wellnigh interrupted by a precipitate and ill-timed step on the part of the government of the Ionian Islands, Cæsar Berthier. The consent of the Divan had just been given to the march of the French troops across the northern provinces of the Empire, when intelligence was received that the towns of Parga, Previso, and Butrin, on the coast of the Adriatic, though then in the possession of the Turks, had been summoned in the most peremptory manner by that officer, as dependances of the Venitian States, out of which the modern Republic of the Seven Islands had been formed, with the threat to employ force if they were not immediately surrendered. This intelligence May 29.

* "Nothing," said he, in his letter of the 2d of June to the King of Prussia, "would gratify me more than to be able to contribute with you to the establishment of general order and the independence of Europe; but to attain that end, I think a public declaration should be made in favour of the legitimate cause of the Bourbons, by openly espousing their interests, which is plainly that of all established governments. My opinion on this point is fixed and unalterable, as well as on the events which are passing before our eyes." And two days afterward the following conversation passed between the King of Sweden and Marshal Brune: "Do you forget, marshal, that you have a lawful sovereign, though he is now in misfortune?" "I know that he exists," replied the marshal. "He is exiled," rejoined the king: "he is unfortunate; his rights are sacred; he desires only to see Frenchmen around his standard." "Where is that standard?" "You will find it wherever mine is raised." "Your majesty, then, regards the Pretender as your brother?" "The French should know their duties without waiting till I set them an example." "Will your majesty, then, consent to the notification of ten days before breaking the armistice?" "Yes; but if a month should be secretly agreed on—?" "You know me little, if you deem me capable of such a deception."—See HARDY, ix., 411, 412, and DUM., xix., 139.

† Jom., ii., 393, 394.

excited the utmost alarm at Constantinople; the Turks recollected the perfidious attack which, under the mask of friendship, the French had made on their valuable possessions in Egypt, and anticipated a similar seizure of their European dominions from the force for whom entrance was sought on the footing of forwarding succours to the Danube. Napoleon, though this step was taken in pursuance of orders emanating from himself, expressed the utmost dissatisfaction at their literal execution at so untimely a crisis: the governor was recalled, and the utmost protestations of friendship for the sultan made. But the evil was done, and was irreparable: Turkish honesty had conceived serious suspicions of French fidelity; the passage of the troops was refused, and the foundations laid of that well-founded distrust which, confirmed by Napoleon's desertion of their interests in the treaty of Tilsit, subsequently led to the conclusion of a separate peace by the Osmanlis with Russia in 1812, and the horrors of the Beresino to the Grand Army.*

A nearer and more efficacious ally was presented to Napoleon in the Polish provinces. The continuance of the war in their neighbourhood, the sight of the Russian prisoners, the certainty of the advance of the French troops, and the exaggerated reports everywhere diffused of their successes, had, notwithstanding the measured reserve of his language, excited the utmost enthusiasm for the French emperor in the gallant inhabitants of that ill-fated monarchy. Of this disposition, so far as it could be done without embroiling him with Austria, he resolved to take advantage. His policy towards that country uniformly was to derive the utmost aid from the military spirit of its subjects which could be obtained, without openly proclaiming its independence, and thereby irrevocably embroiling him with the partitioning powers. In addition to the Polish forces organized under former decrees, and which now amounted to above twenty thousand men, he took into his pay a regiment of light-horse raised by Prince John Sulkowski, subsequently decreed the formation of a Polish-Italian legion, and the incorporation of one of their regiments of hussars with his guards, and authorized the provisional government at Warsaw to dispose of royal domains in Polish Prussia to the extent of eighteen millions of francs, and Prussian stock to the extent of six millions. His cautious policy, however, shortly after appeared in a decree, by which the commissary-general at Warsaw was enjoined to limit his requisitions to the territory described by the original decree establishing his powers, which limited them to Prussian Poland. By these means, though he avoided giving any direct encouragement to rebellion in the Russian and Austrian shares of the partitioned territory, he succeeded in generally diffusing an enthusiastic spirit, which, before the campaign opened, had brought above thirty thousand gallant recruits to his standards. This disposition was strongly increased by two decrees which appeared early in June, on the eve of the resumption of hostilities, by the first of which Prince Poniatowski was reinstated in a starosty of which he had been dispossessed by the Prussian cabinet, while by the second the provisional gov-

ernment at Warsaw was directed to set apart 20,000,000 of francs (£800,000) as a fund to recompense those who should distinguish themselves in the approaching campaign.*

The headquarters of Napoleon in the first instance had been fixed at Osterode, on the margin of one of the lakes which form the feeders of the Drewentz; but, on the representations of the learned and humane Larrey, that that situation was low and unhealthy for the troops, he moved to Finken-stein, where all the important negotiations which ensued in that cessation of active hostilities were conducted. The guard were disposed around the emperor's residence, and not only that select corps, but the whole army, were lodged in a more comfortable manner than could have been anticipated in that severe climate. After a sharp conflict in the end of February, the important fortified post of Braunsberg, at the entrance of the River Passarge into the Frisch-Haff Sea, was wrested from the Prussians by Bernadotte, and the *tête du pont* there established secured all the left of the army from the incursions of the enemy. On the left bank of that river no less than four corps of the army were cantoned, while all the passes over it were occupied in such strength as to render any attempt at a surprise impossible. Secure behind this protecting screen, the French army constructed comfortable huts for their winter-quarters, and all the admirable arrangements of the camp at Boulogne were again put in force amid the severity of a Polish winter. The streets in which they were disposed resembled, in regularity and cleanliness, those of a metropolis. Constant exercises, rural labours, warlike games, and reviews, both confirmed the health and diverted the minds of the soldiers, while the inexhaustible agricultural riches of Old Prussia kept even the enormous multitude, which was concentrated over a space of twenty leagues, amply supplied with provisions. Immense convoys constantly defiling on all the roads from the Rhine, Silesia, and the Elbe, provided all that was necessary for warlike operations; while the numerous conscripts, both from France and the allied states, and the great numbers of wounded and sick who, on the return of spring, were discharged from the hospitals, both swelled the ranks and reassured the minds of the soldiers. The magnitude of the requisitions by which these ample supplies were obtained, and the inflexible severity with which they were levied from the conquered states, was, indeed, spreading the seeds of inextinguishable animosity in his rear; but the effects of that feeling were remote and contingent, the present benefits certain and immediate; and the Russians had too much reason to feel their importance in the numbers and incomparable discipline of the troops by whom they were assailed upon the opening of the campaign.†

The Russian army was far from being equally well situated, and the resources at its disposal were by no means commensurate to those which were in possession of the French emperor. The bulk of the allied army was cantoned between the Passarge and the Alle, around Heilsberg, where a formidable intrenched camp had been constructed. The only contest of any moment which took place while the army

* Bign., vi., 252, 253.

† Dum., xviii., 75, 85, 206, 207, and xix., 436, 442. Wilson, 118.

* Bign., vi., 248, 250.

Winter-quarters of the Russians, Combat of Guttstadt.

March 3. occupied this position was in the beginning of March, at Guttstadt, which was attacked and carried by Marshal Ney, with the magazines which it contained; but the French troops having imprudently advanced into the plain beyond that town, several regiments were surrounded by the Cossacks, pierced through, and broken; so that both parties were glad to resume their quarters without boasting of any considerable advantage. Headquarters were at Bartenstein, and the advanced posts approached to those of Marshal Ney on the right bank of the Passarge. These cantonnements, with the great commercial city of Königsberg in their rear, were very comfortable, and the army was daily receiving important accessions of strength from the sick and wounded who were leaving the hospitals. Thirty thousand fresh troops, also, including the Grand-duke Constantine with the remainder of the guard, and several batteries of light artillery, joined the army while they lay in their winter-quarters; and in the end of

March 28. March the Emperor Alexander left St. Petersburg and arrived at Bartenstein, where the King of Prussia had already taken up his headquarters, and where the imperial and royal courts were established.* But although the Russian and Prussian governments both made the utmost efforts to recruit their forces and bring up supplies from their rear, yet the succours which they were enabled to draw from their exhausted provinces were very different from what Napoleon extracted from the opulent German states which he held in subjection; and the addition to the respective forces which the cessation of hostilities occasioned was, in consequence, widely different. Now was seen how immense was the advantage which the French emperor had gained by having overrun and turned to his own account the richest part of Europe, as well as the magnitude of the error which the British government had committed in refusing to the Northern powers, now reduced to their own resources, and with nine tenths of Prussia in the hands of the enemy, the supplies by which alone they could be expected to maintain the contest.†

During the pause in military operations which took place for the three succeeding months, the active mind of Napoleon resumed the projects

which he had formed for the internal ameliorations of his immense empire. Early in March he wrote to the minister of the interior as to the expedience of granting a loan, without interest, to the mercantile classes who were labouring under distress, on the footing of advancing one half of the value of the goods they could give security over; and he announced his design of establishing a great bank in connexion with the state for the advance to manufacturers or merchants in difficulties of sums on the security of their unsold property. Orders were sent to the French ambassadors at the courts of Madrid and Constantinople to use their endeavours to obtain the removal of certain restrictions which existed on French manufactures, and which, in the mortal commercial struggle between France and England, it might be of importance to have recalled. The bridge recently built in front of the Champs de Mars received the name of Jena, an appellation April 14. destined to bring that beautiful structure to the verge of destruction in future times; March 17. a statue was ordered to be erected to D'Alembert in the hall of the Institute; the prize formerly promised to the ablest treatise on galvanism was directed to be paid May 7. to the author who had deserved it; the important and difficult subject of the liberty of the press occupied his serious thoughts, April 19. engrossed much of his correspondence with the minister of the interior;‡ the project for establishing a university for literary and political information was discussed;† a prize of twelve

Great designs of Napoleon at this time for the interior of his empire. March 7.

* "An effective mode of encouraging literature," said Napoleon, "would be to establish a journal, of which the criticism is enlightened, actuated by good intentions, and free of that coarse brutality which characterizes the existing newspapers, and is so contrary to the true interests of the nation. Journals now never criticise with the intention of repressing mediocrity, guiding inexperience, or encouraging rising merit: all their endeavour is to wither, to destroy. I am not insensible to the danger that, in avoiding one rock, you may strike upon another. It may doubtless happen that, if they dare not criticise, they may fall into the still greater abuse of indiscriminate panegyric; and that the authors of those books with which the world is inundated, seeing themselves praised in journals which all are obliged to read, should believe themselves heaven-born geniuses, and, by the facility of their triumphs, encourage still more despicable imitation. Articles should be selected for the journals where reasoning is mingled with eloquence, where praise for deserved merit is tempered with censure for faults. Merit, however inconsiderable, should be sought for and rewarded. A young man who has written an ode worthy of praise, and which has attracted the notice of the minister, has already emerged from obscurity; the public is fixed; it is his part to do the rest."—*NAPOLEON'S Letters*, 19th April, 1807, to the Minister of the Interior. BION., vi., 262, 264.

* Dum., xviii., 203, 207. Wilson.

† Dum., xviii., 86, 91, 203, 207. Wilson, 122, 133.

‡ While occupying these cantonnements, a truce in hostilities, as usual in such cases, took place between the advanced posts of both armies, and this led to an incident equally characteristic of the gallantry and honourable feelings of both. The Russian and French outposts being stationed on the opposite banks of the river, some firing, contrary to the usual custom, took place, and a French officer advancing, reproached the Russians with the discharge; and a Russian officer approaching the Frenchman, requested him to stop the firing of his people, in order that, if necessary, they might determine by single combat who was most courageous. The French officer assented, and was in the act of commanding his men to cease firing, when a Russian ball pierced him to the heart. The Russian officer instantly rushed forward, and cried out to the French soldiers, "My life shall make reparation for this accident: let three marksmen fire at me as I stand here," and, turning to his own soldiers, ordered them "to cease firing upon the French, whatever might be his fate, unless they attempted to cross the river." Already a Frenchman had levelled his piece, when the French subaltern next in command struck it down with his sword, and, running to the Russian, took him by the hand, declaring that no man worthy of the name of Frenchman would be the executioner of so brave a man. The French soldiers felt the justice of the sentiment, and confirmed the feeling by a general acclamation.—See Wilson, 120. With truth did Montesquieu say that honour was, under a monarchical government, the prevailing feeling of mankind.

† "You should occupy yourself with the project of establishing a university for literature, understanding by that word, not merely the belles-lettres, but history and geography. It should consist of at least thirty chairs, so linked together as to exhibit a living picture of instruction and direction, where every one who wishes to study a particular age should know at once whom to consult, what books, monuments, or chronicles to examine; where every one who wishes to travel should know where to receive positive instructions, both as to the government, literature, and physical productions of the country which he is about to visit. It is a lamentable truth, that in this great country a young man who wishes to study, or is desirous of signaling himself in any department, is obliged for long to grope in the dark, and literally lose years in fruitless researches, before he discovers the true repositories of the information for which he seeks. It is a lamentable fact, that in this great country we have no dépôt for the preservation of knowledge on the situation, government, and present state of different portions of the globe, but the student must have recourse either to the office of foreign affairs, where the collections are far from complete, or to the office of the minister of marine, where he will with difficulty find any

June 4. thousand francs (£4800) announced for the best treatise on the best means of curing the croup, which at that period was committing very serious ravages on the infants of France, and of which the child of the Queen of Holland had recently died; a daily correspondence was carried on with the minister of finance, and long calculations, often erroneous, but always intended to support an ingenious opinion, transmitted to test the accuracy and stimulate the activity of the functionaries in that important department;* and the great improvement of keeping accounts by double entry was adopted from the example of commerce, first by the recommendation of the emperor, and, after its advantages had been fully demonstrated by experience, formally enforced by Jan. 8, 1808. a decree of the government. Nor, amid weightier cares, were the fine arts neglected: the designs for the Temple of Glory, ordered by the decree of the 9th of November from Posen, were submitted to the emperor's consideration, and that one selected which has since been realized in the beautiful peristyle of the Madeleine, while all the departments of France were ordered to be searched for quarries of granite and marble capable of furnishing materials of durability and elegance for its interior decorations worthy of a monument calculated for eternal duration.†

one who knows anything of what is asked. I desire such institutions: they have long formed the subject of my meditation, because in the course of my various labours I have repeatedly experienced their want."—*NAPOLÉON to Minister of Interior, 19th April, 1807.* BIGN., vi., 267, 269.

* "The good order which you have established in the affairs of the treasury, and the emancipation which you have effected of its operations from the control of bankers, is an advantage of the most important kind, which will eminently redound to the benefit of our commerce and manufactures."—*NAPOLÉON to the Minister of Finance, Osterode, 24th March, 1807.* In truth, however, what the emperor here called the emancipation of the treasury from the bankers arose, not so much from the regulations of the minister of that department, as from the extraneous sources from whence the chief supplies for the army were now derived, and which rendered the anticipation of revenue by discounting long-dated treasury bills at the Bank of France unnecessary. He admitted this himself in the same letter: "I am now discharging the arrears of the army from the beginning of October, 1806, to the end of February, 1807; we shall see hereafter how this will be arranged with the treasury; in the mean time, the payment comes from Prussia, and that will put us greatly at ease." The pay thus extracted from the conquered states amounted to the enormous sum of 3,300,000 francs, or £132,000 a month, supposing 150,000 men only so maintained, which for these five months alone was no less than 16,500,000 francs, or £660,000 sterling.—*See BIGN., iv., 274, 276.* † BIGN., vi., 257, 278.

‡ "After having attentively considered," said Napoleon, "the different plans submitted to my examination as a design for nation, I have not felt the smallest doubt on the Madeleine that which I should adopt. That of M. Vignon alone fulfilled my wishes. It is a temple which I desire, and not a church. What could you erect as a church which could keep its ground against the Pantheon, Notre Dame, or, above all, St. Peter's at Rome? Everything in the temple should be in a chaste, severe, and durable style; it should be fitted for solemnities at all times, at all hours; the imperial throne should be a curule chair of marble, seats of marble for the persons invited, an amphitheatre of marble for the performers. No furniture should be admitted but cushions for the seats: all should be of granite, of marble, and of iron. With this view, searches should be made in all the provinces for quarries of marble and granite. They will be useful, not merely for this monument, but for others, which I have it in view to construct at future times, and which by their nature will require thirty, forty, or fifty years for their construction. Not more than 3,000,000 of francs (£120,000) should be required, the temples of Athens having not cost much more than the half of that sum; fifteen millions have been absorbed, I know not how, in the Pantheon, but I should not object to an expenditure of five or six millions for the construction of a temple worthy of the first city in the world."—*NAPOLÉON to the Minister of Interior, Pinkinsten,*

The finances of France during this year exhibited the most flattering prospect; but the exposition published was entirely fallacious, so far as the total expenditure was concerned, because a large portion of the supplies were drawn by war contributions from foreign states, and upward of half the army were quartered for all its expenses on the vanquished territories. The revenue of the Empire, as exhibited in the budget, amounted to 683,057,933 francs, or £25,507,000, and its expenditure to 777,850,000 francs, or £32,000,000;* but the emperor did not reveal to the public, what was not less true, that the sums levied on the countries lying between the Rhine and the Vistula, between the 14th of October, 1806, when the war commenced, and the 14th of June, 1807, when it terminated, amounted to the enormous, and if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of 604,227,922 francs, or £24,000,000; that above a million annually was levied on the kingdom of Italy;† that the arrears paid up by Austria for the great war contribution of 1805 were double that sum; that the war subsidies extracted from Spain and Portugal, in virtue of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, were above £3,000,000 yearly. Finally, that the Grand Army, two hundred thousand strong, had, since it broke up from the heights of Boulogne, in September, 1805, been exclusively fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of the German States.‡ The revenues of France, therefore, did not furnish more than half the total sum required by the expensive and gigantic military establishment of the emperor, while its inhabitants received almost the whole benefit from its expenditure: a state of things which at once explains the necessity under which he lay of continually advancing to fresh conquests; the extraordinary attachment which the French so long felt to his government; the vast internal prosperity with which it was attended, and the grinding misery as well as inextinguishable hatred with which it soon came to be regarded in foreign states.§

18th April, 1807. BIGN., vi., 270, 272. It was from this determination of the emperor that the present exquisite structure of the Madeleine took its rise; but his real design in the formation, on so durable and gigantic a scale, of this noble monument was, as already mentioned, still more extensive than the honour of the Grand Army; and he in secret intended it as an expiatory monument to Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution.—*Vide Ante, ii., and LAS CAS, i., 370, 371.*

—Gaeta, i., 305.

† Daru's Report. Dum., xix., 464. Pièces Just.

‡ Jan., ii., 437.

§ The receipts and expenditure of France, as exhibited in the budget of the minister of finance for this year, were as follows:

	Receipts.	
	Francs.	
Dutch taxes	311,840,685,	or £12,040,000
Register and crown lands	172,227,000	6,900,000
Customs	90,115,726	3,360,200
Lottery	12,233,887	369,000
Postoffice	9,968,134	400,000
Excise	75,808,358	3,032,000
Salt and tobacco	6,900,000	276,000
Salt mines of government	3,230,000	130,000
	682,323,740 fr.	£26,507,000
	Expenditure.	
	Francs.	
Public debt	105,959,000,	or £4,240,000
Civil list	28,000,000	1,120,000
Public Justice	22,042,000	880,000
Foreign ministers	10,379,000	420,000
Interim ministers	54,902,000	2,170,000
Finance ditto	25,624,000	1,632,000
Public treasury	8,571,000	335,000
Carried forward,	255,477,000	10,797,000

Receipts and expenditure of the year.

Early in March a grand convocation of the Jews assembled in Paris, in pursuance of the commands of Napoleon, issued in the July preceding. Seventy-one doctors and chiefs of that ancient nation attended this great assembly, the first meeting of the kind which had occurred since the dispersion of the Israelites on the capture of Jerusalem. For seventeen hundred years the children of Israel had sojourned as strangers in foreign realms; reviled, oppressed, persecuted, without a capital, without a government, without a home; far from the tombs of their forefathers, banished from the land of their ancestors; but preserving unimpaired, amid all their calamities, their traditions, their usages, their faith; exhibiting in every nation of the earth a lasting miracle to attest the verity of the Christian prophecies. On this occasion the great Sanhedrim, or assembly, published the result of their deliberations in a variety of statutes and declarations, calculated to remove from the Israelites a portion of that odium under which they had so long laboured in all the nations of Christendom; and Napoleon, in return, took them under his protection, and, under certain modifications, admitted them to the privileges of his empire. This first approach to a reunion and settlement of the Jews, impossible under any other circumstances but the rule of so great a conqueror as Napoleon, is very remarkable. The immediate cause of it, doubtless, was the desire of the emperor to secure the support of so numerous and opulent a body as the Jews of Old Prussia, Poland, and the southern provinces of Russia, which was of great importance in the contest in which he was engaged, but it is impossible not to see in its result a step in the development of Christian prophecy. And thus, from the mysterious manner in which the wisdom of Providence makes the wicked-

ness and passions of men to work out its great designs for the government of human affairs, did the French Revolution, which, nursed in infidelity and crime, set out with the abolition of Christian worship, and the open denial of God by a whole nation, in its secondary results lead to the first great step which had occurred in modern Europe to the reassembling of the Jews, so early foretold by our Saviour; and in its ultimate effects is destined, to all human appearance, by the irresistible strength which it has given to the British navy, and the vast impulse which it has communicated to the Russian army, to lead to the wresting of Jerusalem from the hands of the infidels, and the spread of the Christian faith alike over the forests of the New and the deserts of the Old World.*

The two grand armies, in their respective positions on the Passarge and the Alle, remained for nearly four months after the sanguinary fight of Eylau in a state of tranquillity, interrupted only by skirmishes at the outposts, followed by no material results, and too inconsiderable to deserve the attention of the general historian. Both parties were actively engaged in measures to repair the wide chasms which it had occasioned in their ranks, and preparing for the coming struggle, which was to decide the great contest for the empire of Europe. But Napoleon felt too strongly the imminent risk which he had run of total ruin by a defeat on the frontiers of Russia, before the fortresses in his rear were all subdued, to incur it a second time, until his right flank was secured by the reduction of the remainder of the powerful chain of fortresses in Silesia, which still hoisted the Prussian colours, and his left by the surrender of the great fortified emporium of Dantzic. To these two objects, accordingly, his attention was directed during the cessation of active hostilities in the front of the Grand Army; and his operations in these quarters were not only great in themselves, but had the most important effect upon the future fortunes of the campaign.†

Schweidnitz and Neiss were invested about the same time, in the end of January; but serious operations were not at-tempted against the latter fortress, which was the chief stronghold of the province, till the former was reduced. The siege, accordingly, was carried on with great activity of the former, and with such success that it capitulated, after a feeble resistance, in the middle of February. The reduction of the capital of Silesia was of the highest importance, not merely as putting at the disposal of Napoleon a powerful fortress, commanding a rich territory, but giving him a supply of extensive stores in ammunition and artillery, which were forthwith forwarded to Dantzic and Neiss, and proved of the utmost service in the siege of both these towns. The resources of Silesia, now almost entirely in the hands of Vandamme, were turned to the very best account by that indefatigable and rapacious commander: heavy requisitions for horses, provisions, and forage, followed each other in rapid succession, besides grievous contributions in money, which were so considerable, and levied with such severity on that opulent province, that before the end of March 1,500,000 francs (£60,000) were regularly trans-

Brought forward,	255,477,000	10,797,000
War	195,895,000	7,900,000
Ordnance	147,654,000	5,850,000
Marine	117,307,000	4,900,000
Public worship	12,342,000	550,000
General police	708,000	34,000
Roads and bridges ..	38,215,000	1,800,000
Incidental charges ..	10,252,000	410,000
France	777,850,000	£32,241,000

But as the Grand Army, 200,000 strong, was solely maintained, paid, and equipped at the expense of Germany, this table exhibited a most fallacious view of the real expenditure and receipts of Napoleon during the year. Without mentioning lesser contributions, the following table exhibits the enormous sums which, by public or private plunder, for it deserves no better name, he was enabled, during the same period, to extract from the tributary or conquered states, and their application to the expenses of the war or otherwise:

Receipts.		Francs.
War contribution levied on Germany from October, 1806, to July, 1807	604,227,922, or £24,090,000	
Tribute from Italy	30,000,000	1,200,000
— from Spain	72,000,000	2,880,000
— from Portugal	16,000,000	640,000
War contribution from Austria, arrears of 1805	50,000,000	2,000,000
	772,227,922 fr.	£30,810,000
Expended.		
Costs of the Grand Army from October, 1806, to July, 1807	228,944,363, or £9,130,000	
Leaving to be applied to internal service of France in this or succeeding years	543,283,559	21,740,000
	772,226,922 fr.	£30,870,000

—DARU'S Report on the Finances of 1806; DUM., xix., 464, 465; BIGN., vii., 279, 280; GAETA, i., 305; ANTE, ii., 280, 281.

* D'Abr., ix., 218. Bign., vi., 269, 270.

† Jom., ii., 399. Dum., xviii., 86, 87.

mitted once a week to the headquarters of Napoleon, and this plentiful supply continued undiminished till the end of the war.*

No sooner was the besieging force before Neiss and of Neiss, strengthened by the artillery and reinforcements which were forwarded from Schweidnitz, than the operations of the French for its reduction were conducted with more activity. This fortress, originally situated exclusively on the right bank of the river which bears the same name, was extended by Frederic the Great to the left bank, where the principal arsenals and military establishments were placed. The works surrounding the whole were extensive, but in some places not entirely armed or clothed with masonry, but a garrison of six thousand men, great part of which occupied an intrenched camp without the fortress, promised to present a formidable resistance. Finding, however, that the trenches had been opened, and that the place was hard pressed, an attempt to relieve

April 20. it was made by General Kleist with four thousand men, drawn from the garrison of Glatz. Their efforts, which took place on the night of the 20th, were combined with a powerful sortie from the walls of the place; but, though the attack at first was attended with some success, it was finally defeated by the opportune arrival of Jerome Bonaparte with a powerful reinforcement, who had received intelligence of the projected operation, and arrived in time to render it totally abortive. The defeated troops took refuge in Glatz, after sustaining a loss of seven hundred men. Immediately after, the bombardment was resumed with fresh vigour: the town was repeatedly set on fire in many different places; the outwork of the Blockhausen was carried by assault; already the rampart was beginning to be shaken by the breaching batteries; and the explosion of one of their June 1. magazines spread consternation through the garrison, when the governor offered to capitulate on the same conditions as the other fortresses of Prussia. This offer was agreed to; and on the 16th of June this great stronghold, with three hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, 200,000 pounds of powder, a garrison still above five thousand strong, but entirely destitute of provisions, fell into the hands of the enemy.†

Glatz alone remained to complete the reduction of the province, and it did not And of Glatz. long survive its unfortunate compeers. Prince Jerome commanded the attacking force, and though the garrison was numerous, it was so much discouraged by the bad success of the besieged in all the other fortresses of the province, that it made but a feeble resistance. The intrenched camp which communicated with the town having been attacked and carried, this last bulwark of Silesia capitulated on the 14th of June 14. June, the very day when the battle of Friedland was fought. Thus were all the strongholds of this province, so long the bulwark of Prussia, reduced, by a force hardly equal to the united strength of their garrisons, and Vandamme, with a corps not exceeding twenty-five thousand men, had the glory of wresting from the enemy six first-rate fortresses, containing above twelve hundred pieces of cannon. The defence which they made did little credit to the Prussian arms, as not one of them had resolution enough to stand an assault, and almost all

lowered their colours while the rampart was still unbreached.*

The siege of Dantzic was an operation of more difficulty, and of much more immediate influence upon the fate of the campaign. Napoleon felt the imminent danger which he would have run if Benningsen's army, during the irruption which preceded the battle of Eylau, had succeeded in throwing a powerful re-enforcement into that fortress: thirty thousand men, resting on its formidable ramparts, and amply supplied with every necessary from the sea, would have paralyzed all the movements of the Grand Army. This important city, formerly one of the most flourishing of the Hanse Towns, had fallen to the lot of Prussia on occasion of the last partition of Poland in 1794; and though it had much declined in wealth and population since the disastrous era when it lost its independence, yet it was still a place of great importance and strength. Its situation at the mouth of the Vistula gave it a monopoly of all the commerce of Poland: it served as the great emporium of the noble wheat crops which, in every age, have constituted almost exclusively the wealth of that kingdom, and imported, in return, the wines, fruits, dress, and other luxuries which contributed to the splendour of its haughty nobles, and the rude garments which clothed the limbs of its unhappy cultivators. The River Mottaw, a tributary stream to the Vistula, traverses the whole extent of the city, and serves as a canal for the transport of its bulk in merchandise, while its waters fill the wet ditches, and contribute much to the strength of the place. Previous to the war its fortifications had been much neglected, as its remote situation seemed to afford little likelihood of its being destined to undergo a siege; but after the battle of Jena, General Manstein, the governor, had laboured indefatigably to put the works in a good posture of defence; and such had been the success of his efforts, that they were in March all armed and in a condition to undergo a siege. It was surrounded in all places by a rampart, wet ditch, and strong palisades, in most by formidable outworks; the fort of Weischelmunde, in its vicinity, commanding the opening of the Vistula into the sea, required a separate siege for itself, and was connected with the town, from which it was distant four miles, by a chain of fortified posts. But the principal defence of the place consisted in the marshy nature of the ground in its vicinity, which could be traversed only on a few dikes or chaussées, and the power which the besieged had, by the command of the sluices of the Vistula, the waters of which, from their communication with the Baltic, are almost always at the same level, of inundating the country for several miles in breadth round two thirds of the circumference of the walls. The garrison consisted of twelve thousand Prussians and five thousand Russians, under the command of Field-marshal Kalkreuth, a veteran whose intrepid character formed a sufficient guarantee for a gallant defence.†

To form the besieging force, Napoleon had drawn together a large body of Italian, First operations of the besieging force.
Saxons, Hessians, troops of Baden, with a division of Polish levies, and two divisions of French, in all 27,000 men. The most inefficient part of this motley

* Martens, Sup., 417. Dum., xviii., 98, 99. Jom., ii., 299.
† Dum., xviii., 100, 105. Jom., ii., 399.

* Dum., xviii., 105, 106. Jom., ii., 399.
† Dum., xviii., 124, 126, 141. Jom., ii., 397. Ann. Reg., 1807, 23.

group was employed in the blockade of Colberg and Graudentz; and the flower of the troops, consisting of the French divisions, a Saxon brigade, and the Baden and Polish hussars, amounting to about twenty thousand men, was destined to the more arduous undertaking of the siege of Dantzic. The artillery was commanded by the gallant General Lariboissiere, the engineers under the able directions of General Chasseloup; Marshal Lannes, with the grenadiers of the guards, formerly under Oudinot, who was confined by sickness, formed in the rear of the Grand Army the covering force; and he was in communication with Massena, who had superseded Savary in the command of the corps which had combated at Ostrolenka,* and was re-enforced by the warlike Bavarian grenadiers of Wrede. Thus, while twenty thousand men were assembled for the siege, thirty thousand, under the most experienced marshals of France, were stationed so as to protect the operations against any incursions of the enemy.

So early as the middle of February the advanced posts of the besiegers had begun to invest the place, and on the 22d of that month a sanguinary conflict ensued between the Polish hussars, who composed their vanguard, and a body of fifteen hundred Prussians, at Dirschau, which terminated, after a severe loss on both sides, in the retreat of the latter under the cannon of the ramparts. After this check, General Manstein no longer endeavoured to maintain himself on the outside of the walls; and as the French troops successively came up, the investment of the fortress was completed. The first serious conflict took place on the island or peninsula of Nehrung, the well-known tongue of land which separates the waters of the salt lake, called the Frische-haff, and the Vistula from the Baltic Sea. It is twelve leagues in length, but seldom more than a mile or two in breadth, composed of sandhills thrown up by the meeting of the river with the ocean, in one part of which the waves have broken in and overflowed the level space in its rear, which now forms the Frische-haff; and as it communicates with Dantzic, which stands at its eastern extremity, the approaches to the town on that side could not be effected until it was cleared of the enemy. Sensible of its value, the besieged had spared no pains to strengthen themselves on this important neck of land, and the besiegers were equally resolute to dislodge them from it, and thereby complete the investment of the fortress. Early in the morning of the 20th of March, a French detachment crossed the Frische-haff in boats, and surprised the Prussian posts on the opposite shore; fresh troops were ferried over in rapid succession, and the besiegers, before evening, established themselves in such force in the island, that, though Kalkreuth despatched a body of four thousand men out of the place to re-enforce his posts in that quarter, they were unable to dislodge the enemy, who not only kept their ground, but progressively advancing two days afterward, entirely cleared the peninsula of the Prussians, and completed the investment of the town on that side. By this success the communication of Dantzic with the land was entirely cut off; but the besieged, by means of the island of Holm and

fort of Weischelmunde, with the intrenched camp of Neufahrwasser, which commands the entrance of the Vistula into the Baltic, had still the means of deriving succour from the sea-side.*

After full deliberation among the French engineers, it was determined to commence the siege by an attack on the fort of Hagelsberg, which stands on an eminence without the rampart on the western side of the town, which was the only one entirely free from inundations. The first parallel having been completed, a heavy fire was opened on the works in that quarter on the night of the first of April, though at the distance of eight hundred toises. A fortnight after, the second parallel was also finished, notwithstanding several vigorous sorties from the garrison; and by the 23d, amid snow and sleet, the batteries were all armed and ready to play on the ramparts at the distance of only sixty toises. On the following night, a tremendous fire was opened from fifty-six pieces of heavy cannon and twelve mortars, which, notwithstanding the utmost efforts on the part of the garrison, soon acquired a marked superiority over the batteries of the besieged. For a week together this cannonade continued without intermission night and day; a brave sortie was unable to arrest it more than a few hours; but, although the city was already on fire in several places and the artillery on the ramparts in part dismounted, yet, as the exterior works were faced with earth, not masonry, little progress was made in injuring them, and no practicable breach had been as yet effected. Finding themselves foiled in this species of attack, the French engineers had recourse to the more certain, but tedious method of approach by sap; the besieged countermined with indefatigable perseverance; but, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, the mines of the French were pushed to within eighteen yards of the salient angle of the outermost works of Hagelsberg. At the same time a separate expedition against the island of Holm, which formed the western extremity of the peninsula of Nehrung, from whence it was separated only by one of the arms of the Vistula, proved successful; the garrison, consisting of five hundred men with fifteen pieces of cannon, were made prisoners, and the city by that means deprived of all the succour which it had hitherto obtained by the mouths of that river.†

Invested now on all sides, with its garrison weakened by the casualties of the siege, and the enemy's mines ready to blow its outworks on the side assailed into the air, Dantzic could not be expected to hold out for any length of time. Not deeming himself in sufficient strength to attempt the raising of the siege by a direct at-

* Dum., xviii., 133, 141. Bign., vi., 284, 285. Wilson, 129.

† Dum., xviii., 146, 169. Bign., vi., 285, 286. Wilson, 129, 130.

‡ A remarkable incident occurred on this occasion, highly characteristic of the heroic spirit with which both parties were animated. A chasseur of the 12th regiment of French light infantry, named Fortunus, transported by the ardour of the attack, fell, in the dark, into the midst of a Russian detachment, and in a few minutes that detachment itself was surprised by the company to which the French soldier belonged. The Russian officers exclaimed, "Do not fire, we are French;" and threatened the chasseur with instant death if he betrayed them. "Fire instantly!" exclaimed the brave Fortunus, "they are Russians!" and fell pierced by the balls of his comrades.—DUMAS, xviii., 169.

* *Jom.*, ii., 396, 397. *Dum.*, xviii., 126, 129. *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 23.

tack upon the enemy's cantonments on the Passarge, Benningsen, with the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander, had resolved to attempt the relief of the fortress by a combined attack by land and sea, from the peninsula of Nehrung and the mouths of the Vistula. The preparations made with this view were of the most formidable kind, and had wellnigh been crowned with success. General Kamenskoi, with five thousand men, was embarked at Pillau, under convoy of a Swedish and English man-of-war, and landed at Neufahrwasser, the fortified post at the mouth of the Vistula, distant four miles from Dantzic; while two thousand Prussians were to co-operate in the attack, by advancing along the peninsula of Nehrung, and the Grand Army was to be disquieted and hindered from sending succours by a feigned attack on Marshal Ney's corps; and at the same time General Tutschikoff, who had succeeded Essen in the command of the troops on the Narew and the Bug, was to engage the attention of Massena's corps in that quarter. All these

May 7 operations took place, and, but for an accidental circumstance, would, to all appearance, have proved successful: the proposed feints were made with the desired effects on the side of Guttstadt and the Narew; but, unfortunately, the delay of the Swedish man-of-war, which had twelve hundred men on board, rendered it impossible for Kamenskoi to commence his attack before the 15th inst. In the mean while, Napoleon, who had received intelligence of what was in preparation, and was fully aware of the imminent danger to which Lefebvre was exposed, had time to draw a large body of troops from Lannes' covering corps by the bridge of Marienswerder to the scene of danger. This great re-enforcement, comprising among other troops the grenadiers of the guard under Oudinot, turned the scale, which at that period quivered on the beam. Early on the morning of the 15th, Kamenskoi marched out of the trenches of Neufahrwasser, and, after defiling over the bridge of the Vistula into the peninsula of Nehrung, advanced with the utmost intrepidity to the attack of the strong fortifications which the enemy had erected to bar their advance among the hills and copsewoods of that sandy peninsula. Their first onset was irresistible. The intrenchments were carried in the most gallant style, and all their cannon taken: success appeared certain, as the defeated Saxons and Poles were flying in great disorder out of the woods into the sandy hills which lay between them and the town of Dantzic, when the victors were suddenly assailed in flank, when disordered by success, by Marshal Lannes, at the head of Oudinot's formidable grenadiers of the guards. Unable to resist so vehement an onset, the Russians were, in their turn, driven back, and lost the intrenchments; but rallying again with admirable discipline, they renewed the assault and regained the works; again they were expelled with great slaughter; a third time, stimulated by desperation, they returned to the charge, and routed the French grenadiers with such vigour, that Oudinot had a horse shot under him, and fell upon Marshal Lannes, and both these valiant chiefs thereafter combated on foot in the midst of their faithful grenadiers. But fresh re-enforcements from the left bank were every moment received by the enemy: Kalkreuth, confining himself to a heavy cannonade, had made no sortie to aid this gallant effort to cut through the lines; and, to complete Ka-

menskoi's misfortune, he received intelligence, during the action, that the Prussian corps of two thousand men, which was advancing along the Nehrung to co-operate in the attack, had been assailed by superior forces at Karlsberg, and routed with the loss of six hundred men and two pieces of cannon. Finding the undertaking in these circumstances hopeless, the brave Russian, at eight at night, ordered his heroic troops to retire, and they regained the shelter of the cannon of Weischelmunde without being pursued, but after sustaining a loss of seventeen hundred soldiers; while the French had to lament nearly as great a number of brave men who had fallen in this desperate conflict.*

No other serious effort was made by the allies for the relief of Dantzic. The besieged had provisions enough, but it was well known that their ammunition was almost exhausted, and that, without a speedy supply of that indispensable article, the place must ere long capitulate. An English brig of 22 guns, under Captain Strachey, with one hundred and fifty barrels of powder on board, made a brave attempt to force its way up the river, though the Vistula is a rapid stream, not more, in general, than sixty yards broad, and the passage was both defended by numerous batteries and a boom thrown across the channel; but a cannon-shot having struck the rudder, and the rigging being almost entirely cut to pieces by the French fire, she was forced to surrender. Meanwhile the operations against the Hagelsberg were continued without intermission: the springing of several mines, though not attended with all the ruin

Growing difficulties of the besieged, and fall of the place.

May 20 which was expected by the besiegers, had the effect of ruining and laying open the outworks, and preparations were already made for blowing the counterscarp into the ditch. In vain a sortie from the ramparts was made, and at first attended with some success, to destroy these threatening advanced works of the enemy: the besieged were at length driven back, and on the next day the arrival of Marshal Mortier, with a large part of his corps from the neighbourhood of Stralsund and Colberg, nearly doubled the effective strength of the enemy. Kalkreuth, however, was still unsubdued, and the most vigorous preparations had been made on the breaches of the ramparts to repel the assault which was hourly expected, when a summons from Lefebvre offered him honourable terms of capitulation. The situation of the brave veteran left him no alternative: though his strength was unsubdued, his ammunition was exhausted, and nothing remained but submission. The terms of capitulation were without difficulty arranged: the garrison was permitted to retire with their arms and the honours of war, on condition of not serving against France or its allies for a year, or till regularly exchanged; and on the 27th this great fortress, containing

May 21
May 24
May 27
nine hundred pieces of cannon, but hardly any ammunition, was taken possession of by the French troops. The garrison, now reduced to nine thousand men, was marched through the peninsula of Nehrung to Königsberg: Kamenskoi, unable to render any assistance, set sail from Fort Weischelmunde with his own division,† and its original garrison and a few invalids

* Wilson, 131, 133. Bign., vi., 285, 287. Dum., xviii., 173, 183.

† Dum., xviii., 180, 181. Bign., vi., 287, 289. Wilson, 134, 135. Martens, Sup., iv., 420.

only remained on the 26th to open its gates to the enemy.

While this desperate struggle was going on round Dantzic, the Russians were making the utmost efforts to re-enforce their principal army; but the time which they had was not sufficient to bring up from its im-

Re-enforcements which arrived to the Russian army. Its strength and positions. mense extent the distant resources of their empire, and though men were in abundance in the nearer provinces, both money and arms were wanting to equip them for the field. In the end of March and beginning of April, however, re-enforcements to a considerable amount arrived on the Alle, among which were chiefly to be noticed the superb corps of the guards under the Grand-duke Constantine, consisting of thirty battalions and thirty-four squadrons, full twenty thousand men, the flower of the imperial army. A powerful reserve, drawn from the dépôts in the interior of the Empire, of thirty thousand men, was also advancing under Prince Labanoff, but it was so far in the rear that it could not arrive at the scene of action before the end of June, and was, therefore, not to be relied on for the early operations of the campaign. The whole army which Benningsen had at his command, on the resumption of hostilities, was only one hundred and twenty thousand men, including in that force the detached corps of sixteen thousand Prussians and Russians in front of Königsberg under Lestocq, and the left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy, which was fifteen thousand strong, so that the force to be relied on for the immediate shock on the Alle or the Passarge was scarcely ninety thousand. These were, however, all veterans inured to war, and animated in the highest degree both by their recent success at Eylau,* and the presence of their beloved emperor, who, since the end of March, had been at the headquarters of the army.†

By incredible exertions Napoleon had succeeded in assembling a much greater force. Notwithstanding the immense losses of his bloody winter campaign in Poland, such had been the vigour of his measures for recruiting his army, and such the efficacy of the continued influence of terror, coercion, military ardour, and patriotic spirit which he had contrived to bring to bear upon the warlike population of France, Germany, and Poland, that a greater host than had ever yet been witnessed together in modern Europe were now assembled round his eagles.‡ Exclusive of the army of observation on the Elbe, and the garrisons and blockading corps in his rear, no less than a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, and thirty-five thousand horse, were ready for im-

mediate action on the Passarge and the Narew. Nor was it merely from its nominal strength that this immense force was formidable: its discipline and equipment had attained the very highest perfection; the requisitions enforced by the terrors of military execution had wrenched out of Germany all the supplies of which it stood in need; the cavalry were remounted, the artillery-wagons and carriages repaired and in the best condition; the reserve parks and pontoon trains fully supplied; the return of spring had restored numbers of the veterans to their ranks, the never-failing conscription filled up the chasms produced by Pultusk and Eylau, while the recent successes in Silesia and at Dantzic had revived in the warlike multitude that confidence in themselves and in their renowned leader which the disasters of the winter campaign had much impaired, but which has ever been found, even more than numbers or skill, to contribute to military success.* Vast as the resources of Russia undoubtedly are when time has been afforded to collect into one focus its unwieldy strength, it was now fairly overmatched by the banded strength of Western Europe on its own frontier;† and, though Alexander might possibly have combated on equal terms with Napoleon on the Wolga or the Dneister, he was inadequate to the encounter on the Alle or the Narew.

The Emperor Alexander had arrived at the headquarters of his army on the Defensive 28th of March, and resided since measures of that time with the King of Prussia the Russians. at Bartenstein, a little in the rear of the cantonments of the soldiers. There they had, for two months, carried on a sort of negotiation with the French emperor by means of confidential agents;‡ but this shadow of pacific overtures, which were only intended on either side to give time and propitiate Austria, by seeming to listen to her offers of mediation, was abandoned in the middle of May, and both parties prepared to determine the contest by the sword. To compensate for his inferiority of force, and provide a point of support for his troops, even in the first line Benningsen had, with great care, constructed a formidable intrenched camp, composed of six great works regularly fortified, and sixteen lunettes, or armed ravelins, astride on the opposite banks of the River Alle. Thither he proposed

* The composition and distribution of this force, previous to the resumption of hostilities, were as follows:

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Stationed at
First Corps, Bernadotte ..	23,547	3,744	Braunsberg and Spandau.
Fourth do., Soult.....	30,199	1,366	Lubstadt and Altkin.
Sixth do., Ney.....	15,883	1,117	Guttstadt and the right of the Passarge.
Third do., Davoust.....	28,445	1,125	Osterode and Allenstein.
Imperial Guard, Bessières	7,319	1,808	Finkenstein.
Reserve Cavalry, Murat..		21,428	Lower Vistula and Passarge.
Reserve Corps, Lannes...	15,090	250	Marienburg.
Eighth Corps, Mortier....	14,000	1,000	Lower Vistula.
Second Corps, Massena...	17,580	2,604	Narew.
	152,063	34,442	

Exclusive of officers, which made the force at least 155,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry. The corps of Lefebvre, after the capture of Dantzic, was melted down and divided between those of Lannes and Mortier and the garrison of the place; the second corps was in Dalmatia, under Marmont, the ninth in Silesia, under Vandamme. Augereau's corps was divided among the other corps after its terrific losses in the battle of Eylau.—DUM., xviii., 222, 223; *Pièces Just.*, No. 3, and Jom., ii., 403.

† Dum., xviii., 220, 221. Wilson, 136. Jom., ii., 401. Bign., vi., 294.

* Dum., xviii., App., table iii., and p. 220, 221. Jom., ii., 400. Wilson, 135, 136.

† The Russian army, when the campaign opened, was as follows:

Centre under Benningsen on the Alle, at Arensdorf, Neuhoff, Bergfried, and Bevern.....	88,000
Right wing under Lestocq, near Königsberg and at Pillau.....	18,000
Left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy.....	15,800
	121,800

—See DUM., xviii., 220, 221, and WILS., 136.

The militia, which the patriotic ardour of the Russians led them to raise, were unable to march from want of arms and ammunition, which the ill-timed parsimony of England withheld. One hundred and sixty thousand muskets, sent out in haste by the British government after the change of ministry, arrived at Königsberg in June, just in time to be seized by the French after the battle of Friedland.—HARD., iv., 417.

to retire in the event of the enemy bringing an overwhelming force to bear upon his columns; but he did not conceive himself sufficiently strong until the re-enforcements under Prince Labanoff arrived, to commence any serious offensive movement against the French army, and in consequence allowed the siege of Dantzic, as already mentioned, to be brought to a successful issue, without any other demonstration for its relief than the cannonade against Ney's corps, intended as a diversion in favour of Kamenskoi's attack. The army, though so much inferior in numerical strength to the French, was animated with the best spirit, and the great magazines and harbour of Königsberg supplied it with every necessary; although the situation of that city, without fortifications, and with its back to the gulf of the Curishé, from whence retreat was impossible, rendered it a situation extremely ill-adapted, as the event proved, for the stores on which its operations depended.*

After the fall of Dantzic, and when the French Designs of the army was re-enforced by full thirty Russians on thousand men from the covering Ney's corps. and besieging force, Benningsen was seduced, by the exposed situation of Marshal Ney's corps at Guttstadt, on the right bank of the Passarge, midway between the two armies, to hazard an attack on that insulated body. He had been stationed there by Napoleon expressly in order to serve as a bait to draw the Russian generals into that perilous encounter; and the event proved with perfect success. Early in June all the corps of their army were put in motion, in order to envelop the French marshal. For this purpose he proposed to make a feint of forcing the passage of the Passarge, at the two points of Spandau and Lomitten, and at the same time assail Ney in his advanced position at Guttstadt, in front and both flanks. If, by these means, the corps which he commanded could be destroyed, it was intended on the following day to renew the attack on the bridges in good earnest, and fall with the whole centre of the Russian army on the corps of Soult, cantoned behind the Passarge, and at such distance from that of Davoust as to afford some ground for hope that it, too, might be seriously injured before the remainder of the French troops could advance to its relief. Should this daring attack fail, it was always in their power to retire to the fortified central position of Heilsberg,† and there endeavour to arrest the enemy, as Kray had done with Moreau at Ulm, till the great re-enforcements, under Labanoff, should enable them to resume the offensive.

Early on the morning of the 5th of June, the whole Russian army was put in motion for the execution of this well-conceived enterprise. The feigned attacks, intended to distract the enemy's attention on the two fortified bridges of Spandau and Lomitten, took place at the prescribed time, and perfectly answered the object in view. The Prussians at the former point, and the Russians at the latter, pressed the enemy so severely, and with forces so considerable, that they supposed the forcing of the bridges was really intended, and in consequence, when they drew off in the evening, with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded, from each of

these places, represented their retreat as evidence of a repulse. Bernadotte, who commanded at Spandau, and had collected his whole corps to defend that important passage, was wounded by a musket-ball on the head, during the heat of the action, and replaced in command by General Dupont. Meanwhile, the real attack was directed against Ney's corps in its advanced position at Guttstadt, full seven miles to the right of the Passarge, and so completely in the midst of the Russian army, now that their advanced columns were assailing the bridges over that river, that its destruction appeared inevitable. In effect, the marshal was taken so completely by surprise, that, if Benningsen had pressed the retiring columns with anything like the vigour which Napoleon would have exerted on a similar occasion, they must inevitably have been destroyed. But, unfortunately, orders had been issued for the different corps to delay the onset till they were in a condition to render assistance to each other; and as some were impeded in the march by unforeseen accidents, the serious attack on Guttstadt did not take place till two o'clock in the afternoon. It was then carried by assault, and four hundred prisoners, with considerable magazines and several guns, were taken; but, after having thus made themselves masters of his headquarters, the Russians, though more than double the number of the enemy, exerted so little activity in following up their success, that Ney, who displayed on this trying occasion all his wonted skill and firmness, was enabled to effect his retreat, with comparatively little loss, to Ankendorf and Heiligenthal, where he passed the night. On the following morning he resumed his march, though pressed on all sides by greatly superior forces, imposed on the enemy in the middle of it by a bold and well-conceived return to Heiligenthal, which gave time for his artillery and horse to defile over the bridge in his rear; and at length passed the Passarge at Dippen, with the loss, in the whole of his retreat, of only a thousand killed and wounded, and an equal number made prisoners. On arriving at the heights of Dippen, as the rear-guard of Ney was defiling over, the Russians had the mortification of discovering that the bridge was not only altogether unprotected by a *tête de pont*, but completely commanded by the heights on which they stood on the right bank; so that, if they had exerted ordinary vigour in the attack of the preceding day, the negligence of Napoleon had given them the means of totally destroying the exposed corps of his gallant lieutenant.*

This sudden and unfortunate attack on the centre of his position very much disconcerted the Emperor Napoleon, the more especially as he received the intelligence, the same day, of the passage of the Alle by Platoff, at the head of his Cossacks, and the surprise of five hundred men, who were made prisoners,† and

Napoleon concentrates his army, and the Russians fall back.

* Wilson, 136, 137. Dum., xviii., 230, 246. Jom., ii., 403, 405.

† The French officer in command owed his life to the fortunate incident of his giving the Russian commander the freemasons' sign when seizing his hand just as a lance was about to pierce his breast.—WILSON, 138. In reviewing Sir Robert Wilson's work, the Edinburgh Review says this is an anecdote so incredible, that no amount of testimony could make them believe it; but this only shows the critic's ignorance. The same fortunate presence of mind, in making use of the freemasons' sign, saved the life of a gallant officer, the author's father-in-law, Lieutenant-colonel Tytler, during the American war, who, by giving one of the enemy's officers the freemasons' grip when he lay on the ground with

* Jom., ii., 401, 402. Wilson, 136, 137. Dum., xvii., 211, 217.

† Jom., ii., 403. Wilson, 136. Dum., xviii., 231.

Feigned attacks on the bridges of the Passarge, and real attack on Marshal Ney. June 5.

also of a regiment of Cossacks having swam the Passarge, and cut to pieces an escort of cavalry, and captured some artillery and baggage. He instantly commenced the concentration of his army. The corps of Ney, escaped from so serious a danger, was united to that of Lannes, which had suffered no loss; the guard and reserve cavalry under Murat commanded to assemble and support him with the utmost expedition; Mortier was ordered up by forced marches by Mohrungen; the corps of Bernadotte, which, since his wound, was intrusted to the directions of Victor, ordered to concentrate itself for the protection of Elburg; and Soult, who had assembled his corps at Lubstadt, enjoined to force the passage of the Passarge at Wolfendorf, in order to threaten the communications of the enemy with their intrenched camp at Heilsberg, while Davoust connected himself by the right with Ney, and formed an imposing mass behind the Passarge, against which, it was hoped, all the efforts of the enemy would be shattered. But these great preparations were suitable rather to the confidence which Napoleon felt in himself than that with which his adversaries were inspired. Having failed in his original and well-conceived project of cutting off the corps of Marshal Ney in its advanced position close to his cantonments, Benningsen had no intention of hazarding his army by commencing offensive operations against a force so greatly superior, with a few bridges over the Passarge

June 7. for his only retreat in case of disaster. On the morning of the 8th, the increasing forces which the enemy displayed at Dippen, and the vivacity of their cannonade at that point, prognosticated some decisive movements, and about noon the loud shouts of the soldiers announced the arrival of Napoleon in person. Soon after, General Havoiski, with a body of Cossacks, part of the army opposed to Soult, surprised three regiments of horse, the advanced guard of Soult's corps, which had obeyed its orders by crossing the river at Wolfendorf, and made three hundred prisoners, besides killing a still greater number. But these partial successes were insufficient to arrest the progress of the enemy, whose masses, now rapidly arriving on its banks, gave him a decided superiority; and Benningsen resolved to fall back to the intrenched camp at Heilsberg, while Bagrathion covered the retreat on the left with five thousand foot and two thousand horse, and Platoff with three thousand Cossacks on the right.*

The retreat, however, which was now commenced, was far more hazardous than that which they had just effected with such skill, for it was to be made in presence of Napoleon and a hundred thousand men. No sooner had the Russian carriages begun to defile to the rear, than the French crossed the Passarge in great strength at all points: the guards and cavalry, with the emperor at their head, at Elditten, and the other marshals at Spandau, Lomitten, and Dippen. Their immense masses converged from all these different points towards Guttstadt and Altkirch, whither the Russian army had retired in one compact body, following the direct road to their intrenchments at Heilsberg. The great bulk of the army was so far

The Russians, pursued by the French, fell back to Heilsberg. June 9.

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a bayonet at his breast, succeeded in interesting the generous American in his behalf, and saving his life.

* Wilson, 138, 139. *Jom.*, ii., 405. *Dum.*, xviii., 248, 258.

advanced as to be beyond the reach of danger; but the rear-guard, under Bagrathion and Platoff, was exposed to the most imminent hazard, especially when, towards evening, it became necessary to halt and arrest the enemy, in order to give time to the numerous carriages and guns in their rear to defile over the Alle by the four bridges by which alone Heilsberg could be reached. The brave Russian, however, took post at Glottaw, and sent forth the cavalry of the Imperial Guard and Cossacks into the plain to check the advance of his pursuers. The French infantry instantly halted and formed squares, while twelve thousand of Murat's dragoons rushed upon the rear-guard at full speed, threatening to annihilate them by their thundering charge. Such, however, was the steadiness and intrepidity of the Russian horse, that they successfully combated against the fearful odds by which they were assailed: several brilliant charges took place without any decisive result on either side; but not one square of the retreating rear-guard was broken, not one squadron dispersed; and after a sanguinary conflict, Bagrathion, having gained time for the whole artillery and carriages in his rear to defile over the bridge, withdrew to the other side of the Alle, abandoning Guttstadt, with no greater loss in killed and wounded than he had inflicted upon the enemy: a rare example of intrepidity and skill in such trying circumstances, even more remarkable than the retreat of Marshal Ney two days before, as his own force was much less, and the pursuing host incomparably greater. At the same time, Platoff, on his side, also gained the river and crossed the bridges in safety, having, in order to give an example of coolness to his men, dismounted from his horse, and, with the tranquillity of parade exercise, withdrawn his forces in small bodies, with large intervals between them, which so effectually imposed upon the enemy, that he sustained no serious molestation in his retreat.*

Having thus succeeded in throwing the River Alle between themselves and the French army, and broken down all the bridges over that river, the Russians were enabled, without farther molestation, to withdraw all their troops into the intrenched camp at Heilsberg, where they stood firm under the cover of most formidable fieldworks. Napoleon had now one of two courses to follow. In his front was the great fortified camp of the enemy, by storming which he might hope to terminate the war in a single bloody battle; a little to his left was the city of Königsberg, containing the whole magazines and reserve stores of their army. The most obvious course would have been to have executed a general movement with the right in front, passing Heilsberg, so as to establish the French lines between that place and Bischoffstein, with the right extending towards Bartenstein, and the left reaching to Guttstadt; repeating thereby the circuitous sweep round the enemy's position, which his great numerical superiority so easily gave him the means of effecting, and which had proved so fatal to the Austrians at Ulm, and the Prussians at Jena; the second was to advance with the main body of the army straight against their intrenchments at Heilsberg, and, in the event of their proving so strong as to defy open force, threatening to turn them by the

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 171. *Wilson*, 140, 143. *Dum.*, xviii., 258, 264. *Jom.*, ii., 405.

advance of fifty thousand men on the left towards Eylau, so as to menace the communications of the enemy with his magazines at Königsberg. The first plan offered the most decisive results, as the Russian army, if cut off from its own frontier, by being turned on the right, would have been exposed to total destruction in the event of being thrown, after a defeat, upon Königsberg and the *cul-de-sac* of the Curishé; but the second was most easy of immediate execution, from its avoiding the difficult and intricate country into which an advance upon Biehoffstein would have led the army; and, notwithstanding the obvious risk to which his left wing would be exposed by advancing between a superior mass of the enemy and the sea, Napoleon flattered himself that he would so engage his attention in front as to prevent him from taking advantage of the chances thus offered in his favour.*

On the 10th of June, accordingly, preparations Advance upon Heilsberg, the intrenched camp of Heilsberg, June 10. while Davoust and Mortier moved forward on the French left to turn its right flank, and menace the enemy's communication with Königsberg. For this purpose the cavalry of Murat led the advance against the Russian intrenchments, which were about ten miles distant; bridges were speedily thrown across the Alle at various points; they were immediately followed by the corps of Soult, Lannes, Ney, and the infantry of the guard, who pursued on both sides of that river to Heilsberg, which is situated farther down its course. As long as Bagrathion was pursuing his way through the broken ground on the other side of Guttstadt, he was enabled to keep the enemy tolerably at bay; but when he was obliged to evacuate that favourite cover, and enter upon the open plain which extended on both sides of the Alle to Heilsberg, his task of covering the retreat became much more difficult. In vain the Russian cavalry, by repeated charges, strove to retard the advance of their indefatigable pursuers; in vain the infantry retired by echelon in alternate lines to sustain by continued fire their retrograde movements: the French cavalry and horse artillery incessantly pressed on; by degrees the losses of the Russians became more severe, and they were beginning to fall into confusion, when the opportune arrival of fifteen squadrons of Prussian cavalry, with a troop of horse artillery which Benningsen sent to his succour, gave him great relief, and, by their gallant bearing, enabled Bagrathion to maintain the fight, though with serious loss, till six at night, when the whole allied army had got within its lines. Then, on the word given, the Russian and Prussian cavalry withdrew by their flanks, exposing to view within half-cannon shot the formidable intrenchments, bristling with bayonets, and armed in this part with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. Instantly a fire of grape of extraordinary severity was opened upon the enemy, which speedily swept off all the squadrons who could not escape from its fury; and, though Murat brought up several batteries of cannon, and swarms of tirailleurs occupied every thicket and kept up an incessant rattle along the whole front of the lines, yet they produced no impression, and the superiority of the Russian fire was very apparent.†

The position of Heilsberg, however, was too important for Napoleon to relinquish the prospect of making himself master of it by main force without a struggle. Situated on a cluster of heights on both banks of the Alle, of which the town covered a part, it commanded the three roads of Wormditt, Mohlsack, and Landsberg, which intersected each other within the intrenched camp, and in this way blocked up the access to Eylau and Königsberg. As long as the Russians held this important position, and at the same time maintained the course of the Lower Passarge towards Braunsberg, their line might be considered unassailable. But from the moment that they were driven from the latter ground; and the enemy's columns began to interpose between the intrenched camp and the sea, threatening Eylau and Friedland, its advantages were at an end, because it was cut off from its communication with the very depôts which it was designed to protect. Its weakest side was that on the left bank of the Alle, which was connected with the redoubt on the other side by four bridges. Nearly eighty thousand men were here assembled, under the cover of above five hundred pieces of cannon, in nine divisions: of whom seven, under the Grand-duke Constantine, occupied the left bank of the river, and two, under Prince Gortchakoff, the right bank; while Kamenskoi was stationed in the redoubts which covered the front of the position.*

Napoleon having collected forty pieces of artillery, under the command of General Battle of al Dulauloy, on his left, pushed them forward, and, by the vivacity of their fire, in some degree weakened that of the enemy. The divisions of St. Cyr and Legrand, part of Soult's corps, with Murat's cavalry, advanced, about seven in the evening, by the villages of Lauden, Langwiesse, and Bewernicken, to the attack of the enemy's redoubts on the right bank of the river. These brave men had no sooner quitted the cover of the ravine which for some time sheltered them from the enemy's fire, than they rushed forward with such vigour that, in the first onset, they carried the principal redoubt of the Russians in that quarter, with all the guns which it contained; while St. Hilaire, with his division, penetrated between that intrenchment and the neighbouring works. The moment was critical, and the least wavering would have exposed the Russians to total ruin, for a line of redoubts broken in upon at one point is wellnigh lost; but Benningsen was at the head of men who were equal to any emergency. Prince Gortchakoff, who commanded the Russian right wing, instantly ordered the divisions under his command to charge; the animating hurrahs of his men demonstrated that he had not calculated in vain on their intrepidity at that trying crisis: on they rushed with fixed bayonets, and the two regiments which occupied the redoubt were almost totally destroyed, and their eagles taken. Following up their success, the Russians burst out into the plain between the wood and the redoubts, and forced Soult's divisions to give ground. With the steadiness of discipline, however, they retired in hollow square by echelon, which vomited forth an incessant rolling fire upon their pursuers: the approach of night gave these moving citadels the appearance of being encircled with flame, while the intrench-

Description of the position and intrenched camp of Heilsberg.

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 171. Jom., ii., 468. Dum., xviii., 263, 264.

† Wilson, 144, 146. Jom., ii., 409. Dum., xviii., 264, 266, 272.

* Wilson, 145, 146. Dum., xviii., 266, 268. Bign., vi., 298.

ments represented a line of volcanoes in vehement eruption. At length, however, the retreat of Legrand and St. Cyr obliged St. Hilaire, who had penetrated to the very foot of the redoubt, and had borne without flinching their terrible discharge of grape, also to retire; Savary, with two regiments of the guard and twelve guns, came up to cover his retreat; he, in his turn, however, was surrounded. The French at all points retired to the cover of the woods, and narrowly escaped being made prisoners by the allied cavalry; and at length, grievously shattered, the victorious Russians were again withdrawn into their intrenchments.*

The vehement cannonade which had so long illuminated the heavens now ceased, and the cries of the wounded, in the plain at the foot of the intrenchments, began to be heard above the declining roar of the musketry. At 11 at night, however, a deserter came into the Russian lines, and announced that a fresh attack was preparing. Suitable arrangements were accordingly made; and hardly were they completed, when dark masses of the enemy were seen, by the uncertain twilight of a midsummer night, to issue from the woods, and advance with a swift pace across the bloody plain which separated them from the redoubts. Instantly the batteries opened on the moving masses; they staggered under the discharge, but still pressed on, without returning a shot; but when they arrived within reach of the musketry the fire became so vehement that the heads of the columns were entirely swept away, and the remainder driven back in great disorder, after sustaining a frightful loss. At length, at midnight, after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the firing entirely ceased, and nothing was heard in the narrow space which separated the two armies but the groans of the wounded, who, anticipating a renewal of the combat in the morning, and tortured by pain, implored removal, relief, or even death itself, to put a period to their sufferings.†

* Wilson, 145, 146. Dum., xviii., 272, 277. Bign., vi., 299. Savary, iii., 53.

† "I had on this occasion," says Savary, "an exceedingly warm altercation with the Grand-duke de Berg (Murat), who sent to me, in the very thickest of the action, orders to move forward and attack; I bade the officer who brought the order go to the devil, asking, at the same time, if he did not see how we were engaged. That prince, who would have commanded everywhere, wished that I should cease firing, at the hottest period of the fight, to march forward; he would not see that, if I had done so, I should infallibly have been destroyed before reaching the enemy. For a quarter of an hour I exchanged grape with the enemy—nothing enabled me to keep my ground but the rapidity of my fire. The coming on of night was most fortunate—while every one slumbered the emperor sent for me. He was content with my charge, but scolded me for having failed in the support of Murat. When defending myself, I had the boldness to say he was a fool, who would some day cause us to lose a great battle; and that it would be better for us if he was less brave and had more common sense. The emperor bade me be silent, saying I was in a passion, but did not think the less of what I said. Next day he was in very bad humour; our wounded were as numerous as in a pitched battle."—SAVARY, iii., 54. "He was particularly angry at the cavalry, saying they had done nothing he had ordered."—WILSON, 149.

‡ Wilson, 146, 147. Dum., xviii., 276, 278. Bign., vi., 299. Sav., iii., 53, 54.

§ The bad success of the attack on Heilsberg gave rise to a furious altercation between Lannes and Murat, and an explosion of the former, who was subject to ungovernable fits of passion, even with the emperor himself. It is thus narrated, with dramatic power, by the Duchess of Abrantes: "Your brother-in-law is a mountebank, sir—a tight-rope dancer, with his white dancing plume." "Come, now, you are joking," answered Napoleon, in good-humour: "is he not

Heavy rain fell in the early part of the night, which, though it severely distressed the soldiers who were unhurt in their bivouacks, assuaged the thirst and diminished the sufferings of the host of wounded of both armies, who lay mingled together on the plain. With the first dawn of day the Russians again stood to their arms, expecting every moment to be attacked; but the morning passed over without any movement on the part of the enemy. As the light broke the French were descried on the skirts of the wood, in order of battle, but, more even than by their well-appointed battalions and squadrons, the eyes of all were riveted on a spectacle inconceivably frightful between their lines and the redoubts. This space, about a quarter of a mile broad and above a mile in length, presented a sheet of naked human bodies, the greater part dead, but some showing by their motions that they preserved consciousness or implored relief. Six thousand corpses were here lying together as close as they had stood in their ranks, stripped during the night of every rag of garment by the cupidity of the camp-followers of either army, ghastly pale, or purple with the blood which was still oozing from their wounds. How inured soever to the horrors of a campaign, the soldiers of both armies, even while they loathed it, felt their eyes fascinated by this harrowing spectacle, which exhibited war, stripped of all its pomp, in its native barbarity; and, by common consent, the interval of hostilities was employed in burying the dead, and removing the shivering wounded to the rear of the armies.*

Napoleon was extremely disconcerted by this repulse, and vented his ill-humour in violent sallies of passion against his generals. The butchery had been worse than useless—it had been hurtful. The Russians still held, in unshaken strength, their intrenchments; twelve thousand French had fallen around their redoubts, without having gained, at the close of the day, the mastery of one of them; the ditches were filled with their dead bodies, but no part of them had been crossed. Eight thousand Russians also were killed or wounded; and this loss, though less than that of their opponents, from their having fought in part under cover, was still greater, perhaps, in proportion to the relative strength of their army. The French emperor, however, had felt too severely the strength of

Frightful appearance of the slain after the battle.

Napoleon turns their flank, and compels them to evacuate Heilsberg.

brave? "And who is not so in France? We point with the finger at a coward. Soulé and I have done our duty: we refuse to allow the honour of that day to your brother-in-law—to his serene and imperial highness, Prince Murat! Truly, these titles make one shrug his shoulders! The mania of royalty has seized him also; and it is to tack his mantle to your own that you wish to rob us of our glory. You have only to speak: we have enough remaining—we will willingly give it to him." "Yes!" exclaimed Napoleon, no longer able to contain himself: "I will bestow or take away glory as I please: for hear ye! it is I ALONE who give you both glory and success." On this Lannes became pale with rage; and with a voice quivering with passion he exclaimed, "Yes! yes! because you have marched up to the ancles in gore on this bloody field, you think yourself a great man; and your fine emplumed brother-in-law crows on his own dunghill. I will have no more of this. And this fine victory of yours—a great triumph, truly! twelve thousand corpses lying on the plain to keep the field for your honour, where you can only trace the French uniform by fractures and mutilation; and yet to deny to me—to me, Lannes—my due share in the honours of the day!"—D'ARBANTES, ix., 369, 372. The lively duchess, with her usual inaccuracy on military details, recounts this scene as relating to the battle of Eylau; but that is impossible, as Lannes was not in that battle at all, but sick in the rear.—*Vide ante*, ii., 473.

* Wilson, 147. Sav., iii., 54.

the enemy's position to venture upon a renewal of the attack, and therefore he resolved to compel the Russians to evacuate it by manoeuvring on their flank. For this purpose he took advantage of the arrival of Marshal Davoust's corps to push it forward at noon on the Landsberg road towards Eylau and Königsberg. This movement alarmed Benningsen, who, though not apprehensive of being forced in his intrenched position, was extremely afraid of being cut off from his supplies at Königsberg, on which the army depended for its daily subsistence; and at the same time an order of Napoleon to Victor was intercepted, which contained commands to attack Lestocq and the right wing of the allies at all points, and push on for Königsberg. Seeing the movement of the enemy to turn his right flank and threaten his magazines now clearly pronounced, the Russian general gave orders to retreat: the intrenched camp was evacuated at nightfall, and the army marched all the night of the 11th, and established themselves, at break of day, in a position in front of Bartenstein, headquarters being transferred to that town. Though great part of this operation was performed after daybreak on the 12th, in sight of the enemy, yet such was the respect produced by the battle of Heilsberg, that they made no attempt whatever to molest the retreat.*

Movements of the two armies before the battle of Friedland.

No sooner was this retrograde movement perceived by the French emperor, on the morning of the 12th, than he detached Murat's dragoons to follow upon the traces of the enemy; and he himself, moving forward his whole army, established his headquarters in the evening on the bloody fields of Preussisch-Eylau. It was no longer a shivering scene of ice and snow: green fields were to be seen on all sides; clear and placid lakes gave variety and animation to the landscape; woods, resplendent with the early green of summer, fringed the rising grounds, and numerous white villages, with handsome spires, rose above their summit, attesting the industry and prosperity of the inhabitants under the paternal government of Old Prussia. The French soldiers could hardly recognise, in the gay and smiling objects around them, the frightful scene of devastation and blood which was imprinted in such sombre colours in their recollection during the preceding winter.

June 12. Meanwhile, General Lestocq resolved to break up from Braunsberg and the Lower Passarge, and retire by the margin of the Frischaff towards Königsberg: a measure which had become indispensable to prevent his being entirely cut off from his communication with the main army, and thrown back without resource on the margin of the sea. Kamenskoi was also directed by Benningsen to march upon Königsberg, but on arriving at Mulhausen, on the road to that city, he found it already occupied by the advanced guard of Davoust, and only reached the object of his destination by making a very long circuit. During the night of the 12th the Russians resumed their march through Schippenheil, and on the following morning had reached the banks of the Alle. On arriving there, however, Benningsen received information that the French had, by the rapidity of their movements and by following the chord of the arc which led to Königsberg, while his own troops were traversing the circumference, anticipated

him in his march upon that city, and were already so far advanced on the road that they could not be overtaken. Murat and Victor were in full advance from Eylau to Königsberg. Soult was marching on Creutzburg; Napoleon himself, at the head of the corps of Lannes, Ney, and Mortier, was approaching to Friedland by Dornau, at which latter place the Imperial Guard was already arrived. A glance at the map must be sufficient to show that by these different movements, not only was the bulk of the French army interposed between the Russian general and Königsberg, where all his magazines were placed, but Napoleon was in a situation, by a rapid advance upon Wehlau, to threaten his line of retreat to the Russian frontier. In these circumstances no time was to be lost, and, though the troops were dreadfully fatigued, orders were given to continue the march all day, and by great exertions the army reached Friedland, where headquarters were established in the evening.*

Friedland, which has acquired immortal celebrity by the memorable battle of Description which it was the theatre, is a considerable town situated on the left bank of the River Alle, which there flows in a northern direction towards the Baltic Sea. It is situated between the river and a large artificial lake or fishpond, which lies to the north, and has been formed by damming up a rivulet called the Mill Stream, which flows from the high grounds to the westward near Posthenen into the Alle, and falls into it at right angles. The windings of the Alle serve as a natural wet ditch round Friedland on the south and east; the artificial lake protects it on the north; in a military point of view, therefore, it is only accessible on the western side, where it is approached by the road from Eylau, which the French were pursuing, and from which side also set out the roads to Königsberg to the north, and Wehlau and Tilsit on the northwest. In that direction there is a large open space dotted with villages and cultivated ground, neither hill nor plain, but an undulated surface, intersected only along its whole extent, by the ravine formed by the Mill Stream, which is very deep, with rugged sides, and in many places, from the reflux waters, scarcely fordable. At the distance of two miles from Friedland as a centre, the cultivated plain to the westward is bounded by a semicircle of woods, which fringe the higher grounds and form the horizon when looking in that direction from the town. The banks of the Alle on the eastward are very steep; and though there are three bridges over that river, two of which were formed by the Russians with pontoons at the town itself, in other quarters it could be passed only at a few fords, which were unknown to the allies till late in the evening, and at that period, from the recent heavy rains, were scarcely practicable.†

In the night of the 13th, Benningsen received information that the corps of Lannes, which had suffered so severely at Heilsberg, was lying at Posthenen, a village about three miles from Friedland on the road to Königsberg. The exposed situation of that corps, which formed the vanguard of the French army, and the well-known losses which it had sustain-

Benningsen resolves to attack Lannes's corps. Situation of that corps.

† Wilson, 150, 152. Dum., xviii., 280, 287. Jom. ii., 10, 411. Sav., iii., 54, 55. Bign., vi., 299, 300.

† Wilson, 152, 153. Dum., xix., 6. Rel. de la Camp., par un Témoin Oculaire, 74.

* Wilson, 149, 151. Dum., xviii., 279, 283. Jom., ii., 409.

ed at Heilsberg, inspired the Russian general with the hope that, by a sudden attack, it might be destroyed before the main body of Napoleon's forces could advance to its relief. This resolution was taken at two o'clock on the morning of the 14th: orders were immediately despatched, and at four the Russian vanguard was already defiling over the bridge of Friedland. The opportunity was tempting, and, to all appearance, the corps of Lannes was placed in a situation of great danger: it consisted now of only twelve thousand infantry and three thousand horse; and though the corps of Mortier, Ney, and Victor, with great part of the cavalry of Murat, might be shortly expected to arrive at the scene of action, yet some hours must elapse before the foremost of these powerful auxiliaries could be relied on, and in the mean while this detached body was exposed to the shock of above fifty thousand veteran troops, who, by proper exertion, might be directed against it. Here, in short, as at Marengo, the French army was to be attacked when on a line of march in echelon, by the concentrated masses of the enemy, who fell first on the leading corps; but there was this essential distinction between its position on these two memorable days, that on the former occasion the army was stationary or retreating, so that the distant corps could not arrive till late on the field of battle, whereas here it was advancing, and, consequently, unless decisive success were gained in the outset, the assailants would have the whole hostile body upon their hands;* and, in case of defeat, could retreat only by the bridge of the Alle, which was wholly inadequate to afford an issue to so large a force.

No sooner were the advanced posts of the Russians descried by the videttes of Lannes's corps than a sharp fire of musketry began, which was soon increased to a heavy cannonade as the dark masses of infantry and cavalry were seen swiftly advancing through the gray twilight of the summer morning. The French tirailleurs fell back, skirmishing, however, sharply as they retired; the alarm was speedily communicated to the rear, and the whole corps stood to arms. A single Russian division had at first been passed over, but the enemy's troops were so constantly fed from the rear, and the resistance opposed so considerable, that Benningsen soon found himself under the necessity of passing over another to its support: three pontoon bridges were constructed to facilitate the passage, and by degrees, as the increasing masses of the enemy showed that other corps had arrived to the support of Lannes, the whole army was brought across. Thus was the Russian general, who at first contemplated only a partial operation, insensibly drawn into a general action, and that, too, in the most disadvantageous of all possible situations, with a superior force of the enemy in front, and a deep river traversed only by a few bridges in his rear.†

The corps of Mortier arrived to the support of Lannes in a short time after the firing commenced, and both corps withdrew to the heights stretching from Posthenen to Heinrichsdorf, about three miles to the westward of the River Alle. Deeming these the only forces with which

he had to contend, and considering himself adequate to their destruction, Benningsen drew up his whole forces, as they successively arrived on the field from the bridges, in the narrow plain, backed by Friedland and the Alle, facing towards the westward, about half a mile in front of that town. The Mill Stream flowing in a perpendicular direction to his line, nearly cut it in two equal parts: the right wing extended from the rivulet to the Alle, through the wood of Domerauer; the left, which was less considerable in length, stretched in a southerly direction also to the Alle, across the wood of Sortlack, and barring the roads of Eylau, Bartenstein, and Schippenheil, nearly at the point where they intersected each other. The whole army was drawn up in two lines facing to the west: the first and third battalions of each regiment, in battle array, composing the first line; the second, in close columns behind the intervals between them, forming the second. Thus the Russians stood on the arc of the segment of a circle formed by the River Alle in their rear. Only one division, of nine regiments and twelve squadrons of horse, remained on the right bank. Gortchakoff commanded the right wing, Bagration the left: Uvaroff and Gallitzin the cavalry of the right, Kollagriboff the horse on the left. After taking into view the losses in the preceding actions, and the large detachment, under Kamenskoi, to the right to the support of Lestock, the whole force of the Russians, on both sides of the river, did not exceed 55,000 men, of whom about ten thousand were cavalry. They were all brave and experienced soldiers, but exhausted by fatigue and want of sustenance for several days; and every man in the array was entirely exposed to fire, and every movement distinctly seen, while that of the enemy was for the most part concealed or sheltered by the woods and rising grounds which fringed the plain to the westward, and bounded the horizon on that side.*

Even with this comparatively inconsiderable force, however, the Russian general might at least, in the earlier part of the day, have gained considerable, perhaps decisive success, against the corps of Lannes and Mortier, which alone had come up to the field of battle, had he acted at once with the vigour and decision which the opportunity afforded, and the critical circumstances in which he was placed imperatively required. But, unfortunately, he was so prepossessed with the idea that he had no other antagonist to expect than the two corps actually on the spot, that the precious hours, big with the fate of Europe and the world, were allowed to elapse without any decided movement being attempted. Lannes gradually fell back from the place in front of Friedland, as the successive divisions of the enemy crossed the bridges, and established themselves on the left bank of the river; skilfully availing himself, however, of every advantage which the inequalities of the ground afforded to retard the advance of the enemy, and covering his movements with a cloud of light troops, whose incessant fire concealed the real amount of his force. A severe action took place on the right, while a body of thirty French squadrons tried to turn the Russian right in front of Heinrichsdorf, and at first with some success; but the

No decisive success is gained on either side before the arrival of the other French corps.

* Wilson, 152, 153. Jom., ii., 411, 412. Bign., vi., 312, 313. Dum., xix., 3, 9.

† Wilson, 152, 153. Dum., xix., 7, 10. Jom., ii., 412, 413.

* Wilson, 153, 155. Dum., xix., 9, 11. Jom., ii., 411, 413.

advance of some fresh regiments compelled the assailants to give ground in that quarter. Soon after a column of three thousand men advanced straight against Friedland: they were permitted to approach close to the Russian cannon without a single shot being fired, when suddenly the whole opened with grape, and with such effect that in a few minutes a thousand men were struck down, the column routed, and an eagle was taken. Encouraged by this success, the Russians advanced their left wing, and drove back the French right with such vigour, that it was thought they were retiring altogether towards Eylau; but this success was of short duration: fresh re-enforcements arrived to the enemy, the lost ground was regained, and a tremendous cannonade along the whole line announced that the other corps were arriving, and that a general battle was at hand.*

Napoleon was at Domnau, ten miles distant, when the first sound of distant cannon was heard. He immediately mounted on horseback and rode rapidly forward to the front, where the increasing cannonade and the quick rattle of musketry announced that a serious conflict was already engaged in, despatching, at the same time, orders for the corps in the rear to hasten their march. About one o'clock in the afternoon he arrived on the heights behind Heinrichsdorf, which overlooked the field of battle, and immediately sent out the officers of his staff in different directions to observe the motions of the enemy. Savary speedily returned with information that the march of troops over the bridge of Friedland was incessant; that none were retracing their steps; that three additional bridges had been constructed to facilitate the passage, and that the masses in front were every minute increasing and extending themselves. "Tis well," replied the emperor: "I am already prepared; I have gained an hour upon them, and, since they wish it, I will give them another: this is the anniversary of Marengo; the battle could not have been fought on a more propitious day." Orders were despatched for all the corps of infantry, as they came up, to concentrate themselves in the immense woods behind Heinrichsdorf, on the skirts of which Marshal Lannes was combating; the artillery alone was placed on the great roads leading from Eylau and Domnau; the cavalry in the large apertures which had been cut for the objects or agriculture in these extensive forests. The firm countenance and dense masses of the enemy, who appeared even more numerous than they really were, as seen from the heights of Heinrichsdorf, at first made the emperor doubtful whether he should not postpone the attack till the following day, when the remainder of the cavalry of Murat and the corps of Davoust might be expected to join from the side of Königsberg;† but the successive arrival of the corps

of Ney and Victor,* with the infantry and cavalry of the guard, and part of Murat's dragoons, at two and three o'clock, joined to the obvious and flagrant disadvantages of the enemy's position, induced him not to lose a moment in bringing matters to a decisive issue. Orders were accordingly despatched for all the troops to prepare for action in an hour. Meanwhile the soldiers were ordered to sit down and rest themselves, while the most minute inspection took place in the ranks to see that the firelocks were in good condition, and the cartridge-boxes amply supplied. The order of battle was soon fixed. Ney occupied the right, directly in front of Friedland; next stood Mortier, on the extreme right of Lannes. In the second line Victor's corps was stationed immediately behind Ney; the Imperial Guard, with a numerous brigade of fusileers, under the orders of Savary; and the cavalry, under Grouchy, Latour Maubourg, and Nansouty, behind the centre and right. The whole army was directed to advance in echelon, with the right in front and the left slightly thrown back; thus Ney would be first engaged; and the artillery received orders to redouble their fire along the whole line as soon as the heads of their columns were seen emerging from the woods. By four o'clock seventy thousand infantry and ten thousand horse were assembled, in the highest spirits and the finest state of discipline and equipment; while Benningsen, who, from seeing the formidable accumulation of forces in his front, had deemed it necessary to detach six thousand men to his rear to secure the bridge of Wehlau over the Pregel, had not more than thirty-eight thousand foot and eight thousand horse to oppose to their attack.†

The cessation of any serious attack for some hours after noon led the Russian general, who had long since abandoned his original project of surprising Lannes, and was desirous only of maintaining his ground till the approach of night gave him the means of regaining, without molestation, the right bank of the Alle, to indulge a hope that nothing farther would be undertaken during that day; but he was soon painfully undeceived. At five o'clock, on a signal given by a discharge of twenty pices of cannon from the French centre, the whole army stood to their arms, and immediately the heads of Marshal Ney's column were seen emerging from the woods behind Postehen, and rapidly advancing straight upon Friedland. On all sides the enemy's forces at once were seen: from the steeples of Friedland, through the interstices of the trees, or in the openings of the forest, they were descried in masses of enormous power and depth. From the plain, the horizon appeared to be bounded by a deep girdle of glittering steel. At one glance the most inexperienced could see the imminence and magnitude of the danger, for no preparations to cover the retreat over the Alle had been made, and the enemy's force appeared at least double that of the Russians. But there was no time for consultation or defensive measures. On came Ney's column with the fury of a splendid at-
tempt, driving before them, like tacks by Ney's foam before the waves, the Russian corps.

I may engage only in a cannonade to-day, and await your arrival before commencing serious operations."—JOMINI, ii., 414.

* Formerly Bernadotte, who had been wounded at Spandau.

† Sav., iii., 56, 58. Wilson, 155, 156. Jom., ii., 413, 415. Dum., xix., 10, 17. Bign., vi., 301, 302.

Preparatory
dispositions
and forces of
Napoleon.

* Dum., xix., 12, 14. Jom., ii., 412. Wilson, 154, 156.

† Accordingly, at one o'clock, he wrote to that general from the field: "The enemy is in battle array in front of Friedland, with all his army. At first he appeared desirous of moving on by Stocken on Königsberg; but now he appears only desirous of receiving battle on the ground he has chosen. I hope that, by this time, you have entered Königsberg; and as the corps of Soult is sufficient for the protection of that city, you will, without doubt, retrace your steps as rapidly as possible, with the remainder of the cavalry and Davoust's corps, towards Friedland. It is the more necessary that you should do so, as very possibly the affair may be protracted till to-morrow. Use your utmost efforts, therefore, to arrive here by one o'clock in the morning. If I perceive, in the outset of the action, that the enemy is in such strength as to render the result doubtful, it is possible that

chasseurs of the guards and several regiments of cavalry and Cossacks who were placed in advance, and had endeavoured to check their progress. Some regiments of militia, stationed on the low grounds near the Alle, also broke and fled towards the bridges, spreading confusion and alarm through the whole rear of the army. At the same time Victor's corps, placed at first in the second line, advanced to the ground originally occupied by Ney, and its artillery, consisting of forty pieces, under the command of General Senarmont, pushed on four hundred paces farther, and from a rising ground thundered over the whole Russian line, and effectually prevented any succours being sent to the distressed left. That portion of their army was now everywhere shaken: the loud shouts of Ney's column were heard along the whole line; their advanced guards were close to Friedland, and, encouraged by this rapid and splendid success,* they were already preparing to storm the town and complete the ruin of the enemy by gaining possession of the bridges in his rear.

At this instant the Russian Imperial Guard, which was placed in reserve behind the artificial lake to the north of Friedland, was ordered to advance. Gallant charge of the Russian guard nearly regains the day. They rushed forward with fixed bayonets, but not in compact order, yet with such vigour, that the leading divisions of Ney's corps, assailed in front and flank, were pierced through, trodden down, and driven back with prodigious slaughter. Such was the change produced by this vehement onset, that the day seemed all but regained: they were repulsed to a considerable distance, and the Russian left wing, in its turn, became the assailants. Then it was that the six thousand men detached in the forenoon to Wehlau might have changed the destinies of Europe. But the Russian guards, being unsupported by any farther reserve, could not singly maintain the contest with the overwhelming odds which were directed against them. As they hurried on in pursuit of Ney, they came upon the reserve under Victor, which had advanced to his support; and one of his divisions, under Dupont, charged them so opportunely in flank while disordered by the vehemence of their pursuit, that they were in their turn repulsed to the edge of the town. Encouraged by this turn of fortune, Ney's soldiers now returned to the charge. Dupont's division, emulating the deeds of its old comrades in the camp of Boulogne, pressed on in hot pursuit; Senarmont's terrific battery advanced, playing without intermission on the crowded ranks of the retiring Russians, and soon the confusion and press in Friedland appeared so great, that the leading French divisions were tempted to hazard an assault.† After an obstinate resistance, the streets were forced: some of the principal buildings in the town took fire; in the first moments of consternation the fugitives applied the torch to the bridges over the river; in a few minutes they were wrapped in flames, and the volumes of smoke which rolled over the whole field of battle spread a dismal feeling in the breasts of the soldiers.

While this decisive success was gaining on the left, the centre and right of the Russians kept their ground with undaunted firmness under a

Progress of the actions on the centre and right of the Russians. dreadful cannonade, which told with fatal effect on the dense masses which, from the limited extent of the ground, were there accumulated between the front and the river. They had even gained considerable success; for some battalions, having broken their array in crossing the deep ravine of the Mill Stream, with which they were unacquainted, were charged before they could reform by the Russian cavalry, and cut to pieces. But when the retreat of the left wing and the guards had uncovered their flank, the infantry in the centre were exposed to the most serious danger, and must have given way, had not the Russian cavalry galloped forward at full speed and charged the corps who threatened them, who were the left of Oudinot's grenadiers, with such vigour that they were in a few minutes trampled under foot and destroyed. Encouraged by this success, the infantry of the centre also moved forward, and threw in so destructive a flanking fire as effectually covered the retreat of their horse; but at this moment the flames of Friedland and the bridges were seen to arise, and the vast clouds of black smoke which darkened the atmosphere told too plainly that their retreat was cut off, and that success was hopeless. Then, indeed, their hopes fell, and despair took possession of every heart. Still, however, the Russian courage was unshaken: uniting the fronts of battalions, closing the ranks of the soldiers, they presented, in circumstances which seemed wellnigh desperate, an unbroken front to the enemy. In vain the artillery, approaching to half cannon-shot distance, ploughed through their dense array; in vain the French infantry threw in a destructive fire with ceaseless vigour; in vain the grenadiers of their guard charged repeatedly with the shouts and confidence of victory: not one square was broken—not one gun was taken. Slowly and in solid order they retired, leisurely retracing their steps towards the river, keeping up an incessant rolling fire from the rear, which faced the enemy, and charging with the bayonet whenever hard pressed by their pursuers.*† Whoever witnessed the conduct of that devoted host during these trying hours, must have felt that Russia, if adequately directed, was destined in the end to take the lead in the deliverance of Europe.

Benningesen, meanwhile, without losing his

* Wilson, 160, 161. Sav., iii., 59. Jom., ii., 418, 419. Dum., xix., 20, 21. Saalf., i., 646.

† "But yet, though thick the shafts as snow,
Though charging knights like whirlwinds go,
Though bill-men ply the ghastly blow,
Unbroken was the ring;

* * * * *

Each stepping where his comrade stood,
The instant that he fell.
No thought was there of dastard flight:
Link'd in the serried phalanx tight,
Groom fought like noble, squire like knight,
As fearlessly and well;
Till utter darkness closed her wing
O'er their thin host and wounded king.
Then skill'd Napoleon's sage commands
Led back from strife his shatter'd bands;
And from the charge they drew,
As mountain-waves, from wasted lands,
Sweep back to ocean blue.

Then did their loss his foemen know:
Their chiefs, their lords, their mightiest low,
They melted from the field as snow,
When streams are swollen and south winds blow,
Dissolves in silent dew.

Alle's echoes heard the ceaseless plash,

While many a broken band,

Disorder'd through her currents dash,

To gain the Russian land." *Marmion*, canto vi.

* Sav., iii., 58, 59. Dum., xix., 17, 19. Wilson, 159, 160. Jom., ii., 417, 418. Bign., vi., 303, 304.

† Saalf., Gesch. der Krieg von Nap., i., 644-7. Wilson, 159, 160. Sav., iii., 58, 59. Jom., ii., 418. Dum., xix., 19, 21.

Benningsen's measures to secure a retreat.

presence of mind in the general wreck, did all that prudence could suggest to repair the consequences of the error into which he had been drawn in the earlier part of the day. His first care was to discover a ford for the cannon, as Friedland was in the hands of the enemy, and the bridges were no longer passable by friends or foes. Happily, some peasants pointed out one where the great park of artillery might be got across: it was in the first instance withdrawn, with the exception of a few pieces which fell into the enemy's hands, while the firm countenance of the infantry warded off the assault of his impetuous columns; but the water came up to the horses' middles, and what remained of the ammunition was utterly spoiled. A hundred guns were immediately after the passage planted on the right bank to retard the enemy; but so closely were the columns on the opposite sides intermingled that it was dangerous to fire, lest the balls should fall in the Russian lines. Meanwhile two of their divisions, impatient of the slow progress at the ford, and unable to endure any longer the incessant showers of musketry and grape, threw themselves, sword in hand, into Friedland, and endeavoured to open a passage with fixed bayonets to the bridge. A desperate struggle ensued with the troops of Ney and Victor in the streets, but the despair of the Russians prevailed over the enthusiasm of the French, and they made their way through the burning houses to the water's edge. There, however, they found the bridges destroyed; and these brave men, after having so heroically cut their way through the hostile ranks, found themselves stopped by an impassable barrier, while the increasing masses of the enemy now enclosed them, amid fire and darkness, on every side. Still, however, no one thought, even in circumstances all but desperate, of surrender: with heroic courage they fought their way back, though with prodigious slaughter, to the ford, and during the darkness of the night plunged into the stream. The water was breast high, and many, missing the fords, were drowned; several guns were abandoned, from the impossibility of dragging them through the press; but such was the unconquerable valour of the rear-guard to the very last, that not one battalion capitulated, and, with the exception of five thousand wounded, few prisoners fell into the enemy's hands.*†

Such was the disastrous battle of Friedland, which at one blow dissolved the great results of the confederacy which the genius and foresight of Mr. Pitt had formed for the coercion of Napoleon's ambition, and left Great Britain alone to maintain the contest with the whole force of the Continent arrayed under his banners. Grievously, then, was felt the want of British aid, and woful were the consequences of the ill-timed parsimony which had withheld all subsidies from Russia during this desperate

struggle: thirty thousand of the militia, whom even a small loan would have clothed and armed, might have averted the catastrophe; twenty thousand British auxiliaries would have converted it into a glorious victory, and thrown Napoleon back upon the Vistula and the Elbe. The losses of the Russians, though nothing like what they had experienced in the decisive overthrow of Austerlitz, were still very severe. Seventeen thousand men had fallen, either killed or wounded, and five thousand of the latter had been made prisoners; but of those unhurt not more than five hundred had become captives; no colours were taken, but seventeen guns remained in the enemy's power. The French had lost eight thousand men, and two eagles wrested from them in fair combat. Nothing can illustrate more clearly the desperate resistance made by the Russians than the small number of guns taken, under circumstances when, with less steady troops, the whole artillery would have been abandoned.*†

During the evening, the right wing of the Russians and part of the cavalry retired by the left bank of the Alle, and crossed without molestation at the bridge of Allenberg. Thither, on the morning after the battle, the remainder of the army retired by the other bank without being at all harassed on the march; indeed, it is a remarkable and unaccountable circumstance that, though fifteen thousand French horse were in the field, they were little engaged in the action after Napoleon arrived on the spot, nor once let loose in the pursuit. On the day following they reached Wehlau, where the Alle and the Pregel unite in the midst of a marshy plain, traversed by a single chaussée. By that defile, not only the artillery and carriages of the main army, but the immense baggage and ammunition train, which had evacuated Königsberg, had to pass; and although no enemy was in sight, yet such was the confusion produced by the enormous accumulation of cannon and chariots on a single chaussée, and such the apprehensions inspired by the evident dangers which would ensue if the rear-guard were to be attacked, that, on a few muskets being accidentally discharged, a general panic took place, and horse, foot, and cannon rushed tumultuously together to the bridge, and, the strongest throwing down and trampling under foot the weaker, broke through and spread in the wildest disorder into the town. Such was the uproar and consternation which ensued, that it was with the utmost difficulty that order could be restored by the personal efforts of

The Russians retreat without molestation to Allenberg and Wehlau. June 15.

June 16.

* Wilson, 163. Dum., xix., 21, 23. Jom., ii., 420, 421. 79th Bull., Camp. de Saxe, iv., 334. Sav., iii., 59, 60.

† The French say in the bulletins, that they took 80 pieces of cannon, and that the Russians had 18,000 killed, and that they lost on their own side only 500 killed and 3000 wounded. Berthier estimated the real loss at Tilsit to Sir R. Wilson at more than 8000; and that officer makes the Russian loss only 12,000 men. The latter estimate, however, is obviously too low, as the peace which immediately followed demonstrated; the account in the bulletin was, as usual, from a third to a fourth of its real amount.—79th Bulletin, Camp de Saxe, iv., 334; and WILSON, 163.

‡ "The Russians had on their right 22 squadrons of cavalry, who covered their retreat; we had more than 40, with which we should have charged them, but, by a fatality without example, these forty squadrons received no orders, and never so much as mounted their horses; they remained during all the battle on foot behind our left; on seeing that, I lamented the Grand-duke de Berg had not been there; if he had, these forty squadrons would certainly have been employed, and not a Russian would have escaped."—SAVARY, iii., 60.

* Saalf., i., 647–8. Wilson, 159, 161. Jom., ii., 419, 421. Dum., xix., 19, 23. Sav., iii., 59. Bign., vi., 304, 305.

† In describing this battle, Lord Hutchinson, who witnessed it, stated, in his official despatches to the British government, "I want words sufficiently strong to describe the valour of the Russians, and which alone would have rendered their success undoubted, if courage alone could secure victory; but, whatever may be the event, the officers and men of the Russian army have done their duty in the noblest manner, and are justly entitled to the praise and admiration of every person who was witness of their conduct."—LORD HUTCHINSON'S Despatch, June 15, 1807; SIR ROBERT WILSON, 162.

Sir Robert Wilson and a few Russian officers who happened to be on the spot; and it inspired these gallant chiefs with the melancholy conviction that, if Napoleon had followed up his success with his wonted vigour, the Russian host would have been utterly annihilated.* But on this occasion, as on many others in the memorable campaign of 1812, it was apparent that the vigour of the emperor in following up his victories was by no means proportioned, either to what it had been in the German or Italian wars, or to the successes which he claimed at the moment: a circumstance for which his panegyrists find it difficult to offer any explanation, but which, in truth, is susceptible of a very easy solution, when the desperate nature of the resistance opposed to him in these northern latitudes, and the consequent magnitude of his losses, is taken into consideration.†

The catastrophe at Friedland, and subsequent retreat of the allies behind the Pregel, rendered the city of Königsberg, which was situated considerably in advance of that river on the left bank or front of its course, no longer tenable. General Lestocq had, with his wonted ability, conducted the retreat of his little army with very little loss, till he was joined on the 12th, in front of Königsberg, by the corps of Kamenskoi. Even their united forces, however, not more than twenty-four thousand strong, could hardly hope to save that town without the assistance of the main army, when they were attacked by the corps of Soult and Davoust, and the greater part of the cavalry under Murat, amounting to full fifty thousand men, of whom above twelve thousand were horse in the finest condition. Notwithstanding this overwhelming odds, however, Lestocq made the attempt, and by the firm countenance which he assumed, and the devoted heroism of his rear-guard in the retreat from the lower Passarge, succeeded in so far retarding the enemy as to gain time for the evacuation of almost all the magazines and stores in the city, even by the narrow and crowded defile of Wehlau. But this great object was not gained

without sustaining a considerable loss. A battalion was surrounded and made prisoners which had been left to defend the passage of the Frisching; and on the following

day, a column of twelve hundred men, which was enveloped by St. Cyr's division and Murat's cavalry, was, after a gallant resistance, compelled to surrender. Weakened by these losses, Lestocq, however, still maintained his ground in Königsberg, repeatedly repulsed the attempts to storm it which were made by the Brandenburg gate, and remained there all the day, putting the mouldering fortifications in a respectable posture of defence, and pressing the evacuation of the magazines; but on the day

following, having received accounts of the battle of Friedland, he ordered the garrison to be under arms, under pretence of making a sally, and when evening approached, the whole took the direction of Labian and the Pregel, leaving General Sutterheim with two battalions of light infantry to man the walls. He also evacuated the place at midnight, and on the following morning the magistrates sent the keys of the city

to Marshal Soult. Three thousand sick or wounded fell into the hands of the enemy; but such was the activity of General Lestocq, and the skill with which Sutterheim conducted his measures, that no magazines or stores of any importance were taken, and the rear-guard, though frequently molested, effected its retreat, without any serious loss, to Wehlau, where they joined the main army as it was defiling over the bridge.*†

Meanwhile Napoleon, after his usual custom, rode on the following morning over the field of battle. It presented a ghastly spectacle, second only to the terrific field of Eylau in circumstances of horror. Then might be seen evident proofs of the stern and unconquerable valour with which the Russians had combated: the position of the squares of infantry could be distinctly traced by the dead bodies of the men, which still preserved their regular array; the station of the cavalry was seen by the multitude of horses, which lay dead as they had stood in squadrons or batteries on the field. In the pursuit, however, he exerted none of his usual vigour, and threw away, in the prosecution of a minor object, the fairest opportunity he had ever enjoyed of destroying the Russian army. Intent only on cutting the enemy off from Königsberg, and securing to himself that noble prize of victory, he totally neglected the following up of his success on the right bank of the Alle, and suffered the disorganized and shattered Russian army to retire without molestation through the narrow defile that penetrated the marshes of Wehlau and over the single bridge of the Pregel, when a little additional vigour in the pursuit would at least have compelled them to abandon, at the entrance

* Wilson, 167, 169. Dum., xix., 33, 36.

† Napoleon, with his usual mendacious policy, gave out, in his 79th bulletin, that he had taken in Königsberg not only twenty thousand prisoners and immense public magazines, but 160,000 British stand of arms! It appeared a happy stroke to make the Parisians believe that the tardy succours of Great Britain had arrived just in time to arm the French troops. "This assertion," Sir R. Wilson justly observes, "is a falsehood of the most extravagant character, and which finds no parallel but in the catalogue of their own compositions." In truth, the British arms escaped by a circumstance more discreditable to England than the falsehood which Napoleon asserted; they had not yet arrived. The cannon, ammunition, and arms for Prussia were sent by Lord Hutchinson, after the armistice, to a Swedish port; those for Russia were landed at Riga, and delivered to the Russian troops.—*Parl. Returns*, 1807. *Parl. Hist.*, ix., App.; and Wilson, 167. The falsehood in regard to the stores taken at Königsberg appeared in the bulletin giving the details of the battle of Friedland, dated Wehlau, June 17, the very day on which that town was taken by the French troops. He there said, "Marshal Soult has entered Königsberg, where we found many hundred thousand quintals of wheat, more than 20,000 Russians and Prussians wounded, and all the military stores which England had sent out; among the rest, 160,000 muskets, still on shipboard." This fabrication was made at Wehlau on the 17th, which is 30 miles from Königsberg, before it was possible that anything farther than the bare capture of the city could have been heard of by the French emperor. The falsehood in the first bulletin, which corresponded to his wishes rather than the reality, was so gross, that it could not be repeated in the succeeding one, dated Tilisit, 19th June, which, after recapitulating the successes of Soult and the fall of Königsberg, said, "In fine, the result of all these affairs has been, that 4000 or 5000 prisoners and 15 pieces of cannon have fallen into our hands. Two hundred Russian vessels, and great stores of subsistence, wine, and spirits, have been found in Königsberg." Yet so little do the French writers attend to accuracy in their detail, that the enormous falsehood in the first bulletin, even when abandoned by the second, has been adopted by all their historians, even Jomini and Dumas, whose accuracy is in general so praiseworthy.—See Dum., xiv., 33; and Jom., ii., 422; and 79th and 80th Bullet., *Camp. de Saxe*, iv., 338, 342; and BIGN., vi., 308; and NORVINS, iii., 27.

* Et si continuo, victorem ea cura subisset, Ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset.

In the first alarm, the Cossacks crowded down to the right bank of the Alle, and, swimming the river, advanced on the opposite side, and discharged a volley of arrows with considerable effect at the enemy.—Wilson, 163, 165.

† Wilson, 164, 165. Dum., xix., 34, 35.

of these passes, the greater part of their baggage and artillery. On the evening of the

June 18. 18th, the allied army, which had united at Wehlau with the troops under Kamenskoi and Lostocq, falling back from Königsberg, reached Tilsit on the Niemen, and early on the following morning the mighty array began to de-file over the bridge. For forty hours successively the passage continued without intermission; horse, foot, cannon, baggage-wagons, store-chariots, succeeded each other in endless array.

June 19. it seemed as if the East was swallowing up the warlike brood which had so long contended with the West for the mastery of Europe. Still, though a hundred thousand men, flushed with victory, were hardly a day's march in the rear, no attempt was made by Napoleon to molest their passage. A few cannon-shots alone were exchanged between the Cossacks and the horse-artillery of Murat,* which, on the morning of the 20th, approached the town

June 20. of Tilsit, which was shortly after evacuated by Bagrathion with the Russian rear-guard, who withdrew without molestation across the river, and burned the bridge.

In truth, hostilities were no longer either required or expedient. Disheartened by the defeat which he had experienced; chagrined at the refusal of succours either in men or money from England; irritated at the timid policy of Austria, when the fairest opportunity that ever yet had occurred was presented for her decisive interposition; foiled in the objects for which he had originally begun the war, and deserted by those for whose advantage, more than his own, it had been undertaken, the Emperor Alexander had taken his resolution. He deemed it unnecessary and improper to risk the independence of Russia in a quarrel not directly affecting its interests, and from which the parties immediately concerned had withdrawn. On the 18th, therefore, General Benningsen wrote a letter to Prince Bagrathion, desiring him to make known to the French generals the emperor's desire for an armistice; this was accordingly communicated to

June 19. Murat on the forenoon of the following day, and orders were immediately transmitted for hostilities to cease at all points. Thus was this mighty conflagration, which originally commenced on the banks of the Danube, finally stilled on the shores of the Niemen.†

These proposals on the part of the Russian emperor gave the highest satisfaction to Napoleon. It had ever been his policy to offer peace to his enemies during the first tumult and consternation of defeat; and more than once, by such well-timed advances, he had extricated himself from a situation of the utmost peril. To be anticipated in this manner in his desires, and have the public demonstration afforded of the reality of his victory by the enemy proposing an

armistice, was a circumstance of all others the most gratifying, which raised him at once to the highest point of glory. He was not ignorant that here, as at Leoben and Austerlitz, a farther continuance of the contest might be attended with very serious dangers. England, it is true, had hitherto, in an unaccountable manner, kept herself secluded from the struggle: but a change had taken place in her councils; a close alliance had been contracted with Prussia; powerful succours in arms and ammunition were on their route, and the greatest military expedition she had ever sent forth was preparing to hoist the flag of a national war on the banks of the Elbe. The dubious policy of Austria rendered it more than probable that, in such an event, she would throw off the mask, and that eighty thousand armed mediators might suddenly make their appearance under the walls of Dresden, and totally intercept the communications of the Grand Army with France. Russia, it was true, was defeated; the army of Bagrathion was little more than half its former amount; but thirty thousand men were advancing, under Prince Labanoff, to repair its losses; and if its frontiers were invaded, and a national resistance aroused, there were four hundred thousand militia enrolled, who would speedily fill the ranks of the regular army. Napoleon, indeed, could collect, notwithstanding the losses of the short campaign, a hundred and fifty thousand men on the Niemen; but even this mighty host appeared hardly adequate to the task of subduing an empire whose dominions on this side of the Ural Mountains exceeded all the rest of Europe put together. How were the conquered provinces to be kept in subjection; how the fortresses taken garrisoned; how the immense lines of communication kept up when the war was to commence at the distance of nearly a thousand miles from the Rhine, and the Scythian monarch, if resolute on preserving his independence, might retreat a thousand miles farther without coming to the verge of his European dominions?*

Nor were the considerations less powerful which induced Alexander to desire an accommodation. By engaging in the war on this desperate principle, indeed, and drawing the enemy into the heart of his dominions, he had every chance of defeating the invasion of this second Darius into the deserts of Scythia; but this could only be done by great sacrifices, and at the hazard of throwing back, for a long period, the internal improvement of his rising dominions. For what object were these sacrifices to be made? For the preservation of Prussia? She was already crushed, and a few inconsiderable forts, with the town of Graudentz, were all that remained to Frederic William of the dominions of his illustrious ancestors. For the safety of England? She was sufficiently protected by her invincible fleets;

Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an accommodation.

* Wilson, 168, 170. Dum., xix., 35, 40. Bign., vi., 308, 309.

† Wilson, 170, 171. Dum., xix., 42, 44.

‡ During this desperate struggle between the Passarge, a conflict of some importance, but overlooked amid the shock of such mighty hosts, took place on the banks of the Narew. Tolstoy had there gained some successes over Masseana, and in particular, made himself master of the entrenched camp of Borki; but the French having at June 15. tacked it some days after with increased forces, it again fell into their hands, and the Russians, following the retreat of their principal army, had retired from Ostrolenka towards Ticozin, when the armistice of Tilsit put a period to their operations.—DUMAS, xix., 41, 43.

* Hard., ix., 426.

† The following regular forces, exclusive of 400,000 militia, were still at the command of the Russian government:

Remains of the army which fought at Friedland . . .	28,000
Kamenskoi's corps	9,000
Re-enforcements which joined at Tilsit, or on march . .	9,000
At Olita half of Labanoff's corps	15,000
Prussians retired with Lestocq	18,000
Tolstoy's corps on the Narew	18,000
On march from Wilna	15,000
Total regulars	112,000

—WILSON, 176.

and the interest she had evinced in the struggle had not been such as to render it imperative on the Czar, either in honour or policy, to continue the contest on her account.* For the sake of the balance of power? That was an object, however important, which could not be brought about by the unaided efforts of a single empire; and if Austria, whose interests were more immediately concerned in its preservation, was not inclined to draw the sword in the conflict, it did not appear that Russia, whose independence had never yet been seriously threatened, was called upon to continue it unaided for its restoration. Now was an opportunity when the war might be terminated, if not with advantage, at least without dishonour: in the fields of Pultusk, Eylau, and Heilsberg, the Russians had sufficiently vindicated their title to military glory; and objects of immediate importance were to be gained nearer home both on the Danube and the Neva,† amply sufficient to indemnify the empire for a temporary withdrawal from the general theatre of European strife.

When such were the dispositions on both sides, there was little difficulty in coming to an armistice. to an understanding. France had June 22. nothing to demand of Russia except that she should close her ports against England: Russia nothing to ask of France but that she should withdraw her armies from Poland, and permit the emperor to pursue his long-cherished projects of conquest in Turkey. The map of Europe lay before them, out of which these two mighty potentates might carve at pleasure ample indemnities for themselves or acquisitions for their allies. No difficulty, in consequence, was experienced in settling the terms of the armistice: the Niemen separated the two armies; the headquarters of Napoleon were fixed at Tilsit, on the left bank of the river; those of Alexander at Piktuhpohnen, a mile distant on the right bank. A friendly intercourse was immediately established between the officers and men of the two armies: they had felt each other's valour too strongly not to be inspired with sentiments of mutual respect; while Napoleon, in eloquent terms, addressed his soldiers on this glorious termination of their labours, in one of those proclamations which made Europe thrill from side to side.‡

* The secret motives which induced the Emperor Alexander to conclude the treaty of Tilsit were the refusal by Lord Howick (now Earl Grey) to guaranty the Russian subsidies, and that, too, in a manner peculiarly painful to the feelings of the emperor: a refusal the more inexplicable, as that minister was the very person who had, after the catastrophe of Jena, warmly solicited the Czar to fly to the succour of Prussia; the delay in the arrival of the troops promised by England in the island of Rugen; the tardiness of the new administration in furnishing the promised supplies in money, arms, and ammunition, circumstances which had warmly irritated him against the English government; the refusal of Austria to accede to the convention of Bartenstein, or take any part in the contest, as well as the exhaustion of his own finances, the penury of arms and ammunition, the famishing state of the troops, and the risk of total overthrow to which they were exposed.—HARDENBERG, ix., 425, and LUCCHESINI, i., 322, 323.

† Boutourlin, Camp. de 1812, i., 21, 22. Hard., ix. Lucchesi, i., 322, 223.

‡ Bign., vi., 308, 312. Dum., xix., 44, 50.

§ "Soldiers! on the 5th of June, we were attacked in Napoleon's our countenances by the Russian army; the unexpected proclamation my misunderstanding the cause of our inactivity. He has learned, when it is too late, that our repose was that of the lion; he now repents having forgotten it. In the days of Guttstadt, of Heilsberg, in the ever-memorable field of Friedland, in a ten days' campaign; in short, we have taken 120 pieces of cannon, 7 standards, killed or wounded 60,000 Russians,

An armistice having been thus concluded, it was agreed that the two emperors should meet to arrange, in a private Interview on the raft at Tilsit, the destinies of the world. It took place, accordingly, on the 25th, under circumstances eminently calculated to impress the imagination of mankind. By the direction of the French general of engineers, Lariboissiere, a raft of great dimensions was constructed on the River Niemen: the raft of Tilsit, which will be recollected as long as the cage of Bajazet or the conquests of Alexander. It was moored in the centre of the stream, and on its surface a wooden apartment, surmounted by the eagles of France and Russia, framed with all the possible magnificence which the time and circumstances would admit. This was destined for the reception of the emperors alone; at a little distance was stationed another raft, less sumptuously adorned, for their respective suites. The shore on either side was covered with the Imperial Guard of the two monarchs, drawn up in triple lines, in the same firm and imposing array in which they had stood on the fields of Eylau and Friedland. At one o'clock precisely, amid the thunder of artillery, each emperor stepped into a boat on his own side of the river, accompanied by a few of his principal officers: Napoleon was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt; Alexander by the Grand-duke Constantine, General Benningssen, Prince Labanoff, General Ouvaroff, and Count Lieven; the numerous and splendid suite of each monarch followed in another boat immediately after. The bark of Napoleon, rowed by the marines of his Guard, advanced with greater rapidity than that of Alexander. He arrived first at the raft, entered the apartment, and himself opened the door on the opposite side to receive the Czar, while the shouts of the soldiers on either shore drowned even the roar of the artillery. In a few seconds Alexander arrived, and was received by the conqueror at the door on his own side; their meeting was friendly, and the very first words which he uttered bespoke both the lacerated feelings occasioned by the conduct of the government of Great Britain during the war, his deep penetration, and clear perception of the ruling passion of Napoleon: "I hate the English," said he, "as much as you do, and am ready to second you in all your enterprises against them." "In that case," replied Napoleon, "everything will be easily arranged, and peace is already made." The interview lasted two hours, during which Napoleon exercised all the ascendancy which his extraordinary talents and fortune, as well as singular powers of fascination gave him, while the Russian emperor

wrested from the enemy's army all its magazines and hospitals, the fortress of Königsberg, with three hundred vessels which it contained, loaded with ammunitions of war of all sorts, and especially 160,000 muskets sent by England to arm our enemies. From the shores of the Vistula we have arrived on those of the Niemen with the rapidity of the eagle. You celebrated at Austerlitz the anniversary of my coronation, but you have this year worthily commemorated that of Marengo, which terminated the war of the second coalition. Frenchmen, you are worthy of yourselves, and of me. You will return to your country covered with laurels, and after having gained a peace which will be its own guarantee. It is time that our country should live in repose, sheltered from the malignant influence of England. My benefactions to you shall testify the large measure of my gratitude, and the whole extent of the love which I bear you." Already was to be seen, not merely in Napoleon's thoughts, but in his words, a return to the celebrated maxim of Louis XIV., "L'état c'est moi."—BIGNON, vi., 311, 312.

gave proof of the tact and finesse, as well as diplomatic ability, by which his nation beyond any other in Europe is gifted. Before they parted the outlines of the treaty were arranged between them—it was not difficult to come to an understanding—the world afforded ample room for the aggrandizement of both.*†

On the day following a second interview took place at the same town, at which the King of Prussia was present; the first had been arranged, and the preliminary terms agreed to, without any concert with that unhappy prince. He was no longer in a situation to stipulate any conditions: bereft of his dominions, driven up into a corner of his territories, destitute of everything, he had no alternative but submission to the stern law of the conqueror.‡ As it was now evident that an accommodation was about to take place, arrangements were made for conducting it with more convenience to the exalted personages concerned. Part of the town of Tilsit was declared neutral, and allotted to the accommodation of the Emperor of Russia and his suite; thither he repaired on the afternoon of the same day, and was received with all imaginable courtesy by Napoleon himself, upon landing on the left bank of the river from his boat. Amid discharges of artillery, and the acclamations of a vast multitude of spectators, whom the extraordinary spectacle had collected together, did these two sovereigns, whose hostility had so lately dyed the fields of Poland with blood, ride side by side to the quarters prepared for the Czar, through a triple line of the French Imperial Guard. The attention of Napoleon descended to the most minute particulars: the furniture in the Emperor of Russia's rooms was all sent from the French headquarters; a sumptuous train of cooks and other attendants were in readiness to make him forget the luxuries of St. Petersburg; even his couch was prepared in a camp-bed of the French emperor's which he had made use of in his campaigns. The King of Prussia also arrived, two days after, in Tilsit with his beautiful and unfortunate queen; and the ministers on both sides, Talleyrand on the part of France, and Prince Kourakin on that of Russia, and Marshal Kalkreuth on that of Prussia; but they were of little service, for such was the extraordinary length to which the intimacy of the two emperors had gone, that not only did they invariably dine and pass the evening together, but almost all the morning conferences, during

which the destinies of the world were arranged, were conducted by themselves in person.*

"Had the Queen of Prussia arrived earlier at our conferences," says Napoleon, "it might have had much influence on the result of the negotiations; but, happily, she did not make her appearance till all was settled, and I was in a situation to decide everything in twenty-four hours. As soon as she arrived I went to pay her a visit; she was very beautiful, but somewhat past the first flower of youth. She received me in despair, exclaiming, 'Justice! justice!' and throwing herself back with loud lamentations; I at length prevailed on her to take a seat, but she continued, nevertheless, her pathetic entreaties. 'Prussia,' said she, 'was blinded in regard to her power: she ventured to enter the lists with a hero, oppose herself to the destinies of France, neglect its fortunate friendship! she has been well punished for her folly—the glory of the Great Frederic, the halo his name spread round our arms, had inflated the heart of Prussia—they have caused her ruin.' Magdebourg, in an especial manner, was the object of her entreaties; and when Napoleon, before dinner, presented her with a beautiful rose, she at first refused it, but immediately after took it with a smile, adding, at the same time, 'Yes! but at least with Magdebourg.' "I must observe to your majesty," replied the emperor, "that it is I who give, and you only who must receive." Napoleon had the talents of Cæsar, but not the chivalry of Henry IV. "After all," said he, "a fine woman and gallantry are not to be weighed against affairs of state." He had frequently, during the repast, found himself hard pressed by the talent and grace of the queen, and he resolved to cut the matter short. When she had retired, he sent for Talleyrand and Prince Kourakin, arranged the few remaining points of difference, and signed the treaty. The queen was violently affected next day when she learned that all was concluded: she refused to see the emperor, and loudly protested she had been deceived by him, an assertion which he positively denies, and which his selfish intellectual character rendered highly improbable. At length she was prevailed on by Alexander to be again present at dinner; and when Napoleon conducted her down stairs after it was over, she stopped in the middle, pressed his hand as he bade her farewell, and said, "Is it possible that, after having had the good fortune to be so nearly the Hero of the Age, he has not left me the satisfaction of being able to assure him that he has attached me to him for life?" "Madame," replied the emperor, "I lament, if it is so; it is the effect of my evil destiny;" and they separated, never again to meet in this world.†

* Savary, iii., 76, 77. Bign., vi., 315, 316. Dum., xix., 53, 55.

† Savary, who had been nominated governor of Königsberg, received orders, when the French army first approached the Niemen, to get ready a pontoon-train, which had been left in the arsenal of that city, for immediate operation. Next day, however, he received the following significant note from Talleyrand: "Be in no hurry with your pontoons: what would we gain by passing the Niemen? what is there to be acquired beyond that river? The emperor must abandon his ideas in regard to Poland: that nation is fit for nothing; disorder alone is to be organized out of its inhabitants. We have another far more important matter to settle: here is a fair opportunity of terminating the present dispute; we must not let it escape." Already the Spanish invasion had entered into the calculations of the rulers of Europe on the Niemen.—SAVARY, iii., 76.

‡ At this period he wrote to the King of Sweden: "Immediately after the armistice, my imperial ally concluded peace on his own account alone. Abandoned in this manner, and left without support on the great theatre of war, I found myself forced, how painful soever to my feelings, to do the same, and to sign a peace, though its conditions were to the last degree hard and overwhelming."—SCHÖELL, viii., 410, and LUCCHES., i., 328.

* Savary, iii., 77, 78. Bign., vi., 316, 317. Dum., xix., 55, 57.

† Las Cas., iv., 224, 228.

‡ "The Queen of Prussia," said Napoleon, "unquestionably possessed talents, great information, and singular acquaintance with affairs; she was the real character of the sovereign for fifteen years. In truth, in spite of my address and utmost efforts, she constantly led of Prussia. The conversation, returned at pleasure to her subject, and directed it as she chose, but still with so much tact and delicacy, that it was impossible to take offence. And, in truth, it must be confessed that the objects at stake were of infinite importance; the time short and precious. One of the high contracting parties frequently repeated to me, that I should forgive everything or nothing at all; but I answered that I had done everything in my power to put things in such a train. The King of Prussia requested an interview that very day to take leave: I put it off for twenty-four hours, at the secret solicitation of Alexander: he never forgave me that postponement. I discovered, in all

The Russians at Tilsit did not consider themselves as vanquished; on the contrary, they felt, after all their misfortunes, much of the exultation of victory. Proud of having so long arrested the progress of the conqueror of the world, glorying even in the amount of their losses and the chasms in the ranks, which told the desperate strife in which they had been engaged, they mingled with their recent enemies with feelings unlacerated by the humiliation of defeat. It was obvious that peace was equally necessary to both emperors; it was soon whispered that it was to be concluded on terms eminently favourable to the Russian Empire. The utmost cordiality, in consequence, soon prevailed between the officers and soldiers of the two armies: fêtes and repasts succeeded one another in rapid order, given by the warriors so recently hostile to each other. In these entertainments the officers of the two Imperial Guards, and in particular Prince Murat and the Grand-duke Constantine, were peculiarly cordial and complimentary to each other. On one of these occasions, to such a length did the effusions of mutual respect and regard proceed, that the officers of the two Guards, amid the fumes of wine and the enthusiasm of the moment, mutually exchanged their uniforms; French hearts beat under the decorations won amid the snows of Eylau, and Russian bosoms warmed beneath the orders bestowed on the fields of Austerlitz. Last and most singular effect of civilized life and military discipline, to strengthen at once the fierceness of national passions and the bonds by which they are to be restrained, and join in fraternal brotherhood one day those hands which, on another, had been dyed by mutual slaughter, or lifted up in relentless hostility against each other!*

In the course of their rides together, the two emperors had frequent opportunities of observing the flower of their respective armies. Napoleon afterward acknowledged that he had never seen anything which impressed him so much as the appearance of one of the regiments

of the Russian Guard. Albeit noways an admirer of the rigid formality of German tactics, and trusting rather to the effect of proclamations on the spirit of his troops than the influence of discipline on their movements, he was inexpressibly struck with the military aspect of its soldiers, and could not avoid the conclusion, that an army thus constituted would be the first in the world, if to the firmness and precision which it had already attained, it should come to unite the fire and enthusiasm of the French. The docility with which they submitted to the orders they received, whatever they were, struck him as particularly admirable. "My soldiers," said he, "are as brave as it is possible to be, but they are too much addicted to reasoning on their position. If they had the impassable firmness and docility of the Russians, the world would be too small for their exploits. The French soldiers are too much attached to their country to play the part of the Macedonians."*

After a fortnight of conference, the treaty of Tilsit, which had been agreed on in the leading articles in the first four days after the armistice, was formally signed and published to the world. The first treaty, between France and Russia, was signed on the 7th; the second, between France and Prussia, on the 9th of July. By the first, the Emperor Napoleon, as a mark of his regard for the *Emperor of Russia*, agreed to restore to the King of Prussia Silesia, and nearly all his German dominions on the right bank of the Elbe, with the fortresses on the Oder and in Pomerania. The provinces which, prior to the first partition in 1772, formed part of the kingdom of Poland, and had since been annexed to Prussia, were detached from that monarchy and erected into a separate principality, to be called the GRAND-DUCHY OF WARSAW, and bestowed on the King of Saxony, with the exception of the province of Bialystock, containing two hundred thousand souls, which was ceded to Russia, which thus participated, in the hour of misfortune, in a share, small, indeed, but still a share, of the spoils of its ally. Dantzic, with a limited portion of territory around it, was declared a free and independent city, under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony, which was in effect declaring it, what it immediately after became, a frontier town of France. A right to a free military road was granted to the King of Saxony across the Prussian States, to connect his German with his Polish dominions; the navigation of the Vistula was declared free to Prussia, Saxony, and Dantzic; the Dukes of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were reinstated in their dominions, but under the condition that their harbours should all be occupied by French troops, so as to exclude the introduction of English merchandise; the mediation of the Emperor of Russia was accepted with a view to the arrangement of a general peace; the Kings of Naples and Holland, with the Confederation of the Rhine, were recognised by the Emperor of Russia; a new kingdom, to be called the KINGDOM OF WEST-PHALIA, was erected in favour of Jerome Bonaparte, the emperor's brother, composed of the whole provinces ceded by Prussia on the left bank of the Elbe, which was recognised by the

Treaty of Tilsit. Its leading provisions. July 7 and 9.

Article 9. Creation of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and kingdom of Westphalia.

Art. 5.

Art. 6.

Art. 7.

Art. 8.

Art. 12.

Art. 13.

Art. 19.

Art. 19.

* Jom., ii., 423, 424.

* Bign., vi., 317, 318.

his unfortunate ally.—SAVARY, iv., 92, note.

- Art. 20. Emperor of Russia. Hostilities were to cease between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to be evacuated by the Russian troops, but not occupied by those of the sultan, till the ratification of a general peace; the Emperor of Russia accepted the mediation of Napoleon for the conclusion of his differences with Turkey; the Emperors of Russia and France mutually guaranteed their respective dominions, and agreed to establish commercial relations with each other on the footing of the most favoured nations.*

By the second treaty, concluded two days after, between France and Prussia, the King of Prussia recognised the Kings of Naples, Holland, Westphalia, and the Confederation of the Rhine, and concluded peace with the sovereigns of those respective states, as well as with the Emperor of France: he ceded to the kings or princes who should be designated by the Emperor Napoleon all the dominions which at the commencement of the war he possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, and engaged to offer no opposition to any arrangement in regard to them which his imperial majesty might choose to adopt:

- Art. 12. King of Prussia ceded, in addition, to the King of Saxony the circle of Gotha, in Lower Lusatia; he renounced all right to his acquisitions in Poland subsequent to the 1st of January, 1772, and to the city and surrounding territory of Dantzic; and consented to their erection into a separate duchy in favour of the King of Saxony, as well as to the military road through his dominions to connect the Polish with the German possessions of the latter sovereign: he agreed to the extension of the frontiers of Russian Poland, by the cession of the provinces of Bialystock; consented, till the conclusion of a general maritime peace, to close his harbours without exception to the ships and commerce of Great Britain; and concurred in the formation of a separate convention, having for its object the restoration of the strongholds of Prussia at certain fixed periods, and the sums to be paid for their civil and military evacuation.†

The losses of Prussia by this treaty were enormous. Between the states forming part of her possessions ceded to by this treaty, the grand-duchy of Warsaw and those acquired by the kingdom of Westphalia, she lost 4,236,048 inhabitants, or nearly a half of her dominions, for those retained contained only 5,034,504 souls.‡ But, overwhelming as

the losses were, they constituted but a small part of the calamities which fell on this ill-fated monarchy by this disastrous peace. The fortresses left her, whether in Silesia or on the Oder, remained in the hands of France nominally, as a security for payment of the war contributions which were to be levied on the impoverished inhabitants, but really to overawe its government, and entirely paralyze its military resources. A garrison of twenty thousand French soldiers was stationed in Dantzic: a frontier station of immense importance, both as hermetically closing the mouths of the Vistula, giving the French authorities the entire command of the commerce of Poland, and affording an advanced post which, in the event of future hostilities, would be highly serviceable in a war with Russia. The newly-established kingdoms of Westphalia and Saxony, with the military road through Prussia, terminating in the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, gave the French emperor the undisputed control of Northern Germany; in effect, brought up the French frontier to the Niemen, and enabled him to commence any future war with the same advantage from that distant river as he had done the present from the banks of the Rhine. At the same time, enormous contributions, amounting to the stupendous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of *six hundred millions of francs*, or twenty-four millions sterling, were imposed on the countries which had been the seat of war between the Rhine and the Niemen; a sum at least equal to a hundred millions sterling in Great Britain, when the difference in the value of money and the wealth of the two states are taken into consideration. This grievous exaction completely paralyzed the strength of Prussia, and rendered her for the next five years totally incapable of extricating herself from that iron net in which she was enveloped by the continued occupation of her fortresses by the French troops.*†

* Hard., ix., 490, 491.

† This war contribution on the north of Germany was so prodigious a burden, and in its first effects was so instrumental in increasing the power of France, and in its ultimate results in occasioning its overthrow, that the particulars of it are here given, taken from the authentic archives of Count Daru, the chief commissioner intrusted by Napoleon with its collection, as one of the most instructive and curious monuments of the revolutionary wars.

War contributions imposed since the 15th of October, 1806, and levied before the 1st of January, 1808.....			France.
			474,352,650, or £19,000,000
Remaining still to recover.....			39,391,759 1,600,000
Contributions levied in kind.....			90,483,511 3,600,000
			604,227,920 £24,200,000

—See DARU'S *Report to NAPOLEON, 1st of January, 1808*; DUM., xix., 462, 465; *Pièces Just.*

In the Prussian estimate the amount is stated considerably higher, even in so far as it was levied on the Prussian States alone. It stood thus:

War contributions, in specie....			France.
			220,000,000, or £8,800,000
Maintenance of the fortresses....			40,000,000 1,600,000
Contributions in kind, without counting the balloting of soldiers.....			346,800,000 14,600,000
Miscellaneous losses.....			8,000,000 320,000
Losses sustained in the local taxes.....			75,000,000 3,000,000
Ditto in the general revenue....			50,000,000 2,000,000
			739,800,000 £30,320,000

—See SCHÖELL, vi., 518.

When it is recollected that the whole revenues of Prussia were only about £6,000,000; that money at that period was at least of twice the value there that it was in England; and that the monarchy was already exhausted by the immense efforts made for the campaign of 1806, either of these estimates must appear among the most enormous instances of military exaction on record in history.

* Mart., Sup., iv., 436, 444. Dum., xix., 58, 64.

† Mart., Sup., iv., 444, 451. Dum., xix., 64, 71.

‡ She lost on the east of the River Elbe:

	Soult.
Circle of Kottbus.....	33,500
Of Western Prussia.....	269,286
Southern Prussia, Old Poland.....	1,282,189
New Eastern Prussia.....	904,518
	2,482,493

On the west of the Elbe:

Circle of Old Munich and Prignitz.....	112,000
Duchy of Magdebourg.....	250,039
Halberstadt.....	148,230
Hildesheim.....	130,069
Ecclesfeld and Erfurth.....	164,690
Maiden and Ravensberg.....	159,776
Paderborn, Munster, Leugen, and Tecklenberg.....	268,542
La Marche, Essen, Elten, and Wreden.....	162,101
East Friedland.....	119,803
Bayreuth.....	238,305
	4,236,048

—See BIGN., vi., 335, and HARD., ix., 467.

Important as the changes introduced by these public treaties of Tilsit were to the political interests of Europe, they were far inferior in daring and magnitude to the provisions of the secret conventions concluded at the same place between the French emperor and the Russian autocrat. These two mighty potentates, who so lately had been actuated by the strongest hostility against each other, deeming themselves invincible when they had united their arms together, had conceived, beyond all question, the project of dividing the world between them. To Russia was assigned, with hardly any limitations, the Empire of the East: France acquired absolute sway in all the kingdoms of the West; both united in cordial hostility against the maritime power of Great Britain. Turkey, in consequence, was abandoned almost without reserve to the Russian autocrat. To the cession of Constantinople alone Napoleon never would agree, and rivalry for the possession of that matchless capital, itself worth an empire, was one of the principal causes which afterward led him into the desperate chances of the Moscow campaign. The clause on this subject was in the following

Art. 8. Secret treaty.

terms: "In like manner, if, in consequence of the changes which have recently taken place in the government of Constantinople, the Porte shall decline the intervention of France; or in case, having accepted it, the negotiations shall not have led to a satisfactory adjustment in the space of three months, France will make common cause with Russia against the Ottoman Porte, and the two high contracting parties will unite their efforts to wrest from the vexations and oppression of the Turkish Empire all its provinces in Europe, Rometia and Constantinople alone excepted.*"

The abandonment of all Turkey, with the exception of its capital and the small adjacent province, to the ambition of its hereditary and inveterate enemies, called for a similar concession to the leading objects of French ambition. This was provided for in the articles regarding the prosecution of the war against England, and the cession of the Spanish Peninsula to the French emperor. In regard to the first object, it was provided that, in case the proffered mediation of France to adjust the differences with the cabinet of St. James should not be accepted, Russia should make common cause with France against England, with all its forces by sea and

land; or "if, having accepted it, peace was not concluded by the 1st of November, on terms stipulating that the flags of every power should enjoy a perfect and entire equality on every sea, and that all the conquests made of French possessions since 1805 should be restored—in that case, also, Russia shall demand a categorical answer by the 1st of December, and the Russian ambassador shall receive a conditional order to quit London." In the event of the English government not having made a satisfactory answer to the Russian requisition,

In addition to all this, Napoleon and his generals, with disgraceful rapacity, carried off from the different palaces in Prussia no less than 127 paintings, most of them by first-rate masters, and 238 marbles or statues, besides all the manuscripts, curiosities, and antiquities they could lay their hands on. The movables thus carried away contrary to all the laws of war, were worth above £300,000. They were all reclaimed and got back by the Prussians on the capture of Paris in 1815.—See the *Official List* in SCROELL, vi., 261, 269.

* Bign., vi., 339, 340. Hard., ix., 430.

"France and Russia shall jointly summon the three courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon, to close their harbours against English vessels, recall their ambassadors from London, and declare war against Great Britain." Hanover was to be restored to England in exchange for the whole colonies she had conquered during the war; Spain was to be compelled to remain in the alliance against Great Britain; and the Emperor of France engaged to do nothing tending to augment the power of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, or which might lead to the re-establishment of the Polish monarchy.*†

This was the whole extent to which the formal secret treaty of Tilsit went; but, extensive as the changes which they contemplated were, they yet yielded in magnitude to those which were also agreed on, in a convention still more secret, between the two emperors. By this, which may literally be called spoiling agreement, the shares which the two imperial robbers were to have respectively in the partition of Europe were chalked out. The mouths of the Cattaro, which had been ostensibly, at least, the original cause of the rupture, were ceded by Russia to France, as well as the seven Ionian islands. Joseph Bonaparte was to be secured in the possession of Sicily, as well as Naples; Ferdinand IV., the reigning King of Sicily, was to receive an indemnity in the Isle of Candia, or some other part of the Turkish Empire; the dominions of the pope were to be ceded to France, as well as Malta and Egypt; the sovereigns of the houses of Bourbon and Braganza in the Spanish Peninsula were to be replaced by princes of the family of Napoleon; and when the final partition of the Ottoman Empire took place, Wallachia, Moldavia, Servia, and Bulgaria were to be allotted to Russia; while Greece, Macedonia, Dalmatia, and all the seacoasts of the Adriatic, were to be enjoyed by France, which engaged, in return, to throw no obstacles in the way of the acquisition of Finland by the Russian emperor.‡

* Bign., vi., 336. Hard., ix., 431. Jom., ii., 434, 435.

† These secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, which are of such moment, both as illustrating the general character of Napoleon's policy, and affording an unanswerable vindication of the Copenhagen expedition, have been literally transcribed from Bignon's work. As that author was not only for long the French ambassador at Berlin, but was also nominated by Napoleon in his testament as the author to whom was committed, with a legacy of 100,000 francs, the task of writing a history of his diplomacy, which he has executed with great ability, it is impossible to quote them from a more unexceptionable authority; and he himself says he has given them "textuellement." They are not yet to be found in any diplomatic collection.—BIGN., vi., 342.

‡ Bign., vi., 347, 348. Hard., ix., 431, 432.

§ As the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit are given chiefly on the authority of M. Bignon, as a chosen partisan of Napoleon, and therefore a valuable unwilling witness, it is proper to mention that he does not admit the express signature of a convention regarding the dethroning of the Spanish and Portuguese sovereigns, and the partition of the Turkish Empire, but says that "these projects were merely sketched out in the private conferences of the two emperors, but without being actually reduced to writing;" while the author of Prince Hardenberg's memoirs, whose accuracy and extent of secret information are in general equally remarkable, asserts that they were embodied in an express treaty.—See BIGN., vi., 345, and HARD., ix., 433. It is of little importance whether they were or were not embodied in a formal convention, since there is no doubt that they were verbally agreed on between the two emperors. We have the authority of the Emperor Alexander that Napoleon said to

Secret agreement between the emperors about Spain and Italy.

Decisive evidence of these projects of spoliation which exists both on the testimony of the French and Russian emperors.

Napoleon was not long of taking steps to pave the way for the acquisition of his share of the Ottoman dominions. On the day after the secret treaty with Russia was signed, he despatched a letter to the King of Naples, informing him of the cession of Corfu to France, and directing him to assemble, in the most secret manner, four thousand men at Otranto and Tarentum, to take possession of that island, and of the mouths of the Cattaro.* On the same day he enjoined Eugene, viceroy of Italy, to send a force of six thousand men into Dalmatia,† while Marshal Marmont, who commanded in that province, was directed, instead of attacking the Montenegrins, as he was preparing to do, to do everything in his power to make these mountaineers receive willingly the French government, beneath which they would soon be placed; and, at the same time, to transmit minute information both as to the resources, population, and revenue of Bosnia, Thrace, Albania, Macedonia, and Greece, and what direction two European armies should follow, entering that country, one by Cattaro, the other by Corfu.‡ At the same time Count Guilleminot

him at Tilsit, "I lay no stress on the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia by your troops; you may protract it if you desire. It is impossible any longer to endure the presence of the Turks in Europe; you are at liberty to chase them into Asia; but observe only, I rely upon it that Constantinople is not to fall into the hands of any European power."—HARD., ix., 432. Napoleon, in conversation with Escoiquiz at Bayonne in the following year, said, "The Emperor Alexander, to whom I revealed at Tilsit my designs against Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would throw no obstacle in the way."—ESCOQUIZ. This coincides with what Savary affirms, who says, "The Emperor Alexander frequently repeated to me, when I was afterward ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Napoleon had said to him that he was under no engagements with the new sultan, and that the changes which had supervened in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to each other. I saw at once that this point had formed the subject of their secret conference at Tilsit; and I could not avoid the conviction that a mutual communication of their projects had taken place, because I could not believe that the Emperor would have abandoned the Turks without receiving some compensation in some other quarter. I have strong reasons for believing that the Spanish question was brought under discussion at Tilsit. The Emperor Napoleon had that affair strongly at heart, and nothing could be more natural than that he should frankly communicate it to the Czar: the more especially as he had on his side a project of aggrandizement, in which, without previous concert, France might be disposed to throw obstacles. I was the more confirmed in this opinion by observing the conduct and language of the Emperor Alexander when the Spanish war broke out."—SAVARY, iii., 98, 99. And Napoleon said at St. Helena, "All the Emperor Alexander's thoughts are directed to the conquest of Turkey. We have had many discussions about it, and at first I was pleased with his proposals, because I thought it would enlighten the world to drive those brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But when I reflected upon its consequences, and saw what a tremendous weight of power it would give to Russia, on account of the number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions, who would naturally join the Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as Alexander wanted to get Constantinople, which I would not allow, as it would have destroyed the equilibrium of power in Europe. I reflected that France would gain Egypt, Syria, and the islands, which would have been nothing in comparison with what Russia would have obtained."—O'MEARA, i., 382. "Was there," says Bignon, "any express treaty assigning to each emperor his share of the Turkish dominions? No; but that there was an agreement on that subject between the two emperors, is beyond a doubt, but no formal treaty." We shall find numberless proofs of this, in the sequel of this work, in the language used by the Emperor Alexander and the actions of Napoleon. They had even gone so far as to assign a portion, also, to the Emperor Francis: "Something," in Alexander's words, "to Austria, to soothe her vanity rather than satisfy her ambition."—BIGNON, vi., 343.

* Nap. to Murat, Tilsit, 8th July.

† Nap. to Eugene, 8th July.

‡ To Marmont Napoleon wrote, on July 8, from Tilsit,

was deputed from Tilsit on a double mission: the first, open and ostensible, to General Michelson's army on the Danube, the other, secret, to General Sebastiani at Constantinople; in the course of which he was to acquire all the information he could on the subject of the population, riches, and geographical position of the country through which he passed.* Finally, to General Sebastiani himself he fully explained the whole design, which was, as stated in his letters, that, as no European power would be permitted to possess Constantinople and the Hellespont, the first thing to be done was "to draw a line from Bourgas, on the Black Sea, to the Gulf of Enos in the Archipelago; and all to the eastward of that line, including Adrianople, was to remain to Turkey; Russia was to obtain Moldavia, Wallachia, and all Bulgaria, as far as the left bank of the Hebrus; Servia was to be allotted to Austria; and Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Peloponnesus, Attica, and Thessalia to France."† Sebastiani at the same time received orders to prepare and transmit, without delay, to the French emperor, a memorial, containing exact details, to define the geographical boundaries of the acquisitions of the three powers entered in the partition.

While Napoleon and Alexander were thus adjusting their differences at Tilsit, by the spoliation of all the weaker powers in Europe, partitioning Turkey, and providing for the dethronement of the sovereigns in the Spanish Peninsula, the chains were drawn yet more closely round unhappy Prussia. In the treaty with that power, it had been provided that a subsidiary military convention should be concluded regarding the period of the evacuation of the fortresses by the French troops, and the sums of money to be paid for their ransom. Nominally, it was provided that they should be evacuated by the 1st of October, with the exception of Stettin, which was still to be garrisoned by French troops; but, as it was expressly declared, as a *sine qua non*, that the whole contributions imposed should be paid up before the evacuation commenced, and that the King of Prussia should levy no revenue in his dominions till these exactions were fully satisfied, and that the Prussians, meanwhile, should feed, clothe, and lodge all

Convention regarding the payment of the French contributions on Prussia.

Art. 2 and 3.

Art. 4.

"Set to work as vigorously as possible to obtain, by officers whom you shall send forward with that view, or in any other way, and address directly to the emperor, in order that he may know by confidential officers, both geographically and civilly, all the information you can acquire regarding Bosnia, Macedonia, Thrace, Albania, &c. What is the amount of its great population; what resources in clothing, provisions, or money those provinces would furnish to any European power which might possess them? In fine, what revenue could be drawn from them at the moment of their occupation, for the principles of their occupation are at present without any proper foundation? In a second memoir state, in a military point of view, if two European armies should enter these provinces at once, the one by Cattaro and Dalmatia into Bosnia, the other by Corfu, what force would be required for each to ensure success; what species of arms would be most advantageous; how could the artillery be transported; could horses for its transport be found in the country; could recruits be raised there; what would be the most favourable times for military operations? All these reports should be transmitted by confidential persons, in whom you have perfect reliance. Keep on good terms with the Pacha of Bosnia; but, nevertheless, gradually let your relations with him become more cold and reserved than formerly."—NAPOLEON to MARMONT, Tilsit, July 8, 1807; Dum., xix., 341, 342.

* Nap. to Count Guilleminot, 9th July.

† Bign., vi., 344, 345. Dum., xix., 337, 344. Which contains Pièces Just.

the French troops within their bounds, the French emperor had, in reality, the means of retaining possession of them as long as he chose, which he accordingly did. In addition to the enormous war contributions already mentioned,* of which 513,744,000 francs, or £20,500,000, fell on Prussia alone, farther and most burdensome commissions were forced on Prussia in the end of the year, in virtue of which Count Daru, the French collector-general, demanded 154,000,000 francs, or £6,160,000, more from that unhappy and reduced state: an exaction so monstrous and utterly disproportioned to its now scanty revenue, which did not exceed £3,000,000 sterling, that it never was or could be fully discharged; and this gave the French a pretence for continuing the occupation of the fortresses, and wringing contributions from the country till five years afterward, when the Moscow campaign commenced.†

Bereft by this disastrous treaty of half his dominions, nothing remained to the King of Prussia but submission; and he won the hearts of all the really generous in Europe by the resignation and heroism with which he bore so extraordinary a reverse of fortune. In a dignified proclamation, which he addressed to the inhabitants of his lost provinces upon liberating them from their allegiance to the Prussian throne, he observed, "Dear inhabitants of faithful provinces, districts, and towns! My arms have been unfortunate. The efforts of the relics of my forces have been of no avail. Driven to the extreme boundary of my empire, and having seen my powerful ally conclude an armistice and sign a peace, no choice remained to me but to follow his example. That peace imposed on me the most painful sacrifices. The bonds of treaties, the reciprocal ties of love and duty, the fruit of ages of labour have been broken asunder. All my efforts, and they have been most strenuous, have proved in vain. Fate ordains it. A father is compelled to depart from his children. I hereby release you from your allegiance to me and my house. My most ardent prayers for your welfare will always attend you in your relations to your new sovereigns. Be to them what you have ever been to me. Neither force nor fate shall ever sever the remembrance of you from my heart."‡

Vast as had been the conquests, unbounded the triumphs of France during the campaign, the consumption of life to the victors had been, if possible, still greater; and it was already apparent that war, conducted on this gigantic scale, was attended with a sacrifice of human beings which, for any lengthened time, would be insupportable. The fearful and ominous call of eighty thousand conscripts, thrice repeated during the short period of eight months, had already told the French people at what cost, of their best and bravest, they followed the car of victory; and the official details which have since come to light, show that even the enormous levy of two hundred and forty thousand men in that short period was not disproportioned to the expenditure of the campaign. Authentic documents prove that the number of sick and wounded who were received into the French hospitals

during the campaign, from the banks of the Saale to those of the Niemen, amounted to the stupendous number of FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND, of whom, at an average, not more than a ninth were prisoners taken from the allies!*

If such were the losses to the victors, it may readily be believed that those of the vanquished were still greater; and, putting the two together, it may fairly be concluded that, from the 1st of October, 1806, to the 31st of June, 1807, that is, during a period of nine months, a million of human beings were consigned to military hospitals, of whom at least a hundred thousand perished, independent of those slain in battle, who were at least as many more! The mind finds it impossible to apprehend such enormous calamities: like the calculations of the distance of the sun, or the fixed stars, they elude the grasp of the most vivid imagination; but even in the bewildering impression which they produce, they tend to show how boundless was the suffering then occasioned by human ambition; how awful the judgment of the Almighty then executed upon the earth!†

Nor is it difficult to discern what were the national sins which were thus visited with so terrible a punishment. Memorable retribution for the partition of Poland on the partitioning powers. Fourteen years before, Austria, Russia, and Prussia had united their armies to partition Sarmatia, and Szwabro had entered Warsaw while yet reeking with Polish blood. In the prosecution of this guilty object, they neglected the vol-

* The following are the details of this enormous catalogue of human suffering:

In hospital of the army on the 1st of October, 1806.	403
Admitted till the 31st of October, 1807.	421,416
Total treated in the hospital.	421,819
Of whom died there.	31,916
Dismissed cured.	370,473
Sent back to France.	11,455
Remained in hospital on the 17th of October, 1808.	7,957
	421,819

The average stay of each patient in the hospital was 29 days. The proportions of maladies out of 200 were as follows:

Fevers.	105
Wounded.	47
Veneral.	31
Various.	17
	200

This is a striking proof how much greater the mortality occasioned by fevers and the other diseases incident to a campaign is than the actual number killed or wounded in the field. Applying these proportions to the total number of 420,000, we shall have the whole numbers nearly as follows:

Fevers.	210,000
Wounded.	100,000
Veneral.	62,000
Miscellaneous.	48,000
	420,000

The immense number of wounded being at least five times what the bulletins admitted, demonstrates, if an additional proof were wanting, the total falsehood in the estimate of losses by which these reports were invariably distinguished. The great number of venerable patients is very curious, and highly characteristic of the French soldiers.—DARU'S REPORT TO NAPOLEON. Dum., xix., 486, 487.

It appears from Savary's report of the number of sick and wounded in the great hospital at Königsberg, of which city he received the command after the battle of Friedland, that, at the end of June, 1807, they amounted to the immense number of 27,376. Preparations were made for the reception of 57,000, but the sudden conclusion of the peace at Tilsit rendered them in a great degree unnecessary. Nevertheless, the whole hospitals of the army were again overflowing in spring, 1808, in every part of the north of Germany.—SAVARY, iii., 66, 69.

† Daru's Report to Napoleon, in Dum., xix., 486. Pieces Just.

* Note, p. 544.

† Daru's Report. Dum., xix., 85, and Hard., ix., 453, 454.

‡ Scott's Nap., v., 411, 412.

Enormous losses sustained by the French during the campaign.

cano which was bursting forth in the west of Europe: they starved the war on the Rhine to feed that on the Vistula, and opened the gates of Germany to French ambition. Prussia, in particular, first drew off from the European alliance, and after the great barrier of frontier fortresses had been broken through in 1793, and revolutionary France stood, as Napoleon admits, "on the verge of ruin," allowed her to restore her tottering fortunes, and, for ten long years, stood by in dubious and selfish neutrality, anxious only to secure or increase her ill-gotten gains. And what was the result? Poland became the great theatre of punishment to the partitioning powers; her bloodstained fields beheld the writhing and the anguish of the victors. Pierced to the heart by hostile armies, driven up to a corner of her territory, within sight almost of the Sarmatian wilds, Austria saw her expiring efforts for independence overthrown on the field of Austerlitz. Reft of her dominions, bound in chains for the insult of the conqueror, with the iron driven into her soul, Prussia beheld her last hopes expire on the shores of the Vistula. Banished almost from Europe, conquered in war, sullied in fame, Russia was compelled to sign the ignominious peace on the banks of the Niemen, the frontier of her Lithuanian spoils. The measure of her retribution is not yet complete: the grand-duchy of Warsaw is to become the outwork of France against Moscow; the tide of war is to roll on to Red Russia; the sacred towers of Smolensko are to be shaken by Polish battalions, the sack of Praga is to be expiated by the flames of Moscow. That Providence superintends the progress of human affairs; that the retributions of justice apply to political societies as well as single men; and that nations, which have no immortality, are destined to undergo the punishment of their flagrant iniquities in this world, was long ago announced in thunders from Mount Sinai, and may be observed in every subsequent page of civilized history. But it is often on the third and fourth generation that the retribution descends, and in the complicated thread of intervening events, it is sometimes difficult to trace the connexion which we know exists between the guilty deeds and the deserved suffering. In the present instance, however, the connexion was immediate and palpable: the actors in the iniquitous spoliation were themselves the sufferers by its effects; it was the partition of Poland which opened the gates of Europe to France; it was the partitioning powers that sunk beneath the car of Napoleon's ambition.

And was France, then, the instrument of this terrible dispensation, to escape herself that the punishment of her sins? Was she, stained with the blood of the righteous, wrapped in the flames of the Church, marked with the sign of the miscreant, to be the besom of destruction to others, and to bask only in the sunshine of glory herself? No! the dread hour of her retribution was steadily approaching; swift as was the march of her triumphant hosts, swifter still was the advance of the calamities which were to pre-empt her fall. Already to the discerning eye was visible the handwriting on the wall which foretold her doom. At Tilsit she reached the highest point of her ascendancy; every subsequent change was a step nearer to her ruin. True, the Continent had sunk beneath her arms; true, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had suc-

cumbently fallen in the conflict; true, she had advanced her eagles to the Niemen, and from the Rock of Gibraltar to the Baltic Sea: no voice dared to breathe a whisper against her authority; still the seeds of destruction were implanted in her bosom. Her feet were of base and perishable clay. The resources of the Empire were wasting away in the pursuit of the lurid phantoms which its people worshipped; its strength was melting under the incessant drains which the career of victory demanded; a hundred and fifty thousand men were annually sacrificed to the Moloch of its ambition. They saw it not, they felt it not; joyfully its youth, "like reapers, descend to the harvest of death." "They repented not of their sins, to give glory to the Lord."* But the effect was not the less certain, that the operation of the circumstances producing it was not perceived; and among the many concurring causes which at this period were preparing its fall, a prominent place must be assigned to that very treaty of Tilsit which apparently carried its fortunes to their highest elevation.

In this treaty were to be discerned none of the marks of great political capacity on the part of the conqueror: in the harshness and perfidy with which it was accompanied, the foundation was laid for the most powerful future allies to the vanquished. The formation of the kingdom of Westphalia, and the grand-duchy of Warsaw, with three or four millions of souls, each connected only by a military road across the impoverished and indignant remaining dominions of Frederic William, could not be supposed to add, in any considerable degree, to the strength of the French Empire. The indignities offered to Prussia, the slights shown to her beautiful and high-spirited queen, the enormous contributions imposed upon her inhabitants, the relentless rigour with which they were levied, the forcible retention of her fortresses, the tearing away of half her dominions, were injuries that could never be forgiven. Her people, in consequence, imbibed the most unbounded horror at French oppression; and though the fire did not burst forth for some years in open conflagration, it smouldered incessantly in all ranks, from the throne to the cottage, till at length its force became irresistible. And what allies did Napoleon rear up on the Vistula by the arrangements of Tilsit, to prove a counterpoise to the deadly hostility of Prussia thus gathering strength in his rear? None equal to the enemies whom he created. Saxony, indeed, was made a faithful ally, and proved herself such in the hour of disaster, as well as the day of triumph; but the hopes of the Poles were cruelly blighted, and that confidence in the restoration of their empire by his assistance, which might have rendered their warlike bands so powerful an ally on the shores of the Vistula, forever destroyed.† Instead of seeing their nationality revived, the ancient line of their princes restored, and their lost

* Rev. xvi., 8, 9.

† "The treaty of Tilsit," says Oginski, "spread consternation through all the Polish provinces. Numbers in Lithuania and Wolhynia had left their homes to join the army raised under the auspices of Napoleon, and knew that their safety was compromised. Those who waited only for his passage of the Niemen to declare themselves, were disappointed. Universally the treaty was regarded as the tomb of all the hopes which had been entertained of the restoration of the ancient monarchy; and from that moment the confidence of all the Poles in the good intentions of the Emperor Napoleon were irrecoverably weakened."—OGINSKI, *Mem. Sur La Pologne*, ii., 345.

provinces again reunited under one sceptre, they beheld only a fragment of their former empire wrested from Prussia, and handed over, too weak to defend itself, to the foreign government of the house of Saxony. The close alliance with Russia, and, still more, the extraordinary intimacy which had sprung up between the two emperors, precluded all hope that the vast provinces of Lithuania would ever again be restored to the dominion of the Jagellons or the Sobieskis. The restoration of Poland thus seemed farther removed than ever, in consequence of the successful efforts which a portion of its inhabitants had made for their liberation; they appeared to have now as much to fear from the triumphs of the French as the Russian arms. Thus, the treaty of Tilsit irrevocably alienated Prussia, and at the same time extinguished the rising ardour of Poland; and while it broke down the strength of all the intervening states, and presaged a future desperate strife between the despots of the East and the West on the banks of the Niemen, laid no foundation in the affections of mankind for the moral support by which its dangers were to be encountered.

But if the treaty of Tilsit involved serious errors in policy, so far as Poland and Prussia were concerned, much more was it worthy of reprehension when the provisions for the immediate partition of Turkey are taken into consideration. Six months had not elapsed since he had written to Marmont "to spare no protestations or assistance to Turkey, since she was the faithful ally of the French Empire."* Seven months had not elapsed since he had publicly declared at Posen "that the full and complete independence of the Ottoman Empire will ever be the object most at heart with the emperor, as it is indispensable to the security of France and Italy. He would esteem the successes of the present war of little value, if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete independence:"† *one month* had not elapsed since he had said to the Turkish ambassador, in a public audience

at Finkenstein, that "*his right hand was not more inseparable from his left than the Sultan Selim should ever be to him.*"‡ In consequence of these protestations, Turkey had thrown itself into the breach: she had braved the whole hostility of Russia, and defied the thunders of England when her fleets were anchored off the Seraglio Point. And what return did Napoleon make to these faithful allies for the exemplary fidelity with which they had stood by his fortunes when they were shaking in every quarter, and Europe, after the battle of Eylau, was ready to start up in fearful hostility in his rear? The return he made was to sign a convention with Alexander for the partition of all their European dominions; and, not content with assuring the Czar that he was at perfect liberty to chase the Ottomans into Asia, provided only he did not lay violent hands on Constantinople, he stipulated for the largest share of the spoils, including Thrace, Albania, Dalmatia, Epirus, and Greece, for himself, while the consent of Austria was to be purchased by the acquisition of Servia! A more iniquitous and shameless instance of treachery is not to be found even in the dark annals of Italian perfidy; and it is sufficient to demonstrate, what so many other circumstances

conspire to indicate, that this great man was as regardless of the sanctity of treaties as he was of the duty of veracity; that vows were made by him only to be broken, and oaths intended to be kept only till it was for his interest to violate them; and that in prosperous, equally as adverse fortune, no reliance could be placed upon his feelings of gratitude, if a present interest was to be served by forgetting them.

The excuse set up for this monstrous tergiversation by the French writers, viz., that a few weeks before the battle of Friedland an insurrection of the janizaries had taken place at Constantinople, and the ruling powers there had been overturned by open violence, is totally without foundation. The deposition of one sultan—no unusual occurrence in Oriental dynasties—had made no change whatever in the amicable disposition of the Divan towards France, or their inveterate hostility to the ancient and hereditary rivals of the Mohammedan faith: on the contrary, the party of the janizaries which had now gained the ascendancy was precisely the one which has ever been inclined to prosecute hostilities with Russia with the most fanatical fervour. It ill became France to hold out a revolution in the seraglio as a ground for considering all the existing obligations with Turkey as annulled, when her own changes of government since the Revolution had been so frequent that Talleyrand had already sworn allegiance to *ten* in succession. And, in truth, this violation of public faith was as short-sighted as it was dishonourable: the secret articles soon came to the knowledge of the British government; they were communicated by their ambassador to the Divan, and produced an impression which was never forgotten. Honest and sincere, without foresight equally as deceit, the Turks are as incapable of betraying an ally as they are of forgetting an act of treachery committed to themselves. The time will come in this history when the moment of retribution arrives, when Napoleon, hard pressed by the storms of winter and the arms of Russia, is to feel the bitterness of an ally's desertion, and when the perfidy of Tilsit is to be awfully avenged on the shores of the Berezina.*

* The perfidious conduct of Napoleon towards Turkey has been almost overlooked by the liberal writers of Europe, in the vehemence of their indignation at him for not re-establishing the kingdom of Poland. Without doubt, if that great act of injustice could have been repaired by his victorious arm, and a compact, powerful empire of sixteen millions of souls re-established on the banks of the Vistula, it would have been alike grateful to every lover of freedom, and important as forming a barrier against Moscovite aggrandizement in Europe. But was it possible to construct such an empire, to form such a barrier, out of the disjointed elements of Polish anarchy? That is the point for consideration; and if it was not, then the French emperor would have thrown away all the advantages of victory, if, for a visionary and impracticable scheme of this description, he had incurred the lasting and indelible animosity of the partitioning powers. With the aid of two hundred thousand brave men, indeed, which Poland could with ease send into the field, he might, for a season, have withstood the united armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but could he rely on their tumultuary assemblies sustaining the steady and durable efforts requisite for permanent success? What made Poland originally fall a victim to the coalesced powers, once little more than provinces of its mighty dominion? "The insane ambition," as John Sobieski said, "of a plebeian noblesse;" the jealousy of six hundred thousand electors, incapable alike of governing themselves, or of permitting the steady national government of others. Was this fatal element of discord eradicated from the Polish heart? Is it yet eradicated? Was it possible, by re-establishing Poland in 1807, to have done anything but, as Talleyrand well expressed it, "organized anarchy?" These are the considera-

No defence can be made for it in consequence of the revolution at Constantinople.

Disgraceful perfidy of Napoleon towards the Turks. Jan. 2, 1807.

On 28th May, 1807.

On 28th May, 1807. *his right hand was not more inseparable from his left than the Sultan Selim should ever be to him.*† In consequence of these protestations, Turkey had thrown itself into the breach: she had braved the whole hostility of Russia, and defied the thunders of England when her fleets were anchored off the Seraglio Point. And what return did Napoleon make to these faithful allies for the exemplary fidelity with which they had stood by his fortunes when they were shaking in every quarter, and Europe, after the battle of Eylau, was ready to start up in fearful hostility in his rear? The return he made was to sign a convention with Alexander for the partition of all their European dominions; and, not content with assuring the Czar that he was at perfect liberty to chase the Ottomans into Asia, provided only he did not lay violent hands on Constantinople, he stipulated for the largest share of the spoils, including Thrace, Albania, Dalmatia, Epirus, and Greece, for himself, while the consent of Austria was to be purchased by the acquisition of Servia! A more iniquitous and shameless instance of treachery is not to be found even in the dark annals of Italian perfidy; and it is sufficient to demonstrate, what so many other circumstances

* *Ante*, ii., 468. † *Id. ib.*, 468. ‡ *Ibid.*, ii., 521.

Towards the other powers of Europe the conduct of the two imperial despots was alike at variance with every principle of fidelity to their allies or moderation towards their weaker neighbours. France abandoned Finland to Russia, and Alexander felt no scruples at the prospect of rounding his territories in the neighbourhood of St. Petersburg by wresting that important province from his faithful ally, the King of Sweden; and even went the length of advancing his western frontier, by sharing in the spoils of his unhappy brother, the King of Prussia; while Russia surrendered Italy to France, and engaged to shut her eyes at the appropriation of the papal states by Napoleon, who had resolved upon seizing them, in return for the condescension of the head of the Church in recently travelling to Paris to place the imperial crown on his head. The rulers of the Continent drew an imaginary line across Europe, and mutually gave each other *carte blanche* in regard to spoiliations, how unjustifiable soever, committed on their own side of the division. Napoleon surrendered half the European territories of Turkey to Alexander, and appropriated the other half to himself; while Alexander engaged to throw no obstacles in the way of the dethronement of the sovereigns of the Spanish Peninsula, to make way for the elevation of princes of the Bonaparte family. Both appear to have conceived that, in thus suddenly closing their deadly strife, and turning their irresistible arms against the secondary states in their vicinity, they would gain important present objects, and mutually find room for the exercise of their future ambition, without encroaching on each other; forgetting that the desires of the human heart are insatiable; that, the more powerful empires become, the more ardently do they pant after universal dominion; and that the same causes which arrayed Rome against Carthage in ancient, and brought Tamerlane and Bajazet into fierce collision in modern times, could not fail to become more powerful in their operation from the mutual aggrandizement which their gigantic empires received. "Nec mundus," said Alexander the Great, "duobus solibus regi potest, nec duo summa regna salvo statu terrarum, potest habere."*

The great and ruling principle which actuated Napoleon in the negotiations at Tilsit was the desire to combine all Europe into a cordial

union against Britain. For this end he was willing to forego or postpone his rivalry with Russia; to permit her to emerge, apparently crowned with the laurels of victory, from defeat; and derive greater advantages from the rout of Friedland than she had reaped even from the triumph of Pultowa or the sack of Ismael. All these sources of aggrandizement to his great Continental rival were to Napoleon as nothing, provided only they led to the overthrow of the maritime power of England. That accomplished, he anticipated little comparative difficulty even with the colossal strength of the Scythian monarch. In yielding to his seductions, Alexander appears to have been impressed with a belief that he was the man of destiny, and that, in continuing the combat, he was striving against fate.*

Nor had England any great cause of complaint against him for violating his engagements to her, whatever Sweden or Turkey might have for the ambitious projects entertained at their expense. The cabinet of St. James had themselves receded from the spirit as well as the letter of the confederacy; the subsidies promised by Mr. Pitt had disappeared; the cabinet of St. Petersburg had been drawn for the interest of Germany and England into the contest, and both had withdrawn or been overthrown, leaving Russia alone to maintain it. So circumstanced, Great Britain had no reason to be surprised if Alexander took the first opportunity to extricate himself from a struggle in which the parties chiefly interested no longer appeared to take any share; nor could she complain if she was left alone to continue a contest which she seemed desirous of reducing to a mere maritime quarrel. Deeply did England and Austria subsequently suffer from this infatuated and ill-timed desertion of the confederacy at the very moment when the scales hung nearly even, and their aid might have been thrown in with decisive effect upon the balance. They might have stood in firm and impregnable array beside the veterans of Russia on the Vistula or the Elbe; they were left to maintain singly the contest on the Danube and the Tagus; they might have shared in the glories of Pultusk and Eylau, and converted the rout of Friedland into the triumph of Leipzig; and they expiated their neglect in the carnage of Wagram and the blood of Talavera.

But though the timidity of Austria, when her forces were capable of interfering with decisive effect on the theatre of European contest, and the supineness of England, when she had only to appear in adequate force to conquer, were the causes to which alone we are to ascribe the long subsequent continuance, multiplied disasters, and unbounded ultimate bloodshed of the war, yet for the development of the great moral lesson to France and mankind, and the illustration of the glories of patriotic resistance, it was fortunate that, by protracting it, opportunity was afforded for the memorable occurrences of its later years. But for that circumstance the annals of the world would

Napoleon's leading object in the treaty was the humbling of Great Britain.

England could not complain of its conditions.

tions which then presented, and still present, an invincible obstacle to a measure, in other points of view recommended by so many considerations of justice and expedience. It is evident that the passions of the people, their insane desire for Democratic equality, were so powerful, that, if re-established in its full original extent, it would speedily have again fallen under the dominion of its former conquerors: the same causes which formerly proved fatal to its independence would, without doubt, again have had the same effect.

* Quint. Curtius, l. iv., c. 11.

† "It cannot admit of a doubt," says Bignon, "that in the treaty of Tilsit, as in all the actions of his life, it was the desire to force England to conclude peace that was the sole, the only principle of Napoleon's actions. A prolonged state of war with Russia, or even the conclusion of a treaty which would have only put a period to the bloodshed, would not have satisfied him. It was necessary, not merely that he should have an enemy the less, he required an ally the more. Russia, it is true, had ceased to combat his army, but he required that she should enlist herself on his side; that she should enter into the strife with England, if not with arms, at least by joining in the Continental blockade, which was to aim a deadly thrust at her power. All his lures held out to Alexander were calculated for that end; it is with reference to that object that all the minor arrangements to which he consented are to be regarded."—BIGNON, vi., 351, 352.

* "Sire," said one of the Russian counsellors to Alexander at Tilsit, "I take the liberty of reminding you of the fate of your father, as the consequence of French alliance." "Oh! my God!" replied the emperor, "I know it, I see it; but how can I withstand the destiny which directs me!"—SAVARY, iii., 92.

have lost the strife in the Tyrol, the patriotism of Aspern, the siege of Saragossa, the fields of Spain. Peace would have been concluded with France as an ordinary power; she would have retained the Rhine for her boundary, and Paris would have remained the depository of revolutionary plunder; the Moscow campaign would not have avenged the blood of the innocent, nor the capture of their capital entered like iron into the soul of the vanquished. The last act of the mighty drama had not yet arrived: it was the design of Providence that it should terminate in

yet deeper tragedy, and present a more awful spectacle of the Divine judgments to mankind. England would have saved three hundred millions of her debt, but she would have lost Vittoria and Waterloo; her standards would not have waved in the Pass of Roncesvalles, nor her soldiers entered in triumph the gates of Paris; she would have shared with Russia, in a very unequal proportion, the lustre of the contest, and to barbaric force, not freeborn bravery, future ages would have awarded the glory of having struck down the Conqueror of the World.

CHAPTER XLVII.

CONTINENTAL SYSTEM AND IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF NAPOLEON.

JULY, 1807—AUGUST, 1812.

ARGUMENT.

Change in Napoleon's Projects for the Subjugation of England.—Plan of uniting all Europe in the Continental System, and getting the Command of and concentrating their Fleets in the French and Flemish Harbours.—Object of the Berlin Decree.—Its Provisions and vigorous Execution.—First Order in Council by the British Government, January 7, 1807.—Reasons which led to a farther and more rigorous Measure.—Order in Council of the 11th of November, 1807.—Import of these Orders.—Milan Decree of the 17th of December, 1807, published by Napoleon.—Argument in Parliament against the Orders in Council.—Reply of their Supporters in both Houses.—Able Note of Lord Howick on this Subject to the Danish Minister.—Reflections on this Debate, and the Justice of the Orders.—Comparative Blame attaching to each Party.—Reflections on their Policy.—Jesuits' Bark Bill in England.—Vast ultimate Effects of the Continental System.—Introduction of the License System.—Evasions of the Decrees on both Sides by the great Extension of this System.—Universal Joy at Napoleon's Return to Paris.—Unbecoming Adulation of the Orators in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.—Grand Fête in Honour of the Grand Army.—Suppression of the French Tribunal.—Slavish Submission with which the Change was received in France.—Establishment of a Censorship of the Press.—Identity of the Imperial Tyranny of Napoleon and the Democratic Tyranny of the United States.—Banishment of Madame de Staël and Madame Recamier.—The Judges are rendered removable at Pleasure.—Severe Decrees against any Connivance at English Commerce.—Rapid Progress of the System of Centralization in France under the Imperial Government.—Policy of the Emperor in this Particular.—He re-establishes Titles of Honour.—Principles on which the Change was founded.—Re-establishment of hereditary Titles in Addition to personal Ones.—Speeches on the Subject in the Legislative Body.—Address of the Senate to the Emperor on the Occasion.—Endowment of the new Peers with Revenue drawn from foreign States.—List of the Revenues bestowed from the Electorate of Hanover.—System of Fusion which Napoleon pursued of the ancient and modern Noblesse.—Total Departure thus made from the Principles of the Revolution.—Rapid Progress of Court Etiquette at Paris.—Great internal Prosperity of France under the Empire.—Its Revenues from 1808 to 1813.—Vast Effects of the foreign Plunder and Contribution on its Industry.—Striking Account of the Public Works in Progress in August, 1807, by the Minister of the Interior.—General Delirium which it produced.—French Finances under the Empire.—Budget of 1808.—Despotic Character of the new Law of High Treason.—Decree establishing eight State-prisons in the French Empire.—Extraordinary Assemblage of Persons who were brought together in them.—Slight Causes for which Prisoners were immured.—Vast Extent of Napoleon's Power, and great Aggravation it was of his Persecution.—Universal and slavish Obedience to his Authority.—Enormous Consumption of human Life under his foreign Wars, and the System of the Conscription.—Excessive Rigour of the Conscriptive Laws.—System of the Imperial Education.—Ecclesiastical Schools, Lyceums, and Military Academies.—Formation of the Imperial University, Lyceums, or Military Academies.—Their Constitution and great Importance.—Rapid Transition in France from Republican to despotic Ideas.—Remarkable Difference between the English and French Revolutions in this

Respect.—Its Causes.—Superior Violence and Injustice of the French Convulsion.—But this alone will not explain the Difference.—It was not the Love of Freedom, but the Desire for individual Elevation which was the ruling Principle in France.—The Principles of Freedom never were attended to in the French Revolution.—General Corruption of Public Opinion which it produced.—Rapid Growth of Centralization in this State of Public Feeling.—But this, how great soever an Evil, was unavoidable in the State in which France was on the Termination of the Revolution.—Striking Opinion of M. de Tocqueville on this Subject.—Ability with which Napoleon took Advantage of these Circumstances to establish despotic Power.—Ultimate Effect to general Freedom of the Resistance to Democracy in England, and its Triumph in France.

WHEN the battle of Trafalgar annihilated the prospect of invading England, and extinguished all his hopes of soon bringing the maritime war to a successful issue, Napoleon did not abandon the contest in despair. Quick in perception, he saw at once that the vast preparations in the Channel must go for nothing; that the flotilla at Boulogne would be rotten before a fleet capable of protecting its passage could be assembled; and that every successive year would enable England now exclusively to engross the commerce of the world, and banish his flag more completely from the ocean. But he was not on that account discouraged: fertile in resources, indomitable in resolution, implacable in hatred, he resolved to change the method, not the object of his hostility; and indulged the hope that he would succeed, through the extent and terror of his Continental victories, in achieving the destruction of England, by a process more slow, indeed, but in the end, perhaps, still more certain. His design in this view consisted of two parts, both essential to the success of the general project, and to the prosecution of which his efforts, during the whole remainder of the war, were directed.*

The first part of his plan was to combine all the Continental states into one great alliance against England, and compel them to exclude, in the most rigid manner, the British flag and British merchandise from their harbours. This system had long obtained possession of his mind; he had made it the conditions of every treaty between a maritime state and France, even before he ascended the consular throne.† The adroit flattery which he applied to the mind of the Em-

Change in Napoleon's projects for the subjugation of England.

Plan of uniting all Europe in the Continental system.

* Las Cas., v., 8, 15.

† Ante, ii., 133.

peror Paul, and the skill with which he combined the Northern powers into the maritime confederacy in 1800, were all directed to the same end; and, accordingly, the exclusion of the English flag from their harbours was the fundamental condition of that alliance.* The proclamation of the principles of the armed neutrality by the Northern powers at that crisis, filled him with confident expectations that the period had then arrived when this great object was to be attained; but the victory of Nelson at Copenhagen dissolved all these hopes, and threw him back to the system of ordinary warfare, so cruelly afterwards defeated by the battle of Trafalgar. The astonishing results of the battle of Jena, however, again revived his projects of excluding British commerce from the Continent; and thence the BERLIN DECREE, to be immediately considered, and the anxiety which he evinced at Tilsit to procure, by any sacrifices, the accession of Alexander to the confederacy.

The second part of the plan was to obtain possession, by negotiation, force, or fraud, of all the fleets of Europe, and gradually bring them to the great central point near the English coast, from whence they might ultimately be directed, with decisive effect, against the British shores. By the Continental system he hoped to weaken the resources of England, to hamper its revenue, and, by the spread of commercial distress, break up the unanimity which now prevailed among its inhabitants. But he knew too well the spirit of the ruling part of the nation to expect that, by the spread of commercial distress alone, he would succeed in the contest. He was desirous of reducing its strength by a long previous blockade, but it was by an assault at last that he hoped to carry the day. In order to prepare for that grand event, he was at the utmost pains to increase his naval force: amid all the expenditure occasioned by his military campaigns, he proposed to construct, and, to a certain extent, actually did construct, from ten to twenty sail of the line every year, while vast sums were annually applied to the great naval harbours at Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, and Brest. The first, from its admirable situation and close proximity to the British shores, he considered as the great outwork of the Continent against England; he regarded it, as he himself has told us, as "itself worth a kingdom;" and, but for the invincible tenacity with which he held to this great acquisition, he might with ease have obtained peace in 1814,

* The Directory had previously adopted the system of compelling the exclusion of English goods from all the European harbours; but the multiplied disasters of their administration prevented them from carrying it into any general execution. By a decree, issued on the 18th Jan. 18, 1798, of January, 1798, it was declared, "That all ships having for their cargoes, in whole or in part, any English merchandise, shall be held good prize, whoever is the proprietor of such merchandise, which should be held contraband from the single circumstance of its coming from England, or any of its foreign settlements; that the harbours of France should be shut against all ships having touched at England, except in cases of distress, and that neutral sailors found on board English vessels should be *put to death*." Napoleon, soon after his accession to the consular throne, issued a decree, revoking this and all other decrees passed during the Revolution, and reverting to the old and humane laws of the monarchy in this particular;* but, in the exultation consequent on the battle of Jena, he very nearly returned to the violence and barbarity of the decrees of the Directory.—*Vide Ann. Reg.*, 1800, 54, 55, and 1807, 226, 227.

* *Ante*, ii., 143.

and have left his family at this moment seated on the throne of France.* But it was not with the fleets of France alone that he intended to engage in this mighty enterprise: those of all Europe were to be combined in the attempt; the navies of Denmark and Portugal, in virtue of the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit,† were to be required from their respective sovereigns, and seized by force, if not voluntarily surrendered; that of Russia was to come round from the Black Sea and the Baltic to Brest and Antwerp, and join in the general crusade, until at length a hundred ships of the line and two hundred thousand men were prepared, on the coasts of the Channel, to carry to the shores of England the terrors of Gallic invasion. "When in this manner," said Napoleon, "I had established my ground, so as to bring the two nations to wrestle, as it were, body to body, the issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium."‡

It was, therefore, no momentary burst of anger or sudden fit of exultation, occasioned by the sioned by his unparalleled triumphs, Berlin Decree, which induced Napoleon, by his celebrated decree from Berlin, to declare the British islands in a state of blockade. It was the result of much thought and anxious deliberation, of a

* *Las Casas*, v., 8, 15.

† *Las Casas*, v., 8, 14. *Jom.*, ii., 449.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 545.

§ Napoleon's projects, in regard to the maritime war against England, have been already explained;† but this is a point of such vital importance to the future security of the British Empire, that it will bear a second note from an additional authority. "He said," says *Las Casas*, "that he had done much for Antwerp, but nothing to what he proposed to have done. By sea, he proposed to have made it a mortal point of attack against the enemy; by land, he wished to render it a sure resource in case of great disasters—a true point of refuge for the national safety; he wished to render it capable of containing an entire army in its defeat, and of resisting a year of open trenches, during which the nation might have risen in a mass for its relief. The world admired much the works already executed at Antwerp—its numerous dockyards, arsenals, and wet docks; but all that, said the emperor, was nothing—it was but the commercial town; the military town was to have been on the other bank, where the land was already purchased; three-deckers were to have been there constructed, and covered sheds established to keep the ships of the line dry in time of peace. Everything there was planned on the most colossal scale. Antwerp was itself a province. That place, said the emperor, was the chief cause of my having been here; for, if I could have made up my mind to give up Antwerp, I might have concluded peace at Chatillon in 1814."—*Las Casas*, vii., 43, 44.

Gigantic as these designs for Antwerp were, they were but a part of what Napoleon meditated or had constructed for his grand enterprise against England. "Magnificent works," says *Las Casas*, "had been set agoing at Cherbourg, where they had excavated, out of the solid rock, a basin capable of holding fifteen ships of the line and as many frigates, with the most splendid fortifications for their protection; the emperor intended to have prepared that harbour to receive thirty more line-of-battle ships of the largest size. Innumerable works had been prepared to receive and protect the flotilla which was to be immediately concerned in the invasion of England; Boulogne was adapted to hold 2000 gunboats; Vimereux, Etaples, and Ambleteuse, 1000 more. The harbour of Flushing was to have been rendered impregnable, and enlarged so as to hold twenty of the largest ships of the line; while dockyards for the construction of twenty line-of-battle ships were to be formed at Antwerp, and constantly kept in full activity. So immense were the preparations on the French coast for the invasion of England! The emperor frequently said that Antwerp was to him an entire province; a little kingdom in itself. He attached the greatest importance to it, often visited it in person, and regarded it as one of the most important of all his creations."—*Las Casas*, vii., 51, 57. It is not a little curious that, within twenty years after his fall, the English government should have united its forces to those of France to restore this great outwork against British independence to the dominion of Belgium, and the rule of the son-in-law of France.

* *Ante*, ii., 273.

calm survey of the resources at his disposal, and the means of resistance which yet remained to his antagonists. The treaty of Tilsit gave the English government ample room for serious reflection on the danger which now beset them. The accession of Russia to the Continental League was thereby rendered certain; the secret articles of the treaty, of which, by great exertions, they soon obtained possession,* made them acquainted with the intention of France and Russia, not only to unite their forces against Great Britain, but to compel Denmark and Portugal to do the same. In addition to having their flag proscribed from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Gulf of Bothnia, they had the prospect of seeing all the maritime forces of Europe arrayed against their independence. The assistance of Sweden could not much longer be relied on, pressed as she would soon be by her colossal neighbour; the harbours of South America were still closed to her adventure; the neutrality of North America was already more than doubtful, and would certainly be soon abandoned to range the United States by the side of France, in open enmity with Great Britain. Thus had England, proscribed from all civilized commerce over the whole world, and weakened in her resources by the internal suffering consequent on such a deprivation, the prospect of soon being compelled to maintain a contest with all the naval and military forces of Europe, directed by consummate ability, and actuated by inveterate hostility against her independence and renown. A clear and constant perception of this prospect is indispensable both to the formation of a just opinion on the measures to which she was speedily driven in her own defence, and of the character of the illustrious men who, called to the direction of her councils and armies in such a gloomy situation, speedily raised her fortunes to an unparalleled pitch of glory and prosperity.

The English government, in 1806, after the occupation of Hanover by the Prussian troops, had issued an order, declaring the coasts of Prussia in a

* They were obtained by the agency of the Count d'Antraigues.—HARD., ix., 431, *note*. In the king's speech on the 21st of January, 1808, it was said, "We are commanded by his majesty to inform you that, no sooner had the result of the negotiations at Tilsit confirmed the influence and control of France over the powers of the Continent, than his majesty was apprized of the intention of the enemy to combine those powers in one general confederacy, to be directed either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his majesty an insecure and ignominious peace. That for this purpose it was destined to force into hostility against this country, states which had hitherto been allowed by France to maintain or to purchase their neutrality; and to bring to bear upon different points of his majesty's dominions the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Denmark and Portugal. To place those fleets out of the power of such a confederacy became, therefore, the indispensable duty of his majesty." The complete accuracy of these assertions has been abundantly proved by the quotations from the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, already given; and ample confirmation of them will appear in the sequel of this chapter. Ministers, in the course of the debates which ensued on the Copenhagen expedition, were repeatedly called upon to produce their secret articles, or specify what private information they had received; but they constantly declined doing so, and, in consequence, it became a very general opinion at the time that there, in reality, were no such secret articles, and that this assertion was put forward without foundation in the king's speech, to palliate an aggression which, on its own merits, was indefensible. It is now proved, however, that they had the secret information, and that they had the generosity to bear this load of obloquy rather than betray a confidence which might prove fatal to persons high in office in the French government. This was fully explained, many years afterward, when the reasons for concealment no longer existed, by Lord Liverpool in Parliament.—See *Parl. Deb.*, x., 1.

state of blockade. That the English navy was amply adequate to establish an effectual blockade of the two rivers which constitute the only outlet to Prussian commerce, cannot be doubted.* This blockade, however, and one at the same time declared, of the coasts of the Channel, gave Napoleon an excuse for the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, which, on the narrative, "that the British government had violated the law of nations, so far as regarded neutral vessels; that it regards as enemies every individual belonging to a hostile state, and, in consequence, makes prize, not merely of the crews of merchant vessels equipped as privateers, but also those of such vessels when merely engaged in the transport of merchandise; that it extends to the ships and the objects of commerce that right of conquest which does not properly belong but to public property; that it extends to commercial cities and harbours, and mouths of rivers, the hardships of blockade which, on the best interpretation of the law of nations, is applicable only to fortified places; that it declares blockaded harbours, before which it has not a single ship of war, although a place cannot be considered as blockaded till it is in such a manner beset that entry cannot be obtained without imminent danger; that it even declares blockaded places, which all its naval forces are inadequate to blockade, as entire coasts and a whole empire; that this monstrous violation of the law of nations has no other object but to obstruct the communications of other people, and elevate the industry and com-

* As this order in council is referred to by the French writers and their supporters in this country as a vindication of the Berlin Decree, its provisions merit attention. It proceeds on the narrative, "that the Prussian government has, in a forcible and hostile manner, taken possession of the electorate of Hanover, and has also notified that all British ships shall be excluded from the ports of the Prussian dominions, and from certain other ports in the north of Europe, and not suffered to enter or trade therein;" and then declares, "That no ship or vessel belonging to any of his majesty's subjects be permitted to enter or clear from any ports of Prussia, and that a general embargo or stop be made of all Prussian ships and vessels whatever, now within, or hereafter which shall come into, any of the ports, harbours, or roads of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels; but that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of the cargoes on board of the said ships or vessels, so that no damage or embezzlement whatever be sustained."—*Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 677. This was followed, upon the 16th of May, 1806, by an order in council, signed by Mr. Fox, which, "considering the new measures adopted by the enemy for the obstruction of British commerce, declared the whole coasts, harbours, and rivers, from the Elbe to Brest inclusive, as actually blockaded; provided, always, that this blockade shall not extend to neutral vessels having on board merchandise not belonging to the enemies of his majesty, and not contraband of war; excepting, however, the coast from Ostend to the mouth of the River Seine, which is hereby declared subject to a blockade of the strictest kind." There can be no doubt that the coasts thus declared in a state of blockade were, in the strictest sense, subject to such declaration, when the peril of leaving the harbours they contained was such that not one of the enemy's armed vessels ventured to incur it. This decree, such as it was, was repealed as to all ports from the Elbe to the Ems inclusive, by a British order in council of the 25th of September, 1806.—See MARTENS, v., 469, *Supp.* These orders in council, thus providing only for the blockade of harbours and coasts, which it was at the moment in the highest degree perilous to enter, or for the interim detention of the Prussian cargoes, in retaliation for the unprovoked invasion of Hanover by the Prussian troops, and exclusion of British commerce, in pursuance of the orders of Napoleon already detailed,† was clearly within the law of nations, as admitted by the French emperor himself, and, in truth, a most moderate exercise of the rights of war. They afford, therefore, no excuse or palliation whatever for the Berlin Decree.—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 677. And see the previous Prussian proclamation excluding British trade on the 25th of March, 1806. *Ibid.*, 692, and MARTENS, *Supp.*, v., 435.

† Mart., *Supp.*, v., 437.

† *Ante*, ii., 424.

merchandise of England upon the ruins of that of the Continent; that this being the evident design of England, whoever deals on the Continent in British merchandise, by that very act favours its designs, and becomes participant in them; that this conduct of England, worthy of the first barbarous ages, has hitherto turned to its own great profit and the detriment of all other states; and that the law of nature entitles every belligerent to oppose its enemy with the arms with which it combats, and the mode of hostility which it has adopted, when it disregards every idea of justice and liberality, the result of civilization among mankind;" therefore it declared:

"1. The British islands are placed in a state of blockade. 2. Every species of commerce and communication with them is prohibited; all letters or packets addressed in English, or in the English characters, shall be seized at the postoffice, and interdicted all circulation. 3. Every British subject, of what rank or condition whatever, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops, or those of our allies, shall be made prisoners of war. 4. Every warehouse, merchandise, or property of any sort, belonging to a subject of Great Britain, or coming from its manufactories or colonies, is declared good prize. 5. Commerce of every kind in English goods is prohibited; and every species of merchandise belonging to England, or emanating from its workshops or colonies, is declared good prize. 6. The half of the confiscated value shall be devoted to indemnifying those merchants whose vessels have been seized by the English cruisers for the losses which they have sustained. 7. No vessel coming directly from England, or any of its colonies, or having touched there since the publications of the present decree, shall be received into any harbour. 8. Every vessel which, by means of a false declaration, shall have effected such entry, shall be liable to seizure, and the ship and cargo shall be confiscated as if they had also belonged to England. 9. The prize court of Paris is intrusted with the determination of all questions arising out of this decree in France, or the countries occupied by our armies; that of Milan, with the decision of all similar questions in the kingdom of Italy. 10. This decree shall be communicated to the Kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria, and to our other allies, whose subjects have been the victims, like our own,* of the injustice and barbarity of English legislation. 11. The ministers of foreign affairs, of war, of marine, of finance, and of justice, of police, and all postmasters, are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present decree."

Such was the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, which was only an extension to all Europe of the declaration and order that all English

merchandise should be liable to confiscation, which had been issued by Napoleon at Leipsic on the 18th of October preceding, and at Hamburg on the 3d of November.* It was not allowed an instant to remain a dead letter. Orders were despatched in all directions to act upon it with the utmost rigour; and with undisguised reluctance, but trembling hands, the subject monarchs and prefects prepared to carry the stern requisition into execution. So strongly was its unjust character and ruinous tendency felt in Holland, that Napoleon's own brother, Louis, king of that country, at first positively refused to submit to its injustice; and at length could only be prevailed on, in the first instance, to promulgate it in the foreign countries occupied by the Dutch troops, reserving its execution in his own dominions till it should be ascertained whether the measures already in force should prove insufficient.† So strongly did this opposition on the part of his brother irritate Napoleon, that he declared, in a fit of ill-humour, "that, if Louis did not submit to his orders, he would cause domiciliary visits to be made through the whole of Holland." Nevertheless, as Louis perceived, what every person in the country knew, that this rigorous decree, if fully acted upon, would occasion the total ruin of his dominions, it was enforced in a very loose manner in the United Provinces. In the north of Germany, however, it was not only most rigorously put in force, but the decree was made a pretence for a thousand iniquitous extortions and abuses, which augmented tenfold its practical oppression. An army of locusts, in the form of inspectors, custom-house-officers, comptrollers, and other functionaries, fell upon all the countries occupied by the French troops, and made the search for English

* *Ante*, ii., 451.

† "This decree," says Louis Bonaparte, king of Holland, "was as unjust as it was impolitic. The command that it should be obeyed by the Kings of Spain, Holland, Naples, and Etruria, was the commencement of universal empire, if it had any meaning; if not so intended, it was senseless. The ground of justification put forth in the decree, viz., 'that England applies the right of blockade, not only to fortified places and the mouths of rivers, but to whole coasts, when the law of nations only authorizes that rigour in the case of places so closely invested that they cannot be entered or quitted without danger,' is itself its chief condemnation; for a nation whose vessels can proceed to a distance from its frontiers, even to the waters of the countries belonging to its enemies, is undoubtedly better entitled to say that it blockades coasts and ports, than a nation without a navy to say that it blockades an island surrounded by numerous fleets. In this last case, it is the Continental power which voluntarily places itself in a state of blockade. Besides, wrong cannot authorize wrong, nor injustice injustice. The fourth and fifth articles of the Berlin Decree are atrocious. What, because the English seize merchants travelling from one place to another, and subject the vessels of individuals to ill treatment, shall we, in an age of reason, dare to seize every Englishman, and whatever of their property we can lay hold of? This was augmenting and justifying the injury of the English government. The sixth article is barbarous, the eighth still worse. Here, by a single stroke of the pen, the property of all Frenchmen who, up to that period, had traded in English goods, is taken from them: vessels even thrown on the coast by tempests are to be refused admission into any port. Enough has been said to justify the extreme repugnance of the King of Holland to carry this decree into execution: it threw him into the utmost consternation; he felt at once that it would speedily prove the ruin of Holland, and afford a pretext for oppressing it. This measure appeared to him as singular and revolutionary as denationalizing. He ventured to write to the emperor that he believed this gigantic measure to be imposed, and calculated, to effect the ruin of France, and all commercial nations connected with it, before it could ruin England. Obligated, however, to carry it into effect, under the penalty of a complete rupture with France, he only endeavoured to do so in the least illegal and most independent manner possible."—LOUIS BONAPARTE, *Documents Sur La Hollande*, i., 294, 307, 308.

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 201. *Schoell*, ix., 344, and *Dum.*, xvii., 46, 47.

† Two days after the publication of the Berlin Decree Napoleon wrote the following highly characteristic letter to Junot, then governor of Paris: "Take especial care that the ladies of your establishment take Swiss tea; it is as good as that of China. Coffee made from chicorie is noways inferior to that of Arabia. Let them make use of these substitutes in their drawing-rooms, instead of amusing themselves with talking politics, like Madame de Staël. Let them take care, also, that no part of their dress is composed of English merchandise: tell that to Madame Junot: if the wives of my chief officers do not set the example, whom can I expect to follow it? It is a contest of life or death between France and England; I must look for the most cordial support in all those by whom I am surrounded."—*NAP. to JUNOT*, 23d Nov., 1806; *D'ABRANTES*, ix., 267, 268.

goods a pretext for innumerable frauds, vexations, and iniquities. "They pillaged, they plundered," says Bourrienne, "in a systematic manner, in all the countries of the north of Germany, to which my diplomatic mission extended. Rapine was in a manner established by law, and executed with such blind fury, that often the legalized robbers did not know the value of the articles they had seized. All the English merchandise was seized at Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and the other Hanse Towns; and Berthier wrote to me, that in that way I should obtain ten millions of francs for the emperor. In point of fact, I compounded with the proprietors for twenty millions (£800,000); and yet such was the demand for these useful articles, that, when exposed to sale by the proprietors, after paying this enormous ransom, their advanced prices brought them a very handsome profit."*†

The English government replied to the Berlin Decree, in the first instance, by an order in council of the 7th of January, 1807, issued by Lord Howick, which, on the preamble of the French decree, and the right of retaliation thence arising to Great Britain, declared, "That no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, if both belong to France or her allies, and shall be so far under their control as that British vessels are excluded therefrom; and the captains of all British vessels are hereby required to warn every neutral vessel coming from any such port, and destined to such other port, to discontinue her voyage; and any vessel, after being so warned, or after having had a reasonable time allowed it for obtaining information of the present order in council, which shall, notwithstanding, persist in such voyage to such other port, shall be declared good prize." The spirit of this order was to deprive the French, and all the nations subject to their control, which had embraced the Continental system, of the advantages of the coasting-trade in neutral bottoms; and, considering the much more violent and extensive character of the Berlin Decree, there can be no doubt that it was a very mild and lenient measure of retaliation. This order was relaxed, soon after, as to vessels containing grain or provisions for Great Britain, and as to all vessels whatever belonging to the Hanse Towns, if employed in any trade to or from the dominions of Great Britain.‡

After the treaty of Tilsit, however, had completely subjected the Continent to the dominion or control of the French emperor, it soon appeared that some more rigorous and extensive

system of retaliation was called for. A few months' experience was sufficient to show that the Berlin Decree, while it rigorously excluded every species of British manufacture or colonial produce from the ports of the Continent, by no means inflicted a proportional injury upon the inhabitants of the countries where its provisions were put in force; and that, in truth, it opened up a most lucrative commerce to the industry and colonies of neutral powers, at the expense of the vital interests of the British Empire. By prohibiting, under the penalty of confiscation, the importation of every species of British produce, it necessarily left the market of the Continent open to the manufacturing industry and colonial produce of other states; and this, in the end, could not but prove highly injurious to English industry. The obvious and direct retaliation would have consisted in prohibiting the importation into the British dominions of the produce of France or its dependances which had embraced the Continental system, whether in their own or neutral bottoms; but it was extremely doubtful whether this would have been by any means a retribution of equal injury. England was essentially a commercial state. The resources from which she maintained the contest were in great part drawn from the produce of her colonies or manufactories; and the general cessation of commercial intercourse, therefore, could not fail to be felt with more severity in her dominions than in the Continental nations. What to them, considered as a whole, was secondary, to her was vital; the suffering which with them would be diffused over a wide circle, to her would be concentrated in the narrow space of a few counties. In these circumstances, some measure seemed indispensable which should inflict upon the enemy not merely the same *injustice*, but the same *suffering* which he had occasioned; and, by causing his own subjects to feel in their own persons the consequences of his aggression, produce that general discontent which might arm them against his authority, or render necessary a return to more equitable measures.

Under the influence of these ideas, the celebrated orders in council of the 11th of November, 1807, were issued, which, on the preamble of the British islands having been declared by the Berlin Decree in a state of blockade, and of all importation of British merchandise having been absolutely prohibited, and of the mitigated measures of retaliation adopted in the order in council of the 7th of January, 1807, having proved inadequate to the object of effecting the repeal of that unprecedented system of warfare, declared that from henceforth "all the ports and places of France and her allies, from which, though not at war with his majesty, the British flag is excluded, shall be subject to the same restrictions, in respect of trade and navigation, as if the same were *actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner*; and that all trade in articles the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed to be unlawful, and all such articles declared good prize; declaring, always, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to capture or detention of any vessel or cargo which shall belong to a country not declared by this order subject to a strict blockade, which shall have cleared out with such cargo from such port to which she belongs, ei-

* Bour., vit., 265, 326, 327. Louis Bonaparte, Doc. sur Hollande, i., 295, 309.

† A striking instance occurred, a few months after the promulgation of the Berlin Decree, of the utter impossibility of carrying such a monstrous system of legislation into execution. Shortly after the Berlin Decree had been issued, there arrived at Hamburg a thundering order for the immediate furnishing of 50,000 greatcoats; 200,000 pairs of shoes, 16,000 coats, 37,000 waistcoats, and other articles in proportion. The resources of the Hanse Towns were wholly unequal to the supply of so great a requisition in so short a time; and after trying in vain every other expedient, Bourrienne, the French diplomatic agent, was obliged to contract with English houses for the supply, which speedily arrived; and while the emperor was denouncing the severest penalties against the possession of English goods, and boasting that, by the Continental system, he had excluded British manufactures from the Continent, his own army was clothed with the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and his soldiers would have perished amid the snow of Prussich-Eylau but for the seasonable efforts of British industry.—See BOURRIENNE, vi., 292, 294.

‡ Parl. Deb., x., 127, 130. Ann. Reg., 1807, 671, 672.

Reasons which led to a farther and more rigorous measure.

Orders in council of 11th Nov., 1807.

ther in Europe or America, or from some free port in the British colonies, under circumstances in which such trade from such free port is permitted, direct to some port or place in the colonies of his majesty's enemies, or from those colonies direct to the countries to which such vessel belongs, or to some free port in his majesty's colonies; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to a country not at war with his majesty, which shall have cleared out from some port in this kingdom, and shall be proceeding direct to the port specified in her clearance; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to any country not at war with his majesty, which shall be coming from any port or place in Europe, declared by this order to be subject to a strict blockade, destined to some port or place in Europe belonging to his majesty, and be on her voyage direct thereto." All vessels contravening this order are declared good prize. "And whereas countries not engaged in the war have acquiesced in the orders of France, and have given countenance and effect to these prohibitions by obtaining from agents of the enemy certain documents styled 'certificates of origin,' therefore if any vessel, after having had reasonable time to receive notification of the present order, shall be found carrying any such certificate, it shall be declared good prize, together with the goods on board."*†

Divested of the technical phraseology, in which, for the sake of legal precision, these orders are couched, they in effect amount to this: Napoleon had declared the British islands in a state of blockade, and subjected all goods of British produce or manufacture to confiscation within his dominions, or those of the countries subjected to his control, and prohibited all vessels from entering any harbour which had touched at any British port; and the English government, in reply, proclaimed France and all the Continental states in a state of blockade, and declared all vessels good prize which should be bound for any of their harbours, excepting such as had previously cleared out from, or touched at, a British harbour. Thus France prohibited all commerce with England, or traffic in English goods, and England prohibited all commerce between any of the states which had embraced the Continental system and each other, unless in vessels bound for some British harbour.

Napoleon was not slow in replying to these orders in council. By a decree dated from Milan on the 17th of December, 1807, he declared, "1. That every vessel, of whatever nation, which shall have submitted to be searched by British cruisers, or paid any impost levied by the English government, shall be considered as having lost the privileges of a neutral flag, and be considered and dealt with as English vessels. 2. Being so considered, they shall be declared good prize. 3. The British islands

are declared in a state of blockade. Every vessel, of whatever nation, and with whatever cargo, coming from any British harbour, or from any of the English colonies, or from any country occupied by the English troops, or bound for England, or for the English colonies, or for any country occupied by the English troops, is declared good prize.* 4. These rigorous measures shall cease in regard to any nations which shall have caused the English government to respect the rights of their flag, but continue in regard to all others, and never be released till Great Britain shows a disposition to return to the law of nations as well as those of justice and honour."

It may safely be affirmed that the rage of belligerent powers, and the mutual violation of the law of nations, could not go beyond those furious manifestoes. They produced, as might have been expected, most important effects, both on the Continent and the British isles, and gave rise to memorable and luminous debates in Parliament, in which all that could be advanced, both for and against the justice and expedience of these measures, was fully brought forward.

On the one hand, it was strongly urged by Lord Grenville, Lord Howick, and Lord Erskine: "Let the case at once be stated in the manner which has produced the whole controversy. France, on the 21st of November, issued her decree, which announced the intention to distress this country in a way unauthorized by the public law, subjecting to confiscation the ships and cargoes of neutrals with British merchandise, or going to, or coming from Great Britain, with their accustomed trade. Such a decree undoubtedly introduced a rule which the law of nations forbids, as being, even as between belligerents, and much more as with neutrals, an aggravation of the miseries of war, and unauthorized by the practice of civilized states. If carried into execution, it would vest the suffering belligerent with the right of retaliation; and, indeed, as between the belligerents only, it may be admitted that the mere publication of such a decree would authorize the nation so offended to disregard the law of nations towards the nation so offending. But that is not the present question: the point here is, not whether we would have been justified in retaliating upon France the injury she has inflicted upon us, but whether we are justified in inflicting, in our turn, a new and still more aggravated species of injury on neutral states. If A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking him, and neither law nor reason will weigh very nicely the comparative severity of the blow given from that at first received. But it is a new application of the term retaliation to say that, if A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking B. If the interdiction of a neutral from trading with us is submitted to by him from favour to the belligerent, he directly interposes in the war, and his character of a neutral is at an end; if he does so from terror or weakness, in that case, too, he ceases to be a neutral, because he suffers an unjust pressure to be affixed upon us. But admitting that, the question remaining, what right have we to retaliate upon a neutral upon whom the decree has never been executed; who in no shape has been made either the instrument or the victim of oppression by the enemy?"

"Now that is the real question, and the only

* Parl. Deb., x., 134, 138.

† By a supplementary order in council, the severe enact-

ments of this regulation were declared not to extend to "articles of the produce and manufactures of the blockaded countries which shall be laden on board British ships;" and by a more material one, passed six weeks afterward, it was provided, "that nothing in the order of the 11th of November shall be construed so as to permit any vessel to import any produce or manufactures of the enemy's colonies in the West Indies, direct from such colonies to any port in the British dominions."*

* Parl. Deb., x., 148.

* Mart., Sup., v., 453. Ann. Reg., 1807, p. 779. State Papers.

question here. America, the only great maritime power which has not now taken a decided part in the contest, was virtually excluded from its operation. The air was white with her sails; the sea was pressed down with her shipping, nearly half as numerous as our own, bringing her produce into every port of England, and carrying our commodities and manufactures into every corner of Europe. Up to the date of the orders in council, she continued to take, without the least defalcation, ten millions of our manufactures, and she carried to other nations what was beyond her own consumption. She carried on this traffic, in the face of the French decree of the 21st of November, when we could not have done it for ourselves. She did this, it is true, from no feeling of friendship towards us, but from self-interest to herself; but Providence has so arranged human affairs, that, by a wise pursuit of self-interest, everything is full and stands in its proper place. We had so much the start of other nations, that we had only to lie by, and they, for their own purposes, came to our relief. America smuggled our goods into France for her own interest, and France bought them for hers. The people cheered the emperor at the Tuileries every day, but they broke his laws every night. The Berlin Decree, in fact, had become a dead letter, either from the connivance, or licenses for contraband trade issued by the French government: she had no ships to carry her decrees into effect, and the barbarous system of the enemy was rapidly falling into that neglect in which Mr. Pitt, with great sagacity, left the corresponding decree of the Directory in 1798.

"Such was the state of matters, when, in an evil hour, our own government interfered, and gave a helping hand to the enemy. The orders in council were the real executors of the Berlin Decree. Under it we employ our own shipping to stop our own trade upon the sea; we make prisons of our own ports to terrify away the neutral seaman, who otherwise would carry on our traffic, and find a vent for our manufactures; and playing the very game of France, by throwing neutral powers into her arms instead of our own. And this, it seems, is retaliation! Can we, who do such things, object to the Irish rebels, who burned the notes of an obnoxious banker to ruin his trade? Our orders in council have turned the mistake of the ignorant Irish into the shade.

"The order of the 7th of January, 1807, was liable to none of these objections. It introduced or adopted no new or illegal principle; it merely reprobated the illegal decree of France, and asserted the right of retaliation by actual blockade: a restriction which, it is admitted on all hands, neutrals must submit to. But the order of the 11th of November stands in a very different situation. Sir William Scott has told us, in the case of the *Maria* (Robinson, i., 154), that no blockade can be made, by the law of nations, unless force sufficient is stationed to prevent an entry. Can this be predicated of all Europe put together? Is every harbour and river, from Hamburg to Cadiz, so closely watched that no vessel can enter any of them without evident risk of capture? Such a proposition is clearly out of the question; and therefore government has issued an order in council, which its own prize courts, if adjudicating in conformity with their former principles, must declare to be contrary to the law of nations, and therefore refuse to execute.

"Nor is it in this view only that these orders are illegal. They purposed to interrupt the commerce of neutral and unoffending nations, carrying on their accustomed traffic in innocent articles, between their own country and the ports of our enemies, not actually blockaded, and even between their own country and our allies; they compel neutrals, under the pain of confiscation, to come to our ports, and there submit to regulations, restrictions, and duties which will expose them to certain destruction the moment they approach the enemy's shore; they declare all vessels good prize which carry documents or certificates declaring that the articles of the cargo are not the produce of his majesty's dominions, contrary alike to the law of nations and the rights and liberties of the people of this realm: such a monstrous system of aggression never was, and never should be, successful. Let us leave to our enemies the guilt of discord and bloodshed, and seek to support our country by the virtues of beneficence and peace.*

"The idea that you can starve the enemy into submission, or the adoption of a more reasonable mode of hostility, is founded on an essential and fatal mistake in regard to the relative situation of Great Britain and the Continental states in the contest. The former must of necessity be the greatest sufferer. The Continental nations will lose only articles of luxury, but the British will be deprived of those of necessity; sugar may rise to an extravagant price in Germany, but the manufacturers will be deprived of their daily bread in England. The greatest calamity which could befall this country, in her present predicament, would be a war with America, both as depriving her of the chief vent for her manufactured industry, and of the advantage of neutral carriers, who would contrive, for their own profit, to elude every Continental blockade, in order to introduce them into the Continental states. And surely the present moment, when we have all Europe, from the North Cape to Gibraltar, arrayed against us, is not that when it is expedient, gratuitously and unnecessarily, to withdraw so beneficial a customer from our markets, and add his forces to those of the enemy."

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Hawkesbury, the advocate-general, ^{Reply of the} and Lord-chancellor Eldon: "It is ^{supporters of} in vain to refer to the law of nations ^{the orders in} for any authority on this subject, in ^{both houses.} the unprecedented circumstances in which this country is now placed. What usually passes by that name is merely a collection of the *dicta* of wise men who have devoted themselves to this subject in different ages, applied to the circumstances of the world at the period in which they wrote, or circumstances nearly resembling them, but none having the least resemblance to the circumstances in which this country is now placed. Such as they are, however, they all admit, what, indeed, common sense dictates, the right of retaliation, or of resisting an enemy by the same means by which he attacks ourselves. Nothing can be more expedient in the general case than to adhere, with scrupulous exactness, to the law of nations; but if one belligerent commences a violation of them, it is sometimes indispensable, in order to put an end to the enormity, to make the enemy feel its effects. In some cases the most civilized nations have been

* Parl. Deb., x., 682, 930, 970.

driven to the melancholy necessity of putting prisoners to death to terminate a similar practice on the part of their enemies; doubtless, in the general case, quarter should be given, but during the fury of a charge or the tumult of an assault, it is universally felt by the experience of mankind that a less humane rule must be followed. Every belligerent should usually adhere to the ordinary instruments of human destruction; but if your enemy fires red-hot shot, you are entitled to do the same. Russia herself acted on this principle in repelling, when still a neutral power, the aggressions of France: she authorized the seizure of all ships proceeding to France. Lord Howick himself, in his letter to the Danish minister, in relation to the order of the 7th of January, had clearly vindicated the justice, not only of his own measure,* but of the more extensive measure, based on the same principles, which was ultimately adopted.†

"The Berlin Decree of the 21st of November is at once the foundation and the justification of the present proceeding. That decree declared the British islands in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce, even in neutral ships, in the produce or manufactures of this country: it went so far as even to exclude the possibility of one neutral nation trading in safety with another. But it is said that this threatened blockade was not, in point of fact, carried into effect; and that, in some other exceptionable mode, its consequences might have been avoided. But it is immaterial whether it was executed at sea or not: unquestionably it received execution, and the most rigorous execution, at land. Foreign ships were only enabled to come to this country with their foreign produce: they were not permitted, under the pain of confiscation, to take away our goods in return; and can it be said that this is not a real execution?

"The French government justify, in the pre-

* Parl. Deb., x., 674, 971, and 975.

† Lord Howick's letter to the Danish minister, who complained of the British order of the 7th of January, was a very able state paper, and, among other things, observed, "The French government, in adopting a measure at once so violent in itself, and so unjust in its consequences, committed a manifest act of aggression, though immediately levelled at Great Britain, against the rights of every state not engaged in the war, which, if not resisted on their part, must unavoidably deprive them of the privilege of a fair neutrality, and suspend the operation of treaties formed for the protection of their rights in relation to Great Britain. The injury which would be sustained by England, if she suffered her commerce with foreign nations to be thus interdicted, while that of the enemy with them should remain unmolested, is so manifest, that it can require no illustration. It never could have been supposed that his majesty would submit to such an injury, waiting in patient acquiescence till France might think proper to attend to the slow and feeble remonstrances of neutral states, instead of resorting immediately to steps which might check the violence of the enemy and retort upon him the evils of his own injustice. Other powers would have no right to complain, if, in consequence of this unparalleled aggression, the king had proceeded immediately to declare all the countries occupied by the enemy in a state of blockade, and to prohibit all trade in the produce of those countries; for, as the French decree itself expresses it, the law of nature justifies the employment against our enemies of the same arms he himself makes use of. If third parties suffer from these measures, their demand for redress must be directed against that country which first violates the established usages of war, and the rights of neutral states. Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in taking advantage for the neutral profit of every situation between the belligerents, whereby emolument may be made, but in observing a strict and honest impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the war to either, and particularly in so far restraining its trade to its accustomed trade in time of peace, as to prevent one belligerent escaping the effect of the other's hostilities." —Lord Howick's Letter to Mr. Riser, 17th March, 1807. Parl. Deb., x., 403, 406.

amble of their decree, their proceedings on the previous proclamation of the late administration in April, 1806, which declared the coasts of the Channel in a state of blockade. But that is a mistake in point of fact, for in no one single instance did they declare either a harbour, or a coast containing several harbours, in a state of blockade, without having previously invested it. The coasts of the Channel, it is well known, when this blockade was declared, were so closely blockaded that not a pram could venture to leave the range of their own batteries without incurring the most imminent risk of capture. The French government, on the other hand, in their decree, declared this country in a state of blockade, not only without making any attempt to invest it, but without being able to send out a single vessel to endanger the neutral vessels which might attempt to violate their blockade. Therein lay the difference, the vital difference between the proceedings of the two countries: the British government declared coasts and rivers blockaded when their maritime force was so great, and so stationed, that the enemy themselves evinced their sense of the reality of the investment by never venturing to leave their harbours; the French declared an imaginary blockade on the seas, and acted upon it in their condemnations on land, when they not only had not a single vessel at sea to maintain it, but their enemies were insulting them daily in their very harbours. Such a proceeding was as absurd as if England, without having a soldier on the Continent, were to declare Bergen-op-Zoom or Lisle in a state of blockade, and act upon this order by seizing all goods belonging to citizens of those towns, wherever she could find them in neutral bottoms on the high seas.

"But it is said the neutral nations did not acquiesce in these decrees, and therefore we were not justified in retaliating in such a way as would affect their interests. Where, then, did they resist? What followed the Berlin Decree? did the three nations, whose next decree materially affected Denmark, Portugal, and America, either remonstrate or take up arms to compel its repeal? Not one of them did so. The Danish government, indeed, complained in strong terms of the British order of the 7th of January, 1807, but were completely silent on the previous and far stronger Berlin Decree of the 21st of November, 1806, to obviate which alone it was issued. This temper savoured pretty strongly of the principle of the armed neutrality, which it has ever been the anxious wish of the Danish government to establish as the general law of the seas. Portugal was not to be blamed, because she had no force at her command to make any resistance; and, accordingly, the port of Lisbon was made the well-known *entrepôt* for violating our orders of the 7th of January, and restoring to the enemy, under neutral colours, all the advantages of a coasting trade. But America was completely independent of France, and has she done anything to evince a repugnance to the French decree? When the corresponding decree of the French Directory was issued in 1798, it was noticed in the president's speech as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and such as could not be allowed to exist without subverting the independence of their country. What has America now done in relation to the Berlin Decree? Nothing; and that, too, although Napoleon himself announced his resolution to make no distinction between the United States and other

neutrals in this particular, and acted upon this resolution in the Spanish decree issued on the 17th of February, which contained no exception whatever in favour of the Transatlantic states. Having acquiesced in the violation of the law of nations in favour of one belligerent, America is bound, if she would preserve her neutral character, to show a similar forbearance in regard to the other.

"But it is said these orders are injurious to ourselves, even more than our enemies, and that they exclude us from a lucrative commerce we otherwise might have carried on in neutral bottoms, either by connivance or licenses with our enemies. Let it be recollected, however, that, when these orders were issued, we were excluded from every harbour of Europe except Sweden and Sicily; and these answered what trade we could have carried on with the Continental states, or what we can have lost by our retaliatory orders. It is in vain to pretend that these orders were never meant to be acted upon by Bonaparte, and that, but for our orders in council, they would have sunk into oblivion. Such a dereliction of a great object of settled policy is entirely at variance with the known character of the French emperor, and his profound hostility to this country, the ruling principle of his life. It is contradicted by every newspaper, which, before the orders were issued, were full of the account of the seizure of English goods in every quarter of Europe; and by his unvarying state policy, which, in every pacification, and especially at Tilsit, made the rigorous exclusion of British goods the first step towards an accommodation."^{*}

Upon a division, both houses supported ministers: in the upper by a majority of 127 to 61, in the lower by 214 to 94.[†]

In endeavouring, at the distance of thirty years, to form an impartial opinion on this most important subject, it must at once strike the most cursory observer, that the grounds on which this question were debated in the British Parliament were not those on which its merits really rested, or on which they were placed by Napoleon at the time, and have been since argued by the Continental historians. On both sides in England it was assumed that France was the first aggressor by the Berlin Decree, and that the only question was, whether the orders in council exceeded the just measure of retaliation, or were calculated to produce more benefit or injury to this country. Considered in this view, it seems impossible to deny that they were at least justifiable in point of legal principle, whatever they may have been with reference to political expedience. The able argument of Lord Howick to the Danish minister is invincible on this subject.[‡] If an enemy adopts a new and unheard-of mode of warfare, which affects alike his opponent and neutral states, and they submit without resistance to this novel species of hostility, either from a feeling of terror or a desire of profit, they necessarily contract the obligation to be equally passive in regard to the measures of retaliation which the party so assailed may think it necessary to adopt. If they act otherwise they lose the character of neutrality, and become the disguised, but often the most effective and the most valuable allies of the innovating belligerent.

But was the Berlin Decree the origin of the

commercial warfare; or was it merely, as Napoleon and the French writers assert, a retaliation upon England, by the only means at the disposal of the French emperor, for the new and illegal species of warfare which, in the pride of irresistible maritime strength, they had thought fit to adopt? That is the point upon which the whole question really depends; and yet, though put in the foremost rank by Napoleon, it was scarcely touched on by either party in the British Parliament. Nor is it difficult to see to what cause this extraordinary circumstance was owing; both the great parties which divided that assembly were desirous of avoiding that question: the Whigs, because the measure complained of by Napoleon, and on which the Berlin Decree was justified by the French government, had been mainly adopted by Mr. Fox, and subsequently extended by Lord Howick; the Tories, because they were unwilling to cast any doubt on the exercise of maritime powers, in their opinion of essential importance to this country, and which gave them the great advantage of having their political adversaries necessarily compelled to support the general principle on which the measures in question had been founded.

History, however, must disregard all these temporary considerations, and in good faith approach the question blame attaching to each party.

And on this point, as on most others in human affairs, where angry passions have been strongly excited, it will probably be found that there were faults on both sides. Unquestionably the most flagrant violation of the law of nations was committed by Napoleon; as, without having a ship on the ocean, or a single harbour of England invested, he took upon himself to declare the whole British islands in a state of blockade—a proceeding similar to what it would have been had England proclaimed a strict blockade with her men-of-war of Strasbourg or Magdebourg. Most certainly, also, the resolution of the French emperor to reduce England, by means of a Continental system, had been formed long before the blockade of the French coasts in April, 1806, by Mr. Fox; inasmuch as it had been announced and acted upon eight years before, on occasion of the conquest of Leghorn, and had formed the first condition of his pacification with every maritime state since that period. But still the English historian must lament that the British government had given him so plausible a ground for representing his measures as retaliatory only, by issuing, in May, 1806, the blockade of the French coasts of the Channel. True, this was anything rather than a mere paper blockade; true, it was supported by the greatest maritime force in existence; true, it was so effective, that not a French ship of war could venture, without imminent risk, out of the protection of their batteries; still, the declaration of a whole coast, several hundred miles in length, in a state of blockade, was a stretch unusual in war, and which should, in an especial manner, have been avoided in a contest with an antagonist so unscrupulous in the measure in return which he resorted to, and so dexterous at turning any illegal act to good account as the French emperor.

In regard to the policy of the orders in council, there is, perhaps, less difficulty in forming a decided opinion. It was foretold at the time, what subsequent experience has since abundantly veri-

Reflections on their policy.

^{*} Parl. Deb., x., 666, 673.

[†] Ibid., x., 684, 976.

[‡] *Ante*, ii., 558.

fied, that, in the mutual attempt to starve each other out, the manufacturing state, the commercial emporium, would of necessity be more exposed to suffering than the nations with whom she carried on mercantile transactions, on the same principle on which a besieged town must, in the end, be always reduced by the concentric fire of a skilful assailant. The ruin and suffering on the one side is accumulated on a single spot, or within a narrow compass; on the other it is spread over an extensive surface;—the sum total of distress may be, and probably will be, equal on both sides; but how wide the difference between the garrison which sustains it all on a single breach, or a few hospitals, and the army without, which repairs its losses by the resources of a great empire. Sound policy, therefore, recommended, on the commencement of this novel and dangerous species of hostility, the adoption of a system on the part of Great Britain which should bind more closely the cords which united her to the few remaining neutrals of the world; and which, by opening up new markets for her produce in states beyond the reach of the French emperor, might enable her to bid defiance to the accumulated hostility of all the nations who were subjected to his control. This important subject, however, will more properly come under consideration in a subsequent volume, when the practical operation of the Continental system, and the orders in council for several years, is to be developed; and the able arguments on the part of the English opposition are recounted, which, together with the multiplied complaints of the neutral powers, and the abandonment of the Continental system by Napoleon, at length brought about their repeal.

There is one measure on the part of the British government connected with commercial transactions, however, on land, which, from the very outset, a decided opinion may be hazarded. This is the bill introduced by Mr. Perceval, and which passed both houses of Parliament,* for prohibiting the exportation of Peruvian bark to the countries occupied by the French troops, unless they took it with a certain quantity of British produce or manufactures. This was a stretch of hostility unworthy of the character of England, and derogatory to the noble attitude she had maintained throughout the war. No excess of intemperance or violence on the part of the enemy should have betrayed the British government into such a measure, which made war, not on the French emperor, but the sick and wounded in his hospitals. How much more dignified, as well as politic, was the conduct of the Duke of York in 1794, who, when the French Committee of Public Safety had enjoined their troops to give no quarter, issued the noble proclamation already noticed,† which commanded the British soldiers to deviate in no degree from the usages of civilized warfare. But such was the exasperation now produced on both sides by the long continuance and desperate character of the contest, that the feelings of generosity and the dictates of prudence were alike forgotten, and an overwhelming, and, in some instances, mistaken feeling of state necessity led men to commit many actions foreign alike to their usual principles and previous conduct.‡

April 7, 1808.

Jesuits' Bark Bill in England. — which, from the very outset, a decided opinion may be hazarded. This is the bill introduced by Mr. Perceval, and which passed both houses of Parliament,* for prohibiting the exportation of Peruvian bark to the countries occupied by the French troops, unless they took it with a certain quantity of British produce or manufactures. This was a stretch of hostility unworthy of the character of England, and derogatory to the noble attitude she had maintained throughout the war. No excess of intemperance or violence on the part of the enemy should have betrayed the British government into such a measure, which made war, not on the French emperor, but the sick and wounded in his hospitals. How much more dignified, as well as politic, was the conduct of the Duke of York in 1794, who, when the French Committee of Public Safety had enjoined their troops to give no quarter, issued the noble proclamation already noticed,† which commanded the British soldiers to deviate in no degree from the usages of civilized warfare. But such was the exasperation now produced on both sides by the long continuance and desperate character of the contest, that the feelings of generosity and the dictates of prudence were alike forgotten, and an overwhelming, and, in some instances, mistaken feeling of state necessity led men to commit many actions foreign alike to their usual principles and previous conduct.‡

Long as the preceding disquisition on the Continental system and the orders in council has been, it will not, to those who consider the importance of the subject, appear misplaced. It relates to the ruling principle, the grand object of Napoleon's life: one which he pursued with a degree of perseverance with which no other object was followed, and which, by imposing on him the necessity of general obedience, left him no other alternative but universal empire or total ruin. As such, it is closely linked with the attack on Spain and Portugal, and the long-continued carnage of the Peninsular war; the seizure of the Roman States, and incorporation of the ecclesiastical dominions by the successor of Charlemagne; the incorporation of the ephemeral kingdom of Holland with the great empire; in fine, the grand invasion of Russia in 1812, and the unspeakable horrors of the Moscow campaign. In the history of Napoleon, more, perhaps, than that of any other man that ever existed, the close connexion between one criminal act and another, and the irresistible force of the moral law by which the audacious in wickedness are impelled from one deed of darkness to those which succeed it, till a just retribution awaits them in the natural consequences of their own iniquities, is clearly evinced. The lustre of his actions, the bright effulgence of his glory, has shed an imperishable light over every step of his eventful career; and that mysterious connexion between crime and punishment, which in most men is concealed by the obscurity of their lives, and can only be guessed at from the result, or believed from the moral laws of the universe, is there set forth, link by link, in the brightest and most luminous colours.* The grandeur of his intellect precludes the idea of any cause having co-operated in his fall but the universal and irresistible laws of nature; and the first capacity of modern times was subjected to the most memorable reverse, as if to demonstrate the utter inability of the greatest human strength to combat the simple law which brings upon the impassioned prodigal the consequences of his actions.

It is observed by Dr. Johnson, that no man ever rose to supreme power among men in whom great qualities were not of the system combined with certain meannesses of license, which would be deemed inconceivable in ordinary men. Never was the truth of this singular but just remark more clearly evinced than by Napoleon on this great subject of the Continental system. While it was the great object of his life from this period—while it was the secret key to all his negotiations, all his wars, and all his conquests—while, to enforce its rigorous execution, he put all the forces of Christendom in motion, and hurled the strength of the South in desperate fury at the power of the North, he himself was the first to set the example of the evasion of his own decrees, and, for a temporary profit to himself, to establish a system which, in a great degree, subverted the whole objects for which these mighty risks and sacrifices were undergone. Many months had not elapsed after the publication of the Berlin Decree before it was discovered that a lucrative source of revenue might be opened up by granting, at exorbitant prices, licenses to import British colonial produce and

* In the Lords by a majority of 110 to 44, in the Commons by 92 to 29.—*Parl. Deb.*, x., 1170 and 1325.

† *Ante*, i., 335.

‡ *Parl. Deb.*, x., 1323-5, 1168-70.

* *Quanto vita illius præclarior ita scordia flagitiosior est. Et profecto ita se res habet, majorum gloria posteris lumen est, neque bona neque mala eorum in occulto patitur.*—*Sal.* *Bel. Jug.*

manufactures; and though this was done under the obligation of exporting French or Continental produce to an equal amount, this condition soon became illusory. Old silks, satins, and velvets, which had completely gone out of fashion, were bought up at fictitious prices, and, when the vessels which took them on board were clear of the French coasts, thrown into the sea, and rich cargoes of English goods brought back in return; and such were the exorbitant prices at which they were sold, that they yielded a very handsome profit to the merchants, after paying an enormous ransom to the emperor for the licenses, and defraying the cost of all the French goods which were lost to give a colour to the transactions. British manufactures and colonial produce rose to an extravagant height, and, as a natural consequence, they became the fashion and the object of universal desire. A pair of cotton stockings were sold for six or seven shillings, and worn by ladies, and in dress, in preference to the finest silk; sugar was soon five shillings, coffee ten shillings a pound. Such enormous prices excited the cupidity alike of those who were engaged in promoting, and whose duty it was to repress the contraband traffic; the vast profits of such cargoes as could be sold, on any terms, compensated the loss of several in the perilous undertaking; and fiscal corruption, taking example from the open sale of licenses at the Tuileries, seized every opportunity of realizing a temporary profit from the sufferings of the people.*†

England was not slow in following the example thus set by the French emperor. Even more dependant than her great antagonist on the disposal of the national produce, the British government gladly availed themselves of a system which promised to mitigate, in so important a particular, the severity of the Continental blockade, and restore, under the safeguard of imperial licenses, the wonted encouragement of European wealth to British industry. Thence arose a system on both sides the most extraordinary and inconsistent that ever existed upon earth. While the two governments were daily carrying on their commercial warfare with increased virulence; while Napoleon was denouncing the punishment of death against every government functionary who should connive in any way at the introduction of British merchandise;† and con-

signing to the flames all the bales of English manufactures that could be discovered by fiscal cupidity in all the extensive dominions subjected to his control; while these terrible severities were carried into rigorous execution wherever his influence reached, and piles of British goods were frequently burned in the public market-places of all the chief Continental cities, and unhappy wretches shot for conniving at the lucrative contraband traffic in the forbidden articles;* while the English Court of Admiralty was daily condemning merchant vessels which had contravened the orders in council, and issuing the strictest injunctions to its cruisers to carry them into full execution, both governments were the first to set the example of the open and undisguised violation of the very decrees to which they required such implicit obedience in others. British licenses were openly sold at the public offices in London, and became the vehicles of an immense commerce with the Continent; and Napoleon at length carried the system of authorizing this illicit traffic to such a height, that, by a decree issued from Antwerp, in July, 1810, it was expressly declared, "Subsequent to the first of August no vessel shall issue from any of our ports, bound for any foreign port, without being furnished with a license signed with our own hand."† Thus the Continental system and the retaliatory measures of the orders in council were mutually abandoned by the government on both sides, though rigorously exacted as the first of public duties from their subjects; the whole prohibitions of the orders in council disappeared before the magic of a writing from Downing-street, and the boasted *grande pensée* of Napoleon degenerated into a mere pretext for exacting, under the name of licenses, an immense annual profit for the behoof of the Great Imperial Smuggler in the Tuileries. To such a height was this practice carried by the French emperor, that it opened up new channels of commerce to British industry, quite equal, on the Continent of Europe, to those his decree had destroyed; and the suffering experienced in England during the continuance of the Continental system was almost entirely owing, not to this Berlin Decree, but to the loss of the great North American market, which the orders in council ultimately closed against British industry. Thus, in this the greatest measure of his life, on which he staked his influence, his fame, his throne, the mighty intellect of Napoleon was governed by the same regard to inferior interests which prompted the Dutch, in former times, to sell ammunition and provisions at an exorbitant rate to the inhabitants of a town besieged by their armies; resolved, at all events, to make profit by their hostilities, and, if they could not reduce their enemies to subjection, at least realize a usurious profit from their necessities. To such

* Bour., vii., 233, 237.

† The following instance will illustrate the mode in which the love of gain in all the imperial functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, counteracted all the state objects of the Berlin Decree. The English, in the summer of 1807, had made themselves master of Heligoland, from whence enormous quantities of British produce were smuggled into Holstein, from whence they were conveyed, at a charge of from 33 to 40 per cent., within the French custom-house line. This regular traffic being well known to the imperial authorities, and probably secretly connived at by them for a share of its enormous profits, Bourrienne, then the French resident at Hamburg, represented to Napoleon that he had much better at once authorize the trade on these terms, and realize for himself this contraband profit. Napoleon adopted the proposal, and, in consequence, 60,000,000 worth of English produce (£2,400,000) was, in 1811, imported openly into that town alone, at a profit of 33 per cent. to the emperor! The same system was soon after adopted in Prussia, but, notwithstanding this relaxation, the legions of douaniers and coast-guards who were quartered on the country were so prodigious that they were of necessity in part lodged in the public prisons and hospitals, and the unhappy captives and patients crowded into confined and unhealthy corners.—See BOURRIENNE, vii., 237, 238, 240.

† The imperial decree, November 18, 1810, created post-officers for the summary punishment of all custom-house officers, carriers, coach-guards, tide-waiters, and oth-

ers engaged in repressing illicit commerce, and authorized them to pronounce and carry into instant execution the most severe and infamous punishments, including death, without appeal or respite of any kind.—*Moniteur*, 18th Nov., 1810, and MONTGAILLARD, vii., 54.

* At Hamburg, in 1811, under the government of Davoust, an unhappy father of a family was shot for having introduced into his house a little sugar loaf, of which his family stood in need; and at that very moment, perhaps, Napoleon was signing a license for the importation of a million such loaves. Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, and the government carried it on on the greatest scale; the same regulations filled the European prisons with victims, and the imperial coffers with riches.—BOURRIENNE, vii., 233, 234.

† Mart., Sup., v., 512

a length did the License System proceed under the imperial government, that it constituted a principal source of the private revenue of the emperor; and we have the authority of Napoleon himself for the assertion, that the treasure thus accumulated, in hard specie, in the vaults of the Tuileries, amounted, at the opening of the Russian war in 1812, to the enormous and unprecedented sum of four hundred millions of francs, or above sixteen millions sterling.*†

The return of Napoleon to Paris, after the glorious termination of the Polish campaign, diffused a universal enchantment. Never, since the commencement of the Revolution, had the triumph of their arms been so glorious, and never had the French people such universal cause for exultation. No commercial crisis had brought the treasury to the brink of ruin as at the close of the campaign of Austerlitz; no gloomy presentiments of a future desperate war in the North, as at Jena, alloyed the buoyancy of their present transports. The great contest appeared to be over: the forces of the South and the North had been brought into collision, and the latter had been discomfited; the strength of Russia, instead of an inveterate antagonist, had been converted into the firmest support of the French Empire; and, emerging from all the gloom and darkness of a Polish winter, the star of Napoleon again appeared resplendent in the zenith. Their standards had been advanced in triumph to the Niemen; the strength of Prussia was, to all appearance, irrevocably broken; Austria had been throughout overawed; Russia at last defeated. No power of the Continent seemed to be longer capable of withstanding the French emperor; for the forces of Sweden, far removed from the theatre of European strife, would soon, it was foreseen, be compelled to yield to the domineering influence of Alexander. England alone maintained, with unconquerable resolution, the maritime contest; but the very greatness of the triumphs of the two hostile powers on their respective elements precluded, to all appearance, the possibility of their being brought into collision; and, like land and sea monsters, the Colossus of the earth and the deep regarded each other with fruitless rage and impotent fury.‡

So unprecedented a series of triumphs might have turned the heads of a nation less passionately devoted than the French to military glory, and it will excuse much in the way of flourishing declamation. But the oratorical effusions of the public bodies in France went beyond every allowable limit. Theirs was not the exultation of freemen, but the adulation of slaves, and the classical scholar recognised with pain, in their studied flowers,

the well-known language of Byzantine servitude. Already it had become evident that the passions of the Revolution, withdrawn from their original objects, had become wholly centred on military aggrandizement; and that the generous glow of freedom, chilled by suffering, or extinguished by disappointment, was wholly absorbed in selfish ambition—the grave in every age of durable liberty. “We cannot adequately praise your majesty,” said Lacépède, the president of the Senate: “your glory is too dazzling; those only who are placed at the distance of posterity can appreciate its immense elevation.” “The only eulogy worthy of the emperor,” said the president of the Court of Cassation, “is the simple narrative of his reign; the most unadorned recital of what he has wished, thought, and executed; of their effects,* past, present, and to come.” “The conception,” said Count de Fabre, a senator, “which the mother of Napoleon received in her bosom, could only have flowed from *Divine inspiration*.”

Shortly after the return of the emperor, a military spectacle of the most animating and imposing kind took place in the French capital. The Imperial Guard made its entry in state into Paris, amid an enthusiasm and transport which can hardly be imagined by any but those who were eyewitnesses to the vehemence of the military ardour which in France had succeeded to the passions of the Revolution. A triumphal arch was erected on the road to Mayence, at a considerable distance from Paris, from which, to the capital, the way was thronged by innumerable spectators; in brilliant order and proud array the guard marched, through a double file of soldiers, by the Port St. Martin to the Tuileries, where they defiled under the new triumphal arch, opened for the first time on that day. There they deposited their eagles in the palace; they piled their arms, and then passed through the gardens of the Tuileries to the Champs Elysées, when they sat down to a repast laid with ten thousand covers. The animating strains of the military bands, which made the air resound along the whole length of this magnificent procession; the majestic aspect of the soldiers, who were almost all picked men, bronzed by service, but undaunted in aspect; the admirable discipline which they preserved, and the recollection of their recent glorious exploits, with the renown of which the world resounded, filled every heart with transport. In the evening the theatres were all opened gratis; universal delirium prevailed. It was spectacles of this heart-stirring kind, intermingled with the astonishing external triumphs which he achieved, which gave Napoleon his magical influence over the French people, and makes them still look back to his reign, notwithstanding the numberless calamities with which it was at last attended, as a brilliant spot in existence, the recollection of which obliterates all the remembrance of later times, and fixes every eye by a glow of almost insupportable brightness.†

Napoleon, seeing his advantage, took the favourable opportunity which this burst of enthusiastic feeling afforded to eradicate the last remnants of the French Tribunal, popular institutions from the Constitution. In the speech which he addressed to the Legislative Body on his return from Poland,

Slavish adulation of the orators in the Senate, and Chambers of Deputies.

* Las Casas, iv., 115.

† The accounts and details of this immense treasure were all entered in a little book kept by the emperor's private treasurer, and no part of them appeared in the public accounts of the nation or the armie. The greater part of it was drawn out and applied to the necessities of the state during the disasters of 1813 and 1814, and in this resource is to be found one great cause of the stand made by him against the forces of combined Europe in those memorable years. As the expenses of the state always exceeded the income under Napoleon's government, and the contributions levied by the armies, how vast soever, were all absorbed in the cost of their maintenance, this secret fund must have been chiefly, if not entirely, realized from the sale of licences, and its great amount furnishes an index to the extent to which that traffic was carried.—See LAS CASAS, iv., 115.

‡ Savary, iii. Dum., xix., 138. Mont., vi., 273. Bign., xl. 400.

* Montg., vi., 275.

† Thib., vi., 247, 248.

Great fête in honour of the Grand Army. November 25.

he announced his intention "of simplifying and bringing to perfection the national institutions." It soon appeared what was in contemplation: the "simplifying" consisted in the destruction of the only remaining relic of Democratic power; the "bringing to perfection," in vesting the whole powers of legislation in a Council of State, presided over by the emperor, and composed entirely of persons paid by government, and appointed by himself. It has been already mentioned* that, by the existing Constitution, three public bodies were required to concur in the formation of the laws: the Council of State, the members of which were richly endowed, and all appointed by the emperor; the Tribunal, in which they were discussed and approved of, and the members of which, though also in the receipt of salaries from government, were, to a certain degree, dependant on popular election; and the Legislative Body, which, without enjoying the privilege of debate, listened in silence to the pleadings of the orators appointed by the Council of State, for the measures proposed by government and those of the Tribunal, either for or against their adoption. But, notwithstanding the influence of the emperor over a legislature thus in a great part appointed, and wholly paid by himself, the debates in the Tribunal occasionally assumed a freedom which displeased him; and, while he was willing to allow any latitude in argument to the discussions in the Council of State, addressed to himself or his confidential advisers, he could not tolerate public harangues in another assembly, calculated to arouse extraneous or controlling influence, or revive in any form the passions of the Revolution. For these reasons, he resolved on the entire suppression of the Tribunal, which, having been already reduced from a hundred to fifty members, and stripped by imperial influence of its most distinguished orators, had lost much of its consideration; and on the elevation of the age requisite for admission into the Legislative Body to forty from thirty years, a period of life when it might be presumed that much of the fervour in support of political innovation would be extinguished. The previous discussion on the laws proposed by government, which alone enjoyed the power of bringing them forward, was appointed to take place in three commissions, chosen from the Legislative Body by the emperor; but their debates were not to be made public. Thus was a final blow given to popular influence in France, and the authority of the executive rendered absolute in the Legislature, as it had long been in the other departments of government, just eighteen years after it had been established, amid such universal transports, by the Constituent Assembly.†

* *Ante*, ii., 574.

† De Staël, *Dix Ans d'Exil*, 37, 38. *Montg.*, vi., 277, 278. *Bign.*, vi., 398. *Petit*, 150, 153.

‡ The project of extinguishing the Tribunal had been long entertained by Napoleon. In the Council of State, on the 1st of December, 1803, he said, "Before many years have elapsed, it will probably be advisable to unite the Tribunal to the Legislative Body, by transferring its powers to committees of the latter assembly. The Senate, too feebly constituted in the outset, will require some strengthening. The other legislative bodies have no consistency: none of them could secure the nation from becoming the prey of a colonel of hussars who may have four thousand men at his disposal. The only institutions which offer any security to the public safety are the Senate and Electoral Colleges." "The Legislative Body," said he, on the 29th of March, 1806, "should be composed of individuals who, after the termination of their public services, have some private fortune to fall back upon, without the necessity of giv-

What effect did this important change, which annihilated all the objects for which the Revolution had been commenced, and restored government to a despotic form, more strict and powerful than that of the old monarchy, produce in France? Did it convulse that enthusiastic empire to its centre, and revive again the terrible Democratic fervour of 1789? Did clubs reappear, and popular ambition arise from its ashes, and the stern virtue of the old patriots obliterate the more modern illusions of military glory? It did none of these things: it was hardly noticed amid the blaze of the emperor's triumphs; it did not excite a murmur, or awaken an expression of discontent from Calais to the Pyrenees. Numbers of pamphlets appeared on the subject, but they were all in warm and earnest commendation of the change: one would have supposed that two centuries, instead of eighteen years, had rolled over the head of the nation; that the days of Mirabeau and Danton had passed into the vaults of forgotten time; that the transports of Gracchus had melted away into the servility of Constantinople. The very body which was to be annihilated was the first to lick the hand which was destroying it; if liberty arose in France amid the tears of suffering and by the light of conflagration, it expired amid the servility of eunuchs and the adulation of the East. When the fatal decree was read in the hall of the Tribunal, thunders of applause shook the walls, and Carrion Nisas, a member of that body, and cousin of Cambacères exclaimed, "This communication has been accompanied with so many expressions of esteem and affection, on the part of our sovereign, for his faithful subjects in the Tribunal; these assurances are of such inestimable importance; they have been brought forward with so much lustre, that I am sure, gentlemen, I am the organ of your sentiments when I propose that we should lay at the foot of the throne, as the last act of our honourable existence, an address which may impress the people with the idea that we have received the act of the Senate without regret at the termination of our political existence, without disquietude for the destinies of our country, and that the sentiments of love and devotion to the monarch which animated our body will live forever in the breasts of all its members." The address was voted by acclamation, and these sentiments found a responsive echo in the Legislative Assembly. Its president, Fontanes, said, in the name of the whole body, "The majesty of the National Assembly is about to revive under the auspices of a great man; these walls, which

Slavish submission which this change was received in France.

ing them a pension for their subsistence. Nevertheless, there are every year sixty legislators discharged from the Legislative Body, whom you know not what to make of: those who are not in office carry back nothing but ill-humour to the departments. I would wish to see there proprietors of a certain age, married, attached by the bond either of children or some fortune to the public welfare. These men would come annually to Paris, would speak to the emperor, and live in his circle, and return to their departments illuminated with the slender share of his lustre which had fallen on their heads. The public functionaries should also be members of the Legislative Body: you cannot render the legislature too manageable; if it becomes so strong as to be seized with the desire of ruling, it would destroy the executive, or be destroyed by it."—See *PELLET*, 148, 152. An able and authentic brief record of the discussions in the Council of State, at which the emperor presided, and his opinions on the most important subjects of government; of which an accurate and valuable translation has just been published by Mr. Cadell at Edinburgh, executed by the author's valued friend, Captain Basil Hall.

once resounded with so much clamour, were astonished at their silence, and that silence is about to terminate. Popular tempests shall no longer roll there: they will be succeeded by wise and temperate discussions. He who has enchained the demon of faction, no longer desires that voices respectful, but free, should be banished from these walls. Let us show ourselves worthy of such a gift: let the Tribune reappear without its storms; let truth shine there in its native lustre, mingled with the radiance of wisdom. A great prince must love its *éclat*; it alone can fitly illuminate his path. What has he to fear from it? The more he is regarded, the more majestic he appears; the more he is scrutinized, the more subjects of admiration are discovered." These extravagant sallies excited no general burst of indignation: they were silently read in the *Moniteur*; and the Tribune, the last relic of freedom, sunk unheeded into the grave.* "When the citizens," says Rousseau, "fallen into servitude, enjoy neither liberty nor the power of choice, terror and selfishness convert their suffrages into acclamations: deliberation is at an end; every one adores in public, or execrates in private. Such was the manner in which the Senate was regarded under the Roman emperors."† How little did the eloquent apostle of freedom anticipate another confirmation of the same remark, from the very people whom his fervent declamations had roused to such unanimous enthusiasm in the cause of liberty!

The complete success of this great infringement on the only remaining popular part of the Constitution, encouraged Napoleon to undertake still more decisive measures against the liberties of the people. Six weeks after, an imperial decree, professing to establish the freedom of the press, in reality annihilated it, by enacting that no bookseller was to publish any work without its having previously received the sanction of the censors of the press! The same restriction had previously been imposed on journals and periodical publications: so that, from this time forward down to the fall of Napoleon, no thought could be published to the world without having previously received the sanction of the imperial authorities. Under the active administration and vigilant police of the Empire, these powers were so constantly and rigorously exercised, that not only was the whole information on political subjects or public affairs, which was permitted to reach the people, strained through the imperial filters, but all passages were expunged from every work which had a tendency, however remote, to nourish independent sentiments, or foster a feeling of discontent with the existing government. So far was this carried, that, when the allies entered France in 1814, they found a large proportion of the inhabitants ignorant of the battle of Trafalgar. The years of the Empire are an absolute blank in French literary annals in all matters relating to government, political thought, or moral sentiment. The journals were filled with nothing but the exploits of the emperor, the treatises by which he deigned to enlighten the minds of his subjects on the affairs of

state, or the adulatory addresses presented to him from all parts of his dominions; the pamphlets and periodicals of the metropolis breathed only the incense of refined flattery, or the vanity of Eastern adulation. Talent in literature took no other direction but that pointed out by the imperial authorities; genius sought to distinguish itself only by new and more extravagant kinds of homage. The press, so far from being the safeguard of the people against these evils, became their greatest promoter, by exerting all its powers on the side of despotism. Whoever attentively considers the situation of France, the most enlightened monarchy of Europe, and so recently teeming with Democratic fervour, during the ten years of the imperial government, will at once perceive the groundless nature of the common doctrine that the press is, under all circumstances, the bulwark of liberty, and that despotism is impossible where it exists. They will rather concur in the opinion of Madame de Staël, that the effect which this mighty instrument produces is entirely dependant on the power which gains possession of its resources; that it is only in a peculiar state of the public mind, and when a certain balance exists between political parties, that it is exerted beneficially on the side of freedom; and that at other periods, or under the influence of more corrupted feelings, it may become the instrument of the most immovable popular or imperial despotism which ever was riveted upon mankind.*†

* Montg., v., 282. De Staël, *Rév. Franc.*, ii., 381, 382.

† Observe the picture of the identity of the effects of the press under the imperial despotism of Napoleon and the Democratic tyranny of the majority in the American Union, as delineated by two masters, Madame de Staël and M. de Tocqueville. "This police, for which we cannot find terms adequately contemptuous, was the instrument which Bonaparte made use of to direct public opinion in France; and, in truth, when there is no such thing as the freedom of the press, and the censors of the press not confining themselves to erasing, dictate to writers of every description the opinions they are to advance on every subject of politics, religion, manners, books, and individual character, it may be conceived into what state a nation must fall which has no other nutriment for its thoughts but such as a despotic authority permits. It is not surprising, therefore, that French literature and criticism descended to the lowest point during the Empire. The restrictions on the press were far less severe under Louis XIV. than Napoleon. The profound saying, 'Paper will receive anything,' never received a more appalling illustration. The journals were filled only with addresses to the emperor, with his journeys, those of the princes and princesses of his family, the etiquettes and presentations at court. They discovered the art of being tame and lifeless at the epoch of the world's overturn; and, but for the official bulletins which from time to time let us know that half the world was conquered, one might have believed that the age was one only of roses and flowers, and sought for words in vain but those which the ruling powers let fall on their prostrate subjects. A few courageous individuals published books without the censorship of the press, and what was the consequence? they were prosecuted, the impression seized, banished, or shot like the unhappy Palm. Such terrible examples spread such a universal terror, that submission became universal. Of all the grievances which the slavery of the press produced, perhaps the most bitter was the daily spectacle of those we held most dear insulted or reviled in the journals or works published by authority, without the possibility of making a reply, over half of Europe."—DE STAËL, *Rév. Franc.*, ii., 377, 383.

So far Madame de Staël, in painting the perversion of the press to the purposes of despotism in imperial France; mark now the picture of its operation in America, under the unrestrained sway of a numerical majority of electors. "Among the immense crowd," says Tocqueville, "who, in the United States, take to the career of politics, I have met with few men who possess that independence of thought, that manly candour which characterized the Americans in their war of independence. You would say, on the contrary, that all their minds are formed on the same model, so exactly do they adopt the same opinions. I have sometimes

* "The change," says Bignon, "in the age of eligibility to the Legislative Body, and even the suppression of the Tribune, now so important in our eyes, were hardly thought of in 1807; and so little was public opinion regarded, that the former change was introduced by the sole authority of the emperor, without the concurrence of any of the legislative bodies."—BIGNON, vi., 398-9.

† Montg., vi., 277, 280. Bign., vi., 397, 393.

Under the combined influence of the entire suppression of the liberty of the press and the unwearied activity of imperial censors and police agents, every approach even to a free discussion on public affairs or the principles either of government or social prosperity was stifled in France and its dependant monarchies, and one half of Europe, in the opening of the nineteenth century, and the close of a struggle for extended privileges and universal information, was brought back to a darkness more profound than that of the Middle Ages. Never did papal ambition draw so close the fetters on human thought as imperial France; the Jesuits were not such active agents in the extension of spiritual, as the police were in the establishment of temporal power. Madame de Staël and Madame Recamier were illustrious instances that the jealousy of the imperial government could not be relaxed even by the most brilliant or captivating qualities of the other sex. The former, long the object of Napoleon's hostility, from the vigour of her understanding and the fearlessness of her conduct, was at first banished forty leagues from Paris, then confined to her chateau on the Lake of Geneva, where she dwelt many years, seeking in vain, in the discharge of every filial duty to her venerable father, to console herself for the loss of the brilliant, intellectual society of Paris. At length the rigour of the *espionage* became such,

met with true patriotism among the people, but rarely among their rulers. This is easily explained: Supreme power ever corrupts and depraves its servants before it has irrevocably tainted its possessors. The courtiers in America, indeed, do not say sire! your majesty! Mighty difference! But they speak without intermission of the natural intelligence of their many-headed sovereign; they attribute to him every virtue and capacity under heaven; they do not give him their wives and daughters to make his mistresses, but, by sacrificing their opinions, they prostitute themselves to his service. What revolts the mind of a European in America, is not the extreme liberty which prevails, but the slender guarantee which exists against tyranny. When a man or a party suffers from injustice in the United States from the majority, to whom is he to apply for redress? To public opinion? It is formed by the majority. To the legislative body? It is elected by the majority. To a jury? It is the judicial committee of the majority. To the executive power? It is appointed by the majority, and is the mere executor of its wishes. How cruel or unjust soever may be the stroke which injures you, redress is impossible and submission unavoidable. I know no country in which there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of discussion as in America. The majority raises such formidable barriers to liberty of opinion, that it is impossible to pass them; within them an author may write whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if he ever step beyond them. In Democratic states, organized on the principles of the American Republics, the authority of the majority is so absolute, so irresistible, that a man must give up his rights as a citizen, and almost abjure his quality as a human being, if he means to stray from the track which it lays down. If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event will arise from the unlimited tyranny of the majority; anarchy will be the result, but it will have been brought about by despotism." To the same purpose is the opinion of President Jefferson, the ablest advocate for Democratic principles that ever appeared in the United States: "The executive power," says he, "is not the chief danger to be feared; the tyranny of the legislature is the danger most to be feared." What testimonies from such minds to the identity of the effect so long observed by political writers, by unrestrained power, whether in an absolute despot or an irresponsible numerical majority; and of the necessity of establishing the foundations of the breakwater which is to curb the force of either imperial or Democratic despotism in another element than that by which its own waves are agitated! And how remarkable a confirmation of the profound remark long ago made by Aristotle, that courtiers and demagogues not only bear a strong resemblance to each other, but are, in fact, the same men, varying only in their external character according to the ruling power which they severally worship!—See TOCQUEVILLE, *De l'Amérique*, ii., 145, 146, 156, 157; JEFFERSON'S *Correspondence*, iv., 452; and ARISTOTLE, *De Pol.*, c. 21.

that she fled in disguise through the Tyrol to Vienna, and hunted out thence by the French agents, continued her route through Poland into Moscow, where she arrived shortly before the invasion of 1812, happy to find in the dominions of the imperial autocrat that freedom which old Europe could no longer afford. Her immortal work on Germany was seized by the orders of the police and consigned to the flames; and France owes the preservation of one of the brightest jewels in her literary coronet to the fortuitous concealment of one copy from the myrmidons of Savary. The world has no cause to regret the severity of Napoleon on the illustrious exile, whatever his biographer may have; for to it we owe the *Dix Années d'Exil*, the most admirable of her moral sketches; the three volumes on Germany, the most eloquent of her critical dissertations; and the profound views on the British Constitution, with which she has enriched her great work on the French Revolution. Madame Recamier shared the rigours of Napoleon from her generous attention to her persecuted friend; a transient visit of a few days to Coppet was the pretence for including her also in the sentence of banishment; the graces which had won the admiration of all Europe, and which had disdained the advances of the emperor himself,* were consigned, in a distant province, to the privacy of rural retirement, and the ruler of the East and West deemed himself insecure on the throne of Charlemagne, unless the finest genius then in Europe, and the most beautiful woman in France, were exiled from his dominions.†

Another decree of the Senate soon after inflicted a mortal wound on the independence of the judicial establishment, by en- Judges are rendered removable at pleasure, 12th October.
acting that their commissions for life should not be delivered to them till after five years' previous service, and then only on the condition that their conduct had been entirely satisfactory to the emperor. He reserved to himself the exclusive power of judging on the continuance or dismissal of every judicial functionary, from the highest to the lowest, with the aid of commissioners, ap-

* D'Abr., xiii., 124.

† De Staël, *Dix Années d'Exil*, 74, 75, 177, 191. Id., *Rév. Franc.*, ii., 309.

‡ Napoleon's jealousy of Madame Recamier's beauty and influence carried him to still more unjustifiable lengths. Her husband, who was a great banker in Paris, became bankrupt, and he seriously proposed in the Council of State that she should be subjected to a joint responsibility with him for the debts of the bank! "I am of opinion," said he, "that, in case of bankruptcy, the wife should be deprived of all her conjugal rights; because our manners sanction the principle that a wife must follow the fortune of her husband, and that would deprive her of all inducement to make him continue his extravagances." "The class of bankers," says Pelet, the impartial reporter of these important debates, "always excited the emperor's jealousy, because they were an independent class who had no need of the government, while the government often stood in need of their assistance. Besides that, in wishing to render Madame Recamier responsible for her husband's debts, he was actuated by a special spite against that celebrated lady. The little court with which she was surrounded, on account of her incomparable beauty, excited his jealousy, as much as the talents of Madame de Staël. Elevated as he was above all others, he could not see, without pain, that she shared with him the public attention. He was more irritated by it than he would have been by a decided opposition to his government. Even the celebrity of M. Gall, and his well-known system of craniology, excited his jealousy; he could not endure that he should be more talked of than himself."—PELET, *Opinion de Napoléon, dans le Conseil d'Etat*, 261. The well-known story in Boswell of Goldsmith, at Antwerp, taking the pet, because two handsome young ladies at the window of the inn excited more attention than Goldsmith, is nothing to this.—See BOSWELL'S *Johnson*.

pointed and exclusively directed by himself. From this time the independence of the bench, over the whole French Empire, was totally destroyed, and practically every judge held his office during the pleasure merely of the emperor. Several instances of arbitrary dismissal of judges, if they pronounced decrees disagreeable to government, took place; but they were less frequent than might have been expected, from the universal spirit of slavish submission which seized the magistrates of every grade, and rendered them not merely, during the whole reign of Napoleon, the servile instruments of his will, but led them formally, after his fall, to invoke the re-establishment of despotic power.*

Following up the same arbitrary system, it was enacted, by an imperial decree on the 11th of January, that not only should every seaman or passenger on board a vessel arriving in any harbour of France who should declare that it came from an English harbour, or been searched by English cruisers, receive a third of the value of the vessel or cargo, but that every public functionary who should connive, in the slightest degree, at the infringement of any of the decrees against English commerce, should be brought before the criminal court of the department of the Seine, which was erected into a tribunal for that special purpose, and indicted for *high treason*. Bales of English goods, of great extent, were publicly burned in all the chief cities of the countries which directly or indirectly acknowledged the French influence; and at the moment that the unhappy owners were begging from the executioners a few shreds which the flames had spared, to cover their children from the inclemency of the weather, the emperor, by means of licenses, was daily carrying on an extensive commerce in these very articles, and amassing enormous sums at the Tuileries by the sale of the right to deal in those goods which brought death to any inferior functionary.†

Meanwhile, the thirst for public employment in France, always great among that energetic and aspiring people, rose to a perfect mania. The energy of the Revolution, the ardent passion for individual elevation, which constituted its secret but main spring, was now wholly turned into that channel, and by a change of circumstances, remarkable, indeed, but not unnatural, the same desire which, when revolutionary elevation was practicable, convulsed all the nation with Democratic fervour, now that court favour was the only avenue to promotion, led to the extremity of Oriental obsequiousness. The prefects, who had the patronage of all the numerous government offices within their jurisdictions, held a court, and exercised an influence equal to that of petty sovereigns; the ministers of state were besieged with innumerable applications for every office which fell vacant; the emperor himself received hundreds of petitions for every situation in his gift, from the highest to the lowest. All ranks, classes, and parties concurred in this selfish struggle; the old noblesse, with a few honourable exceptions, vied with each other for the most trifling appointments in the imperial antechambers; the patriots of 1789 burned with ardour to share in the advantage of the imperial government; even such of the bloodstained Jac-

obins of 1793 as the guillotine and subsequent proscriptions had spared, sunk down into obscure pamphleteers or functionaries in the employment of the despot who had extinguished their extravagant chimeras.* When such was the disposition of the leading parties in the Revolution, both on the Royalist and Republican side, it may readily be conceived with what eagerness the rising generation, the young men who had grown up to manhood under the star of Napoleon's glory, who knew of the fervour of Democracy only as a hideous dream of former days, the immense mass who looked to advancement in life, and saw no hope of attaining it but in the favour of government, rushed into the same career, and how completely every feeling, down to the fall of Napoleon, was absorbed in the general desire to bask in the sunshine of imperial favour. Such was the universality and vehemence of this passion, that it superseded every other feeling, whether private, social, or political, and with the exception of a few rigid Republicans, such as Carnot and Lafayette, swept before it the whole Democratic principles of France.†

The Constituent Assembly had paved the way for this great alteration by the suppression of the privileges of the nobles, and the annihilation of all provincial and local authority, which necessarily devolved in every branch of the administration, either on the popular assemblies or the Central Government; the Legislative Assembly followed it up by banishing all the clergy and landholders, and issuing the iniquitous decrees for the confiscation of their property, and the Convention put the finishing stroke by inhumanly massacring their leading members, and rendering the reparation of this injustice even to their heirs impossible, by alienating their possessions to the innumerable millions of revolutionary proprietors. It is in these frightful deeds of national injustice that we are to look for the remote but certain cause of the rapid centralization of the subsequent governments and the unbounded extent of the imperial authority. When Napoleon succeeded to supreme power, he found all local or subordinate sources of influence or authority closed up or annulled, and nothing remained but the Central Government. The people had effectually succeeded in destroying the counteracting influence of all other bodies or individuals in the state; but they had been unable to retain in their own hands the power which they had, in the first instance, erected on their ruins. Such had been the corruption, selfishness, incapacity, or wickedness of the functionaries appointed by the masses, that, by common consent, they had been deprived, either formally or tacitly, of their power of nomination; and every appointment, without exception, in the Empire, flowed from the Central Government. Not only were the whole members of the Council of State, the Senate, and the Legislative Body selected by the emperor, but he had the appointment of the whole officers in the army and navy, and the police, whether local or general; the whole magistrates of every degree; the judges, whether supreme or inferior; all persons employed in the

* Montg., vi., 282, 283.

† Montg., vi., 299. De Staël, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 251.

* Even Barère was employed in this capacity by Napoleon, and dragged out an obscure existence as a hired pamphleteer, and eulogist of the imperial government, till its fall in 1814.—*Biog. des Contemporaries*, Sup. Voce Barère.

† De Staël, ii., 372, 373. Dix Ans. d'Exil, 38. Las Cases, vii., 100, 101.

collection of the revenue, the customs, and excise; the whole ministers of the Church; all the teachers of youth; all the professors in the universities, academies, and schools; all persons in the postoffice, or concerned in the administration of the roads, bridges, harbours, fortresses, and cities in the Empire. In a country deprived of its great landed proprietors by the confiscations of the Revolution, bereaved of commerce and colonies by the events of the war, and almost destitute of capital or private fortunes from the preceding convulsions, these different employments constituted the only avenues to subsistence or eminence which remained to those who were either averse to, or above the rank of manual labour, or retail trade. This state of matters, incident to a people highly excited and inspired with the strongest feelings of individual ambition, can alone account for the universal passion for government employment which seized all ranks of the French nation during the latter years of the reign of Napoleon; and before we censure them as volatile and inconsistent, when we contrast this mania with the Democratic fervour of 1789, we would do well to reflect, whether any other people, under similar circumstances, would have remained more steadfast to their original professions; and whether both dispositions of the public mind were not, in truth, at bottom, the result of the same thirst after individual distinction, varying in the effect it produced* according to the change in the means of obtaining elevation which the altered circumstances of society had occasioned.†

Napoleon seized, with all his wonted ability, Policy of the on the extraordinary combination of emperor in circumstances which had thus in a this respect. manner thrown absolute power into his hands. "His system of government," says Madame de Staël, "was founded on three bases: to satisfy the interests of men at the expense of their virtue; to deprave public opinion by falsehoods or sophisms perpetually repeated from the press; and to convert the passion for freedom into that for military glory. He followed up this system with rare ability." The emperor himself has given us some important information on his designs, and what he had effected in this respect. "I had established," said he, "a government the most compact, carrying on its operations with the utmost rapidity, and capable of the most nervous efforts that ever existed upon earth. And, truly, nothing less was required to triumph over the immense difficulties with which we were surrounded, and produce the marvels which we accomplished. The organization of the prefectures, their action and results were alike admirable. The same impulse was given at the same instant to more than forty millions of men; and by the aid of these centres of local activity the movement was as rapid at all the extremities as at the heart of the Empire. Strangers who visited us were astonished at this system; and they never failed to at-

tribute the immense results which were obtained to that uniformity of action pervading so great a space. Each prefect, with the authority and local patronage with which he was invested, was in himself a *little emperor*; but, nevertheless, as he enjoyed no force but from the central authority, owed all his lustre to official employment, and had no natural or hereditary connexion with the territory over which his dominion extended, the system had all the advantages of the feudal government without any of its inconveniences. It was indispensable to clothe them with all that authority; I found myself made dictator by the force of circumstances; it was necessary, therefore, that all the minor springs should be entirely dependant on and in complete harmony with the grand central moving power. The spring with which I covered the soil required a prodigious elasticity, an unbounded tension, if we would avert the strokes which were levelled at our authority. Education may subsequently effect a change; but our generation were inspired with such a thirst for power, and exercised it in so arrogant a manner, to give it the mildest name, and, at the same time, were so headlong in their passion to fawn upon greatness and wear the chains of slavery, that no other system of government was practicable."*

But, with all his admiration for the centralized government which he had established, and of the machinery of prefects, mayors, adjoints, and other functionaries, by which it was carried into effect, no man knew better than Napoleon that it was not in such a system that the foundation for a durable dynasty on the throne could be laid. The system of prefects enjoying absolute power, but deriving all their consideration from transient government appointments, was, in reality, nothing else but the system of Oriental pachaics, held in subjection by a vigorous sultan; and all history told that such governments rarely descended to the third generation from their original founder. "An aristocracy," says Napoleon, "is the true, the only support of a monarchy; without it, the state is a vessel without a rudder—a balloon in the air. A true aristocracy, however, must be ancient; therein consists its real force; and that was the only thing which I could not create. Reasonable Democracy will never aspire to anything more than obtaining an equal power of elevation to all. The true policy in these times was to employ the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and the spirit of Democracy. Above all, it was necessary to take advantage of the ancient historic names: it was the only way to throw the halo of antiquity over our modern institutions. My designs on this point were quite formed, but I had not time to bring them to maturity. It was this: that every lineal descendant of an old marshal or minister should be entitled at any time to get himself declared a duke by the government, upon proving that he had the requisite fortune; every descendant of a general, or governor of a province, to obtain the title of count upon obtaining a similar endowment. This system would have advanced some, excited the hopes of others, awakened the emulation of all without injuring any one: pretty toys, it is true, but such as are indispensable for the government of men. Old and corrupted nations cannot be governed on the same principle

He re-establishes titles of honour. Principles on which it was founded.

* Las Cas., vii., 101. De Staël, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 372, 374. *Id.*, *Dix Ans d'Exil*, 38, 39.

† Napoleon has left some precious observations on this important subject. "Our excuse for the boundless thirst for employments which existed under the Empire," said he, "is to be found in the misfortunes and convulsions of the Revolution. Every one was displaced; every one felt himself under the necessity of seating himself again; and it was in order to aid that feeling, and give way to that universal necessity, that I felt the propriety of endowing all the principal offices with so much riches, power, and consideration; but, in time, I would have changed that by the mere force of opinion."—LAS CAS., vii., 102.

* Las Cas., vii., 97, 99.

as simple and virtuous ages; for one, in these times, who would sacrifice all to the public good, there are thousands and millions who are governed only by their interests, their vanity, or their enjoyments; to attempt to regenerate such a people in a day would be an act of madness. The true genius of the workman consists in making a right use of the materials which he has at his disposal, to extract good even from the elements which appear at first sight most adverse to his designs; and there is the real secret of the revival of titles, ribands, and crosses. And, after all, these toys are attended with few inconveniences, and are not without some advantages. In the state of civilization in which we are placed, they are proper to awaken the respect of the multitude, and not without influence in producing a feeling of self-respect in their owners; they satisfy the vanity of the weak, without giving any just cause of offence to the strong.*

Proceeding on these principles, a *senatus consultum*, in March, 1808, re-established hereditary titles of honour, under the denomination of prince, duke, count, baron, and chevalier. The persons so ennobled were empowered to entail a certain income, under the name of majorats, in favour of their direct descendants. This was the first formal re-establishment of a nobility; but Napoleon had previously, on repeated occasions, exercised the power of conferring titles on the leading persons in his government or army without any other authority than his own will; and among others had, by a patent dated the 28th of May, 1807, created Lefebvre Duke of Dantzic, with an hereditary succession to his son; and all the marshals of the Empire, as well as grand officers of the imperial court, had already been created princes or dukes, shortly after the campaign of Austerlitz.† But these titles were all connected with foreign estates or possessions, or named after some glorious foreign exploit, and did not infringe, except indirectly, on the equality in France itself, which it had been the great object of the Revolution to establish. Now, however, this fundamental principle was openly violated; and in the lifetime of the generation which had waded through oceans of blood to abolish these distinctions, they were re-established in greater numbers, and on a more rigid style of etiquette than ever.‡

Such a stretch, coming so soon after the universal passion for equality, which, bursting forth in 1789, had since convulsed France and Europe, was of itself sufficiently remarkable; but it was rendered still more so by the speeches by which it was ushered into the Legislative Body. "Senators!" said Cambacérés, "know that you are no longer obscure plebeians or simple citizens. The statute which I hold in my hand confers on you the *majestic title of Count*. I myself, Senators, am no longer merely the citizen Cambacérés; as well as the great dignitaries of the Empire, I am a prince, your most serene highness! and my most serene person, as well as all the other holders of the great dignities of the Empire, will be endowed with one of the grand duchies reserved by the imperial decree of the 30th of March, 1806.§ As the son of a prince cannot, in the noble hierarchy, descend to a low-

er rank than that of a duke, *all our children* will enjoy that title. But the new order of things erects no impassable or invidious barrier between the citizens: every career remains open to the virtues and talents of all; the advantage which it awards to tried merit will prove no injury to that which has not yet been put to the test." Thunders of applause shook the Senate at this announcement; and that body, composed almost entirely of persons of plebeian birth, whom success in the Revolution had raised to eminence, and many of whom had voted in the convention for the death of Louis, not only accepted with gratitude the imperial gift, which was thus the price of abandoning all their former principles, and put on with alacrity the state livery which was the badge of their servitude, but *unanimously* imbibed their devotion in an address to the emperor on the occasion, which must be given entire, as one of the most memorable monuments of political tergiversation and baseness which the history of the world has to exhibit.*†

The institution of this new hereditary noblesse was attended with one peculiarity, which was at once indicative of the ephemeral basis on which it was founded, and the incapability of the infant order to answer any of those

* Montg., vi., 304, 306.

† "Sire! The Senate presents to your august majesty the tribute of its gratitude for the goodness which has prompted you to communicate, by his most serene highness the chancellor of the Empire, the two statutes relative to the erection of imperial titles of the 30th of March, 1806, and the 19th of August in the same year. By that great institution, sire! your majesty has affixed the seal of durability to all the others which France owes to your wisdom. In proportion, sire, as one observes the mutual links which connect together the different parts, so multiplied and yet so firmly united, of that great fabric; in proportion as time, which alone can develop the full extent of its benefits, shall have fully unfolded them, what effects may not be anticipated from your august wisdom! A new value awarded to the recompenses which your majesty never fails to award to real merit, in what obscurity soever fortune may have placed it, and how varied soever may be the services which it has rendered to the state; new motives to imitate such great examples; fresh bonds of fidelity, devotion, and love towards our country, its sovereign and his dynasty; a closer bond of union between our institutions and those of confederate or friendly nations; fathers recompensed in what is most dear to them; the recollections of families rendered more touching; the memory of our ancestors enshrined; the spirit of order, of economy, and of conservatism strengthened by its most obvious interest, that of its descendants; the first bodies of the empire, and the most noble of our institutions drawn closer together; all dread of the return of the *odious Feudal System* forever abolished; every recollection foreign to what you have established extinguished; the splendour of the new families deriving fresh lustre from the rays of the crown; the origin of their illustration rendered contemporary with your glory; the past, the present, and the future attached to your power, as in the sublime conceptions of the great poets of antiquity, the first link of the great chain of destiny was placed in the hands of the gods. Such, sire, are the results of the institution to which your majesty has given life. The combination of such important results, giving security to those to whom the present is as nothing, when there is no guarantee for the future, consolidates in its foundations, fortifies in all its parts, brings to perfection in its proportions, and embellishes in its ornaments, the immense social edifice, at the summit of which is placed the resplendent throne of the greatest of monarchs."—See *Moniteur*, 11th March, 1807, and Montg., vi., 306, 308. The extraordinary nature of this address will not be duly appreciated unless it is recollected that a considerable proportion of these obsequious senators, now so ready to wear the imperial livery and form a part in the great pyramid which supported the throne, were once furious Jacobins, stained with the worst atrocities of the Reign of Terror, and almost all at one period ardent supporters of the principles of liberty and equality. It is sufficient to mention the names of Cambacérés, Fouché, Siéyes, Merlin de Douai, Carnot, Beugnot, Cornudet, Pastout, Viennot-Vaublanc, Fontanes, Fabre de l'Aude, &c., besides a host of others.

* Las Cas., v., 23, 25.

† *Ante*, ii., 418.

‡ Montg., vi., 303, 305. Dum., xix.

§ *Ante*, ii., 415.

important purposes in the state which an ancient and independent aristocracy afford. Most of the new nobles were soldiers of fortune; almost all of them were destitute of any property, but such as their official emoluments or the opportunities they had enjoyed of foreign plunder had afforded. To obviate this inconvenience, and prevent the new nobility from degenerating into a mere set of titled menials or pensioned functionaries, Napoleon fell upon the expedient of attaching to these titles rich endowments drawn from the revenue of foreign countries conquered by the French arms, or held by them in subjection. All the French marshals and the chief dignitaries of the Empire were in this manner quartered on the German or Italian States, and large sums, drawn from the industry or resources of their inhabitants, annually brought to the great central mart of Paris to be expended.* The increase of opulence to the imperial capital was thus, indeed, most sensible; and in a similar proportion did the imperial government, the author of so many benefits to its citizens, become popular and respected; but the effects of this perpetual abstraction of wealth from other countries to the metropolis of the great nation were, to the last degree, vexatious to their inhabitants, and proved one considerable cause of the deep-felt and far-spread hatred which ultimately occasioned its fall. In this respect Napoleon not only evinced none of his wonted sagacity, but acted in direct opposition to what common sense dictated as the fitting course for the monarch of a great and varied empire. How different was the policy of

the Romans, who not only left at the disposal of the municipalities in their extensive dominions the greater proportion of their local revenues, but annually remitted large sums from the imperial treasury for the construction of edifices of utility or embellishment in all their principal cities; so that the sway of the emperors was felt chiefly in the increasing opulence and splendour of their provincial capitals.*

It was another part of Napoleon's system, which he laboured assiduously to promote, to effect an amalgamation, or fusion, as he called it, of the ancient with the modern noblesse, that, burying in oblivion former discord, they should cordially unite in resisting any farther changes, and supporting the imperial throne. With this view he not only opened his antechambers to the old nobility, who rushed in in crowds to occupy them, but promoted to the utmost of his power the distribution of the old families through the innumerable offices of his dominions, and did all that he could, by the offer of splendid establishments, to overcome the repugnance of the ancient noblesse to matrimonial alliances with the soldiers of fortune who had risen from the ranks to greatness under the banners of the Empire. In one respect, this system succeeded even beyond his expectation. Fondly attached, notwithstanding all their reverses, to feudal ideas, clinging still, notwithstanding a total change of manners, to antiquated customs, the old nobility found themselves suddenly elevated to an extraordinary and unhopèd-for degree of importance in the court of the new emperor; and, by the grace of their manners, the brilliancy of their conversation, and their perfect familiarity with the formalities and etiquette of the ancient régime, soon acquired a marked superiority in that field over the soldiers or civilians of humble birth whom the changes of the Revolution had elevated to greatness. By a singular, but not unnatural feeling, also, they were destitute of the scruples at accepting offices in the household which persons of less illustrious descent might have felt. A Montmorency would willingly become maid of honour to the empress, or even descend to lace her shoe, which a lady of plebeian birth might have deemed a degradation. Thus the court was soon filled with the descendants of the old noblesse, and widely as the emperor opened his doors for their reception, amply as he multiplied the chamberlains, equeries, lords in waiting, ladies of the bedchamber, squires, pages of the antechambers, and other functionaries of the palace, he found it impossible to keep pace with the crowds of titled applicants who incessantly besieged its gates for admission. The new nobility soon conceived a violent jealousy at these intruders who had supplanted them in the court circles, and openly testified their animosity even in presence of the emperor himself. The system of fusion met with very little success with the ladies of the rival classes of nobility; but the substantial advantages of great fortune and dignified station reconciled the plebeian duchesses to the superior favour shown to their patrician rivals, while the brilliant uniforms, high stations, and military lustre of the young generals induced not a few of the descendants of the oldest families in France to ally their fortunes to the sons of those upon

System of fusion which Napoleon pursued of the ancient and modern noblesse.

* As a specimen of the manner in which the imperial generals or dignitaries were endowed out of the revenues of the conquered or subject states, it may be sufficient to cite those who were located on the domains of the small electorate of Hanover.

Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel 140,000 frs., or £5,600 a yr.
Bernardotte, Prince of Pontecorvo.....

Mortier, Duke of Treviso.....	100,000	4,000
Duroc, Duke of Friuli.....	85,000	3,400
Ney, Duke of Elchingen.....	83,000	3,180
Augereau, Duke of Castiglioni.....	80,000	3,200
Massena, Duke of Rivoli.....	80,000	3,200
*Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza.....	66,000	2,700
Davoust, Duke of Auerstadt.....	60,000	2,400
*Soul, Duke of Dalmatia.....	53,000	2,150
Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzie.....	50,000	2,000
Prince Lebrune.....	50,000	2,000
Lannes, Duke of Montebello.....	50,000	2,000
Marshal Bessières.....	50,000	2,000
Gen. Sebastiani.....	40,000	1,600
*Junot, Duke of Abrantes.....	35,000	1,450
Gen. Friand.....	30,000	1,200
Gen. Bessan.....	30,000	1,200
Generals Victor, Oudinot, St. Hilaire, Gardenue, Gazan, Caffarelli, Dupas, Lassalle, Klein, Soulis, Rapp, Dorsenne, each 20,000, in all.....	240,000	9,600
*Generals Hullin, Drouet, Compans, Gudin, Verdier, Bonnies, Lacoste, Daru, and others, in all 13, 25,000 each,..	325,000	13,000
Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, Maret, Fouché, Decres, Regnier, Mollini, Gaudin, Champagny, Lernaiois, Clarke, Cretel, Bertrand, Moncey, Perignon, Servieres, Ségur, Marchand, Dupont, 20,000 each, in all 19 individuals..	380,000	15,200
Monton, Belliard, Lauriston, Savary, each 15,000.....	60,000	2,400
General Becker.....	12,000	480
Regnaud, St. Angely, Dufemier, Lacrier, Gen. Grouchy, Gen. Nansouty, Bigot, each 10,000, in all.....	60,000	3,200

Total, 2,259,000 frs., £91,160 yly.

—HARD., x., 488–440; *Pièces Just.*

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* Hard., x., 488, 490.

† Pelet, 107, 108. Las Cas., ii., 288, 289. De Staël, Rev. Franç., ii., 333, 335. D'Abr., ix., 287; ii., 324.

whom their parents would have deemed it a degradation to have bestowed a look.*

Notwithstanding all his efforts, however, it was impossible for Napoleon to conceal from the clearsighted Republicans of France that the restoration of hereditary titles of honour was an entire departure, in the most vital points, from all the principles of the Revolution. In fact, the only surprising thing is, that he himself did not perceive how completely its ultimate effect was subversive of all the passions which had agitated France in 1789, and during the whole fervour of its subsequent changes. It was in vain to say that titles of honour were now restored as a personal, not an hereditary distinction; that the career of merit, both in the civil and military department, was open to all; and that every peasant's son might indulge the hope, by bravery in the field, of fighting his way from the humble rank of a grenadier to a marshal's baton and dukedom; or, by skill and address in diplomacy, of advancing from the counter of the tradesman to the dignity of ambassador and prince of the Empire. During the reign of Napoleon, indeed, and under the pressure of those national difficulties which rendered it indispensable to look for talent in every grade, even the lowest in the state, there might be some foundation for this observation; and doubtless the aspiring temper of the *tiers état* could not but feel gratified at beholding the number of their own, or an inferior rank, who now, as warriors or statesmen, occupied the highest stations in the Empire. But to those who carried their views beyond the reign of the emperor or the existing generation, and looked to the present institutions as a guarantee for Republican equality in future times, these considerations afforded little matter for consolation. They could not disguise from themselves that the new imperial dignities, though the reward of merit to the present holders, would become the birthright of descent to the next generation; they could not hope that the same stirring and anxious times would always continue which rendered it necessary for government to throw themselves for support on the middling classes of the people; and they anticipated the time with dismay when, during the pacific periods of subsequent reigns, the imperial nobility would come to monopolize the influence, offices, and power of the state, as completely as ever had been the case by their feudal predecessors in the days of Francis I. or Louis XIV. What was the origin of all nobility but personal merit? every family, how great soever in its subsequent stages, had some obscure citizen for its original founder; the first king had been a fortunate soldier. If an aristoc-

racy existed at all obstructing the rise of inferior citizens, and monopolizing for a privileged class the influence and riches of the state, it would be no consolation to the friends of equality to assert that it took its origin from the revolutionary, not the feudal wars, and that its paladins were to be found, not in the Round Table of Charlemagne, but the marshals of Napoleon.

In truth, the emperor was too far-sighted not to feel the justice of these observations; and although, in his addresses to the people, he was cautious to hold out the new nobility as the reward of merit only, yet he secretly felt that it was, in fact, the revival of a family distinction. But he was also aware that the favour of the populace cannot be relied on for the durable support of government; that an hereditary monarchy cannot exist without an hereditary aristocracy, whose interests are entwined with its fate; and that without such lasting support, founded on the permanent interests of a privileged class, his throne would be lost by his descendants as speedily as it had been won by himself. All history, and especially that of the Asiatic empires, prove that no family, how great soever in its original founder, could long keep possession of the throne, unless it had cast its anchor either in the interests of an hereditary nobility or religious attachment centred in the descendants of a single family. And the friends of freedom, had they possessed more penetration than at that time, or even now prevails on this subject in France, might have been consoled by the reflection that, however hostile to the equality, the passion for which formed the leading principle of the Revolution, such an aristocracy formed an essential element in the formation of lasting freedom; and that, although there were many instances in which such an aristocracy had proved an insurmountable bar to the elevation of the middling classes of society, there was not one example of liberty not having entirely perished, without such a barrier to resist its encroachments, under the debasing influence of a centralized despotism.

The rapidity with which court etiquette and all the minutiae of regal manners now spread exceeds belief, and, notwithstanding the abundance of contemporary proof, appears almost incredible in a country so recently convulsed with revolutionary passions. The old archives of the monarchy were ransacked to discover the whole details of the ancient ceremonials; whoever could point out an additional bow to be made, a more respectful mode of presenting an address to be adopted, a more gorgeous display of pomp or splendour to be introduced, was received as a benefactor of the human race. The old ceremonies at the rising and retiring to rest of the kings were re-established, though abridged in some of their details; the ancient forms of presentation were revived; and it was seriously debated at court whether the fatiguing form of dining in public once a week should not be restored. Magnificence and splendour the imperial court far exceeded not only anything in Europe, but all that the pride of Louis XIV. had conceived. The whole royal palaces, with the exception of Versailles, were refurbished in the most sumptuous style; the value of the plate and furniture which they contained was estimated at fifty millions of francs, or two millions sterling. At the marriage of the Empress Marie Louise, four queens held her train. In the antechambers of

* The reasons assigned by Napoleon in the Council of State for the employment of the ancient in preference to the modern noblesse was as follows: "It is among the old families that you can alone find still some remains of great fortune; by that means they exercise a great influence on government. How could you compose a court with the men of the Revolution! You find in their ranks only honourable functionaries without fortune, or opulent contractors without character: a court of salaried officials would be at once onerous to the state, and without dignity in the eyes of the people. If the old fortunes are divided by distributions on death, they are restored by successions: the new fortunes have nothing to look to in that way; on the contrary, they are surrounded with needy relatives. Government can now no longer enrich, as formerly, its servants by the domains of the crown or confiscations; it ought, therefore, as much as possible, to take advantage of fortunes already made, and employ them in its service."—FELET, *Conseil d'Etat de Napoléon*, 107, 108.

the emperor, seven kings were sometimes to be seen.* And when this occurred, it was just seventeen years since it had been written, with universal consent, over the principal archway in the Tuileries: "Monarchy is abolished in France, and *will never be restored.*"†

While not merely the forms of monarchical, but the essence of despotic power, were in this manner re-established in France, amid the general concurrence of the nation, the emperor was careful to accompany the change with such substantial benefits and real ameliorations as amply reconciled the great mass of the citizens to the loss of the once prized Democratic powers which had brought such unheard-of disasters on their possessors and the whole community. Though completely despotic, the imperial government had one incalculable advantage: it was regular, conservative, and systematic. The taxes were heavy, but the government expenditure was immense, and enabled the people to pay them with facility: no forced loans or arbitrary confiscations swept off, as in the time of the Republic, the accumulations of years by one fell exaction; no uncertainty as to enjoying the fruits of industry paralyzed in any branch of employment the hand of the labourer. Everything was orderly and tranquil under the imperial sway; the emperor demanded, indeed, more than half their sons from his subjects of every degree, but a boundless career was opened to the conscripts; and visions of a marshal's baton or a general's staff danced before the eyes of many a youthful aspirant, who was destined to an early and unheeded grave in the field of battle or amid the horrors of the military hospital. The stoppage of all external commerce, combined with the vast and constantly increasing expenditure of government, produced an extraordinary degree of vigour in domestic industry and internal communication; the roads, the canals which connected the provinces with each other, were covered with wagons or boats laden with the richest merchandise; the cultivators everywhere found an ample market for their produce in the vast consumption of the armies; the manufacturing cities vied with each other in activity and enterprise; and even commercial wealth, reviving from its ashes under the firm rule of the emperor, exerted its energies on internal traffic, and, turning inward, promoted internal circulation through the great arteries of the Empire. Beet-root was largely cultivated as a substitute for the sugar-cane, and though the saccharine matter obtained from that useful vegetable was inferior in sweetness and richness to that which the West India islands yielded, yet it was superior in clearness and delicacy, and, as a native production, was justly admired. Lyons, Rouen, and the Flemish cities again resounded with the activity of the artisan; their ruined fabrics were restored, the empty warehouses replenished; and the vast internal consumption of the Empire, deprived of all foreign competition, rapidly raised from the dust the prosperous manufactures of the monarchy, which the confiscation of the Revolution had, to all appearance, irrevocably destroyed.‡

Much as this extraordinary flood of internal prosperity was owing to the rapid circulation of wealth, occasioned by the great expenditure, exceeding thirty millions sterling, which was drawn

from the ordinary revenue of the Empire,* more still was to be ascribed to the enormous sums which were extracted from one half of Europe in the shape of subsidies, contributions, or the maintenance of the imperial armies, which was all expended, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of the French people. The immense sums, amounting to above twenty-four millions sterling, have been already mentioned which were extracted from Prussia, and the countries between the Elbe and the Vistula, in two years subsequent to the irruption of the French armies into their territories in October, 1806. But, exorbitant as this was, it constituted but a part of the great system of foreign plunder which formed so important an element in the general system of the imperial government. We have the authority of the able and impartial biographer of Napoleon for the assertion, "that, since their departure from the heights of Boulogne, two hundred thousand French soldiers had been constantly fed, clothed, paid, and lodged at the expense of foreign states; above four hundred millions of contributions (£16,000,000) had, in addition, been levied in money or goods from the countries occupied by the imperial troops: the treasury had received part of this sum, and the remainder, expended on the services of the army, had reduced by one half the amount required from the French exchequer for its support." A few years before, Louisiana had been sold by the First Consul to America, to obtain a supply for the pressing wants of the treasury; on his return from the campaign of Austerlitz, the emperor found the treasury exhausted, and the bank on the eve of insolvency; but the campaigns of the two next years gave him a year's revenue in advance in the coffers of the state, besides a large reserved treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries.‡ When such extraordinary supplies were obtained by foreign plunder for the French treasury, it is not surprising that a very great degree of prosperity should have pervaded all its departments, and in an especial manner made itself felt at the metropolis; and, in truth, all the great and splendid works thenceforward undertaken by the emperor, and which have shed such an imperishable lustre round his name, were carried on by funds wrung, directly or indirectly, from the suffering inhabitants of his subject territories.§

And these works, undertaken under the imperial government, were really such as to justify the enthusiastic admiration of a people even less pas-

Great effect of the foreign plunder and contribution on the industry of France.

* Revenue of the Empire, exclusive of contributions from foreign states and all extraordinary supplies:

In 1808.....	664,879,901 frs., or £26,500,000	
1809.....	723,514,090 "	29,000,000
1810.....	744,392,027 "	29,700,000
1811, including		
Roman States	907,295,657 "	36,200,000
1812.....	876,266,180 "	35,300,000
1813.....	824,273,749 "	33,000,000

—DUPRÉ DE GAETIA, i., 307, 308.

It is not going too far to say, that the sums drawn during these years, directly or indirectly, by plunder, contributions, tribute in subsidies from foreign states, amounted to at least half as much more; and the sums, from the difference in the value of money, were equal to almost double their nominal amount in the currency of Great Britain. Thus, during the last six years of Napoleon, an expenditure equal to nearly a hundred millions sterling in England took place in the French Empire, of which more than a third was drawn from foreign countries. It is not surprising that such a government for the time should be popular, notwithstanding its despotic character and the conscription.

† *Ante*, ii., 544.

‡ *De Staël*, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 266.

§ *Jom.*, ii., 437, 438.

* *Las Cas.*, ii., 290, 291. *De Staël*, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 334, 335.

† *De Staël*, ii., 235.

‡ *Bign.*, vi., 403, 407. *Jom.*, ii., 442, 444.

Striking account of the public works of France by the minister of the interior, Aug. 16, 1807. sionately devoted than the French to public splendour. They were thus noticed in the report of the minister of the interior in August, 1807, when Napoleon met the chambers after his return from Tilsit; and, after making every allowance for the exaggerated style of such state papers, much remains to attract the admiration of succeeding ages, and demonstrate the great objects to which, in domestic administration, the ambition of the emperor was directed. "Thirteen thousand leagues of public roads have been kept in order or repaired: the two greatest works undertaken for centuries, the roads of Mont Cenis and of the Simplon, have, after six years of labour, been completed. The road from Spain to Italy is in progress; the Apennines are the theatre of a series of works which will unite Piedmont to the shores of the Mediterranean, and complete the union of Liguria to France; eighteen rivers have seen their navigation improved or prolonged beyond hitherto impassable barriers by means of locks, dikes, or towing paths; four bridges have been erected during the last campaign; ten others are in full progress; ten canals, almost all commenced during the present reign, are in full activity. Nor do the maritime harbours offer fewer prodigies. Antwerp, so recently insignificant, has become the centre of our great maritime preparations: for the first time that part of the Scheldt sees vessels of 74 and 80 guns floating on its bosom; fourteen ships of the line are on the stocks within its walls; many are finished, and have descended to Flushing; that harbour has seen its docks deepened, its entrance improved, and it is already capable of containing a squadron; at Dunkirk and Calais piers have been constructed; at Cherbourg two vast breakwaters erected; at Rochefort and Marseilles equally important maritime improvements are in progress. The existence of our cotton manufactures being secured, investigations are in progress for the discovery of places suited to the culture of that important article: the improvement of the linen fabrics has been the object of constant solicitude; veterinary schools have been established, and already fill the army and the fields with skilled practitioners; a code is preparing for the regulation of commerce; the school of arts and mechanics at Compeigne flourishes, and has been transferred to Chalons; others on a similar plan are in the course of formation; Italy opens an extensive mart for our industry; the war, changed into a contest for commercial independence, has become the greatest stimulant to French industry; every one of our conquests, while it is a market closed to England, is a new encouragement afforded to French enterprise. Nor has the capital of this great empire been neglected; it is the emperor's wish that that illustrious city, become the first in the universe, should befit by its splendour so glorious a destiny. At one extremity of Paris a bridge has been completed, to which victory has given the name of Austerlitz; at another, a second is commencing, to which Jena will afford a still more glorious appellation; the Louvre advances to its completion, marking, in its matured progress through centuries, the successive ages of Francis I., of Henry IV., of Louis XIV., restored to life by the voice of Napoleon; fountains without number flow night and day in all parts of the city, testifying, even to the humblest classes, the care which the emperor bestows on their most

trifling accommodation. Two triumphal arches are already erected, or founded, one in the centre of the palace inhabited by the Genius of Victory, the other at the extremity of the most beautiful avenue of the finest city in the world. The tomb of Dessaix has been erected on the summit of the Alps, whose rugged precipices are not less startled at the monument of our perfection in the arts, than they were at the passage of the artillery drawn by the arms of valour. The fine arts in France are occupied almost entirely in tracing on marble or canvass the glorious exploits of our armies, while the mind of the emperor, ever meditating fresh triumphs, has selected for his antagonist the Demon of Ignorance; and, by the establishment of twelve colleges for the study of law, and gratuitous schools for the teaching of medicine in all the principal cities of the Empire, has laid the foundation of the extension of general knowledge in the most essential subjects of public instruction.*

When the French people saw this magnificent announcement of internal improvement, contemporaneous with the official promulgation of the treaty of Tilsit, the conquest of Prussia, the restoration of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and the erection of the kingdom of Westphalia, it is not surprising that they were dazzled by the brilliancy of the spectacle, and yielded to the pleasing illusion that the Revolution, nursed in violence and baptized in blood, was to set amid a blaze of unprecedented glory. But the querulous discontent and substantial oppression of other nations might have even then taught them that this splendid fabric rested on a dangerous foundation, and that the system was not likely to be durable which impoverished all others to enrich one favoured state; while a sagacious observer of this long and glowing enumeration of the internal projects of the emperor could hardly have avoided the inference that the government had now drawn to itself the patronage and direction of domestic improvement of every description; that the very magnitude and universality of public undertakings proved that private enterprise had sunk into the dust; and that, reversing the whole principles of the Revolution, the welfare of society had come to depend on the point of the Pyramid.

The finances of France, in an especial manner, occupied the attention of the French emperor; and the talent of his subjects under the jects, adapted beyond any other people in Europe to organization and accuracy in matters of detail, brought that important branch of administration to an extraordinary degree of perfection. The official exposition set forth by his ministers annually, exhibited an excess of income above expenditure;† but no reliance can

* Bign., vi., 402, 407.

† The Budget exhibited to the Chambers for 1808, was as follows:

Income.		France.	Budget of 1809.
Direct contributions	295,241,651		
Registers and crown lands	181,458,491		
Customs	75,973,797		
Lottery	12,804,488		
Postoffice	8,524,556		
Excise	82,772,692		
Salt and tobacco, by the Alps	5,104,198		
Salt mines	3,000,000		
	664,879,901		
	or £26,500,000		
Expenditure.		France.	
Public debt	74,000,000		
Pensions	31,000,000		
Civil list	28,000,000		
Carried forward	133,000,000		

be placed on these statements as a true picture of the financial condition of the Empire, when ten or fifteen millions sterling were annually drawn from foreign nations by contributions or subsidies, which did not appear in the yearly budgets; and all the armies quartered beyond the frontiers of the Empire, whether in Germany, Italy, or the Spanish Peninsula, were systematically and invariably maintained and paid at the exclusive expense of their inhabitants. It is sufficient to observe, therefore, that, as long as the empire of Napoleon endured over foreign nations, no want of money was ever experienced at the imperial headquarters, and that the sums extracted from them during its continuance amounted to at least a half of those derived from the legitimate taxation of his own subjects. The longer his experience extended, the more was he attached to the admirable system of indirect taxation, the only secure basis for the permanent income of a great nation. "The principle I should wish to see established," said he, on the 20th of February, 1806, "is to introduce a great number of moderate indirect taxes, susceptible of augmentation, when the public necessities call for their elevation."*

But the march of despotism is not forever on flowers; nor is it always blessings and splendid improvements only which it confers upon its subjects. It soon appeared that the brilliant public works and bewildering enumerations of great undertakings with which the minister of the interior dazzled the eyes of the people, were but the splendid covering with which Napoleon was gilding over the old and well-known chains of Roman servitude. On the 1st of February, 1810, the Penal Code made its appearance; and the few real patriots who had survived the storms of the Revolution perceived with grief, that, out of 480 crimes which it enumerated, no less than 220 were for state offences.† In this long and portentous enumeration were included almost all the offences embraced under the denomination of lese-majesty in the jurisprudence of the lower empire: among others, the non-revelation of crimes affecting the security of the state, which have come to any one's knowledge; illegal societies or assemblages of any kind; and seditious offences, committed either by writings published or unpublished, images or engravings. The punishment of such non-revelation was declared to be the galleys, if the crime not disclosed was

lese-majesty; imprisonment from two to five years, if sedition. So special and minute are the crimes against the security of the state, and so slender the evidence required to establish them, that in troubled times, and in the hands of a despotic monarch, they furnished the most ample means of totally extinguishing the liberties of the people, and rendering every person amenable to punishment who in the slightest degree obstructed the measures of government.*

Imprisonment has ever been the great instrument of despotic power: it is not by heart-rending punishments inflicted on its victims in presence of the people, but by the silent, unseen operation of confinement and seclusion, that the spirit of freedom has in general been broken. Founded, as the empire of Napoleon was, on the suppression of all the passions of the Revolution, and succeeding, as it did, to a period when great political parties had been interested in their preservation, it was not to be expected that this great engine was to remain powerless in his hands. It is a remarkable fact, highly characteristic of the ambitious spirit which inspired, and the absence of all regard for real freedom which distinguished the whole changes of the Revolution, that not one of the successive parties which were elevated to power during its progress ever thought of the obvious expedient essential to anything like freedom, of limiting by law the period to which imprisonment, at the instance of government, without bringing the accused to trial, could extend. Each was perfectly willing that arbitrary imprisonment should continue, provided only that they enjoyed the power of exercising it. During the Reign of Terror, this iniquitous system was carried to a height unparalleled in any former age; and above two hundred thousand captives at one time groaned in the state prisons of France. Even under the comparatively regular and constitutional sway of the Directory, it was still largely acted upon: the first use of their power made by each faction, as they got possession of the executive, was to consign all the dangerous persons of the opposite parties to prison; and we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion that, at one time, the state prisoners under their rule amounted to sixty, and when he took possession of power, were still nine thousand.† Under his more vigorous, but humane administration, the amount was much lessened, but still it was considerable; and great numbers of persons constantly remained in jail, without any means either of procuring their liberation or forcing on their trial. Their number and unhappy condition had long attracted the attention of the emperor, and at March 3. length a decree was passed regulating their treatment and places of confinement, and defining the authorities by whom their detention was to be authorized. By this decree eight state prisons were established in France, viz., Saumur, Ham, If, Landskrown, Pierre Chatel, Fenestrelles, Campiano, and Vincennes. The detention of prisoners in them required to be on a warrant of the private council of the emperor, on a report of the minister of police or public justice. The former was invested with the power of putting any person that he thought proper under the surveillance of the police. The captives in the state prisons retained the

Decree establishing eight state prisons in France. March 3, 1810.

Expenditure.	Francs.
Brought forward	133,000,000
Judges	22,000,000
Foreign relations	9,000,000
Minister of the Interior	52,000,000
— of Finance	21,900,000
— of Treasury	8,000,000
— of War	201,649,000
Ordinance	134,880,000
Marine	117,200,000
Religion	14,000,000
Police General	1,055,000
Negotiations	8,000,000
Miscellaneous	6,316,000
	730,000,000
	or £29,200,000

See DUC DE GAETA, i., 306, and MONTGAILLARD, vi., 304, 365.

The kingdom of Italy alone produced to Napoleon a yearly tribute of 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000, and for this we have the authority of his own words; but no mention of this contribution, any more than the £3,400,000, paid annually by Spain and Portugal, or the £24,000,000 levied on the north of Germany, appears in these annual budgets.— See *Seance*, 7 April, 1806; PELET. * Pelet, 236.

† Code Penal, § 75 to 131, and § 132 to 294.

* Code Penal, Arts. 132 to 294.

† Napoleon in Month., i., 178.

power of disposing of their effects, unless it was otherwise ordered; but they could not receive any money or movables but in the presence of the governor of the prison, and by his authority. All correspondence or intercourse with the rest of the world was rigorously forbidden; and any jailer who should permit or connive at the correspondence of any prisoner with any person whatever was to be dismissed, and punished with six months' confinement.*

Under this rigorous system, great numbers of persons of the highest rank and noblest character were confined in these state prisons during the whole reign of Napoleon, not only from France itself, but from Piedmont, Lombardy, the Roman States, Germany, and Switzerland. An order, signed by Napoleon, the minister of police, or the Privy Council, was a sufficient warrant in all those countries, not only to occasion the arrest of any suspected person, but his detention in one of these gloomy fortresses, to all appearance for the whole remainder of his life: nobles of the highest rank, priests of the most exalted station, citizens of the most irreproachable lives, were seized in every part of Europe subject to the French influence, paraded through the towns of the country to which they belonged, with shackles on their hands, or chains round their necks, and then consigned to the gloomy oblivion of the state prisons, there to languish in captivity for the remainder of their lives. The offences for which this terrible penalty, worse than death itself, was inflicted, were of the most trivial kind; their being regarded as punishable at all, savoured rather of the dark policy of Tiberius than the more lenient administration, even of despotic countries, in modern times. An unhappy *bon mot*, a cutting jest at the expense of any of the imperial authorities, a few sarcastic lines, were sufficient to consign their unfortunate authors to close confinement for the rest of their days.† The state prisons exhibited the most extraordinary assemblage of persons: those on the north of the Empire were chiefly filled with ardent Democrats, or devoted partisans of the house of Bourbon; those in the southern provinces with ecclesiastics, or priests who had expressed themselves incautiously regarding the captivity and dethronement of their spiritual sovereign; but numbers were there immured against whom no definite charge or overt

act could be brought, but who, from some unknown cause, had excited the jealousy of the emperor or some of the imperial authorities. One day there arrived at the doors of these gloomy abodes a young nobleman of elegant figure, gay manners, and dissipated habits; the next an aged priest, in the decline of life, whose gray hairs were sent to bleach amid the snows of the Alps; next came a violent Democrat, who, untaught by the disasters of twenty years, was still raving about the Rights of Man; then a faithful adherent of the fallen dynasty, or an uncompromising assertor of the wrongs of the conquered provinces. All who in any way, or from any motive, had excited either the displeasure or the fear of the emperor, were sent into captivity; but the greater proportion were ecclesiastics, among whom was the intrepid and able Cardinal Pacca who had, in an especial manner, roused his indignation by his bold counsels to the pope, soon the companion of his captivity, to resist the imperial aggressions on the Holy See.††

One circumstance of peculiar and unprecedented severity attended the state victims of Napoleon, which had been unknown in Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire. The extent of his dominions, the wide sway of his influence, rendered it almost impossible to fly from his persecution. By passing the frontier, and escaping into other states, no asylum, as in former times, was obtained; the influence of the imperial authorities, the terrors of the imperial sway, pursued the fugitive through the whole of Europe; and, as in the days of Caligula or Nero, the victim of imperial jealousy could find no resting-place on the Continent till he had passed the utmost limits of civilization, and amid the nomade or semi-barbarous tribes on the frontiers of Europe found that security which the boasted institutions of its ancient states could no longer afford. The mandates of the emperor, the inquiry of his police, reached the trembling fugitive as effectually on the utmost verge of the Austrian or Spanish dominions, in the extremity of Calabria, or in the marshes of Poland, as in the centre of Paris; and it was not till he had escaped into the Ukraine or the Turkish provinces, or had found an asylum in the yet unsubdued realm of Britain, that the victim of imperial persecution could find a secure resting-place. The knowledge of this, which universally prevailed, added fearfully to the terrors of the imperial government; the firmest mind, the most undaunted resolution despaired of entering the lists with an authority which the whole civilized world seemed constrained to obey; and the immense majority of the prudent and the selfish quailed under the prospect of incurring the displeasure of a power whose lightest measure of animadver-

Universal extent of Napoleon's power, and great aggravation it was of his persecutions.

* Decree, March 3, 1810. *Moniteur* and *Montg.* vii., 11, 12.

† Cardinal Pacca, long a victim of the tyrannical government of Napoleon, on account of the courageous stand which he made against his spoliation of the Holy See, and who, for six years, was confined in the state prison of Fenestrelles among the solitude of the Alps, has given us the following account of some of his fellow-captives: "On my arrival in the prison, one of the first persons I met was the arch-priest of Fontaine, in the Duchy of Parma, *vir simplex et timens Deum*, who had been sentenced to three years' confinement for having written, in 1809, to a neighbouring curate that the Archduke John was advancing with his army; the next was Tognetti de Pisa, condemned to six months' imprisonment for having imprudently repeated a satire he had heard against the emperor; Girolamo de Forte, also, for having composed some poems in favour of the Austrians, when in 1800 they chased the French from Italy; and Leonard de Modigliano, dean of Forlì, for having been imprudent in his language against the French emperor, were sentenced to an unlimited period of captivity, and only received their liberation on the downfall of Napoleon. They traversed the most populous cities of Lombardy in the course of their transmission to prison, the former with handcuffs, the latter with a chain about his neck, of which he still bore the marks when I saw him in the prison of Fenestrelles."—*Mémoires de CARDINAL PACCA*, i., 237, 238.

* Pacca's *Mem.* i., 237, 270, 271, 274.

† These ecclesiastics were sentenced to unlimited imprisonment for the most trifling causes. Out of nineteen who were imprisoned along with Cardinal Pacca in the fortress of Fenestrelles, amid the Savoy Alps, three Spaniards by birth were there for having declared, at Parma, against the iniquitous war which the emperor was waging against their nation; another for being suspected of having carried on a secret correspondence with the pope when in confinement in France; others for having refused to take the oath of fidelity to the French emperor in the Roman States; one from Bastia, in Corsica, for having preached a sermon containing some passages which were thought to be a satire on the emperor, in regard to the affairs of the Church. He was seized before he had concluded his discourse, and instantly conducted to prison.—*PACCA*, i., 271, 272.

sion would be banishment into the savage or uncivilized parts of the earth.* Such was the weight of this despotism, that even the brothers of Napoleon could not endure it. Louis resigned the throne of Holland, and Lucien sought in England that freedom, for the loss of which all the grandeur and power of the brother, whom his presence of mind had seated on the consular throne, could afford no compensation.

With such powers to support his authority, and such terrors to overawe discontent or stifle resistance, Napoleon succeeded, without the least difficulty, in maintaining a despotism in France during the whole remainder of the Empire, unparalleled for rigour and severity in modern times. Not a whisper of resistance was anywhere heard to his orders throughout all his vast dominions. The Senate joyfully and servilely registered his decrees, voted his taxes, and authorized his conscriptions; the press was occupied only with narrating his journeys, transcribing his eulogies, or enforcing his orders; the Chamber of Deputies vied with their dignified brethren in the upper chamber in addressing the emperor only with the incense of Eastern adulation. The Legislature voted, and the nation furnished to their ruler, during the ten years which elapsed from his assuming the imperial throne to his abdication, the stupendous number of two millions three hundred thousand conscripts, of which above two millions two hundred thousand perished in his service.† The taxes, enormous-

ly heavy, were only prevented from being screwed up to the highest possible amount by the systematic plunder of all the tributary countries of Europe. Yet this government was not only obeyed without a murmur during all that time, but these terrible sacrifices, draining as they did its brave's blood from the nation, were passively yielded by all classes; and the despot, who was visibly leading them to perdition, was surrounded on all sides and at all times by the incense of flattery and the voice of adulation.*

So severely, however, did the conscription press upon the natural feelings of the human heart, both in parents and their offspring, that, although the salaried dependants of the emperor, in the Legislature and elsewhere, obsequiously voted all his demands for men, and the press lavished nothing but encomiums on his measures, yet it was not without extreme difficulty and excessive rigour that it could be carried into execution, especially in the rural districts of the Empire. The infirmities which might be pleaded in exemption were severely scrutinized, and inveterate asthma, habitual spitting of blood, or incipient consumption, alone sustained as a sufficient excuse. Exemptions at first were allowed to be purchased for three hundred francs; but this privilege was soon repealed, and in the latter years of the Empire a substitute could not be procured for less than eight hundred or a thousand pounds. No Frenchman, liable, or who once had been liable to the conscription, could hold any public office, receive any public salary, exercise any public right, receive any legacy, or inherit any property, unless he could produce a certificate that he had obeyed the law, and was either legally exempted, in actual service, discharged, or that his services had not been required. Those who failed to join the army, when drawn, within the prescribed time, were deprived of their civil rights, and denounced to all the gendarmerie in the Empire as deserters. Eleven dépôts were appointed for the punishment of the refractory, where they wore the uniform of convicts, received their fare, and were employed to labour on fortifications or public works without any pay. The terrors of this treatment, however, being at length found to be insufficient to bring the conscripts to their colours, it was decreed that a deserter or person who failed to attend should be fined fifteen hundred francs, and sentenced to three years' hard labour in the interior, with his head shaved, but his beard long; if he deserted from the army, his punishment was to be undergone in a frontier place, where he was sentenced to hard labour for ten years, on bread and water, with a bullet of eight pounds' weight chained to his leg, and with a shaved head and unshaved beard: a penalty, in comparison of which death itself would have appeared an act of mercy. Such were the punishments which awaited, without distinction, all the youth of France if they tried to evade a conscription which was cutting them off at the rate of two hundred and twenty thousand a year. The practical result of this excessive severity, joined to the known impossibility of earning a subsistence in a coun-

* De Staël, *Dix Ans. d'Exil*, 219, 229. *Id.*, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 400.

† Madame de Staël has left a graphic picture of the terrors with which the jealousy of Napoleon were attended even to the softer sex, and which prompted her to undertake a perilous journey from Geneva by the Tyrol, Vienna, and Galicia, into Russia, in the depth of winter, in order to fly the intolerable anxiety of her situation. The Austrian police, acting under his orders, continued the same odious system; and it was not till she reached the frontiers of Old Russia, and war was declared between that power and Napoleon in 1812, that she was able to draw breath. The Duchess of Abrantes has given a still more romantic and interesting account of the extraordinary adventure of Mrs. Spencer Smith, wife of the British resident at Stutgard, who incurred the real or feigned displeasure of Napoleon in 1804, at the time of the Duke of Enghien's murder, and the alleged counterplot in which he was participant to dethrone the emperor. * She was actively pursued by the bloodhounds of the French police, solely on account of her husband's acts, from the neighbourhood of Vienna, across the Julian and Tyrol Alps to the romantic shores of the König Sea, near Salzburg, where she for the first time got beyond their reach, by escaping into the Austrian territories, which were not at that period (1804) subjected to the disgrace of being forced to yield obedience to the mandates of the French police.—See *D'ARR.*, xiii., 124. A few years later she could have found no security till she had traversed the whole imperial territories, and reached the Ottoman dominions.—*Dix Ans. d'Exil*, 239, 250.

‡ The following is a summary of the men levied and destroyed in France during the ten years of the emperor's reign; the most extraordinary instance of the destruction of the human species by the operation of regular government that exists in the annals of the world:

Dates of the decrees of the Senate.		
Sept. 24th, 1805.....	80,000 men.	
Nov., 1806.....	80,000	
April 7th, 1807.....	50,000	
Jan. 21st and Sept. 10th, 1808.....	240,000	
April 18th and Oct. 5th, 1809.....	76,000	
Dec. 13th, 1810.....	160,000	
Dec. 20th, 1811.....	120,000	
March 13th, Sept. 1st, 1812.....	237,000	
Jan. 16th, April 3d, Aug. 24th, Oct. 9th, Nov. 11th, 1813.....	1,040,000	
In ten years.....	2,113,000, exclusive of voluntary enlistment.	
Army in existence in 1804.....	640,000	
	2,753,000	

* *Ante*, ii., 291, 292.

Departmental Guards, Voluntary Levies, and Levy en masse, in 1814.....	250,000
	3,003,000
Remained alive in arms, or prisoners, in 1814.....	802,600
Destroyed in 10 years.....	2,200,400
—See DUPIN, <i>Force Commerciale de France</i> , i., 3; and Montg., <i>dates ut supra</i> .	
	* Montg., vi., 276, 277.

try where landed property was already subdivided into eight millions of hands, and commercial enterprise annihilated, by any other means than the favour or employment of government, was, that the whole youth of the nation, of the requisite age and capable of undergoing its fatigues, were voluntarily or involuntarily enrolled in the profession of arms.*

The public instruction established in France under the Empire was eminently calculated to favour the same tendency. The schools were of two kinds, the ecclesiastical schools and the lyceums. The ecclesiastical schools were established by the bishops and clergy, chiefly for the education of the young persons destined for their own profession, and in them the elements of grammar were taught along with a system of religious education. As they were supported, however, by voluntary contributions alone, they were few in comparison with the numbers of the people, and totally inadequate for the purposes of national instruction. Such as they were, however, they excited the jealousy of the emperor, who was unwilling that any considerable establishment in the Empire, especially in relation to so important a matter as public education, should exist independent of the patronage and authority of government. It was decreed, therefore, that there should be no more than one ecclesiastical school allowed in each department; and that that one should be in a large town where a lyceum or government academy was established; all others were to be shut up in a fortnight, under heavy penalties, and their property of every description applied to the use of the great imperial establishment called the University.†

The imperial University was the chief instrument which the emperor had set on of the imperial Constitution for obtaining the entire direction of public education in all its branches. This body was totally different from a university in our sense of the term: it was rather a vast system of instructing police diffused over the country, in connexion with and dependent on the central government. At its head was placed a grand master, one of the chief dignitaries of the state, with a salary of 150,000 francs (£6000) a year. Under him were an ample staff, all of whom were nominated by himself, and extending over the whole Empire, viz., a treasurer and chancellor, ten counsellors for life, twenty in ordinary, and thirty inspectors-general, all endowed with ample salaries; under them were the rectors of academies, as they were called, who in no respect corresponded to the English functionaries of the same name, but were elevated officers, analogous to and ranking with the bishop of the diocese, as numerous in the Empire as there were courts of appeal, and each possessing an inferior jurisdiction and staff of officers similar to the grand master. Under each rector were placed the faculties or schools of theology, jurisprudence, medicine, physical sciences, the lyceums, colleges, institutions, and pensions, and even the schools of primary instruction. The teachers in all these various schools were either nominated directly by the grand master, or by the inspectors, counsellors,

or rectors who owed their appointments to him; so that, directly or indirectly, they were all brought under the control of the central government. Voluntary schools, or communal colleges, as they were called, established by the communities or rural divisions of the Empire, were not prohibited, and about four hundred of them were set on foot in the early years of the Empire; but it was required that every person who taught in them should take out a graduation at the University, and pay for his license to teach from 200 to 600 francs every ten years; and, besides, that the whole sums which they drew should be thrown in a common fund, to be apportioned out by the central government, not according to the number of the scholars which each could produce, or the expenditure which it might require, but the pleasure of the minister to whom the distribution was confided. Under such restrictions, it may easily be believed that the communal or voluntary schools rapidly died away, and nearly the whole education of the Empire was brought directly under the direction and appointment of government.*

The government schools, which thus, under the successive gradation of schools of primary instruction, colleges, and lyceums, pervaded the whole Empire, were the great instrument to which Napoleon trusted, both for the formation of the national temper into a docile and submissive character, and the direction of its whole moral energies to the purposes of military aggrandizement. All the boys who, in the primary schools, evinced talent, spirit, or aptitude for military exploit, were transferred to the colleges, and from thence to the lyceums. In the latter academies everything bore a military character; the pupils were distributed into companies, having each its sergeant and corporal; their studies, their meals, their rising and going to bed, were all performed by beat of drum; from the age of twelve they were taught military exercises; their amusements, their games were all of a military character. Nor were other encouragements of a more substantial description wanting. To each lyceum one hundred and fifty bursaries were annexed, paid by government, and bestowed on the most deserving and clever of the young pupils, in order to defray their expenses at the higher military academies, or polytechnic school at Paris; and from the many thousand salaried scholars thus chosen, two hundred and fifty were annually transferred to the special military academies, where they were exclusively maintained at the expense of the state, and when they arrived at the proper age, provided with commissions in the army, or offices in the civil departments of government. Nor was this all: two thousand four hundred youths of the greatest promise were annually chosen from the conquered or dependant territories, and educated at the military schools at the public expense, and in like manner apportioned out, according to their disposition and talents, into the military or civil services of the Empire. At all these schools religion was hardly mentioned; political studies were altogether prohibited; moral disquisitions little regarded; but geography, mathematics, mechanics, the physical sciences, fortification, gunnery, engineering, and whatever tended di-

* Code Nap., Art. Conscription. Southey's Pen. War, i., 23, 28.

† Thib., Hist. de Nap., vi., 539, 555. Southey's Pen. War, i., 47, 48.

* Thib., Hist. de Nap., vi., 540, 558. Southey's Pen. War, i., 44, 47.

rectly or indirectly to the art of war, sedulously taught and encouraged. The professors in the lyceums and colleges were bound to celibacy; the primary teachers might marry, but in that case they were compelled to lodge without the precincts: a regulation which, to persons of their limited income, seldom exceeding twenty pounds a year, amounted to a prohibition. All the teachers, of whatever grade, were liable to instant dismissal on the report of the rectors or inspectors that any of the rules were infringed. Their emoluments were all derived from government, and their promotion depended entirely on the same authority. The scholars were debarred from all correspondence except with their parents, and letters even from them could only be received in presence of the master. Thus, not only were the whole schools of the Empire directed to the purposes of war or abject submission, and directly placed under the control of government, but a spiritual militia established in them all, to enforce everywhere the mandates and doctrines which it promulgated. Napoleon did not discourage education, but rendered it solely and exclusively subservient to his purposes. He did not destroy the battery, but seized its guns, and skillfully turned them on the enemy. Combining into one government all the known modes of enslaving and degrading mankind, by the conscription, he forced, like Timour or Genghis Khan, all the physical energies of his subjects into the ranks of war, and the prosecution of military aggrandizement; by the police, the state prisons, and the censorship of the press, he enforced everywhere, like the Byzantine emperors, implicit obedience to his civil administration, and directed at pleasure the thoughts of his subjects; while, by means of a vast system of centralized education skillfully directed to the purposes of conquest or despotism, and maintained by an order of educational Jesuits abjectly devoted to his will, he aimed, like Loyola or Hildebrand, at throwing still more irremovable chains over the minds of the future generations of mankind.*

On one occasion, when the learned and intrepid M. Suard had concluded, in Napoleon's presence, a warm eulogium on the talent with which Tacitus had portrayed the lives and vices of the Roman emperors, he observed, "You say well; but he would have done still better if he had told us how it happened that the Roman people tolerated, and even loved, those bad emperors. It is that which it would have been of the most importance for posterity to know."† If this observation is just, as it undoubtedly is, with reference to the Roman emperors, how much more is it applicable to Napoleon himself; for nothing is more certain than that, in the midst of all this despotic rule, when the emperor was overturning all the principles of the Revolution, draining France of its heart's blood, and training the generation, educated amid the fumes of equality, to the degradation of slavery, he was not only tolerated, but almost worshipped by his subjects. This extraordinary change took place, not as in the Roman Empire, after the lapse of centuries, but in one generation. The age of Gracchus was, in France, instantly succeeded by that of Caligula; the Democratic fervour of the contemporaries of Marius, plunged at once

into the Eastern adulation of the successors of Constantine.

In this respect, there is a most remarkable difference between the English and French Revolutions. In both, indeed, a brief period of Democratic fervour was succeeded, as it ever must be in an old state, by a military despotism; but the temper with which this change of government was received in the two countries was totally at variance, and the frame of government which has been left in each is essentially different. "The English aristocracy," says Madame de Staël, "had more dignity in their misfortunes than the French; for they did not commit the two immense faults from which the French will never be able to exculpate themselves: the first, that of having united themselves to strangers against their native country; the second, that of having condescended to accept employments in the antechambers of a sovereign who, according to their principles, had no right to the throne."‡ But this remarkable difference was not confined to the aristocracy: all classes in England evinced an early and decided aversion to the violent measures of the army and its chiefs; the nobles and landed proprietors kept aloof from the court of the Protector, neither assisting at his councils nor accepting his repeated offers of lucrative situations; and such was the temper of the Commons, that Cromwell soon found they were totally unmanageable, and therefore disused them as jurymen, and they returned such refractory representatives to Parliament, that none of the houses which he summoned were allowed to sit more than a few days. England, therefore, was overwhelmed by a military usurpation; but the spirit of the nation was not subdued, and even in its gloomiest periods might be seen traces of a free spirit, and growing marks of that independent disposition which waited only for the death of the unfortunate usurper to re-establish the national liberties. In France, on the other hand, all classes seemed to vie with each other in fawning upon the triumphant conqueror who had subverted the Revolution: the nobles rushed in crowds into his antechambers, and laid the honours of the monarchy at his feet; the burghers vied with each other in obsequious submission to his will, or graceful flattery to his actions; the *tiers état* joyfully clothed themselves with his titles, or accepted his employment; the peasantry gave him their best blood, and cheerfully yielded up their children to his ambition. The Senate was the echo of his sentiments; the Council of State the organ of his wishes; the Legislative Body the register of his mandates; the Legislature was submissive; the electors pliant; the jurymen obedient; and, in the whole monarchy, so recently convulsed with the fervour of Democracy, was to be heard only the mandates of power, the incense of flattery, or the voice of adulation.

Much of this extraordinary difference between the immediate effects of the Revolutions in the two countries is, without doubt, to be ascribed to the greater devastation, more sweeping changes, and deeper guilt of the French convulsion. The bloody proscriptions, and unbounded confiscations of the popular party, were the causes which at once occasioned

Remarkable difference between the English and French Revolutions in this respect.

Its causes. Superior violence and injustice of the French convulsion.

* Thib., vi., 540, 547. Southey, i., 48, 55. *Genie de la Rev.*, i., 392.

† De Staël, *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 287.

* *Rév. Franç.*, ii., 336.

and justified the emigrations of the noblesse. Though political wisdom, equally as true patriotism, should have forbid their uniting their arms, under any circumstances, with the stranger against their native land, yet some allowances must be made for the lacerated feelings of men first driven into exile by a bloodthirsty faction, and then deprived of their estates and reduced to beggary, because they declined to return and place their necks under the guillotine. We can sympathize with the implacable vengeance of those who had seen their parents, brothers, sisters, or children massacred by an inhuman party, who, by rousing the cupidity of the working classes, had succeeded in establishing the most infernal despotism in their country which had ever disgraced mankind. The excessive misery, too, which Democratic ascendancy had produced upon all ranks, and especially the lowest, induced, as its natural result, that universal and ardent desire for the establishment of a powerful and energetic government which woful experience had proved to be the only practicable mode of terminating the general calamities. The reaction of order and tranquillity against Republican violence and misery was more powerful and widespread in France than England, because the suffering which had preceded it had been more acute and universal. The despotism of Napoleon was more oppressive and more willingly acquiesced in than that of Cromwell, from the same causes which had rendered the atrocities of the Revolutionists in France more excessive than those of the Republicans in England.

But, after making every allowance for the weight and importance of these circumstances, it is evident that something more is required to explain the extraordinary change in the national disposition which took place from the days of the Revolution to those of the Empire. That suffering should produce an alteration of opinion in regard to the merits of the changes which had occasioned it; that the now universally-felt evils of Democratic government should incline all classes to range themselves under the banners of a single chief, is, indeed, intelligible, and, in truth, nothing more than the operations of experience upon the great body of mankind. But that this experience should produce individual baseness—that the fumes of Republicanism should be succeeded, not by the caution of wisdom, but the adulation of selfishness—and that the riot of European liberty should plunge at once into the servility of Eastern despotism, is the extraordinary thing. It is in vain to attempt the explanation of this phenomenon in the influence of an extraordinary man, or the mingled sway of the ambitious passions, which an unprecedented career of success had brought to bear upon the nation. These circumstances will never at once alter the character of a people; they cannot convert public spirit into selfishness; they cannot do the work of centuries of progress, or change the age of Fabricius into that of Nero.

An attentive consideration of these particulars must, with every impartial mind, lead to the conclusion that it was not the spirit of genuine freedom which convulsed France and desolated Europe, but the bastard passion for individual elevation. Both these passions are, indeed, essential to a success-

ful struggle in the later stages of society in favour of liberty, because such a struggle requires the general concurrence of mankind; and such concurrence, except in cases of extraordinary fervour or rural simplicity, is not to be gained but by the combined influence of the selfish and the generous passions of our nature. But everything, in the final result, depends on the proportion in which these noble and base ingredients are mingled in the public mind. In either case, if Democracy becomes triumphant, suffering will be induced, and a reaction must ensue; but if the generous flame of liberty is the ruling passion, the period of despotic sway and military force will be one of indignant silence, convinced reason, or compulsory submission; if the selfish passion for distinction, or the ardent thirst for authority is the moving power, it will be distinguished by the baseness of servility, the lust of corruption, the rhetoric of adulation. The reason is obvious. In the excesses of power, whether regal, aristocratic, or republican, the disinterested friends of freedom, either in the conservative or liberal ranks, can discover nothing but a matter of unqualified hatred and aversion; but the aspirants after distinction, the candidates for power, the covetous of gold, find in those very excesses the precious objects of their desire, provided only that their benefits accrue to themselves. If, therefore, from the temper of the public mind, it has become evident that Democratic anarchy can no longer be maintained, and that the stern sway of authority has, for a season at least, become unavoidable, the selfish and corrupt hasten to throw themselves into its arms, and lavish that flattery on the single which they formerly bestowed on the many-headed despot, in the hope that they may thus secure to themselves the real objects of their ambition; while the virtuous and patriotic retire altogether from public life, and seek in the privacy of retirement that innocence which can no longer be found in the prominent stations of the world. Then is the period when the indignant lines of the poet are indeed applicable:

"When vice prevails, and impious men bear sway,
The post of honour is a private station."

That the spirit of freedom was at no period the ruling passion of the French Revolution, has been declared by all its observers, and clearly demonstrated by the events of its progress. Napoleon and Madame de Staël have concurred in stating that the desire for equality was the moving principle; and this desire is but another name, in an advanced age, for the selfish passion for individual aggrandizement. Men profess, and for the time perhaps feel, a desire that all should start equal, in order that their own chance of being foremost in the race should be improved; but if they can turn the advantage to their own side, they are in no hurry to share it with those whom they have outstripped. The most ardent of the French Revolutionists showed, by their subsequent conduct, that they had no sort of objection to the most invidious and exclusive distinctions being re-established, provided only that they were conceived in their own favour. The remarkable and luminous facts that not one of the successive factions which rose to power in the course of the convulsion, ever thought either of limiting the period within which an accused party may be detained in prison without being brought to trial or abolishing the odious and degrading fetters of the

The principles of freedom never were attended to in the French Revolution.

But this alone will not explain the difference.

It was not the love of freedom, but the desire of elevation which convulsed France.

police, or securing to the minority, in opposition to the ruling power, the means of influencing public opinion, by a practically free press, and the undisturbed right of assembling to discuss the measures of government in public meetings, afford insurmountable proofs that nothing was ever farther from their real intentions than the establishment of the principles of genuine freedom. All these parties, indeed, when struggling for power, were loud in their demand for these essential guarantees to liberty, without the full establishment of which its blessings must ever be an empty name; but none, when they attained it, ever thought of carrying their principles into practice, or putting that bit in their own mouths which they had been so desirous of placing in those of their antagonists. None of them evinced the slightest hesitation in taking advantage of, and straining to the utmost, those arbitrary powers which, by common consent, seemed to be left at the disposal of the executive government. The conclusion is unavoidable that, throughout the whole period, it was selfish ambition which was the real principle of action; and that, if the love of freedom existed at all, it glowed in so inconsiderable a number of breasts as to be altogether incapable of producing any durable impression on the national fortunes. Nor is this surprising, when it is recollected in what an advanced age of society, and among what a corrupted, and, above all, irreligious people the Revolution broke out. The degrees in which the spirit of public freedom and the desire of private aggrandizement will be mingled in every Democratic convulsion, must always be almost entirely dependant on the proportion in which the generous and disinterested, or the selfish and grasping passions, previously prevail in the public mind. And without disputing the influence of other causes, it may safely be affirmed that the main cause of the difference is to be found in the prevalence or the disregard of religious feeling; that it is in its ascendancy that the only effectual safeguard can be found against the temptations to evil, which arise during the progress of social conflicts; and that, of all desperate attempts, the most hopeless is to rear the fabric of civil liberty or public virtue on any other basis than that Faith which alone is able to overcome the inherent principles of corruption in the human heart.

Of all the manifold and lasting evils which the thorough ascendancy of Democratic power, even for a short time, produces, perhaps the most lamentable, and of which France, under the Empire, afforded the most memorable example, is the utter corruption of public opinion and confusion of ideas which it necessarily induces, terminating at last in the general application to public actions of no other test but that of success. The way in which this deplorable consequence ensues is very apparent, and it points in the clearest manner to the principle on which alone a good government can be formed. Where property is the ruling, and numbers the controlling power, the opinion of the multitude is necessarily, in the general case, in favour of a virtuous administration, and adverse to the corruptions or oppression of government, because the majority have nothing to gain by such abuses; and where private interest does not intervene, it will always, as in a theatre, be on the side of virtue. However much disposed the holders of authority in such a state may be unduly to extend its limits, or apply it to their own

private purposes, as well as the public service, they are prevented from pushing such abuses to any great excess by the watchful jealousy of the popular classes in the state. But when the people are themselves, or by means of their demagogues, in possession, not merely of the power of controlling and watching the government, but of actually directing its movements and sharing in its profits, this salutary and indispensable check is at once destroyed. From being the determined enemies, the Democratic party become at once the most decided supporters of every species of corruption, because they are now to profit by its effects; and although the opposite party, now excluded from office, may be loud in their condemnation of such proceedings, yet, being overthrown in the conflict, they are no longer able to direct the measures of government, and, but a minority in the state, they are not, at least till after the lapse of a very long period, able to bring over the majority to their sentiments, or form that general concurrence which can properly be called public opinion. In the interim, every species of abuse is not only practised, but loudly applauded by the Democratic body now interested in their continuance; and hence, not only the destruction of that invaluable check which, under other circumstances, the opinion of the majority in opposition forms to the misdeeds of the few in power, but the total corruption and deprivation of the feelings on public matters of that majority itself. The restraining has now become the moving power; the check upon evil the stimulant to corruption; the flywheel instead of the regulator of the machine, the headlong force which is to hurl it to destruction. Such is the extent of this evil, and such the rapidity with which, under the combined influence of temptation to themselves and impotence in their adversaries, the tyrant majority are seduced into depraved principles and a course of iniquity, that it may perhaps be pronounced the greatest, because the most lasting and irremediable, of the evils of Democratic government.

CENTRALIZATION in such a state of public feeling is the great enemy which freedom has to dread, because it is the

Rapid growth of centralization in this state of public feeling.

principles which possess the most durable sway over the human heart. More than military force or anarchical misrule, it has in every age been the grave of real liberty. If such a withering system is attempted in the healthful state of the body politic, that is, where property and education are the ruling, and numbers and popular zeal the controlling power, it will always experience, from the natural jealousy of government on the part of all who do not participate in its advantages, the most decided opposition, and, except in extraordinary circumstances, is not likely to meet with any considerable success. But the case is widely different when the Democratic rulers are themselves in power. Centralization then goes on at the gallop; and for a very obvious reason, that both the necessities of government, the interests of its Democratic supporters, and the experienced evils of the popular election of public functionaries, concur in recommending it. The executive being erected on the ruins of, or against the wishes of the holders of property, has nothing to expect from their support, and, therefore, is fain to extend its influence, and provide for its numerous and needy followers, by the multiplication of offices, all in the appointment of the Central Govern-

General corruption of public opinion which the French Revolution produced.

ment; the popular leaders, hoping to profit largely by this accumulation of official patronage in the hands of their chiefs, not only in no ways oppose, but give their most cordial support to the same system; while the great mass of the people, disgusted with the weak or corrupt administration of the municipal or local functionaries who owed their elevation to popular election, rapidly and inevitably glide into the opinion that no mode of appointment can be so bad as that under the evils of which they are now suffering, and that a practically good government can never be attained till the disposal of all offices of any importance is vested in the executive authority. Thus all classes, though for very different reasons, concur in supporting the system of centralization; a system, nevertheless, which, though doubtless often productive of improvement, in the outset, in practical administration and local government, is the most formidable enemy, in the end, which the cause of freedom has to combat, and against which, therefore, it behoves its real friends, in an especial manner, to be on their guard. The anarchy which is the first effect of Democratic ascendancy, necessarily and rapidly terminates in military despotism; that despotism itself, from its brutality and violence, cannot, in any well-informed state, be of very long endurance; but the irresistible sway of a centralized government, established by a Democratic executive, and sustained by the aid of selfish support from the popular party, may finally crush the spirit and extinguish all the blessings of freedom by removing all the practical evils which preceding convulsions had occasioned, enlisting alike the friends of order and the partisans of Democracy in its ranks, and engaging the most influential portion of the people by interested motives in its support. It was neither the vengeance of Marius nor the proscriptions of Sylla, neither the aristocracy of Pompey nor the genius of Cæsar, which finally prostrated the liberties of Rome: it was the centralized government of Augustus which framed the chains which could never be shaken off. There is the ultimate and deadly foe of freedom: there the enemy ever ready to break in and reap the last spoils of the discord and infatuation of others. And wherever such a centralized system has grown up in an old-established state, after a severe course of Democratic suffering, it is not going too far to assert, that the cause of freedom is utterly hopeless, and that the seeds of death are implanted in the community.*

* I am happy to find this opinion, which I have long entertained, supported by the great authority of M. de Tocqueville. "If absolute power," says he, "should re-establish itself, in whatever hands, in any of the Democratic states of Europe, I have no doubt it would assume a new form unknown to our fathers. When the great families and the spirit of clanship prevailed, the individual who had to contend with tyranny never felt himself alone: he was supported by his clients, his relations, his friends. But when his estates are divided, and races are confounded, where shall we find the spirit of family? What force will remain to the influence of habit among a people changing perpetually, where every act of tyranny will find a precedent in previous disorders, where every crime can be justified by an example; where nothing exists of sufficient antiquity to render its destruction an object of dread, and nothing can be figured so new that men are afraid to engage in it? What resistance would manners afford which have already received so many shocks? What could public opinion do, when twenty persons do not exist bound together by any common tie; when you can no more meet with a man, a family, a body corporate, nor a class of society, which could represent or act upon that opinion; when each citizen is equally poor, equally impotent, equally isolated, and can only oppose his individual weakness to the organized strength of the central government?"

Striking opinion of M. de Tocqueville on this subject.

It is in these predisposing circumstances that we must look for the real causes, not merely of the despotism of Napoleon, but of the ready reception which it met with from all classes, and the alacrity with which the fervent passions of Democracy were converted at once into the debasing servility of Asiatic despotism. The Republican writers fall into the most palpable error when they accuse that great man of having overturned the principles of the Revolution, and of being the real cause of its terminating in the establishment of arbitrary power. So far from it, he worked out these principles to their natural and unavoidable result; he did no more than reap the harvest from the crop which had been sown by other and very different hands. The real authors of the despotism of Napoleon were those who overturned the monarchy of Louis. It was Siyès and Mirabeau, and the exalted spirits of the Constituent Assembly, who set in motion the chain of causes and effects which necessarily, in their final result, induced the chains of the Empire. Doubtless, Napoleon availed himself with great skill of the extraordinary combination of circumstances which had thus in a manner presented despotism to his grasp. The leading principles of his government, as Madame de Staël has well observed, were to respect studiously the interests which the Revolution had created, to turn its passions into the career of military conquest or civil ambition, to open the career of success alike to all who deserved it, and to govern public opinion by a skillful use of the influence of the press.* No maxims more likely to govern an active, energetic, and corrupted people, could possibly have been devised; but still they would have failed in producing the desired effect, and the attempt to enslave France would have proved abortive, even in his able hands, if success had not been rendered certain by the madness and guilt which preceded him. And in executing the mission on which he firmly believed he was sent, to close the wounds and put a stop to the horrors of the Revolution, we are not to imagine that he was to blame, so far, at least, as his domestic government was concerned. On the contrary, he took the only measures which remained practicable to restrain its excesses, or put a period to its suffering; and subsequent experience has abundantly proved that every government which was founded on any other principles, or practically gave the people any share of that power for which they had so passionately contended, involved in itself the seeds of its speedy destruction.

And although nothing can be more certain than

To figure anything analogous to the despotism which would then be established among us, we would require to recur not to our own annals, we would be forced to recur to the frightful periods of Roman tyranny, when manners being corrupted, old recollections effaced, habits destroyed, opinions wavering, liberty deprived of its asylum under the laws, could no longer find a place of refuge; where, no guarantee existing for the citizens, and they having none for themselves, men in power made a sport of the people, and princes wore out the clemency of the heavens, rather than the patience of their subjects. They are blind indeed who look after Democratic equality for the monarchy of Henry IV. on Louis XIV. For my own part, when I reflect on the state to which many European nations have already arrived, and that to which others are fast tending, I am led to believe that soon there will be no place among them but for Democratic equality or the tyranny of the Cæsars."—Tocqueville, ii., 258, 259. What a picture of the effects of Democratic triumph from a liberal writer, himself an eyewitness to its effects!

* Rév. Franç., ii., 255.

But this, how great soever an evil, was unavoidable in the state in which France was on the termination of the Revolution.

that centralization is the ultimate extinguisher of freedom, and the insidious foe which, elevated on its triumphs, is finally destructive of its principles, yet it is not, in such a state of society as France was in the time of Napoleon, to be regarded as an evil which it was the duty of a real patriot to resist. As long, indeed, as the elements of freedom exist in a state—that is, as long as the higher and middling classes retain their public spirit and their possessions—it is impossible that public jealousy can be too strongly aroused on this subject, or that it can be too strongly impressed upon the people; that, if all the interests of the state are centred in the hands of the executive, be it monarchical or Democratic, the extinction, not only of the rights, but of the spirit of freedom, is at hand, and nothing remains to the state but an old age of decrepitude and decline. But, if the people would shun these evils, they must pause in the threshold of their career, and avoid the destruction of those classes inferior to the throne, though superior to themselves, whose influence forms an essential ingredient in the composition of public freedom. The English did so: the rights of the middling ranks, the Church, and the aristocracy, survived the triumphs of Cromwell, and, in consequence, two hundred years of liberty have been enjoyed by the British nation. The French did not do so: the Church, the middling ranks, and the aristocracy were utterly destroyed during the fervour of the Revolution; and in consequence, notwithstanding all their sufferings since that time, they have not enjoyed one hour of real freedom. Many struggles have ensued and may ensue for the possession of supreme power; many revolutions of the palace have shaken, and may hereafter shake, the fabric of their society; but no attempt has been made or will be made to limit the power of their executive, or extend the liberty of their people. The centralized, despotic government of Napoleon still remains untouched: the question with all parties is, not whether its powers shall be restrained, but who shall direct them. The more popular and Democratic the faction is which gains the ascendancy, the more formidable does the action of the state machine become, because the weaker is the counter-acting force which is to restrain its motions. If the extreme Democratic party were to succeed to power, the force of the centralized government, based on the support of the people, would, in a short time, become wellnigh insupportable. In the triumphs which they achieved, and the crimes

which they committed, the early Revolutionists poured the poison which ever proves fatal to freedom through the veins of their country; with their own hands they dug the grave of its liberties; nothing remained to their descendants but to lie down and receive their doom. When this last deplorable effect has taken place, it becomes the duty of the patriot no longer to resist the centralizing system, but to support it as the only species of administration under which, since freedom is unattainable, the minor advantage of a tranquil despotism can be attained.

It was a rule in one of the republics of antiquity, that no public monument should be voted to any person who had been engaged in the administration of affairs till ten years after his death, in order that the ultimate effect of his measures, whether for good or for evil, should be first fully developed. Judging by this principle, to how few characters in the French Revolution will the friends of freedom, in future times, rear a mau-soleum; to how many will the abettors of arbitrary power, if their real opinions could be divulged, be inclined to erect statues! Looking forward for the short period of only eighteen years, not a month in the lifetime of a nation, and seeing in the servility and sycophancy of the Empire the necessary effects of the vehemence and injustice of the Constituent Assembly, what opinion are we to form of the self-styled patriots and philosophers of the day who thus, in so short a time, blasted the prospects and withered the destiny of their country? Who were the real friends of freedom? Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke, who, by combating the ambition of Democracy and coercing its extravagance in this country, have bequeathed to their descendants the glorious and enduring fabric of British liberty; or Mirabeau and Danton, who, by achieving for its votaries a bloody triumph on the banks of the Seine, plunged their children and all succeeding ages into the inextricable fetters of a centralized despotism? It is fitting, doubtless, that youth should rejoice; but is fitting, also, that manhood should be prosperous and old age contented; and the seducers, whether of individuals or nations, are little to be commended, who, taking advantage of the passions of early years or the simplicity of inexperience, precipitate their victims into a course of iniquity, and lead them, through a few months of vicious indulgence or delirious excitement, to a life of suffering and an old age of contempt!

Ultimate effect on general freedom of resistance to Democracy in England, and its triumph in France.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS OF EUROPE FROM THE PEACE OF TILSIT TO THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR.

JULY, 1807—SPRING, 1808.

ARGUMENT.

General Suffering and Dismay produced in Russia by the Treaty of Tilsit.—Universal Feeling of Despondence which it occasioned in Great Britain.—Continental Changes by which it was followed.—Constitution for the Grand-duchy of Warsaw.—Constitution of the Kingdom of Westphalia.—Oppressive Military Government of the Confederation of the Rhine and Hanse Towns.—Excessive Rigour of the Treatment which Prussia experienced.—Fresh Requisitions imposed on its Inhabitants.—Limitation of its regular Forces, and Intersection of its Territory by Military Roads.—Wise internal Measures adopted by the Prussian Government.—Accession of Baron Stein to the Ministry.—His firm Character and admirable Measures.—Salutary Reforms which he introduced into the Kingdom.—Varied Causes of Distress in Prussia, which lead to the Exile of Stein.—History, Character, and great military Reforms of Scharnhorst.—Rise and Progress of the Tugendbund and Secret Societies in the North of Germany.—Illustrious and patriotic Characters which that Secret Society embraced.—Situation, Statistics, and Power of Austria at this Period.—She joins the Continental System, and thereby obtains the Evacuation of Brauman.—Resources, Statistics, and Strength of the Austrian Monarchy.—Affairs in Sweden: its Continental Forces are shut up in Stralsund.—Siege and Fall of that Fortress.—Capture of the Islands of Danholm and Rugen.—Reasons which led to the Copenhagen Expedition.—Resolution of the British Cabinet in regard to it.—Equipment and Departure of the Expedition.—Ineffectual Negotiation with Denmark.—Proclamation of Lord Cathcart to the Inhabitants of Zealand, and Reply of the Prince Regent of Denmark.—Siege of Copenhagen.—First Action of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Europe.—Surrender of the City and Fleet to the English Forces.—Great Sensation excited in Europe by the Expedition.—Justification of it soon afforded by Napoleon.—General Feeling of England on the Subject.—Argument in Parliament against the Expedition.—Argument in Support of it by the Ministers.—The secret Article of the Treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish Fleet is at length produced, which settles the Question.—Napoleon's real Opinion regarding it.—Ineffectual Mediation of Russia between England and France.—Rupture of that Power with Great Britain.—Concurring Statement of the English and French Ambassadors on its Causes.—The Russians declare War against Sweden.—Russian Manifesto against England.—Declaration by Great Britain in Reply.—Denmark enters cordially into the War against Sweden and England.—Affairs of Russia and Turkey.—Curious secret Despatch from Savary at St. Petersburg to Napoleon on this Subject.—The Turks, finding themselves betrayed by the French, prepare themselves to renew the War.—Changes in the Constitution of the Italian States.—Union of Parma and Placentia to France.—Great Works undertaken at Milan, and State of Italy at this Period.—Further Encroachments of Napoleon on the Side of Holland, Germany, and Italy.—Reflections on the imminent Hazard to Europe from the Treaty of Tilsit, and from the Division of its Kingdoms between two Potentates.—Importance of the Blow already struck by England at Napoleon's new Naval Confederacy.

If the treaty of Tilsit was productive of glory to the Emperor Napoleon, and transport and opulence to the citizens of his victorious capital, it was the commencement of a period of suffering, ignominy, and bondage to the other capitals of Continental Europe. Russia, it was true, had extricated herself unscathed from the strife; her military renown had suffered no diminution on the field of Eylau, or in the agony of Friedland; it was apparent to all the world that she had been outnumbered by banded Europe, not conquered by France in the strife. But still she had failed in the object of the war: her arms, instead of being

advanced to the Rhine, were thrown back to the Niemen; in indignant silence her warriors had re-entered their country, and surrendered to their irresistible rivals the mastery of Western Europe. If the Czar had been seduced by the artifice of Napoleon, or dazzled by the halo of glory which encircled his brows; if the army was proud of having so long arrested, with inferior forces, the conqueror before whom the Austrian and Prussian monarchies had sunk to the dust, the nobles were not carried away by the general illusion; they saw clearly, amid the flattery which was lavished on their rulers, the gilded chains which were imposed on their country. They could not disguise from themselves that France had not only acquired by this treaty an irresistible preponderance in Western and Central Europe, but subjected Russia herself to her command; that the price at which all the advantages of the treaty to the empire of the Czar had been purchased was its accession to the Continental system, and the closing of its ports to the ships of Great Britain; and that thus not only were they likely to be deprived of half their wonted revenue from their estates, by losing the principal market for their produce, but compelled to contribute to the aggrandizement of a rival empire, already too powerful for their independence, and which, it was foreseen, would, ere long, aim a mortal stroke at their national existence. So strong and universal were these feelings among the whole aristocratic and commercial circles, that when General Savary, whom Napoleon had chosen as his ambassador at the Russian capital, on account of the address he had exhibited, and the favour with which he had been received by Alexander at the time of the battle of Austerlitz,* arrived at St. Petersburg, he experienced, by his own avowal, the utmost difficulty in finding any furnished hotel where he would obtain admission; and during the first six weeks of his stay there, though he was overwhelmed with attention from the emperor, he did not receive one invitation from any of the nobility; and while he saw the guests whom he met at the palace depart in crowds to the balls and concerts of that scene of festivity, he himself returned, mortified and disconsolate, from the imperial table to his own apartments.†

* *Ante*, ii. 373.

† Savary, *ibid.* 98, 100. *Hard.* x. 26, 29.

‡ In Savary's case, the general aversion to the cause of France was increased by the part which he was known to have taken in the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, which had been one of the leading causes of the irritation which led to the war. Napoleon, charmed as he was by the contest, gave the most positive injunctions to his envoy at the Russian court at all hazards to avoid its renewal. "I have just concluded peace," said he to Savary; "they tell me I have done wrong, and that I shall repeat it; but, by my faith, we have had enough of war—we must give repose to the world. I am going to send you to St. Petersburg as chargé d'affaires till an ambassador is appointed; you will have the direction of my affairs there; lay it down as the ruling principle of your conduct that any farther contest is to be avoided; nothing would displease me so much as to be involved in that quarter in fresh embarrassments. Talley-

In the British dominions the disastrous intelligence produced a different, but, perhaps, still more mournful feeling. England was, by her maritime superiority, relieved from the apprehensions of immediate danger, and the general resolution to maintain the contest continued unabated; but a feeling of despondence pervaded the public mind, and the strife was persevered in rather from the stern principle of dogged resistance, or a sense of the impossibility of making a secure accommodation, than from any hope that the war could be brought to a successful issue. This general impression cannot be better portrayed than in the words of Sir James Mackintosh, the able champion, in its early days, of the French Revolution: "I do not, indeed, despair of the human race; but the days and nights of mighty revolutions have not yet been measured by human intellect. Though the whole course of human affairs may be towards a better state, experience does not justify us in supposing that many steps of the progress may not be immediately for the worse. The race of man may at last reach the promised land, but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness. The prospect of the nearest part of futurity, of all that we can discover, is very dismal. The mere establishment of absolute power in France is the least part of the evil: it might be necessary, for a time, to moderate the vibrations of the pendulum in that agitated state; but what are the external effects of these convulsions? Europe is now covered with a multitude of dependant despots, whose existence depends on their maintaining the paramount tyranny in France. *The mischief has become too intricate to be unravelled in our day*; an evil greater than despotism, or, rather, the worst and most hideous form of despotism approaches; a monarchy literally universal seems about to be established; then all the spirit, variety, and emulation of separate nations, which the worst forms of internal government have not utterly extinguished, will vanish. And in that state of things, if we may judge from past examples, the whole energy of human intellect and virtue will languish, and can scarce be revived otherwise than by an infusion of barbarism.* Such were the anticipations of the greatest intellects of the age, even among those who had originally been most favourable to the Democratic principle, and that, too, on the eve of the Peninsular campaigns, and at no great distance from the general resurrection of Europe after the Moscow retreat: a memorable example of the fallacy of any political conclusions founded upon the supposed durability of the causes at any one time in operation; and of the oblivion of that provision for the remedy of intolerable evils, by the reaction of mankind against their suffering, and of the general intermixture of the principles of good and evil in human affairs,

and will tell you what to do, and what has been arranged between the Emperor of Russia and me. I am about to give repose to the army in the country we have conquered, and to enforce payment of the contributions; that is the only difficulty which I anticipate; but regulate yourself by this principle, that *I will on no account be again drawn into the contest*. Never speak of war; in conversation, studiously avoid everything which may give offence; contravene no usage; ridicule no custom. Neglect nothing which may draw closer and perpetuate the bonds of alliance now contracted with that country."—SAVARY, iii., 96, 97, and 1 HARD., x., 29.

* Sir James Mackintosh to W. Ogilvie, February 24th, 1808, Mem., i., 383, 384.

which, as it is the most general lesson to be deduced from history, so is it fitted above all others to inspire moderation in prosperous, and constancy in adverse affairs.

The political changes consequent in Central Europe on the treaty of Tilsit were speedily developed. On his route for the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon met a deputation of eight of the principal nobles, in the French interest, of Prussian Poland at Dresden; and Talleyrand, in a few days, produced a constitution for the grand-duchy, calculated, as he thought, at once to satisfy the general wish for a restoration of their nationality, and accord with the despotic views of the emperors of the East and West. By this deed, which was produced with more than usual rapidity, even in those days of constitution manufacture, the ducal crown was declared to be hereditary in the Saxon family: the grand-duke was invested with the whole executive power, and he alone had the privilege of proposing laws to the Diet, with whom the prerogative remained of passing or rejecting them. This diet was composed of a Senate of eighteen, named by the grand-duke, embracing six bishops and twelve lay nobles, and a Chamber of Deputies of a hundred members; sixty being named by the nobility, and forty by the boroughs. The Chambers, like those at Paris, were doomed to silence: they could only decide on the arguments laid before them, on the part of the government, by the orators of the Council of State, and of the Chambers by commissions appointed by them. This mockery of a Parliament was to assemble only once in two years, and then to sit only fifteen days. The ardent plebeian noblesse of Poland, whose Democratic passions had so long brought desolation on their country, found little in these enactments to gratify their wishes; but a substantial improvement was made in the condition of the peasantry, by a clause declaring that the whole serfs were free. No time, however, was left for reflection: the deputies were constrained to accept it; and the new Constitution of Poland was not only framed, but sworn to at Dresden during the brief period of Napoleon's sojourn there on his route to Paris.*

The constitution given to the new kingdom of Westphalia was, in like manner, founded entirely upon the model of that of France. It contained a King, Council of State, Senate, silent aristocratic Legislature, and public orators, like all those cast at this period, from the Parisian mould. The throne was declared hereditary in the family of Jerome Bonaparte, the emperor's brother, and first sovereign; one half of the allodial territories of the former sovereigns, of which the new kingdom was composed, were placed at the disposal of Napoleon, as a fund from which to form estates for his military followers; provision was made for payment of the military contributions levied by France, before any part of the revenue was obtained by the new sovereign; the kingdom was declared to form part of the Confederation of the Rhine, and its military contingent, drawn from a population of about two millions of souls, fixed at 25,000 men; in default of heirs-male of his body, the succession to the throne was to devolve to Napoleon and his heirs by birth or adoption. Every corporate

* Hard., ix, 448, 449. Bign., vi., 387, 388. Lucches., ii., 14, 19.

right and privilege was abolished—trial by jury and in open court introduced in criminal cases; all exclusive privileges and exemptions from taxation annulled—the nobility preserved, but deprived of their former invidious rights. The Chamber of Deputies consisted of a hundred members, of whom seventy were chosen from the landed aristocracy, fifteen from the commercial, and fifteen from the literary classes. Salutary changes! if the equality which they were calculated to induce was the enjoyment of equal rights and general security, but utterly fatal to freedom, if they were only fitted to introduce an equality of servitude, and disable any individuals or associated bodies from taking the lead in the contest for the public liberties with the executive power.*

The states of the Rhenish Confederacy had flattered themselves that the general peace concluded on the shores of the Niemen would finally deliver them from the scourge of warlike armaments and military contributions, but they were soon cruelly undeceived. Shortly after the general pacification, and before they had recovered from the burden of maintaining, clothing, and lodging the numerous corps of the Grand Army which Sept., 1807. traversed their territories on the road to the Rhine, they were overwhelmed by the entry of a fresh body of forty thousand men, who issued from France and took the route of the Vistula, still at the sole expense of the allied states. They were speedily followed by a body of Spaniards, drawn from Italy, Oct., 1807. and which went to augment the corps of Romana, under the orders of Bernadotte, on the shores of the Baltic: a sad omen for succeeding times, when the conclusion of peace was immediately succeeded by fresh irruptions of armed men, and burdensome preparations, at the cost of the allied states, for future hostilities. It soon appeared that the stipulations in favour of the conquered territories in the formal treaties were to be a mere empty name: it had been provided at Tilsit that Dantzic was to be a free city, governed by its own magistrates; but Rapp, the new governor, was speedily introduced at the head of a numerous French garrison, who summarily expelled the Prussian inhabitants, and began the rigorous enforcement of the French military contributions and the Continental system. The same system of government was sternly acted upon in Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, and all the Hanse Towns; Bourrienne continued to enforce it with such severity at Hamburg, that the trade of the place was entirely ruined, and large sums remitted quarterly to the Tuileries, out of the last fruits of the commercial enterprise of the Hanse Towns.†

But most of all did the ruthless hand of conquest fall with unmitigated rigour on the inhabitants of Prussia. Hard as their lot appeared to be, as it was chalked out in the treaty of Tilsit, it was yet enviable, compared to that which, in the course of the pacification which followed, actually ensued from the oppressive exactions of the French government and the unbounded insolence of its soldiery. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty

which reft them of half their dominions, the king and queen repaired to Memel, where July 19. they were compelled to sign a fresh convention, which, under the pretext of providing for the liquidation of the contributions and speedy evacuation of their territories, in effect subjected them, without any appearance of termination, to those intolerable burdens. By this treaty it was provided that the evacuation of the fortresses, with the exception of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, should take place before the 1st of November; but that on the condition only that the whole contributions were previously paid up: a condition which it was well known could not be complied with, as they amounted to above four times the revenue of the whole kingdom before its dismemberment,* in addition to the burden of feeding, clothing, paying, and lodging above one hundred and fifty thousand men, for which no credit was given in estimating their amount by the French commissaries. By a second convention, concluded at Elbing three months afterward, the unhappy monarch, instead of the single military road through his territories from Oct. 13. Dresden to Warsaw, stipulated by the treaty of Tilsit, was compelled to allow five passages, two for troops and five for commercial purposes, to Saxony, Poland, and their respective allies: a stipulation which, in effect, cut them through the middle, and subjected the inhabitants on these roads to unnumbered exactions and demands both from the French and allied Nov. 5. troops. Rapp soon after, instead of a territory of two leagues in breadth around the walls of Dantzic, as provided in the treaty, seized upon one two German miles, or eight English miles broad, counting from the extreme point of its outworks; while by a third convention, Nov. 9. in the beginning of November, Prussia was not only forced to cede to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw New Silesia and the circle of Mischelau, no inconsiderable addition to the losses, already enormous, imposed by the treaty of Tilsit, but to ratify the ample grants out of the hereditary revenues of the Prussian crown made by the Emperor Napoleon in favour of Berthier, Mortier, and other of his military chiefs.†

Vexatious as these fresh demands were, and cruelly as their bitterness was aggravated by the arrogant manner in which compliance was demanded by the French authorities, they were Fresh requisitions imposed on Prussia, limitation of its regular forces, and imposition of fresh military roads. inconsiderable to the enormous burden of the military requisitions which, from this time to the opening of the Russian campaign, perpetually drained away all the resources of Prussia. Not content with the crushing exactions, to the amount of 600,000,000 of francs (£24,000,000), already imposed during the war, Daru, the French receiver-general for the north of Germany, brought forward after the peace fresh claims to the amount of 154,000,000 (£6,200,000); and although that able functionary, on the earnest representations of the king, consented to take 35,000,000 of francs off this enormous requisition, the French minister, Champagny, by the directions of Napoleon, raised it again to the original sum. It was at length fixed at 140,000,000 (£5,600,000), and Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin pledged for its final liquidation, on condition

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 783. State Papers. Bign., vi., 389, 390. Mart., Sup., iv., 493.

† Bourr., vii., 231, 240. Hard., ix., 442, 443. Lucches., ii., 14, 17.

* They amounted to 600,000,000 francs, or £24,000,000; and the revenue of Prussia, before the war, was about £4,500,000.—*Vide Ante*, ii., 288, 344.

† Hard., ix., 451, 454. Mart., Sup., iv., 452, 474.

that, till that took place, a French corps of ten thousand men should be put in possession of these fortresses, and maintained there entirely at the expense of Prussia. All this was exclusive of the cost of feeding, paying, and clothing the whole French troops, still on or passing through the Prussian territory, who were not short of a hundred thousand men. In addition to this, the king was obliged to bind himself not to keep on foot, during ten years, more than forty-two thousand men, and to permit his dominions to be traversed by five additional military roads between Warsaw, Dresden, Dantzic, and Magdebourg. Thus, while his territory was intersected in every direction by military chaussées for the benefit of his enemies, his chief fortresses still in their hands, and his subjects oppressed by the merciless exactions of a prodigious army, quartered, apparently without end, upon their industry, his own troops were reduced to so low an amount as to be barely equal to the collection of the revenue required by so vast a host of depredators. And, to complete the picture of his misfortunes, the king was immediately compelled to adopt the Continental system, and declare war against Great Britain: a measure which, by exposing his harbours to blockade, and totally destroying his foreign commerce, seemed to render utterly hopeless the discharge of the overwhelming pecuniary burdens with which his kingdom was loaded!*

To all human appearance the power of Prussia was now completely destroyed, and the monarchy of the Great Frederic seemed to be bound in fetters more strict and galling than had ever, in modern times, been imposed on an independent state. And, doubtless, if these misfortunes had fallen on a people and a government not endowed in the highest degree with the spirit of patriotism and constancy in misfortune, this effect would have taken place. But adversity is the true test of political as well as private virtue, and those external calamities which utterly crush the feeble or degenerate, serve only to animate the exertions and draw forth the energy of the uncorrupted portion of mankind. While the diplomatists of Europe were speculating on the entire extinction of Prussia as an independent power, and the only question appeared to be, to what fortunate neighbour the remnant of her territories would be allotted, a new and improved system of administration was adopted in all the branches of her government, and the foundation was laid, in present suffering and humiliation, of future elevation and glory. Instead of sinking in despair under the misfortunes by which they were oppressed, the king and his ministers were only roused by them to additional exertions to sustain the public fortunes. During the long period of peace which Prussia had experienced since the treaty of Bâle, in the midst of wars and disasters all around her, Frederic William had enjoyed ample opportunities for cultivating his natural taste for the fine arts; and already a gallery of paintings was, at the opening of the campaign, far advanced at Berlin, which promised ere long to rival the far-famed museums of Munich, Dresden, or Paris. But all these gems in his crown were torn away by the ruthless hand of conquest, and his much-loved monuments of genius now adorned the halls of the Louvre or

graced the palace of the French emperor. Driven by necessity to more important pursuits, the first care of the king, upon the termination of hostilities, was to free the public service from those whose temporizing and unworthy policy, or treacherous and pusillanimous conduct, had induced the general calamities. Haugwitz remained forgotten and neglected at his country residence; Hardenberg, whose great abilities were loudly called for in the present crisis, and who had been the leading minister since hostilities had been resolved on, was compelled by the jealousy of Napoleon, not only to leave the government, but retire from the country; and it was only after the withdrawal of the French armies that he obtained leave to re-enter Prussia and return to his rural seat of Templeberg. The Chancellor Goldbeck and all the inferior ministers, Massow, Reck, D'Auger, Thulmeyer, and their coadjutors, were dismissed, to the great satisfaction of the public; and the generals and inferior officers, who had so disgracefully yielded up the bulwarks of the monarchy after the catastrophe of Jena, were in a body removed from the army. Yet even here the humane and perhaps prudent disposition of the king prevailed over the justly roused feeling of general indignation at such unworthy betrayers of national trusts; and, instead of grounding their dismissal on their notorious dereliction of duty, it was in general rested on the destitute state of the public treasury and the necessity of rigorous economy in every branch of administration. The inquiry, however, under the direction of the princes royal, was carried through every department and grade in the army; and, to demonstrate its entire impartiality, the heroic Blücher himself was subjected to the same test with his less intrepid brethren in arms!*

Deprived, by the unworthy jealousy of Napoleon, of the assistance of Hardenberg's counsels, the King of Prussia had still the courage, in the almost desperate state of his fortunes, to have recourse to a statesman who, like him, had been distinguished in an especial manner by his hatred. It is to the great abilities, enlightened patriotism, and enduring constancy of the BARON STEIN, that Prussia is indebted for the measures which laid the foundation of the resurrection of the monarchy. This eminent man, born in 1756, had entered the public service in the administration of the State Mines, under the Great Frederic, in 1780; but his admirable talents for business soon raised him to the direction of the customs and excise in 1784, which he held till the breaking out of the war in 1806, when he withdrew to his estates, and remained in retirement till again called to the public service, in the beginning of October, 1807. During his active employment he acquired, by the accuracy and fidelity of his administration, the esteem both of his sovereign and his fellow-citizens; and, during his subsequent retirement, he had ample opportunities for meditating on the causes which had brought such calamities on his country. So clearly were his ideas formed, and so decided his conviction as to the only means which remained of reinstating the public affairs, that he commenced at once a vigorous, but yet cautious system of amelioration; and, only four days after his appointment as minister of the

Accession of Baron Stein to the ministry. His firm character and admirable measures.

Oct. 5.

Oct. 9.

* Hard., ix., 453, 455. Mart., Sup., iv., 452, 474, 483.
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* Hard., ix., 456, 459. Lucches., ii., 8, 17.

interior, a royal decree appeared, which introduced a salutary reform into the Constitution.*

By this ordinance, the peasants and burghers obtained the right, hitherto confined to the nobles, of acquiring and holding landed property, while they in their turn were permitted, without losing caste, to engage in the pursuits of commerce and industry. Landholders were allowed, under reservation of the rights of their creditors, to separate their estates into distinct parcels, and alienate them to different persons. Every species of

slavery, whether contracted by birth, marriage, or agreement, was prohibited subsequent to the 11th of November, 1810; and every servitude, *corvée*, or obligation of service or rent, other than those founded on the rights of property or express agreement, was forever abolished. By a second ordinance, published six weeks afterward, certain important franchises were conferred on municipalities.

By this wise decree, which is in many respects the magna charta of the Prussian burghs, it was provided that the burghers should enjoy councillors of their own election, for regulating all local and municipal concerns; that a third of the number should go out by rotation, and be renewed by an election every year; that the council thus chosen should assemble twice a year to deliberate on the public affairs; that two burgo-masters should be at the head of the magistracy, one of whom should be chosen by the king, from a list of three presented, and the other by the councillors; and that the police of the burgh should be administered by a syndic appointed for twelve years, and who should also have a seat in the municipal council. The administration of the *Haute Police*, or that connected with the state, was reserved to government. By a

third ordinance, an equally important alteration was made in favour of the numerous class of debtors, whom the public calamities had disabled from performing their engagements, by prohibiting all demand for the capital sum till the 24th of June, 1810, providing, at the same time, for the punctual payment of the interest, under pain of losing the benefit of the ordinance. Thus, at the very moment that France, during the intoxication consequent on the triumphs of Jena and Friedland, was losing the last remnant of the free institutions which had been called into existence during the fervour and crimes of the Revolution, Prussia, amid the humiliation of unprecedented disasters, and when groaning under the weight of foreign chains, was silently relaxing the fetters of the feudal system, and laying the foundation, in a cautious and guiltless reformation of experienced grievances, for the future erection of those really free institutions which can never be established on any other basis than those of justice, order, and religion.†

In the prosecution, however, of these glorious, because wise and judicious, plans of public improvement, Stein had great difficulties to encounter. Government was overwhelmed by a multitude of civil servants, to the number of seven thousand, who had been deprived of their situations in the ceded provinces, and whose just prayers for relief could not be attended to by a treasury drained of the last farthing by the charges of the war, and the inordinate requisitions of

the French armies. The rapid absorption of the precious metals by these rigorous taskmasters, the general practice of hoarding which their depredations occasioned, and the necessity, in consequence, of having recourse to a currency of a baser alloy, or paper money, to supply the deficiency, had totally deranged the monetary system, and occasioned a rapid enhancement of prices, under which the labouring classes suffered severely. The closing of the harbours against foreign commerce, in consequence of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, put the finishing stroke to the public distress, and raised such a ferment that the king was obliged to yield to the general clamour, and the representations of the French authorities, who dreaded the effects of such an intrepid system of government, and sent Stein into honourable exile in Russia. So rapidly was this insisted on by the ministers of Napoleon, that the last of these regenerating measures, dated the 24th of November, 1807, were signed by his successors, M. Dohna and Altenstein. But by this ebullition of jealousy the French emperor gained nothing; the merit of Stein was too generally known by the intelligent classes to be forgotten; from his retreat in Courland he really directed the Prussian councils; and by the appointment of SCHARNHORST to the elevated office of minister at war, the door was opened to a variety of important changes in that department, which were of the highest consequence, six years afterward, in the mortal struggle for European freedom.*

Gerard David de Scharnhorst, who was now intrusted with the military direction of Prussia, and whose great scientific abilities subsequently rendered him so distinguished in the fields of European glory, had quitted the Hanoverian service for that of Prussia in 1801. Taken prisoner at Lubeck, but subsequently exchanged, he had powerfully contributed, by his decisive conduct at the critical moment with Lestocq's corps, to the brilliant result of the battle of Eylau. In him a blameless life and amiable manners were combined with the purest patriotism and the soundest judgment; exalted attainments were undisfigured by pride; vigour of thought was adorned by simplicity of character. The perfection of the French military organization, as well as the energy of their army, appeared to him in painful contrast beside the numerous defects and dejected spirit of that over which he now presided; but, instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of his situation, he was only inspired by the magnitude of the evil with additional ardour in the work of amelioration, and induced, like Stein, to take advantage of the general consternation to effect several salutary reforms, which, in more tranquil times, might have been seriously obstructed by the prejudices of aristocratic birth or the suggestions of interested ambition. Boldly applying to the military department the admirable principles by which Stein had se-

History, character, and great military reforms of Scharnhorst.

Dec. 15, 1807, cured the affections of the burgher and Jan. 7, 1808.

* Hard., ix., 460, 461.

† Hard., ix., 460, 463. Lucches., ii., 17, 18.

* Hard., ix., 464, 466.

personal service in the army, made its weight fall with additional severity on those who were not relieved. Every department of the service underwent his searching eye: in all he introduced salutary reforms, rectified experienced abuses, and electrified the general spirit by opening to merit the career of promotion; while the general strength of the army was silently augmented to an extent which afterward became in the highest degree important, by the introduction of an equally simple and efficacious regulation. By the subsisting engagements with Napoleon, it was provided that Prussia should not keep on foot more than forty-two thousand men, a stipulation which at once cast her down to the rank of a fourth-rate power, and totally disabled her from assuming the attitude of resistance to the numerous and hourly-increasing demands of the French armies. To elude its operation, and at the same time avoid any direct or obvious infringement of the treaty, he took care never to have more than the agreed on number of men at once in arms; but no sooner were the young soldiers sufficiently drilled than they were sent home to their hearths, and other recruits called to the national standards, who in like manner, after a brief period of service, made way for others in succession. By this simple but admirable system, which is the true secret of the political strength and military renova of Prussia, so much beyond the physical resources of the monarchy, a military spirit was diffused through the whole population; service in the army came to be considered, instead of a degradation, as an agreeable recreation, after the severe labours of pacific life; the manner, carriage, and intelligence of those who returned from their standards were so superior to those of the rustics who had remained at home, that no Prussian damsel would look at a youth who had not served his country; the passion for arms became universal; and while forty thousand only were enrolled in the regular army, two hundred thousand brave men were trained to arms, and ready at a moment's warning to join the standards of their country.*

From these salutary changes, joined to the oppressive exactions of the French armies, and the enormous contributions levied by the government through the whole of the north of Germany, arose another effect, not less important in its ultimate consequences upon the future fate of Europe. Grievously oppressed by foreign depredation, deprived by national disaster of domestic protection, surrounded within and without by rapacious enemies or impotent friends; deprived of their commerce, their manufactures, the vent for their industry, with their farm produce liable to perpetual seizure by bands of rapacious men, armed with imperial authority, the inhabitants both of the towns and the country had no resource but in mutual and voluntary associations. The universality of the suffering produced a corresponding unanimity of opinion: the divisions which existed before the war disappeared under the calamities to which it had given birth; the jealousies of rank or class yielded to the pressure of common distress. Genius and learning, amid the general despondency, stood forth as the leaders, privately and cautiously, indeed, but still the leaders, of public thought. Societies were everywhere formed, in profound secrecy, for the future deliverance

of Germany; the professors at the Universities were at their head; the ardent youth who attended their seminaries joyfully enrolled themselves in their ranks; the nobles and statesmen at the helm of affairs lent them what, with such materials, was much required, the aid of their wisdom and the benefits of their experience. Stein was at their head: from his retreat in Russia he exercised a secret but unlimited sway over the minds of all the energetic and generous portion of the north of Germany. Arndt, who was soon after compelled to seek an asylum from French persecution under the same empire, lent the cause all the aid of his nervous eloquence; Professor Jahn supported it with powerful zeal; Hardenberg was active in its behalf; Scharnhorst, and almost all the councillors of the king, though compelled publicly to discountenance its proceedings, were, in reality, either in secret members of the TUGENDBUND,* or warmly disposed to second its efforts.†

There, too, were to be seen those exalted spirits who subsequently, through evil report and good report, in prosperity and adversity, stood foremost in the bands of European freedom: Schill, whose ardent patriotism, in advance of his countrymen, precipitated, in 1809, to his own ruin, that premature resistance which four years longer of ignominy and bondage were required to render universal; Wittgenstein, the future antagonist of Napoleon, whose clear judgment, notwithstanding the prudent reserve of his character, saw in these associations the only means of future salvation; Blücher, whose generous and inconsiderate ardour threw him early into their arms, as it afterward warned him in the headlong charge against the enemy; Gneisenau, whose scientific abilities, supplying what was wanting in his gallant associate, proved so fatal to the arms of France. The nobles, straitened in their fortunes by the French requisitions, and insulted in their persons by the French officers; the peasants, ground to the dust by merciless exactions, supported by military force; the merchants, ruined by the Continental system, and reduced to despair by the entire stoppage of foreign commerce; the burghers, become the bitterest enemies of Napoleon, from his entire overthrow of those liberal principles on which the early fortunes of the Revolution had been founded, all combined to join the secret societies, from which alone they could one day hope for the deliverance of their country. The machinery put in motion for the attainment of these objects was, indeed, highly dangerous, and capable of being applied to the worst purposes, but the necessities of their situation gave the lovers of the Fatherland no alternative. Alike in town and country, equally among the rich and the poor, the Tugendbund spread its ramifications: a central body of directors at Berlin guided their movements; provincial committees carried their orders into effect; and, as is usual in such cases, a dark, unseen authority, was obeyed with an implicit alacrity unknown to the orders of the successor of Charlemagne. Thus, while France, rioting in the triumph of Tilsit, and deeming her power established on an immovable basis, was fawning on her rulers with Eastern adulation, and bartering her freedom for the enjoyments of gold, Prussia, taking counsel from adversity, was preparing in silence, in the amelioration of her institutions and the energy of her inhabitants,

* Hard., ix., 467, 468.

* Society or Bond of Virtue. † Hard., ix., 467, 469.

that real regeneration which, independent of individuals, unstained by crime, was destined hereafter to raise her from the lowest state of depression to an unexampled height of prosperity and glory.*

Bent to the earth by the disasters of Austerlitz, but still possessing the physical and material resources of power, Austria, during the desperate strife from the Saale to the Niemen, was silently but uninterruptedly repairing her losses, and preparing to resume her place in the rank of independent nations. If she had lost the opportunity, during the preceding winter, of interposing with decisive effect on the banks of the Elbe, she had the magnitude of previous losses, the mortal hazard of an unsuccessful demonstration, to offer in her excuse. Sufficient reliance, it was thought, would not yet be placed on the constancy of Russia; suffering had not adequately tamed the hereditary jealousy of the Prussian government. But the observers of the imperial cabinet augured, not less from the measures which they were in the course of adopting, than the known perseverance and constancy of their policy, that they had by no means relinquished the contest, and that, if a favourable opportunity should occur, they would yet appear foremost in the struggle for European freedom. During the interval of hostilities, the Aulic Council had been indefatigable in their efforts to restore the equipment and revive the spirit of the army. The artillery, abstracted from the arsenal of Vienna, had been regained, in great part, by purchase from the French government; vast exertions had been made to supply the horses wanting in the cavalry regiments; the infantry had been, to a considerable extent, recruited by the prisoners who returned from France, or the new soldiers who had been unostentatiously invited to the imperial standards.†

In open violation of the treaty of Presburg, however, France had hitherto retained the fortress of Braunau, on their western frontier, on the absurd pretext that Russia, an independent power, over whom the imperial cabinet had no control, had not, agreeably to that treaty, evacuated the mouths of the Cattaro. Other measures, equally significant, told them that they were regarded by the great conqueror only in the highest rank of vassals. Andreossi, the French ambassador at Vienna, openly used the most menacing language, both before and after the treaty of Tilsit; new states were, without either notice or negotiation, added by a simple decree of the French emperor to the Confederation of the Rhine;‡ and, by Aug. 24, 1807, a summary decree, the cabinet of Vienna was ordered forthwith to adhere to the Continental system. By yielding on this vital point, however, and, at the same time, making a skilful use of the termination of the dispute with Russia about the mouths of the Cattaro, by the treaty of Tilsit, and the growing anxiety of the French emperor to increase his forces on the Pyrenean frontier, with a view to his ambitious projects in the Spanish Peninsula, Metternich, to the great joy of the inhabitants of Vienna, who regarded its prolonged occupation as a con-

tinued badge of subjection, at length succeeded in obtaining the removal of the French troops from the ramparts of Braunau, and the imperial dominions, still flourishing and powerful, notwithstanding all their losses, ceased to be polluted by the presence of a stranger.*†

In the general wreck of the hopes of Europe on the shores of the Niemen, the Affairs of Sweden, who possessed a spirit worthy of a more powerful monarchy and a greater part on the political theatre, was not discouraged. His semi-insular situation enabled him to bid defiance to the threats of the French emperor: the passage round the Gulf of Bothnia was scarcely practicable; and, with the assistance of England, he did not despair of being able to make head against his enemies, even if Russia should be added to their already formidable league. No sooner, therefore, did the English squadron, with the advanced guard of the land-forces, which had been destined for the support of Russia and Prussia, appear in the Baltic, than he denounced the armistice, six nineteen days after the battle of Friedland. Napoleon, noways displeased at this unexpected resumption of hostilities, immediately made preparations for bringing them to a rapid conclusion. Thirty thousand men were speedily assembled under Marshal Brune, who, as soon as hostilities recommenced on the 13th of July, began to press on all sides the fifteen thousand Swedes who occupied Pomerania. Unable to bear up against so great a preponderance of force, the Swedish generals, after some inconsiderable combats, took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund; and Brune completed the investment of the place in the middle of July.‡

* Hard., ix., 445, 447.

† The resources of Austria in 1807, notwithstanding the loss of Tyrol and other provinces by the peace of Presburg, were still very great; and they are an object of interest, considering the prominent share which that power soon after took in the war. They are thus stated by Baron Lichtenstein:

Population.....	24,900,000
Inhabited towns.....	796
Burghs.....	2,012
Villages.....	65,572
Composed of	
Germans.....	6,400,000
Slavonians.....	13,000,000
Hungarians.....	3,400,000
Poles, Jews, Bohemians.....	2,100,000
	24,900,000
Divided by religion as follows:	
Catholics.....	19,292,000
Greek Church.....	2,100,000
Zuinglians.....	2,000,000
Protestants.....	1,000,000
Jews.....	508,000
	24,900,000

Florins.	
Revenue.....	110,000,000, or £8,000,000
Public debt.....	900,000,000 72,000,000
Civil list and court annual charges.....	11,000,000 900,000
Army.....	40,000,000 3,200,000
Interest and charges of debt.....	271,800 3,900,000
Army.—Infantry.....	271,800
Cavalry.....	50,000
Artillery.....	14,300
Guards.....	3,000
	339,100 men.

Besides the Hungarian Insurrection, or levy en masse.

Florins.	
Annual produce of agriculture ..	760,000,000, or £61,000,000
minerals	47,000,000 3,600,000
Number of oxen.....	3,000,000
horses.....	1,500,000

—LICHTENSTEIN'S *Stat. de la Monarchie Autrichienne*, and HARD., ix. *Pièces Just.*, K.

† Dum., xix., 138, 145. Jom., ii., 456, 457

* Hard., ix., 467, 469; x., 74, 75.

† Hard., ix., 445, 446. Report of Archduke Charles, Aug. 10, 1807.

‡ The principalities of Anhalt, Reuss, Ladepé, Schwartzbourg, and Waldeck

The King of Sweden was soon made to perceive, from bitter experience, that, after the pacification of Tilsit, the possession of his transmarine dominions was held by the most precarious tenure. At first, the English troops, under Lord Cathcart, above ten thousand strong, and in the finest condition, formed part of the garrison; and the presence of this imposing force appeared to promise to Gustavus, who commanded in person, the means of making a defence which might rival that by which Charles XII. had immortalized its walls. At this period the Swedish monarch appeared to be passionately desirous of military renown, and so ambitious was he of the perils and glories of actual warfare, that he went so far as to send a flag of truce to the French marshal, offering a purse of gold to the gunner in the French lines who had levelled the piece of ordnance whose shot had struck the wall a few feet from the place where he was standing: a proceeding which the English general justly considered as savouring rather of a romantic or highly-excited temperament, than the sober judgment befitting the ruler of a nation.* But stern necessity soon put a period to these chivalrous illusions. The English troops were withdrawn in the end of July, to co-operate in the great armament intended for the reduction of Copenhagen July 30. and seizure of the Danish fleet, of which mention will immediately be made; and the Swedish garrison, without any external aid, was left to make head alone against the hourly-increasing forces of the French marshal, which already were more than double their own. The evident hopelessness of the attempt to preserve the place after the treaty of Tilsit was known, and it had become apparent that the French emperor could increase the besieging force at pleasure to quadruple its present amount, damped the military ardour of the Swedes, and induced them to prolong the defence rather from a sense of duty than any hope that it could ultimately prove successful. Trenches were opened on Aug. 15. the night of the fête of the emperor, by seven thousand workmen, and advanced, under the scientific direction of General Chasseloup, with extraordinary vigour. Contrary to all previous example, the approaches were made on three fronts at the same time, and pushed with such rapidity, that in four days they were within three hundred yards of the external palisades, the batteries already armed, and everything prepared for a bombardment. Seeing their city about to be ruined, for no political or national purpose but a mere point of military honour, the magistrates

threw themselves at the feet of the king, Aug. 20. and besought him to spare the inhabitants the horrors of an unavailing defence. He could not resist the appeal, and withdrew with almost the whole garrison into the adjacent island of Rugen, while Stralsund itself, with four hundred pieces of cannon and immense military magazines, fell into the hands of the enemy.†

Still the enemy kept their ground in the isles of Rugen and Danholm, which not only completely blockaded the harbour, but neutralized all the advantages otherwise consequent on the possession of this extensive fortress. Marshal

Brune showed great activity in the measures adopted to root the Swedes out of this their last stronghold on the German shore. Three days after the capitulation, two hundred boats and small craft were assembled, chiefly by means of land carriage, in the harbour of Stralsund, with which, on the night of the 25th, a descent was effected on the isle of Danholm, which fell into the hands of the French, Aug. 25. with twenty pieces of cannon and its little garrison of a hundred and eighty men. Still the isle of Rugen, with the bulk of the Swedish forces, remained in the possession of the king; but the troops, wearied of a fruitless contest which they deemed foreign to the real interests of the monarchy, and strongly impressed with the idea that the military excitement of their sovereign bordered on insanity, murmured so loudly on the farther continuance of the contest, that he was obliged to yield; and a convention was concluded on the 7th of September, by Sept. 7. which the island was to be given up to the French troops, and the king, with the whole garrison and fleet, were to withdraw to the Swedish shore. This convention relieved Napoleon from all anxiety in the north of Germany, and put the finishing stroke to the Continental war in that part of the world; but it was far from answering the expectations of the French emperor, who had calculated on the capture of the Swedish king, or at least the whole of his garrison;* and it was the occasion of Marshal Brune falling into a disgrace from which he never afterward was able to recover.

While the last flames of the Continental war were thus expiring around the walls of Stralsund, a blow of the highest importance on the future prospects of the maritime contest was struck by the vigour and decision of the British cabinet.

Notwithstanding all the precautions taken by the two emperors, in their negotiations at Tilsit, to bury their designs in profound secrecy, the English government were possessed of a golden key which laid open their most confidential communications. They were made aware of the determination of the imperial despots to seize the fleets of Denmark and Portugal, not only before it was reduced to a regular treaty, but almost as soon as it itself was formed; and the vast forces at the disposal of the French emperor left no room for doubt that they possessed ample means to carry their intentions into effect. Not a moment was to be lost; for in the final treaty, as already noticed,† the first of September was fixed as the period when the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon were to be summoned to place their fleets at the disposal of the combined powers, and enter into the general confederacy against Great Britain. Hardly was the ink of the treaty dry, when the French forces, under Bernadotte and Davoust, began to defile in such numbers towards Holstein, and assumed so menacing a position, that it was evident that Denmark would speedily lose her whole Continental possessions, if she resisted the demands of the combined emperors. Nor did there appear any reason to believe that the cabinet of Copenhagen would incur any such hazard to maintain their neutrality. On the contrary, there were the strongest grounds for concluding that they would readily embrace so favourable

Capture of the islands of Danholm and Rugen.

* I received this anecdote from my venerable and much-esteemed friend the Earl of Cathcart, whose recollection of all the events of that memorable period, in which he bore so prominent a part, is still as vivid and correct, though at a very advanced age, as when they occurred, thirty years ago. † Dum., xix., 145, 161. Jom., ii., 456, 457.

* Jom., ii., 456, 457. Dum., xix., 161, 165. † Ante, ii., 545.

an opportunity of contending, with the aid of such powerful allies, for those maritime changes which had long constituted the ruling objects of their ambition. In 1780, they had been the first to join the Northern Confederacy against England, and proclaim the principles of the armed neutrality; in 1801, they had exposed themselves for the same object, in the front rank, to the cannon of Nelson and all the terrors of the English navy. More lately, their conduct had savoured still more strongly of aversion to the English and partiality for the French alliance. The Berlin Decree of the 21st of November, which inflicted so unexampled and fatal a wound on neutral commerce, had drawn forth no complaints from the Danish government; but no sooner did the British order in council of the 7th of January issue, which provided only a mild, and, as it proved, ineffectual measure of retaliation, by putting a stop to the coasting-trade of neutrals from one French harbour to another, than the Danish minister made loud complaints, which drew forth the able and unanswerable reply from Lord Howick, which has already been quoted.* No remonstrances had been made by the Danish government against the threatening accumulation of forces on the frontier of Holstein; no advances to secure aid, in the peril which was evidently approaching, from the British or Swedish cabinets. On the contrary, although Napoleon had, previous to the battle of Friedland, made proposals to Gustavus, with a view to detach him from the Russian alliance, and actually offered, as an inducement, to wrest the kingdom of Norway from the Danish crown, and annex it to that of Sweden, yet even the generous refusal of this offer by that upright monarch, accompanied by its instant communication to the cabinet of Copenhagen,† had made no alteration in their line of policy, and they declined all offers of assistance against a power which had manifested so little scruple at the prospect of partitioning their dominions.

In these circumstances the cabinet of Great Britain had a most serious duty to perform. They were menaced with an attack from the combined navies of Europe, amounting to one hundred and eighty sail of the line; and of that immense force they were well aware that the Baltic fleet would form the right wing.‡ No time was to be lost: every

hour was precious: in a few days an overwhelming French force would, to all appearance, be assembled on the shores of the Great Belt; and, if ferried over to Zealand, might enable the Danish government securely to comply with the requisition of the combined emperors, and bid defiance to all the efforts of Great Britain. In these circumstances they took a resolution similar to that adopted by Frederic the Great in regard to Saxony, when he received authentic intelligence of the accession, or probable accession, of Saxony to the league of Russia and Austria against his existence; and resolved, by a vigorous stroke, not only to deprive the enemy of the prize he was so soon to seize, but convert its resources to their own defence.*

Accidental circumstances gave the British government, contrary to the usual case with an insular power, the means, both with respect to land and sea forces, of instantly acting on this vigorous resolution. The first division of the expedition which had been so long in preparation to aid the allies on the shores of the Baltic was already in the isle of Rugen, and the remainder were in such a state of forwardness as to be ready to embark at a few days' notice. A large naval force was also assembled, to act as occasion might require, and this was speedily added to with extraordinary expedition. Such was the activity displayed, that in the end of July twenty-seven ships of the line, having on board twenty thousand land-troops, set sail from the British harbours, besides other smaller vessels, amounting in all to ninety pendants, and stretched across the German Ocean for the shores of Denmark. They arrived off the Danish coast on the 3d of August, and immediately stationed such a force under Commodore Keats, in the Great Belt, as effectually cut off all communication between the island of Zealand and the adjacent isles, or shores of Jutland.† At the same time, the troops from Stralsund, under Lord Cathcart, arrived, who immediately took the command of the whole expedition; and the formidable armament, spreading their sails before a favourable wind, passed the Sound, and cast anchor in appalling strength before the harbour of Copenhagen.‡

It was no part, however, of the design of the British government to precipitate the country into hostilities; on the contrary, they were on many accounts most desirous to avoid, if possible, proceeding to that extremity, and rather to gain the object in view by diplomatic arrangements than actual force. With this view they had sent Mr. Jackson with the armament, who had resided as envoy of Great Britain for many years at the court of Berlin, and was supposed to enjoy, in a very high degree, the confidence of the Northern powers. As soon as he arrived off the Danish coast, Mr. Jackson landed at Kiel, and proceeded to announce the purport of his instructions to Count Bernstorff, and request an audience of the

* March 17, 1806. *Aate*, ii., 558, and *Parl. Deb.*, x., 402.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 249, 255. *Parl. Deb.*, x., 402, 407. *Jom.*, ii., 450, 451.

‡ General Jomini has given the following summary of the design of Napoleon and Alexander, after the treaty of Tilsit, to unite all the navies of Europe against England, and of the probable forces at their disposal. Speaking in the person of the French emperor, he says, "After Russia had joined my alliance, Prussia, as a matter of course, followed her example; Portugal, Sweden, and the pope alone required to be gained over, for we were well aware that Denmark would hasten to throw herself into our arms. If England refused the proffered mediation of Russia, the whole maritime forces of the Continent were to be employed against her, and they could muster 180 sail of the line. In a few years, this force could be raised to 250. With the aid of such a fleet, and my immense flotilla, it was by no means impossible to lead a European army to London. One hundred ships of the line employed against her colonies in the two hemispheres would have sufficed to draw off a large portion of the British navy; while eighty more, assembled in the Channel, would have sufficed to assure the passage of the flotilla and avenge the outrages of nations. Such was at bottom my plan, which only failed of success from the faults committed in the Spanish war."—*JOMINI, Vie de NAPOLEON*, ii., 449.

Vessels.—French ships of the line..... 60

Spanish do..... 40

Carried forward..... 100

Brought forward.....	100
Russian ships of the line.....	25
Swedish do.....	15
Danish do.....	15
Dutch do.....	15
Portuguese do.....	10
Total.....	180

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 255, 257. *Jom.*, ii., 450, 451.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 257. Lord Cathcart's Despatch, 14th Aug., 1807, *ibid.*, 661, 682.

prince royal. By the former he was received with the indignant vehemence natural to a patriotic minister, who saw, from what he conceived to be foreign injustice, a grievous misfortune impending over his country; by the latter, with the mild but courageous dignity which added lustre to a throne under the storms of adversity. The instructions of the English envoy, however, were peremptory; and, as the prince royal positively refused to accede to the terms proposed, which were that the fleet should be deposited with the British government in pledge, and under an obligation of restitution, till the conclusion of a general peace, he had no alternative but to declare that force would be employed. Upon this, the prince royal, with praiseworthy resolution, declared his determination to share the dangers of his capital, and immediately set out for Copenhagen. He was allowed by the British cruisers to pass the Great Belt with all the officers of his staff, and was soon after followed to the capital by the British envoy; but, having no powers to accede to an accommodation on the basis proposed, the negotiation broke off, and both sides prepared to decide the matter in dispute by the sword. At the same time Aug. 16. a proclamation was issued by the English commanders, declaring in precise terms the object of their hostility, disclaiming all idea of conquest or capture, but demanding the fleet in deposit till the conclusion of a general peace.*†

* Parl. Deb., x., 222, 223. Ann. Reg., 258, 261. Dum., xix., 167, 173.

† "Whereas the present treaties of peace, and the changes of government and of territory acceded to, and by so many powers, have so far increased the influence of France on the Continent of Europe, as to render it impossible for Denmark, even though it desires to be neutral, to preserve its neutrality, and absolutely necessary for those who continue to resist the French aggression, to take measures to prevent the arms of a neutral power from being turned against them: in this view his majesty cannot regard the present position of Denmark with indifference, and he has therefore sent negotiators with ample powers to his Danish majesty, to request, in the most amicable manner, such explanations as the circumstances require, and a concurrence in such measures as can alone give security against the farther mischief which the French meditate through the acquisition of the Danish navy. The king, therefore, has judged it expedient to demand the temporary deposit of the Danish ships of the line, in one of his majesty's ports. The deposit seems to be just, and so indispensably necessary, under the relative situation of the neutral and belligerent powers, that his majesty has farther deemed it a duty to himself and to his people to support his demand by a powerful fleet, and by an army amply supplied with every necessary for the most active and determined enterprise. We come, therefore, to your shores, inhabitants of Zealand, not as enemies, but in self-defence, to prevent those who have so long disturbed the peace of Europe from compelling the force of your navy to be employed against us. We ask deposit—we have not looked to capture: so far from it, the most solemn pledge has been offered to your government, and it is hereby renewed, in the name and by the express commands of the king our master, that, if our demand is acceded to, every ship belonging to the Danish navy shall, at the conclusion of a general peace, be restored to her, in the same condition and state of equipment as when received under the protection of the British flag. It is in the power of your government, by a word, to sheath our swords, most reluctantly drawn against you; you will be treated on the footing of the most friendly powers; property of all sorts will be respected and preserved; the most severe discipline enforced; every article required paid for at a fair price; but if these offers are rejected, and the machinations of France render you deaf to the voice of reason and the call of friendship, the innocent blood that will be shed, and the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital, must fall on your own heads, and those of your cruel advisers."—See *Parl. Deb.*, x., 222. The prince royal replied, "No example Prince Royal is to be found in history of so odious an aggression as that with which Denmark is menaced; more honour may now be expected from the pirates of Barbary than the English government. You offer us your alliance! Do we not know what is its worth? your allies,

The British troops commenced their disembarkation without resistance on the 16th, and in three days the whole force was landed, and the investment of the town completed. It then appeared that, however much the Danish government might have been inclined to accede to the summons of the combined emperors, and unite their navy to the general maritime confederacy, they at least had no expectation of being so soon involved in hostilities on their own shores, and were totally unprepared for the formidable forces now arrayed by sea and land against them. Such had been the vigilance of the cruisers in the Great Belt, that no troops whatever had been ferried over from the adjacent shores, and no preparations had, on their arrival, been made in Zealand itself. The ramparts were unarmed, the fleet unequipped; and though great fermentation, and the most honourable patriotic zeal prevailed in the capital, few regular troops were assembled within its walls, and little progress could in so short a time be made in the organization of a voluntary force. The sudden calm, however, which ensued, and prevented the ships from approaching the coast to land the heavy ordnance and siege equipage, retarded for several days the approaches, and afforded the Danes a breathing-time, of which they actively availed themselves, both to prepare for their defence and retard the operations of the besiegers. But this respite was of short duration, and, by inspiring the inhabitants with fallacious hopes, in the end only led to additional and lamentable calamities. The heavy artillery was at length landed, and brought up to the trenches: the assistance of the sailors enabled the works to be prosecuted with great rapidity, and on the 1st of September they were so far advanced as to have everything in readiness for the bombardment to commence. The place was then summoned, and the same terms generously offered which had before been rejected.* Meanwhile, ARTHUR WELLESLEY, who then began in high command that career in Europe which has rendered his name and country immortal, moved with ten thousand men against a body of twelve thousand militia, supported by a few regular troops which had assembled in the interior of the island at Kioje, and by a sudden attack, in which the 92d and 52d regiments distinguished themselves, dispersed them, with the loss of several hundred killed and twelve hundred prisoners.†

The offer of accommodation being rejected, the bombardment began, and was continued with uncommon vigour, and with only a short interruption, for three days and nights. The inhabitants sustained with heroic re-

vainly expecting your succours for an entire year, have taught us what is the worth of English friendship."—See *Dumas*, xix., 171.

* The summons set forth: "To convince the Danish government and the whole world of the reluctance with which his majesty has recourse to arms, we, the undersigned, at the moment when our troops are before your gates, and our batteries ready to open, renew to you the offer of the same advantageous terms which we formerly proposed: viz., if you will consent to deliver up the Danish fleet, and to our carrying it away, it shall be held in deposit merely, and restored in as good a state as received, with all its equipments, as soon as the provisions of a general peace shall have removed the necessity which occasioned this demand. But, if this offer is now rejected, it cannot be repeated."—CATHCART, GAMBIER, *Sept. 1, 1807.*

† Sir A. Wellesley's Despatch, *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 703. *Dum.*, xix., 171, 176.

olution the flaming tempest, and all classes were indefatigable in their endeavours to carry water to the quarters where the city had taken fire; but in spite of all their efforts the conflagration spread with frightful rapidity, and at length a great magazine of wood and the lofty steeple of the Church of Our Lady took fire, and the flames, curling to a prodigious height up its wooden pinnacles, illuminated the whole heavens, and threw a lurid light over all the fleet and army of the besiegers. With speechless anxiety the trembling citizens watched the path of the burning projectiles through the air, while the British soldiers and sailors from afar beheld with admiration the heavens tracked by innumerable stars, which seemed to realize more than the fabled splendours of Oriental fireworks. At length the obvious danger of the total destruction of the city by the progress of the flames overcame the firmness of General Peymann, to whom the prince royal had delegated his command, and on the forenoon of the 5th a flag of truce appeared at the British outposts to treat for a capitulation.* But the period of equal negotiation was past: the Danes had perilled all on the issue of the sword, and no other terms would be agreed to but the unconditional surrender of the whole fleet, with all the artillery and naval stores which the place contained. Hard as these terms appeared, necessity left the Danes no alternative, and a capitulation was signed on such conditions two days afterward, in virtue of which the British troops were immediately put in possession of the citadel, gates, and arsenal; and, by the united efforts of friends and foes, a stop was at length put to the progress of the conflagration, but not before it had consumed an eighth part of the city.†

By the terms of the capitulation, it had been stipulated that the English should evacuate the citadel of Copenhagen within six weeks, or a shorter time, if the fleet could be got ready before the expiry of that period. But such was the expedition with which the operations were conducted, and the activity displayed by both the naval and military departments, that long before the expiry of that period the fleet was equipped, the stores on board, and the evacuation completed. Early in October the British fleet and army returned to England, bringing with them their magnificent prize, consisting of eighteen ships of the line in excellent condition, fifteen frigates, six brigs, and twenty-five gunboats, besides two sail of the line and three frigates which had been destroyed as not worth the removal.‡

The Copenhagen expedition excited a prodigious sensation throughout Europe; and as it

was a mortal stroke levelled at a neutral power, without any previous declaration of war then ascertained, or ground for hostility, it was generally condemned as an uncalculated violation of the law of nations. "Blood and fire," said Napoleon, "have made the English masters of Copenhagen;" and these expressions were not only re-echoed over all the Continent by all that great portion of the public press which was directly subjected to his control, but met with a responsive voice in those nations who, chagrined with reason at the refusal of its government to lend assistance in men or money at the decisive moment on the banks of the Vistula, were not sorry of this opportunity of giving vent, apparently on very sufficient grounds, to their displeasure. The Russians were loud in their condemnation of the English administration: the emperor, with that profound dissimulation which formed so remarkable a feature in his character, affected to be deeply afflicted by the catastrophe, though none knew so well the reality of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit which had rendered it necessary; even their long-established national rivalry with the Danes could scarcely induce the Swedes to receive with satisfaction the intelligence of so serious an invasion of neutral rights. Thus, on all sides and in all countries, a general cry of indignation burst forth against this successful enterprise; and the old jealousy at the maritime power of England revived with such vehemence, as for a time to extinguish all sense of the more pressing dangers arising from the military power of France.*

But, whatever might be the general impression of Europe as to the Copenhagen expedition immediately after it occurred, Napoleon was not long of affording it a complete vindication. It has been already mentioned that it was stipulated in the treaty of Tilsit, that, in the event of England declining the proffered mediation of Russia, the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon should be summoned to join the Continental league, and unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia. On the 12th of August, a note was transmitted to the French minister at Lisbon, peremptorily requiring that the Portuguese fleet should co-operate with the French and Danish in the maritime war, and that the persons and property of all Englishmen in Portugal should be forthwith seized. And it soon after appeared that on the same day similar orders had been transmitted to the cabinet of Copenhagen. In a public assembly of all the ambassadors of Europe at the Tuileries, the Emperor Napoleon demanded of the Portuguese ambassador whether he had trans-
Count Romanzoff's note to Lord G. L. Gower.
Aug. 12.
Aug. 16.
 mitted to the court of Lisbon his orders to join their fleet to the general maritime confederacy against England, and confiscate all English property within their dominions. And, having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish ambassador, and asked him whether he had done the same. The note addressed to the Portuguese government was immediately communicated by its ministers to the British cabinet; that to the Danish was concealed, and its existence even denied. Thus, at the very time that the English expedition was, unknown to France, approaching the Danish shores, the diplomatic pa-

* "From the top of a tower," says a respectable eyewitness, "I beheld, in October, 1807, the extent of the devastation: whole streets were level with the ground; 1800 houses were destroyed; the principal church was in ruins; almost every house in the town bore some marks of violence; 1500 of the inhabitants had lost their lives, and a vast number were wounded. The Danes certainly defended themselves like men, and left to the English the poignant regret that the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte had converted this gallant people into our enemies."—BRENTON'S *Naval History*, ii., 177.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 263. Lord Cathcart's Despatch, *ibid.*, 706, 707. *Dum.*, xix., 175, 181. *Jom.*, ii., 454, 455.
 ‡ Lord Gambier's Despatch, *Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 698, 699. *Dum.*, xix., 179, 180.

§ Including the cannon placed on the prams and floating batteries which were brought away, the artillery taken amounted to 3500 pieces. The prize-money due to the troops engaged was estimated by Admiral Lord Gambier at £960,000.—See HARDENBERG, x., 42.

* *Hard.*, x., 42, 45. *Bign.*, vi., 422, 423. *Parl. Deb.*, x., 211.

pers and public words of Napoleon were affording decisive evidence of his preconceived designs against the Danish fleet, while the conduct of their government was equally characteristic of an inclination to slide, without opposition, into the required hostility against this country.*

But these diplomatic communications, little understood or attended to at the time by the bulk of the people, produced no general impression in England, and very painful division of opinion existed for a considerable time, both as to the lawfulness of the expedition and the justice of retaining the prizes which had been made. Whatever violence might have been meditated by the French emperor, it was very generally said it would have been better to have suffered him to perpetrate it, and then made open war on his vassals, than to forestall his iniquity in this manner by its imitation. This feeling was as creditable to the public mind and the severe principles of morality which religious faith and long-established habits of freedom had produced in Great Britain, as the conception of the measure itself was honourable to the government. It was a memorable thing to see the people of England repudiate a triumph won, as it was thought, by injustice; disregard security purchased by the blood of the innocent, and look with shame on the proudest trophy of maritime conquest ever yet brought to a European harbour,† as long as doubt existed as to the justice of the means by which it had been acquired. Contrasting this honourable feeling with the utter confusion of all moral principle which in France resulted from the Revolution, and the universal application to public measures of no other test than success, it is impossible to deny that the religious feelings and the tempered balance of power, which in England both saved the country from a disastrous convulsion, and, by restraining the excesses of freedom, preserved its existence, were equally favourable to the maintenance of that high standard of morality which, in nations as well as individuals, constitutes the only secure basis of durable prosperity.

The Copenhagen expedition, as might have been expected, led to vehement debates in both houses of Parliament, which, though now of comparatively little importance, as the publication of the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit has completely justified the expedition, are of historical value, as indicating the opinions entertained, and the arguments advanced at the time in the country, on a subject of such vital importance to the honour and security of the Empire.‡

* Lord Wellesley's Statement, Parl. Deb., x., 345, and Lord Hawkesbury's, *ibid.*, x., 371.

† There is no example in modern times of such an armament being at once made prize and brought home by any power. At Trafalgar, only four ships of the twenty taken were brought to the British harbours; at La Hogue, none of the prizes were saved, out of eighteen taken; and at Toulon, in 1793, no more than three sail of the line and three frigates were brought away out of the vast fleet there committed to the flames.—See SMOLLETT'S *History*, ii., 151, and *Ante*, i., 333.

‡ On the part of the opposition, it was strongly urged by Argument in Par- Mr. Granville Sharpe, Mr. Ponsonby, and lament against the Lord Erskine: "The ground stated in the Copenhagen ex- king's speech for the Copenhagen expedition, tion was, that the government were in possession of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in which it was stipulated that the Danish fleet should be employed against this country. If so, why is it not produced? It is said that Denmark has always been hostile to this country, and would gladly have yielded up her fleet for such a purpose on the first summons. If this is really the case, on what grounds is the charge supported? True, the ships at

The great circumstance which long suggested a painful doubt as to the justice of the Copenhagen expedition was the non-production of the alleged clauses in the secret treaty of Tilsit, of which ministers asserted they were in possession, which provided for

The secret article of the treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish fleet is at length produced.

Copenhagen were in a certain degree of preparation, but not more so than they have been for the last half century. Was it probable that Denmark would have risked her East and West India possessions, the island of Zealand itself, and Norway, from an apprehension that Holstein and Jutland would be overrun by French troops? If history be consulted, it will be found that no considerable armament has crossed the Great Belt on the ice for 150 years, in the face of an allied British and Swedish naval force. Such an attempt would never have been thought of, so that the Danes had no reason to tremble for their capital. When the Copenhagen expedition set sail, there were 350 Danish ships in British harbours, with cargoes worth two millions; and when the British consul applied to the Chamber of Commerce, at the Danish capital, he received for answer that there was not the slightest room for apprehension, as no such circumstances existed as were calculated to disturb the neutrality of Denmark. The plea, therefore, of impending danger, to justify so flagrant a breach of neutral rights, has not even for its basis the essential ground of correctness in point of fact.

"The vindication of this step, supposing that some danger had been shown to have existed, must rest upon its necessity; for the first principles of justice demonstrate, and the concurring testimony of all writers on the law of nations has established, that one belligerent could not be justified in taking its property from a neutral state, unless it is clearly established that its enemy meant and was able to take possession of it, and apply it to the purposes of its hostility. How, then, is it to be justified, when every appearance is against the opinion that the enemy had either the inclination or the power to convert the Danish navy into an instrument of our destruction? But this is not all: supposing it proved, beyond the possibility of doubt, that Bonaparte intended to have seized the Copenhagen fleet, and had a force at his command adequate to that purpose, as he afterward did with the fleet at Lisbon, are we to justify our robbery upon the plea that our enemy was meditating a similar spoliation, and that it was best to be beforehand with him? It is a principle of morality applicable alike to nations and individuals, that one wrong will not authorize another; and that, unless in extreme cases, even self-defence will not justify a deviation from the laws and usages of war; how much more, therefore, is an illegal act indefensible, committed not in retaliation for, but in anticipation of, a similar unjustifiable stretch on the enemy's part! Better, far better that Bonaparte should have carried his alleged designs into full effect, and united the Danish navy to his own, than that we should have stained our national character by an act, indefensible by those who were to profit, execrable in the estimation of those who were to suffer by it.

"A comparison of dates is alone sufficient to demonstrate the untenable grounds on which this expedition was sent out. The treaty of Tilsit was signed on the 8th of July; the orders for the sailing of the expedition were issued on the 19th of the same month, and for several days previously the newspapers had announced its destination. How was it possible that, in so short a time, preparations could have been made for so vast an armament? Admitting that a military armament, to co-operate with Russia or Sweden, and act as occasion might require, in the Baltic, had previously been resolved on, and was in a great state of forwardness, still the peculiar force employed in that expedition, the great quantity of battering cannon and besieging stores, as well as the vast amount of the naval force, proves that, long before the treaty of Tilsit was either signed or thought of, the resolution to spoliolate Denmark had been formed.

"We have got possession, indeed, of the Danish fleet; but is that the real or the principal object which we have to dread, in the great maritime confederacy which an inveterate enemy is forming against us? Do we esteem as nothing the now urgent and avowed resentment of the Danish sailors; the dubious neutrality of Russia, converted by our rapacity into real and formidable hostility; the indignation of all neutral and maritime powers at our unparalleled injustice; the loss of the character which formerly rendered us the last asylum of freedom and independence throughout the world? Better, far better would it have been to have had to combat the Danish fleet manned by disaffected seamen and fitted out by a reluctant government, than to have, as now, the fleets of France and Russia to fight, manned with the indignant and exasperated sailors of the North. With what countenance can we now reproach the French emperor with his attack on Egypt, his subjugation of Switzerland, his overthrow of Portugal? We have ourselves

the seizure of the fleet by France and Russia. Notwithstanding all the taunts with which they

furnished his justification: we have forever closed our lips from the most powerful argument which we could ever have used to effect the future liberation of mankind. Will no recollection of our violence in Denmark lie heavy on our spirits when called upon to resist the violence of the enemy retaliating upon us? Will not the hostile myriads on the opposite shore be animated with fresh ardour and confidence, now that they are no longer following the banners of a desolating conqueror, but revisiting upon us the aggression of our own fleets and armies? When we reflect on the little we have gained, and the much we have lost by this aggression, it clearly appears to have been not less impolitic and inexpedient than iniquitous and unjust."^{*}

Powerful as these arguments were, and warmly as they spoke to the best and noblest feelings of our nature, they were met by others not less cogent, and, perhaps, when the period for impartial decision arrived, still more convincing. It was answered by Lord Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Secretary Canning: "It is needless to ask for additional documents to justify that great and saving measure, the expedition to Copenhagen. It was evident that, after the battle of Trafalgar had annihilated his present hopes of maritime ascendancy, and the victory of Friedland had laid all the Continental states prostrate at his feet, all the efforts of Bonaparte would be turned against the power and resources of the British Empire. Was any proof requisite of his desire to annihilate our independence, nay, destroy our very existence as a nation; or was any necessary as to the mode in which, being actuated by such motives, he would proceed? How has he uniformly acted in his acquisitions at land? By compelling the powers whom he had conquered, or intimidated into an alliance, to co-operate with him in his future hostility against such as still remained to be subdued. Was it to be supposed that profound statesman and consummate general would not proceed in the same manner in the great object of his life, the destruction of the maritime strength and resources of this country? Actuated by such motives and principles, is it conceivable that, after his great land victory, and when he had for the first time the maritime resources of the whole Continent at his command, he would hesitate to accomplish the inviting object of adding the Danish navy, lying in a manner within his grasp, to his resources?"

"But the matter does not rest on probabilities and inferences. The French emperor announced his intention almost in direct terms, immediately after the battle of Friedland, of uniting all the navies of Europe in one great confederacy against this country, and all his subsequent conduct has been regulated by the same principle. His plan was not confined to Denmark: it extended also to Portugal; these two powers were placed in exactly the same situation, and in both of these countries all British property was to be seized, and their respective courts compelled to unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia. It was well known that, before the 1st of September, the Emperor Napoleon publicly demanded of the Portuguese ambassador, in presence of all the envoys of foreign courts, whether he had transmitted his order to the court of Portugal to join their fleets to the maritime confederacy against England, to shut their ports against the British flag, and confiscate the property of its subjects within the Portuguese territory; and, having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish minister and asked if he had transmitted the same order to his own court. The cabinet of Lisbon have transmitted official intelligence to the government of Great Britain, that a formal demand had been made on them for the surrender of their fleet and the closing of their ports against English commerce, and the confiscation of all English property within their territories; and upon their failure to comply with the last only as the most unjust of these demands, they received a notification in the *Moniteur*, that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign: a clear demonstration of what fate awaited the Danish court if they hesitated a moment to obey the same haughty summons.

"Difficulties, it has been said, existed in the way of the French troops effecting the passage of the Great Belt, and compelling the Danes to join in the maritime confederacy against this country. These difficulties have been much exaggerated, for it is well known that Copenhagen depends almost entirely for its supply of provisions on Jutland and Holstein, and the occupation of these provinces by the French troops would soon starve the government into submission. It was idle to suppose that the Danish troops, which did not at the utmost exceed 20,000 men, could cope with the united armies of France and Russia. Even supposing that, with the aid of British valour, they could for a time have made a successful stand, was it likely that they would not be paralyzed by the dread of engaging in a conflict with these two colossal empires, whose strife had so recently resounded through the world? And even if the Danish cab-

were assailed on this subject, they for long withheld its production from the public, and it came, in consequence, to be seriously doubted whether such an agreement article really existed, until at length, in 1817, when the reasons for withholding it had ceased by the death of the persons by whom the discovery had been made, the decisive article was publicly revealed in Parliament.* Thus had the British cabinet the merit of having at once early discovered, and instantly acted upon, the hidden designs of the enemy; paralyzed by the vigour of their measures the formidable naval force which was preparing against them in the North; and afterward, for a long course of years, generously borne the whole load of opprobrium with which they were assailed, rather than, by a premature publication of the secret information they had received, endangered the persons by whom it had been transmitted.†

inet, in a cause in which they were heartily engaged, possessed the firmness of the Roman Senate, is it not notorious that their wishes, in this instance, would have led them to join their forces, at the first summons, to those of France? It is in vain to refer to the dangers which their transmarine possessions would run from the hostility of Great Britain. They braved these dangers in 1780, in prosecution of the object of the armed neutrality; they braved them in 1801, when the cannons of Nelson were pointed at their arsenals, though on neither of these occasions were they supported by such a gigantic Continental confederacy as now summoned them to take their place at its side. Their inclinations and secret bias have been clearly evinced by their public acts: and he has studied the history of the last fifty years, indeed, to little purpose, who does not perceive that they would enter the alliance, not as reluctant neutrals, but ardent belligerents, contending for objects which they have long had at heart.

"The power of France, already sufficiently formidable by land, and daily receiving important additions by sea, would have been increased in the most alarming manner by the fleet and the arsenals of Denmark. Twenty ships of the line, ready for sea, backed by a great supply of naval and military stores, constitute a force, in addition to that already possessed by the enemy, on which England, with all her maritime strength, cannot look without alarm. But this is not all. These twenty line-of-battle ships would speedily be joined by those of Russia and Sweden, amounting to at least as many more; the Russian fleet in the Euxine had already proceeded to Lisbon, to join the Portuguese squadron, which together amounted to twenty ships of the line. Spain could furnish the like number, and thus Napoleon would soon have been enabled to direct against this country a centre of fifty ships of the line, drawn from Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, with two wings, each of forty, supplied by his northern and southern confederates. He is a bold man who can look unmoved on such a prospect. Had ministers not acted as they have done, they would have neglected their first and greatest duty, that of preserving the independence of their country, and with it the liberties of the world. Self-preservation is the law of nature, and that law loudly called for the adoption of this vigorous step, which has at least completely paralyzed the designs of their confederates in the north seas. Here was an instrument of war within the grasp of our inveterate enemy: we interposed and seized it, as he was stretching out his hand for the same purpose, and that act of energy and wisdom has the hard epithets of rapine and impiety ascribed to it! The bloodshed and devastation which occurred in the execution of this necessary act are, indeed, deeply to be deplored; but the Danes had themselves to blame for these calamities, by refusing to deliver up their fleet in deposit till the conclusion of the war, as originally and rightly proposed by the English government. The expedition had been originally destined for co-operation with the Russians and Prussians; but upon the pence of Tilsit, with a promptitude and energy worthy of the highest commendation, ministers at once gave it a different destination; and though this bold step may now be unanimously blamed on the Continent by writers who take their opinions on every subject from the beck of one or other of the imperial despots who rule its empires, it will one day be applauded by an impartial posterity as the salvation of the British Empire."[‡]

Upon a division, both houses supported ministers: the Commons by a majority of 253 to 108; the Peers by one of 105 to 48.†

† The writers on the law of nations are clear that, in such circumstances as the Danish fleet was here placed, its sei-

* *Parl. Deb.*, x., 254, 297, 355, 358, 1186, 1205.

* *Parl. Deb.*, x., 267, 287, 342, 350.

† *Ibid.*, x., 310, 383.

The negotiations contemplated by the treaty of Tilsit were not long of being set on foot. Early in August the cabinet of St. Petersburg tendered their good offices to that of London for the conclusion of a general peace. To which Mr. Canning answered, that Great Britain was perfectly

willing to treat, on equitable terms, for so desirable an object, and required, in return, a frank communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as the best pledge of the friendly and pacific intentions of his imperial majesty. Baron Budberg, on the part of Alexander, eluded this demand, and, instead, entered into a

statement of many grievances of Russia against this country, some of which, especially the want of co-operation when the contest was quivering in the balance on the Vistula, were too well-founded. Matters were in this dubious state when intelligence arrived of the landing of the British forces in Zealand, and the demand made for the delivery, in deposit, of the Danish fleet.

From the outset the cabinet of St. Petersburg manifested the utmost disquietude at this intelligence, and loudly protested against it as an un-called-for violation of the law of nations. In reply, the British ambassador explicitly stated that his cabinet had received information of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the destined co-operation of the Danish fleet in a descent on the British shores, and called upon the Russian minister to disprove the assertion, by an unreserved communication of these hidden stipulations, and of the grounds on which France was willing to treat, and which appeared to the cabinet of St. Petersburg so reasonable, that they gave them the additional weight of their interposition. The Russian cabinet, however, both when Baron Budberg had the direction of its foreign affairs, and after he was succeeded,

early in September, by Count Romanzow, constantly eluded this demand; and the intelligence of the capture of the Danish fleet gave them a plausible pretext for breaking off the negotiation, without complying with so inconvenient a requisition.* Upon that event being known

zure was perfectly justifiable. "I may," says Grotius, "without considering whether it is merited or not, take possession of that which belongs to another, if I have reason to fear any evil from his holding it; but I cannot make myself master or proprietor of it, the property having nothing to do with the end which I propose. I can only keep possession of the thing seized till my safety is sufficiently provided for."—GROTIUS, b. iii., c. i., § 2. This was precisely what the English government proposed to Denmark.

Napoleon felt the Copenhagen blow most keenly, the more so that it was achieved by a vigorous and decision in the English councils to which they had long been strangers, and which, in that instance, even surpassed his own promptitude. "The success of the attack on Copenhagen," says Fouché, "was the first derangement of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in virtue of which the navy of Denmark was to have been put at the disposal of France. Since the catastrophe of Paul, I had never seen Napoleon in such a transport of rage. That which struck him most in this vigorous coup-de-main was the promptitude and resolution of the English minister."—*Mémoires de Fouché*, ii., 137.

* It appears, however, from the following passage in Sir Walter Scott, evidently founded on official information, that the cabinet of St. Petersburg, though obliged to yield to circumstances, were secretly gratified at the vigorous and decisive stroke struck at the Danish fleet.

"An English officer of literary celebrity" (probably Sir R. Wilson) "was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British ministry the emperor's expressions of the secret satisfaction which his imperial majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating

in the Russian capital, the emperor demanded of the English ambassador whether the fleet would be restored at the conclusion of a general peace? To which Lord Leveson Gower replied, Oct. 29, that "the object for which the expedition had been undertaken, viz., the removing of the Danish fleet, during the continuance of hostilities, beyond the reach of France, having been accomplished, the English government was perfectly willing to renounce any advantage which could be derived from the continuance of the war with Denmark, and earnestly pressed the emperor to recommend neutrality on these conditions to the prince royal." These moderate views so far prevailed with the Russian cabinet, that a note was presented by them to Savary, to signify the wish of the emperor that the neutrality of Denmark should be re-established, and there was every prospect of the peace of the North being undisturbed by any farther hostility, when the arrival of a messenger from Paris, with decisive instructions from Napoleon, at once put an end to the negotiation. He brought a peremptory demand for the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the instant closing of the Russian harbours against the ships of Great Britain. The Emperor Alexander was startled with the imperative tone of the mandate, as, since his return to St. Petersburg, he had been endeavouring to withdraw from his promises in that particular; but it was too late: Savary appealed to his personal honour pledged at Tilsit, and the emperor, at whatever hazard to himself or his dominions, felt himself bound to comply.*†

and preventing the purposes of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the Czar, as with a prince who, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was, nevertheless, as much as ever attached to the cause of European independence."—SCOTT, vi., 24. Certainly of all the remarkable qualities of Alexander's mind, his profound power of dissimulation was the most extraordinary; and this was the opinion formed by Lord Cathcart and all who had an opportunity of seeing him even in the most unreserved and confidential manner.

* See the whole papers in *Parl. Deb.*, x., 195, 218. Sav., iii., 126, 128.

† The statements of the French and English ambassadors on this point are very material, as not only are they perfectly in unison with each other, but distinctly prove that the rupture with Russia had no connexion with the Copenhagen expedition, but was the result of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. Savary says, "In the first days of November I received a courier from the emperor, which brought instructions from the minister of foreign affairs to insist upon the execution of one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. On the day following I said to the emperor, at a special audience, 'Sire, I am charged with the desire of my master that you should unite your force to his to compel England to listen to his propositions.' 'Very well,' replied the emperor, 'I have given him my word that I would do so, and I will keep my promise'; see Romanzoff, and return to speak with me on the subject." On the day following I returned; and the emperor then said that it had been agreed that France and Russia should unite to summon England, but that the mediation of Russia was first to be proposed, which should still be done. I represented that this had already taken place, and that England had refused his mediation. He hesitated a moment, and then said, 'I understand you; and, since your master desires it, I am quite disposed to fulfil my engagements. I will to-day give orders to Romanzoff.' Two days afterward the hostile note against England was issued, and the British ambassador demanded his passports. Having gained this much, though well aware that the principal object of Napoleon was to strike at the English commerce, I deemed it expedient to shut my eyes to the time given to the British vessels to clear out from the Russian harbours."—SAVARY, iii., 126, 128. Lord L. Gower says, in his despatch to Mr. Canning, November 4, 1807, "Some members of the council, who were consulted on the matter, advised the emperor not to reject so fair an opportunity of re-establishing the tranquillity of the north of Europe; and their opinion was so far

Concurring statement of English and French ambassadors on its causes.

Next day a note was presented to the British ambassador, breaking off all relations between the two countries, requiring his immediate departure from St. Petersburg, and reannouncing the principles of the armed neutrality; and on the day following Lord L. Gower set out for the British shores.*

taken, that a note was written to General Savary with the view of engaging the French government to consent to the restoration of the neutrality of Denmark. The French general has remonstrated violently against this measure; and the Russian cabinet, alarmed at the violence of his language, is undecided what answer to return to the overtures received from England." And on the 8th of November he wrote to the same minister, "The enclosed note, the contents of which are so extremely important" (they contained a declaration of war), "has been produced by a peremptory demand, brought by the last messenger from Paris, of the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; and the French mission boasts that, after some difficulty, they have gained a complete victory, and have carried not only this act of hostility against England, but also every other point essential to the success of Bonaparte's views. I shall ask my passports to-morrow."—Lord L. GOWER to Mr. CANNING, *Petersburg, 4th and 8th Nov., 1807. Parl. Deb., x., 215, 216.*

* The Russian manifesto bore: "The great value which Russian man- the emperor attached to the friendship of his

British majesty enhanced the regret at perceiving that that monarch altogether separated himself from him. Twice has the emperor taken up arms in a cause which was directly that of England, and he solicited in vain from England such a co-operation as her own interest demanded. He did not demand that her troops should be united to his; he desired only they should effect a diversion. He was astonished that in her cause she did not act in union with him, but, coolly contemplating a bloody spectacle in a war which had been kindled at her will, she, instead of co-operating, sent troops to attack Buenos Ayres and Alexandria. And what sensibly touched the heart of the emperor, was to perceive that England, contrary to her good faith and the express terms of treaties, troubled at sea the commerce of his subjects at the very time that the blood of the Russians was shedding in the most glorious of warfare, which drew down and fixed against the armies of his imperial majesty all this military force of the French emperor, with whom the English then were and still are at war. Nevertheless, when the two emperors made peace, the Emperor of Russia, faithful to his old friendship, proffered his mediation to effect a general pacification; but the King of England rejected the mediation. The treaty between Russia and France was intended to procure a general peace; but at that very moment England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself; but it was to east upon the north of Europe new firebrands, which were to light anew the flames of war. Her fleets and her armies appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in wickedness, does not afford a single example. A tranquil and moderate power sees itself assaulted as if it had been forging plots and meditating the ruin of England, and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation. The emperor, wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the courts of the north, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic, did not dissemble his resentment against England; new proposals were made by England for the neutrality of Denmark, but to these the emperor would not accede. His imperial majesty, therefore, breaks off all communication with England, proclaims anew the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and annuls all conventions inconsistent with its spirit."—*Parl. Deb., x., 218, 221.*

To this manifesto it was replied, in a long and able declaration by Great Britain, drawn by Mr. Canning. "His majesty was apprized of the secret conditions which had been imposed upon Russia in the conference at Tilsit; but he indulged a hope that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negotiation, and its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and the interests of the Russian Empire, would have led him to extricate himself from these trammels, contracted in a moment of despondency and alarm. His majesty deemed it necessary to demand a specific explanation from Russia with respect to these arrangements with France, the concealment of which could not but confirm the impression already received as to their character and tendency. The demand was made in the most amicable manner, and with every degree of delicacy and forbearance; but the declaration of war by the Emperor of Russia proves but too distinctly that this forbearance was misplaced. It proves, unhappily, that the influence acquired over Russia by the inveterate enemy of England, is such as to excite a causeless animosity between the two nations,

This declaration of war against Great Britain was attended by a summons to Sweden to join in the league against the latter place, and it soon appeared, from the vigorous preparations for the prosecution of the war in that quarter, that the cession of Finland

Oct. 6, 1807.

The Russians declare war against Sweden. Feb. 10, 1808.

to Russia had been arranged at Tilsit, and that the Czar was resolved immediately to add that important province, lying so near his capital, to his extensive dominions. As fast as the troops arrived from the Niemen at St. Petersburg, they were passed through to the frontiers of Finland, and such a force was soon accumulated there as rendered hopeless the preservation of that bright jewel to the Swedish crown. A formal declaration of war was, however, delayed till the spring following, when the preparations of the cabinet of St. Petersburg were completed, and the season of the year enabled them to resume military operations. In the interval, the Swedish government had so carefully abstained from giving any cause of complaint to the Northern Autocrat, that, when he came to assign his reasons for a rupture to the world, he could find no ground whatever on which to justify his hostilities, but that the Swedish monarch had not acceded to his proposal to break with England and join his forces to those of Russia, and was desirous of preserving throughout the contest a strict neutrality: a pretext for a

whose long connexion and mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation. The King of England does full justice to the motives which induced the Emperor of Russia twice to take up arms in the common cause. But, surely, the Emperor of Russia, on the last occasion, had a more pressing call to join his arms to those of his ally, the King of Prussia, than Great Britain, then actually at war with that power. The reference to the war with the Porte is peculiarly unfortunate, when it was undertaken at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining the Russian interests against those of France. If, however, the peace of Tilsit was really a punishment for the inactivity of Great Britain, it was singularly unfortunate that it took place at a time when England was making the most strenuous exertions in the common cause, and had actually got that great armament prepared which she has since been obliged to employ to disconcert a combination directed against her own immediate interests and security. The complaint of vexations to Russian commerce is a mere imaginary grievance, never heard of before, and now put forth only to stigmatize the exaggerated declamations by which France strives to inflame the animosity of the other Continental powers. The vindication of the Copenhagen expedition is already before the world, and Russia has it in her power at once to disprove the basis on which it is erected, by producing the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. These secret articles were not communicated to his majesty—they are not yet communicated—not even that which prescribed a time for the acceptance, by Great Britain, of the proffered mediation of Russia. Even after this unworthy concealment, however, so unsuitable to the dignity of an independent sovereign, the mediation was not refused: it was conditionally accepted, and the conditions were a communication of the basis on which the proposed treaty was to be founded, and of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit: conditions to which the Emperor of Russia could not object, as the first was the same which the emperor had himself annexed to the mediation of Austria between himself and France, not four months before; and the second was clearly called for by the previous and long-established relations between Russia and Great Britain. Instead of granting either of these demands, Russia declares war."—*English Declaration, December 18, 1807; Parl. Deb., x., 118-122.* It will be observed how studiously, in these diplomatic papers, Russia eludes all allusion to the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. "The capture of the Danish fleet," says Hardenberg, "was not the cause, but the pretext, of Russia's rupture with England. The cabinet of St. Petersburg, if the truth was known, was not sorry of so fair an opportunity for getting quit of all restraints upon its meditated hostilities in the North, as it already was in the South of Europe; and, notwithstanding all the loud declamations against the Copenhagen expedition, beheld, with more satisfaction, the success of England in that quarter, than it would have done the junction of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of the French emperor."—*HARD., x., 49.*

Declaration by Great Britain, Dec. 18, 1807.

war which came with a singularly bad grace from a power which affected to feel such indignation at the English government for having, for a similar reason, and when well informed of the secret designs of France against the Danish fleet, commenced hostilities against the court of Copenhagen.

This declaration was immediately followed by Feb. 6, 1808. a proclamation to the Fins by the Russian commander, in which he declared that he entered their territory with no hostile intentions, and solely to preserve them from the horrors of war, and invited them to abstain from hostilities or revolt to Russia: a promise instantly belied by the formal occupation of the whole provinces by the Moscovite forces, and the establishment of Russian authorities in every part of them excepting those fortresses still held by Swedish garrisons. Meanwhile the King of Sweden, faithful to his engagements, relying on the support of Great Britain, and encouraged by the great blow struck at the Danish power by the English armament, bid defiance to the united hostility of France and Russia, and replied to the Russian manifesto in a dignified proclamation, a model for greater powers and more prosperous fortunes, in which he bitterly complained of the invasion of his dominions and the incitement held out to his subjects to revolt by the Russian forces, without any declaration of war, or ground of hostility; contrasted the present subservience of Russia to France, with the repeated declarations she had made, that its ambition was inconsistent with the liberties of Europe, and her solemn engagements to conclude no peace with that power which should be "inconsistent with the glory of the Russian name, the security of the Empire, the sanctity of alliances, and the general security of Europe;"* and justly observed that the present war, based on the avowed design of Russia to dictate all their foreign connexions to the Northern powers, was undertaken for no other object but to add Finland to the Russian dominions, and compel Sweden to sacrifice her fleet and commerce as a security for Cronstadt and Revel.†

It was not to be supposed that Denmark, after the grievous though unavoidable losses she had sustained, should not into the war. Denmark en- ters cordially into the war. resent to the utmost of her power the hostility of Great Britain. She threw herself, therefore, without reserve into the arms of France, and made every preparation for the most active hostility; though the loss of her fleet and dismantling of her arsenal deprived her of the means of carrying on any efficient warfare, and which, on the other hand, exposed her commerce and colonies to total destruction. The prince royal, carried away by an excusable resentment, overlooked all these considerations, and not only constantly refused to ratify the capitulation of Copenhagen, but concluded, soon after, a treaty offensive and defensive with the Emperor Napoleon, which, by a singular coincidence, was signed on Oct. 16. the very day on which Junot, at the head of a powerful army, commenced his march from Bayonne to enforce a similar obedience to the secret resolutions adopted at Tilsit from the court of Lisbon.‡

While a new war was thus kindling from the ashes of the old one in the north of Europe, Rus-

sia was steadily prosecuting those ambitious designs on her southern frontier, the unmolested advancement of which had constituted the principal lure held out by Napoleon to gain her alliance on the shores of the Niemen. In this attempt, however, she did not experience all the facilities which she expected. As the main object of Napoleon, in the negotiations at Tilsit, was to accelerate the rupture of Russia with Great Britain, and procure her accession to the Continental system,* so the ruling principle of Russia was to obtain facilities for the prosecution of her designs against the Ottoman Empire, and in the mean time to postpone the evacuation of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, till she was better prepared to carry her projects of conquest into effect. Napoleon, as already stated, had agreed at Tilsit that the evacuation should be indefinitely postponed;† but hardly had he returned to Paris, when, being engrossed with his ambitious projects in the Spanish Peninsula, and unable to appropriate to himself, in consequence, his anticipated share of the Ottoman spoils, he repented of the ready consent which he had given to the advances of Russia in that direction, and became desirous to throw every obstacle in the way of their farther prosecution. In terms of the stipulation to that effect in the formal treaty, the mediation of France had been offered to the Divan, which having been accepted, Aug. 24. and an armistice concluded, nothing remained to justify the prolonged occupation of the principalities. It appeared the more necessary to bring it to a termination, as the Turks, though they gladly availed themselves of the French mediation at first, did so in the belief that they were to obtain thereby the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; but no sooner did they discover that this was not really intended, and that the Moscovite standards were still to remain on the Danube, than they loudly expressed their resolution to continue, in preference, the conflict. They said, with justice, "In what worse situation could we be, if the French, instead of being victorious, had been beaten in Poland? is this the emperor's care of his allies, whom he has drawn into the conflict, to leave their richest provinces in the hands of their enemies?"‡ Savary, therefore, received orders to insist in the mildest possible manner, but still to insist, for the evacuation of the principalities, and to consent to the prolonged occupation of them by the Russian forces only on condition that Alexander sanctioned the continued possession of Silesia by the French troops. This was at once agreed to: the two autocrats readily consented to wink at their mutual infraction of the rights of other states; and as the Turks found that they had been betrayed by Napoleon, and some account of the secret article of the treaty of Tilsit which provided for their partition had reached them, they declined the farther intervention of the French, and prepared to renew the war.¶

Affairs of Russia and Turkey.

The Turks, finding themselves betrayed by the French, prepare to renew the war.

* Bign., vi., 429.

† Ante, ii., 544.

‡ Vous pouvez le trainer en longueur.

§ Ann. Reg., 1807, 742. State Papers. Sav., iii., 110, 111. Bign., vi., 429, 430. Hard., x., 51, 53. Corresp. Conf. de Nap., vii., 364, 385.

¶ The negotiation between Savary and Romanzow, and his conversations with Alexander himself on this important subject, which are given in the secret and confidential correspondence of Napoleon, are highly curious, as indica-

Curious secret despatch from Savary at St. Petersburg to Napoleon.

* See Russian manifesto, 30th Aug., 1806.

† Ann. Reg., 1808, 237, 303, and 307. Sav., iii., 112.

‡ Hard., x., 48, 49.

Meanwhile Napoleon had set out for Italy, where great political changes were in progress. Destined, like all the subordinate thrones which surrounded the great nation, to share in

Changes in the constitution of the Italian States.

ting the ulterior ambitious views of the great empires which they severally represented, and the seeds of that jealousy which, in the midst of unbounded protestations of present regard, was laying the foundation of future and mortal hostility. By despatches from Napoleon dated Fontainebleau, 14th October, 1807, Savary was required to inquire what was the cause which had retarded the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russian troops, and to observe that peace could not be re-established between Russia and the Porte till that evacuation had taken place; as it was the condition which must precede the armistice which was to be the foundation of the definitive treaty; that the delay to evacuate could not fail to annul the armistice, which had been concluded, and rekindle the flames of war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. In reply, the Emperor Alexander, after alleging various insignificant reasons for not commencing the evacuation, observed, "Circumstances now appear to require a deviation in this particular from the strict letter of the treaty of Tilsit. The latest advices from Vienna and Odessa concur in stating that the influence of France has declined at Constantinople; it is even said that Lord A. Paget, the English ambassador, has embarked on board Lord Collingwood's fleet in the Dardanelles. There is every probability that a treaty will be concluded between England and the Porte hostile to you, and, consequently, to me; and that, if I should evacuate these provinces, I should soon have to re-enter them in order to avert the war from my own frontiers. I must revert to what the Emperor Napoleon said to me, not once, but ten times, at Tilsit, in respect to these provinces; and I have more confidence in these assurances than in all the reasons of expedience or policy which may subsequently appear to thwart them. Why, then, renounce my present advantages, when past experience tells me so clearly what will ensue if I evacuate these provinces? Even supposing that you have the upper hand at Constantinople, you can never prevent bands of insurgents from crossing the Danube, and renewing the pillage of these provinces: the orders of the Porte are null a mile from Constantinople. In our conversations at Tilsit, your emperor often said that he was noways set on that evacuation: that it might be indefinitely postponed; that it was not possible any longer to tolerate the Turks in Europe; that he left me at liberty to drive them into Asia. It was only on a subsequent occasion that he went back on his word so far as to speak of leaving the Turks Constantinople and some of the adjacent provinces."

Savary replied, "Russia can always renew the war if you find it advisable. It is needless to refer to the engagements between the two monarchs: the Emperor Napoleon has too much confidence in the honour of the Emperor Alexander to doubt the validity of the reasons which have hitherto prevented him from executing these secret engagements; but still he is desirous of seeing them carried into effect, as a peace between Russia and the Porte is all that remains to conclude the execution of the stipulations of the public treaty of Tilsit. All that the Emperor Napoleon has said at Tilsit shall be religiously executed; nor is there anything in the secret treaty which is calculated to thwart the desires of Russia. Nay, the surest and most expeditious mode to arrive at it is to carry into execution the public treaty; for we must conclude an armistice with the Turks before a treaty is concluded; or do you propose at once to write their epitaph?"

"I yesterday had a long interview," replied Alexander, "with the Swedish ambassador, and strongly urged him to enter into all the views of France, and the risk he would run in not making common cause with her and Russia. Meanwhile, the march of the troops continues: in seven or eight days the last division will have arrived, and fifty thousand men will be ready to commence the war on the frontiers of Finland. When you demanded from me a declaration of war against England, I was well aware it was no trifling change of policy which was required; no slight change of system which could be altered as soon as adopted. Had I conceived it to be such, I would never have put my name to it; but I viewed it in a more extended light. What am I required to do? said I to myself. To prepare great events which will cause the memory of mournful ones to be forgotten, and put the two states in such political relations as can never be disturbed. Impressed with these ideas, and within twenty-four hours after your requisition, I did what you desired, though that war was not only noways conducive to our interests, but, on the contrary, exposed us to very serious losses. Now you insist that I should make war on Sweden; I am ready to do so; my armies are on her frontier; but what return are we to obtain for so many sacrifices? Wallachia and Moldavia are the recompense which the na-

the rapid mutations which its government underwent, the kingdom of Italy was soon called upon to accept a change in its constitution. Napoleon, in consequence, suppressed the Legislative Body, and substituted in its room a Senate, which was exclusively intrusted with the power of submitting observations to government on the public wants, and of superintending the budget and public expenditure. As this Senate was named and paid by government, this last shadow of representative institutions became a Nov. 20, 1807. perfect mockery. Nevertheless, Napoleon was received with unbounded adulation by all the towns of Italy: their deputies, who waited upon him at Milan, vied with each other in elegant flattery. He was the Redeemer of France, but the Creator of Italy; they had supplicated Heaven for his safety, for his victories; they offered him the tribute of their eternal love and fidelity. Napoleon received their adulation in the most gracious manner; but he was careful not to lose sight of the main object of his policy, the consolidation of his dominions, the dependance of them all on his imperial crown, and the fostering of a military spirit among his subjects. "You will always find," said he, "the source of your prosperity, the best guarantee alike of your institutions and of your independence, in the constant union of the Iron crown with the Imperial crown of France. But, to obtain this felicity, you must show yourselves worthy of it. It is time that the Italian youth should seek some more ennobling employment than idling away their lives at the feet of women, and that they should spurn every lover who cannot lay claim to their favour by the exhibition of honourable scars."*

From Milan the emperor travelled by Verona and Padua to Venice: he there admired the marble palaces, and varied scenery, and gorgeous architecture of the Queen of the Adriatic, which appeared to extraordinary advantage amid illuminations, fireworks, and rejoicings, and, returning to Milan, arranged, with an authoritative hand, all the affairs of the Peninsula. The discontent of Melzi, who still retained a lingering partiality for the Democratic institutions which he had vainly hoped to see established in his country, was stifled by the title of Duke of Lodi; Tuscany was taken from the King of Etruria, on whom Napoleon had settled it, and united to France by the title of the department of the Taro; while magnificent public works were set on foot at Milan to dazzle the ardent imagination of the Italians, and console them for the entire loss of their national independence and civil liberty. The cathedral was daily adorned with fresh works of sculpture; its exterior decorated and restored to its original purity, while thousands

Union of Parma and Piacenza to France. Great works at Milan. State of Italy Dec. 10, 1807.

tion expects, and you wish to bereave us of them. What reply can we make to our people, if, after their evacuation, they ask us what benefits are to compensate to them for the manifold losses consequent on the war with England?"—See the whole diplomatic papers and conversations in SAVARY'S *Secret Despatch to Napoleon, Petersburg, 18th November, 1807; Corresp. Conf. de Napoleon*, vii., 564, 585. That confidential despatch reveals more of the real nature of the secret engagements at Tilsit than any other documents in existence; and demonstrates that both the Swedish and English war were the result of those engagements, and noways connected with the Copenhagen expedition, which is never once mentioned as a ground of complaint against Great Britain, by either Savary, Alexander, or his minister, Romanzow.

* Bot., iv., 224, 230. Hard., x., 26. Montg., vi., 293.

of pinnacles and statues rose on all sides, glittering in spotless brilliancy in the blue vault of heaven; the forum of Bonaparte was rapidly advancing; the beautiful basso-relievos of the arch of the Simplon already attracted the admiring gaze of thousands; the roads of the Simplon and Mont Cenis were kept in the finest order, and daily attracted fresh crowds of strangers to the Italian plains. But in the midst of all this external splendour, the remains of which still throw a halo round the recollection of the French domination in Italy, the finances of all the states were involved in hopeless embarrassments, and suffering of the most grinding kind pervaded all classes of the people: the public expenditure of the kingdom of Italy had risen to 120,000,000 francs (£5,000,000); the annual tribute of a million sterling to France was severely felt; ten thousand men had recently been raised by conscription to fill up the chasm in the army; and the misery of Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Venitian States, from the enormous contributions levied by the French troops, and the total stoppage of foreign commerce, was such as to draw forth the most piteous lamentations from its native historians.*

The encroachments thus made on the Italian Peninsula, were not the only ones which he effected in consequence of the liberty to dispose of Western Europe acquired by Napoleon at the treaty of Tilsit. The territory of the Great Nation was rounded also on the side of Germany and Holland. On the 11th of November, the important town and territory of Flushing was ceded by the King of Holland to France, who obtained, in return, merely an elusory equivalent in East Friesland.

Jan. 21. On the 21st of January following, a decree of the Senate united to the French Empire, besides these places, the important towns of Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, on the right bank of the Rhine. Shortly after, the French troops, who had already taken possession of the whole of Tuscany, in virtue of the resignation

Feb. 2. forced upon the Queen of Etruria, invaded the Roman territories, and took possession of the ancient capital of the world. They immediately occupied the castle of St. Angelo and gates of the city, and entirely dispossessed the papal troops. Two months afterward, an imperial decree of Napoleon's severed the

April 2. provinces of Ancona, Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino, which had formed part of the ecclesiastical estates under the gift of Charlemagne for nearly a thousand years, and annexed them to the kingdom of Italy. The reason assigned for this spoliation was, "That the actual sovereign of Rome has constantly declined to declare war against the English, and to coalesce with the kings of Italy and Naples for the defence of the Italian Peninsula. The interests of these two kingdoms, as well as of the armies of Naples and Italy, require that their communication should not be interrupted by a hostile power." The importance of these acquisitions, great as they undoubtedly were, especially in Italy, was not so momentous as the principles on which they were founded, and the ulterior acquisitions to which they evidently pointed. France now, without disguise, assumed the right of annexing neutral and independent states to its already extensive dominion, by no other au-

thority than the decree of its own Legislature. The natural boundaries, so long held forth as the limits of the Great Nation, were overstepped: by extending its territory beyond the Rhine, it was plain that Holland and the north of Germany were soon to be incorporated with its dominions; by stretching across the Alps, it was evident that, ere long, Rome and the whole of Italy would form an integral part of the dominions of Napoleon.*

But all the other consequences of the peace at Tilsit were trifling, in comparison of those which took place in the Spanish Peninsula. As the war to which they led in that quarter, however, was by far the most important and eventful which arose out of the French Revolution, brought, for the first time, the English and French armies as principals into the contest, and was the chief cause of the overthrow of Napoleon, as well as the best index to the leading features of his policy, it requires for its elucidation a separate chapter.

In the consequences, however, which have already been described as flowing from the treaty at Tilsit, is to be discerned the clearest indication of the great peril which instantly threatens the cause of European independence, from the undue preponderance acquired by any of its potentates, and of the absolute necessity which exists for the maintenance of that balance of power in which superficial observers have so often seen only the prolific source of unnecessary warfare. The principle on which that policy is founded is that of *obsta principis*: resist the encroachments which may give any one state an undue preponderance, and regard such contests, at the extremity of the outworks, as the only effectual means of defending the ramparts of the place. Such a system requires a sacrifice of the present to the future: it involves an immediate expenditure to avert a remote, and possibly contingent, evil. It will therefore always be supported only by the wise, and be generally unpopular with the bulk of mankind. It is of great importance, therefore, to attend to the consequences which immediately resulted from the treaty at Tilsit, and the effects which necessarily ensued from the overthrow of this system. The inferior powers of Europe were then overawed or subdued. England had withdrawn almost entirely from the strife, and, secluded in her inaccessible isle, had remained, according to the favourite system of a numerous class of her politicians, a neutral spectator of the wars of the Continent. What was the consequence? Was it that her independence was better secured, her interests more thoroughly established, or her ultimate safety better provided for than under the more active and costly system of former times? On the contrary, while the rights and liberties of the Continental states were utterly destroyed during her secession, England herself was brought to the very edge of perdition. The European strife immediately ran into a contest between its two great powers: the whole moral as well as physical strength of the Continent was arrayed under the banners of France and Russia, and when these rival powers came to an accommodation, it was by the mutual agreement to divide between them the spoils of all subordinate or neutral states. To Russia, already enriched by a portion of Prussia, was

Reflections on the imminent hazard to Europe from the treaty of Tilsit.

* Bot., iv., 230, 234. Hard., x., 26

* Montg., vi., 288, 299, 315.

assigned Finland, the greater part of Turkey, and an irresistible preponderance in the Euxine and Baltic Seas; to France, already master of the half of Germany, was allotted Italy, Poland, and the Spanish Peninsula. These great powers at once laid aside all moderation and semblance even of justice in their proceedings; and, strong in each other's forbearance, instantly proceeded to appropriate, without scruple, the possessions of all other states, even unoffending neutrals or faithful allies, which lay on their own side of the line of demarcation. It was easy to see that the present concord which subsisted between them could not last. The world was not wide enough for two such great and ambitious powers, any more than it had been for Alexander and Darius, Rome and Carthage. Universal empire to one or other would, it was plain, be the result of a desperate strife between them, and in that case it would be hard to say whether the independence of Great Britain had most to fear from the Scythian or the Gallic hosts. Already this danger had become apparent: all the fleets of Europe were combined under the command of the French emperor, and in a few years he would have two hundred sail of the line to beat down in the Channel the naval forces of England, and carry slavery and ruin into the British dominions. Such were then the consequences of the subversion of the balance of power; such the dangers which induce the far-seeing sagacity of political wisdom to commence the conflict for national independence as soon as the rights of inferior powers are menaced.

Although, however, both the liberties of England and independence of Europe were at this time placed in such imminent peril, yet a great step had already been made towards diminishing the danger; and the Copenhagen expedition had completely paralyzed the right wing of the naval force by which Napoleon expected to effect our subjugation. The capture of twenty ships of

the line and fifteen frigates, with all Napoleon in their stores complete, equivalent, in Month. Napoleon's estimation, to the destruction of eighty thousand land-troops, was perhaps the greatest maritime blow ever yet struck by any nation, and weakened the naval resources of the French emperor to a degree greater in extent than any single calamity yet experienced during the war. The hostility of Russia, predetermined at Tilsit, was by this stroke kept almost within the bounds of neutrality. Sweden was encouraged to continue in the English alliance: the maritime force of the Baltic was in a manner withdrawn from the contest; a few sail of the line were all that were required to be maintained by England in that quarter. It is remarkable that this great achievement, fraught with such momentous consequences at that eventful crisis, was regarded by the nation, at the time, with divided and uneasy sentiments; and that the opposition never had so largely the support of the public as when they assailed the government for a measure calculated, in its ultimate results, to prove the salvation of the country. But it is not to be supposed that this dissatisfaction was owing to factious motives; on the contrary, it was brought about by the ascendancy in the public mind of the best and noblest principles of our nature. And it is a memorable circumstance, highly characteristic of the salutary influence of public opinion under a really free government, in bringing the actions of public men to the test of general morality, that while in France, where Revolutionary ascendancy had extinguished every feeling in regard to public matters, except the admiration for success, and in Russia, where a despotic sway had hitherto prevented the growth of any public opinion, universal satisfaction ensued at the ill-gotten gains of the respective emperors; the English people mourned at the greatest maritime conquest yet achieved by their arms, and disdained to purchase even national independence at the expense, as it was then ignorantly thought, of the national faith.

